APEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00788R000100120043-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: October 4, 1979
• Content Type: MF

STAT Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100120043-4
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100120043-4
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4 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (P&M)
I
se pecia ecurity Center
SUBJECT: APEX
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise the
Director of Security that basic philosophic and practical
obstacles exist both within the Agency and the Community
which must be examined prior to the acceptance of the proposed.
APEX system.
2. Those objections to APEX--which have been expressed
repeatedly since October 1978 by such varied authorities as
NFAC, DIRNSA, national and executive agent Program Managers,.
need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note that
they oppose APEX from security, cost, efficiency and manage-
ment viewpoints. Those objections have not been accommodated
by the APEX system as proposed and it remains basically
incompatible with the expressed needs and desires of the
Community.
3. From the writer's perspective of having participated
in several APEX working groups, and having seen objection
after objection either ignored or "papered over," with no real
resolution, there is a mounting uneasiness within the Community
that APEX represents, not an improved managerial scheme for
SCI, but rather a sinister (to put it bluntly) bureaucratic
attempt to build an empire at the expense of the security and
efficiency of current collection systems and their products.
4. Aside from the inevitable "whitening" of hitherto
"black" programs which APEX will cause, and the accompanying
erosion of security, there are more mundane but very real
side effects which will curtail the Director of Security's
.All Portions of This
Document Are Confidential
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authority in the compartmented intelligence field to that
of an interested bystander. The proposed APEX management
organization will subsume the following functions now
performed by various Office of Security components:
a. Overall management of the APEX security
control system and the development of APEX security
policy. (This is now conducted by SECOM and SSC.)
b. Oversight of APEX matters in all organizations
outside the Intelligence Community and with foreign
participants in the APEX system, with the exception of
those foreign. liaison matters specifically delegated
by the DCI to other NFIB principals. (Currently the
job of SSC and NFAC/RES)
c. Responsibility for the development of APEX
policy and procedural manuals and coordination of
implementing guidance manuals or procedures developed
by other organizations participating in the APEX
system. (Both operational and product manuals have
been either produced by or coordinated with SSC.)
d. Development of the APEX Central Access
Approval Registry and review and staffing of requests
for changes and allocations of APEX ceilings and
access approvals, including administrative access
approvals. (Assumes and broadens the CIB role while
impacting directly upon the "must know" prerogative
of Program Managers.)
e. Policy direction and guidance for the APEX
network of APEX Co rol Officers, APEX Security
Officers, and Control Officers, including
(1) security in indoctrination procedures for briefings
and debriefings of personnel cleared for access to
APEX, (2) the personnel, physical, and technical
security programs for the protection of APEX materials,
and (3) Community standards for document control,
including markings, control systems, transmittal
procedures, and inventory and accountability procedures.
(Arrogates an enormous amount of power and authority
currently held by various Office of Security components.)
5. The above is meant to point toward just the internal
Office of Security impact of APEX. The Community impact, and
the potentially catastrophic impact upon contractors, would
require a more detailed study.
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6. It should be noted, in passing, that the loss of
the CIB function would leave CIA as the only NFIB Agency with
no independent responsibility, authority and resources for the
management, administration and control of the accesses it
sponsors. The Director of Security, CIA would be the only
senior NFIB security person with no direct control over his
Agency's recordkeeping operations. Because of sensitive cover
arrangements and the danger of exposing valuable assets, the
CIA's Director of Security needs direct authority and control.
7.. What the writer believes is really needed is not
a completely new system of compartmentation, but rather a
set of specific-guidelines which would permit the maximum
amount of intelligence product to be decompartmented from the
currently existing intelligence product systems. It is
believed that such an approach would be more secure and more
cost effective.
8. The Director of Security should be aware that to accept
APEX without full knowledge of its implications, both to his
Office and the Community, would be a disservice to both.
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Att: Draft APEX Organization Outline
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Organization for the APEX Special Access Control System
1. Upon implementation of the APEX system, there will be a
need to consolidate a number of Community functions associated
with this single special access system which currently are being
carried out by at least five organizations in the Community. They
are: CIA, NSA, the DCI Security Committee, COMIREX, and the SIGINT
Committee.
Mission and Functions
2. The'central Community organization for the APEX system
would have as it -i>ve-ra1-l--rjssian serving as`fhe 'DCI' staff ~" Iw%:
-- the development of common security and access
standards for managing and handling compart-
mented foreign intelligence systems, informa-
tion, and products.
-- the establishment of special access programs
to control access, distribution, and protection
of particularly sensitive classified information.
3.... In performing these activities, the APEX organization should
be required to coordinate with the Chairman, DCI Security Co,-m,ittee,
all activities which establish new, or amend existing, Community
physical and personnel security policies.
4. The APEX organization would be responsible for the following
specific functions: _
a. Overall management of the APEX security control
system and the development of APEX security policy.
b. Staff for the DCI the reviews and approvals re-
quired for programs contained within the APEX system,
including projects approved for the ROYAL dissemination
system.
c. Oversight of APEX matters in all organizations
outside the Intelligence Community and with foreign par-
ticipants in the APEX system, with the exception of those
foreign liaison matters specifically delegated by the DCI
to other NTFIB principals.
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d. Responsibility for the development of APEX
policy and procedural manuals and coordination of
implementing guidance nanuals or procedures developed
by other organizations participating in the APEX
system.
e. Establish and staff the Commtmity mechanism for
exercising the right of challenge to classification or
compartmentation of APEX materials and providing guidance
on security classification and downgradinand the de-
C> or sanitization of APEX materials.
f. Develop Corramznity policy guidance and procedures
for the release of APEX materials to foreign governments
and liaison services.
g. Development of the APEX Central Access Approval
Registry and review and staffing of requests for changes
and allocations of APEX ceilings and access approvals,
including administrative access approvals.
h. Policy direction and guidance for the APEX network
of AP"X Control Officers, APEX Security Officers, and,
Control Officers, including (1) security indoctrina-
n procedures for briefings and debriefings of personnel
cleared for access to APEX, (2) the personnel hysical,
and-technical security programs f t ie-protection o,
APEX materials,- and (3) Community standards - for -docuTnent
control, including markings, control systems, transmittal
procedures, and inventory and accountability procedures.
i. Developmnt of policies and procedures for access
by contractors and consultants to APEX materials.
Staffing and Resources
4. The staffing arrangements and resource requirements for this
new organization could be achieved as follows:
a. A ninnber of the responsibilities listed above
are presently carried out by the COMIREX and SIGIN7
Conan ttees. These responsibilities and the associated
resources would be removed from the jurisdiction' of these
two Committees and transferred to the APEX organization.
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b. Others of these responsibilities are presently
carried on by the DCI Security Committee, and parts of
the Office of Security, such as the Compartmented Infor-
mation Branch. These functions and the associated
resources could- also be transferred to the new organization.
c. The staffing pattern of the new organization should
be changed radically, compared with the existing staffing
patterns of the organizations named above. Rather than
being staffed with a cadre of people who are almost uniquely
expert in security matters or in the specific disciplines
of COMINT or Imagery collection, the new organization
should be staffed on a much more catholic basis. A small
cadre of Security, Imagery, and SIGINT specialists is
necessary, but the remainder of the staff should include
representatives from:
other collection activities,.e.g., NSA,
Navy.
other processing organizations, e.g.,
NPIC, OIA.
-- user organizations, e.g., NFAC, DIA
Production, and INR.
5. To preserve the momentum and thrust of the program, the initial
chief of the organization should be from the user co.~ ity. He should
also be of sufficient status--supergrade level--to deal with senior
members of the Cormam ity.
6. The new organization should be viewed clearly as a Community
organization reporting to the DCI through his Deputy for Corm-,unity
Support. Each of the principal members of the NFIB should be required
to detail officers to serve rotational tours with this organization.
7. The functions of this organization would require an estimated
2S to 28 positions. This would include the 12 positions in the Colrmpart-
mented Information Branch of CIA's Office of Security which would move
intact to the new organization. One staffing arrangement for the organiza-
tion might be as follows:
Office of the Chief -- Chief, Deputy and two secretaries.
The Deputy would also have direct
responsibilities for the0 25X1
dissemination system
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Security Staff -- Two-three professionals and one
secretary.
Imagery Staff -- Two-three professionals and one
secretary.
Signals Staff -- Two-three professionals and one
secretary.
APEX Control Access -- Two professionals, two technical
Approval Registry and eight clerical employees
S. Based on present commitments (positions'or man-year equivalents)
to activities similar to those to be performed by the new organization,
20 of the required 28 positions are immediately identifiable:
COMIREX
--
3 positions
SIGI`'T Committee
--
2 positions
Coy- artmentation
--
3 positions
Branch, DCI Security
Committee
Cor artmented Infor- --
12 positions
mation Branch, Office
of Security, CIA
9. As a matter of Community concern, other Community members most
involved in the APEX program should be asked to provide positions for
the remaining staffing requirement of eight positions. NSA, for example,
could be asked to underwrite two positions and the following to under-
u-rite.one position--S.IFSS, NPIC, Navy, CIA/DDSET/OSO, CIA/?NFAC, and DIA.
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