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APEX - NSA ISSUE PAPER

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00788R000100150003-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 24, 2003
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 2, 1980
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00788R000100150003-5.pdf120.34 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2003/08/13 : CIA-RDP85T00788R00010015000 SECRET ME 3RANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM - to the DUI or o artmentation .SUBJECT : APEX - NSA Issue Paper 1. Attached is the LDX transmission from NSA in response to your call for issue papers on 1 December. In sum, Ms. Caracristi acknowl- edges that the NSA paper reiterates long-standing concerns they have ,expressed before. The paper states that NSA considers the APEX develop- entyto be bad for the security of COMINT, that APEX is expensive without commensurate benefits, that APEX does not provide equal protection for electronically transmitted information, that APEX ignores COMINT's 2. .In effect, the NSA issue paper recommends the APEX effort be started anew or abandoned. Initial comments follow and are keyed to NSA's numbered paragraphs: 1. Information Security The COMINT Product compartment is no more specific than the present system, i.e., no change involved. The statement seems to assume that the documents protected by APEX COMINT will be available to enemies. The APEX manuals were approved in October 1979 in draft by NFIB and again in the summer of.'80 before. release. The concept of APEX is to protect with compartmentation only that which is most sensitive. APEX, as such, is not believed to be in need of compartmented protection. The comment about operating'two systems during extended conversion is valid and has always been valid. Care must be exercised. during conversion. The alternative, however, seems to be to go on as is forever. 2. Expense The manpower costs, again, stem mostly from Executive Order 12065. You have indicated that some computer costs may be funded and Phase IV presumes maximum conversion in the process of other necessary work on the involved systems. us 0 3 017 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/13: CIA-Rrb RRnnn1 nn1 5000.1-5 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/08/$EI21GIll-RDP85T00788R000100150003-5 3. Electronic Age The comment on lack of added protection for electrically processed information is accurate. No one, however, could afford the document processing demanded by Executive Order 12065 for electricals which exceed 1,000 per day and as machine systems develop, they will increas- ingly be able to keep records. At any rate, APEX does no damage to existing processes except to require eventual conformance to APEX. No less accounting will occur. 4. Legal Implications This paragraph continues the attempt to keep COMINT from DCI cog- nizance under Executive Order 12065. I see no grounds for accepting it. S. SIGINT and the APEX Model NSA continues to be concerned that SIGINT product is more sensitive than SIGINT collection programs per se and, therefore, continues to object to'the APEX structure of OPERATIONAL and PRODUCT compartments. Attachment 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08t? : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100150003-5 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/08/13 : CP.5T00788R000100150003-5 SUBJECT: APEX - NSA Issue Paper SA/DCIb 4 1(2 December 1980) Distri uti n: Original - Addressee 1 DDCI 1 - Executive Registry 1 - DCI APEX Security Officer 1 - OGC 1 - SA/DCI C File IC 1 - SA/DCI/C Chrono 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/135~~-DP85T00788R000100150003-5