THE PROCESS OF CONVERTING TO APEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00788R000100160007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 4, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
4 April 1980
SUBJECT: The Process of Converting to APEX
The attached memorandum on "The Process of Converting
to APEX" reflects collective thinking of the APEX Steering
Group, as of approximately 1 April 1980. The learning process
regarding APEX continues, and no guarantee of immutability is
attached to that which follows. It is to be used simply as
a guide to understanding the conversion process. NFIB must
review and concur as milestones are reached in the conversion
of APEX. Questions should be directed to your respective
system security officer who can, in turn, contact your agency's
APEX Steering Group Member.
Chairman, APEX Steering Group
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED When Separated
from CONFIDES TIAL Attachment.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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4 April 1980
The Process of Converting to APEX
1. A new special access control system for compartmentation,
called APEX, has been approved by the President and is being readied
for introduction. The inauguration of the APEX system will touch
all of us who presently deal with compartmented information. It
will bring about a number of changes in the way the Intelligence
Community conducts its business. Some of these changes are merely
administrative in nature, some are designed to improve compartmented
security practices, while others should bring about a significant
decrease in the total amount of compartmented material
2. The most significant aspect of APEX is the establishment of
a single and uniform control system for all compartmented intelligence
information. Many of the complexities and inconsistencies will be
eliminated that presently exist in the numerous and autonomous systems.
There will be single Government and Industrial manuals for the imple-
mentation of policy. Along this same central theme is the establish-
ment of a central organization, the APEX Steering Group, to promulgate
and monitor APEX security policies and procedures, as well as a central
clearance and access certification unit to be known as the Central
APEX Access Registry. The latter will provide the capability to verify
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access approvals and to monitor security and administrative aspects
of each APEX program.
3. The discontinuation of separate control systems (e.g.,
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TK, SI) in favor of the new APEX Control System will necessitate
certain changes in procedure. The former control system caveats
and color codes will no longer guide the dissemination of a document.
Instead, the document will be color-coded as being in one of the APEX
categories, and its routing will be determined by the project name(s),
codeword(s), subcompartment indicator(s), or product indicator(s) on
the cover sheet and on the document. This means that the control
facilities must be converted from an operating mode based upon individual
control system accreditation to one based upon certification for
specific operational projects, subcompartments and products. The
accompanying conversion of individual access will be somewhat simpler,
but will still require changing the concept from one in which the
individual had access to a general control system to one based upon
access approvals for specific operational projects, subcompartments,
or categories of productI
4. The advantages of single uniform policies in the administra-
tion of APEX are complemented by several security changes which are
designed to permit maximum dissemination of intelligence at collateral
levels and to protect, within compartmentation channels, intelligence
which clearly warrants special protection. The specific separation
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between operational and product compartments is expected to result
in a decline in the number of people having access to operational
data. The use of operational subcompartments will help avoid-the
spill-over of operational data into product compartments, providing
better protection for that sensitive data clearly warranting protection.
The requirement for each SIO to grant access on a need-to-know basis
and to certify this need each year, along with attributing intelligence
to generic sources instead of to specific collection platforms, are
yet other changes enhancing protection. However, in order to realize
these advantages, all members of the APEX Community must cooperate
and coordinate their efforts. For example, maximum dissemination at
collateral levels is entirely dependent on everyone sanitizing and
decompartmenting at an increased volume in accordance with APEX
threshold criteria. Not only must all APEX material be sanitized and
decompartmented to the maximum, but all pre-existing SCI must receive
the same attention. The basic rule of the intelligence producer should
be to disseminate sanitized and decompartmented reports, studies,
analyses and memoranda. Reserve for APEX control only that data that
clearly warrants such restrictive protection. As an adjunct to maximum
sanitization and dissemination, the classification of data as TOP SECRET
must continually be reviewed. Failure to accomplish this review could
lead to the saturation of the APEX Control System with unnecessary
TOP SECRET data.
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5. The direction to execute the APEX Control System has not,
to date, been issued by the DCI. The initial step is to indoctrinate
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and orient the many thousands of people, who now have access to various
forms of compartmented data, as to what the APEX system is, how it
will affect them, and what changes they can expect. The number one
villain in this orientation process is resources, i.e., time and person-
nel. A specific date for implementation of APEX has not been established.
The DCI desires, however, that APEX be implemented no later than January
1981. Preliminary data indicates that to indoctrinate all persons who
now have access to compartmented information will require three to six
months by each agency and department. This is due to physical location
and nonavailability of personnel due to various reasons, e.g., PCS,
leave, TDY, illness.
6. The planning for such a mammoth orientation program has been
tackled by two working subgroups of the APEX Steering Group. The
subgroups are working on the orientation of Government employees, in
accordance with the Security Manual for Government and the orientation
for contractors as prescribed in the Security Manual for Industry.
These two audiences are very much different in their makeup and problems.
Within these groupings exist unique situations apropos to their own
environment which require special attention and handling. In order
to assist these populations to convert to APEX in a manner not
disrupting normal day-to-day operations, and to create as little
confusion as necessary, the major command and agency security and
administrative personnel will attend a seminar designed to expose them
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to and interpret the APEX system. In turn, this nucleus will orient
the personnel of their organizations on the basic APEX system concept,
while tailoring their remarks to the individual registries and working
units. Indoctrination plans are also being worked out for the industrial
program. Unique situations arise in this area because of variations
in contractor size, the Government sponsoring agency (with multiple
confusing manuals and instructions in existence), the possibility of
the same contractor having multiple contracts with more than one
Government agency and the various techniques which tend to vary. The
program being developed will provide to the contractors a uniform
explanation of the APEX system. It will be presented by the US Govern-
ment sponsor or cognizant contract manager.
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7. To uniformly present and explain APEX, a videotape has been
produced which provides a general orientation into the new system.
It is the desire of the APEX Steering Group that this film be viewed
as a jumping-off point in the overall indoctrination program. To further
assist secretaries, administrative and registry people, another video-
tape is being produced to provide additional detail and specific criteria
for the conversion to APEX. Additional videotapes and film will be
produced to assist specific audiences in conversion if required. Like-
wise, annexes to the basic security manuals will be produced if problem
areas requiring further explanation are identified. To assist in the
seminars, a package is being prepared which will present questions and
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answers on a broad range of APEX topics. Additional Q and A's re-
sulting from the seminar, when'combined with those already prepared,
will form a basis for all security officers to have a broad background
in order to field questions from their respective organizations.
8. The. concept of conversion from the present compartmented
systems to the APEX system is relatively simple. The numbers of
people involved, their physical location and the local habits of
operating under past systems, however, combine to make the actual
conversion somewhat complex, manpower intensive and time-consuming.
Even after APEX begins, we will continue to have a mix of the old
and the new which will require maintenance of both systems. A possible
solution to this would be the "stopping" of all activity, striking
over, or obliterating present project name(s), codeword(s), and
nickname(s)/source indocator(s), as appropriate, and restamping or
affixing the new APEX terminology and control numbers to the document.
For those facilities which have relatively few documents, this approach
would be feasible. For libraries and those offices having many
thousands of documents, however, a "stop and convert" process would
be physically impossible. We are, therefore, faced with a reality
that for some years we must concurrently maintain documents labeled
and controlled under past compartmented systems, as well as under the
new system.
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9. As we dig deeper into the conversion process, we find more
and more unique sets of problems. The thought of having documents
marked and controlled under two systems (one of which theoretically
no longer exists) is a sobering thought, but it must be addressed.
It is envisioned that as present documents become outdated, obsolete,
and/or destroyed, holdings of such documents will be reduced. When
holdings in existing systems are not retired or otherwise disposed
of, the ASO/ACO and or US Government sponsor or contract monitor, in
the case of contractors, will be able to make a conscious decision
to terminate the access under an old compartment and convert completely
to the APEX system. In this case, all holdings in the old systems
must be remarked and controlled in accord with APEX. In the case of
libraries holding large amounts of microfilm and microfiche, it very
well may be time and cost prohibitive to ever convert all of their
holdings. The ASO/ACO and CASO/CACO, working with analysts, engineers
and all those people within compartmented systems can, with a positive
approach, go a long way towards the achievement of having holdings
controlled under one system. Each institutional holder of such documents
is encouraged by the APEX Final Report to institute a program for an
obligatory quantitative reduction in current holdings of documents
issued in operational control systems. It is emphasized, however, that
this does not mean that important segments of the Community data base
be destroyed to ease the administrative burdens of conversion. Necessary
analytical and historical files should be retained.
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10. When the start date for APEX implementation is announced,
it is imperative that the beginning of APEX be conducted in a conducive
atmosphere. A first step in this approach would be to reduce the
present holdings of all compartmented data. This can start NOW; there
is no requirement to wait, but there is a distinct advantage to starting
immediately. Everyone maintains documents which are outdated and obsolete;
their destruction and clean-out now would be a positive step in converting
to the new APEX system. The requirement to conduct annual inventories
of all hard copy TOP SECRET APEX documents and to annually conduct random
audits on all other hard copy APEX material should provide a strong
incentive. In this regard, it must be emphasized that there is no, repeat
no, requirement for retrofit. Everyone is encouraged to reduce holdings,
to recontrol documents under the APEX system when used (as in the case
of libraries), and to have the ASO/CASO institute a positive program for
the complete conversion to the APEX system. It is realized that not all
ACF/CACF's will be able to do this, and it is acknowledged that a mix
of the old and new systems will exist for some time to come.
11. An APEX Nondisclosure Agreement is being formulated which
will be signed by each indoctrinated person granted access to APEX
material. This agreement will be required only once and will be
accomplished upon receiving the orientation briefing. The indoctrina-
tion and agreement will be performed and recorded by the ASO/CASO. The
agreement will indicate that the individual has received the APEX
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orientation briefing and may be provided specific accesses under the
APEX system when authorized by the SIO. It is imperative that person-
nel now indoctrinated for compartmented access who will continue to
require such access be APEX-oriented and that this action be recorded
by the ASO/CASO in order to facilitate the across the board orientation
and to help determine who may still require such a briefing. When an
individual has executed an APEX Nondisclosure Agreement, access to
individual programs will be granted by the appropriate SIO on a need-
to-know basis. A record of the individual's access to different programs
and projects will be recorded by each SIO as he finds necessary and
will, of course, be transmitted to the Central APEX Access Registry.
Program and Project access forms will be redundant to the access record
in the Central APEX Access Registry but may be maintained to provide
a specific audit trail of accesses granted or withdrawn by date. At
the time of indoctrination for each new access, the ASO/CASO will remind
the person of his/her responsibilities as stipulated on the previously
signed Nondisclosure Agreement.
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12. The fact of no retrofit creates a situation whereby documenta-
tion will exist and be controlled under more than one system. We will
experience the necessity to convert accesses into the new APEX system
on a one-for-one basis at the outset, subject to the determination of
each SIO. To be specific, this means that if the SIO determines that
each person in his organization requires the APEX access equivalent to
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the access now held, he may convert on a one-for-one basis. The
current access registry held by various organizations already indicates
the various project names/codewords to which specified individuals
have already been granted access. In the case of operational compartments,
these same project names, preceded by the term APEX, will be used. In
the case of product, various source indicators will be replaced with the
generic term IMAGERY, HUMINT, COMINT, TECHNICAL. There will necessarily
be some short period of time required to administratively accomplish
this, and common sense must govern the application, because one set of
rules or guidance cannot cover all situations. Conversion will begin
modestly for documentation, but will be more rapid for the individual
accesses which must be applied. The ASO/CASO will be given conversion/
equivalency tables for access in order to convert the old to the new.
Those equivalencies that each ASO/CASO will require will be provided
on a need-to-know basis. An all-inclusive conversion table for all
projects, subcompartments, etc., cannot be published because of the
security problems involved.
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13. A very important aspect of the APEX conversion rests with
the SIO, who will be required to individually screen each of his
people, establish their need-to-know, and grant the required access.
In the case of operational and operational subcompartmented material,
the SIO, after receiving approval from the program manager, will grant
access. This screening process should begin as soon as practicable. It
will also be necessary to rewrite the various user manuals and documentation
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which, in the past were produced specifically for the analyst, tasker,
etc., and which contain a great deal of what is now established as
operational data. The new operational subcompartments will contain
that information which the program managers and user SIOs have agreed
upon in order for the user to accomplish his/her job while, at the same
time, restricting to operational compartments that data which the program
managers and SIOs. agree the user does not need to know. Preparation of
this new subcompartment data (designated by an ALPHA suffix) may not be
completed by the time implementation of APEX has begun. APEX is a
new single compartmented control system and, as such, will have its
growing pains. The rewriting of user manuals, which will form the
informational basis of the operational subcompartments, is essential
to the establishment by the SIOS of the requirement for access by
persons in their organizations.
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14. There is a need to rigorously implement the APEX Threshold
Criteria in order to substantially limit the amount of material to be
handled in the APEX system. The handling of most APEX imagery-derived
information, as well as formerly compartmented ELINT reporting at
standard levels of classification, will substantially reduce the amount
of material that needs to be handled in APEX. Thus, the APEX transition
will rest heavily upon rapid adoption and implementation of the
Threshold Criteria I
15. Directives for each of the various programs and generic
sources of APEX data are in the process of being prepared. Until these
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have been completed, existing rules and regulations, including those
pertaining to emergency and exercise use of compartmented data, will
continue to be followed.
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16. Once the indoctrination/orientation phase is completed,
the execution of APEX can be directed. At initiation, the immediate
difference will be that the phrase "HANDLE VIA APEX CONTROL SYSTEM"
will replace the system caveats representing several systems presently
in use. This will mark the conversion into the APEX system. Secretarial
and administrative personnel will use this phrase on all newly created
compartmented documents, as well as using new APEX logo and cover sheets.
New stamps and cover sheets will be supplied through the APEX Control
Staff. The use of new APEX control numbers will also begin, as explained
in the security manuals. Administrative personnel should be cautioned
not to discard or dispose of old system stamps because they may continue
to be required for some period of time. The APEX system departs from
customary practice in its treatment of operational project codewords.
The APEX system does not permit operational codewords to be compartmented
but does allow them to be protected at the standard classification level
of CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET. As a reminder, no new markings (retrofit)
need be applied to existing markings at the initiation of APEX.
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17. Personnel who do not require substantive access to individual
APEX compartments, but who require physical access or who administratively
process APEX materials, will be given an administrative access called
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APEX-GENERAL. This may be given in two phases. Phase I will be
granted to those personnel who must have physical access to APEX
areas, but do not physically see or process clear text APEX materials.
Personnel who might require Phase I access are guards, couriers carrying
APEX material in sealed pouches, and technical people such as switching
center and computer technicians. Phase II will be granted ONLY to
those personnel who process substantive clear text APEX materials in
an administrative capacity. Personnel who might require Phase II access
include secretaries, distribution personnel, communications center and
ADP output device operators, and document control personnel. Individuals
who require substantive data will not be granted an APEX-GENERAL access.
The intended use is only for those categories of personnel as described
above.
18. There will be some concern regarding the relationship between
2nd and 3rd parties and APEX.
quired to impose this new system, but it will be extremely difficult
for them not to do so. All indicators point to their acceptance of
the APEX system. They have been provided releasable versions of the
Final Report and the Government manual, the videotape and most of the
data which is available to US personnel. Many of the products received
will bear the new markings, which is another reason why it is anticipated
that they will join the system. As for 3rd parties, there will generally
be no change, and, of course, generally no access. Due to the diversity
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any change
will be dealt with on an individual basis and reflect APEX conventions
in varying degrees, if at all.
19. The conversion process may result in some confusion at its
inception and will take years to complete. Three very important tasks
which should start as soon as possible are: (1) the reduction of present
holdings which are not absolutely required, (2) the review by the SIO
for each individual presently having access to compartmented information
(resulting in a conscious decision of what access they require under
APEX), and (3) the writing of operational compartment and subcompartment
manuals by program managers in conjunction with the user community. It
is imperative that the indoctrination/orientation of persons proceed as
rapidly as possible. This must be accomplished as a first step to
APEX being instituted and can be done prior to the creation of subcompart-
ment documentation or review of accesses by the SIOs. It is a Community-
wide effort which requires the assistance and cooperation of all concerned.
A good faith effort by everyone involved will make the task easier.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
12 February 1980
APEX STEERING GROUP CHARTER
0 j gnaw mu;tu!
Pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
Section 102(d); Executive Order 12036, Subsections 1-601 (h) and
(i); Executive Order 12065, Section 4-2; Presidential Directive/
NSC-55 of 10 January 1980; and DCI Memorandum of 10 January 1980
for Principals, National Foreign Intelligence Board, the APEX
Steering Group is established to assist in ensuring that the Intel-
ligence Community's compartmentation policies and procedures
effectively and consistently protect intelligence sources and
methods while also ensuring timeliness and economy in the handling
of sensitive compartmented information.
Mission: The mission of the APEX Steering Group is to assist
the Director of Central Intelligence in establishing and operating
a single Community special access system for national foreign intel-
ligence called APEX. The intent of APEX is:
1. to protect particularly sensitive intelligence
sources and methods;
2. to ensure establishment of policies and pro-
cedures to control information on the operational
details of the most sensitive intelligence sources
and methods and intelligence product that can reveal
such information;
3. to ensure uniform security standards governing
access to, distribution of and protection of intelligence
sources and methods, subject to any specific statutory
requirements and executive directives applicable to any
department or agency.
Functions: The functions of the APEX Steering Group include:
Review, formulate and recommend to the National
Foreign Intelligence Board and the Director of Central
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Intelligence, policies, guidelines and standard procedures
related to the implementation of the APEX Special Access
Control System. In fulfilling this requirement, the APEX
Steering Group will:
a. Formulate, coordinate and promulgate
guidance for the administration of the APEX
system at all echelons of department and agency
activities, including those involving contractor
and consultant support activity;
b. Task, guide, assist and monitor the
activities of the Committee on Imagery Require-
ments and Exploitation (CCIIREX), the SIGINT
Committee, the Security Committee, other
relevant committees, and managers of executive
agent programs in discharging their responsi-
bilities relevant to the conversion to APEX in
accord with the December 1979 Report of the
NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation;
c. Energize, monitor and oversee the con-
version of current systems of compartmentation
to APEX control;
d. Guide, assist and monitor departments
and agencies in implementing maximum dissemina-
tion, decompartmentation and sanitization of
APEX material;
e. Staff for the DCI any appeals arising
during implementation of the APEX program;
f. Assist the Special Assistant to the DCI
for Compartmentation in discharging his responsi-
bilities;
g. Obtain from departments and agencies
participating in the APEX program information
needed to ensure accurate and detailed reports
to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and
the DCI on the progress of implementation, problem
areas and recommendations for improvements, and
to make such reports at appropriate intervals but
not less than on a quarterly basis.
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Composition: The APEX Steering Group will be chaired by the
Special Assistant to the DCI for Compartmentation who will be
supported by the APEX Control Staff. The APEX Steering Group will
be composed of representatives of appropriate member organizations
of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the DCI COMIREX, SIGINT,
and Security Committees and managers of executive agent programs.
The Chairman, on his own initiative or that of a member of the
Steering Group, may invite a representative of any other Department
or Agency having functions related to matters being considered by
the Steering Group.
The Chairman will establish panels and ad hoc working groups
as he finds necessary, assuring that their composition represents
an opportunity for joint coordinated efforts of program managers
and users of their products.
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V
Membership
APEX STEERING GROUP
AT Chairman
AT Deputy Chairman
Special Assistant tole DCI for
Compartmentation
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7E-12, Langley, Virginia
Deputy Chief, APEX Control Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7E-12, Langley, Virginia
William P. Deary
Deputy Director, Office of Resources
and Policy
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 7638, New State
E flop- ~ I
Sec r u --q e
ST
Telephone
Richard L. Welch
Deputy Director, Security of Military
Information Division
Commonwealth Building, Room 750
1300 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Va. 22209
MAILING ADDRESS: Chief of Naval Intelligence-
Department o e Navy (OP-009-DB)
Room 5C-600, Pentagon
Maynard Anderson
Deputy Director for Security Policy
Department of Defense
Room 2E-812, Pentagon
632-0877
Gray: 2161
Green: 5239
695-6609
Gray: 3254
Green: 2313
ST
Herbert Taylor
Department of the Army, ACSI
Room 2E-464, Pentagon
(Alternate) Richard H. Smith
Directorate of Intelligence Systems
Department of the Army
Room 2E-478, Pentagon
697-4644
Green: 2206
695-6295
Green: 2206
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Telephone
Colonel Herbert Kamm, USAF
AFIS/INS
Room BD-951, Pentagon
695-4320
Gray: 45
SAFSS Lt. Colonel John Rothrock
Deputy for National Security Council
Affairs
Office of Space Systems
Room 4C-1000, Pentagon
(Alternate) Raymond Hart
Deputy for Security
Office of Space Systems
Room 4C-1000, Pentagon
Chairman, William Kvetkas
bILANT Chairman, SIGINT Committee
Committee Room BW-09, Community Headquarters
(Alternate) Ms. Dorothy Richards
Executive Secretary, SIGINT Committee
Room BW-09, Community Headquarters
Chairman
CONIREX
(Alternate)
Chairman, DCI
Security
e
(Alternate)
695-0945
Green: 2257
Gray: 2368
695-0945
Green: 2257
Gray : 2368
376-5530
Gray: 1291
376-5533
Gray: 1271
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 STAT Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100160007-0
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100160007-0