THE SEVEROMORSK EXPLOSION AND THE SOVIET RESUPPLY EFFORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00840R000101870001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION 'CENTER
imagery analysis report
The Severomorsk Explosion and
the Soviet Resupply Effort (S)
Secret
Secret
SC-628365/85
IAR-0001/85
MARCH 1985
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SECRETI
THE SEVEROMORSK EXPLOSION AND THE SOVIET RESUPPLY EFFORT (S)
1. On imagery of there was evidence of a series of explosions at Severomorsk Naval
Missile Storage Facility the Soviet Union's largest naval missile storage complex and the
principal naval missile storage facility for the Northern Fleet. The explosions, which occurred after
according to imagery, destroyed a large part of that fleet's cruise and surface-to-air missile (SAM)
stockpile. The explosions damaged or destroyed between 50 and 60 percent of the stored cruise missiles,
including all the Northern Fleet's known reserve of SS-N-22 antiship cruise missiles; over 60 percent of the
stored SAMs, including all the SA-N-6s and SA-N-7s; and all the stored warhead and booster/component
crates. The Soviets began rebuilding the facility soon after the explosion, and the facility was completely
operational by the end of 1984. (S/WN)
2. This report summarizes the damage to the facility and the subsequent salvage and resupply
operations, and its conclusions may also help determine the short- and long-range effects of the explosion
on the Northern Fleet. The information presented is based on an analysis of ima ery acquired prior to and
following the explosion. The intelligence cutoff date is This report includes 10
annotated photographs and two tables. (S/WN)
Introduction
3. Severomorsk Naval Missile Storage Facility
(I igure 1) provides storage facilities for most of the
Northern Fleet's ballistic missile submarines, cruise
and attack submarines, and surface combatants.
The installation is colocated with the largest sur-
face combatant base in the Northern Fleet, Severo-
morsk Naval Base Severomorsk
also provides missile checkout facilities for test
missiles fired from combatants in the Barents Sea.
(S/WN)
4. Between
chain-reaction explosion
a massive,
destroyed most of the
SAM and cruise missile canisters and crates in
open storage at Severomorsk. Because of the limit-
ed number of bunkers capable of containing read-
ied missiles, most of these canisters and crates
contained missiles. The explosion extensively dam-
aged two principal areas within the facility: the
SAM/cruise missile storage area and the SAM
component storage area. These two storage areas
contained most of the Northern Fleet's cruise mis-
siles and SAMs as well as facilities and equipment
for maintaining and readying the missiles for trans-
fer to combatants. In addition, the SLBM storage
area and the Severomorsk Naval Ammunition Stor-
age. (S/WN)
Damage
sustained minor dam-
SAM/Cruise Missile Storage Area
5. The mid-May destruction probably began
as one explosion in the missile storage bunker
(Figure 2) on the peninsula in the lake. Two large
blast holes on the side of the storage bunker indi-
cated that the explosion occurred within the bun-
ker (Figure 3). Missile systems stored in this area
included SA-N-1, SA-N-3, SA-N-6, and SA-N-7
SAMs and SS-N-3, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, and SS-N-22
cruise missiles. The first explosion was likely fol-
lowed by sympathetic explosions of SAMs, cruise
missiles, components/boosters, and warheads in
open storage. All the SA-N-1, SA-N-3, and SS-N-
22 canisters stored on the peninsula were de-
stroyed. Additionally, 65 of 142 SS-N-19, 65 SA-N-
6, and 65 SA-N-7 canisters in the area between the
checkout building and the lake were damaged or
destroyed. Table 1 shows the approximate number
of canisters and crates damaged or destroyed in
the explosion and the percentage of the supply
that was lost. (S/WN)
6. The blast and flying debris from the blast
severely damaged the main checkout/assembly
building and a smaller checkout building. The blast
and debris also destroyed one of the small compo-
nent bunkers directly across the lake from the
main storage bunker. (S/WN)
SAM Component Storage Area
7. Debris from the main explosion probably
caused the explosion in the SAM component stor-
age area (Figure 4), approximately 400 meters west
of the SAM/cruise missile storage area. This area
contained SA-N-1 and SA-N-3 canisters and nu-
merous booster crates and warhead canisters. The
storage/checkout building, a component storage
building, and the entire supply of booster crates
and warhead canisters were destroyed (Figure 5).
(S/WN)
8. The extent of damage, if any, to ballistic
missiles in the adjacent SLBM storage area could
not be determined, although blast marks were evi-
dent on the sides of at least four of the airframe
storage bunkers. Additionally, the explosion
ripped the metal sheeting from the sides of Quon-
set-type buildings within the Naval Ammunition
Storage West Facility (Figure 6), approximately 400
meters east-southeast of the SAM/cruise missile
storage area and approximately 600 meters north
of the SAM component storage area. (S/WN)
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Cleanup, Salvage, and
Reconstruction Operations
9. Analysis of the first postexplosion imagery,
that of showed that the initial cleanup
effort began within a few days of the explosion and
involved the removal of debris from roadways and
the relocation of some of the salvageable missile
systems. This effort lasted until the end of May. In
June, the actual rebuilding began. Numerous
trucks, cranes, and personnel were in the facility,
and the relocation of the remainder of salvageable
missiles to the SLBM area had begun. Severely
damaged buildings were razed, and reconstruction
of the main assembly/checkout building had be-
gun, as had an inspection of missiles that survived
the explosion. Table 2 shows a chronology of the
reconstruction activity. (S/WN)
Table 2.
Chronology of Reconstruction Activity at Severomorsk
Naval Missile Storage Facility
SAM/Cruise Missile
Storage Area
Small component
storage bunker razed,
razing of smaller
checkout building
begun.
Earth removed from
main checkout bunker.
Main checkout bunker
razed, area cleared
of debris.
Arch-roofed sections
delivered, indicating that
main checkout bunker
was to be rebuilt.
SAM Component
Storage Area
Razing of assembly/
checkout building begun,
reconstruction of
support building begun.
Assembly/checkout
building razed, support
building rebuilt.
IAR-0001/85
SECRET
Two Quonset-type
buildings razed
in torpedo storage
area.
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SECRET 7_1
10. The reconstruction of the main assem-
bly/ checkout building (Figure 7) in the SAM/cruise
missile storage area was probably made a high
priority project so that missiles that survived the
explosion could be checked out at the facility prior
to being transferred to combatants. Without this
building, which houses the electronic equipment
required in the missile checkout process, the major
step in the provision of fully serviced missiles could
not be accomplished. In early June, all the over-
head supports and the sidewalls of the high-bay
section of the building were removed. The high-
bay section, which supported a gantry crane, was
completely rebuilt, probably because the overhead
and the sidewall supports were too weak to sup-
port the overhead crane. By the sidewalls
and a large section of the roof had been replaced.
The building was externally complete by
(S/WN)
11. The Soviet salvage efforts also included
the inspection of the SS-N-19 missile canisters.
Even though they were closer to the blast, the
newer-design, metal SS-N-19 canisters stored near
the lake survived the explosion better than the
older, wooden SS-N-3/-12 crates, which were ei-
ther crushed or burned in the explosion. No dam-
age to the SS-N-19 canisters was discernible on
imagery. On many of the SS-N-19 canisters
had been opened and were being inspected (Fig-
ure 8). By 30-40 of the 60-65 SS-N-19
canisters had been moved from the facility to an
area just north of Severomorsk Naval Missile Load-
ing Facility Okolnaya the canis-
ters or possibly the missiles inside them were dam-
aged and/or no longer functional. (S/WN)
12. By the end of August, the facility had
significantly recovered from the explosion. Though
cleanup and salvage operations were still in pro-
gress, the facility had a clean appearance and was
operational. The buildings severely damaged by
the explosion had been either razed or rebuilt or
were being reconstructed. (S/WN)
Preparations for Resupply
13. Before the main resupply effort, several
types of missile systems, which were at the Severo-
morsk Missile Transfer Point
were transferred to the Missile Storage Facility. On
there were 99 SA-N-1 canisters (54 proba-
bly empty), 64 SA-N-3 canisters (21 probably emp-
ty), 117 SA-N-6 canisters (projected for Kirov-class
nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser [CGN] unit
2), four SS-N-2 crates, seven SS-N-7/-9 crates, and
15 SS-N-3/-12 crates (probably empty) at the Mis-
sile Transfer Point (Figure 9). Immediately following
the explosion, the Soviets began transferring these
missile systems to Severomorsk Missile Storage Fa-
cility. (S/WN)
14. The first missile system removed from
the Missile Transfer Point was the SA-N-6 SAM. By
110 of the 117 SA-N-6 canisters that were
in the Missile Transfer Point before the explosion
had been moved to the Missile Storage Facility.
These missiles were probably for the second unit
of the Kirov-class CGN, which arrived at Severo-
morsk in early September, and were not replace-
ments for destroyed missiles. (S/WN)
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15. By~approximately 54 SA-N-1 and
21 SA-N-3 canisters were removed from the Mis-
sile Transfer Point. Because no increase in the
number of SA-N-1 or SA-N-3 systems was ob-
served at the Missile Storage Facility, these canis-
ters were probably empty and were probably re-
turned to the production plant. Between
the remaining 45 SA-N-1 and 43
IAR-0001/85
SECRET
SA-N-3 canisters at the Transfer Point had been
moved to the Missile Storage Facility. The SS-N-3/
-12 crates at the Transfer Point were repositioned
next to the rail line; thus, they were probably emp-
ty crates also slated for return to the production
plant. The SS-N-2 crates were not removed from
the Missile Transfer Point. (S/WN)
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Resupply
16. The Soviet resupply effort began in early
June. As a temporary replacement for the loss of 72
percent of the SS-N-12 missiles at Severomorsk,
the Soviets ferried missiles from Cuba Litsa Subma-
rine Base South On at least two
occasions, a Yuryuzan ferry transferred between
six and eight SS-N-12 crates from Cuba Litsa to
Severomorsk (Figure 10). In the past, the Yuryuzan
ferry has transported other missile systems, includ-
ing the SS-N-19. (S/WN)
17. The major resupply effort, involving the
transfer of missiles from outside the Severomorsk
area, began in mid-July. Imagery of indicat-
ed that 85 SS-N-3/-12 crates were removed from
Surok Naval Missile Transshipment Storage Center
and were probably taken to Olen-
egorsk Naval Missile Storage Facility (BE
center on imagery of ~ Imagery of
indicated a second transshipment from Surok oc-
curred, with 28 additional SS-N-3/-12 crates and
approximately 200 SA-N-1 and 130 SA-N-3 canis-
ters delivered to Olenegorsk Naval Missile Storage
Facility. During this period, Olenegorsk was im-
aged only twice; therefore, a complete analysis of
the number of missile systems entering/exiting the
facility was not possible. Surok is in the central
USSR and is a major transshipment and storage
facility. Olenegorsk is on the Kola Peninsula, 130
nautical miles south of Severomorsk, and serves as
the principal rear depot for the Northern Fleet.
Missiles shipped from Surok to Severomorsk by rail
would pass through the Olenegorsk area.
18. Between the first
11 SS-N-3/-12 crates from rear depot storage ar-
rived at the Missile Transfer Point. On 15
additional SS-N-3/-12 crates were on railcars with-
in the Transfer Point. By a total of 36 SS-
N-3/-12 crates, 150 SA-N-1, and 100 SA-N-3 canis-
ters had been delivered to the Missile Transfer
Point from rear depot storage. (S/WN)
19. After the arrival of the SS-N-3/-12 crates
at Severomorsk from Surok, a number of SS-N-3/
-12 crates, probably carrying SS-N-12s, were re-
turned from Severomorsk to Cuba Litsa. On F
a Pioneer Moskvy-class merchant ship was
at Severomorsk Naval Missile Loading Facility
Okolnaya with approximately 20 SS-N-3/-12 crates
on deck. By the shi had departed
the facility, and on it was at Litsa
Cuba Submarine Base South. Only nine SS-N-3/
-12 missile crates remained on deck. (S/WN)
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20. Although imagery to date indicates that
the storage and handling facilities at Severomorsk
will likely be completely restored within a year of
the explosion, the explosion has other significant
longer-term ramifications. In order for the Soviets
to recover completely, they will have to replace
those missile systems lost in the explosion, restock
rear depot storage, and increase production of
missile systems projected for newly deployed units.
Satisfying these requirements should have little ef-
fect on other fleets because most of the newer
missile systems are utilized on vessels deployed
only in the Northern Fleet. Unless increased missile
production can be rapidly accomplished, the Sovi-
ets will have shortfalls in the number and class of
missiles intended for and required by their ex-
panding Northern Fleet. Until substantial resupply
of Severomorsk and its rear depots occurs, the
operational capabilities of this fleet will be re-
duced. (S/WN)
21. By early September 1984, most of the
damaged facilities had been rebuilt. The cleanup
and salvage operations revealed two important
facts: the early cleanup efforts and the lack of
decontamination equipment indicated that no nu-
clear material was involved in the explosion; the
speed of reconstruction and resupply at Severo-
morsk demonstrated the Soviet intent to return the
facility to complete operational status. Continued
monitoring of Severomorsk will provide consider-
able insight into the Soviets ability to return a
facility to its once preeminent status. (S/WN)
22. Resupply, not cleanup, has been the ma-
jor problem. Restocking the munitions lost has
been restricted to older systems readily available at
rear depots, including SS-N-3/-12s, SA-N-1s, and
SA-N-3s. Clearly, the production rate will largely
determine the resupply rate, especially for newer
missile systems such as the SS-N-22 and SS-N-19
which are not stockpiled in rear depots. (S/WN)
23. The loss of the newer and more ad-
vanced missile systems creates an especially unde-
sirable situation in the Northern Fleet, where
IMAGERY ANALYST'S COMMENTS
newer missile systems are being required in in-
creasing numbers to complement the additional
surface ships and submarines produced. The clear-
ly intended deployment of new combatants to the
Northern Fleet further complicates the resupply of
Severomorsk because these combatants require
the newer missile systems. For example, the SS-N-
22 missile system was designed for the Sovre-
menny-class guided missile destroyer (DDG).
Three of these DDGs are currently operational in
the Northern Fleet: one is conducting at-sea trials
in the Baltic, and two are fitting out. Additionally,
the loss of 40 SS-N-19 cruise missiles will severely
degrade the Northern Fleet's operations and could
strain attempted increases in the Soviet Union's
missile production facilities. The SS-N-19 missile
system is the primary antiship weapon carried
aboard the Kirov-class nuclear-powered guided
missile cruiser and the Oscar-class nuclear-
powered cruise missile submarine. Older missile
systems such as the SA-N-1 and the SA-N-3 were
already in limited production prior to explosion.
Increases in the production of these older missile
systems may not be possible or easily achieved due
to the limited availability of system components.
The older systems are, however, in abundant sup-
ply in rear depot storage. For example, approxi-
mately 4,000 SA-N-3 canisters are stockpiled
throughout the Soviet Union. (S/WN)
the present time, crew training on missile-
equipped surface shi s and submarines has been
limited. Furthermore,
The long-range
ramifications of the explosion may even include
the acceleration of production and the introduc-
tion of newly designed missile systems to replace
older systems currently in limited production.
IMAGERY
All applicable imagery acquired through
DOCUMENTS
1. CIA. SC-02384,
of Damage at Severomorsk
(SECRET
was used in the preparation of this report. (SAWN)
Naval Missile Storage Facility (U), 11 Oct 84
2. NPIC. Z-14071/84, IAR-0033/84, Procedural Changes at Soviet Naval Storage Facilities (S), Aug 84 (SE-
CRET
Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed
Soviet Air Navy and Nuclear Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC, at
IAR-0001 /85
SECRET
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Secret
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