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STAT Approved For Release 2002/10/31 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 IIIIIIIII III~~~~~IIIIIIIIIII FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~I FOREIGN PR L".'SS DIGES1 Translations From "Voyennaya Myrl" NUMBER 11 - NOVEMBER 1971 STAT A::: T PLEF~r RcT, AGENCY. APnc1iiVu5 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85TO STAT Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST NO. 0004 -- 22 January 1974 TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL'," No. 11, NOVEMBER 1971 Issue No. 11, November 1971, was signed to press on 13 October 1971. War and the Socialist Revolution (3-14) Maj Gen A. Mil.ovidov On the Question of Programmed Learning (15-19) Co.]. Gen I. Shkadov Ideological-Political Training of Young Officers of the Czechoslovak People's Army (20-24) Maj Gen Vaclav Mati'dka Evolution in the Correlation of Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics (25-33) Lt Gen I. Zav'yalov 24 Principles of Milit-ary Art and Their Development (34-44) 42 Col V. Chervonobab Troop Control to the Level of Current Requirements (45-52) Lt Gen M. Ivanov General Principles of the Approach to Appraising the Effectiveness of Combined Arms Control Systems (53-62) Col N. Zubkov 67 Military Cambuflage (63-68) 79 Engr-Lt Col Kh. Adam and Lt Col R. Gebel' Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 The Significance of the Cheimical Situation and Its Evaluation (69-T2) Engr-Ma3 Kh. Gorges (Abridged translation by Col I. Andrushkevich) Radio Electronic Equipment in Theaters of Military Operations (73-82) Mai Gen Sign Trps V. Grankin and Engr-Col V. Galinskiy V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science (83-87) Col Ye. Rybkin Book on Troop Control (88-96) Col I. Chetverikov 87 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 WAR AND THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION (Military Problems in Theory of Scientific Communism) Maj Gen A. Milovidov, Dootor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor The present era of transition from capitalism to socialism, which was ? ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution, has placed mankind face to face with an abrupt break with the old principles of societal. affairs. Under conditions of rapid development of the world revolutionary process, when socialism has become firmly esthblished in the wo::ld and has become a powerful international force, under conditions of growing aggres- siveness on the part of imperialism and increased potential for utilization of the achievements of scientific and technological progress in war, the problem of war and the socialist revolution has become particularly acute. The present situation is both complex and conflictive. It demands dialec- tical flexibility in analyzing and solving specific problems; a scientific- ally substantiated conclusion on the fact that the road to socialism passes through revolution, however, is mandatory and indisputable for the peoples of all the nations of the world. "...Socialism," wrote Karl Marx, "cannot be achieved without revolutions" (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch. [Works], Volume 1, page 448). The fundamental conflict of the present era -- the antagonistic conflict between two opposed social systems -- can be resolved only by means of a world socialist revolution -- this is the logical path of social develop- merit of the modern world. The militarists grossly falsify Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the socialist revolution and declare it to be a special expansionist program. Equating the terms war and revolution, they cynically ascribe to the Communists aggressiveness and an attempt to resolve social conflicts with the aid of war, while they describe Leninism as the product of "military thinking," of a unique military doctrine oriented toward "baptizing its revolution in blood," Marxism-Leninism has provided a precise definition of war and the socialist revolution and has revealed the dialectical interrelationship between them. Its doctrine on the socialist revolution, on war and peace enables re- volutionary parties to elaborate a scientifically substantied strategy and tactics and to wage an implacable struggle against the lie of anticommunism, a struggle both against rightist opportunists, who fear the revolution, and against the adventuristic course of "leftist" elements. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 War and Revolution -- Social Phenomena of a Differing Character War and revolution possess certain common traits. They are engendered by the conditions of an exploiter society and constitute forms of political struggle, a continuation of the policies of specific classes, ExIloitation of the toiler masses and predatory wars are two aspects of one and the same bourgeois policy. At the same time war and revolution are radically dif fe: cant as social phenomena War and revolution possess different sources, The socialist revolution possesses first and foremost an internal source. It matures within the capitalist society as a result of the objective laws of its development. All economic development of the capitalist system leads to a termination c the dominance of capitalism. "No force would destroy capitalism," wrote Lenin, "if it were not urda~aft-ad by history" (Poln, Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 32, page 99). The socialist revolution involves the effect of the law of conformity between production relations and the character and level of development of productive forces. Its economic basis is th;a conflict between the new productive forces and capitalist production relations, which have become an inhibiting factor in their development. The conflict is expressed in a sharp aggravation of the antagonistic con- flict between labor and capital. The socialist revolution is the result of the development both of objective and subjective preconditions for social revolution in a given country. The material, sociopolitical preconditions presume the existence of a, political army of the revolution -- class forces which are politically, ideologically and organizationally prepared to storm the bastions of the old society. A war engendered by the domination of capitalism and/the policies of the bourgeoisie is not always necessarily linked with an acute conflict between productive forces and production relations. The founders of scientific communism came out vigorously against the theory of export, of the urging of revolution from without, and,'particular- ly with the aid of war. ' Marx and Engels subjected to withering criticism those Blanqui'sts and anarchists who claimed that it was sufficient to have an orga;,iized group of conspirators in order to produce a revolution at any giveri time, At the time of the negotiation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Lenin sternly branded the "leftist Communists" as adventurers and pseudorcivolutionaries who were calling for the spread of socialist revolution in ;Western Europe even at the cost of the collapse of the Soviet government.' War would con- stitute such an urging of revolution. These views are incompatible with the theory of Marxism, which has always denied the "pushing" of revolu- tions. Lenin angrily branded the idea of "revolutionary;'war" for the purpose of priming the pump of the revolutionary process;; as advanced by Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 the Trotskyites, as a "mangy revolutionary phrase," and people who think that revolution can arise in any country on order as fools or provocateurs. Adventurist theory is oriented toward passivity of revolutionary class forces within a given country. The danger of such an approach to the problem under present-day conditions was emphasized by Le Duan,'First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party. "...One cannot conclude," he wrote, "that war is an essential source of and con- dition for the outbreak of revolution and that therefore one can sit +.dle and wait for war to come, only then waging revolution."1 War and revolution differ in motive forces. Wars are waged both by reactionary and progressive classes. A revolution is waged only by progres- sive forces. Preparations for unjust wars are kept completely secret from peoples, are waged under false banners specially prepared by the military organization -- the army -- and express the selfish, narrow class interests of the bour- goisie. Progressive social forces capable of pronouncing a judgment of history rise up in revolution. The socialist revolution is based on the political activeness of the broad toiler masses, particularly the worker class, guided by Marxist-Leninist parties. The revolution is prepared not by machinations behind the scenes but rather by means of open and frank mobilization of the masses. Without their sympathy and active participa- tion a victorious revolution is impossible. Of unfading significance is the Russian experience, about which Lenin wrote. "w.e were a small party in Russia, but we had as allies the majority of soviets of worker and peasant deputies throughout the country... Almost one half of the army was with us, an army which at the time tvt3led at least 1D million men" (Poln. Sobr. 5och., Volume 44, page 26). Bolshevism united around itself the entire revolutionary vanguard and the great majority of toilers. Lenin's nesis is extremely pertinent today, when the opportunity has arisen to expand the social base of the revolu- tion, when the problem of winnip6 over the bulk of the masses, the problem of creating a broad front of antiimperialist forces has become one of the most important problems in the strategy and tactics of Communist and worker parties. Their struggle for implementation of general democratic slogans and for peace is helping to create a mass political army of socialist revolution. The general democratic struggle does not further postpone the socialist revolution but rather draws it closer. Falsifying Marxism-Leninism, the Maoists place the struggle for democratic reforms in opposition to the cause of the socialist revolution. In their opinion, the less developed democracy in capitalist countries is, the Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 greater the chances for socialist revolution. This primitive, metaphysical appraisal is incompatible with the dialectical Leninist idea of rapproche- ment of the struggle for democracy with the struggle for socialism, In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism it is not essen- tial in each and every country, at each and every stage of its development, to proclaim the slogans of socialist revolution. Whatever stages the revolutionary masses must pass through, whatever intermediate programs and slogans the Communists may advance in consolidating and rallying the masses, they always remember that there lies ahead a struggle for the over- thr o w of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. Under present- day conditions of the development of mankind, national; anticolonial and liberation revolutions, independent nations constitute tributaries which flow into the general stream of the antiimperialist and anticapitalist world revolution. Propaganda and agitation alone are insufficient to bring the masses to sup- port the position of ;:he proletariat; the masses themselves must gain political experience for this. It would be not only unintelligent but criminal to throw the vanguard alone into decisive combat before the masses have been drawn into the struggle. Our party led the masses in the assault on capitalism when suitable objective and subjective conditions had been created for this, "when the consciousness, will and passion of tens of millions of persons had been prepared for this by the entire course of the struggle," state the Central Committee CPSU Theses "On the Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Birth Centennial." The fundameni:al law of revolution thus presupposes the presence of the vanguard of a revolutionary class, as well as political experience of the masses. War and the socialist revolution differ in political content, end goals and social consequences. In contrast to wars, which can be progressive or reactionary, revolutions pursue just goals, which prompted Karl Marx to call them the "locomotives of history." While an imperialist war serves the aims of plundering the peoples of other countries, the seizure of territories, markets, spheres of influence and the aims of destroying revolutionary forces, the socialist revolution encompasses the entire aggregate of economic, political and spiritual transformations which lead to the total destruction of capitalism, to the building of socialism and consequently to elimination of the source of all wars. War and the socialist revolution, societal phenomena which are profoundly different in content, frequently lead to diametrically opposite socio- economic consequences. Imperialist wars have brought mankind incalculable loss and suffering. Productive forces are savagely crushed and millions of Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 human lives destroyed. Lenin sharply censured the-,e who lescribed wars as an accelerator of development of productive forces, The arguments of German professor Heniger in favor of an arms race as a stimulus of economic progress were called by Lenin the babblings of a "nasty little man dedicated to militarism" (Leninskiy Sbornik [Lenin Collection], XXVII, page 17). Lenin's assessment of this ideologue of militarism has a direct rel-tion- ship to the present-day apologists of aggression, who have fabricated a special theory of the benefits of civilian utilization of the results of research conducted on the basis of contracts with the military, on the beneficent influence of the development of military technology for improv- ing the health of science. Social revolution means a transition to new, more progressive forms of societal affairs. The Great October Socialist Revolution is the best evidence of this. Those 10 days in October "shook the world," while the 54 years which have passed since then have changed it, The ideas and legacy of the October Revolution consist in the total and ultimate victory of socialism in the USSR, in the establishment and consolidation of the world socialist system, in the burgeoning of the present-day labor, communist and national liberation movement, in the profound change in the spiritual life of mankind, The triumph of the Great October Revolution signifies a new chapter in world history -- an era of unprecedented revolutionary accom- plishments. The essence of the revolution consequently lies not so much in compulsion, which is characteristic of war, as in the creative establishment of a new society. War and socialist revolution coo not coincide in methods and forms of achieving political goals. In contrast to war, for which employment of means of armed violence and mass armed struggle is a specific, determining indicator from the standpoint of form of implementation of political. goals, the socialist revolution presupposes, depending on specific historical conditions of place and time, a variety of ways, methods and means of achieving common goals. Marxists have never claimed that the conquest of power must he achieved everywhere and in all cases with identical means. Lenin warned against stereotype in determining the forms of transition to socialism and criticized attempts to shift the center of gravity from the content of the term revolution to the forms of its manifestation. Withcut predetermining in advance the method of gaining political power, without absolutizing any given variant of implementing the socialist revolution, he considered it essential to master all, without the slightest exception, forms of struggle, to be prepared for a rapid shift from one form to another. ",.,Marxism definitely does not renounce any forms of struggle," Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 wrote Lenin (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 14, page 1). The ruling classes do not voluntarily yield power, and therefore revolution is always social coercion, but it does not always constitute phys'cal, armed violence. The methods and forms of gaining political power depend on the general conditions of the era, the specific situation in each country and its na- tional features, the acuteness of class conflicts, the correlation of class forces, the degree of organization and political maturity of the worker class and its allies, skilled party guidance, as well as on the strength or weakness of resistance by the bourgeoisie. Consequently, selection of forms of struggle is based not on subjective desires but rather on the objective logic of historical development. Each party elaborates its own policy, specifies areas, forms and methods of struggle and selects, depending on circumstances, a peaceful or nonpeaceful path of transition to socialism. The Chinese schismatics have placed their dogmatic and adventurist position in opposition to the scientific conclusions of the Leninist parties, which have been confirmed by practical experience. A Marxist-Leninist concept of the socialist revolution is alien to the Maoists. They reduce the revolu- tionary process to extreme forms of armed activity, justify the correctness of Blanquist insurrections, etc. They replace the decisive role of the class struggle with the determining significance of war, absolutize armed violence as the highest form of class struggle, as the main front of struggle, and have declared war to be an ideal toward which one riust strive. In actual fact the highest form of class struggle is the socialist revolu- tion proper. Armed violence cannot be called the highest form of class struggle. It is the most acute but not the highest and not an absolutely mandatory form. Utilizing the ultrarevolutionary phrase fcr purposes of obfuscation, the Maoists are playing into the hands of capitalism. Denying the possibility of employing peaceful means, they express thereby a lack of faith in the power of the worker class and its allies, in the strength of the socialist community. Orienting themselves totally toward the achievement of results on the basis of war and assessing the"cultural revolution" as a great mili- tary exercise "with the got'. of preparing to wage a popular war," the Maoists in fact are joining the general chant of the American "superhawks" with their militarist slogan "Victory, Not Peace," Thus by the very logic of things leftist slogans converge with the slogans of the extreme rightist supporters of ultramilitarism, who openly state that they are constrained by no caution in selection of the means of struggle. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 For justification of this petit-bourgeois, anarchist element, the Peking propagandists have replaced materialist dialectics with sophistry and eclecticism. They translate Marxist-Leninist dialectics into the language of demagoguery and a subjectivist fast shuffle. They seek to make capital on the element of authenticity, absolutizing it, removing it from the general context. It is a well-known fact that a strategy of protracted guerrilla warfare was implemented in China when an offensive was being mounted on the cities from the rural areas. This strategy, failing to take the concrete situation into account and hypertrophied to a global scale, is expressed in the absurd theory of revolutionary war of the "world village" (the entire nonindustrial world of -Asia, Africa, and Latin America) with the "world city" (the industrially developed regions of Europe and North America), which includes the Soviet Union. Thus the specific knowledge of tactics of guerrilla warfare in an. agrarian country is sophistically universalized and transferred to the world arena. History indeed knows of many instances of temporary coincidence of war and revolution, revolution and civil war, but this is not a natural law. Maoist claims are rejected by Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolu- tion and by the very experience ref the world revolutionary process. A revolutionary situation does not necessarily become transformed into a revolution as a result of war. The experience of the 1919 Hungarian revolution is of interest. The bourgeois dictatorship collapsed under the pressure of a powerful worldwide wave of revolution, as it was unable to cope with the growing revolutionary crisis in Hungary. The Hungarian Com- munist leader Bela Kun, who enjoyed solid support by the masses, took over as head of government. As Lenin stated, the transition to a Soviet system, to dictatorship of she proletariat was incomparably easier and more peaceful in Hungary (Poln. Sobr. Soch.,, Volume 38, page 260). The young Hungarian revolution was crushed by the forces of domestic and external counterrevolution. Soviet Russia, whose every effor.i: was committal to the struggle against foreign intervention and domestic counterrevolution, was unable to lend that assistance which would have been possible under different circumstances. In the People's Damocrac.ies of Central and South- eastern Europe the worker class, under the leadership of Marxist-Leninist parties, ensured an essentially peaceful transition from democratic to socialist revolution, under different historical conditions, with a more favorable balance of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces in the international arena. It is characteristic that a revui?.icion is not always accomplished in that country which has participated in war. The revolution is victorious wherever a revolutionary situation has been established. Sixty-one nations were drawn into World War II, while a socialist revolution took place in 11, countries, where internal preconditions existed. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Nor is civil war a mandatory form of class political struggle, Lenin spoke of the necessity of the most acute class struggle under certain historical conditions of civil war. One must bear in mind the fact that "the world bourgeoisie is organizing and waging civil war against the revolutionary proletariat..." (Poln, Sobr. Soch., Volume 39, page 187). The Bolsheviks demonstrated an example of combination of peaceful and non- peaceful means of struggle and flexibly utilized them, depending on the prevailing situation. Specific patterns and relationships are inherent both in war and socialist revolution. The course and outcome of an armed conflict depends on the correlation of economic, moral-political and military forces of the belligerent states. This is the most general law of war, and war is not at all mandatory for the transition from capitalism to socialism. Revolution as a mandatory and inevitable condition for transition by any capitalist country to socialism, with all the unique features and diversity of the individual countries, develops on the basis of the same common patterns of collapse of the exploiter edifice of state and the establish- ment in one form or another of a dictatorship of the proletariat, which has entered into an alliance with other toiler strata, liquidation of exploiter classes, nationalization of the means of production and establish- ment of socialist production and other societal relations in city and village, and acquisition of cultural treasures by the broad toiler masses. Although the genesis of an imperialist war is determined by laws in- herent in imperialism, it can be prevented, since a new world balance of forces has been created. Nothing can prevent a socialist revolution, how- ever, since there are no other means than socialist revolution to resolve the increasingly-acute conflict between labor and capital. Thus war and the socialist revolution, constituting societal phenomena engendered by the exploiter capitalist system, are not mandatorily linked by cause and effect relations. They have fundamentally different sources of origination, motive forces, method., and forms of implementing political goals. The attitude of the masses toward them is fundamentally different. The laws of war and revolution are specific. Features of dif.ferenc,: between war and socialist revolution do not exclude but rather presume a dialectical interrelationship, flexible, mobile, multifaceted and profoundly contradictory interlinks between them. Correlation Between War and Socialist Revolution Revolutionary processes cannot be viewed in an isolated fashion, abstract- ing from other social phenomena, including wars between nations and civil Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 wars. Wars between nations have a definite effect on development of the class struggle and maturation of the revolutionary situation; the so- cialist revolution in turn influences the origination of a war, its course and outcome. Wars between nations, particularly world wars, exert a dual influence on the socialist revolution: on the one hand they speed up the ripening of a revolutionary situation and on the other hand inhibit and complicate achievement of the goals of revolution. In many cases an aggressive, unjust war functions as a catalyst of revolu- tionary processes. It leads to an excessive strain on all socioeconomic contradictions of capitalism and creates a dynamic situation as regards the political interrelationships between classes. World War I generated in Russia prof'iind revolutionary moods among the masses and placed them before a dilemma: to perish or to overthrow the yoke of capital by revolutionary means, to pass final judgment on social institutions which had lost their viability. Under certain conditions war is capable of accelerating the maturation of objective and subjective preconditions for a socialist revolution. In the first place, an unjust war exposes the policy of the ruling classes, unmasks its class, antipopular character and promotes a deepening of the "summit" crisis. The conflict between people and government is manifested particularly acutely when a war fails to bring victory to the aggressor. Under these conditions the government is unable to pull the nation out of crisis, writhes in agony, going from one extremity to the other, displaying nervousness and confusion. Political improvisations may assume the character of governmental desperation. The "summit" loses the ability to administer and govern. Secondly, during the course of an aggressive war the government is more dependent on the people than during peacetime. The masses are drawn into the war by the millions. The times are long since past when, for example, it sufficed Nicholas I to give the command: "Gentlemen, mount up! France has become a republic!" t o strangle with impunity a revolutionary war by means of intervention. Today the militarists are compelled to adapt them- selves and adjust, but opportunities for maneuver are narrowing, During war it is more difficult to play at democracy. Militarist propaganda loses its force, since it contradicts the experience of the masses. In addition, the highly-trained,, militaristic officer caste dwindles away in numbers as casualties rise. The toiler masses, now dressed in uniforms, possess in their hands weapons which they can turn against their oppressors. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Thirdly, war aggravates social antagonisms, brings even greater suffering to the toilers and deepens the discrepancy between the rising level of greedy demands of the bourgeoisie and toiler living standards, Today this te*~dency is -'hewing up increasingly clearly in the world's richest capitalist natioi., which is staggering v.ider the burden of war in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the United States the mad rampage of militarization, whipped to a fever pitch by the war, is dev,'uiing the lion's share of the gross naticaal product. The arms race and related climb in military expenditures constitutes the main reason for a growing burden of taxation. The monetary crisis, which is leading to inflation -- rising prices, stagnation or decline in real wages -- is becoming a real calamity to the toilers. The monetary crisis which broke out in the United States has led to confusion throughout the capitalist world. Crisis phenomena, which are aggravated in the course of an unjust war, im- part greater dynamism to the historical process. "...It is precisely the 'instability' of capitalism," wrote Lenin, "which is that enormous progres- sive factor which is accelerating societal development, drawing the masses to an increasing degree into the mainstream of societal life, com- pelling them to think about its structure, compelling them to 'forge out their own prosperity"' (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 2, page 208). Fourthly, war exerts influence on a regrouping of class forces and promotes changes in the sociopolitical situatic:n which cxestes an objective pos- sibility for a decisive onslaught on capitalism. The popular masses open- ly engage in sociopolitical affairs. Indignation breaks through to the surface. There occur active mass demonstrations by the worker class and progressive forces, which escalate into decisive, revolutionary actions. Tile masses acquire their own political experience and rally around their political vanguard, the worker class. Symptomatic phenomena are occurring today in the United States, to a substantial degree under the influence of the war. Animosity and hostility toward the military-industrial complex is being aroused; there is a lack of confidence in both the Democratic and Republican parties. Confusion and dissatisfaction are being manifested even among those elements friendly toward the regime; more and more social groups are escaping from the in- fluence of the ruling class. In the recent past the leaders of the military-industrial complex spoke much about the stability of capitalism, counting on the political in- difference of large segments of the population, on the "silent majority." The process of activization of the masses in a country whose rulers are waging bloody aggression is becoming increasingly apparent, Broad segments of the population are being drawn into the struggle, including those which prior to the dirty war in Vietnam maintained a state of political lethargy. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 This awakening frequently channels into various streams of a spontaneous antimonopoly, antimilitarist, national-democ-Tatic movement. One must bear in mind, however, that it can also be utilized by reactionary forces. It is extremely important to bring the nor.proletarian masses into the world revolutionary liberation movement headed by the worker class and Marxist- Leninist parties. Fifthly, war speeds up the process of delimitation of class elements in the imperialist army. During World War I favorable conditions developed in Russia for movement by soldiers and sailors to the side of the revolution, for development of the class struggle emong the troops. The prediction of Friedrich Engels that the day would come when soldiers under arms would refuse to kill their brothers and fathers had come true. Under present-day conditions increased social unreliability of military personnel, particularly under the influence of the dirt}- and unsuccessful war which is being waged in Indochina, is characteristiz even of the army of the citadel of modern capitalism, the United States, It is true that this army still constitutes a powerful war machine capable of carrying out inhuman orders but, to quote the magazine Newsweek, the war in Vietnam has become "poison in the veins of the American army." We are all familiar with the fact that military personnel transferred from Vietnam to other units, including in Western Europe, carry with them a spirit of distrust and rebelliousness. Upon arriving home they frequently become antiwar activists. In the spring of 1971 Washington was stunned by a demonstration by Vietnam veterans, which took place in conjunction with widespread strikes by American toilers, a stepped-u? movement against racial oppression and increasing public protest against the domination of the military-industrial complex and the bureaucrat:Lc police edifice. In order to achieve development of the revolutionary situation it is essential that people, accumulating political experience under the in- fluence of Marxist-Leninist ideology, reach an awareness of their class missions, that a substantial increase in mass political awareness and activeness take place on the basis of increased organization, conscious discipli"e and expansion of the influence and leadership role of the Communist Party. International solidarity of the worker class, interna- tional solidarity in the revolutionary struggle, and unification of various currents of the revolutionary process into a single mainstream capable of crushing the exploiter system, acquires particular importance. An unjust war contains negative aspects from the standpoint of prospects for development of the socialist revolution. Accelerating its advance in certain cases, wars can have a negative effect:. Under conditions of a Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 war situation, a reactionary government endeavors to establish a rigid dictatorship,, strengthens the military-bureaucratic edifice, encourages terrorist actions against the toilers and the liberation movement, and organizes reprisals against revolutionary and democratic elements. During the period of preparing for and in the course of waging war the imperialists, as is the case, for example, in the United States, endeavor to chain society with despotic military rule, All aspects of activity are permeated with bureaucracy and militarization. Factory, office, city, and the state as a whole are transformed into a barracks. Liberal American journalist Fred Cook had reason to call the United States a symbolic juggernaut - - a garrison state, a being of ruthless force demanding of its subjects blind faith and a willingness for self-destruction. Political repression, military despotism, lawlessness and the employment of cruel, punitive actions complicate revolutionary activities and make the establishment of links between the worker class and the masses more dif- f icult. In the course of war, under conditions of intensified political reaction, favorable soil is created for d=formation of revolutionaries and the burgeoning of opportunism. Great numbers of petit-bourgeois elements, in- fected with opportunism, elements who have evaded mobilization, replace cadre workers who have bees. cast into the field of battle. Savage acts of repression against the most, conscious members of the worker class and their leaders can revive conciliatory, compromise-prone parties and trade unions, which make political deals with the bourgeoisie, making capital on the nationalist-chauvinist attitudes of ideologically immature in- dividuals. There also exists a danger of another kind. An imitation of revolutionary nature, leftist adventurism may arise in an atmosphere. of unrest, dis- satisfaction and growing anger against militarism. The strategy and tactics of the Communist and worker parties rigorousLy take into account all the plus and minus points of the effect of a war in a given specific historical situation. Positive prospects are borne in mind under conditions of any and all difficulties. The exploiter classes, initiating aggression, have the goal of diverting the attention of the toiler masses from internal political crises, of disuniting and fooling the masses, of destroying the vanguard, of weakening the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. Their cal- culations, however, ultimately fail. A general tendency of development of the class-antagonistic society is specifically revealed in this area -- the law of discrepancy between the content of the objective and the pract'.cal results of the activities of the ruling class. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 The influence of war on development of the class struggle and maturation of the revolutionary situation is not one-sided. A process of inverse influence is extremely important. The effect of a victorious socialist revolution is particularly powerful. It creates a new, unprecedented op- portunity to eliminate war from the experience of society. Only a social- ist revolution can liquidate the exploiter classes and do away with the conditions which produce wars. The Great October Socialist Revolution plucked our nation from the maw of a bloody imperialist war. Popular dcmocra-ic followed by socialist revolutions in many European and Asian nations helped bring World War II to a speedy end. When we, wrote Lenin, 'overthrow, ultimately defeat and expropriate the bourgeoisie throughout the world, not only in one country, wars will become impossible" (Poln. Sobr. Soch.,.Volume 30, pp 133-134). Complete accomplishment of this task is a thing of the future, although even now, where victorious socialist revolutions have taken place in many countries, with the ensuing creation of a mighty community of socialist states, which enjoy vast international prestige and authority, a formidable obstacle has been placed in the path of the aggressive policies of i-.nperialism. The era of imperialism has been correctly defined as an era of wars and revolutions. It is nou pos- sible to prevent or even exclude world wars from society even prior to the complete victory of socialism tlroughout the world. The victory of so- cialist revolutions in a number of countries has given particular im- portance to external, international conditions of maturation of precondi- tions for a socialist revolution in other countries. Socialism is receiv- ing the opportunity to dictate to the iiorld bourgeoisie both the forms of struggle and the battlefield as well. The ratio between peaceful and nonpeaceful forms of socialist revolution has changed substantially. Under conditions of total hegemony of im- perialism the peaceful path of revolution was improbable, an extremely rare historical possibility, although extremely desirable. Since the war a socialist revolution without wa has become increasingly probable, a fact which of course does not remove from the agenda or diminish the role of the nonpeaceful course of revolution. Economic development of socialist nations constitutes a powerful and revolutionizing factor in the world, Lenin appraised economic success as a force and factor of revolution. One can hardly exaggerate the effect on the masses elsewhere in the world produced by successful development of a new society in a number of countries in various parts of the globe. The very fact of existence of a socialist world constitutes enormous assistance to the toilers in the capitalist nations in their struggle for their rights. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 The Comprehensive Program of Further Deepening and Improvement of Coopera- tion in Development of Socialist Economic 'Lntegration of the CEMA Member Nations, passed at the 25th Session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (1971), attests to the political solidarity of the, nations of the socialist community, to the indisputable advantages of socialism over capitalism and, 'i.he attractive force of the., positive example of socialism. Under peacetime conditions one observes enormous changes,in development of the world revolutionar=y process. Imperialism is receiving increasingly telling blows both in the central areas of its domination and on the flanks -- delivered by the peoples of colonial and dependent: countries. Everywhere, in all capitalist nations, the bourgeoisie is experiencing an intensifying onslaught by the labor movement. Militant demonstrations by tens of r,.illions of proletarians constitute the best response to the fabrications of the enemies of Leninism, who are spreading a lie about the alleged loss of revolutionary spirit by the worker class, The founders of scientific communism have emphasized time and again that, utilizing the entire arsenal of means of revolutionary overthrow, it is essential to seek ways toward less painful forms of revolutionary trans- formations. Marx Marx and Engels stated that it was desirable for the prole- tariat to take over power by peaceful means, without armed violence, with a minimum of lives lost and detriment to productive resources, in order to speed up the building of socialism. Taking into account the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolu- tion, Lenin stated that although the socialist revcli. `ion connected with the world war led to the collapse of capitalism, "one could not conceive of a more painful, more difficult transition, more acute deed and a more acute crisis, undermining all productive forces" (Poln, Sobr. Soon,, Velum' 36, page 397). Revolution breaking out during Oar "is a particularly difficult case of birth" of a new social system. Lenin's idea was reflected in the Manifesto of the Communist International, adopted at the First Comintern Congress: "Never artificially inciting civil war, Communist parties en- deavor to make it as brief as possibly when a civil war of necessity occurs, to reduce the number: of victims and particularly to ensure the victory of the proletariat." In the eighties of the last century the founders of Marxism approached the prospects of a temporary convergence of the socialist revolution with a general European war "with redoubled caution." Under the new conditions, Lenin emphasized, particular prudence is necessary, since war "will result in unprecedented brutalization and backwardness of all Europe..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 36, page 397). Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 A nuclear missile war would lead to even more devastating consequences than the two world wars. Such a war could destroy a lrrge part of the world's productive resources, is capable of inflicting ill.-afforded losses on the worker class and retarding the movement toward communism, since it would take a long time to rebuild. the economy, culture, and. local resources. The end objective of the socialist revolution is not s mply the overthrow of capitalism at any price but rather the building of communism. The Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence is consequently not a temporary slogan but rather a realistic, scientifically-substantiated political course. It most fully reflects the interests of the toilers of the entire world and the interests of development of the world revolutionary process. The Chinese dissenters scoff :9t the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence. They portray Marxist-Leninist.^ in the. caricature of toothlass pacifists who are counting on "the love of peace and humanitarian nature of the im- perialists"; at every opportunity :hey raise a cry about an' alleged deal between the USSR and the United States. They cynically ignore the: genuine dialectic of Marxist-Leninist foreign policy, characteristic of which are purposefulness, consistency, boldness and decisiveness, refusal to compromise in the struggle against imperialist aggression, and at the same time composure, caution, and precise calculation. The dialectics of the Leninist foreign policy course are consequently such that "the love of peace and willingness to offer suitable resistance to aggression are totally merged and coalesced in our policy.i2 The 24th CPSU Congress, in its "Freedom and Peace for the Peoples of Indo- china!" appeal and its "For a Just and Solid. Peace in the Near East" declaration, confirmed a readiness and willingness to continue resolute support of the just cause of the peoples of Indochina and the Near East, which have been made the victims of imperialist aggression. A revolutionary course without war is not reformism, it is not a negation of the revolution, nor does it constitute social partnership between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; it is a savage bttle which demands of Marxist-Leninist parties flexibility, firmness and resoluteness. It is not demobilization but rather mobilization of the masses, isolation of both rightist opportunists and "leftist" sectarians and schismatics. Peaceful coexistence between nations of diff3ring social systems does not mean absolutization of peaceful forms of socialist revolution in a given country, nor does it exclude the employment of arned forms of revolution in certain areas of the class struggle. "The policy of peaceful coexistence is not in contradiction to the right of oppressed peoples to utilize in the Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 struggle for their liberation that path which they consider necessary -- military or, nonmilitary...i3 The struggle between socialism and capitalism is a class struggle in all areas of societal affairs and activities, including military. Under con- ditions of increased aggressiveness on the part of imperialism, the greatest vigilance is necessary. Our Communist Party is rigidly guided by Lenin's instructions that "we must accompany our by stepping up our military preparedness..." (Poln. steps Sobr. toward Soch., peace Volume 40, page 248). Minister of Defense A. A. Grechko declared at the 24th CPSU Congress that the Soviet Union is prepared, Logether with the other so- 'ialist nations, to respond to force with superior force. FOOTNOTES 1. Le Duan: "Under the Glorious Party Banner," Pravda, 24 March 1970. 2. L. I. Brezhnev: Speech delivered at a meeting of constituents on 12 Juae 1970. 3. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye k.ommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy (International Conference of Communist and ?-Iorker Parties), Politizdat, 1970, page 317. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 ON THE QUESTION OF PROGRAMMED LEARNING Col Gen I. Shkadov, Chief, Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense USSR The principal task in the area of training officer cadres consists in implementing the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress on further development of higher and secondary specialized education in conformity with the demands of scientific and technological progress, improvement in the quality of training and ideological-political indoctrination of future specialists. In accomplishing this task military educational institutions not only equip students with the requisite volume of knowledge and practical skills, a volume rapidly growing under present-day conditions, which constitutes an objective pattern; they also form in sti'dents a scientific philosophical outlook and creative thinking, indoctrinate Communist conviction, party- mindedness, moral-psychological and professional qualities. Therefore implementation of party emands is inconceivable without seeking new and improving existing form:, ?f organization of the curricular process and methods of training and inductrination. Collective study efforts by military iducational institutions in this area have enriched our educational science with effective methods cf working with students, have created the opportunity to improve organization of the curricular process and have made it possible to incorporate modern. tech- nical devices the employment of which within the framework of tradicional forms has promoted intensification of he learning process and improved control.and management of this process. An article by Lt Gen P. Vashurin entitled "More Widely Adopting Programmed Learningi1 and responses to this article2 reflect an endeavor on the part of military higher educational institutions faculty to achieve further improvement of the curricular process as well as their interest in this problem, to which more than 5000 publications have been dedicated in the last 10 years in the Soviet Union alone. During this same period effective studies of the problems of programmed learning have been conducted at military educational institutions. In 1967 a special scientific theory Conference was held; on the basis of the results in this conference clear-cut guidelines were presented for the con- duct of scientific investigation in the area of improving the curricular process and one of its elements, programmed learning. In conformity with these guidelines, a comprehensive scientific research effort is being conducted under the general supervision of the Main Directorate of Military Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 1 4 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense USSR at service academies, schools and in other bodies. It is planned to complete this program by the end of this year. A number of conclusions based on this program are already being implemented in the schooling process. We should note that matters pertaining to programmed learning which are discussed in the journal Voyennaya Mysl' reflect the results of these studies. The conclusions of scientific investigations and experience in utilizing programmed learning methods at military educational institutions and at higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education USSR indicate that they produce positive results, which are influencing the rate of learning, quality, depth and firmness of assimilation of knowledge by students and attest to its effectiveness. But in order to utilize this method with maximum effect for accomplishing the overall task, it is essential clearly to see its advantages and draw- backs and to determine the role and place of programmed learning in instructional procedure. In the initial period of elaboration of this problem, when there was lack- ing a clear-cut definition of the essence of programmed learning, its con- tent, as well as its tole and place in the instructional process, some specialists excessively enlard the area of application of programmed learning. The author of the article "More Widely Adoptin(r? Programmed Learning" as well as the authors of several replies to this article also failed to avoid this error. They continue to assign it the function of determining demands on future specialists, determination of an optimal volume of knowledge and skills, elaboration of scientifically-substantiated curriculum plans and programs, organization of the instructional procedure, lecture methods, employment of technical devices in teaching, etc. This is evidently due to an insufficiently clear idea on the differences between programmed learning, the programming of instruction , scientific organiza- tion of the instruction process, curriculum and instruction programs. As early as 1967 an editorial in the journal Sovetskaya Pedagogika (No 7, page 41) st C(o) P cs c S where Ecs -- effectiveness of new control system; E(S)-- effectiveness of old control system; p -- commensurability factor of system operational- tactical effectivenss and cost. If this condition is not observed, that is economic outlays for the con- struction: or improvement of system exceed the rise in the required level of its operational-tactical effectiveness, the control system is in- expedient. In this case ways to reduce its cost should be sought. Other criteria, reflecting the specific features of the functioning of various system elements, can also be employed in appraising individual control subsystems. For example, in an appraisal of control of radio and radar reconnaissance these will include: anticipated number of enemy installations reconnoitered, timetables for presentation of data on enemy offensive %t'.clear weapons and other targets, cost of efficiently operating reconnais,arLce means. Criteria for appraising rear services control can include probability of prompt support services fir troop combat operations, quantity of current stores at supply dumps_ outlx,.: for the transport of delivered supplies and equipment, as well as the cost of maintaining rear services records, etc. Control subsystems of the various arias also have their own specific effectiveness indices. General principles of approach to effectiveness appraisal and many of the above-examined criteria; however, are applicable for describing each subsystem. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 MILITARY CAMOUFLAGE* Engr-Lt Col Kh. Adam; Lt Col R. Gebel', Candidate of Military Science The experience of World W ar II and particularly of the national liberation wars of the postwar period indicates that success in any military operation is inconceivable without adequate concealment of both m:.litary installa- tions and troop activities. Continuous improvement in camouflage and concealment techniques in peacetime promotes maintenance of a high degree of troop combat readiness. As is well known, there exist various approaches toward studying camouflage, its content and structure. Tn our investigations we proceed from the posi- tion that there exists a dialectical interrelationship between camouflage and hostile reconnaissance. The essence of this interrelationship con- sists in the fact that reconnaissance constantly sees to detect targets and to determine their nature., and this engende:-s in the opposing side an objective necessity and effort to resort to various forms of camouflage and concealment (active and passive). Figure 1 shows the structure of military camouflage, as well. as the inter- relationship between its nature and demands imposed, as the authors see it. Camouflage is divided into tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical camouflage is effected on a tactical scale and consists: in utiliz- ing time of day or night, geographic and weather conditions, employing camouflage devices and materials, with the aim of concealing (camouflaging) separate installations and small subunits, as well as for simulating solitary installations (small subun.'.ts) and displaying feigned tactical activity in combination with observance of camouflage discipline. Operational camouflage is a type of operation support. It promotes the achievement of operational surprise. It includes: keeping operation preparations secret (radio silence, concealed control, dissemination of false information to the enemy) ; concealment of troop regroupings, camou- flage of assembi areas of support echelons (reserves and supply bases) ; creation of dummy troop concentrations, command posts, defensive installa- tions, structures, etc. The effect of operational camouflage is achieved only with strict obser- vance of tactical camouflage measures. * MilitArwesen, No 9, 1970; No 3, 1971. 79 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Bo wYcR n'nCNU/)u;rn,u TONl7.7u'/eC Unepo;n t7~J0/7If J11 NoA 4 ; cK;r~ 9vda'U51- 3eY.7 ce7 Z Cam ao- .iccxupyenv2a o6semo 24 r%>NmUYCL'.YaA U C/I0~7U3~+UN C,7 AO39edxO /Lw'Pua urn? 28 Figure 1. Structure of military camouflage Key to figure: 1 -- military camouflage; 2 -- tactical; 3 -- operational; 4 -- strategic; 5 -- missions; 6 -- camouflaged object; 7 - physical properties; 8 -- basis for meeting requirements; 9 -- aim; 10 -- demands; 11 -- aggregate of conditions; 12 -- objective conditions; 13 -- manpower, means and purpose of camouflage; 14 -- subjective conditions; 15 -- camou- flage properties; 16 -- theoretical knowledge; 17 -.- terrain concealment properties; 18 -- means and methods of enemy reconnaissance; 19 -- camou- flage effect; 20 -- revealing signs; 21 -- camouflage discipline and ob- servance of secrecy; 22 -- weather conditions and tine of day or night; ijOCNaA6/ dNp a 1OonNeNUN m~l?ccdoHUu ~- - - - - r - CunSr, C 9i a77J9ubcm I a710Kyn 3 ____ NOCmb (/C - ? 12 CJa:x,nua? Ccr6aeN? NS;e ycno 1'/eNSIB reopcmu? au~ ycncalfl4 I VGCNUe 16 - _ . 1 , a r 4cwuw - ~a c"d5 ? pvJaedvu hfacxa a- C,;JO rromuaNU I P Y-:,77.40- M7 d0YN0A dUC m'J [(UnnUNO U 18 m,,1, 6 ue ;aau.+ U I epenq I P: rue#Ue cymcN22 ~ YOr7ONoU Pa 23 1;'JCNUp0a0 V- 'V'; /e CdQUCf- 15do "OCNU;7O ? 50q NSW ff-Min-NU. /,yw ; ue npr'7NOxw; 201 O Py.wcx' (uU 'Cl 25 PiecmNDCmu Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 (Key to Figure 1 on previous page, continued) 23 -- commander decision; 24 -- properties o2 ~.nstallatic.i to be camouflaged; 25 -- terrain back- ground; 26 -- types (forms) of camouflage; 27 -- simulation; 28 -- hostile reconnaissance; 29 -- objective Strategic camouflage as we define it constitutes a component of defense of home territory and includes camouflage of important installations from the moment of their construction. It is quite obvious that not all such camouflage measures can and should be carried out in peacetime. The objective of camouflage depends on the nature of the proposed actions (o,)eration) and their scale. In general form it will reduce to preventing the enemy from discovering our intentions, to deluding the enemy, and thus minimizing potential losses. This is achieved by concealing troops well, by reducing the degree of recognition and identification of targets (by altering their external configuration, color, etc), as well as by feigned actions (demonstration). The following types of camouflage are differentiated on the basis of properties of camouflaged objects: concealment against direct observation - optical, light, sound, heat, infrared, radio and radar (antiradar), con- cealment of operation of friendly reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering devices. Concealment of troops and weapons from hostile ground and air observation is one of the principa' duties of commanders of all echelons, Concealment can be total or partial, depending on the situation, terrain conditions, as well as av;.:Llable time. It is possible to reduce the revealing signs of troops and objects, if it is not possible to conceal them from hostile observation, by altering their external appearance. For example, a large camp or supply base can be camouflaged as a town, a tank farm can be camoufiaged as apartment houses, While individual military installations can be camouflaged as rubble, smoldering ruins, etc. Important elemants of a camouflage effort are the mounting of feigned assaults and the con- struccion of dummy defensive fortifications (control posts). Such ac- tions can be employed not only at the tactical echelon but particularly at the operational and strategic- We have already noted the existence of a direct relationship between hostile reconnaissance and camouflage (it is indicated in Table 1). The task of camouflage is to conceal installations (targets) from hostile ground, air and space observation both in the area of combat operations and deep in rear areas. Any of the types of camouflage enumerated in the table presumes the fullest utilization of terrain, weather conditions and various means of concealing and camouflaging objects in order to reduce the Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010003-1 2 1 Ln It till 411.)JP 11 X X Y J O r. K G CIIBIIIMB X X X Ln UIIOgillalfauocual x x x x X CV = N YMrae x x n -.-CCd OHIrud God y y ` ?OiOJadaU xroH -1101~1JVJ1 fHN X -PCHNI.Cv3tron Hvrancvd pox]anHIF ?!dlouol YYl]rad7? XXX :>C X X Uod ?(le?tUUVY (JOM] p-anudl.arloL cfc x X N - -- - r . n per I1a1IH X x Y8NRI,CV3000 t~ YMrauCYdovltj) r-( X x x X XOQOHOI])A mill ?N OH CHHOW31 o1VrnO6`1 }' X ?00 ] allHa17OuV9214 CY) 4 1IVNYH]]YII X X X x X60 r(~ ^V 0== C = x YrFH a HJ.VT X X X X X N 11do9Hdu auM]apui r-j ?uo v aiIHarav92H X X X X "ore Vl hn HHa`Kcdo ' x x - 094H all HarOIL 9fH _ b p . . ? x -A o o U1 a' F? r_~ a . - N x N. o X O r O p C 7- r 0 W-CO3 ? v aaa 'svJl Y d r{ cl X iJ G u 2 u u c O M 0- r:. 0 n - ''3 J O auX ono va M c 0 O 0 `) 2 v O a 3 C a~i C, G. ri v O Table 1. Interrelationship betareert camouflage and reconnaissance Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Key to Table 1 on previous page: 1 -- types of camouflage; 2 -- optical camouflage; 3 -- light camouflage; 4 -- sound camouflage; 5 -- radar camouflage; 6 -- infrared camouflage; 7 -- heat camouflage; 8 -- radio camouflage; 9 -- camouflage of reconnaissance equipment operation; 10 -- capabilities of hostile reconnaissance; 11 -- naked-eye observation; 12 -- observation with instruments; 13 -- observation with the aid of infrared instruments; 14 -- active; 15 -- passive; 16 -- observation with the aid of television; 11" p- hotoreconnaissance; 18 -- acoustic recon- naissance; 19 -- eavesdropping; 20 -- with sound ranging equipment; 21 -- topographic reconnaissance equipment; 22 -- reconnaissance with communica- tions devices, 23 -- intercepting telephone traffic; 24 -- radio reconnais- sance; 25 -- heat ranging; 26 - radar reconnaissance effectiveness of hostile reconnaissance. These objectives should also be promoted by comprehensive utilization of various types of camouflage, the interrelationship between which is shown in Figure 2. We shall briefly describe the basic types of camouflage. Optical and light camouflage is directed against hostile visual and photographic, including aerospace reconnaissance. It consists in utilizing the camouflaging and concealing properties of the terrain, adverse weather conditions, hours of darkness, observance of specific illumination con- ditions, giving objects camouflaging shapes, employment of camouflage nets and other devices, as well as the construction of dummy installations, in- cluding light-emitting. Sound camouflage is directed against hostile acoustic reconnaissance and consists in reducing the noise level of operating vehicles and machinery (displacement of mechanized troops, the sound of submarine engines, etc) or in simulating noise produced by dummy installations. The varying nature of concealment properties of terrain, weather conditions and time of day can facilitate or complicate the conduct of sound camouflage. The sound of an operating vehicle motor, the clanking of tracks, and sounds produced by entrenching tools carry further at night and in fog. Heat camouflage is directed against heat ranging instruments (indicators) and other enemy equipment capable of detecting thermal-contrast objects aircraft in the sky, ships in the water, missiles in flight, etc. Heat camouflage supplements optical and improves the overall concealment ef- fect. This is achieved by employing a special heat-insulating screening layer to conceal particularly important installations, by the extensive utilization of heat-protective terrain propett.Les, by employing screens, blinds, by constructing dummy installations with a heat source, as well as by utilizing water or air-cooling systems. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 I cc/wpodYa 00dO- E-,,7 ,776/ p036edb/60 - 2 ' /l npu6opod Padua - r7ockupoaxo 4 Tenaceos 7 MCCA'upc8X0 HHq7pcKpCCNOA nocNupoeka Figure 2. Interrelationship between types of camouflage Key to figure: 1 - optical camouflage; 2 -- camouflage of operation of reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering instruments; 3 -- light camou- flage; 4 -- radio camouflage; 5 -- sound camouflage; 6 -- radar camou- flage; 7 -- heat camouflage; 8 -- infrared camouflage Infrared camouflage is directed against hostile visual reconnaissance employing active and passive infrared observation devices, as well as against infrared photography. This is achieved by reducing the infrared radiation given off by objects, by setting up additional radiation sources with the aim of altering the configuration of the camouflaged objects or installations, and by utilizing camouflage nets, blinds, and other op- tical camouflage devices. When employing active infrared observation devices one should periodically change their position; at halting points headlights should be switched off immediately, for technical reasuL.s. The fact that visual reconnaissance comprises the basis of enemy recon- naissance on the battlefield substantially enhances the role of infrared camouflage and at the same time complicates it. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Radar and radio camouflage make the active operation of hostile radar (radio) reconnaissance difficult or impossible. It consists in establish- ing strict operating conditions, limiting the operation of radioelectronic equipment and eliminating revealing signs when utilizing them. Decoy radar installations are set up, and false information is fed to the enemy. One must bear in mind that identification of concealed or camouflaged in- stallations by hostile radar reconnaissance means is made difficult by the simultaneous display on enemy radar screens of a large number of reflected signals, concealing the true position of the target being sought. When carrying out radar camouflage it is essential to make maximum use of ter- rain concealing and camouflaging features. carefully to construct troop ccmbat positions, utilizing camouflage devices (camouflage nets, screens, etc), as well as the extensive employment of simulation of targets (setting up corner reflectors, etc). These measures can be particularly effective against enemy ground and air radar reconnaissance. Table 2. Possibilities of Employing Camouflaging Techniques (Methods) with Various Types of Camouflage g ec n ques (Methods) opti- light sound radar heat iinfra- ra- operation cal red dio of f ri-eni- ly re con- nais- sance de- vices Disruptive Painting x x x Camouflage Nets x x Decoys and Dummies x x Decoy Devices x x x x ,. x Change in Telltale Indicators x x ,. x Feigned Activity x x x Smoke x x Blackouts and Dimouts x x x Utilization of Vegeta- t i ~,a (Flooding) X x x Camoufla e T h i Types of camouflage - Camouflage and concealment devices include the employment of camouflage painting, various types of camouflage nets and screens, smoke devices, blackouts, strictly-regulated use of communications equipment and observa- tion devices, as well as utilization of terrain background (Table 2). Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Selection and utilization of a given camouflaging or concealment device (method) is determined primarily by objective conditions, Of great impor- tance thereby is enemy combat activity and utilized enemy reconnaissance means and methods. One must also bea_. in mind that one and the same method (means) of camouflage can sometimes be used to accomplish several tasks. For example, employment of various types of camouflage coatings (depending on the nature of the material employed) can protect an object not only from visual observation (photography) let also against being spotted by enemy radar. Nor should one ignore such an effective and inexpensive device as various types of smoke thermal generators and the employment of concealing smokes in general. Comprehensive utilization of the above types and aiethods of camouflage will make it possible to achieve msx:imum effect and to compensate for the tell-- tale indications inherent in various military installations. Camouflage should be total, continuous, active, and in keeping with the specific situation and circumstances. This demand acquires particular significance under conditions of enemy utilization of weapons of mass destruction. Increasing sophistication of reconnaissance methods and techniques, in- cluding space reconnaissance and utilization of high-accuracy intelligence- gathering devices, demand in turn a constant improvement in concealment and camouflage methods. Therefore modern military camouflage should be based on the latest scientific and technological advances, Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP8 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHEMICAL SITUATION AND ITS EVALUATION1 Engr-Maj Kh. Gorges (Abridged Translation. by Col I. Andrushkevich) The American imperialists assign an important role in their aggressive plans to the employment noc only of nuclear weapons but also of other weapons of mass destruction as well -- chemical and biological weapons. Chemical and biological agents have many common properties. These weapons are capable of affecting personnel aver large areas, penetrating into various shelters and comba_ vehicles lacking a tight seal Their range of effect is very broad -- from moderate effects leading to temporary loss of combat capability, to death. In the opinion of bourgeois military theorists this property of these weapons is unique in comparison with other weapons, particularly since materiel is not destroyed. Chemical weapons, beginning ir. 1915, have gone through various stages of development. Each succeeding; stage has been d.istinguisl'ed by an increase in the degree of toxicity of chemical warfare agents as well as by the employment of new natural poisons and various toxins, Means of delivery have developed parallel with the development of chemical weapor..s Today the potential enemy possesses chemical warfare agents with a high degree of toxicity, And he may use these agents, in spite of varir,us existing international treaties and bans. Therefore a correct evaluation of the chemical situation is one of the most important duties of every combined-arms headquarters. l-ie should stress that one cannot equate the terms "radiation situation" and "chemical situation," The chemical situation is a component part of the operational-tactical situation. It. arises as a result of the enemy's employment of chemical agents and encompasses the entire aggregate of conditions which in- f_lue.ncc! troop combat operations. We should emphasize that the chemical situation estimate should consist of two parts: a) theoretical assumptions and predictions (computations.), pertaining co the possibility and probable results of de enemy's employment of various chemical agents; b) estimate of th-a specific tactical situations, weather conditions and nature of terrain. Kno~.hedge of the chemical situation makes it possible correctly to estimate troop combat capability and to determine the possibility of their further action, better to organize their individual and collective protection, and prom^.rtly to conduct warning and preventive measures. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Determination of the specific results of the enemy's employment of chemical agents requires a rather long period of time. Therefore a num- ber of measures to neutralize the consequences of a hostile chemical at- tack and for protection of friendly troops should be organized initially on the basis of preliminary calculations, in order to refine them subse- quently, after details have been obtained. Ii, estimating the chemical situation it is essential: to determine the dimensions and degree of contamination of areas of terrain, structures and objects by chemical agents; to determine the direction of spread and height of the base of the chemical cloud; to estimate the potential effect and magnitude of irreplaceable losses in personnel subjected to attack. At the same time it is essential to determine the type of chemical agent employed by the enemy and to determine the damage it has caused, in order to neutralize the consequences of the chemical attack. The content of the various chemical situation evaluation elements will frequently depend on many factors prcceeding from the specific situation. They include, in particular: type, depth, place and time of the attack, degree of surprise, chemical agent employed, met'iod of delivery, character of affected ob- jects; position, mission and nature of actions of fri.andly troops, degree of protection of personnel, total time in contami',zate' areas; weather conditions and nature of terrain: ground level wind direc- tion and velocity, temperature and vertical stability of air mass, season, time of day or night, terrain configuration and vegetation, in- teraction of meteorological and topographic conditions. Determination of type of chemical agents employed by the enemy will make it possible correctly to estimate the results of its effects and to choose the most effective methods of protection of personnel. Knowledge of means of delivery of the chemical agent will make it possible more precisely to determine the boundaries (configuration) of contaminated terrain. Persistence of chemical agents is determined to a substantial degree by weather conditions; this applies in particular to the rate of spread, since the latter is determined by wind velocity and ambient air temperature. Finally, as has been emphasized, any estimate of the chemical situation will be meaningful only when it takes into account specific local conditions. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Commanders and staffs of all echelons should constantly improve methods of rapid and error-free chemical situation estimate. In the interest of prompt and effective protection of troops against chemical warfare agents, o%e should follow a specific sequence and establish optimal scope of ohemical situation estimates. In any case the principal items should be protection of troops against the effects of chemical agents, since the protective gear at their disposal makes it possible to cope with this problem successfully. A prerequisite for purposeful troop protection is comprehensive evaluation of the anticipated effectiveness of an enemy chemical attack. In conclusion we shall emphasize that one should not underrate chemical weapons as a variety of mass destructica weapons, which the enemy may employ in a future war. The imperialists' intentions of using these weapons compel us to add??ess in all seriousness problems of protection against chemical warfare agents. 1. `1ilitarwesen, No 7, 1970. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 RADIO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN THEATERS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS* Maj Gen Sig Trps V. Grankin, Doctor of Military Science, Professor; Engr-Col V. Galinskiy The equipping of armed forces with modern weapons, particularly missile weapons, jet-propelled aircraft and nuclear-powered missile-armed sub- marines, has dictated the necessity of preparing theaters and zore~ .,f military operations for the conduct of warfare and their equipping in ad- vance with electronic systems and devices. The imperialist member nations of the NATO aggressive bloc, particularly the United States, Great Britain, ant West Germany, are applying t},e greatest efforts in this area. In the opinion of military leaders in these countries, prior electronic equipping of these theaters will make it possible to accomplish the fol.- lowing strategic missions: to mount surprise attacks on major enemy cargets with maximum involvement of all available weapons, including nuclear arms; to conduct dynamic offensive and defensive operations on a wide front and to great depth, employing the men and equipment of formations and large units of all services. In addition, radio electronic systems and devices halp secure coordination of ground troops with the other s:ivices, as well as control of formations and large units and their effective utilization. In peacetime they ensure the conduct of continuous intelligence gathering, operational training of staffs and combat training of troops, constituting at the same time an important element in maintaining a high degree of armed forces combat readiness. The principal radio electronic systems and devices with which theaters and zones of military operations are equipped, depending on their intended use, can be arbitrarily divided into the following groups: electronic intel- ligence; control of forces and their nuclear weapons; control of antiair- craft, ABM and space defense forces and weapons; radio navigation. Electronic intelligence systems include radio, television; radar and infra- red (thermal) reconnaissance. Under present-day conditions electronic in- telligence in the armies of the imperialist states has become one of the principal types of strategic and operational intelligence. Its conduct, in addition to ground equipment, involves the extensive utilization of gear carried on hoard aircraft, warships and artificial earth satellites. Equipmer? for toe receipt and processing of intelligence data also is in- cluded in the arsenal of radio electronic equipment of theaters :f military operations. Ground rac'.{o reconnaissance is conducted with the aid of radio intercept networks (stations) and direction finder stations sited in theaters of *From materials published in the foreign press. 90 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 military operations, maintaining continuous watch to intercept propagated signals from enemy radio electronic equipment. According to figures pub- lished in the press, the facilities of the National Security Agency alone, these electronic "eves" and "ears" of the United States, in a 24-hour ? period intercept and DF several million words in 60 languages in all the ate. -. Deployed in every theater, electronic intercept stations make it possible to intelligence-monitor all frequency bands, from the centimeter band to the very low frequency band,, and at ranges up to several thousand kilo- meters. As a rule the intelligence effort conducted with stationary equipment is supplemented by mobile reconnaissance subunits. According to the West German magazine Stern, "dry-land evesdropping" has been organized .o beef up West German electronic intelligence operations in the Western Tieater, with the aid of motorized Bundeswehr radio and electronic reconnaissance subunits ranging along West Germany's border with the GDR and Czecho- slovakia. Air, sea and space radio and electronc surveillance is conducted with the aid of st"ategic, tactical and embarked aircraft, naval ships and artificial earth sar.2ilites carrying special intelligence gear on board. High-altitude reconnaissance flig:its as well as sea observation capabili- ties make it possible substantially to increase the ra.ige of intelligence coverage. According to the procedure established by military leaders in the United States and other imperialist nations, electronic reconnaissance aircraft fly regular missions along the borders of the socialist nations and over international waters adjoining their territory, while specially-equipped ships ;aintain a constant intelligence watch. For example, West Germany maintains two so- ,-.lled "research vessels" in the. Balti.,_ f or this pur- pose, while the United States operates Liberty and Pueblo class naval reconnaissance vessels and specially equipped submarines in the Mediter- ranean and other seas. Artificial earth satellites equipped with special radio electronic gear ar employed to observe the entire depth of the theater or several theaters simultaneously. The Americans, for example, have built and are operating Ferret satellites, which gather intelligence on radar and radio stations. Satellites launched under the 770 program carry electronic gear to obtain radar maps of terrain. Midas satellites are designed to detect the firing of ICBMs from the infrared radiation of the rocket en- gine exhaust. It is reported that they can also detect on the basis of Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 thermal radiati)n such objects as tanks and trucks. Versatile suc?.eillance satellites carrying electronic and photoreconnaissance gea: have been developed under Project 949. Intercepted signals emitted by radio electronic devicp.s as well as electri- cal signals into which photographic images are converted are recorded on tape and are transmitted on telemetric channels to ground stations.' Satellite communications centers and stations occupy an important place iri ?resent-day stationary equipment in theaters of military operations. The Americans have set up such centers and stations in Northern England (Cumberland), in Alaska (Kodiak) , in Japan, and in tie Urited States (Hawaii, California, New Hampshire). Figure 1 contains a diagram showing the location of radio electronic intelligence facilities in a theater of military operations. In the near future plans call for the use of orbital laboratories with alternating crews for the conduct of surveillance from space. In 1973, for example, the United States plans to launch an "orbital workshop" with three astronaut crews on 28 and 56-day missions. Thus theater electronic intelligence means make it possible to acquire a large volume of information on the enemy simultan?^u61y from a large area, adverse weather, day and night. The intelligence effort is conducted at great depth, not only in wartim3 but in peacetime as well. Radio electronic control systems fcr military forces and their nuclear weapons are designed to secure troop operations and the employment. of weapons during war. In peacetime these systems assist in the daily routine activities of all large units and units within a given theater, particular- ly nuc' -ar weapons , nui:'_ear weapons a 1 er t and nuclear weapons continuous combat readiness. A network of command posts 4 set up for control of military forces within a t''eater; these are stationary structures sited as a rule underground and well protected. These stationary command posts are establi;;hed primarily for major head- quarters. In the Central European Theater, tar example, all principal NATO headquarters, down to army groups inclusively, have such command posts. An extensive stationary communications system is set up for the control of groui.d troops in a theater, particularly in the administrative (rear) zone. It is based on main-line and branch radi' relay and tropospheric multi- channel links and high-capacity underground cable communications lines. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 CTaw?wn Cwcr.?vy pa0.wopeneAw~. Tponocc epwo.? cone. 4 CTawwn Ce33. I .,)a NC3 5 Qe.'r np4'3M. wwgopwauw? 01 9 pa3aaAwsaron,woro HC3 6 0 0~ YX CO Y3!n goo nowrl caaja7 I....Tp oa?wcnepe.oaraS rnavoaa crawuw++ Hong+raropwo.. .eTw O Aapow'poY. 10 Figure 1. Diagram of location of radio communications facilities in a theater Craprovu, 103>(1>1. oawer 11 noel Ja:.w O+e rw~~eCw O~ 0839964.12 Nopaon. oa0.woanewTporwoa 0%3ae:ww ww.lw Cen)w fflp 10!ewwn 13CT.1Nw n6e7woro opyM.In 15 pa3ao.1ww 16 flonoer oaaaexww a NC3 electronic surveillance and of military operations Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 ., STAT Approved For Release 2002/10/31 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Key to Figure 1 on preceding page: 1 -- communications satellite; 2 -- surveillance satellite; 3 -- legend; 4 -- tropospheric radio relay com- munications system station; 5 -- satellite communications station; 6 -- reconnaissance satellite ground receiving station; 7 --- communications center (facility); 8 -- radio intercept center; 9 -- DF network principal station; 10 -- airfields; 11 -- missile sites; 12 -- electronic reconnais- sance station; 13 -- electronic intelligence chip; 14 -- eleccronic sur- veillance aircraft; 15 -- nuclear weapons control communications line; 16 --- depth of radio electronic surveillance zone; 17 -- satellite sur- veillance cone Radio links formed by short-wave radio sets servo as redundant means of communu.cation in such a system. Territorial communications systems and equipment are most effectively utilized in such a system. In addition, civilian communica'-- ions line; in the theater are constructed with the thought to their potential maximum utilization for military purposes. For example, the project for laying a 640-channel submarine cable between Italy and Spain calls for redundancy of terminal equipment including sources of electric power, and the capability of automatic switching (in case of necessity) to backup equipment.2 Stationary tropospheric radio facilities are extensively employed in the theater troop control systems; these facilities provide communications with a range of 200-400 k.m without relay. They can be used to establish high- capacity multichannel links. The Central European Theater, for example, contains the Ace High NATO joint forces multichannel communications system, a complex network consisting of radio relay and tropospheric communications stations. It begins in Norway, covers all European NATO member nations, and terminates in Turkey. The total length of its links is 15,000 km. The equipment of the tropospheric part of the system provides 36 telephone channels, each of which can be utilized for several dozen telegraph (tele- type) communications channels. Radio relay links are extensively employed for incorporation of Ace High into the European civilian and military systems. Radio communications in the shortwave band and underground cable lines in this system are backup elements. According to statements by axp`rts, Ace High has now become the main NATO military communications system in Europe.3 In 1966 the 486L MEDCOM tropospheric communications network was put into operation in the European Theater, linking Spain, Italy, Greece, the island of Crete, and Turkey. This system extends a total of 9700 km." Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 The stationary theater communications system is linked with army mcbile systems, which enables high-level command echelons when necessary to transmit information to large units and units, bypassing intermediate levels. We should emphasize that major headquarters and command posts in the theater are linked by communications channels (operating on various ? principles): underground cable, multichannel radio relay, tropospheric links, etc. This increases the system's traffic capacity and improves control stability against hostile fire and jamming efforts. Mobile command posits can be employed in the theater in addition to the system of stationary command pers. For example, the U.S. and NATO army commands are studying the possibilities of establishing and utilizing air- borne command posts. It is believed that military transport aircraft (such as the C-131), specially e':sipped with communications gear, situation display and information processing equipment, will be little vulnerable to attack and will provide stable and reliable control of subordinate troops and weapons under nuclear warfare conditions. The effective range of airborne radio communications equipment is usually greater than that of ground facilities.5 U.S. and NATO military leaders are exerting a considerable effort to achieve further development and improvement of communications facilities. Much has been done in recent years to establish global systems, which will make it possible to support the operations of forces both within a single theater of military operations and in several theaters simultaneous- ly. The following demands are imposed on such communications systems: a high degree of reliability and stability under nuclear warfare conditions, high transmitting capacity, redundancy, interc:nnection of parallel ele- ments. 6 For example, the Autodyne global automated system being developed by the United States will link more than 2000 military facilities located on the North American continent and elsewhere. Voice and digital infor'iation can be transmitted on its wideband channels. It is planned to deploy 93 communications centers of this system, including 65 on U.S. territory, by 1972.7 Another system, Autovon , also consists of switching centers and multi- channel communications links. Nineteen of 20 switching centers, including 12 outside the United States, went on line in 1968.8 Information is transmitted on A,Lodyne system channels in the form of digital groups. In the opinion r U.S. experts, the absence of inter- channel interference during the transmission of information, low cost, Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 secrecy potential and independence of quality of transmission on length of lines add up to making digital communications close to the ideal type. It is also planned to use digital communications to transmit television images of reconnaissance photographs, maps, diagrams and other documents by narrow-band telephone channels. For this purpose the United States is developing a special Videocoder system, which will utilize regular radio- telephone or satellite communications links. In the more distant future it is planned to establish a common military automatic communications system from the Autodyne and AUtovon systems. The employment of satellite communications systems being developed for military use is considered particularly promising. In the opinion of ex- perts, as more and more satellite communications systems are put into operation, there will be less need for communications facilities sited on foreign territory, there will be less possibility for the enemy to establish a fix on radio transmitters and consequently to discover various elements of control organization. A characteristic feature of such systems is a high transmission capacity and excellent operational reliability. One U.S. satellite military communications system calls for the launching into orbit of 19 satellites and the deployment of 11 ground stations (in the United States, on Guam and Okinawa, in South Vietnam, in West Germany, etc). The Americans are working on several projects for a similar commercial global communications system. According to statements made by U.S. mili- tary leaders, these systems can also be used for military purposes.9 By mid-1968 the operating U.S. commercial satellite communications system totaled 17 satellites and 28 ground stations. The system was fully in operation by 1969. It was planned to build 12 ground stations in NATO countries, with stations in West Germany, Italy, Turkey and the Netherlands to go into operation in 1970.10 Radio electronic devices, some of which comprise theater stationary radio electronic equipment, are extensively utilized to control forces and offensive nuclear weapons. The theater nuclear forces control system is developed and constructed taking into consideration the conduct of combat operations under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons. It is therefore based on radio electron- ic equipment which is minimally subjected to the destructive effect of nuclear weapons. For example, the 487L control system being built by the Americans in the continental United Statesaaad designed to provide strategic air-force communications following an enemy nuclear attack, employs powerful stationary low frequency and very low frequency trans- mitters with antennas 367 meters in height.11 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Thus the L_,eater force control system is based on command posts and their radio electronic equipment, particularly wire (cable), microwave relay and tropospheric communications facilities. Communications systems deployed in the Central European Theater have the capability of rapid transmission of engagement orders and signals, including orders to employ offensive nuclear weapons, to large uni;.t3 of the services. Radio-electronic theater air defense control systems include a network of detection, warning and guidance centers and sites equipped with stationary or mobile radars, electronic computers and communications gear. Air situation inforniation (after site processing) is transmitted to air defense sector centers, where the decision is made to scramble fighters or fire antiaircraft missiles. Radar sites may include equipment which automatical- ly takes data from radarscopes, transmits information to command posts and centers for subsequent computer proc,.;ses. Transmission of control and target designation commands to active air defense means can also be ef- fected automatically. A 412L automated system of this type is deployed in the Central European Theater, It links seven air defense control centers and command posts.12 Analogous systems a:o being built by NATO member na- tions : n other parts of the European Theater. In recent, years work has been under way to set up a NATO common automated air defense system under the acronym NADGE. During the course of the project tht. opinion was expressed that no one country is capable of handling independently all the tasks of modern air defense. U.S. experts explain that this is dictated by the necessity of daily performance, even in peacetime, of an enormous volume of effort. For example, NORAD, the North American Air Defense Command, tracks more than 600 satellites and other artificial objects in space which daily circle the earth in various orbits, as well as daily identifying more than 200,000 aircraft.13 The NADGE system will consist of 80 radar stations of various types, automated data processing centers and communications lines. Some of the radars are designed to detect targets at long range (300 km and more) . They include two extremely high-power stations in Norway and Turkey. Ac- cording to the designers of this system, it will take less than 1 minute from target radar detection t o output of identifying data. The NADGE sys- tem should be fully operational by 1971-1972. Its elements in Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany were deployed in 1969.14 Devices to solve problems connected with ABM ouJ antispace weapon defense comprise an important part of theater radio-electronic equipment to be developed in recent years. These facilities include powerful stationary missile and space objects detection and tracking radar stations. The BMEWS ICBM radar early warning system has been in operation since 1964. It consists of three groups of AN/FPS-49 and AN/FPS-50 powerful stationary Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 extremely long-range detection radar stations; this system has a missile detection range of 4500-5000 km. BMEWS sites are located in Filingdales Moor (England), Thule (Greenland), and Clear (Alaska). Beginning in the sixties, the United States has been working intensively on the development of so-called below-the-horizon radar. In 1970, for example, the AN/FPS-95 high-frequency radar with backscattering went into operation; this radaz is designed for extremely long-range missile detec- tion and tracking. In 1967 the U.S. put into operation a below-the- horizon detection radar which detected targets on the basis of distortion of a signal transmitted from one point on the earth's surface and received at another. As we can see, the operation of an air defense system, and particularly the collection of data on the air and space situation, as well as direct control of air defense active forces and weapons, is based on radio electronic equipment. The most advanced radio electronic gear coupled with high -speed computers is used in air defense systems. Radio navigation systems are an important component of the radio electronic facilities in a theater of military operations. These systems are used for aircraft and ship navigation. The most widely-used radio navigation sys- tems are Loran, Decca, and Tacan, which are employed in both stationary and mobile versions. Usually several radio navigation system groups of various types, each consisting of three to four stations, are deployed in a theater of military operations. It is known, for example, that several groups of Loran-C are deployed in the Central European Theater. In 1968 16 Decca radio navigation stations went into operation in Norway; one of the purposes of this system is to assist in low-altitude mi$ions. In 1969 con- struction was reported on a group of three radio navigation stations in Sweden.16 In atheater of military operations radio navigation system sta- tions are sited in order that their effective zones of operation cover the theater, and particularly probable areas of combat operations. We should stress in particular that in recent years radio navigation methods have been adopted by ground forces as well. Radio navigation sys- tems are used to obtain position fixes for troops and weapons, particularly missile, artillery and tank units and subunits, on terrain with few land- marks and reference points, during hours of darkness and in adverse weather. The Loran-A system, developed during World War II, was used only for air- craft and surface ship navigation, and Loran-C, developed in the fifties, was designed primarily for missile-carrying submarines, while the Loran-D system, which was developed in the sixties, is versatile in nature and designed for joint tactical utilization by naval forces, air and ground forces. A Loran-D network, for example, contains three ground-base low Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 frequency transmitters. This s y s. t e m has been tested and used by the Americans in Vietnam. The Tacan short--range radio navigation system provides navigation aids for tactical aircraft in a theater of military operations, including departure, en-route navigation, approach to target or reconnaissance area, return to airfield, and landing approach. The system includes a network of ground beacons and airborne receiving and display equipment. Aircraft interroga- tion results in automatic determination and display of the aircraft's bearing to or from the interrogated beacon, plus distance to station. Tacan is extensively used in the Western Theater of Military Operations . Approximately 170 beacons of this system have been deployed in Europe. Figure 2 contains a diagram of the location of air defense radio electronic systems and radio navigation facilities in the theater. The operating zones of Loran and Decca radio navigation systems cover areas of a theater. Preparing to conduct combat operations simultaneously in several theaters, imperialist military leaders are endeavoring to have at their disposal global radio navigation facilities with an effective range of several thousand kilometers. The Omega radio navigation system, which encompasses the entire earth, constitutes such a global system. The Americans have been setting it up since 1957; it is designed primarily for controlling strategic offensive weapons -??- nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines, carrier task forces and strategic bombers. The system operates in the very low frequency band (10-14 kHz) and will consist of 8 powerful transmitters, At the present time only fan' stations are in operation (Hawaiim Islands,, Norway, Spain, New York). In 1966 the Omega system was tested on civil airways extending 18,000 km. Future plans call for the establishment of four more stations in Japan or the Philippines, Argentina, New Zealand or Australia, and on Madagascar, The Omega system should be fully opera- tional in 1972.17 Development and deployment of the Omega global radio navigation system graphically demonstrate the aggressive nature of U.S. policy. Theater stationary radio electronic facilities include radio electronic communications and air navigation facilities located at airfields -- ILS, VOR, compass locaters, etc, In the Central European Theater, for example, aircraft navaids include omnidirectional VOR beacons, which indicate an aircraft's bearing to or from the station, as well as DME facilities, which measure range from station to aircraft.18 In recent years special systems for air traffic control in a theater of military operations have been developed in connection with the increased use of jet aircraft in highly-developed nations; these systems are de- signed for airways surveillance and for air traffic safety in control zones Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 (loci ynpaaaGMaa a oncostuC..r11 6 PHC In ?- Ilop-': A-?Aa*na") Figure 2. Diagram of location of radio electronic air defense control and navigation facilities in theater of military operations Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Key to Figure 2 on preceding page: 1 --- legend; 2 -- missile defense sys- tem radar site; 3 -- air detection radar site; 4 -- Tacan beacon; 5 -- air defense warning and control center; 6 -- air defense warning and com- mand post; 7 -- radio navigation system (11 -- Loran; p,--Decca); 8 -- Transit ground radio navigation system complex; 9 -- fighter airfields; 10 -- antiaircraft artillery and missile units; 11 -- Omega radio naviga- tion system station; 12 ?-- radio relay link; 13 -- effective zone of Loran radio navigation system and terminal areas. One of the main demands made of such systems is the capability of c-)n trolling both civilian and military traffic under heavy- traffic conditions. One example of such a system is the Mediator system, installed in England. It is designed for air traffic control of military and civilian aircraft at altitudes of 1500-2100 m and above wit-'-,in British airspace. The system consists of a network of radar stations, coin- puter complexes and communications facilities. Theater radio electronic equipment also includes radiogeodetic systems, designed to determine with a high degree of accuracy the coordinates of fixed topographic objects. For example, the American Shiran radio geodetic system (an improved version of Shoran) can determine range to targets up to a distance of 1500 km with an error not exceeding 3 m. The system includes four transponder-equipped ground sites located at base stations, plus airborne gear. U.S. military experts place great stock in satellite: radio navigation systems (for example, Transit), consisting of several satellites, ground tracking stations, a data processing center, accurate time stations, as well as on-board receiving-display equipment and specialized computers. Thus military leaders in the imperialist nations attach great importance to equipping theaters of military operations with radio electronic facilities. On the basis of fundamental development trends, following are the most promising areas in radio electronic facilities for theaters of military operations: adoption of radio electronic surveillance-reconnaissance systems and facilities with improved performance capabilities;, expansion of the network of multichannel tropospheric and radio relay links, as well as the establishment of satellite communications systems; Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 establishment of communications systems designed for the accomplish- ment of special missions (support of operations by nuclear forces, tactical air communications, air defense communications system, etc); ground forces adoption of radio navigation systems; improved reliability and invulnerability of radio electronic systems and facilities. The fact that stationary radio electronic systems and facilities supporting armed forces combat operations in theaters and zones of military operations are under present-day conditions a mandatory and important component of operational facilities in a theater of military operations as a whole faces Soviet military investigators with the task of continuously monitor- ing the state of radio electronic facilities in theaters of military opera- tions, taking into full account the development and capabilities of these facilities. FOOTNOTES 1, U.S. News and World Report, 24 September 1969, pp 32-33. 2. Engineer, No 5890, 1968, page 890. 3. NATO', Fifteen Nations, October-November, 1968, pp 58-63. 4. Signal, No 3, 1966, page 62. 5. Interavia Air Letter, 16 June 1970. 6. Armed Forces Manageme,i:, No 10, 1969. 7. Infantry, November-Le::ember 1968, page 57. 8. Product Engineering, No 5, 1967, page 43. 9. Electronics News, No 686, 1968, page 31. 10. Electronics Weekly, No 431, 1968, pp 1, 36. 11. Aviation Week, No 6, 1967, page 27. 12. Interavia Air Letter, June 1970, pp A-E. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 13. Plain Dealer, June 1969, page 42. 14. Revue Internationale de Defense, No 4, 1969. 15. Teknisk Tidskrift, No 26, 1968, page 5. 16. Svensk:s S18fartstidning, No 6, 1969, page 6. 17. Undersea Technology, No 12, 1.968, page 40. 18. Interavia, No 2, 1969, pp 196-199. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Col Ye. Rybkin, Doctor of Philosophical. Science, Professor Another very interesting and solid study has been added to our military literature, a study dedicated to Lenin's military theory legacy and his practical activities in the area of military affairs -- Lenin and Soviet Military Science by N. N. Azovtsev.* This study encompasses a broad range of problems of the Leninist military heritage, from the ideological-theoretical foundations of Soviet military science to problems of tactics and personnel indoctrination. Of consider- able interest is a special survey section, a systematized list of primary sources and historiography on the military activities of V. I. Lenin. One virtue of this study is that the author innovatively utilizes the Leninist military theory legacy to interpret and comprehend today's problems. For example, discussing in detail Lenin's development of Marxist doctrine on war and army and his solution of key problems of military science, the author consistently links them with its contemporary level, with those problems which concern us today. Also remarkable is the fact that the author, who has thoroughly studied Lenin's ideas, advances on the basis of these ideas new theses pertaining to contemporary problems of military science. Although we cannot agree with some of these theses, this fact does not minimize the importance of his innovative approach to the subject. Discussing the principal aim of the study, Azovtsev writes that, relying on the works of Lenin, numerous party documents, as well as published mono- graphs, he sets for himself the task of "showing Lenin as an eminent mili- tary theorist and practitioner and ingenious strategist, under whose guidance an army of a new type was established and victory won over foreign and domestic counterrevolutionary forces" (page 10). The author endeavors to interpret these problems in a comprehensive manner, to comprehend Leninist ideas as an integral system of views reflecting the conditions of the first years of genesis and development of Soviet military science, and at the same time to show the close link between Lenin's ideas and today's military science. The author makes extensive use not only of Lenin's writings but also archival materials, recollections of Lenin by his contemporaries, and a number of historical works. * N. N. Azovtsev: Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka, Moscow, Izd-vo Nauka, 1971, 360 pages. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Chapter One examines the Leninist ideological-theoretical pri.ncipl's of Soviet military science. The cuthor emphasizes that Soviet military sci- ence arose not on empty ground but rather on soil prepared by the past development of military affairs. But it was only thanks to Marxism that it acquired a scientific philosophic basis. Linked to the name of Lenin is a new stage in Marxist military-theoretical thought -- the birth and development of Soviet military science and art of war. Discussing the Leninist methodological principles of Soviet military sci- ence, the author focuses great attention on the principle of historicism and the utilization of the lessons of history for the present day. Of major importance in this respect is Lenin's thesis that "one cannot learn to solve one's problems with new techniques today if yesterday's lessons have not opened our eyes to the erroneous nature of the old techniques" (Poln., Sobr- Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 44, page 205). At the same time he emphasizes Lenin's statement on the inadmissibilicy of overrating the experience of the past. This tenet is acquiring particular significance today, when in the course of the scientific and technological revolution there is occurring a process of profound changes in all areas of military affairs. The author presents Lenin's views on the specific features of war and its peculiar features as a form of social struggle; he presents Lenin's appraisal of the relationship ietween the development of war and politics e!s well as the correlation of forces of the belligerents. Unfortunately this relationship, which is a fundamental law of war, is insufficiently revealed, In our opinion the author intelligently systematizes Lenin's ideas on the structure of Soviet military science and demonstrates that military science is an integral system of knowledge, encompassing general theory of military science (which studies the factors, laws and principles of warfare), theory of the art of warfare, and theory of organization and training of armies. We cannot agree, however, with the author's statement that. all military historical science comes within the framework of military science. It, as is well known, is a social science, a part of general history. Only such elements as history of the art of warfare, weapons and army organizational development constitute simultaneously to a certain degree elements of mili- tary science. The author has not fully examined the contrast between Soviet and bourgeois military science. To those elements which characterize this opposition (page 35), one should add: while Soviet science is distinguished by an organic coalescence of scientific methodology and science, in bourgeois Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 military science one notes a deep split between military science and philosophic methodology. This is dictated by the fact that bourgeois general methodology is in substantial conflict with the interests of the art of war. Lenin attached enormous importance to science as one of the factors of victory in war. It is a well-known fact that today the role of science in warfare has grown immeasurably in comparison with the Civil War. On this basis we today specify scientific potential as a particular factor in war- fare. The author examines it within the framework of economic potential. We feel that such an interpretation of this problem fails to reflect con- temporary views on the role of science,. A substantial position in the study is occupied by discussion of Lenin's ideas on morale and political factors. The author is correct in stressing Lenin's idea about the unity and at the same time the difference of these factors. Politics is the guiding, organizing force of war, the activities of the governing party, the government; the morale factor is the state of morale of the masses, their willingness or unwillingness to support the war effort. Political leadership should in no case be equated with the morale factor, although it does play a central role in the formation of the latter. Chapter Two deals with Lenin's substantiation of the principles of building an army of the new type. The author presents the principal theoretical tenets of Marx and Ergels on the necessity for armed defense of the con- quests of the proletarian revolution and the nature of its military orga- nization; he also discusses Lenin's contribution toward the subsequent elaboration of these problems. It is noted that the basis of military organizational development is defined by the nature of the social system, by the character of the state. Lenin focused particular attention on the relationship between this organi- zational development and the processes taking place within the country as .:?l as various aspects of societal affairs. It is precisely from this aspect that the author examines the economic, sociopolitical, ideological- theoretical, and scientific-technical foundations of Soviet military orga- nizational development. The author thoroughly discusses Lenin's assess- ments and the characteristics of these principles, and draws conclusions for the present day. Among economic and sociopolitical factors, the author analyzes such factors as the socialist mode of production, the socialist societal and govern- mental system, the alliance between the worker class and the peasantry, tr?, morale-political unity of our society, guidance by the Communist Party, and unity of army and people. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Marxism-Leninism and its doctrine on war and army, communist consciousness, party-mindedness, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism con- stitute the ideological-theoretical foundation of Soviet military organiza- tional development. Examining the r)rinciples of military organizational development, the author presents what in our opinion is a. good classification of Lenin's gu4.deline theses in this area: "The nature of Lenin's military activities and his emphasis on solving specific military problems at various stages in history make it possible in the first place to specify those principles which directly pertain to creation of the military organization of the proletariat and its further organizational development, in the second place, those principles connected with armed forces combat and political training and, in the thi:-d place, the principles pertaining to leadership and guidance of the armed forces" (page 75). in characterizing this part of the study, we should like to note the extremely felicitous combination of theoretical and historical analysis, the intelligent selection of Leninist theses from his many statements on this matter. We feel that the author has sufficiently thoroughly discussed Lenin's theses on the relationship between forms of organization and forms of combat, on one-man command and centralism, on high degree of armed forces vigilance and combat readiness, on the role of party political effort in the army, on military specialists, etc. We should like to draw the reader's attention in particular to Lenin's statements on the qualities of the leader (sec pp 104-106). Chapter Three examines problems of Leninist direction of a war in defense of the socialist homeland. Here the author litaits himself, however, to problems of direction of armed combat, military operations, and analysis solely of military forms and means of combat proper. An analysis of the economic and moral factors in war would be interesting from the standpoint of modern military science, if only as regards their direct link with mili- tary operations (for example, an assessment of the interrelationship between strategy and economics, strategy and the morale-political factor) ; Lenin offers very interesting material on this matter, But the author discusses these questions only indirectly, in passing, in conjunction with other problems. We cannot strongly criticize the author in this regard, however, for statement of the problem in this context would greatly expand the scope of the subject matter, Selecting as a subject for investigation Lenin's activities as a strategist, the author primarily examines those matters connected with this aspect of our leader's activities. He devotes considerably less attention to a dis- cussion of the particular problems with which the great revolutionary leader dealt. The author was undoubtedly correct in this. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 In this chapter the reader's attention is drawn by an examination of Lenin's theoretical tenets and practical activities connected with ensuring unity of military and leadership, establishment of appropriate government agencies, and development of the ability in military cadres to wage war in a revolutionary nanner. The author cites a very instructive statement by S. S. Kamenev: "I affirm with total conviction," he wrote, "that I, as a participant in the imperialist war, drew no conclusion on the most fundamental question of the war. I overlooked the fact that the terms to engage in war and to fight are not identical. It seems that one can simply engage in war in a formalistic manner... and one can genuinely fight to win -- this is what Vladimir Il'ich's guidance taught me" (pp 125-126). On this chapter as well, however, we must make a few critical comments. On page 111 the author states that "the socialist mode of production and its socialist economy served as the economic foundation for direction of the armed struggle..." As we know, however, the socialist mode of produc- tion was at the time only ita an incipient stage of development. The economy of the transition period was characterized by the coexistence of socialist and nonsocialist sectors. This placed a profound imprint on the military capabilities of the state, substantially diminishing them. In Chapter Four the author examines a theoretical question -- V. I. Lenin on the forms and means of armed struggle. Of greatest interest are those pages on which the author discusses Lanin's views on the correlation between offense and defense, on the connection between forms of struggle and its spatial scope, on partisan struggle, on the forms and methods of training and mobilizing reserves, plus many others. Considerable attention in this chapter is devcted to Lenin's ideas of activeness, decisiveness, boldness, organization, the element of surprise, massing of forces and careful preparation of operations. These ideas form the basis of the leading principles of the Soviet art of war. Discussing Lenin's elaboration of the theory of waging partisan warfare, the author notes that the ingenious strategists of the proletarian revolu- tion particularly emphasized the necessity of purposeful party guidance of the partisan struggle. Therefore during the Civil War years this form of armed struggle, which occupied a prominent place in achieving victory over the enemy, was incorporated in war plans, and the rules of its con- duct were included in the Field Service Regulations, while the party Central Committee regularly discussed problems connected with guidance and direction of partisan activities and carried out a number of organiza- tional measures, including the establishment of an entire partisan army. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 The forms and methods of partisan struggle elaborated at that time con- stituted a valuable contribution to theory of Soviet art of war. In discussing the matter of Lenin's gu.idanco of training and mobilization of reserves, the author focuses attention on the fact that under the extraordinarily complex and rapidly-changing conditions of the Civil War, a decision was reached for comprehensive utilization of various forms and methods of assembling and training troops, as well as training replacement personnel. An object of particular concern by Lenin in this regard was the Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training] system, which played a most important role in coping with this task. Chapter Five merits attention. Here the author endeavors to show the creative development of the Leninist legacy in the area of military science right up to the present. We must say that this is a very ambitious task, for much has already been written on this subject. We feel that the most interesting treatment of this subject would have been an analysis of specific utilization of the Leninist legacy in solving specific problems of military science following Lenin's death. It would be important to demonstrate how Lenin's ideas live on under new conditions, the elements of his teachings in new forms and at new stages of development of the military organism. The author strives to accomplish this, but he is not successful in every case. In many instances he very neatly captures the "pulse beat" of Lenin's teachings under the new conditions, but in some places the presentation degenerates into a simple rehash of various stages in the development of military affairs. The author was successful in describing Frunze's activities and the features of development of Soviet military theory in the twenties, and in discussing several questions pertaining to the period of the Great Patriotic Warr and various elements of the present day. He has not done such a good job of discussing the thirties and the initial postwar years. The chapter ends with a general description of the state of Soviet military science 4t the present stage. We must state that on the whole the description is fair17 complete and convincing. There are some weak points, however. On page 278 the author discusses the basic tasks of Soviet military science at the present time. These tasks are correctly stated, but the presentation is far from complete. The author discusses only cer- tain aspects of the general theory of military affairs: determination of the range of research in connection with the military technological revolu- tion, explanation of manifestation of the laws of armed combat under con- ditions of nuclear weapons employment; classification of milita-,:-37 science; elaboration of methodological, problems; assessment of the potential enemy and critique of his ideology; consideration of economic, moral, military Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 and scientific-technological potential "in the aspects of military sci- ence as a whole and its branches, and elaboration of recommendations for Soviet military doctrine and doctrine on war and army." It is easy to see that the author has failed to treat one of the fundamental elements of military science -- elaboration of theory of art of war, strategy, opera- tional art and tactics. He has also ignored problems of specific military sciences. One reads with interest those pages where the author discusses the root military scientific theses of Leninist doctrine applicable to nuclear war: problems of correct assessment of the correlation of friendly and hostile forces, on the unity of military and political leadership, on creation of preponderance of forces at the decisive moment and at the decisive point, plus a number of others. Extremely interesting in our opinion is Chapter Six, in which the author comprehensively describes the sources of the Leninist military theory legacy and presents a survey of the literature. This is not simply a reference chapter: in it the author evaluates studies devoted to examina- tion of the military activities and military-theoretical legacy of V. I. Lenin, and makes an attempt to demonstrate the process of synthesis and development: of Leninist ideas in these studies. Unfortunately the author was not entirely succescEul in showing the initial stages in the study of Lenin's military activities as a process of accumulation, deepen- and development of knowledge with a certain succession and interlink among its _ttages and elements. In appraising this study as a whole, we should state that the reader is offered an extremely useful book which continues the efforts of many in- vestigators working on the study, dissemination and development of the Leninist military legacy and maker, a substantial contribution to this honorable task. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Under conditions of rapid scientific and technological advances, with in- creasing aggressiveness on the part of imperialism, new and higher dem,aa:is are imposed on armed forces control. One can no longer be satisfied with established forms and methods, even if they have served well in the past. This was discussed in detail in the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress; particular attention was directed to the fact that "problems of control pertain not only to a narrow group of leaders and experts but to all party, soviet and economic organizations, as well as all work forces. This means that improvement of management is an important component of all party activities pertaining to management of the economy." These party demands fully apply to all aspects of Soviet Army and Navy activity. Therefore the innovative thinking of military experts is focused on the question of how we can more effectively develop the theory of armed forces control under present-day conditions. This is the subject of what we consider to be an interesting book, entitled Fundamentals of Troop Control,' which consists of a brief introduction and 12 chapters. The first two chapters concisely and yet with a fair amount of detail preccn.t the development of theory and practice of troop control before and after the scientific and technological revolution. Subsequent cha-~Lt~-: analyze a complex of questions pertaining to troop control. Primary attention is devoted to the most vital problems. examina- tion of radical changes in the technical control base, caused by the developmc;;: c.` electronic computer and information systems; discovery of the increasing importance of a comprehensive approach to solving control prohit.n,s; the authors discuss in detail how, under the influence of ad- vanced echnical devices and control methods, the transition is made to flexible and dynamic organizational structures which ensure rapid troop response to various changes in internal and external conditions? The authors examine this entire complex of very important and complicated matters in the historical relationship of change trends in, troop control, based on methodology of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge and with extensive utilization of the achievements of various sciences, including mathematics, psychology, and education science. Chapter III, "System of Troop Control," describes i-i detail the structure of control systems and various technical devices used in control; the authors list the requirements imposed on control entities and command posts; the term "control system" is defined, This term is still given Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 various definitions in the literature. In our opinion the authors cor- rectly define control system as "a complex dynamic aggregate of control entities and command posts, interrelated in a specified sequence of sub- ordination, together with their structure and equipment, the interrela- tions and work methods of officials involved" (page 86). Also correct is the idea that the structure of troop control systems directly reflects the organizational structure of the troops proper: the higher the position of a troop control system in troop organizational structure, the greater the number of elements it encompasses and the more complex the relationships in that system. The authors quite rightly assign an important position'in this book to an examination of demands on control entitles. It is noted that their structure should be as simple as possible and at the same time should en- sure precise, continuous, skilled troop contrcl in all situations. The principle of one-man command forms the basis of the organizational structure of control entities. The commander is the basic figure in con- trol.. This principle, established in the protracted process of develoD:r~-nr. of control entities, acquires particularly great importance under present- day conditions, when combat operations develop at an exceptionally rapid pace, are distinguished by extreme intensity and abrupt situation changes. The reader will find in Chapter III useful information on various tech- nical control means: communications, information acquisition, processing of acquired data and the ;plr!..,.-mance of tactical computations, the preparation and duplication of 4ocuments -- the state and level of development of which substantially influence the control process. It seems to us, however, that the value of this section would be considerably greater if in examining the solution of complex control problems the authors more extensively demonstrated utilization of automated control systems, electronic computers, computer input devices and information display devices, telecode communications equipment, the application of various cybernetic theories and mathematical methods. It is quite wrong, for example, to devote as much space to computer description as to the description of a dictating machine or typewriter. Chapter IV discusses the principles of organizing the operation of control entities. The authors Jis;:uss in detail principles of troop control and the work style of commanders and staffs, indicating the conditions for in- creasing organization in the operations of control entities and the pos- sibilities of utilizing network schedules in planning combat operations. It is noted that the work procedu,:e of commanders and control entities in performing various functions connected with control of subordinate troops will depend in each specific instance on the nature of the assigned combat mission, availability of time, level of cfficer training, degree of Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 technical control facilities at headquarters; and other conditions. Defini- tions of the general principles of troop control also seem correct. The most important are the following: party-mindedness, scientific content, foresight and prediction, one-man command, and centralization. The principle of party-mindedness proceeds from the class character of warfare and the decisive importance of the morale-political state of mili- tary personnel for successful accomplishment of combat missions. An im- portant role in observance of this principle is played by such executive qualities as high ideals, conviction and dedication to the Communist cause, political maturity and sensitivity, an implacable attitude toward shortcomings, efficiency and discipline. The principle of scientific character of troop control. under conditions of the s, ';,;ti.fic and technological j.,-*olution occupies a core position. In order to ensure effective actions by large or small teams armed with complex and diversified combat equipment, essential first and i:oremost is a scientific approach to troop control, which in the 'broadest sense means utilization of the objective laws of various sciences by commanders and staffs in their practical activities. It is quite obvious that profound and comprehensive knowledge is required of commanders for implementation of this principle. The principle of foresight and prediction is inseparably linked to the principle of scientific character, supplementing and enriching it. This principle occupies a prominent place in the theory and practice of troop control, since it is impossible to achieve victory over the enemy without the ability to anticipate and predict. One-man command is a most important princi_Ae both cf armed forces orga- nizational development and of troop control durir!.g the conduct of combat operations. The importance of one-man command has increased considerably under present-day conditions. It must ensure of f ictent employment of new weapons, flexible and reliable troop control, as well as firm personnel caiiitary discipline. The principle of centralization of control is inseparably linked to the principle of one-man command. They cannot be equated, however. In practical application of the principle of centralization it is essential to take into consideration those changes which have taken place in the military, On the one hand participation in mndern combat of a large number of different arms and special troops with diversified combat equip- ment demands centralized unification of their efforts and continuous co- ordination by the higher commander of all actions directed toward accom- pi-shing the common combat mission. On the other hand the more highly- maneuverable character of the modern engagement, less time available to prepare for battle, troop operations on separate axes, increased firepower, Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 greater volume of control tasks and other factors dictate the necessity of giving subordinate commanders greater independence and the opportunity to display initiative (but intelligent initiative!) and innovativeness in accomplishing missions. The reader's attention is drawn by pages devoted to scientific organization of labor in the area of cor.t'-ol. Of practical interest are statements made by the authors on utilization of scientific organization of labor methods in searching for and iiading the best variant of task distribution among control entities and officials, in seeking the most efficient form of work organization, in determining the minimum number and optimal structure of command posts, in selecting effective methods of executing troop control measures under various situation conditions, etc. The authors discuss critical-path planning methods, which have in recent years been extensively applied to practical troop control, methods which make it possible to analyze different decision variants much more fully and deeply in comparison with traditional methods, to reproduce flowcharts for sequence in execution of missions by troops, and graphically to represent the organization of combat operations. Critical-path methods are particularly indispensable for analyzing structure of control entities and seeking ways to increase their efficiency. Key problems of troop control -- the commander's combat decision-making and planning of combat operations -- are examined in Chapters V, VI, and VII (pp 194-280). Chapter V, "Collection and Pr:,cessing of Situation Data in Preparing for and During Combat Operations," in our opinion essentially correctly reflects the significance of prompt collection and synthesis of tactical information in the business of troop control. The authors emphasize that only on the basis of a thorough analysis of situation data and precise calculations is a scientific approach possible in developing the battle plan, in correct determination of troop combat missions, in organizing coordination and all types of support and supply, as well as in controlling subunits during battle. Without such an approach to the problem, as is correctly noted in the study, voluntarism in decision-making and adven- turism in actions are inevitable. The authors group numerous situation data needed by the commander for reaching a well-founded and most expedient decision on the basis of the following elements (in conformity with established traditions): the ad- versary, friendly troops, adjacent units, raciiat!'rn, chemical, bacterio- logical situation, terrain, weather, season, time of day or night. Quite logical is the suggestion on the expediency of including in this list data on the economic state of the combat area and the social-class composi- tion of the population. In our opinion the authors draw a correct Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 conclusion on the necessity of taking into consideration the interrela- tionships and interlinks of all situation elements and at the same time the differing degrees of influence by each on a given decision. It would evidently be useful to end this section with the demands imposed on situation data. Evidently the authors, having decided to discuss the matter in greater detail, have proceeded to examine the scope and content of data pertaining to the situation elements. As a result they have un- necessarily repeated themselves, for in analyzing the process of situation assessment (Chapter VII) they were compelled to return to the matters already discussed in Chapter V. At the same time we should like to note that a number of statements con- tained in the first section of Chapter V require more specific comment. For example, it is stated on page 202 that "the lack of specific situation data does not free the commander from the necessity of prompt decision-mak- ing," This is a well-known demand contained in field service regulations. Obviously it would be advisable to clarify 'iow the commander proceeds in the given instance (he evidently resorts to utilization of data on the adversary's tactics, the demands contained in his field service regulations, analyzes the experience of past engagements and the history of the art of warfare, utilizes the results of his prediction of the development of events, etc). Further presentation of material on the problem raised in the above-men- tioned three chapters gives rise to sc!ii::? question, since the authors have departed from the logical sequence of the proceso of decision-making and planning of combat operations, historically established on the basis of considerable ccmbat experience. For some reason they initially examine the planning of combat operations (Chapter VI) and only later study prob- ?e^s connected with the commander's combat decision-making (Chapter VII). This sequence in presentation of the material also seems strange because at the very beginning of the book the authors quite correctly note: ",,,The act of decision-making is the most important and critical in the overall control process" (page 25), and "first and foremost the commander makes a decision on the engagement, which comprises the basis of planning of troop combat operations" (page 24). We should add that the commander's decision comprises not only the basis of planning combat operations but also the basis of all troop control. It is another matter altogether that these two processes under present-day conditions are closely interwoven and proceed in parallel, for the limited time available for battle preparation as well as the higher commander's endeavor not to "consume" his subordinate commanders' time requires that they be combined. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Thus it would obviously be more expedient to examine initially matters connected with the commander's battle decision and subsequently combat operations planning. This comment pertains not so much to the content as to the architectonics of the book. As regards content, we should like to comment on Chapter VI, particularly the first section, "Content of the Planning Process." The authors begin it (page 220) with the sentence: "There exists a rather widesnread opinion that initially the commander makes his decision and then his staff proceeds with planning, which boils down essentially to putting, the decision into document form" (Our underline -- I. Ch,). We do not understand at all on what is based the authors' assertion of such a simplified comprehension of the process of planning combat operations. We cannot agree with such an assertion. The content of the planning process is presented i?., a fairly understandable manner, with great enphasis placed on the preparation of various computa- tion data essential to the commander' for his decision-making. Suffice it to say that in the example the computation of time required for the move- ment of subunits frrm the line of departure to the final coordination line f ails to take into account the depth of the subunits columns, which is impermissible for such a serious study. We also hope that the authors, when working on subsequent editions, will more rigorously coordinate their, recommendations with the text. For example, on page 239 they present a variant of distribution of responsibilities among officials. It follows from this presentation that both the commander and chief of staff compute time required to organize combat operations. Is it necessary for two officers to do this under limited-time conditions? Obviously for this reason more specific recommendations are contained on page 254. We feel that the best-done chapter is Chapter VII, "The Commander's Battle Decision." Thy- authors examine in detail the content of the decision and the demands imposed on it. They succeed in convincingly demonstrating that the commander can reach a correct decision only if he thoroughly under- stands the fundamentals of the modern engagement and if he has thoroughly studied weapons performance and methods of combat operations of Friendly and enemy troops. The commander's decision-making is a complex, creative process of in- tellectual activity. Of decisive significance here is the commander's ability to grasp in detail the current situation, to abstract from the un- essential, to concentrate on the essential, to find the general and determining in the individual and isolate it. An essential condition for a correct approach to situation assessment is the necessity of examining each situation element dynamically, that is to assess not only the actual state of a given element at a given moment but also to predict its Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 possible changes. We feel that the authors have done a good job of reveal- ing this aspect of the commander's activities and have convincingly demonstrated the sequence of his efforts at each stage of situation esti- mate and decision-making as a whole. We feel that it would be extremely useful here to utilize examples from the experience of our commanders in .he Great Patriotic War, in order to stress the great diversity of c_ond.i- tions under which a decision is made and, in addition (perhaps this is the most important), to help the reader understand control of combat and to obtain maximum benefit from the past for the solving of present-day problems, The three examples the authors give are fine, but they are not enough. The authors devote considerable attention to planning measures involving support of combat operations (Chapter VIII). With the adoption of new weapons (particularly nuclear weapons), the influence of these measures on successful accomplishment of assigned missions becomes incalrt.lably greater. It is no longer sufficient to provide for the organization only of such traditional f:.rms of support operations as reconnaissance, security, camouflage, etc. Other types of support are also required, proceeding from the altered chr..:acter of modern combat: protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction, electronic countermeasures, and weather services support. At the same time the limited time available for organization of thA engagement dictates the necessity of planning all these measures simultaneously (parallel) with combat decision-making and prepara- tion of formal operation documents. In the modern engagement, where combat operations are conducted at a rapid pace, under conditions of swift and abrupt situation changes, the role of reconnaissance-intelligence becomes more important. The authors correctly note that principal indicators of the quality of reconnaissance planning, in addition to promptness and reliability of information on the adversary and the terrain, include data on the radiation, chemical and bacteriologi- cal situation. Manifested in this is the dialectical unity of such types of combat support activities as reconnaissance and protection of troops against weapons of mass destruc'-:ion. The latter type, as the authors state, comprises an entire system of measures, which in turn are inseparably linked with engineer support and camouflage. Of definite interest in our opinion is the section entitled "Electronic Countermeasures," written on the basis of materials published i_i the foreign press. The authors emphasize that success in this effort depends on prompt acquisition of detailed data on the enemy's radio and radar n equipment. One source of such information is long-range, fast and reliable electronic intelligence effort. Here the reader will find many useful recommendations on protection of friendly radio electronic facili- ties. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 The authors devote proper attention to weather service support and quite correctly emphasize the fact that for successful troop control, in addition to knowledge of local terrain conditions, it is necessary to possess a clear picture of temperature and humidity', wind velocity and direction at various a..titudes, cloud cover, precipitation, atmospheric pressure, water conditions of rivers, reservoirs, swamps, and the condition of snow (ice) cover. Hence the most important tasks of a headquarters staff, in the authors" opinion, are the following: collection of data on weather condi- tions, orgarization of weather observation, prompt warning of troops abc.ut dangerous weather conditions, etc. In examining the problems of rear services support, the authors note that the basic indicator of precise operations of rear services entities is uninterrupted supply in all categories of materiel under all situation con- ditions. At the same time we feel that the book does not fully present the demands imposed on rear services support in connection with the altered --athods of conducting military operations and the potential conse- quences of enemy nuclear strikes, as well as the procedure and sequence of fulfilling these demands. Chapter IX is an irportant one. It examines matters pertaining to the commander communicating his operation decision to the executing agents, as well as organizing and maintaining coordinated effort. The limited time available for preparing for combat operations, frequent and abrupt situation changes, as well as the increased volume of informa- tion required by executing entities demand that commanders and staffs of all echelons employ various forms and methods of communicating decisions to subordinates. In particular the authors discuss in detail one of the basic forms of com- municating a decision -- the operation order. It is emphasized that retention of a certain sequence in presentation (verbal and written) at the various control levels is of great methodological importance. This disciplines an officer's thinking, guarantees against possible omissions, and saves time. In discussing methods of communicating orders and in- structions to the executers, the authors note that each method has its advantages and drawbacks. In most cases time is the principal criterion in selection. At the same time the authors state that while in the last war the method of personal contact between the commander and his subordinates in the issuing of an operation order was in particularly widespread use, today it will not always be possible or expedient, particularly during combat. Therefore the most widespread method will be the communication of orders to subordinates by technical communications channels. It is recommended that the most important instructions be trap switted by the method of direct verbal contact with subordinates. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Examining problems of troop coordination, the authors proceed from a cor- rect ccn,?lusion that it is acquiring the force of objective necessity and a patters: of conduct of any combined-arms engagement. But the authors also note that this pattern. i s not manifested by itself but operates only through the subjective activity of commanders and staffs. Consequently their task is intelligently to utilize this pattern and to master the at of organization and maintenance of precise and continuous troop coordina- tion. Based on the generally-accepted interpretation of the essence of troop coordination, the authors arrive at two theoretical conclusions which in our opinion are of great practical significance: first of all, organization and maintenance of coordination cannot be separate, detached acts in com- mander and staff activities ccna.:~,:ted with troop control but must permeate their entire. effort; secondly, the combined-aims commander and his staff play a guiding and decisive role it the organization and maintenance of coordinated acti..n. Also meriting attention is the recommended me;.hod of approaching determina- tion of the content of coordination instructions; particularly in the attack without halting in an attack position. At the end of this chapter the authors examine the features of organization of troop coordinated action in the conduct of combat operations involving only the employment of conventional weapons. The process of troop control in combat also encompasses such areas of com- mander, staff and political entity activity as maintenance of high troop morale, monitoring of troop actions, study, synthesis and practical adop- tion of advanced combat experience and know-how. Chapters X, XI, and XII deal with these matters. The authors devote particular attention to the question of maintaining high troop morale in combat (Chapter X), correctly considering this area of commander, staff and political entity activity as one of the most im- portant functions of control, unique in content and methods of execution, They note that its successful accomplishment is possible only on the basis of thorough knowledge o. Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the morale factor and innovative practical application of the points of this doctrine. In the first section of this chapter the authors examine the sources of troop morale and the means used to establish morale in the armies of the imperialist nations and in the Soviet Army. For the most part the authors correctly handle this task. But nevertheless one should note that the genesis of the forming of the morale of people and army under conditions of the socialist state are presented insufficiently consistently and complete- ly, Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 For example, the political and psychological elements on the basis of which the morale of Soviet fighting men is formed in the course of moral- political and psychological training (p,ge 337), for some reason are isolated from the same elements which are inherent in Soviet society as a whole. On page 338 the authcrs state: "The term morale also includes elements pertaining to the social strata of society, the character and level of culture of people and army, the national features of the people, its customs and traditions, as well as elements expressing the moral state of the people and army..." But it is a well-known fact that the social strata of Soviet society comprise the worker class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the toiling intelligentsia, from which our army and navy are made up. There are no antagonistic conflicts among these strata, aid from a socio- political standpoint they form a unified, monolithic Soviet society. The moral strength of this society is cimprised of the socioideological and sociopsychological elements formed by the Communist Party in the process of communist indoctrination of the Soviet people.2 The content of these e:ements should have been revealed in greater detail, since they form the basis of moral-political and psychological training of Soviet fighting men in light of the tasks performed by the Soviet Armed Forces. The unity of Soviet people and army, a point which is subsequently discussed in a fair amount of detail, is also formed on the basis of these elements. Correctly noting that psychological training of military personnel is effected in an organic unity witn moral-political training, with the determining influence of the latter (pp 337-338) , the authors at the same time claim that the moral-political qualities of military personnel are formed during the course of political training, while psychological qualities are formed in the course of combat training, when military per- sonnel acquire professional knowledge and skills (page 340). A question naturally arises: how is an organic unity of these two types of training achieved? What ways, means and methods are employed to achieve this? Un- fortunately the authors provide no answers to these questions. In the second part of this chapter the authors examine methods of maintain- ing a high level of morale by troops in combat. As the authors correctly state, the most important thing in resolving this problem is instillment in personnel of a communist ideological outlook, a correct understanding of the nature and features of a potential future war, as well as knowledge of weapons, the nature of modern combat and the methods of waging warfare. While correctly treating this problem on the whole, the authors in our opinion have failed t-o avoid certain extremes and a few inaccuracies. This applies primarily to the description of the nature of a nuclear war (page 310) and the effect of radioactive contamination on troops (page 345). These elements are presented so dramatically that in the opinion of the Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 authors nuclear bursts and radiation will irrevocably produce fear and a sense of impending doom in all personnel (our underline -- I. Ch.). It is certainly true that radioactive contamination is one of the most powerful effect factors of nuclear weapons. But its effect on the per- sonnel of the arms and services is far from uniform, if only because the combat equipment with which they are armed possesses differing but on the whole reliable protection against radiation. Consequently the morale- psychological state of troops operating in areas of radioactive contamina- tion will vary, and obviously this must be considered in accomplishing the task of maintaining a high state of morale. The authors correctly note that an abrupt transition from peace to war, for a number of reasons, leads to changes in the morale and psychological state of troops. But they inaccurately illustrate this point with a historical example. They write that at the beginning of World War II the enemy's mass employment of tanks and aircraft, splitting attacks and encirclement maneuver produced in troops fear and a lack of confidence in their capabilities (page 344). What troops are they talking about? We know that World War II began with an attack by Nazi Germany on Poland, followed by Denmark and Norway, Belgium and France. These countries and their armies surrendered in connection with a number of circumstances, although units of the Polish Army and worker detachments, for example, offered the Ger- mans stubborn resistance. As regards Soviet troops, the above assessment of their state during the init.'.al operations of the Great Patriotic dar is questionable. Everyone is well aware of the courage, tenacity, heroism and unshakable faith in victory over the enemy displayed by our troops in the frontier battles and in the defense of the hero cities. It was only the excep- tionally unfavorable operational-strategic situation resulting from an enemy sneak attack and the adversary's establishment of an overwhelming numerical superiority on the selected axes of advance which compelled our troops to withdraw, It is true that under these conditions there did occur instances of "tank panic" and "aircraft panic," but these were rare, ?.solated occurrences which by no means characterized the behavior of our army and navy on the first days of the last war. Historical examples demand absolutely accurate, precise and clear presentation, A substantial shortcoming of this chapter as a whole in our opinion is the fact that the authors say nothing whatsoever about ways and methods of carrying out troop moral-political and psychological training in peacetime. Chapter XI, "Verification," is quite elaborate. The authors examine in detail the tasks and methods of verification, its organization and execu- tion, But the material would have been much more meaningful if the authors had discussed an additional, very important function accompanying Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 verification -- assistance to troops. Without prompt and effective assistance, verification as a control function is transformed into a bureaucratic procedure. Therefore the verification plan contained on page 359 should obviously have included an additional column: "Measures based on verification results and time of execution." Of considerable interest, is C.iapter XII, "Study of Combat: Experience and Its Communication to th': Troops." We must say that this area of commander, staff and political entity activity is frequently totally ignored or dis- cussed very sparingly in military histories and in theoretical works on the art of warfare. One must give credit to the authors for having the courage to discuss the importance and content of this rather complex and important function performed by control entites. The authors examine the tasks and organization of control entity efforts in studying combat experience, the learning process proper, and the com- munication of combat experience and know-how to the troops. All these items are discussed fairly completely and'in a comprehensible manner, with the exception of a few elements. For example, in discussing the area of main effort by control entities in the study of combat experience, the authors state what primarily should be studied in the actions of the enemy (page 366). This is correct, but at the same time they should hav, formulated the principal areas involved in accomplishing an analogous task in respect our own troops, so that the process of study of combat experience does not look one-sided. The purpose of the war diary is imprecisely stated (page 372). The authors note that it presents the results of a study of combat experience, and at the same time they claim that this document contains basic material for the study and utilization of the experience of completed engagements (our underline -- I. Ch.). The latter statement is correct. In our view the war diary should constitute a fundamental report document, reflecting accurately and objectively the activities of the commander, staff and troops (units, large units) during a specified period of time (usually for a 24-hour period). It should possess equal legal status with operations documents (operation orders, instructions, reports). During the Great Patriotic. War unfortunately war diaries were maintained unsystematically and in a slipshod manner in many units and large units. This occurred because the legal status of the document had not been defined. It is clearly high time to settle this matter officially. In our opinion the authors correctly pose the question of the necessity of further development and improvement of theory of troop control as a special area of military knowledge. Study of control theory as an independent Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1 discipline at military educational institutions and scientific elaboration of its various aspects through the joint efforts of specialists in the area of the social, applied and military sciences would greatly promote successful solution to practical control problems. In conclusion we can state that in spite of the noted shortcomings, on the whole the book is both useful and needed. It will play a definite role in the further elaboration of one of the most vital and complex areas of theory and practice of contemporary military art -?- troop control. The reader will find in this book well-sui,stantiated advice and recommenda- tions on many matters pertaining to organizing the work of commanders and staffs in securing precise, clear-cut control of subordinate subunits and units in combat. 1 D. A. Ivanov; V. P. Savel'yev; P. V. Shenanskiy: Osnovy upravleniya (Fundamentals of Troop Control), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971, 384 pages. 2. For more detail see Voyennaya Mysl', No 9, 1969, pp 14-23. Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010003-1