TRANSLATIONS FROM VOYENNAYA MYSL NUMBER 4 - APRIL 1971

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 25, 1974
• Content Type: TRANS

STAT
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while party supervision over the organization and activities of the
guerrilla forces was an important factor and the basis for their success.
The Communist Party and Soviet state extended all-out assistance to
guerrilla units, particularly in the training of command cadres. During
the Civil War the party Central Committee, on Lenin's instructions,
deployed a vast Bolshevik underground network for efficient direction of
the guerrilla effort and organization of guerrilla forces. The party
steadily increased party influence on the guerrilla masses and extended
all-out assistance via government organizations.
The guerrilla struggle was not viewed by our party as a decisive means of
defeating the enemy, since guerrilla forces were not numerous enough for
this. The role of the guerrillas was important, however; guerrillas
paralyzed the White Guardist rear areas, prevented the enemy from utiliz-
ing manpower reserves, and diverted enemy strength from the front. Lenin
highly praised, for example, the activities of the Siberian guerrillas,
who "helped our Red Army beat Kolchak." Guerrilla forces were also a sub-
stantial source of additional manpower for the Red Army.
The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) was organized to combat
the imperialist intelligence services and the secret agents of the domestic
counterrevolutionaries. The Cheka was "an establishment which was our
sharp sword wielded against numerous conspiracies and numerous attempts to
overthrow the Soviet government..." (V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume
44, page 327). The Cheka laid the foundation for the security agencies of
the Soviet state. Lenin, appraising the role of the Cheka, wrote that at
one time "the principal combat agencies defending Soviet rule were the
People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Cheka" (Ibid., page
396).
Securement of observance of socialist law and order and protection of the
interests of Soviet citizens was handled by the Soviet miZitia,created im-
mediately following the October Revolution. Under the condit.-'_ons of civil
war the militia, as an armed organization, performed military functions and
to this extent constituted a reserve for the Red Army.8
Thus Soviet military organization during the Civil War period constituted
an aggregate of the most diversified forms, in principle of recruitment,
subordination and nature of missions performed. The leading role was
played by the regular Red Army. The Red Army, in coordination with other
forms of military organization of our state, routed the interventionists
and domestic counterrevolutionaries and defended the socialist homeland.
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improvement of Soviet Military Organization During the P
Building, of Socialism
The victorious end to the Civil War created favorable conditions for
peaceful construction in this country. Attaching primary importance to
the buildir.g of socialism, Lenin and the Communist Party at the same time
focused considerable attention on matters pertaining to strengthening
national defense and increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed
Forces. "We have completed one series of wars," stated Lenin. "Now we
must prepare for another; but we do not know when it will come, and we must
do everything possible so that we can handle it when it does come" (Poln.
Sobr. Soch., Volume 42, pp 143-144).
The party was again faced with the problem of selection of forms of Soviet
military organization. In connection with this there arose a debate on
what the peacetime army should be: a regular cadre army or a volunteer
militia army, This deLate continued until the 10th Party Congress.
The 10th Party Congress played an exceptionally important role in deter-
mining a scientifically substantiated program of peacetime military orga-
nizational development. The congress resolutely rejected proposals for an
immediate transition to a militia system, which would in fact signify
disbandment of the Red Army. It was pointed out that "for the immediate
future the core of our armed forces should be the present Red Army,
reduced in size by discharging older personnel, with an increase in the
percentage o f the army of proletarian origin and with party membership."
The congress demanLed that the process of removing Communists from the army
be stopped and that politically-weakened units be fortified with political
workers and Communists.
As regards the territorial-militia system of army organization, the
congress stated in its resolution that "the party has no reason to revise
its program. The forms, methods and pace of transition to a militia depend
entirely on the international and domestic situation, on the duration of
the breathing spell, on relations between city and village, etc."9 A
partial. transition to militia units was recommended only for rayons with
the most cohesive proletarian population (Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals).
Thus the congress stated basic principles for implementation of a mixed
system of army organizational development.
Strengthening cadre large units and units of the Red Army, the party
cautiously introduced a territorial-militia structure, utilizing experience
in organizing Vsevobuch and the specie?. -urpose units. The essence of the
partially introduced territorial-milit.Lr system, as stated in a circular
letter released by the party Central 1, ..imittee in May 1923, consisted in
the fact that "the territorial divisz.ons being organized should be the
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equivalent in political and military-technical. preparedness and combat
efficiency in general to permanent field divisions, differing from the
latter only in the fact that they maintain only a permanent cadre, financed
by the state, comprising approximately one tenth of the wartime personnel
complement; the bulk of the nonprofessional-military Red Army lower-
echelon command and administrative-service personnel attached permanently
to the given division, shall only periodically assemble for brief periods
of training, exercises and other purpcees; while the remainder of the time
they are entitled to live at home and engage in civilian employment, thus
requiring no expenditures for maintenance on the part of the state?"10
Territorial organizational development constituted the most important
component of the military reform carried out by the party in 1924-1925?
In October 1924 the Red Army contained 43 territorial divisiorsanda cavalry
brigade, which comprised 44 percent of the total number of division
(brigade) units of the Red Army,11
During the period of peacetime building of socialism, a powerful navy, air
force, border and internal troops, grew up alongside the Red Army, compris-
ing as an aggregate the Soviet Armed Forces, At the same time the party
focused attention on the potential utilization of guerrilla forces as well
in the areas of probable theaters of military operations.12 On 18 February
1925 F. E, Dzerzhinskiy submitted to the party Central. Committee a plan for
organizing on Soviet territory small, strictly clandestine groups, su'.tably
armed, for the purpose of organizing guerrilla warfare in case of need.
This plan was approved by the Central Committee; and practical implementa-
tion worked out, i
A genuine expression of Soviet patriotism and mass creative initiative in
defense of the socialist homeland was the establishment of volunteer
defense organizations.. Following the end of the Civil War, on 15 November
1920, a military scientific society was established on the initiative of
Communist members of the General Staff Academy. M. V. Frunze was elected
president of the society. This society signaled the beginning of establish-
ment of a number of volunteer defense organizations: the Society for
Assistance to the Defense of the USSR, the Society of Friends of the Air
Force, the Voluntary Society for Furthering the Construction of the Chemi-
cal Industry, and Osoaviakhim, All performed missions of disseminating
military knowledge among the population and teaching military occupational
specialties to young people, The volunteer organizations made a major
contribution toward the moral-political and military-patriotic indoctrina-
tion of the Soviet people.
The rapid development of military aviation and expansion of the area of
armed combat in connection with this demanded, in addition to strengthen-
ing army air defense, organization of local air defense, which by decision
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of the party ('utral Committee was established in October 1932. Local
air defense was set up primarily in major industrial centers, and manned
by industrial workers, white-collar workers, college and high-school
students. Subsequent experience showed that the establishment of this
organization had been the correct move.
The complex international situation at the end of the thirties, caused by
imperialist preparations and initiation of World War II, demanded a full
shift to the regular cadre principle of armed forces organizational develop-
ment. By this time, thanks to the successful building of socialism, the
economic, sociopolitical and organizational prerequisites had been created
for implementation of this principle and elimination of class restrictions
to military service. On 1 September 1939 the USSR law on universal mili-
tary obligation was promulgated, establishing a uniform system of cadre
organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Thus the party laid
the organizational foundation for our victory in the Great Patriotic War.
Soviet Military Organization During the Period of the Great Patriotic War
The Great Patriotic War constituted a stern best not only of the economic,
political and spiritual resources of our society, but of its military or-
ganization as well. As is well known, in making preparations to attack
the Soviet Union, by June i?41 the German High Command had increased its
regular armed forces to 3,500,000 men. Of this total number, 4,600,000,
and a total of 5,500,000 together with the troops of Germany's satellites,
were allocated for the attack on the Soviet Union.14 The Nazi German
troops designated for executing Plan Barbarossa were not only mobilized
and trained in advance but also possessed experience in conducting large-
scale military campaigns. They were supported by he resources of the
subjugated nations of almost all Europe.
As of 1 June 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces totaled al.proximately 5,000,000
men, 9,900,000 of whom were deployed in the western frontier districts.15
Thus at the moment of the treacherous attack by *?--Li Germany on the Soviet
Union, the German invasion army was almost twice the size of our forces
stationed in the western border districts, and was even somewhat larger
than our total armed forces. Under conditions of a sneak attack and such
a substantial inequality in numbers, it became extremely urgent to achieve
further development and improvement of Soviet military organization,
bringing it fully to bear against the powerful and treacherous enemy.
The process of solving this problem vividly revealed the exceptional orga-
nizational talents of our party and the basic superiority of the socialist
societal and governmental system.
During the first hours of the war the party Central Committee took resolute
measures to mobilize the entire Soviet people to resist the foe. The
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fundamental program document on the basis of which Soviet military orga-
nization was improved and mobilization of the nation for the struggle
against fascism was effected, was the 29 June 1941 directive of the
Council of People's Commissars USSR and party Central Committee to party
and soviet organizations in the oblasts along the front. The party and
government raised the Soviet nation up in a holy war against the aggressor,
A vivid expression of national patriotism and love of the Su,iet homeland
was establishment of a volunteer militia, initiated by the Communists and
worker class of Moscow and Leningrad. The difficulties of the initial
period of war required the most vigorous mobilization of resources to
resist the foe. The people's militia was one' of the forms of accelerated
mustering of regular armed forces on a volunteer basis. It was created under
the guidance of party organizations, the bureaus and committees of which
were frequently transformed into mobilization headquarters, with the
assistance of military commissariats. The resources of enterprises, public
organizations and the population at large were used in addition to central-
ized state funds to establish this militia, In the summer and fall of 1941,
at the initiative of the party organizations of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev,
Khar'kov, Smolensk, Odessa, Sevastopol', Tula and other cities, approx-
imately 60 people's militia divisions were formed, plus 200 separate
regiments, a large number of subunits (battalions, companies, detachments),
totaling almost 2 million men. More than 40 local volunteer defense force
divisions were incorporated into the army in the field. Many of them saw
combat and performed valiantly, ultimately prosecuting the war far beyond
Soviet borders. During the war a large number of people's militia or local
volunteer defense force units were employed as reserves to replenish the
regular large units of the army in the field.16
At the initiative of party organizations, during the first phase of the
Great Patriotic War Communist units and large units were formed of volun-
teers -- Communists, Komsomol members and non-party patriots. The
formation of these units promoted rapid mobilization and strengthening of
the armed forces, which were fighting under exceptionally difficult con-
ditions during the initial years of the war. A total of 150 Communist
units and large units were formed, which were incorporated into the army in
the field.
A variant of the local volunteer defense unit was the assault or commando
battalion. These were the first volunteer units set up on a popular mili-
tia basis at the initiative of party organizations, The local volunteer
defense force units performed combat missions side by side with regular
troops at the front, while the commando battalions had a specific mission --
to engage hostile paratroops, enemy spies and saboteurs in the areas along
the front. By the end of July 1941 a total of 1755 commando battalions,
totaling more than 328,000 men, had been organized in the front regions.17
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The experience of the Civil War in organizing Vsevobuch was utilized in
training armed forces reserves. On 17 September 1941 the State Defense
Committee issued a decree entitled "Universal Mandatory Military Trainin
for Soviet Citizens." During the Great Patriotic War 9,862,000 persons1g
received basic military training in the Vsevobuch system while performing
their normal employment duties. Vsevobuch was disbanded at the end of the
war.
The party and government devoted serious attention to antiaircraft defense
of cities and antichemical defense of the civilian population. On 2 July
1941 the Soviet government issued a decree entitled "Universal Mandatory
Training of the Civilian Population for Antiaircraft Defense." Existing
local air defense entities were strengthened and new ones set up -- factory
units and self-defense groups. Males between the ages of 16 and 60 and
females between the ages of 18 and 50 were compelled to participate in
self-defense groups set up at enterprises, offices and apartment house
management offices. These groups trained during off-duty hours. Personnel
of the Osoaviakhira volunteer society supervised civilian training for anti-
aircraft and antichemical defense.
By the end of the war local air defense units contained a total of approx-
imately 1 million persons, while more than 5 million were active in self-
defense groups.19 During the Great Patriotic War local air defense played
an. important role in defending industrial installations against air
attacks, in preventing and extinguishing fires started by incendiary bombs,
in repairing damaged utility lines, etc. Local. air defense was particular-
ly important in such cities as Moscow and Leningrad.
During the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet nation was defending the
socialist homeland with weapon in hand, guerrilla forces were employed
against the enemy, just as in the Civil War. On Hitler's orders the Ger-
mans brutally murdered guerrillas; declaring them bandits, they refused to
take prisoners. This Nazi "motivation" is used today by the spiritual
successors of fascism -- the American imperialists and their accomplices,
who are waging war against freedom-loving peoples. The lie is obvious and
is aimed at casting doubt upon the political essence of the popular
guerrilla effort. According to incomplete statistics, more than 6200
guerrilla detachments and groups, totaling more than 1,300,000 patriots,
were operating on temporarily-occupied Soviet territory. In scope of
operations and character of missions performed, the guerrilla mo,.ement
during the Great Patriotic War was transformed into a factor of strategic
significance. 20
The Soviet Armed Forces were the principal and decisive element of the
Soviet military organization, securing total defeat of the enemy. The
other forms named above were supplementary elements, strengthened the
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regular Soviet Army and Navy, and helped them successfully accompliuh
their missions? It is important to note that the mass popular movement
under the guidance of the Communist Party in defense of the homeland served
during the Great Patriotic War as a source of further development of
earlier-originated as well as the creation of new forms of military orga-
nization
The historical conditions of the postwar period critically restated the
problem of Soviet military organization and the forms of its development.
In resolving this problem, the Communist Party takes into consideration
both the experience of the past and the political and economic changes
taking place not only in this country but throughout the world, the
character of the present era, as well as the new stage in the development
of military affairs.
The aggressive nature of imperialism and the danger it presents to peace,
freedom, and independence of peoples has been manifested in recent years
with renewed force. The responsibility of our homeland for the fate of
peace, socialism and the building of Communism increases with an intensifi-
cation of the aggressiveness of imperialism, and U.S. imperialism in partic-
ular. Therefore, in pursuing a policy of peace, the CPSU and Soviet govern-
ment focus serious attention on the problem of strEngthenirg the Soviet
military organization and increasing our homeland's defense capability,
a
Taking into consideration historical experience and trends in the develop-
ment of military affairs, the party focuses principal attention on improv-
ing Soviet Armed Forces, on increasing their combat might and combat
readiness, A vivid manifestation of- this was the Law on Universal Military
Obligation adopted on 12 October 1967 by the Supreme Soviet USSR, Strength-
ening of the Soviet Armed Forces is promoted by the great social changes,
growth in political activeness and general educational level of the Soviet
people, as well as radical changes in military hardware, Profound
qualitative changes in the structure of the armed forces have taken place
on the basis of adoption of missiles and nuclear weapons. Along with their
further developments, as emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev, it is necessary to
improve civil defense, and to impron-, military patriotic efforts among the
toilers, particularly young people; thr entire party, the entire Soviet
public must constantly focus on this task.
In a present-day war, if the imperialists initiate one, if missiles,
nuclear devices and other means of mass destruction are employed, the
demarcation lines between front and rear areas will be effaced. More
complex tasks of defending the rear areas have demanded radical reorganiza-
tion of local air defense. It has evolved into USSR civil defense -- a
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permanent form of military organization set up on a voluntary defense
force-territorial basis. The main function of civil defense is protection
of the civilian population, industrial and other installations against
weapons of mass destruction. Government supervision and mass initiative
are closely linked in civil defense.
At the present time an important contribution towi..,.1 strengthening our
homeland's defense capability is being made by the. Voluntary Society for
Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAN?). "The main task of
DOSAAF," we read in the 7 May 1966 Decree of the Central Committee CPSU
and Council of Ministeru USSR, 'shall continue in the future to be active
assistance ii. strengthening this nation's defense capability and training
toilers to defend the socialist homeland."21
As history attests, Soviet military organization comprises at each stage
an aggregate of governmental, government-public and public (military-
patriotic) organizations carrying out armed defense of the socialist home-
land or directly preparing the members of society for such defense.
Structure of Soviet military organization is closely linked with the
political organization of Soviet society, its fundamental elements.
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Key to diagram: 1 -- CPSU; 2 -- Soviet state (state legislative and executive
bodies); 3 -- public organizations; 4 -- Soviet military organization;
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(Key to diagram on preceding page) continued) 5 -- state organizations;
6 -- public-state organizations; 7 -- military-patriotic organizations;
8 -- Soviet Armed Forces; 9 -- Soviet army and Navy; 10 -- border troops;
11 -- Internal Troops; 12 -- State Security Agencies; 13 -- militia;
14 -- Red Guard; 15 -- Vsevobuch troops; 16 -- special purpose units;
17 -- civil defense; 18 -- partisan forces; 19 ?-- local volunteer defense
force, comman;lo battalions; 20 -- local air defense; 21 -- Military Sci-
entific Society, Society for Assistance to the Defense of the USSR; 22 --
Society of Friends of the Air Force; 23 -- Voluntary Society for Furthering
the Construction of the Chemical Industry; 24 -- Osoaviakhim; 25 -- DOSAAF
Of course the role of the forms of military organization specified in the
diagram is specific and unidentical. As in the system of political orga-
nization of society the main instrument of struggle to assert socialism
is the Soviet state, led and directed by the Communist Party, in the
system of Soviet military organization of pivotal importance in per-
forming the specified missions are governmental forms, and particularly
the Soviet Armed Forces. They are the basis of Soviet military organiza-
tion.
But in spite of a differing role in armed combat, $s well as c'.iffering for-
mations, methods and modes of guidance, all the above-mentioned forms of
Soviet military organization have been essential at one stage or anatirx of our
country's historical development. They are all an exar.t copy o" the so-
cietal and governmental structure, are profoundly popular and serve a
single aim -- defense of the socialist homeland.
In connection with increased tasks connected with defending socialism and
building Communism, the role of t ; Communist Party is becoming more im-
portant in determining the most e~cr_dient forms of Soviet military organiza-
tion and their prompt development. Perfecting Soviet military organiza-
tion and making its contribution toward strengthening the Warsaw Pact Orga-
nization, the CPSU is ensuring the strength and invincibility of the
forces of peace and socialism.
1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 1, 1950, page 11; A. F. Danilevskiy: V. I. Lenin i
voprosy voyennogo stroitel'stva na VIII s"yezde RKP(b) (V. I. Lenin and
Problems of Military Organizational Development at the 8th Party
Congress), Voyenizdat, 1964; I. V. Stavitskiy: V. I. Lenin vo glave
zashchity sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (Lenin at the Head of Defense
of the Socialist Homeland), Izd-vo Znaniye, 1969; Marksizm-Leninizm o
voyne i armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and Army), Voyenizdat, 1968,
pp 216, 229-230.
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2. 1. A. Peshkov: Sovetskiy narod v zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Ote-
chestva of napadeniya imperialistov v 1918-1922 gg (Vsevobuch) (The
Soviet Peopli in Defense of the Socialist Homeland Against Imperialist
Attack, 1918-1922 [Vsevobuch]), Izd. Tomskogo un-ta, 1957, page 99.
3. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Fund 55, List 5, Document
66, Sheet 22.
4. F. N. Gudchenko: "The Communist Party -- Organizer of Military Training
of Toilers in 1918-1920," Trudy akademii (Works of the Academy), Col-
lection 19, Izd. Voyennoy akademii tyla i transporta, 1958, page 84.
5. S. Nayda: "3pecial Purpose Units (1917-1925)," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy
Zhurnal, No 4, 1969, page 108.
6. Computed by the authors from figures cited by S. F. Nayda in 0 nekoto-
rykh voprosakh istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR (Some Problems of the
History of the Civil War in the USSR), Voyenizdat, 1958, page 53.
7. See Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya (Soviet Historical En-
cyclopedia), Volume 11, 1968, page 598. .0
8. M. I. Yeropkin: Razvitiye organov militsii v Sovetskom goaudarstve
(Development of Militia Agencies in the Soviet State), Izd. Vysshey
shkoly MOOP SSSR, 1967, pp 25, 26.
9. Desyatyy s"yezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskiy otchet (Tenth Congress of
the Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik]). Stenographic Report), Gos-
politizdat, 1963, page 616.
10. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Fund 9, List 5, Document
118, Sheet 11.
11. V. N. Konyukhovskiy: Territorial'naya sistema voyennogo stroitel'stva
(Territorial System of Military Organizational Development), Voyenizdat,
1961, page 61.
12. M. V. Frunze: Izbrannyye proizvedeniL (Selected Writings), Voyenizdat,
1965, page 53.
13. A. V. Tishkov: Pervyy chekcist (First State Security Officer), Voyen-
izdat, 1968, page 133.
14. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkava
istoriya (A Brief History of the Great Patriotic War of
Union, 1941-1945), Voyenizdat, 1970, pp 34-35.
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15. Ibid., pp 53-54.
16. Istoriva Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Volume 5, Book 1, Politizdat,
1970, page 183.
17? Ibid., page 180.
18. Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Suvetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945
(History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945),
Volume 6, Voyenizdat, 1965, page 109.
19. K. G. Kotlukov; K. S. Ogloblin; A. I. Sgilevskiy: Ot MPVO - k
grazhdanskoy oborone (From Local Air Deiense to Civil Defense), Atom-
izdat, 1968, page 34.
20. P. A. Zhilin: Usiliya narodov SSSR v doatizhen'.i pobedy vo vtoroy mi-
rovoy voyne. Doklad na XIII Mezhdunarodnom koi:oresse istoricheskil:h
nauk (Efforts by the Peoples of the USSR in Achieving Victory in World
War II. Paper Presented at the 13th International Congress of
Historical Sciences), Moscow, 1970, pp 8, 9.
21. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty (1917-
1968 gg) (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents
[1917-1968]), Voyenizdat, 1969, page 393.
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V. Perfilov, Candidate of Historical Sciences
U.S. foreign policy has always been characterized by aggressive aspirations.
The U.S. Army and Navy, implementing the foreign policy plans of the
monopolies, have on numerous occasions been involved in limited-scope over-
seas military adventures. These include aggressive campaigns against the
North African countries in the last century, and brigand actions against
the countries of the Mediterranean, particularly the Arab state of
Tripolitania. The magazine U.S. News and World Report has calculated that
during she first 3 decades of this century U.S. troops have invaded Latin
American soil more than 30 times. The U.S. Army has twice scourged the
Philippines with fire and sword.
Also well known is the reactionary role played by the aggressors from
across the-sea in organizing "crusades" against the young Soviet Republic.
In the spring of 1918 the U.S. Navy ;u*d Marines hastened to come to the
aid of the Anglo-French troops and linaad at Murmansk. Invaders in
American uniforms helped overthrow Soviet authority in the North and
instituted a reign of terror there. American interventionists also added
black pages to the history of our Far East.
U.S. foreign policy became particularly aggressive following World War II.
Its principal aim was the gaining of world supremacy. U.S. Air ',,orce
ideologue Professor 'John Kidffe- stated in his book entitled Realities
of World Power, published in 1952, that the United States should extend its
power to the remotest corners of the earth. U.S. troops should dot the
territory of dozens of countries... Tomorrow's battlefield is the entire
world. Today the task consists in securing throughout the world as many
strategically important points as possible and to train troops in the
process of seizing these areas.
In the postwar years the peoples of the world were witnesses to one
aggressive action after another perpetrated by the American imperialists.
The United States took part in crushing the national liberation movement in
Indonesia in 1945-1948. In 1948 a reactionary coup was organized with
their assistance. In 1950 they occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan. The
Pentagon waged an aggressive, bloody war against the PRC from 1951 through
1953, In 1962 an attempt was made to invade Cuba. The United States has
inspired and executed provocations and -lots against Argentina, Ecuador,
Honduras, Panama, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Laos, and Cyprus.
Events of recent years clearly demonstrate that U.S. imperialist circles
have no intention of departing from their patently aggressive course.
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The frenzied arms race, the aggression in Indochina and the events in the
Near East are vivid examples of the predatory nature of American imperial-
ism.
"The aggressive policies of imperialism," state the documents of the
International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties,, "are based on
an endeavor to weaken the position of socialism with all. possible means,
to put down the national liberation movement of peoples, to hinder the
toiler struggle in the capitalist countries and to halt the irreversible
process of the decline of capitalism."' The United States of America is
the main force of aggression and war.
As is well known, U.S. ruling circles are placing main emphasis on the
development of missiles and nuclear weapons, on preparations for a nuclear
world war, This aim was and still is the leitmotif of their military
doctrine, of all practical activities pertaining to armed forces organiza-
tional development. At the same time, under the effect of major changes
favoring the forces of peace and socialism, there is occurring an in-
exorable process of weakening of the positions of imperialism in the world
arena. This has been caused first of all by a major change in the world
balance of power in favor of socialism, in connection with growth of the
economic and military might of the USSR and all nations of the socialist
commonwealth, and secondly by successes in the national liberation movement
which have led to the collapse of colonial systems and an intensification
of the class struggle by the toilers of the capitalist nations against
their exploiters, for democracy and peace.
American strategists must take this into account. At the beginning of the
sixties they came to the conclusion that the United States should not rely
solely on total nuclear war as the sole form of potential armed conflicts,
that more flexible and consequently and more promising means and methods
of resolving foreign policy problems are needed. Military scientists
recommended so-called limited warfare to U.S. political leaders as an
appropriate method.
The ideas of the authors of numerous books2 dedicated to elaboration of a
theory of "limited wars" boiled down to the conclusion that they should be
limited in goals, means, territory, objectives, weapons, troops, time, and
pace.
American military theorists claim that one of the causes of orientation
toward limited warfare was the necessity of combatting the national libera-
tion movement under the new conditions which had formed in the world arena.
Exposing the reactionary character of so-called "small" or limited im-
perialist wars, Lenin wrote in 1917: "...Take the history of those small
wars they (the imperialists -- V. P.) waged prior to the Great War --
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'small' because few Europeans were killed in them, and yet there did
perish hundreds of thousands of members of those peoples which they were
strangling, which from their viewpoint are not even peoples (Asians,
Africans -- are these peoples?)..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works],
Volume 32, page 86).
The essence of the strategy of American imperialism pertaining to those
countries which are struggling for their liberation consists in retaining
them within the world system of capitalism. Limited warfare is proposed
as a method of resolving this problem; in the opinion of American
theorists limited warfare can be of inestimable aid to American foreign
policy, giving the United States the opportunity to influence events, not
simply to react to them.
U.S. imperialism, utilizing limited wars, is counting heavily on militari-
ly crushing the national liberation movement throughout the world with the
aid of conventional arms alone. As regards the use of tactical nuclear
weapons in limited wars, American theorists do not yet have a unanimity
of views on this matter. One group, headed by the current Special Adviser
to the President on National Security, Henry Kissinger, believes that
utilization of tactical nuclear weapons will enable the United States to
conduct such wars at moderate cost. Another group, headed by prominent
American theorist H. Morgenthau, believes that with use of tactical nuclear
weapons it is very difficult to keep a war limited, to prevent it from
becoming a nuclear world war. In any case the development and operational
adoption of tactical nuclear weapons, including small ones, is continuing.
The United States and NATO are also continuing to investigate the possibili-
ties of limited nuclear warfare in Europe as well. All this makes the
so-called doctrine of "limited warfare" extremely dangerous in the long
run.
Therefore the summary declaration adopted at the International Conference
of Communist and Worker Parties in Moscow on 17 June 1969 states: "Armed
intervention and cruel acts of repression -- particularly where the
struggle assumes especially acute forms and where revolutionary forces
are fighting with weapon in hand -- counterrevolutionary p l o t s, reac-
tionary and fascist coups, acts of provocation and blackmail -- all these
techniques are being employed by imperialism.i3
The events of past years indicate that initially American imperialism,
waging limited wars, achieved only a modicum of success. On occasion
it has succeeded in crushing the national liberation movement in a number
of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But these were specific,
insignificant successes.
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Following World War II the United States undertook military actions within
the framework of the limited war in Korea; as is well known, these efforts
produced no military-political success whatsoever.
This failed, however, to cool the ardor of the American politicians and
strategists. They resolved to put the doctrine of "limited warfare" to
another and more fundamental test, this time in Vietnam. U.S. ruling
circles were hoping to destroy a socialist outpost in Asia and to es-
tablish on the territory of South Vietnam a major bridgehead for escalating
the struggle against the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia.
U.S. imperialism was extremely anxious to control the major strategic
areas of Indochina, since important sea and air lines of communication pass
precipely through this region. This area is the source of 39 types of raw
materials which are of vital importance to the U.S. economy.' In addition,
Southeast Asia is a giant market for the disposal of pLoducts and an
inexhaustible area for the investment of capital. These are the major
factors guiding U.S. foreign policy and compelling the United States to
continue escalating the war in Indochina.
In scope and scale the American aggression in Vietnam has been the biggest
military invasion since World War II. This limited war, which is not
producing victory, is demanding continually greater efforts. In 1960
there were 800 American military personnel in South Vietnam, 2000 in 1961,
15,500 in 1963, 128,000 by the end of 1965, and 500,000 by 1970. The num-
ber of U.S. troops in Vietnam has now declined to 300,000, but the Saigon,
army has in the meantime grown to 1 million men.
U.S. military expenditures connected with the war in Indochina and the con-
tinuing arms race are also rapidly growing. They totaled 57 billion dol-
lars in 1964-1965. According to the proposed federal budget for the 1972
fiscal year, which begins on 1 July 1971, Washington?s military expendi-
tures (including concealed military expenditures by all agencies) will
total approximately 100 billion dollars, which is much greater than anti-
cipated military expenditures in the 1971 fiscal year. This increase in
U.S. military expenditures attests to the fact that the White House intends
to conti_.ie pursuing its perilous foreign policy aimed at settling major
international questions "from a position of strength." An analysis of
U.S. military expenditures confirms the fact that the Americans are still
counting on a further increase both in the size of strategic nuclear forces
and in the means of waging limited wars.
The total bankruptcy of the adventur:tstic American doctrine of "limited
warfare" has been clearly reveal pd in the war against Vietnam.
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The cost of the Pentagon's military efforts in Vietnam is already exceed-
ing 100 billion dollars. And yet the United States is no closer to a mili-
tary victory today than it was at the outbreak of the war. The United
States has lost in this war more than 330,000 casualties, dead and wounded,
and more than 7000 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.' But no end is in
sight. The conflict has become a long, drawn-out and increasingly bloody
war.
The dynamics of expansion of the arsenal of weapons with which this dirty
war is being waged is extremely characteristic of U.S. policy. Initially
the Pentagon, counting on an air war, made some restrictions in employment
of services, military hardware and methods of warfare. Now that they have
become enmired in the quagmire of the Vietnam aggression, American military
leaders are now employing all services and arms, and all nonnuclear weapons.
Vietnam has become a bloody proving ground, where all modern military
hardware is being extensively utilized.
Air attacks on Vietnam are presently being flown by approximately 50 B-52
strategic bombers, 300 carrier-based attack aircraft, 1400 fighter-bombers,
more than 3000 helicopters, supported by a large part of the Seventh Fleet,
including aircraft carriers.
The experience of the war in Indochina convincingly demonstrates that the
interventionist army, schooled by the Pentagon generals, is willing to com-
mit any crime in the struggle against the South Vietnamese, Cambodian and
Laotian patriots. The endeavor to justify their inhuman methods by talk
of the necessity to "save the lives of American soldiers" is now presented
as the official posture of the U.S. government and military command. It
is not surprising that American observer James Reston cynically writes that
death is becoming the official measuring stick of U.S. success.
The U.S. Army is conducting the war in Indochina according to the principle
of organized banditry and genocide. Over the last decade the intervention-
ists have, according to the most modest estimates, killed more than 170,000
civilians in South Vietnam alone; more than 500,000 have been imprisoned.5
Condemning U.S. crimes in Vietnam, L. I. Brezhnev stated: "The crimes being
committed by the American military in Vietnam revive memories of the crimes
committed by the Nazi monsters. The murder of tens of thousands of civi-
lians, the methodical destruction of cities and villages, the reduction to
rubble of schools and hospitals and the destruction of crops mark the
disgraceful path trod by the American interventionists on Vietnamese
soil.i6
U.S. military policy, which is manifested in an accelerating arms race and
escalation of the aggressive aspirations of the "brass hats" in the Pen-
tagon, is generating a sharp upsurge in antiwar moods on the part of the
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American people and U.S. military personnel. This trend toward an increase
in antiwar attitudes is completely understandable. Very typical in this
respect is a statement made by prominent American sociologist. [Rayt Millis]'
"...Defense of the peace, coexistence, and opposition to war have not been
a popular phenomenon in the United States, but today a powerful stream of
peace attitudes is beginning to burst forth from under the outer covering
of bragging and boasting... More and more Americans are beginning to heed
the warnings and appeals of those who are standing up to be counted for
peace."7
The wave of antiwar sentiment in the United States is continuing to grow,
encompassing increasingly lar2pr segments not only of the civilian popula-
tion but also of the soldier masses as well, particularly those who have
been cast into the fiery furnace of the Vietnam war. These sentiments are
manifested particularly in the military desertion rate. Approximately
60,000 men deserted from the American armed forces in 1967-1968 alone.8
The scale of desettion has increased in recent years. This naturally has
an adverse effect on morale in the army. In response the military is
intensifying repressive actions. The population of U.S. military prisons
has tripled in recent years.9
Antivar organizations are being established in the U.S. Army. In 1967 the
"Union of American Servicemen" was organized, with a membership in excess
of 10,'00. It publishes a semilegal newspaper, which publicizes the anti-
war effort within the military. Recently a new organization was estab-
lished in the United States, the "Movement of Officers Concerned by the
War." In 1.970 28 of its members began to speak at antiwar rallies. The
number of antiwar demonstrations by enlisted personnel and junior officers
at military bases in the United States, on Okinawa and in Vietnam is
continuing to grow.
Today one can hear mole and more frequently in the United States the view
expressed that the Vietnam war has become the most unpopular in the nations
history. The criminal methods which the U.S. Army is unsuccessfully
employing in Vietnam are evoking universal, sharp censure.
The failure of the American doctrine of "limited warfare" in Vietnam has
been dictated by the laws of history. The vivid example of the heroic
resistance on the part of patriotic forces in South Vietnam persuasively
attests to the fact that the people and army, struggling consistently and
selflessly against imperialism, for treedom and independence, and with the
support of the Soviet Union as well as all socialist nations and progres-
sive elements throughout the world, are invincible. The strength of
struggling Vietnam lies in the courage and steadfastness ofits people and
army, in the powerful support offered by the nations of the socialist
commonwealth. These are constant factors in the future victory of the
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Vietnamese people. A. N. Kosygin stated this January in reply to ques-
tions put to him by the Japanese newspap r Asahi 3himbun: "The USSR and
the other socialist nations will give the peoples of Indochina total sup-
port in repulsing the armed imperialist intervention."10
Even foreign military experts, predicting the outcome of the war, believe
that the United States will fail in its calculations, counting on military
strength and sophisticated warfare techniques. The New York Times, for
example, contained the following admission: "...The Vietnam conflict has
massively intensified its negative effect on American society and on
relations between the United States and its disheartened friends abroad."11
Larry O'Brien, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, stated:
"All talk of a military victory in Indochina is absurd."12
Thus the Vietnam experience has demonstrated that in an unjust colonial
war no strategy or tactics of "limited warfare" can guarantee achievement
of the goals of a foreign policy of aggression, adventurism, and plunder.
New Methods, Old Objectives
How do U.S. ruling circles react to the obvious failures in Southeast Asia
of a foreign policy based on the doctrine -)f "limited war"? How do the
bosses of American imperialism react to the ..ontinuing growth in the num-
ber of opponents of America's Vietnam adventure, its baneful influence on
the nation's economy, and bitter protests by the American public in connec-
tion with the enormous cost in human lives?
Essentially U.S. ruling circles have not altered their military-political
aims and calculations, which call for a military solution to the Vietnam
and entire Indochina problem. At the same time they are endeavoring to
change some of the methods and means of implementing this policy. U.S.
military and political leaders, maneuvering desperately, proclaimed the
so-called "Guam Doctrine."
This doctrine of course does not signify a new U.S. foreign policy course.
It should be examined, however.
Just what is the "Guam Doctrine"? In the summer of 1969 U.S. President
Nixon visited several Asian countries. On 27 July he delivered a famous
speech on Guam, describe.. by American propaganda as the beginning of a
"new policy" by Washington in regard to Asia. This policy toward Southeast
Asia was dubbed the "Guam Doctrine." Nixon declared that although "the
United States is resolved to honor its treaty obligations in the Pacific
area, it will refrain in the future from involvement in wars such as that
in Vietnam and will cut back on its military obligations throughout non-
Communist Asia."13
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On 28 July 1969 in Bangl.Lk, as if further developing his idea, Nixon
declared the following: "Geography and common interests bind the United
States with the nations of Southeast Asia. We view the Pacific Ocean not
as a barrier but rather as a bridge... Our firm intention to honor our
obligations is in full agreement with our conviction that the nations of
Asia can and must bear an increasing share of the responsibility..." J4
Analysis of the 't :im Doctrine" clearly shows that U.S. military-political
circles, while resorting to new terminology, have in no way altered their
overall goals. The political and strategic principles of imperialism on
the far shore of the Pacific have fully retained their reactionary
substance and orientation.
The new U.S. "Asian" doctrine signifies that American ruling circles are
merely endeavoring Lu change in some manner the tactics and methods used
in undermining the positions of socialism, in crushing the national
liberation movement, in consolidating present and seizing new military
bridgeheads in Southeast Asia. They wish thereby to unload the bulk of
the military burden onto the shoulders of their Asian partners. In case
of an extraordinary threat an American corps-size landing task force, in
their opinion, would be capable of saving puppet regimes.
Secretary of State Rogers, discussing the "Guam Doctrine," stated on 15
July 1970 that it was explained at a meeting of the SEATO members that
this doctrine should by no means be construed as an indication of lack of
resolve or that "we shall not honor our treaty obligations."
In the summer of 1969 an article appeared in the New York Times which
revealed the essence of "Vietnamizaticn" of the war: "The withdrawal of
25,000 U.S. soldiers and a statement by President Nixon that he hoped
to bring home the bulk of U.S. ground forces signaled the first stage
of the strategy of Vietnamization. The essence of this strategy is based
on strerbthening'and modernizing the South Vietnamese Army and on the
beginning of a gradual transfer of the major combat missions to this
army. "15
The U.S. government is intensively increasing the size of South Vietnam's
Army and is rearming and reequipping it. It will cost 6.2 billion dollars
to carry out the entire plan of ceequipping this army and increasing its
size to 1,100,000 men.
On 3 November 1969 Nixon stated in a television address, explaining the
Vietnam problem, that the United States would meet all its treaty obliga-
tions He promised to provide a shield if any nuclear power threatened the
freedom of an ally or a country whose integrity the United States con-
sidered vitally important. Finally Nixon stated that in other cases the
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United States would offer military and economic assistance whenever such
assistance was requested in conformity with U.S. treaty obligations. At
the same time he expressed the hope that the threatened nation would
assume the bulk of the responsibility for providing its ~?r! de`enoe.
Many persons in the United states asked themselves the question of why the
President had made this speech. The newspaper Washington Post slated:
"The answer must be sought in the President's past. Anti-Communism is
deep-seated in him, engendered by years of cold war. His anti-Communism
occupies a central position in his notion er' how the war must be brought
to an end."16
The government of the DR" stated in referene,i to this speech that President
Nixon did not wane: to end the war but rather to "Vietnamize" it, that is
to compel Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese for he sake of the selfish aims
of the warmongers. The government of the DRV viewed this speech as a
challenge to the Vietnamese people, to the peoples of the entire world and
progressive elements in the United States, who were resolutely demanding
that the Nixon Administr:tion end the aggression in Vietnam.
At a preelection rally of toilers held on 12 June 1970 L. I. Brezhnev
stated: "...We know that the only way not to err in politics is to
believe practical deeds and not verbal declarations. We cannot help but
see that the peaceful declarations of the new administration in the United
States are contrary to U.S. aggressive actions..."
In May 1970 U.S. Secretary of State Rogers stated at a press conference
that the United States did not intend to permit American troops to take
part in events in Cambodia in support of the current or any other regime
in that country. Such is the value of verbal declarations.
Escalation Continues
In practice "Vietnamization" has resulted in the war spreading beyond the
borders of Vietnam. In the summer of 1970 U.S. and Saigon troops invaded
Cambodia. For a period of 2 months a 32,000-man American force and a
48,000-man Saigon army, with massive U.S. air support, conducted approx-
imately 10 major operations against Cambodian patriot forces.17 Following
the withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia, the puppet Saigon army
has been continuing the policy of "pacification" in Cambodia.
Washington officials claim that they achieved their military objectives in
Cambodia. But in fact the position of the Lon Nol government is still
shaky, in spite of assistance by South Vietnamese armed forces. It is
therefore not surprising that James Reston wrote in the New York Times:
"Cambodia introduces an additional element of disenchantment for an ad-
ministration which has so many other problems. The more this administra-
tion does, the more there remains to be done in Cambodia and elsewhere...
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In short the Nixon Administration has gotten itself into another
scrape?" Senate Democratic Majority Leader Mansfield views the Cam-
bodian adventure as "another Vietnam." The best confirmation is the fact
the patriots of South Vietnam and Cambodia are continuing to step up mili-
tary efforts against the interventionists and are inflicting increasingly
heavy losses on them.
On 31 July 1970 the New York Times carried an article by Eugene McCarthy
entitled "The Failure of Vietnamization under any Name." McCarthy correct-
ly stated: "How many times are we going to proclaim a new policy of
Vietnamization and how many times are we going to attempt to implement such
a policy before we recognize its failure and endeavor to end the war in
Vietnam by genuinely political means -- at the conference table.""9
it is now quite obvious that in fact plans for "Vietnamization" are plans
for a new escalation of the war in Indochina, Appraising U.S. aggressive
actions in Indochina in 1970, expressed in renewal of the periodic bombing
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and a stepped-up air war and chemical
warfare in South Vietnam and Cambodia as well as stepped-up military
pressure by Saigon on the Cambodian patriotic forces and strengthening of
the Saigon army, the French newspaper Figaro correctly notes: "There can
be no illusion, We are witnessing another reescalation,i20
New evidence of the fact that Washington and the Pentagon have "reescalated"
the war in Indochina is offered by the events of this winter. At the end
of January and the beginning of February, following massive airstrikes by
several hundred U.S. Air Force aircraft, an invasion of Laos began. As
the New York Times reported, a large force entered the southern part of
Laos at the first stage of the operation. Ground actions were supported
by hundreds of combat and transport helicopters.21 Almost simultaneously
a 10,000-man Saigon force invaded Cambodia.
Thus escalation of the intervention had now involved a third country --
Laos. The aggressive war now rages throughout the Indochina Peninsula.
"The ruling circles of the United States of America bear the entire
burden of responsibility for further aggravation of the situation in Laos
as well as in Indochina as a whole," states a 4 February 1971 TASS state-
ment.22
the spread of the war to the entire Indochina Peninsula is vivid evidence
of the fact that the United States is continuing to pursue a dangerous,
adventuristic foreign policy. It is obvious that they have no intention
of withdrawing from their limited war in this region. A rather frank ad-
mission was made in this connection by General Wheeler, who until recently
held the post of Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Appraising
the aims of the current U.S. military-political leadership, he emphasized:
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"Our aims -- to contain Communism and to maintain the world balance of
power -- have not changed, nor have the other elements of our global
strategy. ii2 3
The American imperialists will fail in their attempts to achieve political
and strategic objectives by means of Asian hands. The above-quoted TASS
statement goes on: "There is no doubt whatsoever that imperialist at-
tempts to crush the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Indo-
china are doomed to failure." The only right solution to the Indochina
problem is a political settlement based on respect for the national in-
terests of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The way to end this
dirty war has been pointed out time and again in statements by Vietnamese
political leaders and has been confirmed by many leaders of socialist
nations: total and unconditional withdrawal of all American troops and the
troops of their puppet regimes from South Vietnam.
The American imperialists, however, are continuing to persist in their
attempt to achieve their goals in Vietnam by force of arms. In connection
with this it is essential to strengthen the international unity of
progressive, democratic, peace-loving forces, because only with their
unity is it possible to block the path of imperialist aggression, wherever
it may occur.
Counting heavily on the fighting of limited wars, U.S. military and
political leaders have ever since World War II quite vigorously assisted
in increasing'the combat capabilities of the armies of U.S. bloc ally na-
tions. Utilization of puppet-regime and ally armies is a component
part of the doctrine.-of "limited wars." This is eloquently stated by
the following facts. According to a statement made by Senator William
Fulbright, the United States has sold or given a total of 175 billion
dollars worth of arms and military assistance since 1945. In the current
fiscal year alone 7 billion dollars have been spent for this purpose.21'
The Pentagon's official Armed Forces Journal reported that by the end of
1969 U.S. military assistance programs had resulted in delivery to
aggressive bloc allies of approximately 17,000 airplanes (including 8000 com-
bat aircraft), 20,000 units of rocket and missile hardware, 20,000 tanks,
5700 armored personnel carriers, 52,000 guns and mortars, 3.5 million rifles
and carbines, 152 500 machineguns, 350,000 trucks, and 2300 combat and
auxiliary ships.H
Failure Is Inevitable
In summary, we can draw the following conclusions. Limited wars are aimed
primarily against the national liberation movement. With their assistance
imperialism is endeavoring to hold emerging nations within the sphere of
capitalism, to seize and consolidate strategic positions in important
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areas of the word. At the same time the United States is preparing for
limited wars against individual socialist countries. Under certain con-
ditions they plan to attempt to weaken the world socialist system? The
Pentagon is continuing to elaborate theories of limited nonnuclear and
nuclear wars in Europe.
Every limited war conducted by imperialist nations is based on the
aggressive, predatory, adventuristic policies of reactionary forces. Any
limited war on the part of imperialism is always of an unjust, predatory
character and is therefore doomed to failure.
The military forces of third countries have been extensively employed in
many limited military conflicts planned and prepared by American im-
perialism, This has been done to conceal the main organizers and insti-
gators. A final and very vivid example is the aggression perpetrated
against three Arab nations in 1967. Israel acted as a third force, The
South Korean puppet army was used for an attack on the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea. The United States recruited Cuban counterrevolutiona-
ries for the irvasion of Cuba.
On the basis of the experience of the war in Vietnam it is important to
emphasize that military operations in limited wars show a dangerous ten-
dency to spill far beyond the framework of the initial territorial
boundaries. The war which was initiated in Vietnam many years ago is now
being waged on a very large scale on the territory of three countries of
Indochina.
An analysis of contemporary limited wars shows that as a rule the U.S.
imperialists endeavor to wage them with coalitions, which include the
leading nations of the aggressive blocs. This is attested by the ex-
perience of the wars in Korea and in Vietnam, The United States figures
that with unified efforts it is possible much more rapidly to crush the
armed forces of the victims of aggression, utilizing phony slogans of
"collective" defense of the free world in order to deceive public opinion?
But it is no simple matter to establish coalitions. It is made difficult
by powerful interimperialist conflicts. The United States had a great
deal of difficulty in obtaining even a small number of troops from South
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, The
Americans succeeded in obtaining only 70 to 75 thousand men from these
countries for the aggression in Vietnam. Major U.S. NATO partners refused
under various pretexts to take direct part in this aggression.
American imperialism is plotting limited wars against a great number of
countries which pursue policies which are not to the liking of the United
States. The newspaper Washington Evening Star published the following
statement by Richard Nixon on 9 June 1969: "Our country will continue in
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the future to carry out its leadership role in order to establish order
and stability in those areas of the world which are of importance for
American interests. We shall not retreat and we shall not depart. We
shall continue to take risks. We shall continue to play a leadership
role."
The war in Vietnam has demonstrated the bankruptcy of the doctrine of
"limited wars." The powerful, modern American war machine has in Indochina
entered an impasse, a quagmire of hopeless war and cannot count on victory.
The failure of this doctrine in turn has become vivid evidence of the
bankri'.ptcy of U.S. foreign policy pursued in Southeast Asia. The war in
Vietnam is the culmination point of this bankruptcy in the foreign policy
of American imperialism.
Ever advancing r.eu military-political doctrines and concepts, U.S. politi-
cians and strategists are attempting to conceal the true reasons for their
failures in this area. In actual fact failure is caused by the reactionary
nature of the aggressive policies of American imperialism. No moderniza-
tion or new doctrines will help.
Thanks to the J'-.creased might of the nations of the socialist commonwealth
and an intensification of the national liberation movement of peoples,
the aggressive forces of American imperialism are receiving increasingly
powerful resistance. These forces are being increasingly held in check
and localized, but they continue to exist and continue to carry the
threat of nc' military adventures.
American imperialism and its aggressive bloc partners "still hope to
'replay the historic battles of the 20th century, to gain revenge, to
cast down socialism from the summits of world influence, to restore
colonialism in new forms. U.S. imperialism has become the general head-
quarters of anti-Communism, the focal point of international reaction and
militarism,..i26
American imperialism, in spite of a patently aggressive foreign policy,
nevertheless has failed to meet a single political and strategic aim.
But it has no intention of giving up its schemes and plans, which are so
dangerous to the cause of peace and international security. Within U.S.
imperialism lies the source of the threat of war. The frenzied arms race,
U.S. attempts to revive military-political blocs and to compel its allies
to pursue more intensively an aggressive policy against the USSR and the
other socialist nations, as well as active preparations for both a nuclear
war and limited wars -- contain a serious danger, the fact of which we
must bear in mind. It is essential to take into account thereby that in
case a war is initiated, including a limited war, U.S. imperialism will
commit any act of treachery. It is not mere happenstance that U.S.
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theorist and ideologue Henry Kissinger stated: "...We must bear in mind
that the entire future depends on our ability to make use of the un-
precedented power at our command, with maximum skill and cunning."
Imperialism is doomed to failure. The crisis of U.S. foreign policy and
military strategy, which reflects the deepening of the genetal crisis of
capitalism, is quite obvious. But American imperialism is doing every-
thing it can to postpone the final collapse of the imperialist system. It
is f o r t h is reason that the importance of a vigorous alliance between
the world socialist system, between the international worker class and the
national liberation movement is more important now than ever before. In
order to hold in check even more powerfully the aggressive forces of in-
ternational imperialism, and of the United States in particular, we need
a high degree of vigilance and an increase in the defensive might of the
Soviet Union and all Warsaw Pact nations
At an official meeting held inthe city of Baku to honor the 50th anniver-
sary of Soviet Azerbaydzhan, L. 1. Brezhnev emphasized; "We see that acute
international crises and situations dangerous to the cause of peace now
and then occur in the world through the fault of the imperialists. We must
realize that the imperialists are continuing the arms race and are waging
a struggle against the socialist nations and the popular liberation move-
ment with the most sophisticated means. This demands of us vigilance,
constant concern for a strong national defense and a tireless struggle
against aggressive imperialist intrigues."
American politicians and strategists, while continuing preparations for
a thermonuclear world war, nevertheless are aware of the enormous risk
such a war would bring for the entire imperialist system. This is why at
the present stage they place such strong hopes on the doctrine of "limited
war," But no matter what doctrines the American theorists may invent, we
can state with assurance that such doctrines have no chance of success.
1. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh t rabochikh partly.
Materialy i dokumenty (Proceedings of the International Conference of
Communist and Worker Parties), Politizdat, 1970, page 286.
2. G. Kissinger: Yadernoye oruzhiye i vneshnyaya politika (Nuclear Arms
and Foreign Policy), Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1959; E. Osgud:
Ogranichennaya voyna (Limited Warfare), Voyenizdat, 1960; M. Teyl.or:
Nenadezhnaya strategiya (Unreliable Strategy), Voyenizdat, 1961;
M. Halperin: Limited War in the Nuclear Age, New Jersey, 1963; Prob-
lems of National Strategy, edited by H. Kissinger, New Jersey-
Washington, 1965.
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3. Mezhdunarodnoye..., op. cit., page 288.
4. Voyennyy Zarube:~hnik, No 1, 1971, page 11.
5. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No 2, 1970, page 150.
6. L. I. Brezhnev: Pyat'desyat let velikikh pobed sotsializma (Filhy Years
of Great Victories of Socialism), Politizdat, 1967, page 57.
7. Nation, December 1957.
8. Voyenno-.Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No 1, 1971, page 49.
9. Ibid.
10. Pravda, 3 January 1971.
11. The New York Times, 14 May 1969.
12, Izvestiya, 2 February 1971.
13. The New York Times, 27 July 1969.
14, The New York Times, 30 July 1969.
15. The New York Times, 28 June 1969.
16. The Washington Post, 4 November 1969.
17. U.S. News and World. Report, 13 July 1970, pp 81-83.
18, The New York Times, 26 August 1970.
19. The New York Times, 31 Jul, 1970.
20. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', No 2, 1971, page 86.
21. The New York Times, 3 February 1971.
22. Pravda, 4 February 1971.
23. Voyennyy Zarubezhnik, No 11, 1970, page 6.
24. Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 January 1971.
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25, Voyennyy Zarubezhnik, No 11, 1970, page 7e
26. K ]00-letiyu so dnva rozhdeniya Vladimira I1'icha Lenina, Tezisy
TsK KPSS (The Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Birth Centennial. Theses of
the Central Committee CPSU) , Politizdat, 1969, page 39.
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Capt lst Rank N. V'yunenko, Candidate of Naval Science
The problem of ASW against missile-armed nuclear submarines continues
to occupy a special place among the many major problems worked on at
U.S. Air Force and NATO headquarters. The reason for such a persistent
search for effective means of combatting nuclear submarines, in the
opinion of Western military experts, is that the Soviet Navy, which
has become a blue-water force, has also become a serious obstacle in
the way of implementation of the aggressive aspirations of the tradi-
tional naval powers. Approximately 60 percent of the time spent on
combat training in the U.S. Navy is presently devoted to ASW. Annual
expenditures on development of ASW weapons alone total 3 billion dollars,l
400 million of which is spent on scientific research in this area.
The seriousness of the problem stands out in particular relief if one
bears in mind that missile-armed nuclear submarines, as a result of the
scientific and technological revolution, have become a major strategic
force.
The missile-carrying nuclear submarine constitutes a highly mobile launch-
ing platform, protected by a thick layer of water, for a large number
of ballistic missiles. It possesses extensive upen-sea maneuver
capabilities and has the capability of destroying critical targets on
land from various directions and at various ranges of fire. A high
degree of concealment of operations is organically inherent in a sub-
marine, which in combination with mobility gives the submarine the
greatest survivability of all strategic nuclear warhead delivering
i,,issile systems.
The great advantage o f -submarines over other launching sites is that
submarine-fired missiles reach the target much faster than do land-
launched ICBMs and therefore can more easily penetrate a hostile air
defense system. Detection and destruction of missile-carrying submarines
deployed at sea, protected by a thick layer of water which is im-
penetrable to radar and optical observation devices, is an extremely
complex task. Western military experts, considering nuclear submarines
invulnerable, attach great importance to the missiles they carry.
Antisubmarine Warfare
American military leaders have come to the conclusion that at the
present time there does not exist any one universal means capable of
* From foreign press materials
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effectively localizing the submarine threat, just as there is no single
naval arm capable of independently performing all the missions involved
in ASW.
U.S. naval leaders seek a way out of this situation by the establishment
of so-called ASW forces. They included al]. vehicles carrying nSW weapons:
approximately 100 submarines, including 47 nuclear powered submarines,
construction of which is continuing at a stepped-up pace and will
reportedly total 105 units,2 more than 500 surface ships, including 11
CVSs (four on active duty and seven in reserve - - N. V.),3 as well as
a large number of ASW fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.." An im-
portant component of ASW forces are theater underwater situation warning
systems, force control systems, special operational-scientific entities
for the processing and analysis of situation data, with corresponding
communications devices.
All these types of units are joined into an ASW system which has already
been established, is operating in peacetime and can shift to a wartime
operational footing without substantial mobilization measures. The
establishment of this system pursues two objectives: to interdict
nuclear attacks from the sea against land targets in the United States
and to prevent hostile submarines from conducting active operations on
major sea lines of communication linking the United States with its
NATO partners and other aggressive military blocs. Priority is given
to the first of these objectives. Therefore principal efforts are
directed at detecting and classifying all underwater targets, that is,
determination of whether a submarine has actually been detected and not
something else: a whale, a school of fish, or an underwater obstruction.
Undersea observation efforts are aimed at establishing continuous
tracking of the movements of every submarine at sea.
Deployment of an ASW system in each ocean theater is effected applicable
to specific military-geographic conditions.5
in the Atlantic a U.S. Atlantic Fleet ASW command has been set up, with
headquarters at Norfolk. Its zone of operations extends from the North
to South Pole, from the coast of the Americas to Europe, and in the
Indian Ocean -- to the boundary between East Pakistan and Burma. The
Atlantic Fleet Command supervises all surface units, aircraft and ASW
submarines under its jurisdiction. When any part of these forces enters
the Mediterranean, it shifts to the operational jurisdiction of the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.
The Atlantic and Indian oceans are subdivided into various AS'.?! zones,
each of which has its corresponding command and assigned forces. The
zones are laid out in such a manner that the U.S. Navy areas of
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responsibility coincide with the NATO naval forces zones of responsLbili-
ty, with the exception of the Northwestern Atlantic, which is under
Canadian Jurisdiction, and the Northeastern Atlantic, where the British
are in charge.
But even in these areas Canadian and British ASW Forces are reinforced
by the U.S. 80th Task Force, designated primarily for seeking out and
destroying, at the outbreak of war, submarines throughout the Atlantic,
from the U.S. East Coast to Europe. It performs its missions in coordi-
nation with the 81st Task Force, deployed in the same area. In case of
an emergency situation, plans exist for establishing the 83rd Task Force
to operate in the Atlantic, consisting of HUK groups which contain an
ASW support aircraft carrier and several destroyers.b
Eact carrier has a complement of 16 Sea King helicopters, 20 S2 Tracker
fixer-wing aircraft, and several communications relay aircraft, which
transmit information from the ships and aircraft to the CIC status
board on the carrier.?
The North Atlantic is also the operations area of the 85th Task Force,
which includes 15 squadrons of land-based patrol aircraft. Nine of
these squadrons contain P3 .-Orion ASW aircraft, while the rest contain
P2 Neptunes. The bases of these squadrons are dispersed in such a manner
th't aircraft can reach any point in the North Atlantic within 2-3
hours.8
Under normal peacetime conditions thess are constantly on duty in the
Atlantic three HUK groups, consisting of an aircraft carrier, air
groups, destroyers, and ocean escorts, which have the mission of convoy
protection, plus submarines.9
Each of these groups works on specific ASW missions against missile-
carrying nuclear submarines. Group Alfa concentrates its attention
on tactics, methods and general ASW operations; group Bravo practices
shielding carrier striking forces; group Charlie works on convoy
escort tactics.
All these forces in their operations rely on stationary undersea situa-
tion warning systems, which are set up and utilized in coordination with
mobile search and destruction capabilities.
In organizing continuous surveillance American military leaders proceed
from the primary aim of maintaining solid coverage of possible entrance
routes into the Atlantic: the waters between South America and Africa,
between the British Isles and Iceland, as well as the English Channel
and the Strait of Gibraltar. These waters are under constant ASW
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surveillance, while in the most important areas -- between Northern
Norway and Spitsbergen, between Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroe and
Shetlond Islands and the Southwestern Coast of Norway, ASW lines have
been established, which constitute an interliaked complex of submarine
detection, classification, identification and destruction systems,
These lines have been organizationally drawn and operate in peacetime,
but limited ASW forces are deployed on them; these forces, however,
can quickly be increased, depenuing on the developing situation.10
The forces permanently stationed on the ASW lines, including on the
Iceland-Faeroe Islands-Norway line, in addition to surface units
(frigates, destroyers, escort ships), land-based patrol aircraft and
special EEUK groups, include nuclear submarines. ASW patrol aircraft
fly into the area of an unidentified noise source on the basis of data
provided by stationary surveillance means. If they establish that the
noise source is a surface ship, response action initiated by the forces
deployed on the line can cease. If the source is a submarine, ASW
ships are dispatched into the area.11
Additional actions by these forces in peacetime include establishing
contact with each submarine and continuously tracking it, regardless
of its direction of movement in the ocean. If war were to break out,
these actions would be culminated by utilization of various ASW
weapons.12
It is noted that the effectiveness of stationary means is greatly in-
creased if they are utilized in combination with mobile means of sub-
marine surveillance -- primarily with submarines and aircraft con-
tinuously deployed on the designated lines.
In the Pacific ASW surface units and squadrons of land-based aircraft
form part of the Pacific Fleet ASW forces, with headquarters at Pearl
Harbor. When they move into the Western Pacific, they come under the
operational control of the Commander, Seventh Fleet.
In the Pacific the main obstacles to submarine penetration are es-
tablished between Hawaii and the Aleutians. But since unfavorable
climatic and natural conditions limit the placement of ASW means in
position on this line, maneuvering forces are employed for the most part.
In order to maintain continuous surveillance of the undersea situation
and to provide warning for ASW forces operating in the area of
Japanese bases and ports and patrolling in the areas of potential
submarine exit into the Pacific, it is considered effective to employ
deep-w..ter hydroacoustic surveillance posts.13
Coastal ASW zones extending 1100 km from the coastline have been sec
up for the purpose of detection of submarines on the far approaches
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to the coast of North America."' They include stationary active and
passive hydroacoustic systems and ASW forces.
In-position long-range hydroacoustic detection systems are considered
the backbone of the long-range submarine detection network. Hydro-
acoustic stations in the Caesar and Colossus systems are sited along
the continental shelf a considerable distance from shore.'' It is
noted that the effective range of the system is secret, but it is
emphasized that it can be increased fivefold by employing explosive
charges or other means of high-output low-frequency acoustic propaga-
tion.
It is claimed that the above-enumerated efforts to equip the theater
with underwater surveillance means have led to the establinhment of
an operational ocean underwater situation warning system which provides
valuable information to ASW forces.
The SOSUS submarine detection system is being set up in the area of
the continental shelf. It consists of hydrophone hydroacoustic
complexes sited on the ocean floor in probable areas of hostile sub-
marine activity, as well as on potential routes of hostile submarine
movement. these complexes are linked by communications lines with
computers cm shore which will classify sounds and identify submarines.l6
The effective range of the system, which operates in an undersea sound
[acoustic waveguide]channel, is limited only by the sound conductivity
of the isothermal layer and the physical dimensions of the receiver-
radiative devices. These include the Artemis system, which constitutes
a complex of in-site deep-water long-range detection equipment,
deployed over extensive areas.'
Operational systems include the Julie system, in which the underwater
detonations of small charges are employed with the aid of radio sonobuoys
for target detection and classification. Its effective range is
approximately 325 km. In the Jezebel system, which operates on the
same principle, a special computer device is employed for on-board
correlation reception of signals from radio sonobuoys. Long-range
submarine detection is also effected with low-frequency cables lying
on the ocean floor (project Artemis) off the U.S. Pacific Coast. The
transducer employed by this complex weighs 400 tons, operates at
ultralow frequencies and can detect a submarine at a distance of more
than 900 km.19
Additional studies are being conducted of other physical phenomena
with the aim of their utilization in detection systems. Particular
attention is being focused on seeking ways to establish submarine
detection lines at ocean entry points with the aid of low-frequency
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electromagnetic radiations. Other devices in the development stage in-
clude magnetometric, thermal, laser, gas analyzer, ionization and other
devices. Studies are also continuing on determination of the possibili-
ty of detecting a submarine from wake infrared radiation.
Principal efforts are aimed at identification of noises produced by
objects moving under water. It is stated in the press, however, that
the United States does not yet possess totally automated dev .es which
discriminate between contact with a hostile submarine and contact with
a spurious target, although experimental projects have allegedly
already reduced the percentage of "false alarms" in comparison with the
situation 3 to 4 years ago.2
An intensive effort is being made to improve control of ASW forces. The
U.S. Navy is transitioning to automated data processing systems, which
assist commanders at all echelons in performing these functions. The
aim of experimental design projects is the creation of a unified system
of interaction and coordination between vehicles carrying ASW weapons
and all command echelons: from tactical units to theater commanders.21
Two electronic fast submarine identification centers are being built
for the U.S, Navy, to be employed in the ASW system. It is believed
that these centers (ASCAC) will rapidly process data on submarine con-
tacts received from surface units, undersea sensing devices and air-
craft. It is believed that when this system becomes operational it will
be possible to evaluate obtained information faster and more accurate-
ly.22
Utilization of ASW Forces
In contrast to past wars, when ASW forces were deployed at the beginning
of the war, under present-day conditions their utilization is viewed as
a continuation and culmination of submarine search operations conducted
in peacetime. "British and American ASW forces are every day conducting
something of a facsimile of a battle of the Atlantic. They have the
mission of tracking Soviet submarines freely maneuvering in the waters
of the Atlantic, as well as the mission of undertaking harassment
actions against them. Naval ships, embarked and land-based aircraft
operating from bases in the British Isles, take part in these operations,
which are supervised by NATO Atlantic headquarters."23
The Western press admits that the high speed and freedom of maneuver
on the part of submarines make it possible for them successfully to
evade encounter with ASW forces. In connection with this fact naval
experts recommend enlargement of the zones under continuous ASW surveil-
lance, which in their opinion will restrict submarine freedom of
maneuver. It is also suggested that search zones be assigned along ASW
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lines or in the immediate vicinity of those areas where submarine search
is already being conducted by other forces, in order to make it more
difficult for submarines to leave surveillance areas.24
As for wartime, it is recommended that ASW operations be culminated
with vigorous attacks on every detected submarine. The sequence and
methods of operations by ASW forces in time of war can he quite
varied, if one is to judge on the basis of U.S. and NATO naval
exercises.
As is well known, up until the mid-fifties U.S. and NATO naval forces
had the mission of totally preventing the submarines of the potential
enemy from reaching the open sea by destroying them in base an'
during initial deployment. Today this is considered unrealistic.
While not rejecting the possibility of attacking submarines in base,
NATO leaders have concluded the advisability of concentrating ASW
efforts on submarine routes of egress to the open ocean.25 Toward
this end it is planned to utilize primarily nuclear submarines deployed
in the immediate vicinity of a hostile coast; these submarines would
effect initial detection of hostile submarines putting out to sea,
would warn ASW forces and of course would engage detected submarines
with their own on-board weapons.
Single-aircraft ASW actions in certain areas would also be used against
diesel-powered submarines. Patrol flights are run at a frequency which
do not permit a hostile submarine to remain surfaced for long. ASW
submarine stations are located in the vicinity of air-patrolled areas.
The mission of these submarines is to detect the hostile submarine aft"_
it, after crossing the air-patrolled zone, exhausts its batteries aed
is compelled either to surface or to continue at snorkel depth,
facilitating detection by ASW forces.
Finally, the third echelon of ASW forces comprises ASW HUK groups
operating in the open sea. Their actions consist in establishing con-
tact with a prior-detected submarine, tracking i1: down and destroying
it. Normally as soon as initial submarine detection information is
received from stationary surveillance devices or from submarines,
embarked or land-based aircraft are sent into the search area; these
aircraft place radio sonobuoys. With the assistance of these buoys
surface units maintain surveillance over the undersea situation, em-
ploying embarked helicopters. The latter, which can move faster than
surface units, search "in bounds," lowering detection gear into the
water for a period of 2-5 minutes, after which they fly to a new point,26
preventing the enemy from surfacing. Helicopter sonar operating con-
ditions are considered better than for a surface unit, since the
transducer is not in the same medium as the helicopter, while its
immersion depth can easily be varied, depending n hydrologic
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conditions. Helicopters have a greater submarine detection and
pursuit capability because they can use in combination with hydro-
acoustic devices such passive devices as magnetic anomaly detection
and infrared detection.
Another important element is the fact that at least for the present
a :submarine can do nothing against a helicopter. This means that
the submarine must try to escape, although this is difficult due to
the high speed of the pursuer.
The HUK group destroyers and frigates, operating in coordination with
ASW fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, search with their sonar gear.
If a submarine has been contacted by a helicopter at a great distance
from the surface units, the attack can be mounted with less haste and
with more precise calculation. In case of a near-in contact th'.' hell-,
copter can employ its own weapons or guide another helicopter or fixed-
wing aircraft to the target, while maintaining contact with it. If a
submarine is contacted by surface units, they endeavor to destroy it
before it can attack them.
Intensified training of the imperialist navies, and the U.S. Navy in
particular, in ASW, since these navies view submarines as a serious
obstacle in the way of their aggressive aspirations, obliges Soviet
navymen to keep a close watch on the development of ASW weapons and
forces abroad, to study the techniques of their utilization, to improve
their combat training performance and to do everything possible to
strengthen the naval might of the Soviet Union.
1. Interavia, May 1970, page 3.
2. Voyennaya Mysl', No 12, 1970, page 73.
3. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1970-1971, page 421.
4. Undersea Technology, August 1967, page 32.
5. Navy Management Review, Nos 11, 12, 14, 1969.
6. Armed Forces Journal, 19 July .969, page 16.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
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9. Undersea Technology, November 1967, page 45.
10. The Royal United Service Institution Journal, No 653, 1969, page 51.
11. Space Aeronautics, February 1969, page 42.
12. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1970, page 24.
13. Space Aeronautics, April 1968, pp 58-68.
14. Oceanology, No ]8, 1969, pp 141??148.
15. Undersea Technology, January 1969, page 1.
16. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No 2, 1969, page 154.
17. Armed Forces Journal, 19 July 1969, page 16.
[no No 18]
19. Armed Forces Journal, 19 .uly 1969, page 16.
20. Data, July 1967, page 51.
21. Times, 14 October 1968.
22. Signal, November 1967, page 36.
23. Times, 14 October 1968.
24. Ibid.
25. Rivista Marittima, September 1968, pp 13-23.
26. Ibid.
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