SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300020003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 29, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

 STATSPEC
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~
SURVEY
q f Commtarairt Propaganda
Confidential
Confidential
29 JANUARY 1970
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 3)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
~E cluded (Pon auromoric
downgrading and
dndanifmrion
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONTENT S
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
FRG Relations With the Bloc: Continued Stress on GDR Proposal .
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1
South Vietnam: NFLSV/PRG Delegations Tour Foreign Countries . . . . .
4
CP Organ Discusses Economic, Financial Tasks in South Vietnam . . . . .
8
DRV Media Continue To Publish Military Articles by "Truc Chien" . . , ,
YUGOSLAVIA
10
Croatian Plenum Debate Reflects Rising Tensions in LCY . . . . . . . .
THE USSR
14
Revised CPSU History Amplifies Rule of Oligarchy . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanction for High-Level Division of Power Is Evident
Formulas on Collective Leadership Are Strengthened
Brezhnev's Stature in Collective Remains Slight
16
Party Members Are Set Apart From Masses, Propagandists Say . . . . . .
Proper Function of Revolutionary Committee Remains Issue
19
Topics in Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Birth Control
21
Anti religious Propaganda
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
- 1 -
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
FRG RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC: CONTINUED STRESS ON GDR PROPOSAL
East German and Soviet ,...dia continue to press for a treaty on
establishment of relations between the two German states, while
deploring alleged West German coolness toward a treaty between two
"sovereign and equal" states. Concurrent attacks on aspects of West
German policy center most notably on the FRG parliamentary meetings
held in West Berlin from 19 to 27 January.* GDR Foreign Minister
Winzer, in a speech on 22 January and in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article
on the 24th endorsing the GDR's treaty proposal, rejects Bonn's
stress on "inner-German settlements" as a plan for step-by-step
preparations for "aggression."
Reporting on the 23d that Chancellor Brandt, in a letter to GDR
Premier Stoph, had indicated readiness to open negotiations with
the East German Government, ADN observes that the letter "does
not contain any views on the GDR draft treaty" or "even mention"
the draft. The ADN dispatch further complains that Brandt's letter
fails to offer "any constructive suggestions" on the question of
establishing normal relations between the FRG and GDR "based on
equality and international law . . ., although it is generally known
that the normalization of relations between the two German states
requires recognition of the GDR on the basis of international law,."
A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article the following day also notes the absence
of any reference in the letter to the GDR draft treaty and goes on
to argue at length against the FRG's "mystical concept of the so--called
preservation of the German nation" which serve:: "to fan nationalism,
this ideology of revanchism."
A 23 January TASS report of the Brandt letter repeats the ADN account
almost verbatim, including the observation that the letter failed to
mention the GDR's draft treaty. Other Soviet propaganda continues
to be critical of Bonn's unwillingness to recognize the GDR. A
participant in a domestic service commentators' roundt a;,le show on
25 January, pointing up "contradictions" in Bonn's foreign policy,
says that while the FRG has expressed a readiness for talks with
* For a discussion of Soviet and East German reaction to the meetings
in West Berlin, see the FBIS TRENDS for 28 January 1970, page 21, and
the FBIS SURVEY for 15 January 1970, pages 2-4.
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CONF:LDEN'i':LAL FBiS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
East Germany on renunciation of the use of force, it has indicated,
that "there can be no question of international legal recognition
of the GDH." The commentator recalls Ulbricht's 19 January press
conference in which he stated that agreements, including those
on the renunciation of force, can be concluded only between states
which recognize each other under international law, And in a
foreign-language commentary on the ,,,-2d Glazunov observes that it
is "contradictory and inconsistent" for Bonn to talk about the need
to normalize relations with the GDR while remaining reluctant to
recognize it as "an international legal subject."
Moscow continues to maintain is virtual silence on the FRG-Soviet
talks on a non-use-of-force agreement which opened in Moscow in early
December.* Consistent with this silence, monitored Soviet media have
not mentioned the arrival of FRG representative Bahr in Moscow on
28 January. According to Hamburg's DPA, Bahr will head the West
German delegation in the next round of talks with the USSR and will
"probably" have his first meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko
on the 29th or 30th.
Despite the silence on the bilateral talks, Soviet propaganda has
intimated that Bonn's policies could have a detrimental effect on
its relations with the bloc, including the USSR. Thus aMikhaylov
article in PRAVDA on 23 January, touching briefly on the parliamentary
meetings in West Berlin, says that these "provocative sorties are
in blatant contradiction to assurances of the FRG Government about
its strivings to help create a favorable atmosphere for meetings
and negotiations" in Europe and can be viewed as attempts to hinder
"practical steps" toward the creation of a system of collective
security. A 27 January German-language commentary, adamant in its
insistence that West Germany has no rights to West Berlin, concludes
that all of the actions of the FRG "have naturally influenced the
socialist countries and the peoples of Europe in their assessment
of Bonn's policy."
Soviet media have apparently acknowledged the talks only once,
in a 25 December 1968 radio commentary in Mandarin reacting to
Chinese charges of a "sellout" of the GDR, The commentary said
that "negotiation between the Soviet Union and the FRG in Moscow
was a routine thing following the birth of the new administration
in Bonn?"
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
In the period since 22 December, when Premier Cyrankiewicz revealed
in a speech before the Sejm that a note on a possible exchange of
views with the FRG would be delivered to Bonn,* Polish media have
given minimal attention to the matter of relations with West
Germany. PAP does report on 27 January, however, that "an exchange
of views on political subjects" between Poland and the FRG will
begin on 5 February in Warsaw. On the same day, Hamburg's DPA
reports that FRG Foreign Minister Scheel said Warsaw had agreed
to bilateral talks shortly before Christmas. DPA adds that "the
Federal Government proceeds from the assumption that the Poles
will attach very special importance to the subject of final
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line."
Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski, in a 22 January article in
the Moscow PRAVDA, had touched briefly on the matter of FRG-Polish
relations, noting that Warsaw's December reply to a late-November
FRG note "expresses agreement on setting about the exchange of
opinions." Poland is waiting, Jedrychowski says, for "a confirma-
tion of the realistic tendencies in the political activities of
the new FRG Government, having an attentive and serious attitude
toward them." The text of the Polish reply has not been released
by Warsaw.
PAP on 25 January reported without comment the conclusion of a
three-day visit to the FRG by Polish Foreign Trade Minister
Burakiewicz. His talks with the FRG Minister of Economics,
according to PAP, "were connected with the negotiations now
under way on a new long-term trade agreement."
* The Cyrankiewicz speech is discussed in the FBIS SURVEY for
2 January 1970, pages 3-4.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
SOUTHEAST ASIA
SOUTH VIETNAM: NFLSV/PRG DELEGATIONS 'POUR FOREIGN COUNThIES
Several joint NFLSV/PRG "friendship delegations" have been touring
abroad over the past several months in an apparent campaign to
increase the prestige and status of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government which was established last June. There have thus far
been visits to all of the communist countries except Romania, Cuba,
and Yugoslavia, and to all other countries which have recognized
the PRG except Mali. Although Cambodia has not been included in
the current round of visits, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat visited
that country in early July.* Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, India, and
Somalia, which had not recognized the PRG, also received delegations,
and it was subsequently announced--by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA)
on 22 January--that diplomatic relations had been established at
embassy level with Tanzania. There were also announcements that
diplomatic relations at embassy level were being established with
several other countries which had previously recognized the PRG--Iraq,
Mauritania, Sudan, and the Congo (B). While ambassadors have been
named to all of the communist countries except Yugoslavia, appoint-
ments in the noncommunist countries have been confined to Algeria,
Cambodia, and the UAR. Cuba remains the only country that is known
to have named an ambassador to the PRG.
The various NFLSV/PRG delegations were headed by Nguyen Huu Tho,
Chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium and of the PRG's
Advisory Council; Tran ?3uu Kiem, Minister to the Chairman's Office
and previously head of the NFLSV delegation at the Paris talks;
Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, PRG Foreign Minister and chief delegate
at Paris; Le Quang Chanh, Deputy Foreign Minister; Nguyen Van Quang,
"special envoy" of the PRG'* ; and Nguyen Van Tien, deputy delegation
head at the Paris talks.
Cambodia had promptly recognized the PRG on 14 June and Nguyen
Van Hieu was subsequently accredited as the PRG ambassador. Phat's
visit from 30 June to 5 July is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of
2 July 1969, page 10, and of 9 July, page 8.
** Although Quang is the PRG Ambassador to the CPR he was not so
identified in propaganda on his visits.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
Several of the visits, both to communist and noncommunist countries,
were on the occasion of various national days. Thus, Nguyen Huu Tho
was in Peking on the CPR's 1 October National Day and in Moscow on
the 7 November October Revolution anniversary; Tran Buu Kiem was
in the GDR on its 7 October National Day; and Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh
was in Tirana on the 29 November Albanian National Day. Tran Buu
Kiem also attended the revolution anniversary in Algeria, Le Quang
Chanh the independence anniversary in South Yemen, and Nguyen Van
Quang National Day in Mauritania.
The following table lists the various countries visited by each
delegation, the dates of the visit, and the status of relations
with each.
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29 JANUARY 1970
DELEGATION HEAD,
DATES OF
DIPLOMATIC
COUNTRY VISITED
VISIT
STATUS
Nguyen Huu Tho*
CPR
29 Sept-16 Oct
Nguyen Van Quang, ambassador
USSR
Dang Quang Minh, ambassador
Tran Buu Kiem**
GDR
3 - 12 Oct
Nguyen Nhu, ambassador
Hungary
12 - 17 Oct
Dinh Ba Thi, ambassador
Poland
17 - 22 Oct
Tran '`Jan Tu, ambassador
Bulgaria
22 - 29 Oct
Huynh Phan, ambassador
Algeria
29 Oct-5 Nov
Pharr Van Quang, ambassador
Syria
6 - 10 Nov
agreement to elevate NFLSV
representation to PRG embassy
reported 24 June; PRG repre-
sented by charge d' affaires a. i .
UAR
10 - 17 Nov
Truong Binh, ambassador
Czechoslovakia
17 - 21 Nov
Hoang Minh Hoa, ambassador
DPRK
26 Nov-3 Dec
Vu Ngoc Ho, ambassador
Mongolia
3 - 8 Dec
Dang Quang Minh, ambassador
Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh
Albania
Nguyen Xuan Long, ambassador
Hungary
1 - 4 Dec
(see Kiem delegation)
* The joint communiques on Tho's visits to the CPR and the USSR are
discuL.. d in the FBIS TRENDS of 22 October 1969, pages 12-13, and of
26 Noveii.uer, pages 7-9, respectively.
** From 17 to 23 December Kiem led a group of a "friendship visit" to the
"liberated zone" of Laos as the guest of the NLHX Central Committee. See
the FBIS TRENDS of 31 December, page 10.
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DELEGATION HEAD,
COUNTRY VISITED
- 7 -
DATES OF
VISIT
FBIS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
DIPLOMATIC
STATUS
Le Quang Chanh
Iraq
South Yemen
Sudan
Tanzania
22 - 26 Nov
28 Nov-2 Dec
5 - 8 Dec
19 - 25 Dec,
reported as
present on
5 Jan and on
20 Jan
agreement to establish diplomatic
relations reported 25 Nov
agreement to establish diplomatic
relations reported 11 July
agreement; to establish diplomatic
relations reported 8 Dec
agreement to establish diplomatic
relations reported 22 Jan; Do Hang
identified as charge d'affaires a.i.
27 Dec-5 Jan
reported
present 27 Jan
no recognition
Nguyen Van Quang
Mauritania 22 - 29 Nov agreement to establish diplomatic
relations reported 3 Dec.
Guinea 1 - 5 Dec no recognition
Congo (B) 10 - 15 Dec agreement to establish diplomatic
relations reported 16 Dec
Nguyen Van Tien
India 13 Dec-8 Jan no recognition
COUNTRIES NOT YET
VISITED BY PRG
RomLnia Nguyen Duc Van, ambassadoz-
Cuba Nguyen Minh Phuong, ambassador
Yugoslavia recognition not known to have been
acknowledged by PRG
no known reference to establishment
of diplomatic relations
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CONFIDENTIAL
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FBIS SURVEY
29 JANUARY 1970
CP ORGAN DISCUSSES ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL TASKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
An unusual discussion of current and future tasks in the financial and
economic sphere appears in a 22-24 January series of Liberation Radio
broadca4-ts of an article identified as appearing in TIEN PHONG
(VANGUARD), the journal of the People's Revolutionary Party, the
communist party in South Vietnam. The radio identifies the issue
simply as "No. 8" and gives no date.* The article claims that
"despite fierce enemy operations we have succeeded n maintaining our
rear's economic potential." But it stresses the need to "promptly
meet the great material demands of the immediate military and political
tasks" and to "positively prepare for the coming struggle phase."
To fulfill the demands requires a heightened leadership responsibility,
TEN PHONG says, in the building of i;he rear areas and the limiting
of the enemy's economic and financial "battleground."
Declaring that economic activities "in our zone and control over rural
areas" must be strengthened, the article routinely asserts that a
sound rear is necessary to win a war. And it says that along with
"the great socialist rear in the North," we have "our rear base in
the South, the vast rural area and Mekong River Delta." Emphasizing
the importance of holding onto the rich food source in the delta in
fighting the allies, it says that the economic struggle must be
closely associated with the military and political struggle in the
contested areas and near cities. The stepping up of food production
and development of small self-sufficient industries are outlined
as practical steps for strengthening positions.
Regarding financial tasks, the article says it is necessary to be
thrifty and to combat usury. Thriftiness is said to be necessary to
acquire sufficient production capital, and "squandering" and corruption
must be fought. The importance of the interrelation of production,
circulation, and distribution is also noted? Pointing out that
resources must be exploited, the article also says that "localities
must strictly refrain from automa`,ically collecting rnd borrowing
money from the people," and warns against the development of a "one-
sided financial viewpoint lacking the mass viewpoint."
* The last time Liberation Radio is known to have broadcast material
from TIEN PHONG was on 24 January 1969 when it carried an article,
said to have been from the December 1968 issue, dealing with President-
elect Nixon's outlook on Vietnam.
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29 JANUARY 1970
The article shows concern regarding the circulation. and organizing of
supplies and the gradual overcoming of the situation in which the
exchange of goods between "our rear areas has to be carried out through
enemy controlled zones." It further notes that general production
and circulation tasks should be better regulated in the Mekong Delta,
eastern Nam Bo, and Zones 6 and lO.*
In preparation for the "future phase" of the struggle, the article
says, it is necessary to conduct a "survey" assessing "our economic
capabilities in various areas," and stimulate certain branches,
su as to advance towards a self-sufficient economy in the South,
and create material conditions for reestablishing economic relations
between the North and South** and developing "our country's
economic relations with other countries in the future."
* Public references to numbered Zones--or Region or Military
Region--are rare. A recent, previous mention of a Zone designation
over Liberation Radio, however, appeared in a 7 December 1969 broad-
cast on a heroes congress in central Nam Bo, which was referred
to as Zone 2.
** While the basic objective of Vietnam unification is referred to
frequently in the propaganda, references to North-South economic
relations do not normally appear. However, the September 1967 NFLSV
Political Program, in advocating the restoration of "normal" relations
between the two zones, did say that pending reunification the people
in both the North and South will "endeavor to expand economic and
cultural exchanges."
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CONi:i:DENTIAli 1"13J:'1 SU1tvEY
;19 JANUARY 1970
DRV MEDIA CONTi'.INUE TO PUBLISH MILITARY ARTICLES BY "TRUC CHIEN"
As part of ! Ire year-end military reviews, QUAN DO! NHAN DAN and Hanoi
radio on 4 r.urd 5 January, respecLively, carried an article attributed
Lo "'T'rue Chien" (hand-to-hand-combat) on the U.S. clear-and-hold
strategy. A flurry of articles by the same author has been broad-
cast throughout the month, with the last known one appearing on
'24 January. The broadcasts have not consistently specified that
the Truc Chien articles have been published in the army paper
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; on the other hand, some of them have been broad-
cast as anonymous articles in the army paper, but Hanoi radio's
press review then has indicated that articles with the same titles
have been published which are attributed to Truc Chien.*
"HOT LESSONS OF 1969"
Since 19 January there has been a flurry of articles with. the general
heading "Hot Lessons Learned in 1969;" three of the five articles
have been specifically attributed to Truc Chien. However, the
initial article broadcast on the 19th under this heading was labeled
an anonymous article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and, as Hanoi does not
broadcast a press review every day, it is not possible to determine
whether Truc Chien authored it.** Another military analysis is
attributed to Truc Chien by a Hanoi broadcast on the 21st which
does riot term it a "hot lessons" article nor note that it was
published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. This article reviews the
destruction of' allied materiel in 1969.
The initial Truc Chien article is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS
IN CONIIvIUNIST PROPAGANDA of 7 January 1970, pages 4-5. The FBIS
SURVEY of 15 January, pages 6-8, discusses some of the subsequent
ones, The first paragraph on page six incorrectly indicates that
the articles broadcast on the 10th and 11th were in the papers of
the 7th and 8th; they were published on the 8th and 9th- There
was an article by Truc Chien in the 7 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN,
broadcast the same day anonymously. The article attacked the
ineffectiveness of General Abrams' defense-in-depth strategy,
claiming that the Americans cannot be sure that even their safest
bases like Tan Son Nhut are out of range, and that they have
failed in their attempts to drive the war from the cities.
** This article is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 21 January,
page 11.
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Hanoi radio on the 20th broadcasts another "hot lessons" article
referred to as being published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN but with no
date. Discussing the combination of small-, medium-, and
large-scale battles, the article claims that all kinds of attacks
were launched continuously against inner and outer lines, causing
heavy allied casualties and materiel losses. It quotes on this
point the PLAF 17th communique of 31 December, which claims that
no month or week elapsed without the allies speculating on a
new wave of attacks and no month passed in which the allies could
avoid serious blows.
The article describes the interrelationship of the attacks: The
guerrilla and self-defense forces' small-scale, continuous,
widespread attacks create conditions and opportunities for
regional and regular forces' large-scale ones. The large-scale
blows of the regulars are said to then create conditions for
regional and guerrilla forces to enlarge their strength. The
article claims that the guerrillas have "most extensively"
mobilized people fighting and use all weapons "including those
seized f,.om the enemy." The article asserts that the allies
have had to cope with small- and medium-scale attacks while
constantly worrying about the large ones. It concludes by declaring
that the PLAF has overcome unspecified "difficulties," thus
creat:'.ng conditions for launching large-scale attacks.
The three other "hot lessons" articles which are attributed to
Truc Chien are broadcast by Hanoi on the 22d, 23d, and 24th. The
article on the 22d is said to be "a continuation" of an article
by the author published in a "recent" QUAN DOI KHAN DAN. It is
not clear whether the broadcast means merely that it is a
continuation of the "hot lessons" discussion. The article deals
with "the coordination of annihilating allied troops and
frustrating their strategic plans." It points out that it is
necessary to skillfully choose direction, bases, and t-)rgets of
the offensive and to know how to deploy and use forces. The
1969 "victories," says the article, show recognition of the
importance of "annihilation." The article also deals with "the
blows at the tools of Vietnamization"--the ARVN forces. And it
describes the "special. importance" attached to attacks on ARVN
trair,'ng centers and schools, and to disintegrati.zg militia and
civil defense forces, since the allies have formed these forces
to "attack and destroy the revolutionary bases." Stopping short
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29 JANUARY 1970
of the claim that the pacification policy was defeated in 1969,*
the article says that "the 1969 battlefield showed" that only
by foiling pacification can the liberated areas be strengthened
and maintained and allied resources halted, thus eliminating
the GVN's "foothold" in the rural areas.
The 'Prue Chien urticle broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 23d is
published in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN of' the 20th, according to
Hanoi radio's press review. It says an excellent communist
tactic of 1969 was "countering enemy encroachments along with
executing deep thrusts into his defense lines." It adds that
1969 showed that the two combat practices must be coordinated.
These thrusts have been a constant threat to the allies, says
Truce Chien, prompting them to use a large force to protect their
important positions. As in the article on the 22d, True Chien
asserts that deep thrusts have been made into ARVN centers, such
as "open arms" units and police services.
Hanoi radio on the 24th broadcasts another of the "hot lessons"
articles by Truc Chien which is also identified as having been
published in a "recent" QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; the Hanoi press
review indicates it was in the paper on the 22d. Discussing
political as well as military aspects of the struggle, he says
that only when the political forces of the masses are developed
and consolidated can "we have steadfast bases for developing
and stepping up guerrilla. activities." To develop guerrilla
warfare, he says, the aim of closely combining combat with
building forces must be understood.
Truc Chien asserts that the building of "militia and guerrilla
forces must be aimed at effectively serving the regional combat
task." If they are only built and do not engage in combat
they will "not be trained" and they may become passive. Truc
Chien points out that "in many areas" the struggle movement
continued to develop, showing that these localities closely
combined combat and construction. And he clearly indicates that
the struggle movement has not been consistent when he calls for a
"review of various waves of struggle against the enemy" to
discover who fought staunchly.
A Liberation Radio commentary on the loth says that
pacification is "being fragmented" although it "can occasionally
create certain difficulties for our compatriots."
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Truc Chien goes on to review guerrilla achievements, including
undermining Vietnamization. This, claims Truc Chien, safeguards
the revolutionary forces whom the guerrillas rely on to develop
the revolutionary military forces. He states that "in areas
where they fight" the regular and regional forces must "not
only cooperate with local militiamen and guerrillas, but also
help them build and develop the local guerrilla force" by
training cadres and improving equipment and political education.
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CONFIDENTIAL 1'1315 SURVEY
.'9 JANUARY 19'rO
-11--
YUGOSLAVIA
CROATIAN PLENUM DEBATE REFLECTS RISING TENSIONS IN LCY
Resurgence of'-the perennial issue of republic nationalism and rising
tensions between party advocates of more republic autonomy and
"conservative" forces which want greater Federal centralization
were underlined in the Croatian party Central Committee's recent
decision to discipline Dr, Milos Zanko for alleging that nationalism
is on the rise in Croatia.
Zanko, a party Central Committee member and a vice president of the
Federal Assembly, leveled his charges in a series of BORBA articles
published 17-21 November 1969. The plenum, alleging that these articles
caused "grave confusion and dilemmas" in the party, censured Zanko at
its 15-17 January meeting for acting "contrary to the policy of the
League of Communists of Croatia" and for trying "to discredit and
divide its leadership." Since Zanko refused to accept the Croatian
party's criticism, the plenum, according to Radio Zagreb on the 17th,
decided that he could no longer continue to be a permanent member of
the conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. He had
been elected a permanent member at the Sixth Croatian Party Congress
on 7 December 1968.
As reported in Yugoslav media, the plenum debate on the Zanko incident,
in which 70 speakers participated, was notable for the fact that
Croatia's two representatives in the Yugoslav Executive Bureau defended
the disciplining of Zanko and viewed "unitarianism" rather than republic
nationalism as the main danger in Yugoslav society. For those who
advocate the decentralization of political power and the devolution
of economic power to the enterprises, "unitarianism" has become a
synonym for bureaucratic centralism which smacks of neo-Stalinism.
The accounts of the plenum debates indicate that Zanko was labeled a
front man for "conservative" elements seeking to use the nationalist
issue to reassert greater Federal control over the republics and to
sabotage self-management. Thus, Croatian Central Committee member
Blazevic, Radio Zagreb reported on the 16th, charged that "Zanko is
the protagonist of those aspirations and trends in the League of
Communists which stem from unitarist positions." Similarly, Radio
Zagreb quoted Croatian party leader Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar ae
stating in her report to the plenum that "it is obvious that the
Zanko articles are an expression of the conservative bureaucratic
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forces which oppose this leadership." Zanko's charges that nationalism
was getting out of control, she argued, constituted a blatant attempt
to interfere in the Croatian party's internal affairs: "Nobody has
the right, apart from what is allowed under the statute of the League
of Communists, to seek intervention from outside the legal leadership;
and this, in a way, is what was implied in these articles." Assai i.i.ng
Zanko for exaggerating the nationalist danger in Croatia, she went on
to picture a conflict between opposing outlooks, of which "unitarianism"
was the "most dangerous":
As far as the reform program is concerned, there are various
attitudes and pressures of which the most dangerous are the
ones that try to turn us back. One attitude is the course
to implement the reform, the struggle for self-management and
the struggle for new relations in the federation; the other is
the fear that this leads to disintegration, the tendency to turn
back, and unitarianism as a way out. In this struggle bureaucratic
forces do not refrain from crude attempts to disavow the progressive
forces.
The unity of the Croatian party leadership on the Zanko question was
underlined in speeches delivered by Federal Executive Bureau members
Tripalo and Bakaric, who supported the Croatian party leader's views
and reaffirmed the republic party's right to manage its own affairs.
Tripalo, according to Radio Zagreb, stressed that "the plenum debate
did not represent a struggle for power but opposition to unitarian
and bureaucratic-statist concepts, the advocates of which are using
factionalist methods." Terming Zanko's charges of nationalism
exaggerated, Tripalo concluded that the Croatian party "is the most
competent to deal with any manifestations of nationalism in the
republic." Bak aric; after expressing similar sentiments, endorsed
Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar's view in remarking that unitarianism was
the "really" dangerous tendency "in the Yugoslav community."
In her closing speech to the plenum, repor+?ed by Radio Zagreb on
the 17th, Dr. Dabcevic-Kucar stated that after a talk was held with
Zanko, he still refused to accept the Central Committee's political
assessment of the situation and criticism of his activities. Hinting
that if Zanko does not mend his ways he may be ousted from the party,
she concluded that after thinking about the Central Committee's
criticism "he may find a way to avoid a final break with the course of
the League of Communists." Zanko's failure to recant, however, appears
to indicate that he feels he has sufficient party support to maintain
his divisive position.
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THE USSR
The recently published third edition of "The History of the CPSU,"
which has received wide publicity in the West for the way in which
it has muted criticism of Stalin and the Stalin era, also sheds new
light on the configuration of power in the Soviet hierarchy. The
authoritative text not only sanctions the continued division of power
between party and government at the highest levels of the regime,
but at the same time appreciably strengthens the formulations on
collective leadership. The new work also pays unusual attention to
the policy-making prerogatives of the CPSU Politburo during recent
years.
Although Brezhnev receives greater attention in the new work than any
of his colleagues, he shares the spotlight with other leaders, particularly
Kosygin and Podgornyy, when important official occasions are mentioned.
Moreover, Brezhnev conspicuously fails to receive the kind of accolades
bestowed on Khrushchev in the second (1962) edition of the party history.
The image of Brezhnev projected in the revised history is that of the
regime's principal spokesman rather than initiator of policy or
inspirational leader.
Sanction for High-Level Division of Power Is Evident
The determination of Khrushchev's successors to prevent a recurrence of
one-man rule is clearly evident in the revised party history. It appears,
first, in the form of criticism of Khrushchev's assumption of the post
of premier in March 1958 while still occupying the post of party first
secretary. "Life showed," according to the new work, "that such a
combination of the two highest posts in one person was inexpedient and
unwarranted. It led to an excessive concentration of power in the hands
of one person, as a result of which violation of the principle of
collectivitiy in work and subjectivism in the solution of a number of
questions were observed." Ironically, while passing judgment on
Khrushchev, the text fails to criticize Stalin for his occupancy of the
same posts.
The new text subsequently discloses that the October 1964 CPSU plenum
which deposed Khrushchev "recognized the inexpediency in the future of
combining in one person the duties of First Secretary of the Central
Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers." Although an
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identical disclosure was made three years ago in Georgian party
secretary P.A. Rodionov's book "Collectivity--2'he Highest Principle
of Party Leadership," this is the first time such a statement has
appeared in an authoritative party publication. A public
disclosure cf this kind, issued more than five years after
KIu't.shchev's fall, clearly points to the continued determination
of the oligarchy to avoid the pitfalls of one-man rule.
Formulas on Collective Leadership Are Strenhened
This same determination is evident in certain new and revised
formulations on collective leadership in the party history. The
recent changes are all the more noteworthy since they point to a
steady progression of emphasis on collectivity since the appearance
of the first edition of the party history in 1959. Thus, the
pointed warnings against one-man rule introduced in the second (1962)
edition reappear in the latest edition, along with even stronger
affirmations of collective leadership.
The most extensive changes in this regard occur in the treatment
of the purge of Beria in 1953. For example, one of the new
formulations in the text is drawn from the 10 July 1953 PRAVDA
editorial on the purge, which was directly addressed to the highest
echelons o' the power structure:
Any official, whatever post he occupies, must be under
the unremitting control of the party. Party organiza-
tions must regularl.r check the work of all organizations
and departments and the activity of all leading
officials. It is also necessary to take under
systematic and unremitting control the acti'r.ty of the
organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Another change in this section involving a definition of the principle
of collectivity reads as follows:
This principle requires from each official of a leading
party organ observance of the Leninist norms of party
life, respect for collective opinion and subordination
to the will of the majority, and full justification by
one's activity of the high trust shown by the party.
In still another revision, the new text reiterates a passage on
collective leadership from the 1962 edition of the party history, but
emphasizes the message by italicizing the phrase "principle of
collectivitiy" in the passage.
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The emphasis on collectivity is also evident in the treatment of
more recent events--the October 1964 CPSU plenum and the 23d CPSU
Congress--not covered in earlier editions of the history. It even
finds expression in the conclusions. that comprise the last 20 pages
of the voluminous tome. Where the old text affirmed that "the
party consistently observes the Leninist norms of party life and
principles of party leadership," the new text sharpens the formula-
tion by substituting the word "strictly" for "consistently."
Brezhnev's Stature in Collective Remains Slight
In line with the emphasis on collectivity, the new party history is
sparing in its references to Khrushchev's successors and miserly in
its dispensation of praise. Thus, in its general coverage of the
post-Khrushchev period, the history refers more frequently to
Brezhnev (16 times) than to Kosygin (5) and Podgornyy (3), but the
vast majority of these references relate to Brezhnev's speeches
at party gatherings rather than to any other accomplishment on his
part. Moreover, on important official occasions, such as the
23d Congress, the 50th anniversary commemoration, and the June
1969 international communist conference, Brezhnev invariably shares
the spotlight with other leaders, particularly Kosygin and Podgornyy.
Even the inclusion of Brezhnev's name in a listing of "prominent"
wartime leaders is offset by a new reference to Kcsygin's wartime
services.
The current treatment of Brezhnev contrasts sharply with that
accorded Khrushchev in the 1962 edition of the party history.
Unlike Brezhnev, Khrushchev was credited with major policy initiatives
which completely overshadowed the records of his contemporaries. This
accreditation has been withdrawn from the new history, along with the
countless citations from Khrushchev's speeches and most of the
references to his activities.
Part of the vacuum created by these revisions is now filled with
occasional references to unidentified "other leaders" and to the
collective institutions of power--"the CPSU Central Committee and its
Politburo." In particular, the activities of the Politburo in the
field of foreign affairs are now singled out for special attention
in the new history, through the device of recalling the occasional
endorsements of those activities by Central Committee plenums. The
apparent enhancement of the Politburo's status is even reflected in
the current treatment of the purge of Beria. The new party history
credits the CPSU Presidium--predecessor of the Politburo--with the
exposure of Beria, whereas the 1962 edition gave the credits to
Khrushchev, for initiating the action, and to the Central Committee,
for carrying it out..
CONFIDENTIAL
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- 19 -
COMMUNIST CHINA
PARTY MEMBERS ARE SET APART FROM MASSES, PROPAGANDISTS SAY
The thesis that the party is superior to all other organizations in
Communist China, seldom spelled out during the cultural revolution,
has come increasingly to the fore in recent weeks. There have been
at the same time scattered but progressively more numerous assertions
that party members as well as the party organization must be set apart
from the masses--the antithesis of the revolutionary view that the
ordinary worker is just as likely, perhaps more likely, to be able
to grasp Mao's thought than the party member.
An article in 'the first issue of ~"D FLAG for 1970, belatedly broadcast
by Radio Peking on 22 January, provided central authority for placing
party members in a special category Tying the thesis to Mao's dictum
that class struggle will continue as long as classes continue to exist,
the article implied that Mao's authority also supports the view that
there must be a distinction between advanced and ordinary members of
the proletariat and a further distinction between party members and
nonmembers. The article explained that the notion that "the time when
party members and the masses are equal is over" rests on a misunder-
standing, It is not a question of an era being "over," RED FLAG
indicates, because the notion of "absolute equality in politics" never
did hold sway during the cultural revolution--although of course one
must not divorce oneself from the masses nor feel that the masses are
backward,
Shanghai radio, which has actively promoted the dictum of party
leadership over other organizations, is the only public sou::'ce to
discuss at any length the problems faced by nonparty cadres under
conditions of a revival of party primacy. A newsletter broadcast on
25 January referred to a new cadre who was faced with the question
"How should we nonparty cadres continue our work of revolution?" He
mistakenly concluded that the party would take over revolutionary
committee responsibilities and he could go back to the workshop. He
soon realized his error, however, and then actively helped form the
new party committee, Another new cadre mentioned in the newsletter
h--lped break down mass organizational factionalism, again illustrating
the continued usefulness of the newer nonparty cadres,
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Proper Function of Revolutionary Comrn~t-tee Remains Issue
The relationship between the party organ and the revolutionary
committee is that between the leader and the led, it has been
clearly stated. Yet the new functions of the revolutionary
committee seem still to be subject to misunderstanding and
differences of view.
A 23 January editorial in HUNAN DAILY, reiterating that the
party must lead both the army and the government, warned that
the party committee must not monopolize revolutionary committee
work lest it "become embroiled in affairs" and progressively
weaken the unified leadership of the party." The editorial, which
also warned against the dangers posed by those who place mass
organizations above the party organizations, indicates that even
the party's prestige is insufficient to heal organizational rivalry
without scars and that unity is best served by putting the party
somewhat above the battle.
There is some risk to the authority of party leadership under the
circumstances of mere indirect party control, however, as indicated
by a Honan broadcast on 13 January. The radio reported on a situation
in which som. leadership cadres failed to treat the party-revolutionary
committee relationship correctly "so that the party was unable to play
its proper role as the core." The chairman of the revolutionary
committee recognized the danger, it was said, and stated that "if the
party leadership core were weakened within the revolutionary committee
there would be a danger that the revolutionary regime would become
a revolutionary regime in name only." Nanking radio on the 23d seemed
to recognize this problem also; it called on all party organs to "oppose
the practice of allowing -each unit to go its own way" by strengthening
the party concept.
The length of time devoted to party building with still no end in
sight stands as testimony to the problems faced by the regime in
adopting measures which will revive the vitality of the party without
in effect risking another revolution by suddenly destroying the
administrative fabric that has run the country for the past three
years. Chengchow radio tried to explain away some of the difficulties
in establishing new party structures by blaming them on incorrect party
building which "was conducted before the ninth party congress and is
very far from meeting the demands of the new party constitution"--not
a very convincing explanation, because the draft constitution, nearly
identical to the final version, was made available as a guide in
November 1968.
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It is likely that the new structure, in which the party seems to
exercise no separate administrative power, accentuates a problem
evident in the pre-cultural revolution setup. In that structure,
with more precise party-government distinctions, many government
cadres exercised considerable power although they had little
prestige, while ordinary party members had the prestige but little
power. The ct?,rrent party-revolutionary committee system, in which
administrative power is exercised by the revolutionary committee
headed by the local party leaders, contains the seeds for a
significant dichotomy between power and prestige. Nonparty members
who occupy revolutionary committee posts will continue to exercise
authority on a day-to-day basis while many party members working
as ordinary workers will exercise scant authority of any sort,
giving them little return for their added responsibility to maintain
far higher standards of personal conduct.
'TOPICS IN BRIEF
Shanghai radio has proclaimed the period 25-31 January a "shock week"
for the propagation of birth control, encouragement of late marriage,
and improvement in sanitation. Tsingtao city and Kiangsi province
have announced similar spring health and sanitation campaigns, but
with no reference to birth control or late marriage. Shanghai has
been the only area to do any serious propagandizing in, behalf' of
birth control, in public media, since the onset of the cultural
revolution; injunctions to marry late have been a little more
widespread, but .sere too Shanghai has be(-.-n easily the most outspoken
Although they do not explicitly draw the connection, the Shanghai
authorities may hope that some young people in Shanghai will find
the prospect of earlier marriage and additional offspring an
inducement t,-) proceed willingly to the countryside and a peasant
life,
ANTIRELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA
Propaganda efforts against religious survivals, seldom mentioned in
public media in recent years, were discussed in Changsha (Hunan)
radio broadcasts on 16-17 January, One report told how a brigade
party branch, working in a largely minority area, had "extensively
propagated atheism" among the peasants, in the course of discouraging
a revival of traditional weddings and funerals. The other report
described efforts to wipe out "superstitions" among peasants in
suburban Changsha, including belies in God and reliance on "extravagant"
weddings.
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