SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R000300020004-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
42
Document Creation Date:
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 22, 1999
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 12, 1970
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
STATSPEC
IIIIIUiiiiiiii~Illlllll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
of Communist Propaganda
Confidential
ConfidentLi
12 FEBRUARY 1970
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 4)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
E.cWu d Go ,."-lit
do-ngcod'ng and
d.do~dfico~inn
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONTENTS
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow Scores Policy of Maintaining U.S. Troops in Europe . . . . . . . . 1
LATIN AMERICA
Cuba Cautious With Latin American Bids to Renew Relations . . . . . . . . 3
Havana Sensitive to Charges It Reneged on Revolutionaries
Three Regimes Denounced for False Revolutionary Images'
Peruvian. Regime Given Most Favorable Cuban Reception
Moscow Approves Initiatives for Rapprochement
South Vietnam: CP Reviews Tasks, Cites "Reoolution 9" . . . . . . . . . 10
Topics in Brief
Soviet Aid to DRV; PRG Diplomatic Status
THE FAR EAST
DPRK Denies Ordering Bacteria, Charges U.S. Prepares CBW . . . . . . . 16
DPP,K Cites Southerners' Hope for Unification by Kim's 60th Birthday . . 17
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Pr-)-Soviet Line Dominates French Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Ga.rauciy Ouster Reflects Impact of Czechoslovak Issue
Moscow Hails Congress as Victory for Communist Unity
Hungarian Debate Over Guevara Underlines Problems of Ultraleft . . . . 25
Orthodox Critic Says Radical Left May "Gain More Ground"
PRAVDA Article Attacks Voronov's Orenburg Constituency . . . . . . . . . 28
Orenburg Leaders Accused of Suppression of Criticism
Orenburg Lauded as Example for Agricultural Successes
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
CONTENT S (Continued)
Party Committees Formed at County and City Levels . . . . . . . . . .
31
RED FLAG Sets Forth Guidelines for China's Economy . . . . . . . . .
32
Forces of Capitalism in the Countryside Said Still Strong
Provinces Amplify CorrupL?ion Charges, Fukien Reports Trial
Several Provinces Discuss Their Agricultural Plans
Possible New Category of PLA Service Noted in Provinces . . . . . .
37
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CONFtDLNT1AL LEIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
- 1 -
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
MOSCOW SCORES POLICY OF MAINTAINING U, S. TROOPS IN EUROPE
The current debate in the United States on the matter of U.S. force
levels in Europe has been duly noted by Soviet propagandists? But
they see the Nixon Administration as maintaining current force levels
despite Senator Mansfield's pending resolution--cosigned by a majority
of the Senate--which urges the withdrawal of a "substantial number"
of U.S,. troops now stationed in Europe, and they view Administration
policy in this regard as being aimed at forestalling progress on
European security. Comment at the time of Prime Minister Wilson's
26-28 January visit to the United States took note of reported
assurances by President Nixon that Washington. would maintain current
force levels at least until 1971, These assurances, in the words
of PRAVDA's London correspondent Or?estov on 31 January, serve to
demonstrate that the United States iias not changed its stand on
European security.
Under Secretary of State Richardson's 20 January speech before the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations also comes under fire. A
participant in Moscow radio's clomestic servi^e roundtable show on
25 January says that Richardson, indicated that despite congressional
pressure, the Administration opposes any unilat,er.al troop reduction.
The commentator calls Richardson's statement symptomatic of the
general line of U.S. foreign policy and concludes that it is
di.rect7y .ref a4ed to the alleged U.S. effort to delay the calling
of a conference on European security. Attacking U.S. reservations
regarding a. c 'nference , the same commentator goes on to say that
Washingtonr. has insisted that a ccnferencp must be preceded by
agreement on the part of the sc.cialist stales to discuss the question
of the mutual reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.
A later article in NEW TIMES, reviewed by TASS on. 11 February,
also touches on the matter of balanced force reductions. The
article says that placing the issue on the agenda of a European
security ccnference could. lead to "endless discussions" and
"doom" the conference in advance,*
tactics of those who would burden the agenda "with questions which
it would be unable to solve."
Ministerial Council session in Brussels had complained of efforts
to place balanced force reduction on the agenda of a European
security conference, over the past two months it has avoided
specific references to force reduction, complaining only of the
~~hile Soviet propaganda at, the time of the early-December NATO
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
The matter of a balanced force reduction is not broached in available
press treatment of the Richardson speech., The most authoritative
comment is a 29 January PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy, who characterizes
the speech as an "attack" against the Mansfield resolution and who
rejects the New York TIMES' editorial defense of the Administration
policy. Mayevskiy assails the TIMES' contention that the U.S.
military presence is a restraining influence on West German
militarization, that it encourages Bonn to improve its relations
with Eastern Europe, and that it creates an opportunity for laying
a foundation for a European settlement. On the contrary, Mayevskiy
says, "the presence of U.S. troops, the U.S. military bases on
European territory, and the entire NATO system, directed against
the socialist countries and the progressive movement in Western
Europe, have been and remain factors splitting the continent,
maintaining tension, and undermining European security." A later
article in PRAVDA--by Orekhov on 6 February--says that Richardson,
in rejecting any idea of a possible reduction of U.S. troop
strength in Europe, "proclaimed a course not of relaxing but of
maintaining tension in Europe."
"VIETNAMIZATION" IN EUROPE
While pointing up the U.S. intent to continue its military presence
in Europe, Soviet commentators at the same time warn that the
Administration seeks to place a greater defense burden on its
allies, a tack which they view as the "Vietnamization" of Europe,
Thus, participants in a 1 February domestic service roundtable show,
taking note of the Richardson speech, conclude that the West
Europeans will be asked to contribute more troops and to pay a
larger portion of U.S. troop maintenance costs. In the words of
one of the show's commentators, IZVESTIYA observer Osipov, this
is in effect "an attempt to 'Vietnamize' West Europe." The same
Osipov repeats the "Vietnamization" thesis in an article in the
1 February issue of the IZVESTIYA supplement NEDELYA. In essence,
he says, the plan is to make the West European members of NATO
"intensify with their own hands the military and political
barriers dividing our continent in order . . . to make the paths
toward pan-European cooperation as impassable as possible." As he
had done in the roundtable show, Osipov takes note of Senator Percy's
remarks on 24 January at a German-American conference in Bonn that
the Nixon Administration was supporting a plan to transfer the cost
of U.S. troop maintenance to "the shoulders of its European NATO
allies."
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CONFIDENTIAL I'EIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
- 3
LATIN AMERICA
CUBA CAUTIOUS WITH LATIN AMERICAN BIDS TO RENEW RELATIONS
Havana has reacted cautiously to a spate of recent statements by
Latin American leaders raising the possibility of Cuba's
reincorporation into the inter-American system. These included
the 3 February statements by Venezuelan President Caldern and
Trinidad.-Tobago Prime Minister. Williams at the eighth special
meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council
(IA-ECOSOC) in Caracas: They suggested that a resumption of
economic relations with Cuba might be in order. While PRENSA
LATINA tersely reported. these statements, Havana comment on the
IA-ECOSOC meeting ignored the question of a Cuban-Latin American
rapprochement, focusing virtually exclusively on irreconcilable
"contradictions" between the United States and Latin America
that allegedly surfaced at the conclave. However, beginning on
the 7th--the date the Caracas meeting closed--Cuban media in
reporting both positive and negative Latin American reaction to
the Caldera and Williams' initiatives carried a statement of
Cuban conditions for a resumption of ties.
The present formulation by Havana media of the conditions for
renewed ties appears to be intentionally more vague than the
specific conditions outlined by Castro in a 14 July 1969 speech.*
Then Castro stipulated that Latin American countries desiring
relations with Cuba "must begin by saying that the OAS agreements
[on Cuba] were arbitrary and unjust and that , . . as a correction
to the crime committed against our fatherland, the complicity
maintained with the Yankee imperialists, they are prepared to
denounce these agreements." In contrast, Radio Havana concluded
its 8 February report of a statement by the Argentine Foreign
Minister that opposed ruban reentry into the OAS until Cuba "changes
its hostile attitude toward the American countries" with the
following comment:
The Cuban Revolutionary Government has repeatedly
stated that, before it could consider the possibility
For an analysis of Castro's 1 July remarks and background on
Cuba's position with regard to renewed relations with Latin America
and with the United States, see the FBIS SURVEY of 17 July 1969,
pages 8-11. Castro's 14 July conditions for resumption of relations
were reiterated in an 8 October speech to the UN General Assembly
by Cuban delegate Ricardo Alarcon.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
of resuming relations with a Latin American
nation, changes would have to take place in the
governments which wish to establish such relations,
not in Cuba. The Cuban Revolutionary Government
has also repeated that relations could be
established only with those governments that do
not subordinate their sovereignty to North
American dictates.
This formulation is a practically verbatim repeat of a statement
made last April by Cuban CP Secretariat member Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez while attending a Lima conference of the Economic
Commission for Latin America,* Although subject to a variety
of interpretations, this recent formulation--in contrast to
Castro's demand for a public repudiation of OAS sanctions against
Cuba--could be construed to mean that an expression of willingness
to establish relations with. Cuba is in itself a sign of the
required "changes" within the Latin American governments and of
their abandonment of "North American" tutelage. There is, in any
case, little doubt that the Peruvian military regime meets these
requirements, as Castro has hailed the measures it has instituted
as genuinely "revolutionary," and in his 14 July speech intimated
hi- interest in establishing relations with it. Although Cuban
me a have not themselves invoked the prerequisite of public
re'.,diation of OAS sanctions, a 6 February PRENSA LATINA dispatch
summarized an article from the Chilean CP organ EL SIGLO which
vowed that Latin American states "will have to admit their
mistake [in obeying OAS anti-Cuba resolutions] and resume the
relations which they broke off unilaterally."
Havana Sensitive to Charges It Reneged on Revolutionaries
A factor that might inhibit Havana in seeking reestablishment of
bilateral ties with Latin American states is that it would leave
her vulnerable to charges of betraying the cause of continental
revolution, a charge which Castro used to level repeatedly at
Moscow and its allies in the course of denouncing their economic
and political overtures to Latin American "oligarchies" which
repressed domestic revolutionaries. There are signs Havana itself
may already be on the defensive in its relations with Latin
American revolutionaries, a situation which would only be
* This statement is carried in the FBIS SURVEY of 8 May 19 9,
page 5. At the Lima meeting Rodriguez issued the first statement
by a Cuban leader backing the Peruvian regime.
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CONFIDENTIAL FF3IS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY. 1970
exacerbated if it reestablished relations with Latin American states
which continue to keep former guerrillas in Jail or press anti-
guerrilla campaigns. While recent reports from Venezuela and
Colombia--unacknowledged by Cuban media--quote guerrillas in those
countries as complaining that Cuba has either terminated or greatly
reduced. its aid to them, Havana has shown sensitivity to suggestions
that her support for guerrilla warfare may be flagging.
This sensitivity was shown on 1+ February, when PRENSA LATINA
released a communique issued by the Cuban Union of Young Communists-
Federation of University Students (UJC-FEU) rebutting an article
in the Chilean EL SIGLO on 28 January, Written by Eduardo Labarca,
and based on statements by a Chilean CP Youth leader who had attended
a Havana consultative meeting of the Cuban-led Continental
Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE), it quoted com-
ments allegedly male by Castro in a 5 January meting with. the
student, leaders. Castro's remarks seemed atypically to endorse
the Chilean party's commitment to peaceful politicking while at
the same time denouncing Latin American ultra-i.'ftist elements
the Cubans had once supported. Castro was said to have called
Chile and Uruguay "institutional oases" which the United States
would find di.ffic'?lt to dominaLF; lauded the Chilean "mass movement,"
Amer.i`en as foJ-l--ws:
In general, guerrilla movements in Latin America. have
done everything contrary to what they should have
done , . . , Some ultra,-radicals who were ready to
conquer the wo?ld arrived in Cuba . . . . They soon
proved to be all talk and some of them showed they
were working in fay-or of the enemy, in favor of
imperialism ? , , , We have experienced many
disappointments. We have risked mu.::h, too much,
even for people who have prove=n not to be worth
anything, We have even risked the prestige of the
Cuban revolution.
In addition, Labarca quot-d Cuban CP Central Committee member
Faustino Perez as questioning the efficacy of robbing banks and
other businesses to squire funds, a tactic used by the Chilean
Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), a Cuban-oriented group at
loggerheads with the Chilean CP. The UJC-FEU reply to Labarca
defensively asserted that Cuba's "forthright policy and theoretical
positions . . , regarding movements which are truly confronting
Yankee imperialism are backed by solid, consistent practice."
Charging that "the essence" of Castro's words had been "distorted"
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
-6-
by Lab area in an article which smacks "of the intrigues and false-
hoodsused by the Yankee Central. Intelligence Agency media to try
and confuse he public," the statement denigrated those who, "not
daring to attack [the Cuban revolution] directly, choose to place
themselves under the shadow of [its] prestige in order to subtly
use pseudorevolutionary stands?" It noted that the OCLAE
consultative meeting "was guided by the permanent memory of
Major Ernesto Che Guevara and the thinking of guerrilla priest
Camilo Torres," and that one of its "greatest. concerns" was for
its "strategic line" of armed struggle, PRENSA LATINA on the
6th summarized a reply in EL SIGLO by Labarca in which he deplored
"deeply that the article could have given rise to any misunderstand-
ing among Cuban comrades?"
Three Regimes Denounced for False Revolutionary Images
While spokesman of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru have evinced the greatest
interest among Latin American governments in resuming relations with
Cuba, the kind of opposition this action might engender among
Latin American guerrilla leaders may have been indicated in a
communique issued by Chato Peredo, self-proclaimed successor to his
fallen brother 'Inti.' as commander of the Bolivian National
Liberation Army (ELN), the guerrilla organization founded by Che
Guevara. Summarized by PRENSA LATINA on the 10th, the communique
denounces all three regimes for their fraudulent cultivation of
revolutionary images. Chastizing the "self-styled revolutionary"
Bolivian government as one that "Jails, kills, and represses the
important and self-denying revolutionaries," Peredo stated:
This "revolutionary," "anti-imperialist," and
"moralizing" government is trying to make a revolution
by merely ousting a company that was worn out, discred-
ited, and hated by many peoples of the world, and on
the other hand flirting behind the people's back with
lesser-known and therefore less-discredited monopolies
than Gulf--as if it made any difference whether it is
Gulf or any other company that seeks easy ways to
invest capital. with the same dismal results for the
people. The same process of the much vaunted "Peruvian
revolution" keeps such revolutionary combatants as Hugo
Blanco, Hector Bejar, and many others in prison. This
is similar to the famous Chilean "revolution in
freedom."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
1,-~ FEBRUARY 19'(0
All of this, he concluded, was part of a new U,S. Latin American
policy whereby "imperialism continues to exploit and suck our
wealth" but uses the new tactic of extending "invigorated
tentacles behind the screen of 'revolution. " Earlier Peredo,
in an interview with the Leftist Uruguayan weekly MARCHA--
transmitted by PRENSA LATINA's correspondent in Montevideo
to his Havana office but apparently not carried by Cuban
media--denied the "possibility" of an "early" resumption of
Cuban-Bolivian diplomatic relations. He was more circumspect
with regard to the question of trade relations, noting that
the ELN would follow "an independent policy" on the matter
but that it lacked "enough information to make a definitive
statement."
Per. uvian Reg; jre Gi?,,?en Most l avoi'able. Cuban R.e tion
Of the three regimes, Cuba continues to take the moet favorable
view of the Peruvian, with recent Havana. comment on the new
Peruvian press law--widely criticized else,4here in Latin America--
praising it for restricting "oligarchical" control of a press
subservient to the "Yankee imperialists." Although criticism
occasionally has crept into Havana comment in connection with
Peru's si_gr.i,rg a, contract with the tJ,S,-owned Southern Peru
Copper Compare/, Peru remains the only Latin A erican government
consistently lauded by Havana media,
Cuban comment has been far more equivocal on the Bolivian regime
of President Ovando--;which Castro on 30 September accused of
'opportunism and demagogy" and contrasted with the Peruvian
regime, which. Castro said was making a "genuine" effort to promote
radica.). chang Typi.calJy, , a Radio Havana. commentary on
23 January observed that; Ovando had adopted "an ambiguous position"
by procla.iming his government to be nationalistic "and even. . . .
anti-imperialistic" while at. the same time keeping Regis Debray
in prison and keeping in asylum in the Mexican embassy Antonio
Ar.guedas, the former minister who transmitted Guevara's battle
diary to Havana, Cuban media apparently ignored an Ovando
interview appearing in the 19 December. MARCHA in which he
indicated receptivity to fo.rming an anti -imperialist bloc with
Cuba and Peru--a view later disavowed by an official Bolivian
spokesman--and expressed interest in selling Bolivian oil to Cuba.
While Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes has been actively
seeking a rapprochement with Cuba, Havana has generally refrained
from discussing his initiatives. In a 29 January press conference
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12 FEBRUARY 1970
Valdes correctly cbserved that Cuba had shown no interest in
rejoining the OAS, but he advocated convocation of an OAS meeting
to rescind the 1964 ban on relations with Cuba imposed by the
coganization., REUTERS on 9 February reported an interview
in EL SIGLO with. former Chilean Senator Baltasar Castro, who
for a long time has been an exponent of renewed relations and
who had just returned from Havana and Lima. The Chilean
alleged that Castro had received Valdes' remarks with great
interest: "We read these statements together with Prime
Minister Castro, and the impression was pretty good? because
the statements are very clear." He intimated that Peru's
General Velasco had indicated be would support Chilean efforts
for a rapprochement with Cuba and reported that in July the
first Cuban ship to visit Chile since the break in relations
would bring sugar and return with wine and other Chilean
products, Last August two Chilean business representatives went
to Cuba to explore the possibility of trade exchanges. While
the mission was reported by Cuban media, no mention was made
of the trip's outcome,
Moscow Approves Initiatives for Rapprochement
Not surprisingly, limited Moscow comment lauds recent Latin
American proposals to normalize relations with Cuba. Among
benefits the USSR might derive from a restoration of ties are a
lessening of Cuban dependence on Soviet economic assistance, a
permanent reduction of Cuba's committment to continental armed
revolutionary struggle and an abandonment of the ideological
heresies associated with this commitment, and the promotion of
an anti-UeS, bloc of Latin American nations. The latter
consideration has been highlighted in Mcscow comment so far,
Thus, a 2 February PRAVDA article by Valentin Kuc.herov praising
Chilean Foreign Minister Valdes' advocacy of renewed relations
with Cuba described "the trend toward" renewed relations as
"a logical manifestation of the Latin American countries' desire
to pursue an independent, foreign policy," Pointing out the
great importance to Latin America of Cuba as an opponent of
the hegemony of "American monopolies" and U.S. "aggressive,
imperialist policies," Kuicherov highlighted the necessity for
"unity of action of the Latin American states on an anti-
imperialist basis." In a similar vein, a NEW TIMES article
on the IA-ECOSOC meeting, reviewed by Radio Moscow on the 9th,
argued that the mere fact the conclave discussed relations
with Cuba and expanded economic links with socialist countries
in general. was proof that Latin America's "resistance o . , to
Washington's economic and political diktat is rising steadily
and irrepressibly,"
CONFIDENTIAL
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An indication of past Cuban resistance to Soviet pressures to
take the initiative in normalizing relations could be inferred
from the 10 June 19G9 address of Cuban observer Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez to the Moscow international party conference,
Rodriguez warned that "the establishing and broadening of
diplomatic relations with the socialist countries and the announce-
ment of possible changes of their latitude toward Cuba" on the
part of Latin American regimes does not necessarily signify "a
serious policy of resistance to U.S. Imperialism," but is "very
often" only a tactic "aimed at gaining time in the face of
difficulties qnd at deceiving and diverting the masses."
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12 FEBRUARY 1970
r
SOUTHEAST ASIA
SOUTH VIETNAM: CP REVIEWS TASKS, CITES "RESOLUTION 9"
Recent Liberation Radio broadcasts have been notable not only for
explicitly discussing the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the
communist party in the South, but for discussing "revolution 9"
and identifying it as a resolution of the PRP Central Committee.'
The PRP, established on 1 January 1962, received fairly frequent
publicity in the 1964-65 period but after 1966 references to it
virtually disappeared. With the establishment of the Pr%-~isionai
Revolutionary Government in the South in June 1969 there was s:;me
after.{,:;.or. to the party and some officials. There was further mention
of it last September in connection with the activities surrounding
Ho Chi Minh's death.
The unprecedented propaganda references to resolution 9 come in
an editorial in the January issue of the PRP journal TIEN PHONG
(VANGUARD), broadcast by Liberation Radio on 31 January, and in a
PRP Central Committee letter on the occasion of Tet addressed to
"all party and youth group members" in South Vietnam. (The Front
radio on 22-24 January had broadcast a three-ins t aliment article
from TIEN PHONG "No. 8.") Both the editorial and the. letter
routinely claim victories over the allies, but they are notable
for the detail in outlining tasks and in acknowledging shortccmings,
The January TIEN PHONG editorial is fairly routine in its assessment
of general developments in 1969 and the prospects for defeat of the
G.S. Vietnamization plan in 1970. It'is notable for its discussion
of party guidance and the explicit instructions to cadres in the
South on carrying out the current political-indoctrination drive.
The editorial notes that all communist echelons recently completed
an indoctrination campaign to study the party's resolution 9 and
Ho Chi Minh's testament. While ^13.iming success in its implementation,
Resolution 9, which was issued after the July 1969 ninth conference
of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)---the Vietnam Communist
Party's central directorate in the South, was captured by allied units
in South Vietnam in early October 1969 and formally released to the
public some two months later by the GVN and the United States. The
resolution, classified "top secret" by the communists, is a lengthy
report assessing the 1969-70 situation and offering general policy
guidance.
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the editorial also rationalizes current difficulties and hardships
in the conflict as developmental ones, experienced at a time when
"we are in a position of actively attacking the enelr." It adds
that if "all our party members and cadres working and fighting at
all echelons and in all areas clearly realize the situation, seeing
our great victories and the enemy's new defeats and weaknesses,
firmly seize the present unprecedent adly favorable opportunity,,
and with high determination and effort implement at all costs their
sacred oath to President Ho when he departed from us forever, we
will ce:?tainly win even more glor'ous v:c;taries in the daya ahead."
in cl.imi.ng that echelons have been strengthened in their "proletarian"
stand and outlick in the recent st,iriy :r rive the editorial. .lutes that
they have devised ".irhitial concre?;e plans" to be carried out. It
reveals specific shortcomings in ufiF:i.ng guida::,'e on foi:.i ma-ln pcints
to which "fu:^ther a.tta:xtion" must be paid. These acs:
(1) The necessity of grasping the "basic oxitent" of the period of
general offensive and concerted uprisings when "we have developed ou:'
c,:cfersi.ve strategy to the highest p~~dnt in a comprehensive, su-~cessive,
and v; g,:)ro12s manner in or. del to gradually a.(3,r zee toward a decisive
vi t")ry." Observing that the enenV must be attacked more "vigorously
and rel;:nt lessl_y to prrrrent his rac?aver-Ing st=ens';h, the editorial
calls fc new progress "in changing the balance of ,~rces between us
and the enemy." And it cells erroneous and dangerous "all passive
and right;iot thoughts" and hopes for a U.S. withdrawal and a deteriora-
tion in the enerrpr potential.
(2) The raisi.n.g by "all" echelons of the level of guidance and
n.:?aaszi.:.a.;ion. among "e.l.l cadres ad pa?f members," sin^-~ the success
:r fail re :;f a "corY ?C; Z^l_7.c: r iS '3.et rm? ned by th' r,ain er in which
it :.s imple ae:~ :e:.. At a t .me wh'-r;1 the e.^.ew, i _ on the pat, of "serious
Jlips " the eci ~C:^ E~ 8 'g "'n have -. iut 'fiery accurate trends,
tasks., and working pol;.cies." And it adds that "the present urgent
p: oblem is that echelons must . . implement ; In one way or another, all
resolutions and conc::-ete plans rapidly and ur ;ently."
('s) The necessity of fully developing the "successes of the recent
p::J_i.1;;.cal indoctriratiion on the 9th resolution" pop1.-_la_?:;zin_g the
exper ie .ces of those local-it--es wher-- tiie we.., -':c cc's s I^t
.al while'
"resolutely" coh.duc .ing a::otber indo ~,trinati mn d--..-- ,--,re "whe,^a 4-er it has
proved unsuccessful." The effects of a success-"b.l drive in party units
are to be felt in other tasks, "especially mass motivation," the
editorial notes. It adds that "it must be realized" that this is the
last but very important link in transforming the party's policy, line,
determiri.ati.on, and strategy into material strength with which to defeat
the enemy.
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(4) Paying greater attention to building up "material bases" so
as to make our forces stronger than the enemy's in the military
and economic, as well as the political fields. The editorial says
that "as followers of dialectical materialism, we highly evaluate
the political and moral factors,"but, it adds, "we must not in the
least overlook the problem of material bases" and "we must urgently,
daringly, and steadily build and develop our revolutionary forces
in all fields."
TIEN PHONG concludes with the claim that the resistance has entered
a "decisive phase," with 1970 offering an "extremely beautiful
outlook." While more hardships and difficulties will still be
experienced, it says, the southern armed forces and people "are
now concentrating all their material and spiritual strength to
deal a decisive blow at the enemy, ?-) change the war situation,
and to win final victory." It also adds--in a paraphrase of
a passage from the COSVN 9th resolution--that "whether we can gain
final victory rapidly or slowly depends on the subjective efforts
of each of us,"
In the 6 February broadcast of the PRP Central Committee letter,
sent to all members on the occasion of the lunar new year, the
announcer describes it as "important." From its content it could
be a companion piece for the TIEN PHONG editorial, but there is
no indication that it was published in the journal or other organs,
although it is known to have been carried in two Liberation Radio
broadcasts on the 6th,,
The letter, like the TIEN PHONG editorial, notes that party and
youth group members had recently studied what it describes as the
"PRP Central Committee" Resolution 9.* It says there was "unanimous
agreement" with the resolution and that its study "initially" led
to a "new change in ideological consciousness"--a development which
the PRP Central Committee welcomes, Nevertheless it is still
necessary, the letter adds, to continue to instill a higher
determination in party chapters in various areas and among the
armed forces and masses "in order to meet the requirements of the
forthcoming tasks."
* This suggests that the PRP Central Committee is synonomous with
the Central Office cr COSVN, the identification on the captured
-version of resolution 9.
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The letter claims that the situation in 1969 developed "strictly
in line with the party Central Committee's resolution" and argues
that last year's successes, won with difficulty and a maturity "which
we should be proud of, prove that the party's lines and policies
are completely correct," In offering general guidance to party
members and combatants the letter notes that they, "more than
anyone else," must know how to "unite, organize, and lead the
masses in arising to liberate themselves," And it adds that in
order to fulfill this task they must "trust and rely" on the
masses and also "thoroughly and realistically mobilize the masses."
In addition, in urging party and youth group members to constantly
train and improve themselves so as to be worthy "pupils and heif's
of President Ho's great enterprise," the party letter tells them
to "thoroughly understand and correctly implement" the advice
given by Ho to southern combatants and compatriots on 18 March 1968
Their will must be vigorous, their plan must be careful,
their supervision must be thorough, their coordinated
actions must be well-geared, their execution must be very
careful; cadres must set a good example, and secrets
must be well-kept. These are key factors enabling them
to satisfactorily fulfill their duties,,*
The letter says that in his Lestament Ho had bequeathed to all party
members, people arid comb atants--"especially to the south"--a
confidence in victory and a "determination-to-fight-and-win" spirit.
It prefaces a pledge to "hold high" President. Ho's "determination-to-
fight-and-win banner" with a. call. for high revolutionary ethics and
the safeguarding of the party's "purity." And it concludes by offer-
ing condolences to the families of "comrades who have sacrificed
their lives, who are in jail, or who have been wounded,"
During 1964 and 1965 numerous PRP pronouncements were publicized.**
For example, at least 14 articles, editorials, or messages
attributed to PRP organs were publicized by Vietnamese communist
media from mid-June 1964 to mid-August 1965.
No such public statement of this date is known to have been
previously publicized,
'* Communist media treatment of the PRP from 1966-1969 is
reviewed in FBIS Special Report "The PRG and the PRP in South Vietnam,"
24 July 1969, pages 19-24, and the FBIS SURVEY of 15 September 1969,
pages 1-4,
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During this period communizt media :referred t v.ari~~us pe:riodi ce s
as the party organ. For example, Liberation Radio ;.n 22 J,rre 1964
carried an editorial said to have appeared in the May 1964 isau.e
of the journal TIEN PHONG, which the radio i.denti.t.ed as the
"political and ideological journal of the PRP," But the Dame radio
on 3 October 1964 identified a monthly periodical, NHAN DAN, as the
"political and ideological struggle organ" ;f the PRFU Selected
items from this southern NHAN DAN were pub.l.."..iaod by c,.Jmmuniat
media for four consecutive months, f'r.;m 0 it,ber 1.964 until February
1965. There have been no known reports of articles from the
southern NHAN DAN since that time.
A 22 July 1965 VNA report on 11Th in South Vietnam's "li.berated
areas" noted that the "paper" NHAN DAN and the "magazine" TIEN
PHONG, "organs of the South Vietnam People's Revolutionary Panty,
are widely circulated, having the effect of guiding and leading
the movement?" There is other evidence that at this pint tiieru may
also have been a daily paper TIEN PHONGO For example, Hanoi Radio
on 25 July 1965 broadcast what it called an editorial from TIEN
PHONG's "15 July issue," while L: beration Radio on 20 August 1965
carried excerpts of what was described as TIEN PHONG's "19 August
editorial,"
The existence of a third PRP organ was indicated in a Hanoi VNA
29 April 1965 rep'.rt of an editorial said to have appeared : the
24 April issue of CO GTAI PRONG, a s.:othern paper that VNA identified
as the "organ of the PRE in the urban areas of South Vietnam."
TOPICS IN BRIEF
A brief Moscow news rep.,:rt Ln 22 January, repeated on the 28th, asy'a
there will be a 50 percent Increase in cs:rg, sent ,c the DRV from
the Sovie',~ Far Eaat this year and that some 50,000 t"nt cf fcod v,iiT
be sent each month. Assertions of in.reases: in caarg;L-are not
unusual, tut Moscow is not known to have previously revealed et;,h
comprehensive figures on the amounts of any specific type :,f g.:;oda
sent to the DRVO Reports occasionally note that an individual ship
is carrying foodstuts or flour to the DRV without jpeclfying tannage,
or report the total tonnage carried by individual ships :;r a 11,21fjet,
without breaking dawn amounts of eaeh,.type of cargo, Individual gifts
of foodstuffs have occasionally been publicized. Fcr example, on
18 March 1968, TASS cited an official of the USSR Ministry of Maritime
Fleet as noting that "re.'ently" 150,000 tons of flour sere sent tc; Vie'-;r+aai
"as a gift from the Soviet people." On 16 April 1969 TASS reported that a
Soviet women's delegation visiting the DRV brought gifts of` 50 tong of
sugar, 25 tons of rice, and 18 tons of powdered and condensed milk.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Background: Typical examples of past references to increased
cargo include the following items: On 20 March 1968 Moscow radio
reported that the Soviet Far East shipping bureau shipped "twice
as many" aid goods as during the corresponding quarter of 1967.
A report on 7 October 1968 noted 'that shipments of industrial
equipment and food from 'the Soviet Far East had "increased by
one-half" for the first 8 months of the year compared to the
corresponding period in 1967. A 4 May 1969 report said that
during the past four months "1.5 times as many goods were
shipped from Vladivostok" to the DRV as during the same period
of 1968.
A 10 February LPA roundup on the recent visits of joint NFLSV/PRG
delegations to various countries of Africa and the Middle East
notes that the group.led by Nguyen Van Quang went to Mali.*
This first available report that a group visited Mali makes no
explicit mention of diplomatic relations. However, that such
relations have probably been agreed upon seems indicated by the
fact the LPA report claims that there are now 11 co11ntries "in
these regions" which have now established diplomatic relations with
the PRG. Eleven noncommunist countries have recognized the PRG,
and all are either African or Arab states except Cambodia. All
but Mali have previously been reported as having received PRG
ambassadors or as having agreed to establish diplomatic relations
at the embassy level,
See the 29 January 1970 FBIS SURVEY, pages T-7, for a review
of the tours of several NFLSV/PRG delegations.
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- 16 -
THE FAR EAST
DPRK DENIES ORDERING BACTERIA, CHARGES U,S. PREPARES CBW
Allegations in ROK and Japanese media since. the end of January that
North Korea had ordered cholera and other bacteria from a Japanese
firm ale denied by Pyongyang in a commentary carried by KCNA and
the domestic service on 5 February. The commentary calls the
reports a "preposterous lie" and "malicious slander"; it says
that the Japanese and South Koreans, at U.S. instigation, are
trying to justify their own "frantic maneuvers" to provoke a war,
"particularly their criminal schemes to use germ weapons more
extensively, by circulating the barefaced lie that our country
intends to manufacture germ weapons."
The commentary goes on to elaborate routinely on alleged U.S.
preparations for the provocation of a new war in Korea as a way
out from defeats in Vietnam and in the face of the "revolutionary
advance" of the people in South Korea and in Asia as a whole.
Asserting that the ROK and Japan are accomplices of the United
States, it adds that Japan has offered its territory as "an arsenal,
supply base, and a chemical and bacteriological weapon procurement
base."
There is no other available Pyongyang reference to this episode,
but pri.)r to the first Japanese report of the alleged Pyongyang
order, on 31 January, KCNA on the 27th had carried a NODONG SINMUN
commentary scoring alleged U.S. preparations for "chemical :nd
germ warfare," referring to a statement by "the commander of a,
base of the U.S. imperialist aggressor army in Alabama." (A
similar commentary broadcast the next day by the "South Korea
Liberation Radio"* says that the statement was made on 24 January
and disclosed that ROK army troops were being brought to the
United States for training in the use of "chemical and bacteriological
weapons." The commentary says that this is a U.S. "machination to
start a war of aggression in Korea and to turn it into a chemical
This radio, first heard 31 March 1967, is a channel for encourage-
ment of the South Korean "struggle" against the ROK Government. It
does not announce its location, but technical clues link it '.o
facilities used by the Pyongyang domestic service.
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and bacteriological war." The commentary explicitly charges the
United States with using "germs" in. the war in South Vietnam.
The commentaries are apparently responsive to a 24 January Army
statement that it is continuing to train foreign officers in CBW
at Fort McClellan, Alabama, although the United States had
recently decided to limit its use of such weapons) The NODONG
SINMUN commentary notes that "chemical and ger?, ;.r.3titutes and
test grounds" have been set up in "various pares of the United
States, Japan, West Germany, and the rest of the world where
the U.S. imperialists set their foot." It calls President Nixon's
statement that he "would not be the first" to use such weapons a
"cunning trick" and recalls that the United States allegedly
used. "chemical and germ weapons" in the "war of aggression in
Korea in the past and in South Vietnam at present"
On 9 and 10 February respectively KCNA carries MIIVJU CHOSON and
NODONG SINMUN commentaries c.enounc~ng the United States for
alleg dly bringing "new poison gas weapcn.s" to Okinawa and claim-
ing at the United States stockpiles "chemical and germ weapons"
in Okinawa and Japan. NODONG SINMUN says this is evidence of
increased U.S. preparations for "criminal. chemical and germ
warfare against the Korean people and other Asian people."
Pyongyang .ra.rc:~.y comments on the subject of bacteriological warfare,
although on appropriate occasions, such as the 25 June anniversary
of the outbreak of the Korean War, propaganda does recall charges
that the UnLted States used bacteriological. weapons during that
war. A 22 July 1969 KCNA commentary on the incident in which
American servicemen were affected by nerve gas in Okinawa also
recalled that charge. Pyongyang has commented before on U.S.
prod.action of CBW weapons A 12 June 1968 domestic service
commentary, for example, reported TJ.S, "tests" of such weapons in
the Panama. Canal Zone., Greer-Land, and. U., S , territory.
DFRK CITES SOUTHERNERS' HOPE FOR UNIFICATION BY KIM'S 60TH BIRTHDAY
In recent weeks Pyongyang' propaganda has for the first time acknow-
ledged reports of alleged assertions by South Koreans--which have
recurred over the past seve.ra.1 years--that the North Koreans hope to
unify the country in time for Kim Ii-song'. 60th birthday. Since
December Pyongyang has reported in at, least three items statements
allegedly made by individuals from South Korea expressing the
expectation that the country will be unified in time for the birthday
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celebratiuns.* The DPRK is not known to have mentioned this target
date on its own authority, and in its own comment, Pyongyang is
invariably vague about the timing, calling for unification "at an
early date," "without delay," or "within our generation." The
latter phrase has been the favored one since the October 1966 KWP
conference. Declarations that the Korean people should be prepared
for the revolutionary struggle "whenever called upon by the party
and the leader" have appeared from time to time since mid-1967.
The first statement on imminent unification was reported on
22 December 1969, when the PYONGYANG TIMES published a press
conference with the pilot and copilot of the South Korean airliner
which was diverted to North Korea on 11 December. The copilot is
quoted as saying: "The South Korean people arcs fighting to bring
as early as possible the day when the country will be unified and
the brothers and sisters of the North and South will live in
happiness, before the respected and beloved ;:ader is 60 years old,"
On 17 January KCNA reports a meeting of some of the plane passengers
with North Korean citizens in which the South '~oreans are cited as
saying that "there is the widespread rumor in South Korea today
that the fatherland will be unified before the 60th birthday of
Premier Kim Il-song . . . ." Again, on 23 January KCNA reports a
Pyongyang city meeting to greet an ROK army soldier who defected
to the North, quoting him as saying that "the South Korean people
say with hope and pride that they will arrange in Seoul a grand
feast celebrating the 60th birthday of Premier Kim Il-song after
the country is unified,"
* According to Kim's official biographers, he was born on
15 April, 1912. In April 1969 Pyongyang and the media of other
countries published messages addressed to Kim congratulating him
on his 57th birthday.
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS
PRO-SOVIET LINE DOMINATES FRENCH PARTY CONGRESS
The French Communist Party (PCF) has again demonstrated. its
subservience to Soviet tutelage by ousting maverick Roger
Garaudy from the party Politburo and Central Committee for his
"anti-Soviet" and "revisionist" views, The 19th PCF Congress,
which met from 11 to 8 February, excluded Garaudy's name from the
list of candidates elected to the party leadership but permitted
him to retain his party membership. Although available reports of
the congress* indicate that the PCF leadership--with an assist
from a high-powered Soviet delegation led by Kirilenko and Ponomarev--
managed to put up a united front against Garaudy and a facade of
unity, it appears to have done so by suppressing discussion of
issues which anti-Soviet intellectuals in the party wished to
explore--the Soviet bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia and its
implications for party autonomy and for the pursuit of diff,ring
roads to socialism.
Having expressed "disapproval" of the intervention in Czechoslovakia
in 1968, the French party has progressively muted its disagreement
with the Soviets on this issue. The PCF Central Committee draft
theses submitted to the congress--carried in the PCF organ
L'HUMANITE on 15 November 1969--make only a brief reference to the
August 1968 events, stating that the party's expression of
"disagreement" following the intervention should not be allowed
to stand in the way of "close cooperation with the CPSU." The
pa.r',J thus sought to paper over the 1968 position while letting
it stand on the record; the PCF could not realistically have been
expected to publicly repudiate its condemnation of the intervention,
in effect embracing the limited sovereignty doctrine and endorsing
the Sovie, Union's right to interfere in another country's affairs,
without seriously compromising its claim to independence and
jeopard.i.zing its negotiations for an antigovernment coalition with
the French Socialist Party and. other leftist groups.
* The texts of speeches by many of the foreign parties are not yet
available.
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Moscow's reportage and comment on the congress suggests that the
Soviets were well pleased with the proceedings. Soviet commentators
evince gratification at Garaudy's removal from the PCF leadership,
although they play down the Garaudy affair--with its embarrassing
implications for the Soviet Union's own image as well as for that
of the PCF--and focus on general approbation of the French communists.
TASS notes that the Soviet Union was lavishly praised and that the
Chinese leadership was fcrmally condemned in the congress documents.
Gansudy Ouster Reflects Impact of Czechoslovak Issue
The impact of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia on West European
communist intellectuals is underlined by the effect they apparently
had on Roger Garaudy. A PCF Central Committee member since 1911.5,
the party's leading theoretician, and director of its Marxist studies
center in Paris, Garaudy for years was a model of ideological ortho-
doxy. He denounced the "anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary uprising"
in Hungary in 1956 and played a major role in weeding out "revisionist"
elements and writing them out of the French party. The Soviet bloc
intervention in Czechslovakia, he maintains in his book "The Great
Turning Point of Socialism," became a catalyst leading to his
reexamination of the nature of socialism and its future.
The central question raised by Garaudy, both in his book and in an
article published in L'HUMANITE on 2 January of this year, emphasize
the idea that it is not enough to "disapprove" of the military inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia"; it is also "necessary to analyze the
theoretical and poli+ical principles underlying it which implicate
our party's entire policy and the French concept of socialism." In
his view, he adds in L'HUMANITE, it is "absolutely Necessary to say
to the French people: the socialism which our party wants to instill
in France is not that which is today imposed militarily on Czechoslovakia."
The PCF Politburo, clearly unwilling to publicly explore the implications
of such cherished communist principles as democratic centralism and
proletarian internationalism, denounced Garaudy in an 18 December
communique published in L'HUMANITE, changing him with advocating anti-
communist heresies and urging him to conform to the party's orthodox
line.*
* For a discussion of the Politburo's indictment and Garaudy's
rebuttal in L'HUMANITE, see the 15 January 1970 issue of the SURVEY,
"French Communist Party Rebukes Anti-Soviet Intellectual," pages
].5-20.
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PCF Secretary Marchais (later elected to the new post of Assistant
Secretary General), standing in for the ailing First Secretary
Waldeck Rochet, detailed the party's charges against Garaudy in
delivering the Central Committee's report to the congress on
4 February. Although the report, carried in L'HUMANITE on the 5th
was mainly concerned with internal French politics and with
support of Soviet foreign policy goals, it provided the rationale
for Garauey's expulsion from the leadership by charging him with
rapidly taking the road "from opportunism to liquidation of
Marxism-Leninism." More specifically, it accused him of launching
"diatribes" against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries
and of taking a too sympathetic view of the Chinese Communist
leadership. On the internal front, he was charged with trying to
promote division within the party and of "contesting the role of
the working class, substituting for it a would-be 'new historical
bloc.'" In this connection, Marchais noted that during the 1968
student revolt Garaudy had sought to subordinate the PCF to workers'
and student movements outside the party.
On the sensitive issue of Czechoslovakia, Marchais defensively pointed
out that the party had "expressed quite frankly its disagreement
with the 21 August military intervention in Czechoslovakia." He
was quick to add, however, that since then the party 'has shown its
understanding of the efforts aimed at finding a political solution
to the crisis" and to warn that the party is "determined to fight
u..^r)mpromisingly any show of anti-Sovietism, whatever its orgin."
According to available accounts of the congress, other PCF members
paraded to the rostrum to denounce Garaudy as a provocateur who was
working against the interests of the French workers, A Paris date-
lined dispatch from the Yugoslav news agency TANYUG on the 7th
noted that up to that time no one had come forward to defend Garaudy's
views. AFP reported on the same day that 130 speakers had addressed
the congress and that "no discordant notes were raised," adding that
the French party was believed to have asked the head of the Italian
delegation to delete any references to Czechoslovakia from his speech.
An unrepentant Garaudy's rebuttal to the congress on 6 February was
largely obscured in L'HTJMANITE's brief account of his address on
the 7th. According to AFP and LE MONDE, Garaudy rejected allega-
tions that he is guilty of "anti-Sovietism" and reasserted his
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central thesis that the PCF must disavow the model of socialism that
has been imposed militarily on Czechoslovakia, If the party is going
to achieve its goal of unity with the noncommunist left and by
implication sell its "advanced democracy" to the French people,
he argued, it must make clear what type of socialism it intends to
build in France and how its model will differ from existing
socialist regimes. The principle of democratic centralism, he
asserted, would have to be modified and the party would have to
broaden its definition of "the working class" to include a growing
number of intellectuals who are becoming an increasingly important
factor in the age of science and technology.
Rejecting the allegation that his views are "anti-Soviet," Garaudy
reportedly argued that what feeds anticommunism are acts which violate
communist principles and not the open discussion of such acts. He
maintained that proletarian internationalism is violated when a
socialist country, in the midst of a miner's strike in Asturia, sends
Franco the coal which helps him to break the strike, and when a
socialist country, after having divided the Greek party of Manolis
Glezos, builds electrical installations for the Greek fascists.*
Acknowledging that this was probably his farewell address, Garaudy.
concluded that although the party could get rid of the dissidents,.
it could not eliminate the realities that nourished them and that
such problems will ultimately force it to modify its methods and
policies.
The sanitized L'HUMANITE version sarcastically reported that Garaudy
failed to respond to the arguments advanced against him at the
congress. It took note of his denial that he was guilty of anti-
Sovietism and his remark on the need to discuss such issues as
Czechoslovakia, while obscuring his attack on instances of violation
of proletarian internationalism: "After having launched a gross attack
against several socialist countries, he concluded and left the hall
amidst total silence."
* Garaudy's reference to coal shipments to Spain appears to be directed
at the Polish party. A recent Spanish CP Executive Committee statement,
broadcast by the clandestine Radio Espana Independiente on 18 January,
called upon Poland to refuse to sell the Franco regime coal that
would be used to offset a shortage resulting from the strike of
Asturian miners. The same statement expressed surprise over Western
press reports of a late-December Moscow airport meeting between the
Spanish Foreign Minister and senior Soviet officials. (See the FBIS
TRENDS of 21 January, page 25,) Garaudy's mention of "electrical
installations" for tha Greeks apparently alludes to a Soviet-built
power plant; Athens radio in early December had reported the Soviet
ambassador's presence at the cornerstone ceremony for the plant.
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In a 20 January interview published in Turin's LA STTAMPA, Garaudy
had predicted that he would be removed from the party Politburo
and Central Committee and charged that the congress was rigged
against him. From the moment the charges against him appeared in
L'HUMANITI'., he said, those who supported his views "were systematic-
ally removed f7.,om the precongress conferences on all levels,"
which guaranteed that there would be "no discussion of any kind
at the congress." Althou,3h Garaudy conceded that he was not
supported by a majority, he observed that "there is a strong current
in the party which thinks as I do; and it will not be represented
at the congress."
Moscow Hails Congress as Victory .for, Communist Unity
Soviet comment hails the French congress as another victory for
communist unity. A TASS report on 9 February noted approvingly that
the party theses praised the Soviet Union "as the major force of
the world socialist system" and "condemned the leaders of the CCP
who dissociated themselves from scientific socialism." TASS also
reported that many speakers condemned "the rightist opportunist
viewpoints of' Roger Garaudy," who was also accused of "dissociating
himself from Marxism-Leninism."
Soviet delegation chief KiriLenko, apparently having been assured
that Garaudy was on his way out of the PCF leadership, in his aduress
to the delegates on 5 February expressed "hign appreciation for the
resolute rebuff" the French Party was giving "to all manifestations
of anti-Sovietism," but did not name Garaudy. And Soviet comment
on the congress has mentioned the Garaudy affair only briefly and
in low key, evidently motived by concern not to seem to be ini,~rfer-
ing in the PCF's affairs and n-)t to embarrass the French party while
its efforts to promote a left coalition are in progress. The
dominant line in the comment is a portrayal of the French party as
a champion of "pea-e, democra.:_y, and socialism," in keeping with the
CPSU message to the congress. While briefly characterizing the PCF
as a "profoundly internationalist party," the message emphasized
that "it indefatigably defends its people's national interests and
actively fights for an independent foreign policy for France."
The Soviet downplaying of the Garaudy affair now that his ouster
from the leadership has been accomplished contrasts with a violent
personal attack on him in the 15 January PRAVDA, while preparations
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for the congress were under way. The article apparently caused
the PCF some embarrassment: widely publicized in noncommunist
French media, it was ignored entirely in the PCP's L'HUMANITE.
In the Italian LA STAMPA interview, Garaudy denounced it as
"intolerable intervention in the PCF's internal affairs" and added
that the Soviets "are unfortunately accustomed to such things. To
them, 'normalization' did not stop in Czechoslovakia."*
* See page 21 of the 15 January SURVEY for a discussion of the
PRAVDA article.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
HUNGARIAN DEBATE OVER GUEVARA UNDERLINES PROBLEM OF ULTRALEFT
The a.irir.s by the Huagac?ian pa,: ty organ NEPSZABADSAG in January of
a sharp debate on t'n rsv.-lutionary role of Che Guevara underscores
both the pex sistencr-, In Hungarian media of an element of Czechoslovak-
style candor and tn. p,~rltlc:n posed by ultraleftist movements to the
orthodox eonimur.iat eat 1G:.-.3;^m?nt ,
The growi:i,g scope of the p_?;,?blem was indicated in speeches at the
19-23 Ja..zuary Mc _cow c.;z.feren:e on Leniia, sm and anticommunism by
Demic'hev, who tic -):red ";n,a~ r ;icz.s and hysterical cries about mankind
as a whole," and by P--~,crx&rev, who identified art,icommunism not only
with the right -: g but also with "v.;.rious leftwing, ultrarevolutionary
and pseudorevoJ.utionary groups such as Trotskiyites, the Maoists, and
their like." A s'catemen'; c,o this conference in the 9 February issue
of Warsaw's ZOLN.IEt?Y, Wr;1.,:J.Cc;t by Werbl n, head of the Polish party's
s;:ience ar...1 .,tressed that the tendencies of
Maoi!it-?sty'J.e "lef t. st ,~~ynr`unir_rn a'-,.so make their impact on the
so-:a11ed pro`.e,: ci yc':.i,g pecp,J.e," and these "reckless
tendencies ideas, repu._tat. the masses from these
ideas, and favor ac, ;i^.o~nuxr?i ;rn." In Czechoslovakia, Prague media
on 12 January f-.):? Brie firs;, time a leftwing "Trotskiyite
conspiracy" in the co ?r.. t-^;; r-,na wetran.ctivcly assigned it a major
rcle ir.; the A,'gus-; 1069 stude: ` riots on the first anniversary of
};he Wa:cc,a?,: ?:,.~ t .'v :s ! oce
0' t'l 10 t~11CT(~ ' i~.'F ~?L [ "~!:a,l si. Le ft May "Gain Mo:"e Grcundll
Wr.'.t'::,g `.r the 10: of NEPSZABAD=.F-G, orthcdcx communist
Ra"i$ Ha.jiiu x mined ',he irnplictions of the appearance of
a poem in pc:a.iue o'' 'o,1 a leftist writer, Miklos Heraszti,
in the December is v .)f 'nd=per.den'f; literary monthly UJ IRAS
(New Writing), ire p.~-sm; "Che's Errors," used the satirical
device of ...t= l ;' c ,6 t'h,= fallen revolut_cnary from
orthodox Marx;: _ c. :.m "&-r rreaponsible adventurer"
and poir:i?irg t. i g,= of load= ship, fri.l'are to gain
" t sc , .a. of material incentives,
lack of knowledge of h?arnanism, ?:,izd denial uf peaceful transition: "And
he was a hypoc:.'ite , beta-:. e he lacked faith/ even in the strength of
his own ideals/ be clai.rn d. there mould be :io,/ in fact, wasn't any
revolution where n:, cane wao waging one . , . ,"
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Hajdu said of iIaraazti''s pcem, an hi_, 10 January NEPSZABADSAG criticiem,
that "in this instance the prnblematL nature of has poetry g;,ea beycr.d
the individual case and drawn attention to the spiritual and rn.;r d.
attitude which is stylish In some--nut too large--cir-cies of C u r y:;ung
intelligentsia and which, as certain symptoms indicate, seems to be
able to gain more ground" Under the title "Revolution or Anarchy i ",
Hajdu reflected the plight of conservatism in Hungary and e.,sewhere:
in the socialist world in remarking defensively that anyone who today
defends communist I,ositaoris in +nrtistic debates is giver, "che epithet
of sectarian, conservative, and dogmatic, or of a phiiistine, petit
or other bourgeois," He cited in this -onnecttion "a recent Budapest
joke--that it is easy to be a communist in the West nowadays, but try
it in our countryl"
Hajdu went on to stress the broader aspects of the pr:.blem in n ting
that "during the past few years a certain, not too significant, part
of our young intelligentsia has forcefully 'radicalized' itse.Lf,"
bringing about a revival "in a different form" of the leftist
communist "infantile disorder" which Lenin had denounced. This
radical element demanded "boundless democracy" and "revolutionary
asceticism," as brought cup in the pcem?? tribute to Guevara'
rejection of material incentives, Hajdu argued that the c;;n.ept :f
boundless democracy was incompatible with Hungary's "socialist
democracy," which "expre.ses class interests"--th::se of the w;;rkers
and peasants. Recalling the "bitte " experience of Hungary',- "'Age
of asceticism" (the 1956 revolt), he concluded with a warning t
the ultraleftists that "they should be afraid of an attitude which
pleads for revolution, be it reasonable c-r nct, and which, disregarding
realities, can only end in?traged.y?"
The debate was continued and, fc.r, the present at least, concluded
in the 24 January NEPSZABADSAG, which published letters by Haraszti
and Hajdu side by side under the heading "A Poem and Its Evaiuat)n
The party paper explained its further airing of the controversy in
a low-keyed editorial note on "the partly impatient and passiu::ats
dispute between a young poet and a young critic--they- are ab. ut the
same age--which, however, goes beyond personal problem: and tuu:hes
upon essential aspects of the revolutionary nature of ;;u:c' you?.h, "
In fact, the letters generally lowered the debate to the le;v41 .,i
personalities, rather than shedding much new light an the subatmn,.,e
of the controversy: Ha.?aszti's "Answer to Rafis Hajdu" attacked
the critic for "replacing concrete esthetic analyst with phrase
taken from everyday politics"--"without even quoting .:ne iine irc,m
my poem.." It also took Hajdu to task for attributing t:; the pz.et.
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"such self-styled notions as 'boundless democracy' and 'revolutionary
asceticism'" and for "carefully dodging the main question of whether
he himself thinks Che was a Marxist,"
Hajdu's "Rejoinder" obligingly included quotations from Haraszti's
"attempt at writing poetry" and took exception to Heraszti's
identification of student movements with Guevara's "isolation" and
theory of "spontaneous" revolution. "We must proceed," Hajdu said,
"together with the really revolutionary part of the student movements,
try to convince those inclining toward adventurism with a romantic
attitude, and isolate the ill-intentioned and harmful elements."
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THE USSR
PRAVDA ARTICLE ATTACKS VORONOV?S ORENBURG CONSTITUENCY
Orenburg oblast--an area that during the 1968-69 period received
more praise than any other for its agricultural successes--has
now been severely criticized, A recent PRAVDA article (28 January)
calls into question its high reputation and rriticizea its present
leaders by name.. Tha obl.ast has been associated with RSFSR Premier
Vorenov, who was obkom first secretary during the 1957-61 period,
and during 1969 it was extensively praised by Vor,;nov's subordinates
for successful implementation of livestock-raising and farming methods
originally introduced in Orenburg by Voronov,
Although Voronov's '?rotege V, A. Shurygin was purged as obkom first
secretary in early 1964, officials who served under Voroncv and
Shurygin still hold important positions in Orenburg, They include
obkom secretaries V. V? Kiselev and M. S, Khroma';a and executive
committee chairman A. N. Balandin,
The attack on Orenburg coincides with a general upsurge of press
criticism since the December 1969 Central Committee plenum, The
sharpest recent criticisms have been directed at the Vor;;rezh
obkom bureau and the Tomsk cblat exe :ut~ve committee, in SOVIET
RUSSIA editorials on 3 and 4 February, Unlike Orenburg, however,
both ~;f these areas had been lagging in agricultural production
and, in line with the current campaign, were basically criticized
for allowing violations of party and state discipline and nonfulfill-
ment of economic plar,,s, The apparent absence of such serious
deficiencies as a bas.s for criticism in Orenburg suggests that
the attack is motivated by purely partisan considerations,
Orenburg Leaders Accused of Suppression of Criticism
Noting that "the drums have been beaten very often lately" about
Orenburg's successes, the PRAVDA article by cr rz-esponde_:ts A. Bla'~ln
and A. Merkulov assails the Orenburgers for a wide range c:f failings,
even including shortcomings in their highly touted livestock
raising. Responsibility is placed squarely on the c'bkom leaders,
who are criticized for complacency, evasion, and suppression of
local criticism.
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The article also condemns the Orenburg obkom leaders for ignoring
or only "formally" reacting to criticism in the central press.
The authors cite a number of critical PRAVDA articles exposing such
minor shortcomings as pollution by Orenburg enterprises, slow
construction of grain warehouses, losses of grain during the
harvest, and poor preparations for sowing millet.
Much more damaging are the article's revelations of the extensive
behind-the-scenes exchanges between the Orenburg leaders and
Moscow, especially PRAVDA and the Party Control Committee. About
half the article is devoted to the "many sharp and important
letters" of complaint received by PRAVDA from Orenburg and the
Orenburg leaders' improper responses to these complaints. One
complaint was reportedly dismissed by obkom secretary V.V. Kiselev
as unfounded, but upon the instructions of the Party Control
Committee in Moscow the obkom had to reinvestigate the matter,
and on 10 November 1969 obkom secretary N,I. Vostrikov reported
to Moscow that the complaint was correct. Some obkom leaders were
also accused of "direct suppression of criticism and persecution
in response" to criticism, and covering up such behavior was
characterized as "quite widespread" in Orenburg. Obkom first
secretary A.V. Kovalenko himself was criticized for cooperating in
wrongly cot,demning a critic and. then having to write a letter to
Moscow reversing his position. The authors sum up by demanding
that the obkom change its attitude toward press criticism and
critical letters.
Orenburg Lauded as Example for Agricultural Successes
The PRAVDA attack represents a sharp revers a]. in press treatment of
Orenburg. After failing to fulfill the grain plan in 1967 (RURAL
LIFE, 20 January 1968), Orenburg gathered an unprecedented harvest
in 1968. On 27 October 1968 (SOVIET RUSSIA) RSFSR First Deputy
Premier Pysin announced that Orenburg had delivered more grain to
the state than any oblast or kray ever had before. The press was
filled with praise for Orenburg, and Brezhnev singled out Orenburg's
"big successes" at the October 1968 Central Committee plenum
(PRAVDA, 31 October 1968). The oblast was awarded an Order of
Lenin (PRAVDA, 29 October 1968).
A second round of press buildup occurred in mid-1969, when the
RSFSR Council of Ministers opened a campaign for specialized meat
cattle farms patterned after Orenburg's experience. Orenburg's
methods--which produced meat cattle of record weight and boosted
beef deliveries by 46 percent over 1968--were praised by RSFSR
agricultural officials, and an RSFSR seminar was held in Orenburg
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to study Orenburg methods (SOVIET RUSSIA, 4 July, 8 July, 3 August,
ind 5 October; RURAL LIFE, 25 July; ECONOMIC GAZETTE, No. 28,
ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, No. 7). The methods used had been
introduced by Vo:.nov during his 1957-1961 tenure as obkom first
secretary and were proposed for national application by him at
the January 1961 Central Committee plenum, but were rejected by
Khrushchev.
Another round of praise for Orenburg occurred in October 1969, when
the oblast was favorably cited for its especially early completion
of fall plowing--another practice insisted upon by Voronov when he
became obkom first secretary in 1957 (3 October 1969 SOVIET RUSSIA
editorial, 6 October PRAVDA editorial, and 10 October TRUD
interview with Orenburg officials).
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COMMUNIST CHINA
PARTY. COM I mi S FORMED AT COUNTY AND CITY LEVELS
The campaign to rebuild the Chincse Communist Party (CCP) as a
disciplined organizational structure appears to be gaining
momentum, with the propaganda indicating some progress in
rebuilding CCP committees at the county and city level.
On 9 February Harbin claimed the formation of Heiiungkiang's
first county CCP committee--fcr Hulin county, which includes the
Chenpao island area, As in the prior example of the first new
county CCP committee in Hunan province, announced on 2 December
by Changsha radio, Peking has not publicized the new committee.
Party building in Hulin appears to have been a painstaking process,
of first reconstructing, under the direction of the county's leading
core, all basic party units at the county, commune, and brigade
level within Hulin and then, two months ago, selecting delegates
to "the fourth congress of the CCP in Hulin county." The congress
"conducted an election by secret ballot, and formed the Hulin
county CCP committee on 2 February " The effort appears to have
been directed by the district CCP core group and the Heilungkiang
provincial CCP core grnup, b;;th represented at the county congress.
The exact membership of the new committee was not revealed, but
the broadcast did claim that pre-Cultural Revolution members and
those who emerged during the Cultural Revolution, as well as PLA
members, were elected to the committee, EaLlier reports from
other prcvinces on rebuilt lower-level party units have not
specifically indicated that PLA members hold pcsit9.ons within the
new party structures,
On 1 February Canton reported that a municipal CCP committee had
been established in Maoming, a lesser Kwangtung city, but nonetheless
the first new city party committee reported in the :.atiozi. Party
rebuilding efforts in Kwangtung were given an extra push on 1 February
when NCNA, in an unusual move, publicized the activities of the CCP
core group of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee in
organizing party members and activists, who asked to join the CCP,
to study the new party constitution. This is the first known reference
in official central media since 1967 to a party core group at the
provincial level- Provincial-level CCP core groups for Inner Mongolia,
Shantung, and Heilungkiang, recently mentioned in local broadcasts,
have not been publicized by Peking.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Kwangtung's sudden emrg ,~, ::e a a leader ?.n the CCP re,: ors true ticn
movement is surprising in light of the fact that no new party
branches or committees had previously been publicized by C9r.%n
radio, Hunan and Heilungkiang, for- example, repcrtsd a metirui;,us
process of building the party prog:: aively branch by branch prior
to formation of their first county committees. Possibly same
"longstanding problems" have been recently resolved in Kwangtung,
and their resolution is being reflected in the current; evden:e of
party reconstruction as well as in an indication that Ting Sheng
may have been named commander of the Canton Mii.itazy Region., Ting,
formerly deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military Region who was
transferred to Kwangtung nearly two years aga, was listed in the
position normally reserved for the regional c,.;mmazider in a 1 Februxry
Canton radio report on a local rally.
RED FLAG SETS FORTH GUIDELINES FOR CHINA'S ECONOMY
With several articles in RED FLAG No. 2 providing the impetus, CPR
media have launched a broad, two-pronged campaign on economic
issues, One aspect is a relatively moderate economic program calling
for rational economic development--but in a context of war prerarerir.ees
precluding the predominance of strictly economic viewpci.nts. The
second aspect consists of a harsh denunciati:m rf acr~nomi:. spy-,uiatior;
and corruption, exposed as a serious, continuing problem, The genera'i
trend of the planning as explicated in articles in RED FLAG anx other
publications is for a great leap forward, but a leap that will av;;Id
the previous error of ignoring economic realities and one that will
be effectively managed by the center, albeit with considerable l: al
autonorry
The theoretical basis for the development of the e:^:r.::iy ~s la,`.d ::u;
in a RED FLAG arti :1e by the Kirin Prcvinciai Revoi.u;;icnary C.;mia.;,tee
attacking Sun Yeh-fang, former director of the Er.,-)nom1 ', Ir.sur e
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Sun was severely criticized at
the beginning of the cultural revolution in much the same Irma.
Setting up Sun's theories as negative examples, the anti^le seem:
to opt for an economy built on revolutionary ferv.:r rather than
profit, scoring Sun's view that the economy must b "r^un with
economic methods." But by taking as Sun's views the =.xtreme limit
of some of his teachings, the article actually aalaw,= c,;.~ derable
room for a rational system of economic planning and c::,n' rol
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The aspect of Sun's theories most energetically attacked by RED FLAG
is that planning should be done on the basis of maximum profit.
The article ridicules Sun by pointing out that national defense
industries are not profitable--an unusual acknowledgment--and that
spreading plants throughout the country in preparation for war does
not conform to the law of value. While Sun. presumably would have
made some allowances for national defense, there is :Little doubt
that he did advocate using maximum profit as a tool for establishing
priorities in economic planning, a use which the article also admits
is legitimate: "We use the law of value as a tool in planning work
and economic accounting, But we resolutely oppose ;raking the law
of value the basis for :regulating prcduction and for mapping out a
plan" The point of departure between Sun Yeli-fang and our-rent
policies thus emerges as one of d=g-re:--_ on this point, and the issue
turns into a political question cf juggling rr-:.oriTy needs
The problem of managing enterprises scattered throughout the country
for strategic reasons is another aspect of the criticism of Sun
which indirectly reveals the economic problems posed by the current
stress on political and rrilitary ne.cessity.. The recent revival of
.the thesis advanced in early 1959 by Ko Ching-shih--that planning
for the whole country must be treated a, a coordinated chessgame--
seems to represent an answer to his problem and is apparently
utilized by RED FLAG for the purpose of reaffirming the necessity
for central control of production units, Making a near-180 degree
turn from many earlier indications of local unit control over
en_telTr .s e management and planning, the RED FLAG article points
cut that ent. -?rprises under the ownership of the whole people have
only one jwner., "the c'i '.,ne p_oletari.an dictatorship.." While
the "delegat::ion of le; s -r auth:;.ri ry" an integral pair of the
state cyst m, powers 3py_ca::'fin#,1y' _ erved for the center include
"deciding the anterprises' orientacior, for development, deciding
the products and the distribution. of production, and deciding the
management of the capital of ente.rprises.."
Gci:,.g to the core .,f Kc C -Ing-ship. Y s ,..hcssboard thesis--designed
ftr the protection of Shan.ghaL industry--the article warns that
"using the planned materials and funds to u,under,ake, capital
eonst ruction not included in ti e plan" would be anarchism. This
appears to be a reminder to: 1, :L:'. ti es that what is good for the
part is not necessarily good for the whole; small, local industries
not included in state plans are not allowed to draw off materials
needed by units included in state plan quotas,
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Forces of Capitalism in the Countryside Said Still Stron
Another RED FLAG article, this one by the Hcnan Provincial Rev:,.ruticna,'y
Committee on the role of agricultural development in China, is dev;,ted
in large part to the notion that victory is not yet won over cap:itaiism
and revisionism. It points out that after liberation land reform was
not enough and capitalistic trends reappeared; the same pozsibility
is indicated for today. Measures advocated to combat this danger
amount in effect to a defense of the status quo as regard; land
ownership and labor management, while seeking leap-forward gains
through basically material m-ans--although, as always, under the aegis
of Mao's thought.
Fuzzing over the retreat from the commune system to ownership by the
production team in the aftermath of the leap-forward disaste.rz-, the
article states that "the existing three-level ownership system and
the people's commune system with production teams as the basis are
basically suitable to the level of development of our productive
forces; today it is imperative to adhere to and further improve this
system." The "o?-rnership by the whole people" thesis, v'rtua1iy
unmentioned in the past few years, is revived in the article a: a,u
eventual goal, of which the commune's "three-'level ownership system
was an initial manifestation" But. the article gives n; indi at i or.
that the system is to change in the near future; it quztes Ma.. t
the effect that "step-by-step" adran:e i:3 best in orde::- t;,
the peasant's fear of "abrupt changed"
Concrete economic measures advocated by the article reaffirm the
impression of moderation, In production the ciuctas of the "national
unified economic plan" are '-o serve as the basic g:,als, with lo~ai:iies
allowed some flexibility in quot-as "on the prc.icndit,ion ci :,b trving
the national unified plan and poli:.ies and laws " This i ;rrr,aiac : or,
may indicate that harvests exceeding the na;ional g::als, r:.nd *.huz~ n t
counted on by the state, will be allowed t;,.) remain within the
In this connection the article replays the standard injunction that
the interests of the state and the cc1lective come before the indiv;dut~i .,
while simultaneously sounding a more unusual nee; "We must ais:;
prevent storing up too much grain so as not to affect, the c:;mnur_r
member's income in a particular harvest year,"
Using the theoretical framework devised in the immediaia i st-Libe.r-atic~n
period--cooperation with the poor and lower-middle peaa-5nte and w:r.r.~ng
over the upper middle peasants--RED FLAG acknowledges that Leric1.~v
ideological problems persist in the countryside0 The article tree:
to assign blame for this phenomenon to the rich peasants and the
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remnants cf class enemies left in the countryside. But the desire
of peasants for individual ownership shows through remarkably clearly,
ranging from an old Mao quote which only claims that "the rural
semiproletariat are less stubborn in their adherence to the system
of small peasant ownership" the middle peasants, to the acknowledg-
ment that even today class enemies can "instigate a small number of
well-to-do peasants to abandon agriculture and engage in commerce
or to engage in sideline production and go it alone," Current problems
in "some" communes are said to include political sabotage, speculation,
and embezzlement, "Old ideas" are being used by class enemies to
corrupt poor and lower-middle peasants, including clan. relationships
that undermine class relationships, the entertaining f guests who
then feel an obligation, and direct bribes.
Provinces Amplify Cor*rup-tion Charges, Fukien Reports Trial
Several provinces have begun to amplify the remarks in RED FLAG on
current dangers in the struggle in the countryside. Fukien broadcasts
from 3 to 8 February included an account of a mass trial and a warning
tc the chief criminals "belonging tc cliques engaged in corruption"
and those who have committed serious crimes and refuse to confess
that they will be "arrested., sentenced, and executed according to
the merits of their cases," The implication of organized crime in
referring to criminal cliques is most unusual, but it may be intended
as a cover for action against some "revolutionary" political groups,
The launching of a general anticorruption campaign at the same time
as a production campaign is certainly not fortuitous and does not
necessarily indicate any sudden increment in economic crimes.
The Fukien campaign was launched o 3 February with a FUKIEN DAILY
editorial calling for "seizing back that portion of the financial
power which has been usurped and is still. held by bad elements,"
Criminals were warned to confesis immediately or "be dealt with
severely by the dictatorship of the proletariat. The charges
leveled at "criminal" elements have been couched in general terms,
again indicating the political nature of the campaign, although
certain trends such as "back-door sales and purchases of merchandise"
were singled out.
On 8 February Foochow radio announced belatedly that or, 6 January
the "responsible department" of the Amoy revolutionary committee
had held a trial rally of l4 "counterrevolutionaries" and "persons
guilty of corruption, theft and speculation." It was noted that
"bourgeois, evil, sinister winds have sprung up, again
making themselves felt in the streets"--suggesting that mass action
by disaffected revolutionary groups may have been involved,
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
12 FEBRUARY 1970
- 36 -
Other provinces indicate similar problems with continued corruption
and violence. Chengchow radio on 9 February claimed that enem..rs
were still buying "important state materials" through the back door
in order to make "fantastic" profits? Taiyuan radio on 4 February
claimed that active economic sabotage was continuing and noted an
incident in which a landlord element committed arson at a warehouae,,
And, with no direct link to economic activities, a Shanghai WEN HUI
PAO article on 4 February extended the ongoing cultural struggle in
Shanghai to include the charge that in "certain places" the struggles
with the counterrevolutionaries "are being carried out violently?"
Several Provinces Discuss Their Agricultural Plans
Several provinces have recently held meetings to discuss agricultural
plans and programs. Chekiang, which recently indicated that it has
surpassed national agricultural program goals in grain production,
on 4 February set up a new model for localities in Chiente county,
The county has set goals to surpass not only the national development
program goal of 800 catties of grain per mou, but also the current
national plan and the area's previous record output. Units were told
to strive for an output of 1,000 catties per mou in 1970, though
this was not actually set as a quota; it had previously been mentioned
as a provincial goal for the next three to five years. The "three
surpass" movement is being linked with the "two breakthroughs"
movement, previously confined to Kiangsi province, which calls for
concentrated labor effort against limited, specific targets,
Changsha radio on 4 February announced that a provincial three-year
plan now in operation would produce a leap forward in the 1970-72
period. Local plans down to the county and enterprise level were
said to have been formulated. Echoing the Honan committee's article
in RED FLAG, the broadcast called for the leadership at all levels
to get rid of "rightist conservative ideas" and oppose departmentalism
by taking "the whole country as one chessboard" and "the whole pr.cvince
as one chessboard." This latter call for provincial coordination
is not a part of the traditional chessboard thesis, although it fits
in with current ideas of local economic systems for national defense
purposes. Stress on the province as a coordinated unit could in fa:.t
negate the idea of national coordination.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS SURVEY
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POSSIBLE NEW CATEGORY OF PLA SERVICE NOTED IN PROVINCES
In connection with the annual spring festival campaign to "support
the army," several provincial radios--including Anhwei, Shantung,
Kirin, Chekiang, and Kiangsi--have noted that among those entit_.ed
to comfort and aid are "those who have been transferred to civilian
work from active service." This category is added to the usual
listing of soldiers, army dependents, disabled and retired soldiers,
and demobilized soldiers, and may indicate a new category of army
reservist, under more direct PLA command than the militia.
There has been a recent upsurge in media mention of the role of
former servicemen in war preparations, including a 24 January
Canton radio reference to former servicemen who pledged that even
though they had left the army they "would not give up their rifles."
The same radio on 6 February mentioned that about half of the local
former servicemen held posts as basic cadres and took part in
directing militia activities.
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