SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300020006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 12, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
STATSPEC
SURVEY
q f Communist Propaganda
Confidential
Confidential
12 MARCH 1970
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 6)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code; as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Eaciud~d from oulomatlc
downgrading a-'.
d.clavificallon
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CONFIDENTIAL FBI_)' SURVEY
12 MARCH 1.970
SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Hungarian Article Reflects Soviet Pressures on Dissidents . . . . 1
Italian CP Defends "National Roads" Thesis, Scores Stalinism
Soviet Press Polemicizes Against "Models of Socialism"
PCI Engages in Critical Examination of Stalinism
RINASCITA Contrasts PCI, CPSU Concepts of 'Party Role
Moscow Ignores PCI Stand Against Invasion of Czechoslovakia
Argument on Czechoslovakia Continues Between PCI and Prague
Controversy Over Soviet Economic Reform Intensifies . . . . . . 13
Liberal Economist Charged With Political Deviation
Disenchantment With Results of Reform Increasing
Soviet Sociological Study Shows Tatar-Russian Friction . . . . . 15
COMMUNIST CHINA
State Council Reemerges, Calls for Higher Cotton Yields 17
Media Advocate Improved Methods to Gain Better Crops
PRC Media Press for Party Authority Over Mass Organizations 19
More Publicity for Setting Up Low-Level Party Organs
Topics in Brief: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grainless Pig Fodder; Steel Industry; Birth Control
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS
HUNGARIAN ARTICLE REFLECTS SOVIET PRESSURES ON DISSIDENTS
A 4 March Budapest press article entitled "In the Wake of the
Moscow Conference" by Ferenc Varnai, an authoritative commentator
on international communist affairs, seems designed--in Moscow's
behalf--to call to account parties which boycotted or took
dissident positions at the June 1969 international party con-
ference in the Soviet capital. The article is in tune with an
apparent Soviet propaganda effort to bring as many parties as
possible into line prior to an expected gathering of communist leaders
for the Lenin centenary in Moscow on 22 April. A series of
Soviet-sponsored theoretical conferences in preparation for the
centenary have been used as forums to press for a hard ideologi-
cal line and to combat a rising challenge from European communist
intellectuals. The latter, notably including the French CP
maverick Roger Garaudy, have been using the case of Czechoslovakia
in particular to raise the question of what "models" of socialism
are to be created in Europe.
Soviet concerti over the challenge from the dissident intellectuals
has been reflected in KOMMUNIST and in a succession of Moscow
press articles that take a rigid ideological line and in effect
reaffirm the Brezhnev doctrine--the ex post facto rationale for
the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Two lengthy articles in
KOMMUNIST, signed to the press 22 January, attacked increasing
"distortions" of Marxist-Leninist theory and focused on the
"revisionist" views of Yugoslav theoreticians, Garaudy, Austrian
CP dissident Ernst Fischer, and New Left ideologue Herbert
Marcuse, all of whom were named. More recently, a Lukonin article
in the 7 March PRAVDA appeared to put the participants in the
April Moscow celebration on notice that approval of the interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia would be the touchstone of "loyalty" to
Moscow, terming the action of the Warsaw Five a confirmation of
"loyalty to the principles of internationalism."
The It March Varnai article appears in NEPSZABALSAG, the organ
of the Hungarian party, which had been a prime mover in preparing
the 1969 Moscow conference: Budapest hosted the February-March
1968 consultative meeting which decided on the conference agenda
and date and was subsequently the home base of the international
preparatory commission which drafted the conference documents.
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In citing dissident parties by name Varnai's article goes beyond
Soviet propaganda on the conference, which has largely been confined
to generalities about the achievement of convening a gathering of
75 parties and bout the concern for unity manifested by all
participants, including those parties (unnamed) which refrained
from fully endorsing the main document. PRAVDA on 5 March carries
only a brief, general review of the NFl'SZABADSAG article, including
among other things the point that the conference provided a "stimulus
t:~ discussion of urgent ideological problems" of the world communist
mcvement and strengthened the anti-imperialist struggle.
Following a general discussion of the conference and its ramifica-
tions the NEPSZABADSAG article mentions the four parties--those of
Italy, San Marino, Reunion, and Australia--which signed only one
part of the main conference document, centering its discussion on
the Italian CP. "Although it disputes certain parts of the main
documents," Varnai says, the Italian party has "acknowledged the
comradely atmosphere" and positive results of the gathering;
"moreover, although it has upheld its previous position on the
Czechoslovak question and displays a certain lack of understanding
toward the process of normalization there also, we are confident
that the results of the Czechoslovak consolidation will win over
our Italian sister party in the end." The article says nothing
about the continuing polemic between leading press organs of the
Czechoslovak and Italian communist parties.
The article is less conciliatory toward the British CP, which
like the Norwegian party--not mentioned in the article--had deferred
its decision on the main conference document pending further
intraparty consultations. Evidently alluding to the reaffirmation,
at a 15-18 November 1969 party congress, of the British CP's eventual
acceptance of the main document with "reservations," the article
portrays the party's stand as "ambiguous" and subject to change:
"In the party--and this was reflected at its recent congress also-
adherents of internationalism are striving more actively to chang
its ambiguous stand." The article ignores the fact that the British
CP congress also reaffirmed the party's unambiguous condemnation
of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which it also had voiced at the
Moscow conference,
Varnai goes on to cite also the Dominican CP--"the only one not to
sign" the main document--as turn by internal dissent on the issue:
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"According to reports," he says, "sharp polemics are transpiring
within the party at the moment, because a considerable section of
the party members disagrees with this attitude." The Dominican CP
delegate at the Chilean Communist Party congress last December had
reaffirmed his party's stand against the main document--because it
was not revolutionary enough--and pleaded for the right to dissent.
As quoted in the party organ EL SIGLO and by the Havana PRENSA
LATINA on 7 December, the delegate said that "the differences in
the formulations of ido ologies and the method followed to arrive
at them was the only obstacle that moved us not to sign" the main
document. He added: "Let this not be a reason for slandering
us or accusing us of divisionism."
The Cuban and Swedish communist parties, also nonsigners by virtue
of their attendance at the conference as "observers," are cited
respectively as having termed the conference "successful" and
as having noted its "frank" atmosphere.
The NEPSZABADSAG article points to the communist parties of Yugoslavia
(which stayed away "despite repeated invitations"), Japan, the
Netherlands, China, Albania, "and a few smaller Asian countries"
to show that "there still are sectarian and revisionist views
harming unity," but says such "disruptive aspirations are
increasingly isolated." As a consequence of this isolation, Varnai
adds, "the Chinese leaders, although they have not as yet abandoned
slandering the CPSU, were obliged to suspend the border provocations
and sit down to negotiate with representatives of the Soviet Union."
To indicate the alleged isolation of "rightist opportunist trends
emerging primarily on the pretext of the Czechoslovak events in
certain parties," the article cites two divided parties which
attended the conference: The French CP, it points out, "has
defended the party's ideological purity in an extensive debate when
it rejected Garaudy's anti-Soviet views." And "our Austrian sister
party has expelled from its ranks Ernst Fischer, who acted against
party unity from a revisionist platform."
Of the absentees, the article gives generally positive treatment
only to the North Vietnamese party. That party, it notes, "has
published the conference's documents with certain abridgement and
acknowledged its efforts toward restoring unity, an anti-imperialist
spirit, and solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people."
The North Korean party, also absent from the conference, is not
mentioned.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ITALIAN LP DEFENDS "NA'T'IONAL ROADS" 'I'UIESIS, SCORES STALINISM
At a lime when Moscow media are arguing that the thesis which allows
for a large variety of "national models of socialism" smacks of
"revisionism" and is contrary to Leninist teachings, Italian
Communist Party (PCT) spokesmen have reaffirmed the party's
allegiance t~) the concept of national variants, contending that it
is wholly consonant with Lenin's doctrines and suggesting that
I' hose who disagree with this view are advocates of Stalinist
"monol.ithism," Moscow has refrained from naming the targets
or its polemical propaganda, which clearly include the Yugoslavs
and Romanians as well as the PCI and some other Western parties,
But there have been a number of indirect signs of Soviet dissatis-
faction with the PCI's use of the Lenin centenary preparations to
promote its "unity in diversity" line, suggesting that the Italian
party is high on the list of those causing con:ern to Moscow.
Arti:les in the PCI theoretical journal RINASCITA have used the
Lenin :elebrati:)n as an occasion to contrast Leninism with Stalinism
and ever, +.o imply that while the PCI is a party of Leninist stripe,
the CPSU is still organized along Stalinist lines, Moscow has pre-
dictably ignored these heresies, condemning those who erroneously
counterpose Leninism to Marxism but remaining silent on those who
rounterpose it to Stalinism. Beginning about a month ago, however,
Prague media have taken the PCI press to task directly over its
highly -ritual treatment of current developments in Czechoslovakia,
The PCI has responded in articles in RINASCITA by editor-in-chief
and Central Committee member Luca Pavolini and in the PCI news-
paper L'UNITA by editor-in-chief and Politburo member Gian Carlo
Pajetta?
An indication of Moscow's displeasure with the PCI's use of the
Lenin anniversary to defend socialist pluralism is conveyed in a
3 March PRAVDA review of a collection of works by prominent
international communists entitled "Marxism-Leninism on Proletarian
Internationalism" Signed by V. Korionov, the review cites
Togliatti to bu-i;tress the thesis that the Soviet model of socialism
continues to haire universal validity:
The world's communists emphasize , , . that the experience of
the USSR and the Leninist party, like an undying beacon, has
revealed the main, general law-governed patterns of socialist
revolution and socialist building, Speaking in the words of
P. Togliatti, the historic experience of building socialism
in the Soviet Union testifies to the fact that "main principles
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exist which make up the laws of socialism's development,
and these principles are obligatory for all.
Quoting selectively from Togliatti, Korionov may have been subtly
attempting here to point out to the PCT that it has strayed from
Togliatti's principles. On the other side, the PCI frequently
invokes Togliatti's teachings in seeking to justify a uniquely
Italian road to socialism.
Sensitivity to the PCT stand on this issue seemed reflected in
Soviet media's treatment of a speech delivered by PCI Politburo
member Aldo Tortorella at a 24-25 February theoretical conference
in Moscow on "Leninism and the World Revolutionary Process." A TASS
report on 24 February, summarizing the speeches of foreign delegates,
simply noted that Tortorella said the PCI rejected "any conception
which considers it possible to wage a struggle for peace and socialism
today without the Soviet Union or even against it." TASS ignored
his defense of the need for different roads to socialism, which he
linked with a condemnation of the Chinese for attempting to impose
a monolithic line on all parties. According to L'UNITA's 27 February
summary of the speech, Tortorella :^eferred to the unequal develop-
ment of capitalism in different r.ount.ries and to "the need affirmed
by Lenin to have 'Marxist programs' which refer to the concrete
reality of each nation." He concluded:
That is why the PCI . . . affirms the need for roads to
socialism and forms of socialist construction that
are specific and are its own. It opposes the effort by the
Chinese comrades to dictate to all countries the line they
have considered right for themselves. Therefore, it is
necessary to avoid the error of conceiving socialism as a
single and equal model everywhere.
TASS, ignoring this statement, publicized the antithetical view
of French CP delegate Cogniot, who stated that the recent French
party congress "emphatically rejected attempts by certain pseudo-
Marxists to absolutize national development and substitute the
antiscientific theory on the multiplicity of the 'models of
socialism' for Marxism-Leninism."
Soviet Press Polemicizes Against "Models of Socialism"
In January and February the Soviet press carried a number of
articles arguing against the notion of "models of socialism,"
most authoritatively in the CPSU's KOMMUNIST signed to the press
22 January. Although the brunt of the attacks is directed against
"revisionist" Yugoslav theoreticians and dissident intellectuals
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in West European parties, as distinct from the leaderships of
those parties, the assault on the notion of multiple socialist
roads has applicability to the PCI.
One of the KOMMUNIST articles, by M. Iovchuk entitled "Leninism and
the Present Struggle of Ideas in Philosophy," lambasts "bourgeois
and revisionist interpreters" of Marx who propound "'new' so-called
national models of Marxism." The author argues that "so-called
'pluralist' conceptions, according to which in our time the
allegedly viable 'national models' and 'national forms' of
Marxism . , . are replacing monolithic Leninism, are erroneous."
In the other KOMMUNIST article, entitled "Concerning the Revisionist
Concept of 'Models of Socialism'" and concerned in part with rebut-
ting the views of the French CP dissident Roger Garaudy, Kh. Modzhyan
obsorves that "the fallacious concept of 'models of socialism"' was
sharply criticized at the June international communist conference
and charges that proponents of this view "try all ways of denigrating
the socialism that actually exists, of reducing it to some distor-
tions or other, and of presenting it as bureaucratic, undemocratic,
and so forth." Modzhyan contends that those who hew to the "models
of socialism" thesis are embracing a doctrine "directed against
international unity of all detachments of the world communist move-
ment" and one that is "incompatible with proletarian internationalism."
An effort to tar the pluralist notions of such parties as the PCI
with the brush of anticommunism is evident in an 8 February SOVIET
RUSSIA article by Candidate of Economic Sciences G. Khromushin,
in the course of a discussion of the tactics employed by contemporary
anticommunists. Citing the work of U.S. scholar Theodore Draper
as illustrative of those who postulate the existence of "two
communisms"--a "Western" variant which is less dangerous than the
"Eastern" type--he quotes Draper as stating that if the French
and Italian parties fall under the influence of "the new Western
communism . ., the consequences may be immeasurable." Khromushin
concludes:
The concept of 'new Western communism' clearly reflects the
characteristic feature of modern anticommunism--the desire
to represent Soviet experience as a nationally limited pheno-
menon . . . of a semi-Asian type, and completely unsuitable for
the Western and Eastern European countries. The anti-Soviet
essense of modern anticommunism appears most clearly in the
presentation of the 'Soviet model' as supposedly 'bureaucratic,'
bound by dogma, and not fit to be the pioneer of progressive
development in the modern world.
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PCI Engages in Critical Examination of Stalinism
FBIS SURVEY
12 MARCH 1970
In keeping with party leader Luigi Longo's call to the PCI last
October to launch an inquiry into nonditions in socialist countries,
and in line with suggestions in the party press that a long-
deferred examination of Stalinism be initiated,* a number of
articles discussing aspects of Stalinism have appeared in RINASCITA
during the last several months.
One such article--by Valentino Gerratana in the 31 October issue--
in effect equated opposition to varying "national models" of
socialism with a "Stalinist" distortion of Leninism. Marxism,
"up to and including Lenin," the author argued, viewed socialism
as a "system of transition" in the revolutionary transformation of
capitalist society into a communi3t society. Gerratana declared
that Stalin threw this "classic" socialist concept "overboard,"
replacing it with another theoretical scheme which later proved
"inconsistent with reality." Discarding the idea of socialism as
a transitional phase, he continued, Stalin replaced it with "a
notion of the 'socialist society' as a new economic-social forma-
tion, homogeneous in its structures and superstructures"; Stalin
used this concept to justify "the practice of monolithism and of
the state-guide as essential factors in internationalism," while
by contrast the "Leninist" idea of a "transitional" system
directly supports the idea of national roads and models:
In this theoretical scheme . . . the function of the "national
ways" is easily understood. If socialism is a system of
transition through a whole period of world's history, it is
irrational to hypothesize a single model of socialist society.
Each country can build socialism only on the basis of its
own history . .
Gerratana concluded that only by conceiving of socialism as "a
system of transition" can the "centrifugal for^.es" that have
increasingly appeared in the socialist countries be understood and
confronted.
For background on the speech in which Longo called for such a
study and on a RINASCITA article urging an examination of Stalinism,
see the 18 December 1969 FBIS SURV:'Y, pages 20-21.
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The Gerratana article touched off a polemic in the pages of RINASCITA,
with pro-Soviet PCT member Ambrogio Donini writing a "Rebuttal to
the Theses of 'Theoretical Stalinism'" which appeared in the
26 December issue. Donini charged Gerratana with "denying the
existence of a socialist society in the Soviet Union" by alleging
that Stalin had confused "nationalization with socialization."
The view that Stalin had discarded the idea of socialism as a
transitional system and replaced it with another theoretical model,
he contended, "has no basis in theory, in politics, or above all
in hist- y." On 2 January 1970 RINASCITA published a counter-
rebuttal by PCI Central Committee member and editor-in-chief of the
PCI bimonthly CRITICA MARXISTA Emilio Sereni. Quoting at length
frc.:i Gerratana's article, including his statement linking the
idea of socialism as a transitional phase with "national roads,"
Sereni praised him for raising a problem of "considerable historio-
graphic and theoretical importance" and scored Donini for refusing
to recognize that such a problem exists. He went on to spell out
the issues:
Has there been or has there not been a change . . . in the very
notion itself of socialism, with a shift of emphasis from a
conception of socialism as a system of transition to communism
toward [a conception of] a relatively autonomous socioeconomic
formation? Is it true or not that this shift in emphasis
corresponded to a change in theoretical and practical positions
in response to such problems as those of national paths and
socialist democracy?
Admonishing Donini to "look around," Sereni cited the expansion of
"centrifugal phenomena" as evidenced by Sino-Soviet conflict and
referred to diverse Yugoslav, Cuban, Chinese, and other socialist
models to buttress his case.
RINASCITA Contrasts PCI, CPSU, Cono'epts , of Party. Role.,
RINASCITA on 26 December carried an article by Francesco Malfatti
entit'.ed "The Leadership Function of the Party" which pictured a
sharp dichotomy between the PCI's conception of the role and
function of the party and that of the CPSU. To the Soviets, Malfatti
observed, "the party as the center of everything becomes identified
with all of society and does not recognize any independent power
center except as a transmission belt," The PCI, on the other hand,
repudiates "the ideological state" and conceives of "a party which
is neither the center of everything nor an absolute entity which
identifies with all of society, but which seeks and develops a
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dialectical relationship with other independent centers of
democratic and socialist power . . . ."
Malfatti emphasized that this difference cannot be ascribed to
"national particularities," since the PCI' scheme is based on
"the universality of Leninism" and because "there is only one way
of conceiving the leadership function of the party." He implied
that the Soviet view of the party is based on Stalinism, and he
described the CPSU as "intransigent" about its concept of the
party's leadership function. This, Malfatti said, produces a
"theoretical and political knot, of a universal nature, which must
be untied." Alluding to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia,
he observed that it was not so much a consequence of a clash about
"national roads" but rather over "socialist democracy," adding
his belief that there could be no socialist democracy "without
democracy within the party and without a leadership function of
the party understood in Lenin's terms."
Malfatti concluded that while "existing diversities" between
socialist parties and states are generally recognized, what is not
recognized is the fact that "monolithism" cannot be viewed as "a
particularity of any of the existing socialist nations." In effect,
he argued that the Italian "road to socialism" as it applies to
the leadership function of the party is not simply a national
variant, but the only conception of the party's role consonant
with Leninism. Returning to the question of "diversities," he
concluded that "it is one thing to confront them with the doctrine
and practice of Leninism, and another to confront them with the
'doctrine' and practice of Stalinism."
The PCI's continuing concern about Stalinism was emphasized in a
10 January L'UNITA article by Guiseppe Boffa, the paper's leading
commentator on international communist affairs. Objecting to the
fact that the period of Stalin's rule has never been fully
examined in the USSR and remarking that there has been a "strong
attenuation" of criticisms of Stalin since "the Prague spring,"
Boffa declared that for the PCI "the problem of Stalinism cannot
be closed," because it is through an examination of this phenomenon
that the party "has developed the conviction that progress must
be made along new roads."
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Moscow Lgnores PCI Stand Against Invasion of Czechoslovakia
In a 10 December PRAVDA editorial article Moscow welcomed the PCI'e
ouster of' anti-Soviet leftist dissidents asso':iated with the
publication IL MANIFESTO, and a 3 February PRAVDA report again
lauded the purge of' these "opportunists" who were guilty of "a
fair amount of anti-Sovietism." But Soviet media have never fully
a^knowledged the PCI's continuing dissent over the Czechoslovak
issue and have generally implied that the IL MANIFESTO group was
alone in its anti-Soviet leanings. A 13 February PRAVDA article
by Korionov, discussing the PCI's celebration of the Lenin
centenary, does note that there are still "within the party . . .
elements which would like to push it on an erroneous course Lnd . . .
into anti-Soviet positions," but Korionov mskes no reference to the
party's continuing criticism of the August 1968 invasion and the
ensuing events.
By cDntrast, a 4 March article in the Hungarian party organ
NEPSZABADSAG, dealing with the current positions of parties which
had been dissenters at the Moscow international commurLst
conference last June, observes that the PCI upholds "its
previous position on the Czechoslovak question and displays a
certain lack of understanding of the process of normalization
there also." It goes on to wishfully express confidence that "the
results of the Czechoslovak consolidation will eventually win over
our.t;Italian sister ~party. "*
Aliment On Czechoslovakia Continues Between PCI and Prague
The PCI press and the Czechoslovak party press are in the midst of
an increasingly abrasive polemic primarily over RINASCITA's dis-
paraging treatment of recent developments in Prague.** Czechoslovak
ire was initially aroused by a 23 February RINASCITA article in which
Franco Bertone criticized statements made by Czechoslovak First
Secretary Husak in a RUDE PRAVO interview. Bertone took Husak to
task for showing "determinatizn to smash to dust the political
* A fuller discussion of the Hungarian comment appears on page 1
of today's SURVEY.
** The polemic is reminiscent of a verbal skirmish that developed
becween the Czechoslovaks and the British CP last September. For
a discussion see the FBIS TRENDS of 31 December 1969, pages 24-25,
and the FBIS SURVEY of 4 December 1969, pages 18-20.
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platform of the 'new direction'" and for denying "any need for
economic reform" while recommending a reversion to "the strict
economic centralization that was already on its way out when
Novotny was in power."
RUDE PRAVO replied to Bertone on 3 February, deploring his "lack
of understanding of the basic sense of Husak's words" and concluding
with an offer to explain Czechoslovak party policy to the PCI "if
interest is shown."
Three days '.ester RINASCITA's chief editor Pavolini came to Bertone's
defense, observing that "a profound crisis situation" in Czechoslovakia
"does not in any way seem headed for a solution" and reasserting
the PCI's view that 'the August 1968 invasion not only has not solved
any of the problems the "new course" was designed to cope with, but
makes it impossible to solve them. He remarked caustically that
RINASCITA "fully implements" the Prague paper's recommendation that
every party expound the positions of other parties by publishing
their official documents and articles. And he said RINASCITA would
be very interested in knowing "the present terms of the internal
debate in Czechoslovakia . . . and what the comrades who were replaced
had to say."
L'UNITA became involved in the polemic on 17 February when it published
a favorable review by Boffa of a book by the Czechoslcvak expatriate
A.-T. Liehm, in which Boffa lauded the preface written by Jean Paul
Sartre. RUDE PRAVO responded on the 25th with an article accusing
Boffa of trying to justify Sartre's "anti-Sovietism" and of echoing
the views of the purged IL MANIFESTO dissidents. On the same day
the Czechoslovak CP weekly TVORBA carried an article by its chief
editor Jiri Hajek criticizing RINASCITA for casting the new
Czechoslovak leadership "in the role of the guilty party, responsi-
ble for the state of affairs of which this same leadership has been
fighting for a way out for our country since April of last year."
Charging that Pavolini and Bertone air views similar to those
expressed by "Italian noncommunist newspapermen" and warning them
not to explain "our differences" on the basis of "so-called o~*.tside
pressure," Hajek reminded them that the PCI had always considered
"anti-Sovietism to be identical with anticommunism" and had
reaffirmed this during the IL MANIFESTO affair.
In the most recent round in the polemic, L'UNITA responded to both
RUDE PRAVO and TVORBA in a 5 March article by chief editor Pajetta,
who saw as key factors underlying Prague's pursuit of the polemic
the intention of wanting to determine--or of demanding
outright from us--a stand, some kind of a healing medium
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by which to close the chapter of the differences concerning
the past and thus turn over the page relative to the problems
of the Czechoslovak events and crises. A principle is almost
enunciated according to which our inquiry and our conclu-
sions . . . should be conducted and formulated solely by
taking up the judgments and analyses provided from time to
time by the leading organs of the Czechoslovak party.
Remarking that the PCI is reproached by Prague for having "placed
excessive trust in Dubcek,, Smrkovsky, and Cernik" and is now being
asked to accept as valid the criticisms directed against those
leaders as well as all the other "normalization" measures, all
"in the name of the current official policy compared with what was
yesterday's official policy," he reminded the Czechoslovaks of the
emphasis at the PCI's 12th congress on the party's "full autonomy
of judgment" in evaluating the policies and actions of the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries. Pajetta completed his rejoinder
by defending Boffa's evaluation of Sartre against RUDE PRAVO's
criticism.
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THE USSR
CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM INTENSIFIES
The longstanding dispute over reforms in the command economy appears
to be intensifying as a result of the slowdown in Soviet economic
growth and the general deficiencies disclosed at the December CPSU
plenum. Conservative spokesmen, apparently emboldened by the
existence of widespread disenchantment over the results of the
reforms instituted in 1965, are now attacking liberal critics of
the command economy by name and in p.nxticularly abusive terms.
In the past, attacks of this kind were leveled mainly at Czech
and Yugoslav economic ref^rmers rather than at their Soviet counter-
parts. The latter, while clearly on the defensive, continue to
appeal for more active implementation and extension of the 1965
reforms in economic management.
Liberal Economist Ch ed With Political Deviation
A 5 March article in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY by the economists M. Kovaleva
and K. Korytov marks a major escalation of the dispute over the
economic reforms. The authors of the article clearly display their
conservative bias in a scathing review of a book by the liberal
economist Boris Rakitskiy which was published in 1968 under the
title "Forms of Economic Leadership of Enterprises." The review
is particularly noteworthy for its abusive tone, comparable to the
invective common in the Stalin era but rarely in evidence in recent
times.
Declaring at the outset that Rakitskiy's book is motivated by a
desire to revise "the fundamental principles" of Soviet economic
policy, the authors of the review present a lengthy bill of
particulars. These include the charges that Rakitskiy disparages
the Soviet system of centralized planning by treating it as
"inherent only in a backward and 'unbalanced' economy," and that
he seeks to replace the planning system with a market economy.
Toward this end, they charge, Rakitskiy proposes that enterprises
be granted greater autonomy in the form of "free choice of
partners" and "fixing prices by contract." The introduction of
these reforms would, in Rakitskiy's view, enable enterprises to
cope more effectively with the problems of plant specialization
and technological change.
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Rakitskiy'e critics repudiate his "erroneous views and recommenda-
tions" largely on political grounds. They point out that the
December plenum reaffirmed the decisive prerogatives of ministries
in the sphere of plant specialization and. technological innovation,
and they reject Rakitskiy's view that such functions could be
managed more effectively at the enterprise level. And they charge
that the effect of his recommendations would be "to exclude the
central agencies from the system of managing production and to
lessen the role of the party in the leadership of economic
construction."
But the most serious indictment of Rakitskiy--reminiscent of the
polemics of the Stalin era--is that his mistakes derive from a
"disregard of a class approach" to economics. In other words,
Rakitskiy gave precedence to "technical" and "organizational"
considerations over ideological considerations in his analysis
of the Soviet economy.
This accusation of political deviation goes beyond any previous
criticism of Rakitskiy and his reformist colleagues. For example,
although Rakitskiy was criticized in 1966 for some of the very
same mistakes cited in the current attack, the criticism was not
abusive in character and did not refer to him by name (A. Bachurin
in ECONOMIC GAZETTE No. 45, 1966).* The broad implications of
the current accusations may also be gauged by the fact that
Rakitskiy's book received highly favorable reviews in 1969 in
NOVY MIR No. 7 and PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS No. 10. Against this
background, the accusation of political deviation and the criticism
of Rakitskiy's publisher, the "Science" Publishing House, seems
clearly aimed at suppressing reformist criticism of the command
economy,
Disenchantment With Results of Reform Increasing
The effort to silence critics of the command economy coincides
with plain indications of growing disenchantment over the results
of the 1965 reforms. A 9 January SOCIALIST INDUSTRY article by a
prominent Leningrad industrial executive, G.I. Kulagin, disclosed
that a majority of economic managers--"both 'above' and 'below'"--
were distressed over the disappointing results of the economic
* For background, see FBIS SURVEY for 23 November 1966, pages 1-
44.
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reform. An even more alarmist view was expressed by one of the
reform's leading public spokesmen, the economist A. Birman, in the
December issue of NOVY MIR. Birman reported that opposition to the
reform was "fairly broad and extensive" and was rooted essentially
in concern over any weakening of state control over the economy.
Birman also alluded to the fears aroused by the abortive Czech
reforms and the exploitation of these fears by opponents of the
Soviet reform. Without mentioning Czechoslovakia, he asserted,
"We must take these facts into consideration since they really
occurred. However, we must not reject economic methods because they
were incorrectly applied in some places: we do not abolish money
because counterfeiters may exist."
Birman's concern over opposition to the reform was a central feature
of his 11 February LITERARY GAZETTE article. Arguing against any
reversion to the methods of the past and urging more active
implementation of the reforms initiated in 1965, Birman reflected
on the importance of time--"even a long time"--as an antidote to
the ills of the economy. However, the possibility that time may
be running out on the reform and its benefactors would seem to be
strengthened by the virulence of the attack on Rakitskiy and by
the rising chorus of agitation for tighter labor discipline,
stricter economy, and increased party control--measures that
directly conflict with the purposes of the reform.
SOVIET SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY SHOWS TATAR-RUSSIAN FRICTION
According to an official study, Tatar intelligentsia tend to show
more anti-Russian. bias than Tatar manual laborers, and contact
between Tatar and Russian intelligentsia worsens rather than
improves mutual understanding. Researchers found that anti-Russian
bias among the Tatar intelligentsia, instead of being merely a
survival of the past, is generated by competition for jobs and
social status and thus is impervious to the traditional methods of
combating nationalism--propaganda and education, teaching of the
Russian language, and increased intercultural contacts.
The study by the sociological research sector of the Academy of
Sciences' Ethnography Institute was described by Yuriy Arutyunyan,
chief of this sector, in the December 1969 issue of QUESTIONS OF
PHILOSOPHY. Researchers interviewed 2,500 Russians and Tatars in
rural areas of the Tatar ASSR to deterriine attitudes in regard to
mixed marriage and employment under boe,ses of mother nationality.
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Predictably, the study found negative attitudes among only a small
number, mostly elderly, and cited this finding as proof of the
success and correctness of Soviet nationalities policy.
The study also turned up some apparently unexpected results, however.
Arutyunyan devotes much attention to the fact that the more
educated Tatars, those engaged in nonmanual labor, are more biased
against Russians than manual laborers and that traditional methods
of breaking down these attitudesa--integration, study of the
Russian language, propaganda and education--not only fail as far
as the intelligentsia are concerned, but are often counterproductive.
As the author puts it, "the effect of knowing the Russian language
and contact with all-union culture seems to disappear among the
intelligentsia," and positive "internationalist" attitudes among
the intelligentsia "are not stronger than among other strata of the
population, but rather even the opposite,"
More detailed study of the jobs and social status of the intelligentsia
led the researchers to conclude that there are different bases for
bias among the intelligentsia than among t:,,-- poorly educated and
tradition-oriented. Among the intelligentsia, anti-Russian bias
appears to be based on competition for jobs, social status, and
opportunities for advancement, and is aggravated rather than reduced
by working with Russians. This latter point is proved by data show-
ing a much higher rate of anti-Russian feeling among Tatar
intelligentsia living in villages with mixed Russian-Tatar population
than in all-Tatar villages. The opposite was true for Tatar manual
laborers: working and living with Russians sharply reduced their
bias.
While he demonstrates the ineffectiveness of orthodox measures of
combating nationalism among the intelligentsia, the author proposes
little in the way of a cure. He suggests tentatively an intensification
of "internationalist" influence on Tatar children in hopes of
reducing subsequent tencencies to bias when competition for jobs
takes over.
The significance of the tensions discovered is perhaps heightened
by the fact that the declared goal of the study was not just to
investigate Tatar attitudes but to examine the more general phenomenon
of ethnic relations in varying social strata and situations. The
Tatar republic was selected for the pilot study because it "to a
significant degree reflects the social structure and social processes
characteristic for Soviet society as a whole."
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COMMUNIST CHINA
STATE COUNCIL REEMERGES , CALLS FOR HIGHER COTTON YIELDS
Continuing normalization of the PRC's administrative structure was
indicated on 6 March when NCNA reported that the State Council had
recently held a national conference on cotton production. There
is no indication that a plenary meeting of the Council itself was
convened; the last reported plenary session, in March 1966, dealt
with spring agricultural planning. The Council had not publicly
been cited as performing a function since March 1966 except in
conjunction with other bodies. Even in this latest instance, the
party's supremacy over the state organ was made clear via the
notation that "responsible comrades of the party Central Committee"
had receivers the delegates to the conference, listcaed to reports,
and delivered "important speeches."
The message apparently conveyed to the delegates is consistent
with the general propaganda line on grain production as the
primary factor; but the mere fact that the conference did concentrate
on cotton does seem to step up the priority for this crop.
Delegates were told that cotton areas are to increase yields
while aiming for self-sufficiency in grain, with the immediate
aim of at least achieving the goals for both cotton and grain set
by the 12-year agricultural plan of 1956, Statistics released by
NCNA indicate that increased cotton output will not be derived from
planting cotton on land which can be used for grain: Cotton
yields have risen 12.2 percent compared with the last precultural
revolution crop in 1965, while the average per-mou yield has
grown at the slightly higher rate of 12.5 percent--indicating that
the stress on grain production over the past few years has resulted
in slightly less acreage for cotton.
While Shanghai and Chekiang are the only first-level administrative
units said to have exceeded the goal set by the national agricultural
program of 100 catties of ginned cotton per mou, figures given for
many model areas invited to the conference far exceeded this
figure, even in areas with poor growing conditions. One brigade
in Anhwei is said to have increased its average per-mou yield from
45 to 154 catties per mou in "less than a year." A Kiangsu
brigade that has achieved an average per-mou yield of 163 catties
for cotton and 1,450 for grain (which has a 12-year-program quota
of 800 catties) was advanced as "an example of high yields in the
south."
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Although the achievements set forth as examples by the report on
the conference seem to sir-ack of leap-forward goals impossible of
rapid achievement, there is no indication that localities are
being asked to rush into such programs. While Mao's thought is
cited as the source of the great advances made by the exemplary
areas, the conference did not advocate general solutions to
problems but instead "demanded" that revolutionary committees
disseminate the experiences achieved by the model areas "in a
way suited to the various localities."
Media Advocate Improved Methods to Gain Better Crops
A general propaganda campaign in behalf of redoubled efforts durin;;
the spring planting season has been highlighted by a 7 March
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and articles published in RED FLAG No. 3,
released 28 February. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the first
one it has published on its own on a domestic issue since last
November, consisted mostly of traditional platitudes. Unlike
the spring planting editorial last March, it provided no new
insights into agricultural policy.
A RED FLAG report detailing the experience of a model brigade in
Anhwei, and broadcast by the Hofei radio on 9 March, was quite
specific in outlining measures to be adopted in order to raise
yields,. The picture that emerges from the report is not one
of a sudden flowering of played-out fields fertilized by Mao's
thought, but that of an arduous, well-planned effort by a
competent brigade leader to reclaim alkaline land. The brigade
is said to have received over one million cattios of relief
grain from 1950 to 1964 as well as over 100,000 yuan in state
aid; now its grain and cotton crops exceed. the goals set by the
national program for development of agriculture, and it sells its
excess to the state.
The first measure adopted by a new leader transferred to the brigade
in late 1964 was in the area of ideological rectification; he
sought to overcome the notion that the brigade must turn to
commerce or the people drift away to the cities. Then a soil
survey was taken to determine how much of the alkaline land could
be improved and to identify the areas for improvement.
The alkaline soil was removed, good soil from a canal was brought in,
irrigation was improved--all without state aid, the article makes
clear--and over the years production was gradually raised through
continuous hard labor. Not only was the soil changed but eight
swamps were filled in and an equal number of machine-pumped wells
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were dug to ease drought problems. Other measures adopted include
establishing a full-time team to stock up on fertilizer, one-third
more multiple cropping, and diversified planting to suit specific
conditions.
The Anhwei brigade is not being presented as a typical example (the
article notes that for a brigade to achieve so much so quickly "is
something rarely seen north of the Huai River") but as a model for
other brigades, especially the poor ones. Problems that the
brigade encountered are glossed over, although the article
indicates that during the first year of the new leadership in 1965
production fell off from the previous year, described as the
"peak year prior to the cultural revolution." The report does not
state how much of the land has actually been reclaimed, although
all of it was said to have be "worked over." If all or most
is now being planted and is included in the per-mou statistics,
large numbers of outsiders must have joined the brigade; its
original population was only 700 people, an insufficient number to
intensively farm the stated 1,700 mou while performing the indicated
improvements.
While progress has recently been noted in rebuilding basic-level
party branches, Peking and Shanghai media are complaining that the
new party organs have run into difficulty in asserting their
authority over "the mass organizations." Some of the criticism
against those who seek to place mass organizations above the party
is doubtless aimed at local revolutionary committees reluctant to
surrender their prerogatives. Although the supremacy of reconstructed
party units over revolutionary committees has been clearly stated,
the issue apparently remains subject to misunderstandings.
On 9 March an NCNA report on activities at the Peking woolen text-Ile
mill argued forcefully for supremacy of the party organization over
the revolutionary committee and mass organizations. The report
stated that the party committee in the mill had leadership authority
over the revolutionary committee there as well as over lower-level
party branches, worker representatives, and Communist Youth League
and militia organizations. Decisions on important questions are
made by the party committee, with the revolutionary committee then
executing the decision "under the leadership of the party committee."
The revolutionary committee must then report to the party committee
"on how the decisions are being carried through."
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NCNA also explained how hierachical party authority operates in the
mill? Differences of opinion between the party committee and "some
of the party branches" are resolved by consulting each party
member concerned prior to a party meeting; then decisions are
reached through discussion, after which the committee secretaries
and deputy secretaries decide how to implement the decision. The
report claimed that this method had instructed party members at
all levels in the mill in the concept of democratic centralism.
Shanghai has also reflected concern in regard to the leadership
role of the party over mass organizations. On 22 February Shanghai
radio condemned the idea that party units and organs of state power
are on equal footing as "a counterrevolutionary aim" to "oppose
the leadership of the party," The broadcast called for more
party members to be placed "in the leading positions in the
state power structure" so that state power is "under the absolute
leadership of the party." On 26 February Shanghai restated the
thesis that "the party is the core of leadership of the masses of
people" and that "the masses must firmly establish the concept of
the party's leadership and consciously accept this leadership."
The broadcast claimed that many mass organizations played their
revolutionary role well during the cultural revolution only
because "they were led by the party." Without the leadership of
the party, Shanghai declared, the mass organizations "will
inevitably run counter to the main orientation of the revolution"
and go astray. On 5 March Shanghai chided those "self-styled
r.e~,resentatives of the interests of the masses" who "have placed
the mass organizations above the party organization." The broad-
cast observed that, while close ties with the masses should be
established, it is "wrong for some comrades to hold the view that
'we must do everything the way the masses want.'"
More Publicity for Setting Up Low--Level Party Organs
Another province has reported establishment of a party committee
at the county level. On 28 February Lanchow radio reported on a
party committee for Chinan county in Kannsu. Only Hunan and
Heilungkiang had previously reported county party committees,
while Kwangtung has reported a city committee.
The Kansu report stressed that the Chinan party committee had worked
jointly with the county revolutionary committee there on various
agricultural problems in Chinan. In contrast, a 27 February
Changsha radio report on the party committee of Taoyuan county,
one of seven county-level committees announced in Hunan last
December, did not mention the county revolutionary committee, even
though the report was lengthy and detailed.
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During the past two weeks, the provincial radios of Fukien, Kirin,
Kwangsi, and Shantung have referred to newly established party
branches in their areas. These are the first monitored reports
of new party organs for each of these areas. Shansi, Sinkiang,
Tibet, and Yunnan are now the only first-level administrative
units which, judging by monitored local broadcasts, have reported
no new local party organs. (No reports have been monitored from
Kweichow, Szechwan, Hopeh, and Tientsin as well, but their local
radios are broadcasting no local news at all.)
TOPICS IN BRIEF
During Peking's year-long campaign to popularize pig-breeding there
have been numerous references to new fermented pig fodders. Recent
releases, including an NCNA report on 26 February, assert that the
latest measures on increasing the numbers of pigs (important as a
source of fertilizer) take account of the need to conserve grain.
NCNA praises a Shenyang PLA company for developing a feed which
"does away with using grain in pig fodder," contains a dozen
nutrients, and has some bacteria-killing effect. The article
indicates that "great importance" was attached to the experiment
by the Shenyang Military Region; it was "popularized in 98 percent
of the unit's subordinate organs in less than a month." The PLA
company has already saved 20 to:;; of grain through using the new
fodder, and the Shenyang units are now "passing on the advanced
experience to the local peasants." Another NCNA report on 8 March
noted a similar experiment in Kiangsi., which would allow more
"pig breeding and provide more fertilizer." While the PLA
experiment relied on the stalks and husks of domesticated plants,
the Kiangsi fodder is said to use the leaves or roots of six wild
plants.
Several recent items indicate that China's steel industry, overbuilt
during the leap-forward period, is now working at full capacity.
Foochow radio on 18 February reported that the Sanming plant had
brought into production a furnace not utilized for eight years and
that a steel-rolling mill unused for five years had been repaired
and pressed into service. On 6 March NCNA reported that a county
in Hopeh had reopened seven small iron mines which "supported
production by big iron and steel plants." Extension of the small
iron and steel industries now being set up in some iron-mining areas
was also publicized by Nanchang on 20 February.
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A 28 February Foochow broadcast explained that a major benefit of
birth control is the freeing of "additional labor force for
production." In a certain brigade, the radio noted, many women were
formerly unable to do productive labor because they had too many
children. But over the past few years the brigade's birth rate
has been "sharply" reduced, freeing labor and improving health
conditions.
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