TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~Illlilll!~~~i!iu~~lllllll~~~
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
7 January 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 1)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
R.ded.d hew .e.e.oIk
dewe9red1.p e.d
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
'r JANUARY 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Wajor Attention . .? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Year-End Reviews of Communist "Victories" . . . . . . . . . 3
Vietnamization and the GVN Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Vice President Agnew's Asian Trip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Announcement of Tet Cease-Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Issue of U.S. Prisoners in DRV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
DRV Production Emulation Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Tenth Anniversary of DRV Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Polemics Cloud Atmosphere as Kuznetsov Returns to Talks . . . . . . . 11
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Assails Agnew's Taiwan Visit, Hits U.S. Policies . . . . . . . 14
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Husak Nurtures Moderate Image, Presses Purge of Liberals . . . . . . .15
ALBANIA
Youth Leaders' Suicides Prompt District Party Purge . . . . . . . . . 17
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
7 JANUARY 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS G:LVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 DECEMBER 1969 - 4 JANUARY 1970
Moscow (3040 iterng )
Peking (1949 items)
Vietnam
(9%)
5%
Domestic Issues
(49%)
42%*
(U.S. "Atrocities"
(4%)
2%]
Joint New Year's
(--)
25%
Cuban 11th Anniversary
(--)
5%
Editorial
Hungarian Foreign
(--)
4%
(Rebroadcasts of
(--)
15%]
Minister inUSSt
Middle east
(4%)
2%
Text
(CPR People's
(--)
11%]
Support
Vietnam
(9%)
1%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscoi; and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* Excludes items on Chinese people's support of the joint New Year's
editorial.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JANUARY 1970
VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Vietnamese communist media carry a flurry of year-end reviews on "victories"
following the 31 December "special"PLAF command communique* which claims
that 1969 was a year of "continuous, accelerated, and persistent offensives"
and that allied casualties were higher than in 1968. The communique's
claims are echoed in subsequent propaganda, including editorials in
Front and DRV media. An article attributed to "Chien Binh" (combatant)
in the DRV army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 3d says that President
Nixon arrived at his "dribbling troop withdrawal policy" after his
scheme of exerting maximum pressure failed completely and he realized
the "bankruptcy" of the three conditions he had set for U.S. troop
withdrawal. An article in the same paper on the 4th, attributed to
"True Chien" (hand-to-hand combat), sets out to document the failure
of the U.S. clear-and-hold strategy -through which "Nixon hoped" to
implement his Vietnamization policy.
The year-end propaganda hails the establishment of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government last June in claiming that 1969 saw important
diplomatic and political as well as military victories. The propaganda
also points to the NFLSV 10-point solution in this connection, but
without mentioning the Paris talks. There are, however, pro forma
references to the Paris .talks in DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's New Year
interview** with TASS' Hanoi correspondent and in PRG Foreign Minister
Mme, Nguyen Thi Binh's New Year remarks over French television. In
the interview as carried by TASS and published in PRAVDA on 1 January,
Dong said that the NFLSV's "reasonable" 10-point proposal submitted at
Paris had further isolated the United States and the "puppets."
According to VNA on the 5th, Mme. Binh reaffirmed Vietnamese communist
good faith in seeking a political solution, adding routinely that if
the United States persists in "intensifying" the war and "downgrading
and sabotaging the Paris conference, the South Vietnamese people will
resolutely struggle until they achieve independence and freedom."
Vice President Agnew's visit to South Vietnam prompts the observation
from Liberation Radio on the 2d that on Neu Year's Day he "sneaked
into Saigon like a thief." Both Hanoi and the Front recall President
Nixor,'s visit last July.
* The PLAF year-end communique is discussed in the 2 January 1970
FB1S SURVEY, pages 9-10.
** There was also a Pham Van Dong interview last year, published in
PRAVDA on 3 January 1969.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JANUARY 1970
Peking has not mentioned Agnew's trip to South Vietnam, but it has
initiated critical comment on his visits to the Philippines and to
Taiwan. The only comment on Vietnam in current Peking propaganda
comes in the course of omnibus year-end reviews of "imperialist"
policy. Thus, a 4 JanuRry NCNA item in Chinese reviewing the Nixon
Adminierration says that in an attempt to occupy South Vietnam
permanently the President is "vj.Eorously pursuing the so-called
de-Americanization and Vietnamization of the war after the war of
aggression failed miserably." NCNA on the 7th report3 the arrival
in Peking of the new DRV ambassador, Ngo Thtiyen. VNA announced on
26 November that DRV Ambassador Ngo Minh Loan had left Peking
on the 24th.
Moscow sees Vice President Agnew's comments during his trip as
further evidence that the Uni~ed States intends to pursue its
"aggression" in South Vietnam. Other comment continues to criticize
the Vietnamization policy as a device to continue the war, and a
3 January IZVESTIYA article sees evidence of U.S. intent to prolong
the war in the training of Vietnamese military personnel at various
bases in the United States as well as in the continued supply of
arms aid.
On 5 January Front media release a PRG statement declaring a cease-fire
for Tet from 5 to 9 February. Reports on military action highlight
alleged allied violations of the Christmas and New Year's truces. LPA
announces on 31 December that to mark the holiday, four ARVN soldiers
who had been captured by guerrillas were released on the 24th by the
People's Revolutionary Committee of Binh Dai district, Ben Tre Province.
LPA arinour,ces on the 7th that a war crimes communique, dated 5 January,
rounds up "crimes" in the South during the past year. On the 3d VNA had
released a communique summing up U.S. "crimes" against both North and
South Vietnam during December. It charged the United States with
continued bombing of DRV territory in Thanh Hoa and Quang Binh provinces
and in the Vinh Linh area.* Other attention to "crimes" includes LPA
and VNA publicity for lists of victims of the March 1968 U.S. "massacre"
in Son My.
a meeting was held in Hanoi to review the 1969 state plan and inaugurate
an emulation movement to overfulfill the 1970 state plan. The 10th
anniversary of the promulgation of the DRV constitution is said to have
been marked by a ".recent" meeting of the Vietnam Lawyers Association at
which Politburo member Truong Chinh and Central Committee member Hoang
Quoc Viet spoke.
* Pham Van Dong clairued in his New Year's TASS interview that "some
85" U.S. aircraft have been shot down over North Vietnam since
November 1968.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JANUARY 1970
YEAR-END REVIEWS OF COMMUNIST "VICTORIES"
The alleged communist successes during 1969 which are detailed in the
31 December "special" PLAF command communique are echoed in 6 flurry
of year-end reviews, including editorials in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN oi.
1 and 2 January and NHAN DAN on the 2d as well as Front editorials
by Liberation Radio and in the English-language SOUTH VIETNAM IN
STRUGGLE on the 1st. Like the communique, the comment claims that
allied losses in both men and materiel were greater in 1969 than in
1968 and that the communists consistently pressed the offensive.
Guerrilla successes in 1969 are hailed in a 5 January LPA item which
claims that at least 10 "waves of offensives" were launched throughout
the South on a regional scale. LPA cites such offensives in Quang
Nam-Quang Ngai in May, September, October, end November; on the high
plateau in July and November; and in the delta in July, September,
November, and December.
Some of the propaganda repeats the PLAF commui:ique's specific claim of
645,000 allied casualties, including 235,000 U.S. and other foreign
troops, and notes that this exceeds the alleged 1968 figure of 630,000,
including 230,000 U.S. and other foreign troops. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial on the 2d, saying vaguely that the number of "enemy" troops
annihilated in 1969 was higher than in the previous yeex, goes on to
observe: "U.S. casualties remained high while puppet casualties
increased substantially." The editorial and much of the other comment
sees this as a direct blow to the Vietnamization policy. The 1 January
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial disparages the ARVN in this connection,
claiming that although it has "slightly increased in strength," it is
undisciplined and has become "increasingly ramshac?tle organizationally
and morally." This editorial also makes one of the rare references
to communist casualties, saying that only "light casualties" were
suffered.* It declares that "we absolutely are fully able to persevere
in the fight until final victory" and claims that 1969 "victories" have
"insured a strong and protracted offensive."
ARTICLE BY The 3 January Chien Binh (combatant) article in QUAN
"CHIEN BINH" 1)0I NHAN DAN, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the same
day, alleges that the 1969 "victories" forced President
Nixon to move from "active deescalation from a position of strength to
a passive deescalation from a weak position." Citing President Nixon's
three conditions for troop withdrawal."from strength"--progress at
Paris, scaling down of military action, and ability of the Saigon army
to replace U.S. troops--Chien Binh says these calculations were upset
by the "great and comprehensive victories of the South Vietnam armed
* A similar contention appaared in a "Chien Binh" article in QUAN
DO! NHAN DAN in October.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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forces and people." He prefaces his recitation of the stscistics in
the PLAF communique with a statement attributed to REUTERS that "the
evolution of the war in 1969 demonstrates that not only were military
activities not slowed down,* but the speed of the southern troops'
and people's attacks was uninterrupted, accelerated, and sustained."
The "dribbling troop withdrawal policy," according to Chien Binh, was
the policy that President Nixon arrived at after hi.s "scheme" of
exerting maximum pressure failed completely and he realized the
"bitter truth about the bankruptcy of his three conditions for, troop
withdrawal," The author says the President's embarrassment and
confusion were apparent in the postponement in August of a troop
withdrawal announcement and his promise, "then forgotten," that he
would withdraw troops at a faster rate than former Defense Secretary
Clifford's scheme to withdraw 100,000 in 1969. Chien BJnh says
that the withdrawals--60,000 in 1969 and the promise of another
50,000 by next April--,shows on the one hand that the "imperialists"
are stubborn in continuing the war and, on the other hand, that
eventually the United States must admit that its local war strategy
is bankrupt and that it has had to "passively deescalate the war
from a weak position."
The second installment of the article concentrates on hailing the
PLAF and communist achievements, including the fcrmation of the PRG
and the establishment of revolutionary administration. Chien Binh
claims routinely that even more important than the quantitative
development of the PLAF's three categories of troops was the achieve-
ment of "higher combat quality through progress in using fighting
methods with high combat efficiency." Not only were the main forces
not weakened, he says, but on the contrary they received "more
training than in any of the previous years . . .-." He goes on to
cite a 28 December AP item as saying that throughout 1969 "the.Viet
Cong built up their forces; at present, they are quite capable of
conducting the war with even greater intensity."
ARTICLE BY The day after QUAN DOI NHAN DAN carried Chien Binh's
"?'RUC CHIEN" article, the paper publishes a discussion of the
U.S. clear-and-hold strategy attributed to "True
Chien" (hand-to-hand combat). This article, broadcast by Hanoi radio
the following day, says President Nixon had hoped through this strategy
VietDamese communist propaganda hau occasionally directly denied
lulls in the fighting. For example, on 14 November a (JUAN DOI NHAN
DAN article said that recent action exposed the "lying propaganda"
about a battlefield lull and a record-low U.S. casualty toll.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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to "Vietnamize" the war in order to "deescalate the war from a position
of strength." It says that the clear-and-hold strategy is based on the
attempt to "preserve" three things--the lives of U.S. servicemen, the
"puppet" army and administration, and bases or footholds throughout
the country.
Truc Chien deprecates allied progress both in defense in depth and
pacification, reviewing alleged failures over the past year to
document his case. Posing the question as to whether the Americans
can pacify populous rural areas, he says that the number of "unsafe
hamlets" remains vast and that "scores of thousands of their wicked
pacification agents have been killed* and many others are demoralized."
He cites AP as having said on 19 December 1,969 that in Q,uang Nam the
Americans "recently sent a battalion to carry out a pacification pilot
project in four coastal hamlets, achieving very uncertain results."
The article states that the main question in "puppetizing" the war is:
when will they be able to shoulder a part of the American burden "so
that the Americans will be able to withdraw a significant number of
troops from combat?" It also cites AP in saying that in many areas
where the Americans "are intensively carrying out Vietnamization the
puppets have been annihilated and sustained heavy losses, such as in
Tay Nguyen, eastern Nam Bo, Ben Tre, Rach Gia." It concludes that
the future of `rietnamization "is very black."
VIETNAMIZATION AND THE G14,i ECONOMY
Liberation Radio on 3 and 4 January broadcasts a two-installment article
attributed to Commentator which discusses the rleationship between the
Vietnamization policy and attempts to build up the GVN economy. It says
the Vietnamization program is aimel not only at using Vietnamese to
fight Vietnamese and at consolidating the "puppet administration,"
but also at "fully exploiting southern economic resources and turning
the. southern economy into one providing on-the-spot logistic support"
for the U.S. war of "aggression," thus alleviating the American burden.
Commentator notes that there have been "extensive efforts" by the
United States to assist the GVN in formulating and accelerating programs
such as land reform so as to build a "self-reliant and self-sufficient"
economy in South Vietnam. But, he says, "economic realities" in
South Vietnam are completely at variance with the American plans.
As documentation Commentator cites, among other things, the deficit
in the GVN's current budget, rising inflation, a decrease in the value
* The Chien Binh article cited an AP item of 20 December as the source
of a report that the communists had killed or captured 25,000 "diehard
cruel agents" in 1969.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JANUARY 1970
-6-
of the piaster, the need to import food, and the high food prices;
this economy, he says, has produced "increasingly miserable and
desperate" living conditions among "every" strata of southerners.
In claiming that the GVN economy is not a "national" one but one
dependent on U.S. aid for survival, he makes the point that current
GVN economic practices and policies now are further exacerbating the
"contradictions" between the GVN and the people.
The theme elaborated in the Commentator article is one that has been
touched on in past propaganda. For example, a 3 November. Liberation
Radio commentary on President Thieu's National Day speech accused
him of' instituting new tax measures in order to obtain funds needed
to expand the armed forces and police and to step up pacification
so as to "realize the scheme of de-Americanizing the Vietnam war--that
is, t') prolong the U.S. aggressive war by using Vietnamese to kill
Vietnamese and forcing them to shoulder the war expenditure burden
in place of Americans."*
VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW'S ASIAN TRIP
HANOI AND Vice President Agnew's trip to Vietnam is noted in a
THE FROt'T 2 January Liberation Radio iroadcast which says that
on New Year's Day he "sneakeri into Saigon like a thief.'.'
The broadcast says that before leaving on the tour of Asian nations
Agnew "spent his time listening to reports on the Vietnamization
plan," and that therefore one c&.? say he will continue to step it
up. Claiming that Thieu, "encouraged by the Americans," has further
disclosed his "fascist nature," the broadcast alleges that before
Agnew arrived Thieu had ordered "repression of meetings of
thousands of students" and had closed "eight Saigon papers accused
of neutralist tendencies." A Hanoi broadcast on the 3d says that
during his Saigon visit the Vice President, like President Nixon,
"boastfully stated" that the GVN had broadened its base. The
broadcast cites the NEW YORK TIMES as refuting this claim.
Agnew's trip to the Philippines, as well as his Vietnam visit, is
reviewed in a 3 January Front broadcast which recalls the
demonstrations in Manila which greeted the Vice President. It
describes his trip as "merely aimed at peddling" U.S. "peace" and
other programs and at sounding out reactions to President Nixon's
Asian policy proclaimed at Guam last summer.
* See the FBIS TRENDS of 5 November 1969, page 12.
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MOSCOW Moscow continues to stress that the main purpose of Vice
President Agnew's Asian tour is to explain the President's
"Guam doctrine" and to reduce Asian "hostility" to it. Commentators
say that in South Vietnam he reaffirmed the policy of continued U.S.
intervention and that in Thailand and Taiwan he promised continued
military aid to the "puppet" regimes. Reports note that he assured
the Thais that U.S. obligations remain in force and that the U.S.
presence in Asia gill be maintained, and that in Taiwan he confirmed
U.S. support for the regime.
Reportage and comment on the Vice President's visit to South Vietnam
note briefly that he met with President Thieu and Ambassador Bunker
to discuss Vietnamization, but the propaganda highlights his speeches
at the military bases. Asserting that Agn_ewis comments mean the
United States intends to continue aggression in South Vietnam, the
reports note that he "alleged" that the American people fully support
the cause the servicemen are fighting for and the. he warned that
the troops "should not count -,n a speedy return to their homeland."
A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia on 5 January
claims that the GIs heard the speech with skepticism; this report,
like others, says that a GI whom the Vice President visited in a
hospital said he thought he should not be in Vietnam.
ANNOUNCEMENT ON TET CEASE-FIRE
The four.-day Tet cease-fire proposed by the communists this year is
shorter:" than the.- one in 1969 and announced further in advance of the
holiday. The 5 January announcement of the PRG statement stipulates
a cease-fire lasting from 0600 on 5 February to 0600.. on 9' February: The
statement routinely hails the humanitarian policy of the communists
and is accompanied, as usual, by a PLAF command order establishing
the cease-fire. The PLAF order says I VN and American troops will
be allowed to move freely during the ease-fire as long as they are
unarmed, move in small groups, and carry no espionage means. It
warns, as usual, that all infractions and violations of the cease-fire
must be appropriately punished.
ISSUE OF U.S. PRISONERS IN THE DRV
HANOI The only available current DRV attention to the issue of
U.S. prisoners is a VNA item on the 7th reporting that the
DRV embassy in Moscow had iss'ied a press communique regarding the
visit there by an American identified as Henry Fora, who said that
29 January, approximately two wehks before it went into effect on
15 February.
Last year's truce lasted seven days and. was announced on
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his son had taken part in the bombing against North Vietnam. `TNA
does not make it clear whether the son is now a prisoner, but it
concludes that the DRV representative's explanation "helped Mr. Fors
see more clearly the crimes committed" by the United States and it
adds that Mr. Fors said. "he would join the movement to demand and
end to the war." The DRV representative's "explanation" was a
reiteration of the standard line :.hat the U,S. pilots a-re given
humane treatment and that the question remains unsolved because
of the U.S. stand on an overall settlement,.
THE USSR AND A 31 December Moscow radio domestic service commentary
EAST EUROPE denounces Ross Perot's efforts 'cc deliver gifts to
the U.S. prisoners in the DRV as "an attempt to slander"
that country, but it does not acknowledge that he had asked the USSR's
assistance in delivering the gifts. Refuting U.S. press charges that
the DRV does not even give out the names of the American prisoners,
the commentator points out that not only does the DRV "not conceal"
the names, but even allows the pilots to send Christmas letters to
their families. Another version of this commentary, also broadcast
in the domestic service on the same day, asserts that the U.S. press
"suppressed" a list of 132 names of American airmen: given to two
members of the Womens' Strike for Peace who visited Hanoi.
The only available communist acknowledgments that U.S. delegate Habib
submitted a list of missing military personnel who may be priscners
in the DRV at the 30 December session of the Paris talks come from
Prague and Budapest. A 31 December Prague CTK report on the Paris
session notes that a list of 1,406 names was submitted, but that
Ha Van Lau said the American move was aimed at distracting-attention
from the main problems of the negotiations. Reports on the Paris
session in the Budapest dailies NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR HIRLAP on
the 31st briefly note that the U.S. delegate, "with the obvious
purpose of provocation," submitted a list of personnel who have
dfsa'ppeare.d in Southeast Asia, "that is, not exclusively on the
territory of the DRV."
DRV PRODUCTION EMULATION DRIVE
MEETING ON VNA oii 3 January reports that a Hanoi meeting on
EMULATION 31 December attended by "leading officials of various
branches" reviewed the achievements recorded in 1969
and inaugurated an emulation movement to overfulfill the 1970 state
plan. The same VNA item also notes that representatives of the party
committees and heads of the various branches, services, departments,
offices, and factories in Haiphong also met to review the realization
of the 1969 plan and launch an emulation movement to fulfill the
1970 plan.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JANUARY 1970
According to Hanoi radio's domestic service, Politburo member Le Thanh
Nghi in his address at the Hanoi meeting observed that..the Politburo
and the Council of Ministers had decided to launch a movement of
production and work throughout North Vietnam. Noting that it is a
broad mobilization aimed at overfulfilling the main tasks under the
1970 state plan, Nghi singled out the boosting of agricultural
production and the production of consumer goods. He said that the
"achievements and performances which the Hanoi people scored in 1969 have
not yet met the requirements in production development and improvement
of livelihood in the new situation." And he went on to ap611 out
tasks which must be fulfilled in such areas as industry and
agriculture.
Nghi claimed that the emulation movement "not only assumes a major
significance towards the rehabilitation and development of the economy,
improvement of the people's life, and strengthening of the economic
and defense potential, but also bears a very important political and
social significance since it will mobilize the entire people" to
resolutely fulfill their obligation.
OTHER COMMENT The week before the announcement of the launching of
the emulation drive, Hanio radio broadcast a
26 Decenuer NHAN DAN editorial which urged a step-up in labor and
production efforts in order to ensure "a good implementation" of the
1970 state plan. The editorial says that the greatest weak points
at present are "low social labor efficiency, much wasted labor time,
and the adjustment and rational use of the labor forces," which
resuited in a low output. It says that due to "inadequate organization
and clumuy management, the DRV's great capabilities have not been
satisfactorily used, especially labor capability, which has beta
wasted." The editorial recalls that the 12 December Council of
Ministers' communique had insisted that the "greatest importance must
be attached to improving state and economic management, and particularly
worker management," in order to insure the satisfactory implementation,
of the 1970 state plan.
A discussion of the realization of the 1969 state plan by Che Viet Tan,
member of the State Planning Commission, in the latest issue of the
Hanoi English-language weekly VIETNAM COURIER concludes that in the
DRV economy "many shortcomings remain and big problems are yct to be
solved which require time: The growth rate of production is still
low . . . , and there are still weaknesses in economic management."
According to VNA on the 1st, Tan said that 1969 saw major efforts of
the North Vietnamese in a year of "hard and tireless work to surmount
a host of difficulties to fulfill the state plan." He explains that
the DRV economy is small-scale and underdeveloped, partly devastated by
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CONFXDLN'TTAL FBIS TRENDS
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war, and experienced a year of "unstable weather . . marked by the
worst typhoons and floods ever experienced in our history and an
unusual heat in summer."
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF DRV CONSTITUTION
The 10th anniversary of the promulgation of the DRV constitution is
marked by a NHAN DAN editorial on 3 January, which, according to VNA,
"highlights the great achievements in the past 10 years." VNA on
the 6th reports that the anniversary was also celebrated by a "recent"
meeting of the Vietnam Lawyers Association which was opened by Pham
Van Bach, vice-president of thb organization, who underscored the
importance of the promulgation of the constitution. Politburo member
Truong Chinh, addressing the meeting, recalled the "great services"
of President Ho Chi Minh, who drafted the first constitution adopted
in November 1946, and led the elaboration of the new constitution
which was endorsed by the National Assembly on 31 December 1959' and
promulgated on 1 January 1960. The NHAN DAN editorial similarly
"paid particularly high tribute to the great contribution of President
Ho Chi Minh who headed the draft committee," according to the VNA
account.
Truong Chinh defined "the characteristics and criteria of a really
democratic constitution end pointed to the high merits of the
socialist constitution of Vietnam." He stressed that the people
"are resolved to materialize President Ho's teachings and make the
constitution a sharp weapon to carry out the class struggle and
national struggle to build successfully socialism" and win the war.
Summing up the work of the meeting, Hoang Quoc Viet, according to
VNA, "exposed the fallacious, deceitful, and nefarious character
of the so-called constitution of the Saigon puppet administration,"
and brought out the "superiority of the DRV socialist regime and
constitution." The 1UTAN DAN editorial, quoting from the constitution,
stresses that the territory of Vietnam is a "single, indivisible
whole from North to South . . . . if
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- 11 -
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
POLEMICS CLOUD ATMOSPHERE AS KUZNETSOV RETURNS TO TALKS
The atmosphere in Sino-Soviet relations has been clouded by defiant
Chinese posturing at the turn of the year as the Peking talks enter
what may be a critical stage, with chief Soviet. negotiator Kuznetsov
back on 2 January after a three-week absence. Peking has the
occasion of the passing of a decade to ventilate again thr:t bitter
ideological conflict with the Soviets, who have responded with their
most authoritative rebuke since agreement was reached to hold the
talks. While Moscow has sought on the whole to strike a pose of
restraint and dignity, it is displaying increasing signs of impatience
with Chinese intransigence.
Both Peking and Moscow reported Kuznetsov's return on 2 January. TASS
noted without explanation that Kuznetsov was met at the Peking airport
by the deputy head of the CPR delegation; NCNA ignored this detail.
(On his original arrival Kuznetsov was met by his Chinese counterpart.)
Neither side's announcement mentioned the Soviet delegation's deputy
head, V. A. Matrosov, the border guards ^,hief, whose departure from
Peking with Kuznetsov had been reported by both sides on 14 December.
There has been no announcement that the talks have resumed.
PEKING Anti-Soviet attacks in Peking's New Year's Day joint
editorial have been echoed in subsequent propaganda
bristling with reminders of the ideological struggles of the past
decade. As in the editorial, an NCNA review of the 1960's transmitted
on 3 January recalls Mao's personal rivalry with Khrushchev and
charges the current Kremlin leaders-.-termed Khrushchev's "successors,"
in contrast to the editorial's direct attacks on Brezhnev--with
practicing "fascist dictatorship at home" and "aggression and
expansion abroad."
The theme of war -rep aredness is underscored in an NCNA report on
1 January rounding up nationwide acclaim for the joint editorial.
Propaganda on this theme has been keyed to a slogan--issued
originally as one of the National Day slogans last September--
which the editorial retroactively incorporated into the canon of
Mao "instructions." The NCNA roundup gives this "great mobilization
call" a concrete context by citing a "combat hero" who "di st--'ngui shed
himself in the fight in self-defense against the Soviet revisionist
armed provocations on Chenpao Island" and who is quoted as holding
"the new tsars in contempt." The roundup concludes with a pointed,
reminder that those "fighting at the antirevisionist frontier posts"
in the border regions of Heilungkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang
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are determined to prepare themselves fully against "any war of
aggression." Another NCNA report, a 3 January dispatch describing
the impact of Mao's "latest instruction" on the PLA, cites still
another Chenpao hero whose unit has enhanced its preparations against
invasion.
While Peking's year-end rhetorical outpouring has given vent to
stridently Maoi.iet and anti-Soviet sentiments, the more conciliatory
line in current Chinese policymaking--as exemplified in the Peking
talks and the recent renewal of contact with the United States in
Warsaw--has also been given authoritative expression in the joint
editorial's declaration that the CPR wishes to develop diplomatic
relations with all countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence.
Continuing signs of resistance tSLtllis-line.,_us.ually taking-.the-
,form of allegorical oultural criticism, suggest that, the dual strains
in Chinese propaganda may reflect disagreement over any relaxation
of rigidly intransigent positions. In a recent example, a domestic
radio commentary on 24 December denounced a group of films for
allegedly slandering people's war. Rejecting "pacifism, defeatism,
and surrender," the commentary declai?ed that the Chinese army "is
determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield." Raising
an issue with significant overtones at the present time, the
commentary assailed what it describecas iaxevisionist._v3ew-that,
there-is a eas.onab-le-gr-aur within the enenr camp. Typically, the
commentary apprc.ringly invoked Chiang Ching, the lodestar of Chinese
radicals.
MOSCOW Peking': intensified polemics have drawn a rebuke in
PRAVDA, the most authoritative such rejoinder since the
two sides agreed to hold talks. An article by Korionov in the
6 January 'asue interjects intc. a broad review of the world situation
a reference to Chinese military preparations accompanied by "unceasing
malicious attacks in the Chinese press against the Soviet Union"and
other countries of the socialist community." A day earlier, Radio
Moscow and IZVESTIYA cited "foreign observers" as notinps the. the
CPR had not reacted to Vice President Agnew's affirmation of
unchanging U.S. support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. RED STAR
repeated this observation on 6 January. Previously, apart from
PRAVDA's reprint on 19 December of a Bulgarian article attacking
Maoism, the Soviet daily central press had carried no critical
comment on China since September.
In another sign of Moscow's more polemical approach, an article in
the current issue of the weekly LITERARY GAZETTE, reviewed by TABS
on 6 January, defends the Russian theatrical innovator Stanislavskiy
against a vigorous Chinese campaign that took place several months
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ago. The article assails the "authoritarian" artistic line being
followed in the CPR and pronounces the cultural revolution "a
tragedy for the Chinese theatrical art."
Moscow uses its -purportedly 'unofficial Radio Peace and Progress
broadcasts in Mandarin to register displeasure at Peking's dual
tactics of "clamorously publicizing their efforts to normalize
relations between our two countries while continuing the anti-
Soviet campaign through the press, radio stations, and slogans."
One of Moscow's rare explicit discussions of the border situation
appears in a 3 January Peace and Progress broadcast. Recalling
that during 1969 "bloody incidents took place along the Soviet-
Chinese border--through no fault of the Soviet Union--and that a
situation with a potential for serious results developed," the
commentary states that "armed provocations on the border will not
lead to solution of the dispute with the Soviet Union" and warns
that "any attempt to violate the Soviet border will meet with
failure." Stressing Soviet willingness to find "constructive
ways to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations and reasserting the
now routine claim that it was Soviet initiative which led to the
current Peking talks, the broadcast calls for Chinese emulation
of the Soviet Government's "principled stand."
Radio Peace and Progress adopted a less admonitory tone in extending
New Year's greetings to the Chinese people on 31 December, expressing
hope that 1970 will "see improvements in Soviet-Chinese relations
and the renewal of friendly cooperation between the peoples of our
two countries." Stressing decades of Sino-Soviet friendship, the
commentary denies that the deterioration of relations is the fault
of the Soviet Union and declares that "all genuine Chinese patriots"
share the Soviet people's concern over the development-of events.
The broadcast comments that "the good will of one side is not
sufficient to bring about a harmonious success in the negotiations"
in Peking and recalls Brezhnev's 27 October appeal to the Chinese
to demonstrate their good will as a prerequiaite to solution of the
border issues.
The official Radio Moscow continues in its Mandarin broadcasts to
rebut alleged attacks by anti-Soviet foreign propagandists on
Soviet domestic economic policies and to assail Chinese military
policies by implication. For example, a 31 December commentary
charges foreign propagandists with attacking Soviet policies in
an attempt to cover up the "anti-people" policies in their own
country. A 3 January program for the PLA on Soviet defense
capabilities asserts that atomic bombs cannot guarantee vi 2tory
in modern warfare and comments: "But shortsighted adventurists
are gambling on nuclear weapons."
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-14-
FBIS TRENDS
7 JANUARY 1970
S I N0-U, S, RELATIONS
PEKING ASSAILS AGNEW'S TAIWAN VISIT. HITS U,S, POLICIES
Vice President Agnew's Asian tour and Peking's customary year-end
reviewing of world events have provided the setting for a spate of
Chinese propaganda attacking U.S. policies Pte] ring standard lines.
Peking thus far has mentioned the Vice President's visits only to
the Philippines and Taiwan, the former prompting reports playing
up hostile demonstrators and the latter evoking attacks on the Vice
President's declaraticns of support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
According to NCNA on 5 January, the Vice President went to Taiwan
in an attempt by the United States to "perpetuate its occupation"
of Taiwan and to continue to use the island as "an outpost for
aggression" in Asia. NCNA quotes the Vice President as expressing a
U.S. intent to honor commitments to the Chiang regime, but it
ignores his remarks regarding initiatives toward relaxing tensions
with the mainland. The agency claims that the United States has
revealed its intention to prevent the Chinese people from "liberating"
Taiwan and to remain "stubbornly hostile to the Chin:;se people."
A low-level article on U.S. foreign policies, carried in the NCNA
domestic service's "worker-peasant-soldier battlefield" column on
4 January, takes aim at the Nixon Administration on familiar counts:
that the Administration has falsely posed as a peacemaker in an
effort to deceive the world; that its new Asian policy represents
an-effort to find scapegoats in Asia to pull U.S. chestnuts out of
the fire; and that the Administration has intensified collusion with
"social imperialism." The article seems to be part of a routine
effort to keep up the Chinese guard against a traditional enemy.
it -has not been disseminated in the foreign services of Radio Peking
or NCNA.
Other routine propaganda at the turn of the year characteristically
plays upon American internal unrest and dissent to draw a picture of
massive revolutionary ferment. A review of developments in the
United States during the past decade, carried by NCNA on 2 January,
gleefully notes that this ferment has increasingly taken the form
of "revolutionary vi.olance"--an "important indication of the American
people's new awakening in the 1960's." Typically, the Afro-American
movement is given pride of place in this account, which adds a
Maoist gloss by observing that "some advanced people" in this movement
began applying "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" to repudiate
black capitalism advocated by the Nixon Administration.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUSAK NURTURES MODERATE IMAGE, PRESSES PURGE OF LIBERALS
In a lengthy New Year interview published in RUDE PRAVO on 5 January,
CPCZ First Secretary Husak sustains his recent posture of holding
vengeful ultraconservatives at bay while serving notice that there
must be a wholesale purge of liberal dissidents in basic party
organizations before another party congress can be held.
As he had done in his 20 December interview following Kadar's visit
to Prague, Husak makes it clear that he is having troubles with both
the right and tt.',e left in his efforts to steer an acceptable course
under occupation conditions. While naming "the rightwing" as the
prime enemy and rejecting "endless democracy" and "anarchy," he also
takes note of pressures from the left in remarking that "certain
critical viewpoints are being voiced which I personally, let us say,
do not regard as necessarily correct" but which cannot be countere3
by "thumping on the table" to stop discussion. Today, he declaree,
"it is not possible for anyone in the leadership of the state to
abuse power," as had happened in the Novotny ere when "the leadership
found itself more or less in the hands of one single man, with
very average political qualities." January 1968 was "inevitable,"*
but not the ensuing anti-Soviet slanders by rightist forces which
continued "up to last Aoril," when Dubcek was dismissed as First
Secretary. "The former leadership," husak adds, "made possible,
permitted, and tolerated their inimical activity."
Husak makes it clear that party elections and the next party congress
will not be held until the political hue of the party rank and file
has been altered. Thus he declares that the annual membership
meetings which are usually held at the start of the year "will be
delayed by the exchange of membership cards" and that "in my opinion,
the elections might be expected after the party congress,," He
explains that "ire want to orient the party on the main political
alma before the party congress." Party "elections" are in fact a
continuing current phenomenon: the Bratislava PRAVDA on 30 December
* Prague TV, in reporting the interview on the 4th, titled it "Why
January Was Necessary," implying that Husak's remarks amounted largely
to a defense of the January 1968 liberal takeover; no such title wns
used by Radio Bratislava or by CTK, both of which carried the text
of the interview.
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reported that the leaO,ing secretary of the Kosice city party organiza-
tion, Holeczy, had asked to be released from the post and had
"expressed the recommendai;ion of higher party organs" regarding his
successor, who was "then unanimously elected."
MOSCOW A fairly long 6 January TASS summary of Husak's interview
follove customary Soviet, practice in portraying it as a
progress report on the fight against rightist elements, omitting
Husak's explanation of the reasons for the January 1968 changes and
his assurances the.t Injustices will be avoided in combatting liberal
elements. Soviet media had totally ignored Husak's 20 December
interview with MTI following Kadar's Prague visit, in which the CPCZ
leader took a more explicitly middle-of-the-road stance in vowing
to resist pressures from both right and left.
Soviet media continue the current practice of featuring articles by
Czechoslovak ultraconservatives to mark special occasions. PRAVDA
on 2 January carries a New Year article by Jiri Hajek, chief editor
of the CPCZ weekly TVOQBA, established in September 1969 to replace
the liberal POLITIKA which had been suspended in April. The
unrelievedly hardline article includes a mild tribute to "the present
CPCZ leadership," which has "in the past summer been able to resolutely
rebuff the latest attempt of open revolutionary provocatir a," and
reports that "the process of purging the party from top " bottom
of ;ts opportunist elements is underway at present." In connection
with this year's 25th liberation anniversary, Hajek adds, the youth
especially must be told that "the soldiers of the land of the Soviets
and the Soviet people brought us freedom, state independence, and
happiness." Hajek goes to unprecedented lengths in charging that the
raising of "the so-called 'Czechoslovak question"' at the June 1969
international party conference in Moscow resulted from a plot by
"revisionist renegades" to "blow up this conference."
Typical of Moscow's own comment around the turn of theiear is a
27 December KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article by the paper's Prague
correspondent presenting a mixed picture of progress toward
"normaliza:;ion" in the occupied country. While approving the
"gradually" developing "unity" and "integration" of the workers
and youth, respectively, the correspondent deplores the open display
of a brochure entitled "Lenin in Czechoslovakia" which allegedly
underplays Lenin's drive against "opportunists." He adds that "such
a Lenin, angry and boldly going to the offensive, is also feared
by opportunists today."
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YOUTH LEADERS' SUICIDES PROMPT DISTRICT PARTY PURGE
Recent indications that the Hoxha regime's ^fforts to "revolutionize"
Albanian society and to create a "new Albanian man" are meeting
resistance and that the party is cracking down on "conservative"
elements are reinforced by a 20 Decaal)er ZERI I FOPULLIT article
which reports for the firot time shat two Tepelene communist youth
leaders committed suicide on an unspecified date in 1969 and di."ulgez
that the district party leadership was purged as a result. Accc.rding
to the article, the two youths had been wrongfully condemned by the
district party committee bureau as "traitors and energies of the party
and people." The article does not spell out the nature of the
"slanders" against the youths in detail, but it praises them as
"vanguard militants" and makes clear that their attempts to fight
for the party's line on the emancipation of women and youth were
what aroused opposition from "the class enemy."
Emphasizing the seriousness with which the regime views the incident,
the paper reports that the party Central Committee met on an
unspecified date to discuss the matter and "gravely denounced the
mistaken attitude of the Tepelene district's leading members." It
adds that the party Secretariat also met and that Hoxha delivered a
programmatic speech or. 18 October entitled "The Rights and Freedoms
of Women and Youth Should Be Deeply Understood and Protected By All."
Hoxha's speech got no publicity at the time it was delivered and
still has not been released in full, but a belated report of its
contents in ZERI I POPULLIT on 14 December appears in retrospect to
have been intend as a prelude to the disclosure a week later of
the suicides and the ensuing shakeup in the Tepelene district.
The suicides evidently took place some time in the summer or early
fall. In what may be read now as pointed allusions to the Tepelene
affair, the 14 December report said Hoxha's October speech raised
problems of "deepening socialist democracy and ensuring the rights
of women and. youth," warned against "gossip, slander, and conservatism,"
and acknowledged that "the class struggle" is taking place "within
the party ranks." The report described the speech as a whole as
concerned with "the struggle for the revolutionization of every
aspect of the country's life" and said it was being studied at every
organizational level.
Following the October meeting of the Secretariat and Hoxha's address,
the 20 December article rer,rts, a plenum of the Tepelene district
"rehabilitated" the deceased youths and "dismissed" three district
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party secretaries from their posts. The plenum, it adds, also took
"punitive measures against other comrades who committed mistakes,
and the principal slanderer was publicly tried and was given the
heaviest possible sentence as a slanderer."
The disclosure cif the Tepelene incident suggests that the regime hopes
to we it to justify an intensif:t,ation of the prese..t phase of the
ideological-political revolutionization campaign. (Albania instituted
its mini-version of a cultural revolution. in February 1967, designed
to "emancipate" youth and women and to abolish all religious
institutions and bourgeois vestiges). Thus the article emphasizes
that party cadres should "draw lessons" from the incident and implies
that any future evidences of "negative phenomena," "alien concepts,"
and"ccnservativism" will be dealt with severely. The article concludes
that the incident underscores a need "to strengthen the party's
political-ideological and organizational work and the further
education of the masses." All basic and mass organizations as well
ao working centers and agricultural cooperatives, it adds, have
already "begun an analysis of the state of their affairs in the light
of Comrade Hoxha's speech, and a sound spirit of self-criticism is
being observed everywhere."
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