TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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~:S '1'ItENDS
1 APRtL 1970
POLISH, CZECH Pul~lr~h comment on EY?SUrt revoal.s evidonce oi' pique
VIEWPOINTS at the slow progress of Warsaw'u own negotiations
with the FIiG on Crude and political questions. Thus,
PAP commentator Guz on the 20th charges that "contrary to the
assurances of its chancellor," the FRG is "still chicaning the GDR
in countless fields" of political and economic life and mtat aet~tle
"quite a number of matters" if it'real.ly wants" to normalize relations
with the GDR. Several Polish comments stress the significance of
Brandt's visit to Erfurt itself, a 20 March ZYCTE WARSZAWY commentator
calling this "a formal., material expression or recognition of the
existc:~e of two states" on German soil and thereby "a great historical
victory of the sacialiet camp." A week].~r POL'2TYKA commentator on the
27th makes the game point but adds that 'by coming to Erfurt" Brandt
"has proved his political realism" demonstrated iri'his early policy
statements. More typicall;{, moat other Polish commentators assert
that Brandt must still prove :pis realism by recognizing Polish borders
and the GDR.
Czechoslovak comment, uniformly stressing the need for FRG recognition
of the GDR and the theme that Brandt must prove his words by deeds,
expresses doubt that he has offered much so far. Bratislava PRAVDA
commentator Sliuka notes on the 20th that Brandt failed to make at?~y
statement on recognition of the status quo or Europe's present
division, but; adds hopes that at future talks Brandt will maintain
"a more realistic policy." As have previous Czechoslovak comments on
Brandt, poet-Erfurt evaluations credit him with "a more realistic
outlook on facts as they are 3.n Europe" than his predecessors. A
SMENA commentator on the 20th ties the Erfurt summit with FRG talks
with Moscow and Warsaw, noting that Brandt "needs positive results"
from the Moscow talks before his Washington visit so he can meet
President Nixon "with at least same sort of success" in his Eastern
policy. He terms the Erfurt results "extraordinarily significant"
in broader respects than dust German internal matters.
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CONFIDEN'T'IAL FBIS TRL`'NDS
1 APRIL 1970
CZECHOS~.OVAKIA
RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL IMPUTES TROTSKIYISM TO LIBERAL REFO~irERS
7.'hc most serious charge agairat the 1968 Czechoslovak liberals to
date is made in a 28 March RUDE PRAVO editorial by the paper's chief
editor, CPCZ Secretariat member Miroslav Moc, who declares in effect
that the liberals' depradationa were similar to and worse than those
of the alleged 1931 Trotskiyite plot in the Soviet Union. In
summarizing the editorial the tame day, CTK underscores this central
point by citing it both in the lead paragraph and the body of its
summary. Moc's authoritative editorial raises the possibility of
criminal trials of liberals who have been expelled from the CPCZ--
most notably Josef Smrkovaky, whose expulsion was announced on 21 Me~rch,
and Dubcek, whose "suspension" from the party was announced the same
day. The progressive downgrading of Dubcek since April 1969 has
followed step by step that of Smrkovsky.
Where the Trotskiyite movement of some 40 years ago was only a plot,
Moc notes, similar ideas were actually implemented byr the modern
"rightists": "In 1931, the Trotskiyite plans for a counterrevolution
in the Soviet Union were masked in a slogan of 'political reform' and
led to demands for founding a 'new workers party.'" He adds that
"we could see a similar process also in our country in 1968, but
already put into practice and adapted to present conditions."
All but branding the Dubcek liberalization directly with the
Trotskiyite label, Moc sa,}rs "it is not difficult to determine its
roots and unoriginal character," recalling that the "utopian"
Trotskiyite plot's "theory of 'sntibureaucra~tism' [also employed as
the main line of attack against Novotny in 1968] influenced the
final transition of its exponents to the platform of open, militant
anticommunism." Presaging further intensification of the purge, the
editorial adds that "only in the future shall we be able to assess
and express in figures what 1968 had cost us, when opportunism had
allowed counterrevolution to turn self-criticism into a murderous
weapon." It extols the "cleansing political process" currently being
carried out through the exchange of party membership cards.
Soviet broadcast media have not so far been heard to mention the
Moc editorial. They have in the past manifested caution regarding
a "Trotskiyite" role in the Czechoslovak liberalization. Soviet media
did not mention an alleged Trotskiyite plot surfaced by Prague media
in January which purportedly had aimed, with Western aid, at
hampering the lost-invasion "normalization" process and which had
allegedly played a mayor role in the August 1969 riots on the first
anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion. Prague's publicity for the
January "plot" did not--unlike the present RUDE PRAVO editorial--impute
Trotskiyism to the whole 1968 liberalization movement itself.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS
1 APRIL iyi0
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SMRKOVSKY ATTACKED The catalog of charges against Smrkovsky is spelled
IN RADIO TALKS out in a aeries of two talks carried in the
Prague domestic service on 28 and 29 March by
Karel Janik, entitled "We Are No Longer With You; We Know You Now."
The first talk takes a passing swipe at such other expellees from the
party as Kriegel, Boruvka, Cisar, Mlynar, and Spacek in leading iip ~o
its main attack on "a politician who became the proi;otype for myths
and illusions--Josef Smrkovsky." The second talk winds up with the
ultimate charge that Smrkovsky's transgressions "were tantamount to a
betrayal of the party."
Smrkovsky's continued popularity, as manifested by the fact that he
still "hands out his autographs," is revealed anew as a mayor sore
point to the conservatives through Janik's efforts to demonstrate
Smrkovsky's rank opportunism and consequent unworthiness of such
popularity. Among other things, the commentator charges that the
fallen liberal leader, despite his imprisonment in the 1950'x, was
"one of the obedient crowd surrounding Novotny" and, before the
Januesy 1968 plenum which ousted Novotny as party leader, "offered
his personal help in exchange for one of the offices held by Novotny."
After the latter "rebuffed" him, Smrkovsky "joined the so-called men
of January." The commentator also points out that the "two-faced"
leader had initially condemned the ultraliberal "2,000 Words" document
of June 1968, an attitude which brought him "into conflict with the
journalists and pseuc:~politicians," including "Dubcek, Cernik, and
others." Thus, a few u9ys later he publicly "made common cause" with
the signatories of "this counterrevolutionary document."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 APRIL 1970
POLEf~IIC ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PRAGUE REOPENS DISPUTE WITH BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY
The Czechoslovak party press, which engaged in a heated polemical
exchange with the Italian CP press only a month agog reopens its
controversy with the British CP on 26 March with articles in the
party paper RUDE PRAVO and the party youth organ MLADA FRONTA.
While the polemic erupting last September between the Czechoslovak '
. and British party press centered mainly on the latter's refusal to
accept Czechoslovak materials justifying the August invasion,~*
the current furor appears to arise chiefly from British criticisms
of actions by the present Prague regime.
For example, a RUDE PRAVO article by the paper's London correspondent
Dusan Rovensky takes issue with an editorial i.n the British party
paper MORNING STAR on 23 March which decried Dubcek's suspension
from the party as an act "bound to arouse concern among communists
outside Czechoslovakia," even though the conduct of Czechoslovak
party affairs is "a matter for its members to decide." Rovensky
in effect reiterates Prague's arguments of last year which implied
that MORNING STAR had engaged in a biased evaluation of 1968 develop-
ments. "The greatest assistance" the British party press could
provide to Czechoslovak communists, he argued, would be to reveal
"what forces actually brought Czechoslovakia to the verge of
economic and political catastrophe" and to show "the real profile of
opportunism and its exponents."
The MLADA FRONTA article rebuts an article from the ~3ritish CP youth
publication COGITO, which is said to have charged that the changes
in the Czechoslovak CP leadership last April had resulted from
"pressure from outside," and to have made an "insulting" reference to
a "Quisling government" which would "have to go." Stating that
COGITO even "advises forces hostile to socialism [in Czechoslovakia]
how they should proceed," MLADA FRONTA concludes that the British CP
~' For a discussion of the polemic with the Italian CP, see the FBIS
SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA for 12 March 1970, pages 10-12.
*~' For a discussion of last year's exchange between the British and
the Czechoslovak party press, see the TRENDS of 31 December x_969,
pages 24-25, and the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of ~+ December
1969, pages 18-20.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 APRIL 1970
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"should not remain silent" on this egregious violation of "communist,
norms." Like previous Prague censures of the British party press,
this one alleges that COGITO d~.storted "the events of August 1968
and the circumstances which led to them" and virtually ignored "the
danger of the rightist center." Although MORNING STAR on the 28th
carried a brief summary of the RUDE PRAVO and MLADA FRONTA articles,
no comment on the Czechoslovak criticisms is a,ailable as yet.
Background: Among Moscow and its East European allies, Prague is
virtually alone in attempting to rebut the continuing criticisms of
Czechoslovak events appearing in some West European CP papers.
While Moscow has frequently attacked anti-Soviet West European
communist intellectuals repudiated by their own parties, such as
the French CP's Roger Garaudy, ousted Austrian CP member Ernst
Fischer, and the IL MANIFESTO group expelled from the Italian CP,
it has not acknowledged the continuing criticisms of the Czechoslovak
situation appearing in the press of several West European CP's. It
evidently prefers to continue to depict the anti-Soviet dissidence
in the Wast European parties that arose from the August 1968 invasion
as being confined to only a few isolated heretics.
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CONI'IDLN'.L'IAL 1~l3I5 '1'Ri;NDS
1 APRIf~ 19'0
ROMANIA AND USSR
ROMANIA REAFFIRMS RIGHT TO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AUTONOMY
An article in the Romanian party monthly LUPTA llli CLASA and a speech by
Romani. an Foreign Minister Maneacu, both publicized on 28 March,
register new Romanian defiance to Soviet integrationist pressures by
reasserting the country's right to control its own armed forces,
economic resources, and relations with other states,
From the Soviet side, another apparent salvo in the latest round of
propaganda pressures against Bucharest is fired by Warsaw Pact
Commander in Chief Yakubovakiy in an article in KOMMUNIST No. 5, which
escalates the Soviet line on the need to strengthen "collective"
defense measures in the face of a growing imperialist threat. In
the context of discussing the need to strengthen the Warsaw Pact,
the article, as reviewed by TASS on 31 March, points out that
"the concern for strengthening defenses is not only a national task
of one or another socialist state but a matter of vital concern
to the entire community." The TASS account singles out for direct
quotation Yakubovskiy's blunt warning that "any weakening of this
unity, even the slightest disregard for our common internationalist
interests as far as the military defense of socialism is concerned,
is inadmissible." The implications of such language for Romania
seem to be clear.
ARTICLE IN ,A~lengthy article in the Romanian Communist Party
LUPTA ~E CLASA theoretical monthly LUPTA DE CLASA, as summarized
by AGERPRES on 28 March, vigorously rejects any
view of proletarian internationalism that limits national sovereignty
and pointedly reaffirms Romania's right to develop relations with
socialist countries outside the Soviet bloc. ?t also reaffirms each
state's right to control its own armed forces and to use its naiul?al
resources as it sees fit. The article does not name the Soviet
Union, but appears to be responsive to Soviet pressures for economic
and military integration. It may also be read as a defensse of
Romania's apparent continuing reluctance to allow Warsaw ~~act maneuvers
on its soil and its refusal to abandon ii,b neutralist posture on the
Sino-Soviet dispute at a time when Moscow is trying to organize its
East European allies to meet the Chinese challenge.
.~
~' President Ceausescu, addressing military commanders and staff
officers on 5 February, had expressed the same view in underlining that
membership in the Warsaw Pact did not compromise Romania's right to
control its own armed forces.
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1 nPrz:rz, 19~~0
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Lrrtitled "SovcrciNrrt;y--M inal.icnublc Al:t;ributc of t;hc Statca in the
World 'Today," the article irr ei'fect challenges the f3rczhncv doctrine
by ussertin~; that, "national sovereignty cannot bc: reckconcd as rncrely
an idaallatic 'invention,' and arr 'abstract,' 'formal,' 'narrow'
category of bourgeoialuw."* SoclallaL anternationaliam, i't goes on
t;o explain, Boca not diminish the sovereignty of a aociAaliat state:
"'i'he world sociali~~t system is not arrd cannot 'be a bloc where
individual states weld into a whole, ceasing to exert their powers,
their right to indepcndc~nt;.y dr_cide on the problcrns of domestic
devcloprncnt und. of.' international policy."
Asserting Romania's right to economic autonomy despite its membership
in CtMA, the journal si;reaaca that national sovereignty "presupposes
the exclusive right of the socialist state to exert to the full its
prerogatives concerning its nsa;ional territory, the riches of its
soil and subsoil , and to freely use all its available resources."
It also presupposes the right "to independently exercise command of
its armed forces, and to take necessary measures--both individual
and collective--for defending the gains of socialism and peace."
A belief in Marxism-Leninie:: and membership in the socialist corrunon-
wealth, the article underlines, have "nothing in common with the
creation of suprastate bodies or organizations or with a supranational
leading center to which prerogatives, responsibilities, or attributes
of the individual communist parties or governments of the responsible
countries would be transferred."
Mutual assistance and cooperation between states, the article concludes,
can only be based on "steadfast observance of the principle of
national sovereignty, in the spirit of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other states," and can only be concluded by party and
"constitutional state bodies of the respective countries"--an
apparent reminder that the National Assembly must authorize any
Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil.
13y implication defending its close ties with the me~verick Yugoslavs
and its improving relations with the PRC and Albania, the journal
insists that coop?ration should not be "limited to a restricted group
of socialist states, but should be expanded among all the socialist
countries."
* ':i~rpical of the Soviet propaganda on this subject is a 29 January
article in SOVIET RUSSIA by 0. Pavlov which observed that the notion
of sovereignty is meaningless "merely as a category in international
law" divorced from its essential "class content."
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CONP'TUliN'T':iAL FBIS `T'RENDS
1 APRIL 1970
MANESCU :Cn a reps in to the Grand National Assembly on 27 March,
SPEECH I~'oreign Minister Manescu reiterates a proposal made by
Romania at the Geneva disarmament conference on 5 March
that would ban maneuvers on the territory oi' other states. According
to a 28 March SC:INTLIA account of his remarks, he also reaffirms
that Romania is ready to develop "collaboration" with the Warsaw
Pact states and to fight with them to repel aggression by ''the
imperialist" forces unleashed in "Europe" against a member state.
He adds that Romania also extends its "collaboration with the armies
of all the socialist states"--a familiar Romanian reminder that it
has military friends outside the Soviet bloc.
Echoing a theme in the LUP'I'A DL CLASA article, Manescu underlines
Romania's "steadfast assertion" of "the right of the people to
determine fir themselves their late, th? roads of economic and
socialist development, to ve masters of their resources, and to use
these resources for the benefit of their progress and of
international collaboration and security."
The only new element in Manescu's report is a more conciliatory posture
toward 'the Arab world, which he alleges has "misunderstood" Romanian
policies. The Romanian Government, he says, is making efforts to
remove such misunderstandings Rnd is achieving "positive results,"
adding that "possibilities exist for the full normalization of
relations with all the Arab countries." Manescu may have had in
mind the signing of a UAR-Romanian five-year trade and payments protocol
in Cairo on 5 March, Cairo media treated the event factually,
reporting details of the agreement and briefly noting that Nasir
received Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Burtica, Bucharest, on
the other hand, embellished its accounts: AGERPRES noted the "spirit
of cordiality and mutual understanding" in which the sides examined
trade and economic relations, and the "constructive spirit" in
which the meeting proceeded, while Bucharest radio described the
Nasir-Burtica meeting as held "in a cordial and sincere atmosphere."
A Romanian effort to improve relations with the Arab world may be
interpreted as an effort to ease an area of tension with Moscow on
a peripheral issue while remaining steadfast on the more central
questions of relations with '::he PRC and of military and economic
integration, questions which go to the heart of the problem of national
sovereignty.
ROMANIAN MINISTER As if to underline Romanian determination to pursue
? IN ~'cKING good relations with the PRC, Romanian media on
27 March publicized Foreign Trade Minister Burtica's
visit to Peking, where he was given high-level attention. Radio Bucharest
reported on the 28th that Burtica was received by Premier Chou En-Tai
and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and was later feted at a dinner given
by the acting foreign minister which was reportedly held "in an atmosphere
of warm friendship." The radio also reported that anew trade pact signed
between the two countries calls for "increased and diversified" trade in
1970.
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MIDDLE EAST
1 APRIL 1970
MOSOOW CALLS PHANTOM DECISION AN ATTFJ~IPT TO PLACATE ARABS
Moscow initiates only a modest amount of comment on the U.S. decision
on military and economic aid to Israel. Soviet media note Arab
assessments that the decision signifies no change in Washington's
commitment to Israel. TASS on the 28th cites the Cairo AL-AHRAM
as reporting that the United States and Israel have reached a secret
agreement on "deliveries of 'new combat planes from U.S. strategic
reserves' to Tel Aviv" early in 1971, under which Israel will receive
replacement aircraft for those lost in military operations. And on
the 31st TASS reports without comment from Washington that a State
Department spokesman said deliveries of U.S. arms, including artillery,
armored cars, and spare parts for tanks and combat planes, began 3n
mid-January this year.
Commentators on the Moscow domestic service roundtable program on the
29Th pursue the line that the decision is an attempt to placate the
Arabs and view it in the context of an attempt to "soften the
impression" of U.S. unconditional support for Israel in light of a
hardening Arab stance toward U.S. oil interests. A Matveyev article
in IZVESTTYA on the 26th assesses the "contradictory" nature of the
U.S. decision: Tf it re ally meant a refection of aircraft deliveries
to Israel, he says, Washington could be said to show an understanding
of the dangerous consequences of further aggravation of the situation.
But in fact, he says, the United States is not refusing Israel's
request for planes but "reserving it for the very near future."
Matveyev acknowledges that Secretary Rogers in his 23 March press
conference "proposed talks on limiting arms supplies" to the Middle
East, but goes on simply to remark that the Secretary said nothing
about Israeli withdrawal, the "primary foundation" for at~y efforts to
normalize the situation. TASS on the 26th also notes without comment
that Nasir, in a 2~+ March speech before the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)
parliamentary body, said the United States supports Israel by calling
for a restriction on arms deliveries to the Middle East. (TASS omits
Nasir's remark that the U.S. call comes at a time when the United
States "admits that Israel is by far superior to the Arabs in weapons
and air power.")
For its pari:i Moscow continues to insist on the righteousness of
Soviet deliveries of "defensive" arms to the Arabs. A Samilovskiy
foreign-language commentary on the 27th declares that "Zionist
propaganda" is making a "terrible fuss" about Soviet arms deliveries
to the UAR, ignoring the fact that the weapons are supplied "to the
victims of aggression and for their self defense." Following the
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CONE TDENTIAI, PDTS 7.'RENDS
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1 APRIL 1970
established pattern of citing UAR media and spokesmen for reports
of military actions, TASS attributes to a UAR Interior Ministry
spokesman a report on Israel's 31 March raids "on the northern
part of the Nile River delta," targets identified in Israeli
accounts as SA-2 missile bases.
USSR INTERESTS Moscow tgain defends the purity o'f its motives
IN MIDEAST in the i~~iddle East and rejects at~y notion that '
it is seeking to further its own interests theree
The Samilovakiy commentary on the 27th accuses "imperialist
propaganda" of attempting to foster Arab mistrust of the Soviet
Union and "to spread lies about special Soviet interests in the
Arab East." He dismisses this "slander" as an effort to cover up
the "aggressive Flans" of the "imperialists and Zionists" in the
area. Moscow also publicizes statements by UAR officials to
demonstrate its selfless stance: TASS on the 26th, reporting a
statement in Cairo by UAR Ambassador to the Soviet Union Ghalib,
says he "emphasized that the Soviet Union pursues no selfish goals"
in the region and that he "pointed to the fruitlessness" of
"imperialist attempts to sow distrust" in UAR-Soviet relations.
On the 29th TASS quotes UAR Vice President as-Sadat as telling a
Cairo rally that any attempts to "cast doubt on the noble Soviet
attitude toward the UAR only serve the interests of our enemies."
Panelists on the 29 March roundtable program complain of the
"remarkable shamelessness" of some American newspapers in asserting
that the Soviet Union ''is edging its way toward Middle East oil"
and therefore is reluctant to see a settlement of the conflict
there. Commentator Shragin asserts that the Nasir speech unmasked
such attempts to disrupt UAR-Soviet relations. He adds that Nasir
said~the United States had gone so far as to present the UAR with
"an obviously unacceptable plan" for settlement of the crisis and
tb assert that it had been agreed upon with the Soviet Union and
constituted a ,joint draft of the two powers, Nasir added, says
Shragin, that the USSR "certainly does nit regard this plan as one
which expresses its view." (Nasir actually stated that "the truth
became known when we asked the Soviet Union about it; it became
clear that it was a U.5. plan and the Soviet Union did not consider
it as representing its viewpoint.") Moscow made the same charge
earlier, in a Tyssovskiy domestic service commentary on 27 January
which claimed that the United States tried to create the impression
that the U.S. proposals regarding the UAR and-Jordan "were allegedly
agreed upon with the Soviet Union," a "falsification" soon exposed
by the Arab countries:. The TASS account of the Nasir speech does
not pick up this passage, although it remarks that Nasir "exposed
and ridiculed attempts by the United States and its allies" to
drive a wedge in UAR-Soviet relations.
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l APRIL 1970
TASS represents Nasir as stating that the UAR agrees with the
Soviet Union on the need for s. political solution, but omits
his qualifier "if there is a possibility of such a solution," and
also his statement that the only alternative to a political
solution is to regain Arab rights by force. Nasir also stated
that the UAR "fully agrees with the Soviet Union on two points"--
complete Israeli withd:^awe~l and Arab refection o~..' direct
negotiations with Israel. The TASS account dissociates the
USSR from the position on direct talks, presenting Nasir as
saying there is complete UAR-Soviet accord on apolitical solution
based on complete Israeli withdrawal, and as adding that the Arabs
will not yield an inch of their land and will not agree to direct
talks with Israel.
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PODGGRNYY IN IRAv
1 APRIL '1970
USSR HAILS BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING PODGORNYY VISIT TO IRAN
Moscow gives voluminous publicity to the 25-31 March of."icial visit t o
Iran by Podgornyy, rebroadcasting his speeches at various functions and,
as during past Soviet-Iranian visit exchanges, playing up the advantages
to Iran of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the positive
e~:ample this sets for the Middle East. The propaganda highlights
Podgornyy's visit in Isfahan to the steel mill and a pumping station
of the trans-Iranian gas pipeline, projects being undertaken with
Soviet assistance; these projects, and the Aralt River hydroelectric
project, are cited in the communique, and were also featured ir.. material
surrounding Kosygin's April 1968 visit to Iran. TASS recounts Podgo rnyy's
visit to Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf , noting that it is one of the
country's oil export centers and that the Soviet guests "welcomed with
interest" the Iranian suggestion to visit Kharg and inspect industrial
enterprises. Podgornyy is not reported as having suggested Soviet
readiness to assist Iran in making use of its natural resources of
"oil, gas, and nonferrous metals," as Kosygin did during his visit,
Publicity for the visit--nine percent of total comment in the week
ending 29 March--considerably exceeds that for Kosygin's April 1968
visit and the Shah's visit to the USSR in October of the same year,
the former representing four percent and the latter less than three
percent of total comment. The propaganda does not suggest any new
developments in bilateral relations emanating from the visii, but the
lavish propaganda treatment may conceivably underline a Soviet desire
to sta;xe out its interests in Iran in light df the scheduled Bx?itish
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf Broadcasts in Persian, which began
playing up the impending visit from the time it was announced on
25 February, largely avoided touching on sensitive issues: Only in
an 11 March broadcast did Moscow refer t o "dangerous" CENTO plans for
the region, and comment on 8 and 18 March routinely attacked "imperialist"
exploitation of Iranian oil.
Outlining views on various international. questions as well as un
bilateral relations, the unremarkable communique on the visit, carried
by Moscow domestic serv~..a on the 31st, falls more in the pattern of
the communique on Kosygin's visit than that concluding the Shah's Soviet
trip in October 1968. During the Shah's visit, according to that
communique, a "useful exchange of opinions " was held on bilateral
relations and international problems , but other than a brief reference
to the United Nations the communique was confined to bilateral--
primarily economic--topics.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8
l API7IL 7.9'x0
The current communiqu?, like that on ICosygin's visit, sums up views
on the Middle East, Vietnam, and colonialism, and additionally
touches on a European security conference and disarmament The
views of the sides are said to be identical or clo?e "on a number of
problems"; in the April 1968 communique this was rendered "on the
problems discuesed~" One of Moscow's infrequent references to a
nuclear-free zone in the Middle East appears in the disarmament
passage, in which the sides confirmed that disarmament, as we'll as
"the creation of zones frAe of nuclear arms, including those in
the Near and Middle East," would constitute effective steps toward
strengthAning international security The passage on the Middle
East confl.Zct reflects Moscow's standard position on implementation
of "all provisions" of the November '1967 Security Council resolution
and the view that 'lsraeli withdrawal constitutes the "main condition"
for a settlement The sides also call for respecting the lawful
rights of the Arab peoples, including the population of Palestine,
and for observance of "relevant UN resolutions," which ere not further
identified, thus avoiding placing the Soviets on record as subscribing
to 'the cease-fire as well as other UN resolutionas
On bilateral relations, the aides note "with special satisfaction" that
the Soviet-Iranian frontier is one of peace and cooperation Podgornyy
remarked in a banquet speech on the 25th that there had been no disputed
border questions for a long time, and "the questions currently arising"
are being resolved, he said, in a spirit of mutual. understanding and
good neighborliness. The communique also expresses the satisfaction of
both sides with successes achieved within the framework of the point
economic cooperation commission in discovering prospects for expanding
economic relations "for the next 12 to 15 years " The communique on the
Shah's October 1968 visit had called on this commission to determine such
prospects for a 12- to 15-year period, "having in mind a greater use of
natural resources and other economic and technical resources" of both
countriese Prior to Podgornyy's visit, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister
Patolichev held talks in Teheran in mid-March on anew five-year tY?ade
agreement for~1971-1975, and Teheran radio had reported that a draft
would be prepared "in the near future" and signed in Moscow The
communique notes that the recent Teheran trade talks will be continued
in Moscow "wi.th a view to signing a new trade agreements" With regard
to scientific and technical cooperation, the sides deemed 3t necessary,
the communique says, "to hold further talks" with a view to concluding
an appropriate agreement
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8