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April 1, 1970
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1Re'i~ase Ob~~9~ ~ t>?t Rbp85T008~5RQ0~3,~ ~ ~~~ # r~ ~i M~ ~ j ~?:;` t ~:S '1'ItENDS 1 APRtL 1970 POLISH, CZECH Pul~lr~h comment on EY?SUrt revoal.s evidonce oi' pique VIEWPOINTS at the slow progress of Warsaw'u own negotiations with the FIiG on Crude and political questions. Thus, PAP commentator Guz on the 20th charges that "contrary to the assurances of its chancellor," the FRG is "still chicaning the GDR in countless fields" of political and economic life and mtat aet~tle "quite a number of matters" if it' wants" to normalize relations with the GDR. Several Polish comments stress the significance of Brandt's visit to Erfurt itself, a 20 March ZYCTE WARSZAWY commentator calling this "a formal., material expression or recognition of the existc:~e of two states" on German soil and thereby "a great historical victory of the sacialiet camp." A week].~r POL'2TYKA commentator on the 27th makes the game point but adds that 'by coming to Erfurt" Brandt "has proved his political realism" demonstrated iri'his early policy statements. More typicall;{, moat other Polish commentators assert that Brandt must still prove :pis realism by recognizing Polish borders and the GDR. Czechoslovak comment, uniformly stressing the need for FRG recognition of the GDR and the theme that Brandt must prove his words by deeds, expresses doubt that he has offered much so far. Bratislava PRAVDA commentator Sliuka notes on the 20th that Brandt failed to make at?~y statement on recognition of the status quo or Europe's present division, but; adds hopes that at future talks Brandt will maintain "a more realistic policy." As have previous Czechoslovak comments on Brandt, poet-Erfurt evaluations credit him with "a more realistic outlook on facts as they are 3.n Europe" than his predecessors. A SMENA commentator on the 20th ties the Erfurt summit with FRG talks with Moscow and Warsaw, noting that Brandt "needs positive results" from the Moscow talks before his Washington visit so he can meet President Nixon "with at least same sort of success" in his Eastern policy. He terms the Erfurt results "extraordinarily significant" in broader respects than dust German internal matters. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 CONFIDEN'T'IAL FBIS TRL`'NDS 1 APRIL 1970 CZECHOS~.OVAKIA RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL IMPUTES TROTSKIYISM TO LIBERAL REFO~irERS 7.'hc most serious charge agairat the 1968 Czechoslovak liberals to date is made in a 28 March RUDE PRAVO editorial by the paper's chief editor, CPCZ Secretariat member Miroslav Moc, who declares in effect that the liberals' depradationa were similar to and worse than those of the alleged 1931 Trotskiyite plot in the Soviet Union. In summarizing the editorial the tame day, CTK underscores this central point by citing it both in the lead paragraph and the body of its summary. Moc's authoritative editorial raises the possibility of criminal trials of liberals who have been expelled from the CPCZ-- most notably Josef Smrkovaky, whose expulsion was announced on 21 Me~rch, and Dubcek, whose "suspension" from the party was announced the same day. The progressive downgrading of Dubcek since April 1969 has followed step by step that of Smrkovsky. Where the Trotskiyite movement of some 40 years ago was only a plot, Moc notes, similar ideas were actually implemented byr the modern "rightists": "In 1931, the Trotskiyite plans for a counterrevolution in the Soviet Union were masked in a slogan of 'political reform' and led to demands for founding a 'new workers party.'" He adds that "we could see a similar process also in our country in 1968, but already put into practice and adapted to present conditions." All but branding the Dubcek liberalization directly with the Trotskiyite label, Moc sa,}rs "it is not difficult to determine its roots and unoriginal character," recalling that the "utopian" Trotskiyite plot's "theory of 'sntibureaucra~tism' [also employed as the main line of attack against Novotny in 1968] influenced the final transition of its exponents to the platform of open, militant anticommunism." Presaging further intensification of the purge, the editorial adds that "only in the future shall we be able to assess and express in figures what 1968 had cost us, when opportunism had allowed counterrevolution to turn self-criticism into a murderous weapon." It extols the "cleansing political process" currently being carried out through the exchange of party membership cards. Soviet broadcast media have not so far been heard to mention the Moc editorial. They have in the past manifested caution regarding a "Trotskiyite" role in the Czechoslovak liberalization. Soviet media did not mention an alleged Trotskiyite plot surfaced by Prague media in January which purportedly had aimed, with Western aid, at hampering the lost-invasion "normalization" process and which had allegedly played a mayor role in the August 1969 riots on the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion. Prague's publicity for the January "plot" did not--unlike the present RUDE PRAVO editorial--impute Trotskiyism to the whole 1968 liberalization movement itself. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS 1 APRIL iyi0 -34- SMRKOVSKY ATTACKED The catalog of charges against Smrkovsky is spelled IN RADIO TALKS out in a aeries of two talks carried in the Prague domestic service on 28 and 29 March by Karel Janik, entitled "We Are No Longer With You; We Know You Now." The first talk takes a passing swipe at such other expellees from the party as Kriegel, Boruvka, Cisar, Mlynar, and Spacek in leading iip ~o its main attack on "a politician who became the proi;otype for myths and illusions--Josef Smrkovsky." The second talk winds up with the ultimate charge that Smrkovsky's transgressions "were tantamount to a betrayal of the party." Smrkovsky's continued popularity, as manifested by the fact that he still "hands out his autographs," is revealed anew as a mayor sore point to the conservatives through Janik's efforts to demonstrate Smrkovsky's rank opportunism and consequent unworthiness of such popularity. Among other things, the commentator charges that the fallen liberal leader, despite his imprisonment in the 1950'x, was "one of the obedient crowd surrounding Novotny" and, before the Januesy 1968 plenum which ousted Novotny as party leader, "offered his personal help in exchange for one of the offices held by Novotny." After the latter "rebuffed" him, Smrkovsky "joined the so-called men of January." The commentator also points out that the "two-faced" leader had initially condemned the ultraliberal "2,000 Words" document of June 1968, an attitude which brought him "into conflict with the journalists and pseuc:~politicians," including "Dubcek, Cernik, and others." Thus, a few u9ys later he publicly "made common cause" with the signatories of "this counterrevolutionary document." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 1 APRIL 1970 POLEf~IIC ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA PRAGUE REOPENS DISPUTE WITH BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY The Czechoslovak party press, which engaged in a heated polemical exchange with the Italian CP press only a month agog reopens its controversy with the British CP on 26 March with articles in the party paper RUDE PRAVO and the party youth organ MLADA FRONTA. While the polemic erupting last September between the Czechoslovak ' . and British party press centered mainly on the latter's refusal to accept Czechoslovak materials justifying the August invasion,~* the current furor appears to arise chiefly from British criticisms of actions by the present Prague regime. For example, a RUDE PRAVO article by the paper's London correspondent Dusan Rovensky takes issue with an editorial i.n the British party paper MORNING STAR on 23 March which decried Dubcek's suspension from the party as an act "bound to arouse concern among communists outside Czechoslovakia," even though the conduct of Czechoslovak party affairs is "a matter for its members to decide." Rovensky in effect reiterates Prague's arguments of last year which implied that MORNING STAR had engaged in a biased evaluation of 1968 develop- ments. "The greatest assistance" the British party press could provide to Czechoslovak communists, he argued, would be to reveal "what forces actually brought Czechoslovakia to the verge of economic and political catastrophe" and to show "the real profile of opportunism and its exponents." The MLADA FRONTA article rebuts an article from the ~3ritish CP youth publication COGITO, which is said to have charged that the changes in the Czechoslovak CP leadership last April had resulted from "pressure from outside," and to have made an "insulting" reference to a "Quisling government" which would "have to go." Stating that COGITO even "advises forces hostile to socialism [in Czechoslovakia] how they should proceed," MLADA FRONTA concludes that the British CP ~' For a discussion of the polemic with the Italian CP, see the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA for 12 March 1970, pages 10-12. *~' For a discussion of last year's exchange between the British and the Czechoslovak party press, see the TRENDS of 31 December x_969, pages 24-25, and the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of ~+ December 1969, pages 18-20. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 1 APRIL 1970 -36- "should not remain silent" on this egregious violation of "communist, norms." Like previous Prague censures of the British party press, this one alleges that COGITO d~.storted "the events of August 1968 and the circumstances which led to them" and virtually ignored "the danger of the rightist center." Although MORNING STAR on the 28th carried a brief summary of the RUDE PRAVO and MLADA FRONTA articles, no comment on the Czechoslovak criticisms is a,ailable as yet. Background: Among Moscow and its East European allies, Prague is virtually alone in attempting to rebut the continuing criticisms of Czechoslovak events appearing in some West European CP papers. While Moscow has frequently attacked anti-Soviet West European communist intellectuals repudiated by their own parties, such as the French CP's Roger Garaudy, ousted Austrian CP member Ernst Fischer, and the IL MANIFESTO group expelled from the Italian CP, it has not acknowledged the continuing criticisms of the Czechoslovak situation appearing in the press of several West European CP's. It evidently prefers to continue to depict the anti-Soviet dissidence in the Wast European parties that arose from the August 1968 invasion as being confined to only a few isolated heretics. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 CONI'IDLN'.L'IAL 1~l3I5 '1'Ri;NDS 1 APRIf~ 19'0 ROMANIA AND USSR ROMANIA REAFFIRMS RIGHT TO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AUTONOMY An article in the Romanian party monthly LUPTA llli CLASA and a speech by Romani. an Foreign Minister Maneacu, both publicized on 28 March, register new Romanian defiance to Soviet integrationist pressures by reasserting the country's right to control its own armed forces, economic resources, and relations with other states, From the Soviet side, another apparent salvo in the latest round of propaganda pressures against Bucharest is fired by Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovakiy in an article in KOMMUNIST No. 5, which escalates the Soviet line on the need to strengthen "collective" defense measures in the face of a growing imperialist threat. In the context of discussing the need to strengthen the Warsaw Pact, the article, as reviewed by TASS on 31 March, points out that "the concern for strengthening defenses is not only a national task of one or another socialist state but a matter of vital concern to the entire community." The TASS account singles out for direct quotation Yakubovskiy's blunt warning that "any weakening of this unity, even the slightest disregard for our common internationalist interests as far as the military defense of socialism is concerned, is inadmissible." The implications of such language for Romania seem to be clear. ARTICLE IN ,A~lengthy article in the Romanian Communist Party LUPTA ~E CLASA theoretical monthly LUPTA DE CLASA, as summarized by AGERPRES on 28 March, vigorously rejects any view of proletarian internationalism that limits national sovereignty and pointedly reaffirms Romania's right to develop relations with socialist countries outside the Soviet bloc. ?t also reaffirms each state's right to control its own armed forces and to use its naiul?al resources as it sees fit. The article does not name the Soviet Union, but appears to be responsive to Soviet pressures for economic and military integration. It may also be read as a defensse of Romania's apparent continuing reluctance to allow Warsaw ~~act maneuvers on its soil and its refusal to abandon ii,b neutralist posture on the Sino-Soviet dispute at a time when Moscow is trying to organize its East European allies to meet the Chinese challenge. .~ ~' President Ceausescu, addressing military commanders and staff officers on 5 February, had expressed the same view in underlining that membership in the Warsaw Pact did not compromise Romania's right to control its own armed forces. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/0~/~;, r ~~f~DP85T008 ~;,~~0~~},, ,,030013-8 1 nPrz:rz, 19~~0 - 3 (i - Lrrtitled "SovcrciNrrt;y--M inal.icnublc Al:t;ributc of t;hc Statca in the World 'Today," the article irr ei'fect challenges the f3rczhncv doctrine by ussertin~; that, "national sovereignty cannot bc: reckconcd as rncrely an idaallatic 'invention,' and arr 'abstract,' 'formal,' 'narrow' category of bourgeoialuw."* SoclallaL anternationaliam, i't goes on t;o explain, Boca not diminish the sovereignty of a aociAaliat state: "'i'he world sociali~~t system is not arrd cannot 'be a bloc where individual states weld into a whole, ceasing to exert their powers, their right to indepcndc~nt;.y dr_cide on the problcrns of domestic devcloprncnt und. of.' international policy." Asserting Romania's right to economic autonomy despite its membership in CtMA, the journal si;reaaca that national sovereignty "presupposes the exclusive right of the socialist state to exert to the full its prerogatives concerning its nsa;ional territory, the riches of its soil and subsoil , and to freely use all its available resources." It also presupposes the right "to independently exercise command of its armed forces, and to take necessary measures--both individual and collective--for defending the gains of socialism and peace." A belief in Marxism-Leninie:: and membership in the socialist corrunon- wealth, the article underlines, have "nothing in common with the creation of suprastate bodies or organizations or with a supranational leading center to which prerogatives, responsibilities, or attributes of the individual communist parties or governments of the responsible countries would be transferred." Mutual assistance and cooperation between states, the article concludes, can only be based on "steadfast observance of the principle of national sovereignty, in the spirit of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states," and can only be concluded by party and "constitutional state bodies of the respective countries"--an apparent reminder that the National Assembly must authorize any Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil. 13y implication defending its close ties with the me~verick Yugoslavs and its improving relations with the PRC and Albania, the journal insists that coop?ration should not be "limited to a restricted group of socialist states, but should be expanded among all the socialist countries." * ':i~rpical of the Soviet propaganda on this subject is a 29 January article in SOVIET RUSSIA by 0. Pavlov which observed that the notion of sovereignty is meaningless "merely as a category in international law" divorced from its essential "class content." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 CONP'TUliN'T':iAL FBIS `T'RENDS 1 APRIL 1970 MANESCU :Cn a reps in to the Grand National Assembly on 27 March, SPEECH I~'oreign Minister Manescu reiterates a proposal made by Romania at the Geneva disarmament conference on 5 March that would ban maneuvers on the territory oi' other states. According to a 28 March SC:INTLIA account of his remarks, he also reaffirms that Romania is ready to develop "collaboration" with the Warsaw Pact states and to fight with them to repel aggression by ''the imperialist" forces unleashed in "Europe" against a member state. He adds that Romania also extends its "collaboration with the armies of all the socialist states"--a familiar Romanian reminder that it has military friends outside the Soviet bloc. Echoing a theme in the LUP'I'A DL CLASA article, Manescu underlines Romania's "steadfast assertion" of "the right of the people to determine fir themselves their late, th? roads of economic and socialist development, to ve masters of their resources, and to use these resources for the benefit of their progress and of international collaboration and security." The only new element in Manescu's report is a more conciliatory posture toward 'the Arab world, which he alleges has "misunderstood" Romanian policies. The Romanian Government, he says, is making efforts to remove such misunderstandings Rnd is achieving "positive results," adding that "possibilities exist for the full normalization of relations with all the Arab countries." Manescu may have had in mind the signing of a UAR-Romanian five-year trade and payments protocol in Cairo on 5 March, Cairo media treated the event factually, reporting details of the agreement and briefly noting that Nasir received Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Burtica, Bucharest, on the other hand, embellished its accounts: AGERPRES noted the "spirit of cordiality and mutual understanding" in which the sides examined trade and economic relations, and the "constructive spirit" in which the meeting proceeded, while Bucharest radio described the Nasir-Burtica meeting as held "in a cordial and sincere atmosphere." A Romanian effort to improve relations with the Arab world may be interpreted as an effort to ease an area of tension with Moscow on a peripheral issue while remaining steadfast on the more central questions of relations with '::he PRC and of military and economic integration, questions which go to the heart of the problem of national sovereignty. ROMANIAN MINISTER As if to underline Romanian determination to pursue ? IN ~'cKING good relations with the PRC, Romanian media on 27 March publicized Foreign Trade Minister Burtica's visit to Peking, where he was given high-level attention. Radio Bucharest reported on the 28th that Burtica was received by Premier Chou En-Tai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and was later feted at a dinner given by the acting foreign minister which was reportedly held "in an atmosphere of warm friendship." The radio also reported that anew trade pact signed between the two countries calls for "increased and diversified" trade in 1970. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 -40- MIDDLE EAST 1 APRIL 1970 MOSOOW CALLS PHANTOM DECISION AN ATTFJ~IPT TO PLACATE ARABS Moscow initiates only a modest amount of comment on the U.S. decision on military and economic aid to Israel. Soviet media note Arab assessments that the decision signifies no change in Washington's commitment to Israel. TASS on the 28th cites the Cairo AL-AHRAM as reporting that the United States and Israel have reached a secret agreement on "deliveries of 'new combat planes from U.S. strategic reserves' to Tel Aviv" early in 1971, under which Israel will receive replacement aircraft for those lost in military operations. And on the 31st TASS reports without comment from Washington that a State Department spokesman said deliveries of U.S. arms, including artillery, armored cars, and spare parts for tanks and combat planes, began 3n mid-January this year. Commentators on the Moscow domestic service roundtable program on the 29Th pursue the line that the decision is an attempt to placate the Arabs and view it in the context of an attempt to "soften the impression" of U.S. unconditional support for Israel in light of a hardening Arab stance toward U.S. oil interests. A Matveyev article in IZVESTTYA on the 26th assesses the "contradictory" nature of the U.S. decision: Tf it re ally meant a refection of aircraft deliveries to Israel, he says, Washington could be said to show an understanding of the dangerous consequences of further aggravation of the situation. But in fact, he says, the United States is not refusing Israel's request for planes but "reserving it for the very near future." Matveyev acknowledges that Secretary Rogers in his 23 March press conference "proposed talks on limiting arms supplies" to the Middle East, but goes on simply to remark that the Secretary said nothing about Israeli withdrawal, the "primary foundation" for at~y efforts to normalize the situation. TASS on the 26th also notes without comment that Nasir, in a 2~+ March speech before the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) parliamentary body, said the United States supports Israel by calling for a restriction on arms deliveries to the Middle East. (TASS omits Nasir's remark that the U.S. call comes at a time when the United States "admits that Israel is by far superior to the Arabs in weapons and air power.") For its pari:i Moscow continues to insist on the righteousness of Soviet deliveries of "defensive" arms to the Arabs. A Samilovskiy foreign-language commentary on the 27th declares that "Zionist propaganda" is making a "terrible fuss" about Soviet arms deliveries to the UAR, ignoring the fact that the weapons are supplied "to the victims of aggression and for their self defense." Following the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 CONE TDENTIAI, PDTS 7.'RENDS - 41 - 1 APRIL 1970 established pattern of citing UAR media and spokesmen for reports of military actions, TASS attributes to a UAR Interior Ministry spokesman a report on Israel's 31 March raids "on the northern part of the Nile River delta," targets identified in Israeli accounts as SA-2 missile bases. USSR INTERESTS Moscow tgain defends the purity o'f its motives IN MIDEAST in the i~~iddle East and rejects at~y notion that ' it is seeking to further its own interests theree The Samilovakiy commentary on the 27th accuses "imperialist propaganda" of attempting to foster Arab mistrust of the Soviet Union and "to spread lies about special Soviet interests in the Arab East." He dismisses this "slander" as an effort to cover up the "aggressive Flans" of the "imperialists and Zionists" in the area. Moscow also publicizes statements by UAR officials to demonstrate its selfless stance: TASS on the 26th, reporting a statement in Cairo by UAR Ambassador to the Soviet Union Ghalib, says he "emphasized that the Soviet Union pursues no selfish goals" in the region and that he "pointed to the fruitlessness" of "imperialist attempts to sow distrust" in UAR-Soviet relations. On the 29th TASS quotes UAR Vice President as-Sadat as telling a Cairo rally that any attempts to "cast doubt on the noble Soviet attitude toward the UAR only serve the interests of our enemies." Panelists on the 29 March roundtable program complain of the "remarkable shamelessness" of some American newspapers in asserting that the Soviet Union ''is edging its way toward Middle East oil" and therefore is reluctant to see a settlement of the conflict there. Commentator Shragin asserts that the Nasir speech unmasked such attempts to disrupt UAR-Soviet relations. He adds that Nasir said~the United States had gone so far as to present the UAR with "an obviously unacceptable plan" for settlement of the crisis and tb assert that it had been agreed upon with the Soviet Union and constituted a ,joint draft of the two powers, Nasir added, says Shragin, that the USSR "certainly does nit regard this plan as one which expresses its view." (Nasir actually stated that "the truth became known when we asked the Soviet Union about it; it became clear that it was a U.5. plan and the Soviet Union did not consider it as representing its viewpoint.") Moscow made the same charge earlier, in a Tyssovskiy domestic service commentary on 27 January which claimed that the United States tried to create the impression that the U.S. proposals regarding the UAR and-Jordan "were allegedly agreed upon with the Soviet Union," a "falsification" soon exposed by the Arab countries:. The TASS account of the Nasir speech does not pick up this passage, although it remarks that Nasir "exposed and ridiculed attempts by the United States and its allies" to drive a wedge in UAR-Soviet relations. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 l APRIL 1970 TASS represents Nasir as stating that the UAR agrees with the Soviet Union on the need for s. political solution, but omits his qualifier "if there is a possibility of such a solution," and also his statement that the only alternative to a political solution is to regain Arab rights by force. Nasir also stated that the UAR "fully agrees with the Soviet Union on two points"-- complete Israeli withd:^awe~l and Arab refection o~..' direct negotiations with Israel. The TASS account dissociates the USSR from the position on direct talks, presenting Nasir as saying there is complete UAR-Soviet accord on apolitical solution based on complete Israeli withdrawal, and as adding that the Arabs will not yield an inch of their land and will not agree to direct talks with Israel. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 - 1-3 - PODGGRNYY IN IRAv 1 APRIL '1970 USSR HAILS BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING PODGORNYY VISIT TO IRAN Moscow gives voluminous publicity to the 25-31 March of."icial visit t o Iran by Podgornyy, rebroadcasting his speeches at various functions and, as during past Soviet-Iranian visit exchanges, playing up the advantages to Iran of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the positive e~:ample this sets for the Middle East. The propaganda highlights Podgornyy's visit in Isfahan to the steel mill and a pumping station of the trans-Iranian gas pipeline, projects being undertaken with Soviet assistance; these projects, and the Aralt River hydroelectric project, are cited in the communique, and were also featured ir.. material surrounding Kosygin's April 1968 visit to Iran. TASS recounts Podgo rnyy's visit to Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf , noting that it is one of the country's oil export centers and that the Soviet guests "welcomed with interest" the Iranian suggestion to visit Kharg and inspect industrial enterprises. Podgornyy is not reported as having suggested Soviet readiness to assist Iran in making use of its natural resources of "oil, gas, and nonferrous metals," as Kosygin did during his visit, Publicity for the visit--nine percent of total comment in the week ending 29 March--considerably exceeds that for Kosygin's April 1968 visit and the Shah's visit to the USSR in October of the same year, the former representing four percent and the latter less than three percent of total comment. The propaganda does not suggest any new developments in bilateral relations emanating from the visii, but the lavish propaganda treatment may conceivably underline a Soviet desire to sta;xe out its interests in Iran in light df the scheduled Bx?itish withdrawal from the Persian Gulf Broadcasts in Persian, which began playing up the impending visit from the time it was announced on 25 February, largely avoided touching on sensitive issues: Only in an 11 March broadcast did Moscow refer t o "dangerous" CENTO plans for the region, and comment on 8 and 18 March routinely attacked "imperialist" exploitation of Iranian oil. Outlining views on various international. questions as well as un bilateral relations, the unremarkable communique on the visit, carried by Moscow domestic serv~..a on the 31st, falls more in the pattern of the communique on Kosygin's visit than that concluding the Shah's Soviet trip in October 1968. During the Shah's visit, according to that communique, a "useful exchange of opinions " was held on bilateral relations and international problems , but other than a brief reference to the United Nations the communique was confined to bilateral-- primarily economic--topics. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8 l API7IL 7.9'x0 The current communiqu?, like that on ICosygin's visit, sums up views on the Middle East, Vietnam, and colonialism, and additionally touches on a European security conference and disarmament The views of the sides are said to be identical or clo?e "on a number of problems"; in the April 1968 communique this was rendered "on the problems discuesed~" One of Moscow's infrequent references to a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East appears in the disarmament passage, in which the sides confirmed that disarmament, as we'll as "the creation of zones frAe of nuclear arms, including those in the Near and Middle East," would constitute effective steps toward strengthAning international security The passage on the Middle East confl.Zct reflects Moscow's standard position on implementation of "all provisions" of the November '1967 Security Council resolution and the view that 'lsraeli withdrawal constitutes the "main condition" for a settlement The sides also call for respecting the lawful rights of the Arab peoples, including the population of Palestine, and for observance of "relevant UN resolutions," which ere not further identified, thus avoiding placing the Soviets on record as subscribing to 'the cease-fire as well as other UN resolutionas On bilateral relations, the aides note "with special satisfaction" that the Soviet-Iranian frontier is one of peace and cooperation Podgornyy remarked in a banquet speech on the 25th that there had been no disputed border questions for a long time, and "the questions currently arising" are being resolved, he said, in a spirit of mutual. understanding and good neighborliness. The communique also expresses the satisfaction of both sides with successes achieved within the framework of the point economic cooperation commission in discovering prospects for expanding economic relations "for the next 12 to 15 years " The communique on the Shah's October 1968 visit had called on this commission to determine such prospects for a 12- to 15-year period, "having in mind a greater use of natural resources and other economic and technical resources" of both countriese Prior to Podgornyy's visit, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev held talks in Teheran in mid-March on anew five-year tY?ade agreement for~1971-1975, and Teheran radio had reported that a draft would be prepared "in the near future" and signed in Moscow The communique notes that the recent Teheran trade talks will be continued in Moscow " a view to signing a new trade agreements" With regard to scientific and technical cooperation, the sides deemed 3t necessary, the communique says, "to hold further talks" with a view to concluding an appropriate agreement Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8