TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 22, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIIIIII9u~~~~u~ll!II!III
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~IIIIIIIIIIII~IIIIIIIIIIII~~
iya G'o~~amunirt Pro~~g~ndd
Confidentiai
22 April 1970
(VOL. XXI, N0. 16)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in commuL.ist
broadcrst and press media. It is published
by F'BI8 without coordination with other 'iT.B.
Government components.
This document contains information affecti:-g
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the U3 bode, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
agour 1
4dvded (rew eWOewtle
de+egred7eq end
de"
Nourishing the sensitive issue of the condition and treatment of minority
peoples in the Central Asian borderlands of China, a subject resurrected
in a 7 April KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article and embellisheu. the next day
i.n a Tashkent radio commentary in Uighur, ~ Alma Ata's KAZAKHS'TANSKAYA
PRAVDA on the 12th provides further details on the Chinese leaders'
treatment of the non-Chinese nationalities in the PRC. Recalling the
succE~sful insurrection ir. the mid-19~0's by the Uighurs, Kazakhs,
and other minorities ir, Sinkiang against Chinese rule, the article also
evokes the memory o~' the struggles--prior to the founding of the PRC--
of the Tibetans and, the Inner Mongolians for the right to self-determination.
The Alma Ata paper cont~ .gists the original promises given by the Chinese
communist leaders with their subsequent' denial of the rights of self-
determination and of statehood, commenting that as a result of mass
resettlement policies tY~ere are many fewer Mongols than Chinese in the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. It pictures a network of concentration
camps throughout the national regions containing "many thousands" of
Mongols , Tibetans , Uighurs , rhuang, Dugan, and Kazakhs , and it names
minority revolutionary leader; such as L'?,anfu--once a mayor leader in
the PRC--who are now being repressed by the Peking leaders' nationality
policy. This repression, the article claims, is causing acute discontent
and growing resistance on the part of the non-Chinese peoples, ~.nd s~nti-
Maoist demonstrations "going as far as open armed clashes" are emergi::g
in Sinl~iang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and elsewhere in China's national
regions.
* See the TRENDS of 15 April 1970, pag^e~l
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CONr'IDENTIAL I'BIw TRENDS
22 APRTT, 1970
PEEING Bl..ASTS BRFZHNEV LEAI~RSHIP FOR BETRAYAL OF (~NINISM
Peking has msrked the Lenin centenary with a comprchenFive restatement
of its ideological case that containR the s harpeet anti-Soviet attacks
since agreement was reached last fal:! to hold talks, An authoritative
,point editorial Q.t^tiele in the 22 Apr:;l PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED 'r'LAG, and
LTBERATTON ARMY ,~ .' SLY takes the occasic;n to levEl a scathing attack on
the Brezhnev leadprsh:;.p for having betra;red Leninism and to urge the
people of the world to struggle against "U.S. impe~ia.lism, Soviet
revisionism, and all reaction," Tn thF.se "fighting tasks," the article
declares,lies the "tremendous significance" of the Chinese commemoration
of Lenin's centenary,
As in the case of the October Revolution semicen~~~nnial celeb?ratiors in
November 1967, when Peking mounted a massive c:ounterpropaganda campaign
to cloud the spectacle being staged in Mosc aw, the Chinese have again
expressed their resentmelt toward Moscow's effort to rally the communist
faithful under its banner in the name of a s acred event in the movement's
history. Peking's current polemical Pffort to denigrate Moscow's
credentials began with an NCNA commentary dated 16 April which seized
on a blunder by the Soviet propaganda apparatus in order to mock the
preparations for the Soviet celebrations. The NCNA commentary,
evident7.y based on earlier Western press reports, gleefully took note
of a passage in the CPSU "theses" on the centenary issued last December
which attributed to Lenin views that in fact were those of one of his
ideological opponents. To help spread this "scandal" that has gone
"around the world," Radio Peking repeatedly carried the NCNA commentary
in programs in Russian beamed to the USSR--prefaced by a Mao quotation
about actions of fools. The commentary has also been widely broadcast
in Radio Peking's other foreign services.
Peking has not mentioned the gathering of foreign communist leaders in
Moscow. NCNA reported on the 20th, as TASS did, that the PRC charge
d'affaires in Moscow laid a wreath that dqy at the Lenin mausoleum
Peking ignored the Lenin birth anniversary in the previous two years,
apparently as a result of the effort to idolize Mao as the ultimate
authority at a time when the CCP was being decimated during the cultural
revolution.
* Peking may also have intended to express its scorn for the rumored
nomination of V.I. Stepakov to be ambassador to the PRC. As the head
of the CPS'i1 Central Committee's propaganda apparatus at the time the
blunder was committed, Stepakov might logically be held responsible
for it.
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CUNP'IULNa'IA;~ I~'13I:; 'I'Ii1:NU;
22 AI'1~1:1:1 19'0
EDITORIAL Symbolized by its introduction oi' the term "ijrezhneviom,"
Artl?iCLE ~thc~ 22 April article elitnaxcs the ohart~en?d attaclc ozi
Drezhnev personally that became particularly evident
after the infiernationu]. communist conference in Moscow loot June--at
whlrh Drazhnev playec? a prominent role au loader o1.~ t}:Q Soviet wing
cif the communist movement and as spokesman for anti-Ch:incae force.
A~~ in ?the period of personal rivalry between Mao and Khrushchev, the
ChinP?ae have again personalized the ideological vendetta by substituting
Br?zhnev for Khruahchev: "Drezhnev is Khrushchev th^ Second," th-~
}ar~,icle states.
The t~naiona aris:.ng from the border conflict and :;he threat of war
are evoked in a passage accusing the nrezhnev leadership of going
further than Kh.rushchev in fostering militarism and ~r~~,gaF,ing in nuclear
*hreata. 'T'his passage contains Peking's first authox:Ztutive reference
t~ :Last year's border clashes since the opening of talks in October,
mFntioning the Chenpao incidents and those along the Soviet border with
Sinkia.~ag. Evincing Chinese sensitivity over a possible Soviet attack,
the article charges that the Soviets have thrAatened to "forestall the
opponent" and have plotted to unleash a blitzkrieg. In another passage,
dwel~ing on Moscow's traditional expansionist policies, the article
claims that the "new tsars" seek to "occupy more Chinese territory."
The article does not, however, mention the border talks or specifically
t:harge that the Soviets are guilty of border provocations at the present
t:.me.
Though frust2?ation over lack of progress at the Peking ~;alks, as well as
resentment over Soviet propaganda about Chiness war preparations, mqy
have prompted inclusion of passages evocative of border tensions, the
editorial article es a whole seems mainly to reflect Peking's felt need
+,'o press its ideological case against Moscow and to reassert the Maoist
claim to leadership of the world retolutionary forces. This need was
made clear at the time Peking announced agreement to hold `.?,alks, when it
issued pronoun:ements which stressed measures to avert conflict along
the border while insisting on pursuing its ''irreconcilable" ic.eological
ri~ralry with Moscow. Similarly, Peking's authoritative New Year's Day
,quint editorial took the occasion to reaffirm the Maoist line in the
ideological struggle that has rent the communist movement.
The Lenin centenary article, with its peroration on "invincible Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" guiding the world revolut;,onary movement,
represents another such effort to remind the communist movement--many
of whose leaders have assembled in the very citadel of heresy--that Mao's
China remains a standard bearer of the true faith while the Soviets have
dishonored the name of their founder. In its claims in behalf of Mac's
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CUNI~'Il)1?NT.lA1, h'11.t;i 't'N1?NllU
~!~~ N~IitL, J.9"rc~
prccrnincnen in thc~ wari.d mvvcmont, howevr.r, t;he urtlcle r~topo short
uC thvor_ ndvurrced ut tha tltna of the UctoUr.r Itava.lutlon srml.centennl.r.~J..
At that; Lima Ps~king comhinad un uttucic on tha t;ovi~at leuitersl,l.i, f'or
huving bctrc;,ynd the revolution with the ciutm that Muv is nc~w the
supreme Murxlst-Leninist mentor who has carried Marxism-Lc~r~iril.:;ur tv
its "highest in the present era."
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r;r~,rl r' 1 hr;rt'r t ni_
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rltl;~ 'rltl~;~tn:,
>;~~ ni~ttu., 1~~70
'ARTY GIIT~IICRING ON L~~J IN I)/IY
'I'hr~ C%rrt trr_`,,hc:?nt; cal' Lcurlr:r~; c t? c:r~tnmunl.:it, ,,cu?Liari In Mortcr~w n i.nr:c the
.fu:;e a.>~9 int;c+rnni,.i.~mn.l i;n.t't-y c(mf'c~rert^c nerved the Sov.ictu tuff r.L new
c~ccr~;ir`n to nncc~rt their c].rL1.m t~; .lr_u.dcrnhi}~ of t;he worad mavem^nt,
rt(~riin~;t, the f,'h.lrrrr..n rhrt.l.lrngc~ rand tt~ oi'f'Gr~t r,hr. )`et?;:i~;t.(ng dittcot'd
F;c.~ncrr,ttrd t;y the. i;xechc,aloval; e~rentu wlth r~ new cllr.p7.c>,y o.C i.ntr_rnuti,onnl
party unity, Ijrc~ltnr,v uncd hln r;l7ccch to c,mphru;i~c tho aced t'or
"hrr,lr~tari.rut ;.ntcrn;ttionrrli:;m" r.Lncl ,Joint uctiott ugn.in:.;t "impr.r.inlic:m,"
ut once indicting ?.hr Chi.ncac rind dct'ea~ding the S^wLct; uctLone; r_~gu:}.nt3t
C echoc~.lovaltir,., rind to I,rcr.;n L'hc rcur!? I'or a mt1:r ~;urily F:owcr('ul Warsaw
1'cLCt c>_lllr~ttcc. `i'h~, c?r.tttenctiry ;:arved, r:~t the auras time, t;rr p,p occu^.ion
i'~r n rest;>:;rt't;:on ot~ nuti.t~nclli:it i.nt,crcutn by the Yugo:tlr>.vu rind
Itomuniun:;--in low }cey and r,urroundcd by tributes to Lenir., bu~L? with
:little ambiguity--rand t}tc rc}tre:~rnt;:ition oi' ootnc ma,Jor Wcut European.
I~artie:t :.orvod an tacit tenti.mony to the unhealed wounds inflicted by
t}te intcrv~ntion itL Czcrh,..;l.ovcL}ciu.
FOREIGN REPRESENTATION REFLECTS STATE OF PARTY RELATIONS
Aa at the ~Oth October Rcvol;.ttion anniversary observance in Moscow in
Nov:~mber 19(7, most oi' the communist countries are represented by their
top l.cuders at the Lenin centenar;/. `T'hus Ceausescu leads the Romanian
del^gation and party i'irct secretary Le Dunn the North Vietnamese, as
at: rhea 1967 ,Jubilee. North Korea sent party Presidium and Secretariat
member and Frec~ic?ent of the Supreme Ar~sembly Choe Yong-kon, also as in
1967? Cuba's dL:,patc}t of a delegation led by President Dorticos registers
the warming trend in Moscow-Ffuvana relations; Dorticos, originally slated
t:. lead Cuba': 1967 delegation, was replaced at the last minute by the
health minister at. a +,ime of bedly ;,trained relation:, with the Sov;ets.
The :;ta+,e oi' unea,;,y r~ccommodat:ion between Moscow and Belgrade is mirrored
in Tito' contribution cf' an article to PRAVDA while sending Bakaric--
a leading speke~man for the 'lugoslavs' revisionist "self-management"
brand of ~o:.ialism--t~ represent him in Moscow. Tito had himself led
the Yugoslav delegation tc the observance in November 1967.
NONRULING TASS on 21 April reports Podgorny;y as welcoming delegates
PAR-TIES ?rc~m 66 nonruling communist parties, which would indicate
a total oi' both ruling and nonruling parties roughly
comparable to the some 75 which attended two and a half years ago.
Again, as in 1967, there are a number of representatives i'rom "national
democratic parties," as well as from socialist parties and trade union
*Brezhnev's remarks en China are discussed in the Sino-Soviet Relations
section of this TRENDS.
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I.UNP'.II~I?PI'I'1A(~ I''JiI~; 'f'it1~;NU;;
;';' 111`(.1. L .Lc)7u
urNnn l ~.nt l.oncr . I tr Nrc~c~ t.i.uN the clot 1.rgraL l ur-tr trt h l.u ul,cn (nN r~pcech,
1'c~clNurnyy r~c~~~_~rrlrrl cnhnnrecJ rttrctutr tc~ the N1~'L,;SV uncl thc~ Luoti.tut
PIC,IIX by 1.trtL.i.nN I,hcrn ,)u:rt ul'tcr~ l.hc.~ rul.inl? r~umrntur.i.ut, prirtlcr:r, bel.'orc
hlc~ cnumcr+atloa of thcr ru~r-ru.Ltng Ct"u. to Novambur 1yG'j, he turd
mentloncd tha PII~L;;V (th%~rc wr.r;.t nu r~i'crencc to r.ut NLIIX group) r~,c;
the end oi' t.hct lJ~.t, of nc~nrulinlr Ir,xrt.lc~:}. 'I'hc NI~L(;V l.c~ rel>rcur.nLcd
by ~ncrctariut u-~rnber Iic> Xuun ~;on urrd tree NI~1lX by Ccntr,.~.l Corrunl.ttec
mernbcr Clouhc.tlc I'hcm:;nvnnc nt tlrc: prcu!~nt Wuthcring.
1'odgorrryy'c, greeting rr%;corda a .t?c:Kul.rlr ,.tlptrubcticul, l.rocitlott among
the rtonrulirrg communiut purtLca to "the Sociuli.;;t Unity I'urty n,(' Ncw
'I,rnland," wh.lc:h Mu;;cuw i:? uuf~porting .i n coppo:~I Lion to 'the pro-i'cking
Ncw 'lculund CI'. At the 19G'j gut;hering, the Sociuiist Unity Party
of Ncw 'L,culund wu.~ liuted lr.tr~t among the ronruling CP's.
Among the Wc?~t European purtica , the l~ tench CP l s represented by
Politburo member Jacques Duclos, rather t:hun deputy party leader
Marchuls, i.n lieu of the oiling Wald~:ck fiochet. The absence of tore
leader:; of other Wert Eurapeun CP's acems related to ten3ions over the
Czechoslovut~ events. 'It-ie Italian n?arty's Longo, the British party's
Gollun, the pro-Soviet Belgian pu:?ty's Burnel?^, and Austrian CP
chairman Muhrl hod attended the November 196'j jubilee. 'I'bis time the
Itul.lun, British, and Austrian prtrties are represented by Politburo
i'igures Pujettu, Ramelson, and Fuernber~; and the Belgian party by
ita deputy chairman, `i'erfve? Ly contrast, the Latin American and
Middle Eastern LP's are for the most part represented by their top
leaders .
The tiny maverick Reunion CP, represented by its chairman, Verges,
in November 1967, this tim?, sent Politburo member Panama. '1'tre Reunion
party hod been one of the more assertive dissenters from Soviet
tutelage at the June 1969 international party conference,
BREZHNEV STRESSES INTERNATIONALIST UNITY AGAINST If~1r'ERIALIS~~
The 1'~oad-brush treatment of foreign policy issues in Brezhnev's 21 April
keynote ;speech leaves established formulas essentially intact. Thus the
Soviet leader reaffirms adherence to a "Leninist" policy of peaceful
coexistence and of support for general disarmament and negotiated
settlement of disputes, assuring "realistically minded circles of the
bourgeois countries" who recognize the principles of peaceful coexistence
that they will find in tha Soviet Union a partner in mutually advantageous
cooperation.
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CONI~:Ill1~;N'!'IAL~ I~'J3:C;; '1.'lZl?N17S
IIIu disrourue on world "imperialism" uu the mu,Jor threat, clcspite its
rurrcnt atatc of "decay," is built around can invocut:Ion of Lenin on
tha aced !br "c],ose military cohec~ion" in th~~ face of the "enormous
t'ront of the imperialist powers." In 11ne with curront propaganda
pressure t'or a strong Warsaw !'act, he declares "we sha1:1 concentrate
all our efforts to make ?tho combat alliance of the socialist countries,
the Wursuw !'act, still more power;ful in order to strengthen the point
defense of the socialist states." And he adds that the joint mi/,ht
of the socialist countries shacltloa "the aggressive desires of the
imperialists ,and creates a decis:Lve obstacle in the path of the
unleashing of a world rocket and nuclear war by the aggressors."
The speech treats Vietnam--briefly--in ttie context of the need for
united anti-imperialist action. Thus Brezhnev cites it as a case in
which the ",joint might" of the socialist countries has blocked the path
of "military adventures" against one of their number, and he traces
+:he "failure of the American adventure" to "socialist solidarity and
the broad aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" as
~~11 as to the Vietnamese people's heroisM and the existence of a
Marxist-Leninist party. A defense of the intervention in Czechoslovakia
follows the paragraph on Vietnam, recalling the socialist countries'
,joint action against imperialist efforts at "silent counterrevolution."
Other foreign policy issues are dealt with briefly and broadly. On the
Middle East, Brezhnev says the aim of Israeli "aggression" and the policy
of U.S. "imperialist circles" that support it is to eliminate the
"progressive regimes" in the IJAR, Syria, and a number of other Arab
countries in order to permit monopoly exploitation of oil resources and
other wealth of the Arab East. Brezhnev's remarks on disarmament $re
confined to a general statement on its desirability and concern for the
"imperialist" policy of accumulating arms "capable of bringing death to
hundreds of million of people." He ignores altogether such issues as
U.S.-Soviet relations, European security, and the German problem.
SOCIALIST Brezhnev underscores the idea that observance~of Marxist-
RELATIONS Leninist "laws" and pursuit of "a foreign policy founded
on principles of proletarian socialist internationalism"
are basic features of socialism in keeping with Lenin's behests. At a
time when imperialism is striving to poison the socialist system
ideologically anc: to divide it, he says, "exceptions?. importance" attaches
to the proposition in the June 1969 Moscow conference document that
defense of socialism is an internationalist duty. Such a reminder has
clear implications for Romania, conspicuously absent from the point
"defense of socialism" in Czechoslovakia and adhering to a neutralist
posture in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
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CUNI~'T.llLN'l'.IAL i~'1.iI;; 'J,'[i1sNUL;
Cn do ('cr?encc to his mixed audloncc, I3rezhnov i~ayu J.ip cerv:Lcc to the
concept;:; oI' c1.L1'1'erinp, roads to accio,liam unci of "equality" ariQ "rcupoct
for r:ationul novcreignty," but ho malc~u clear the limited applicability
of ouch concepts in La'~tcrn Lurope. I[iu at'i'irmation oi' them comes
immediately after u defenuc of the ititcrvention in Czc:choolovakia.
Iie recalls that it woo "the resolute cctiona of the Czechs and Sl.ovalcs
dedicated to the cause of socialism" and of the allied states ":1oya:L
to the principles of socialist internationalism" that "thwarted the
enemies' riungerous glans directed against the common interests oi'
socialism."
Brezhnev dwells in some detail on the increasing "imperialist" threat
in arguing f'or tighter control over the Soviet bloc allies. 1n this
context he quotes Lenin's warning: "Facing ari enormous front of the
imperialist powers, we who are fighting imperialism represent an
alliance that requires close military cohesion, and we regard any
attempt to violate this cohesion as a completely inadmissible
pY~enomenon and a betrayal of the interests of the struggle against
international imperialism." Remembering such words, Brezhnev adds,
"we shall concentrate all our efforts to make the combat alliance of
the Warsaw Pact still more powerful . ."
TI TO, CEAUSESCU CHALLENGE DOGMATIC APPROACH TO LEMINIS'1
Tito and Ceausescu both made their bows to communist unity on the Lenin
centenary by contributing articles to PRAVDA, published on 18 and 19 April
respectively, replete with lavish praise of Lenin's "creative" thought.
But both in effect reassert their challenges to Soviet orthodoxy by
emphasizing the success of their own roads to socialism and by reaffirming--
carefully and in low key--their independent views.
Speaking at a Lenin observance in Bucharest on 17 April, however, Ceausescu
sharpened his ideological line prior to his departure far the Moscow
celebrations by more pointedly rejecting Moscow's view of proletarian
internationalism and exaggeration of the "imperialist threat." His
emphasis on the economic and political succESS of the flourishing
Romanian model underscored the idea that his own brand of socialism
is a legitimate heir of Lenin's thought. B,~ portraying Lenin as a
creative thinker who eschewed dogmatism, Ceausescu seemed both to defend
Romania's flexible approach to Marxism-Leninism and to imply at the
same time that the Soviets have become victims of their own doctrinal
? inflexibility.
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CON1~'TI)C;N'1'7;AT, 1~1SIf~ 'i'IZLNI1;i
?_ AI'IZIL ].97b
TI TO ARTICLE= 'i'i'to'o I'I3AVUA article, which ltudio Bolgradc says
wa, "requcatcd" by the paper' u editorial board, dofcra
to the communist unity theme by },baying uplimltod areas of ideological
agreement between Belgrade and Moocow while playing down their considerable
difi'orences, Thus in passalres warmly prai:~ing Lenin's revolutionary
strategy and his views on t'ne leading role of the worlcing class, '.Pito
manageo to rce'tate his own view of ideoloEpr as a "guide" rather than
dogma and to inter,~ect n low-lceycd re~ect~ion of the Brezhnev doctrine,
Emphasizing the "creative" character of Lenin's thought, he asserts that
"Marxism-Leninism does not recognize ready-made prescriptions and formulas
and does not tolerate dogmat',lsm." Revolutionary theory, he adds, is
developed and "even corrected on the basis of new scientific and
theoretical knowledge and the experience gained in revolutionary
practice." In effect rejecting any leading renter of communism, Tito
observes that Lenin's thought was "alien to the transformation of
certain experiences acquired in the revolutionary movement of a country
into absolute laws." The apparent allusion to the Brezhnev doctrine
comes in an ensuing remark that although Lenin stressed the class
approach to the nation, "he did not do it without recognizing the
people's equality and their equal rights and sovereignty." Without
these principles, Tito adds, "internationalism becomes a mere
declaration ~ ,"
At the same time, in a passage manifestly designed for Soviet consumption,
Tito assures PRAVDA's readers that the Yugoslavs hove "already resolutely
resisted any attempt to endanger or to al't~:r the working class' revolu-
tionary powers as well as all anarchist ideas that the state should be
abolished and the development of society should be abandoned to
spcntaneous movements." A sanitized account of the Tito article carried
by TASS on 18 April emphasizes the lattEr statement and quotes Tito's
comment on the creative nature of Marxism-Leninism being alien tb
"dogmatism"--a remark Soviet readers could interpret as a slap at the
Chinese. TASS ignores the Yugoslav leader's rejection of any leading
center, his view of ideology as a guide and not a law, and his
interi;rc~tation of internationalism.
ARTICLE, SPEECH The Romanian leader's PRAVDA article, pointedly entitled
BY CEAUSESCU "Socialism's Successes in Romania Are a Confirmation of
'the Correctness of Lenin's Ideas," applauds Soviet
achievements but underlines the idea that the Romanian model of
socialism and its independent international line are doing very well.
Romania, Ceausescu asserts, is honoring Lenin by promoting "the supreme
requirement,;" the material and spiritual development of its own people,
and by developing international cooperation with "all" the socialist
countries. In keeping with its t'itle', the article puts considerable
stress on the country's domestic success, "the uninterrupted progress
of the economy" and increasing industrialization.
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