TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 13, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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(,6c.
Confidential
IIIIIIIII~I~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIII
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~I~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
Ds
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
13 May 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 19)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contsins information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
t.ulud.d Iron, ou~oma~ie
do.npoodinp and
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
C 0 N T E N T S
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
President Nixon's Press Conference, Antiwar Demonstrations . . . .
1
Recognition of "Royal National Union Government" of Cambodia . . .
5
First Secretary Le Duan Reported in Poland, USSR, PRC . . . . . . .
6
Issues of International, Asian Conferences on Indochina. . . . . .
7
Moscow Continues Criticism of Chinese Position . . . . . . . . . .
9
Military and Political Situation in Cambodia
10
Situation in South Vietnam
14
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Encroachments . . . . . . .
15
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow, Peking Play Down Dispute, Maneuver on Indochina . . . . . .
16
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade Uses Cambodia Issue to Press Nonalinement . . . . . . . .
18
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Assails Israel for Incursion into Lebanon . . . . . . . . .
19
EAST--WEST RELATIONS
Grechko Atte-ks "Imperialists," Affirms Soviet "Peace" Policy . . .
21.
WEST GERMANY
Stoph to Attend Kassel Summit Despite FPG's "Discrimination" . . . .
23
USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
New Treaty Incorporates Limited Sovereignty Doctrine . . . . . . .
26
Deletion of "In Europe" Phrase Follows Two Precedents . . . . . . .
27
PCI Uses Lenin Centenary to Reassert Autonomous Stance . . . . . . 28
Stress on Party Autonomy Serves Domestic Political Ends . . . . . . 30
May Day Photographs Reflect Rankings of Soviet Leaders . . . . ? . 31
Infighting Continues in Ukrainian Writers Union . . . . . . . . . . 32
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rebuilding of Party Structure Continues at Cautious Pace 37
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 197C
TOPICS AND EVENTS GiVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 MAY 1970
Moscow (3374 items)
Peking (3374 items)
VE Day
(7%)
27%
Indochina
(40%)
83%
Czechoslovakia
(3%)
23%
[Cambodia
(6%)
71%]
[Liberation
(1%)
16%]
[Summit Conference
(34%)
8%]
Anniversary
[Vietnam
(0.4%)
3%]
[Soviet-Czech-
( -)
7%]
[Laos
(--)
0.4%]
oslovak Treaty
Domestic Issues
(25%)
11%
Renewal
Indochina
(17%)
22%
[Cambodia
(11%)
19%]
China
(8%)
5%
Lenin Centenary
(26%)
5%
These statistics are based on the voleecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international r.:dio services. The tern-1 "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda Content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CON:f'IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 1970
I N D 0 C H I N A
Vietnamese communist media dismiss President Nixon's 8 May press
conference as an unsuccessful attempt to cope with the protests of
students and others in the United States over the "overt aggression"
against Cambodia and the expansion of the Vietnam war to the whole
of Indochina. Propagandists continue to obscure the President's
statement that the aim of the U.S. and GVN operations is to clear
out Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia; the allied action
is pictured as directed against the Cambodian "patriots." On
11 May the DRV Ilureign Ministry protests the naval operation up the
Mekong and says Western sources have revealed that "the Saigon
puppet administration, o.,,TJ.S. orders, plans to use its navy to
blockade the Cambodian coast : . . ."
The "Royal National Union Government," announced by Sihanouk on
5 May, has now been recognized by 16 governments, including the
PRC and six other communist countries. But only Romania of the
USSR's European allies has extended recognition, and Kosygin
pointedly fails to mention the new government in a message,
carried by Soviet media on the 12th, which greets the "united
front of Cambodia," the "united front of the people of Indochina,"
and the struggle of the "patriotic forces of Cambodia." Peking
gives unprecedented publicity to Cambodian developments--70 percent
of total comment. More than a quarter of the items on Cambodia
concern the new government, and on the 12th NCNA carries a Burmese
CP statement which says that the Soviets "have not dared up to now"
to recognize it.
High-level Moscow and Peking consultations with the Vietnamese are
now publicized with the reports that First Secretary Le Duan had talks
with Brezhnev on the 8th and with Chou En-lai on the 11th, the same
day Le Duan was received by Mao and Lin Piao. There are continued
attacks in Peking propaganda on alleged Soviet "collusion" with the
United States, and Moscow continues its propaganda attacks on the PRC
for failing to join in "united action" in regard to Indochina. Hanoi
takes its consistent public stance in playing up support from both
countries. A NHAN DAN editorial ~n 13 May says statements issued in
the USSR, PRC, and other fraternal socialist countries "have laid
stress on their resolve to take resolute actions, on the pressing need
for strengthening the unity of all socialist, anti-imperialist
and peace forces in order to stay the hands of the U.S. imperialist
aggressors . . . ."
PRESIDENT NIXON'S PRESS CONFERENCE, ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS
HANOI AND VNA observed on 9 May that the President called his press
THE FRONT conference at a time when the United States "has entered
a political crisis graver than any under the Johnson
Administration" and that the meeting with the press "was intentionally
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Front propaganda on the press conference uniformly includes references
to the recent student demonstrations, particularly the death of the four
students at Kent University. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 11th
sees evidence of Ln effort by the President to "deplete" the Washington
demonstration in his early morning visit with students at the Lincoln
Memorial on the 9th, as well as in his earlier invitation to students
for "private: contacts."
The QIJAN DOT NHAN DAN article repeats a 10 May VNA report of the
demonstration in claiming that 200,000 people attended. It adds
that many Republican and Democratic congressmen have participated
in the "struggle." The article, like a Hanoi radio broadcast on the
loth, says that 250 State Department employees sent a letter to
the Secretary--an "unprecedented" occurrence in the Department.
Earlier, Hanoi media had publicized messages to U.S. organizations
extending wishes for success of the planned demonstrations. They
included messages to the Students Mobilization Committee and Students
for a Democratic Society from the Vietnam Students Union, the
Committee for Solidarity with the American People, and the Liberation
Student Union. A VNA item reports that the Solidarity Committee and
Students Union held a meeting in Hanoi on Lhe 8th to protest the U.S.
"invasion" of Cambodia and to welcome the U.S. protest movement.
The 9 May VNA report of the President's press conference sees the
"anxiety and discontent of broad sections" reflected in the fact that
24 out of 27 questions were about Cambodia and Vietnam, but this and
other Vietnamese communist propaganda ignores much of the substance of
the press conference. VNA says all the President's efforts and
activities since his inauguration have been aimed at winning a military
victory and bringing Vietnam and Indochina under U.S. sway. This
contention appears in other propaganda, including a 9 May statement
by the DRV press spokesman in Paris reported by Hanoi media on the 11th.
The President's remarks on a withdrawal from Cambodia by the end
of June are noted disparagingly. The ZTNA report says that to deal
with "embarrassing questions" on a pullout he "had to mention
30 June as a time limit," and it views his remark that some U.S.
forces would be withdrawn within a week as "an immediate step to
soothe public opinion." VNA also contrasts the President's
statements with the reported remark by ARVN 3d corps commander
Gen. Do Cao Tri that "the occupation of Cambodia would be indefinite."
A Hanoi radio broadcast, also on the 9th, dismisses the promise
that U.S. forces would be withdrawn by the end of June with the
observation that "indeed U.S. troops would be forced to return to
South Vietnam because in July, with the onset of the rainy season,
they would be bogged down if they remained."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 1970
The general tone of the comment is typified by the 9 May Hanoi
braodcast's claim that the President's explanation of his Indochina
policies and his statement that the antiwar protesters' objectives
are similar to his own amount to the same "crafty arguments" he
used in his 30 April speech and represent "the extreme limit of
lying and scorn for public opinion." An LPA Commentator article,
carried by Liberation Radio on the 10th, says "Nixon talked
nonsense because he had run out of reason" and asks: "Can
anyone believe that the U.S. aggressive operations in Cambodia and the
American people's antiwar demonstrations have the same objectives?"
A NHAN DAN commentary on the 11th, as summarized by VNA the same
day, observes that unlike his 30 April address the President's
latest remarks acknowledge the "intensity of the protest movement
in the United States." But the paper says "Nixon remains as
bellicose and adamant as ever, and because he tried to justify the
unjustifiable, his contentions are full of sophisms, lies, and
stupidities." VNA. also briefly reviews an 11 May QUAN DOT NHAN DAN
article which questions the President's rationale for the Cambodian
operations--that the Vietnamization program was threatened.
Pointing out that in his 20 April speech announcing another troop
withdrawal the President had said the program was progressing, the
paper says "Nixon has proved to be the biggest double-crosser, a
most pernicious opponent of the righteous demands of the American
people."
Hanoi's failure to acknowledge the substance of President Nixon's
remarks is illustrated by the radio broadcast on the 9th. It says
cryptically that the President claimed that even after the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cambodia, the United States
"would pay attention to the future and neutrality of Cambodia and
Laos." It then proceeds to cite examples of U.S. "aggression"
which give the lie to professions of respect for neutrality,
and it totally ignores the context of the exchange--the fact that
the President, responding to a question on policy toward Cambodia,
observed that it was necessary to use diplomacy regarding the
neutrality of small coi-aitries which are unable to defend themselves
and that the United States is exploring this problem with the
USSR, Britain, and the Asian countries which are to meet in Djakarta.
Hanoi also ignored the President's references to pursuing
negotiations in forums other than the Paris talks and his statement
that he wc'ild deliver a report to the nation upon the conclusion
of the Cambodian operation. Vietnamese communist comment also
failed to note that the President was asked specifically about
Paris; however, the PRG Paris spokesman's statement--also made on
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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-1E-
the 9th and carried by communist media on the llth--did reiterate
the line that "it is obvious the Nixon Administration is continuing
to prevent all progress at the Paris conference . . . while creating
an extremely serious situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia,"
MOSCOW Moscow has given the press conference minimal attention.
The initial TASS report on the 9th observes that it was
"mainly devoted to the armed intrusion of U.S. troops into neutral
Cambodia" and that the President used old arguments in an attempt
to "dampen the powerful wave" of protests at home and abroad. TASS
says the President supported Secretary Laird's "recent belligerent
statement" that the United States may resume bombing of the DRV and
warned that "large and more effective forces" may be used against the
North, but TASS does not acknowledge that the President made these
actions conditional on a DRV troop movement across the DMZ. A radio
commentary in English to the United Kingdom on the 9th expresses
skepticism about the President's promise that withdrawal from
Cambodia will. begin next week and be completed by the end of June.
TASS carries numerous reports on the U.S. antiwar demonstrations and
notes that Dr. Spock, Mrs. Coretta King, and Senator Brooke were on
the speakers' platform at the 9 May rally in Washington. It also
takes note of protest by such figures as UAW leader Walter Reuther,
Mayor Lindsay, and Yale President Kingman Brewster, as well as the
petition to the Secretary of State from Department employees; there
is publicity for a message from the Student Councils of the USSR
and of various Soviet cities to the National Student Association
expressing support for the 9 May Washington demonstration. On the
12th TASS notes the vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the amendment to the foreign military sales bill cutting off funds
for U.S. forces in Cambodia.
PEKING The only available PRC acknowledgment of President Nixon's
press conference comes in an 11 May NCNA report of the
antiwar demonstrations. NCNA says the President "hastily held a
press conference" on the eve of the Washington rally, again using
"deceptive tactics" to appease the anger of the American people.
NCNA carries numerous reports on the demonstrations, mentioning the
"mammoth" demonstration of some 100,000 people in Washington and
describing rallies at colleges and universities throughout the
country. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, carried by NCNA
on the 9th, scores the Nixon Administration's "persecution" of
the American students, pointing to the deaths of the Kent State
students and the stationing of "fully armed troops and police"
at various universities. The Administration aims its guns at the
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American people as well as the people of Indochina, Commentator
says, but he states that such suppression will only intensify the
protest movement.
On 7 May NCNA and Peking radio's English-language broadcasts carried
a cable from Penn Nouth, Prime Minister of the "Royal Government of
National Union," to Senator Mansfield recalling the Senator':;
past friendship for Cambodia and asking him to use his influence
to make the American people understand that they are being "dragged
by their President" into a spreading war. The message also thanks
Mansfield and his congressional colleagues for their stand against
the President's decision.
RECOGNITION OF "ROYAL NATIONAL UNION GOVERNMENT" OF CAMBODIA
Sihanouk's new "Royal National Union Government" to date has been
recognized by 16 governments, including seven communist regimes.
But the USSR so far has withheld recognition, as have all of its
East European allies except Romania.* On 12 May TASS released the
undated Kosygin message to Sihanouk which "greets" the formation
of "the united front of Cambodia, the strengthening of the united
anti-imperialist front of the peoples of Indochina, and also the
measures taken to organize the struggle of the patriotic forces of
Cambodia against the American aggression." Kosygin fails to mention
Sihanouk's titles, addressing him only as "esteemed Samdech."
Paris AFP reports on the 12th that Sihanouk "immediately" answered
Kosygin's telegram, thanking him for his support but formally
requesting official Soviet recognition of the new government.
Communist media are not known thus far to have mentioned Sihanouk's
response, but NCNA publicizes a "special message" from Sihanouk to
the Cambodian liberation armed forces on the 12th in which he
notes that a "great number" of countries have already broken with
the Lon Nol regime and adds that "in the future only the countries
subservient to or friendly with the United States will maintain or
establish their embassies in Phnom Penh."
* The other communist countries are the PRC, DRV, Albania, Cuba,
North Korea, and Yugoslavia, as well as South Vietnam's PRG.
Noncommunist countries known to have extended recognition are
Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Congo (B), Mauritania, South Yemen, Sudan,
and the UAR.
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Also on the 12th, NCNA carries a 10 May statement by the Burmese
Communist Party, scoring U.S. "aggression" in Cambodia, which
includes an attack on the Soviets: the "Soviet revisionist clique,
though compelled to issue a statement containing pretentious
denunciation, dares not denounce the counterrevolutionary
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique by name, and has not dared up to now
to recognize the Royal Government of National Union."
PEKING AND Peking seized on Belgrade's condemnation of the
BELGRADE U.S. Cambodian action and prompt recognition of the
Sihanouk government on 6 May, the day after its
formation was announced. On the 8th NCNA carried a Belgrade-datelined
item--highly unusual for Peking--publicizing Tito's message to
Sihanouk and citing BORBA for an account of the Yugoslav Federal
Executive Council session which decided to recognize the Sihanouk
government-in-exile. The same item summarized an Executive Council
communique condemning "U.S. open military intervention in Cambodia
and the resumption of bombing of the DRV." Yugoslavia's reaction to
the U.S. actions has been notably vehement, with Tito denouncing the
American move in two speeches, seconded by other leading figures and
by articles in BORBA and other Yugoslav media. TANYUG has recounted
angry popular protests.
DIPLOMATIC The PRC is the only country thus far to have accepted an
PERSONNEL ambassador from the government-in-exile, NCNA reporting
on 9 May that the PRC Government had agreed to the
appointment of Ker Meas. On the 9th NCNA scored the Phnom Penh
authorities for holding Chinese diplomatic personnel "hostages" until
the return home from Peking of the Cambodian diplomats representing
Lon Nol's government. Pyongyang's KCNA carried an "authorized
statement" on the same day denouncing Phnom Penh for similarly
holding North Korea's diplomats.
Hanoi media on the 13th carried a DRV Foreign Ministry statement
recalling that on 25 March the DRV Government had decided to "stop"
the activities of the DRV Embassy and commercial representation
and to bring home all personnel except for a number to guard the
property. The statement says the DRV has now decided that the stay
of the latter personnel "is no longer necessary" and asks Phnom Penh
to permit their departure. A similar PRG Foreign Ministry statement
was carried by Liberation Radio on the same day.
FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN REPORTED IN POLAND, USSR, PRC
Warsaw's PAP reported on 6 May that VWP First Secretary Le Duan left
Poland that day "after a rest of several days." The news agency added
that he had talks with First Secretary Gomulka and other Polish
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leaders "in a cordial and fraternal atmosphere." TASS quoted
the PAP report some four hours later on the 6th.*
This was the first known reference in communist media. to Le Duan's
whereabouts since Prague's CTK--as well as Western news agencies--
reported on 30 April that he had left Moscow the day before for
Peking. Le Duan had arrived in Moscow on 18 April at the head
of the DRV delegation to the Lenin anniversary observances.
On 8 May TASS reported that Brezhnev received Le Duan in Moscow
for talks on "questions connected with the intensification of the
U.S. imperialist aggression against the peoples of Indochina" and
about "some measures to strengthen further friendship and
cooperation" between the two countries. TASS said the conversation
took place in an atmosphere of "brotherhood and cordiality." VNA
carried a similar report on the 9th, and on the same day TASS briefly
reported that Le Duan had "left Moscow for home."
On 10 May NCNA reported Le Duan's arrival that day in Peking for
"a visit to China." The next day NCNA said that he was received
by Chou En-la? for"cordial and friendly talks" and that on the
same day he v accorded the honor of being received by Mao Tse-tung
and Lin Piao, NCNA noted on 12 May that Sihanouk had a "cordial and
friendly" meeting with Le Duan that day, and later on the 12th
NCNA said Le Duan had left for home "after concluding his visit to
China." VNA has reported the meetings with Chou, Mao and Lin, and
Sihanouk.
ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL, ASIAN CONFERENCES ON INDOCHINA
Some inconsistency on the issue of an international conference is
displayed in Moscow propaganda following Kosygin's 4 May press
conference remark that the "decisive word" rests with Cambodia,
Vietnam, and Laos but that now seems the time not for meetings but
for actions to stop U.S. "aggression." TASS reported promptly
on 6 May that Secretary General U Thant had made a statement on
Indochina the day before. TASS noted that Thant "urged the use of
* A message from VNA's home office in Hanoi to the Moscow office
on 9 May asked for a report on Le Duan's visit to Poland. A reply
from VNA Moscow the same day said that there had been no public
announcement when the delegation visited Poland but that there was
authorization now to publicize the fact of the visit. On the 11th
Moscow VNA sent the Hanoi office a more detailed report of the visit
with the caveat "check the following report before releasing it."
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all means to settle the Vietnam problem by peaceful talks," but
it neglected to mention that he spoke of the French proposal on broad
negotiations. PRAVDA published the brief TASS report in full, but
an IZVESTIYA item noted only that U Thant expressed "profound
concern" over the U.S. escalation in Indochina and said nothing
about talks of any kind.
TASS on the 7th, reporting remarks by Polish Foreign Minister
Jedrychowski at a luncheon given by the French Diplomatic Press
Association in Paris, quoted him as saying Poland would not object
to an enlarged conference on Indochina as proposed by France
"provided a majority of countries agreed." Bulgaria is the only
other communist source known to have reported Jedrychowski's comments
on a new conference. Moscow papers have carried no report of his
remarks in Paris. The Warsaw PAP account of the foreign minister's
remarks does not mention an enlarged conference, and an account
published in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 7th says only that "both countries
are profoundly disturbed by the dangerous development of the conflict
in Indochina and wish to do their best to restore peace there as
soon as possible."
On 11 May Soviet media commented negatively on the British stand on
a Geneva conference. A TASS commentary, attacking the British
Government's failure to censure the U.S. intrusion into Cambodia,
says that Britain "insists on its proposal to convene a new
international conference on Indochina and to resume the activity
of the neutral group of observers in Laos and Cambodia." TASS
calls it "ludicrous" to propose the convening of a new conference
after the United States has "arrogantly violated" the 1954 Geneva
agreement which serves as the basis for Cambodia's status. A
Moscow commentary broadcast in English to North America the same
day says that the British Government, a Geneva conference
cochairman, has tried to "camouflage" its support of the United
States by suggesting another Geneva conference on Indochina. It
remarks that at a time when Cambodia is "occupied" by U.S. and
Saigon troops, "such a conference would merely be a screen for
future violations of the already existing Geneva agreements."
Another critical reference to Soviet UN representative Yakov Malik
appears currently in Peking propaganda. NCNA on the 13th carries
a statement by the Thai CP on Cambodia which denounces Malik's
statement on a Geneva conference as an effort to "legalize" the
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "clique."
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DRV ON DRV media promptly scored Secretary General U Thant's remarks
U THANT on an Indochina conference, with I'Iano: radio on 8 May
taking him to task for failing to criticize the U.S.
"imperialists" and instead expressing concern about the "recent
situation in Indochina." The broadcast said Thant's call for "urgent
negotiations among all parties in Indochina" was consistent with a
U.S. scheme aimed at legalizing the Lon Nol regime, and it noted
that Secretary Rogers had immediately endorsed U Thant's remarks.
Hanoi recalled that the declaration issued by the 24-25 April
Indochina summit conference had "strongly condemned all schemes of
the United States and its hirelings as well as Asian reactionaries
to take advantage of the United Nations or any international or
Asian organization or conference to legalize" the Lon Not regime.
VNA commented along the same lines on the 9th and expressed support
for Sihanouk's 5 May statement that "no one has any right to convene
any international conference on the question of Cambodia."
DJAKARTA A Moscow broadcast in English to Southeast Asia on
CONFERENCE 6 May, commenting on the proposal for an Asian and
Pacific countries' conference on Cambodia, reported
that seven out of 21 countries had rejected Djakarta's invitation
but proceeded to list only six--the DPRK, the DRV, India, Pakistan,
Burma, and Ceylon. A Djakarta broadcast on 1 May reported Indonesian
Foreign Minister Adam Malik as stating that the PRC had officially
declined his invitation, but available Peking propaganda has not
mentioned the invitation.
MOSCOW CONTINUES CRITICISM OF CHINESE POSITION
In the wake of Kosygin's statement on 4 May that the escalation of
U.S. "aggression" makes "even more urgent the need for uniting and
strengthening the cohesion of all the socialist, anti-imperialist,
and peace-loving forces," routine Soviet propaganda dire-ted to
the PRC has continued to stress the theme of united action. The
day after a 5 May Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin
recalled various past proposals on united action,* another one
recalled that joint actions of the USSR and the PRC in the past had
dealt blows to the "imperialists" and cited the example of the
resolution of the Indochina question at the 1954 Geneva conference.
Moscow propaganda periodically cites the example of Sino-Soviet
cooperation at the Geneva conference, the most recent previous case
being in a 26 April Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin.
See the 6 May TRENDS, page 11, for background on this commentary.
CONFIDENTIAL
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A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 9 May scored the Chinese for
opening an "unprecedented" anti-Soviet campaign at a time when
"all the peace-loving nations are faced with the solemn and
pressing question of how to adopt united actions to counter the
aggressors" in Indochina. The commentary says that at the end of
April the Chinese stepped up their campaign, thus leading
Washington to believe that "Peking's hands were tied in the
north" and encouraging the Americans to expand aggression in
Southeast Asia. Comparing this with the period of the inception
of the bombing of the DRV, the commentary repeats the recurrent
allegation that Mao Tse-tung assured the American writer Edgar
Snow that China would not go to war if Chinese territory were
left alone. Recalling that at that time the Chinese rejected
proposals on united actions, the commentary remarks that the
"situation is roughly similar today." While "the need is greater
than ever" for all anti-imperialist forces to act in unison, it
says, the Chinese leaders stubbornly disseminate the idea that
China is in danger of being invaded from the north.
A 12 May Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin quotes
Kosygin's greetings message of that date to Sihanouk and
reiterates that the escalation of U.S. aggression in Indochina
makes more urgent the need for uniting and strengthening socialist
cohesion. It recalls that U.S. actions in Indochina were denounced
in the 7 May Soviet-Czechoslovak communique as well as by Brezhnev
in Prague on the 7th and that the comuunique also denounced Peking
for pursuing a splittist, anti-Soviet policy. The commentary
repeats the charge that the Chinese encouraged U.S. escalation by
their anti-Soviet policy and mentions the "scoundrelly" PEOPLE'S
DAILY article of 22 April which "was in reality Mao Tse-tung's
invitation to the United States to begin the invasion of Cambodia."*
MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN CAMBODIA
ALLIED MOVES A Hanoi radio report on the 9th takes note of the
launching across the Cambodian frontier the
preceding day of a combined U.S.-South Vietnamese naval force up the
Mekong River and predictably calls it a "new aggressive attack
against Cambodia." Earlier Vietnamese communist comment had largely
ignored the location of the military operations in the "Parrot's
Beak" area of Svay Rieng Province and the "Fishhook" area of
* The TRENDS of 22 April, page 23, discusses the 22 April joint
editorial article in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION
ARMY DAILY on the ecLasion of the Lenin centenary, which scathingly
attacked the Brezhnev leadership.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 1970
Kompong Cham Province. But Hanoi now notes the allied thrusts
into Svay Rieng, Kompong Cham, Kratie, Mondolkiri, and Ratanakiri
provinces in asserting that the naval, "attack" in the direction
of Phnom Penh has "unmasked" President Nixon's statement that
U.S. forces have not moved beyond 30 kilometers inside Cambodia.
Both an LPA dispatch and a NHAN DAN article of the 9th comment on the
Mekong expedition, LPA saying that the "alleged" purpose is to
assist interned Vietnamese residents in Cambodia but that in fact
the naval armada is "ferrying armaments" to the Phnom Penh
authorities and carrying out the "vicious scheme" of "forcibly"
repatriating Vietnamese residents to GVN-controlled areas of
South Vietnam. NHAN DAN also takes note of the arrival in
Cambodia of "thousands" of native Cambodian "mercenary troops"
from South Vietnam and a reportedly "secret" visit to Phnom Penh
by Vice President Ky to discuss with government leaders further
repressive plans against the Khmer people and Vietnamese residents.
The allied naval expedition also prompts a DRV Foreign Ministry
statement of the 11th, carried by VNA the same day. The statement
condemns "this extremely impudent aggressive act," repeats the
DRV's denunciation of the "massive aggressive operations in the
eastern provinces of Cambodia from Ratanakiri to Svay Rieng," and
takes note of Western reports that the GVN intends to use naval
forces to blockade the Cambodian coast and "land troops at Ream
and Kompong Som." The DRV Foreign Ministry demands an "immediate
end" to these actions and routinely says that the United States,
Saigon, and Phnom Penh "must bear full responsibility for all the
consequences arising from their acts."
STATEMENT BY The first statement uted to the "command"
CAMBODIAN PLAF of the "Cambodian Peoi. Liberation Armed
Forces" (PLAF), dated 3 May, was carried by VNA
)n the 11th. VNA said it was released by the "Information Bureau
of the National United Front of Kampuchea" (FUNK), an organization
which had been mentioned as early as 7 May in a report of military
developments. The PLAF statement contains a call by the command to
its forces throughout Cambodia to 1) quickly develop the three
categories of armed forces, 2) attack enemy troops of all kinds,
be they government, Khmer Serei, U.S.,or Saigon forces, 3) carry
out political agitation among enemy troops, and 4) closely unite
with the Vietnamese and Chinese residents. The statement also
expresses the Cambodian PLAF's conviction that "our Khmer people
and armed forces will certainly attain our immediate fighting
objectives."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13-MAY 1970
The statement claims that the PLAF has "repeatedly attacked the enemy
and liberated hundreds of hamlets and villages and dozens of subsectors
and district towns together with tens of thousands of people . . . and
built up FUNK committees of various levels in the newly liberated
areas." Similar general references to the establishment of popular
administration had appeared in a 6 May Hanoi radio commentary and in
a VNA report on the 7th. Some reports in mid-April specified that
provisional committees had been set up in areas of Kompong Cham and
Svay Rieng provinces.
SIHANOUK Sihanouk's 12 May message to the armed forces mentions the
CLAIMS creation of people's administrations "in many provinces
and districts, particularly in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng,
Kandal, Kompong Cham, Kompong Sepu, Takeo, Kampot, Mondolkiri,
Ratanakiri, Kratie, and Stung Treng provinces."
Sihanouk's 12 May message does not repeat his 25 April reference to
"Indochinese people's liberation forces" and repeatedly refers to
military activity waged by "our liberation army" or "our people's
army." In briefly tracing the chronology of developments in Cambodia
leading up to the American decision to move "against our people,"
NCNA reports Sihanouk as saying that "our people's ar:.-,y had already
surrounded Phnom Penh and was on the point of taking the capital by
assault" before the allied military moves were made. Earlier, NCNA's
11 May report of a Royal Government statement proclaiming the
severance of diplomatic relations with the United States asserted
that had it not been for U.S. intervention the FUNK's armed forces
"would have been in Phnom Penh by now."
Sihanouk's message also contains a brief account of military victories
allegedly achieved by the liberation forces, including "the capture
of the cities of Kratie, Senmonorom, Stung Treng, Chhouk, etc. . .,
the cutting off of the communication, telegraphic and telephone
lines between more than 20 urban centers and Phnom Penh." (The
ellipses are NCNA's.) In the meantime, the message adds, "in 13
provinces, including Battambang, a large part of the population has
been freed from the control of the Lon Nol administration."
FUNK OFFICIALS VNA on the 9th and NCNA on the 11th carried a second
IN CAMBODIA statement, dated 1 May, from the same three former
Cambodian deputies who authored a statement dated
26 March, released by VNA on 10 April.* The three former deputies--
Khieu Sam Phon, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim--are Political Bureau members of
* See the 15 April TRENDS, page 6, for an account of the earlier
statement, which expressed support for Sihanouk's 23 March appeal.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 1970
the FUNK's Central Commi+,tee and, respectively Minister of National
Defense, Minister of In ',jrmation, and Minister of Interior in
Sihanouk's self-proclaiwed "Royal Government of National Union."
In addition, VNA now identifies them as "representatives of the
Cambodian People's Movement of United Resistance affiliated with
the FUNK." This is the first time the propaganda has mentioned
such an organization. The new statement, "on behalf of the members
of the Cambodian People's Movement of United Resistance," sets
out general tasks for all Cambodians, the "FUNK committees at
various levels in the country," and the liberation forces.
NCNA on 11 May reported Sihanouk as having said, during a reception
hosted in Peking the same day for friendly diplomats, that the
three authors of the statement "are in their home country leading the
Cambodian people to carry out heroic struggles." And Sihanouk
says in his 12 May message that he has entrusted the management of
Cambodia "entirely to the patriotic persons who are now leading
the national resistance in the country, particularly Comrades
Khieu Sam Phon, Hou Youn and Hu Nim."
STATEMENT BY The Cambodian CP-front organization called the
"PEOPLE'S GROUP" "People's Group" (Pracheachon) resurfaced when its
Central Committee statement, dated 23 April, was
carried by VNA on 3 May and subsequently publicized by Front and Chinese
media. Expressing support for Sihanouk's 23 March appeal, the statement
says that "ovrer the past 15 years (1955-70)" the People's Group, under
"difficult as well as favorable circumstances," has consistently and
actively carried out its political stand of uniting "patriotic"
Cambodians--including "patriotic members of the royal family"--in
the struggle against U.S. imperialism.
The People's Group was announced on 6 August 1955 when VNA summarized
a statement saying that it had been established in July in accordance
with the Cambodian national constitution and that it was made up
of "former members of the Khmer resistance." The People's Group
ran candidates under its own label in the 1955 and 1958 Cambodian
elections. It was suppressed by Sihanouk in the early 1960's.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS T13ENDS
_ 14 _ 13 MAY 1970
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY Vietnamese communist reports on military
DEVELOPMENTS action in the first week of May include
several items hailing the attacks on Chu
Lai, Quang Nam Province, and attacks on bases along the Cambodian
border said to have been used to launch allied actions in
Cambodia. A Hanoi radio commentary of the 9th says that these
early May "victories" are strong encouragement for the Khmers.
A PLAF command instruction, broadcast by the Front on the 10th,
urges combatant,y to accelerate their emulation in fighting to
defeat the allies and thus commemorate the historic days in May:
Ho's birthday, the anniversary of the PRG, the recent founding of
the'tndochinese people's front,"and the anniversary oL Dien Bien Phu.
The instruction, dated 7 May, hails the "victories" of the communists
in April, routinely calling them a violent blow to Vietnamization
and to U.S. expansion of the war, and proof of solidarity among the
Indochinese people. It sets forth several tasks for the PLAF:
developing the offensive and annihilating allied troops and
destroying their materiel, aiding the people in their uprisings,
and striving for "thrift" and for boosting production.
PEOPLE'S UPRISING, An undated QUAN GIAI PHONG commentary,
REVOLUTIONARY ORGANS broadcast by the Front on the 7th, claims
that in the early days of April people's
uprisings occurred vigorously along with the military offensive.
The commentary describes a variety of actions throughout the
South including demonstrations, punishing allied "agents," and
military attacks. It claims that certain localities which used to
struggle in legal and overt ways now have "arisen to annihilate
tyrants" and take part in military action. This upsurge of
uprisings demonstrates that "our political strength is tremendous"
and the political position of the "revolution" is enhanced even in
allied-controlled areas.
On the 9th the Front radio reports a conference held by Ben Tre
Province on 24 April to discuss plans for stepping up activities of
the revolutionary administration and consolidating and supporting
its organizational apparatus. Representatives of the various
echelons of the "administration" were reportedly present.
A people's revolutionary court in a Can Tho district held a public
session on 20 April to try two "U.S. spies," Nguyen Van Hai and Tran
Van Ba, according to a Front broadcast on the 8th. The broadcast
reports that Hai was sentenced to death because he had been an
informer and refused to be "educated" or warned about his "crimes."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREND""
- 15 - 13 MAY 19'(0
COMMENT ON GVN The recent disturbances at the progovcrnment
Buddhist temple in Saigon prompt communiuL
propaganda attacks on the GVN. Antigovernment
youths and Buddhists reportedly seized the temple; progovcrnment
Buddhists recaptured it early on the 5th. The communists charge
that the latter group of Buddhists was composed of disguised GVN
police, and a Front radio broadcast on the 9th ridicules GVN
denials of involvement.
On the 7th LPA notes chat GVN's action in closing all Saigon schools
beginning 5 May and increasing curfew hours. The item calls these
moves further steps in repressing the students, and adds that
"Saigon is now in a very tense situation." Several items report
other incidents, including student demonstrations at the Cambodian
embassy and protests against massacres of Vietnamese in Cambodia.
A Front radio commentary on the 12th asserts that in another "fascist,
repressive, and terrorist action" b, the Saigon regime, the GVN
supreme court on 11 May decided to put three student leaders on
trial befor: a military court. Available communist propaganda has
not acknowledged the supreme court ruling that Tran Ngoc Chau should
be released from prison or its decision declaring invalid the
military court trials of arrested students.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ON U,S. ENCROACHMENTS
Hanoi radio on 13 May broadcasts a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
protest condemning alleged U.S. artillery shelling on 11. May against
Vinh Hoa village from the southern side of the demilitarized zone.
It adds that at the same time U.S.aircraft fired rockets at Vinh
Gia village. It asserts that both villages are located on the
northern side of the DMZ. The protest routinely condemns the alleged
acts and demands an immediate end to "every act of encroachment" on
DRV sovereignty and security.
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CON1i'Ii)Ii1NTIAL 101310) TTHENDS
- 16 - 13 MAY 1V70
LINO - SOVIET R ELATIONS
MOSCOW, PEKING PLAY DOWN DISPUTE, MANEUVER ON INDOCHINA
In a setting dominated by Indochincoc developments, Moscow and
Pelting have played down their polemic on bilateral iuoucs while
maneuvering to strengthen their respective positions vis-a-vis -the
parties involved in Indochina.* Public statements and propaganda
surrounding Le Duan's visits to Moscow and Peking have included no
reference to the state of Nino-Soviet relations. Last October DRV
Premier Phan Van Dong, on the return leg of his visit to the PRC
winding up a tour that included the USSR and the GDR, had endorsed
the recently opened Sino-Soviet talks and expressed "deep hope"
that they would succeed.** NCNA noted at that time that Dong had
arrived in Peking after visiting the Soviet Union and the GDR;
this time NCNA's 10 May announcement of Le Duan's arrival did not
mention his previous whereabouts.
Minima], comment on China in Moscow's central media consists
essentially of ideological attacks and avoids the previously
emphasized theme of provocative Chinese war preparations and anti-
Soviet hysteria. The border talks were the subject of a 6 May
Moscow broadcast in Mandarin to southeast Asia, elaborating on
Kosygin's l- May press conference remarks on the talks, which went
beyond Kosygin in charging that the Chinese have obstructed the
restoration of good relations by launching an anti-Soviet campaign.
Observing that within the past year Moscow on several occasions
has proposed the normalization of relations, the broadcast said the
Soviets had advanced "concrete proposals" to this end--possibly an
allusion to such proposals as an exchange of ambassadors.
There has been no announcement on the border talks, with chief
Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov's trip to Moscow unreported by either
side. The head of the PRC delegation at the talks, Vice Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, attended a Czechoslovak embassy reception
on 9 May, according to NCNA.
* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS for documentation of
Soviet and Chinese propaganda on Cambodia.
** An appeal for fraternal unity reminiscent of statements by Hanoi
last fall is contained in a speech delivered by the Italian CP's
Berlinguer on 3 May. Calling for solidarity among the Soviet Union,
the PRC, and other socialist countries on the Indochina conflict,
Berlinguer recalled the appeal in Ho Chi Minh's testament for an end
to fraternal strife.
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CONP'IDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
-117- 13MAY1970
GRECHKO SPEECH Moscow'n current restraint on the China question
is reflected in Defense Minister Grechko's 8 May
speech marking the 25th anniversary of Nazi Germany's defeat. In
contrast to his attack in an article on the occasion last year on
the "adventurist" line of the "Mao Tse-tung group," Grechko this
time did not mention the Chinese by name. But while respecting
current political considerations, he served notice that the Soviets
regard China as a source of major concern and have not loi;. e d their
guard. Demanding heightened vigilance toward both "imperialist and
other militarist [read: Chinese] forces," he warned that Moscow has
drawn "the most serious conclusions from the alteration in the
military-political situation in the Far East"--that is, the Sino-
Soviet confrontation. He added that the Soviets are undertaking all
necessary measures to insure that their defense "in both West and East
is strong and' indestructible."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA The sensitive subject of Czechoslovakia has again
figured in Sino-Soviet polemical crossfire. The
7 May joint communique on the Brezhnev-Kosygin delegation's visit to
Czechoslovakia took the opportunity to register the two sides'
"unanimous" views on Peking's policies in the communist movement and
denounced the Chinese for interfering in the internal affairs of the
socialist countries. Moscow has sought to drive the point home in
broadcasts to China censuring the Maoist leadership for its divisive
approach and its inflammatory propaganda urging the Czechoslovaks to
resist their leaders and their Soviet overlords.
Peking has provided a reminder of its effort to probe Soviet
vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe by sending a message to the
Czechoslovak Government on the occasion of Czechoslovakia's
national day. The message pointedly hails the Czechoslovaks as a
people with "a glorious revolutionary tradition." An NCNA
dispatch on 8 May, rounding up worldwide activities marking May
Day, directed a barb at the Soviets in taking note of a Swedish
demonstration against the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the "Soviet
revisionist military occupation of Czechoslovakia."
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YUGOSLAVIA
BELGRADE USES CAMBODIA ISSUE TO PRESS NONALINEMENT
Belgrade has used the U.S. "invasion" of "nonalined" Cambodia
to give impetus to the projected third nonalined summit,
scheduled to be held in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in the
first half of September. Addressing a Belgrade luncheon for
visiting Zambian President Kaunda on 7 May, Tito asserted,
according to TANJUG, that "it is high time indeed for all
democratic and peaceful forces to oppose the most resolute
resistance to the policy of force and to eliminate it from
international relations." He went on to condemn "the brutal
violation of Cambodia's sovereignty" as "a challenge to all
mankind striving for peace." The communique on the two leaders'
talks, released by TANJUG on the 6th, contained a condemnation
of the U.S. action and emphasized that nonalinement "is the
only alternative to the policy of pressure and force and as a
road leading toward progress and peace." Tito had made a point
of Cambodia's nonalinement in a 3 May speech assailing U.S.
"aggression" against that country.
Tito's cloLe associate Kardelj, currently on a tour of Latin
America apparently designed in part to drum up support for
the Lusaka summit, used the occasion of an airport reception
in Santiago, Chile, on 10 May to call on all "peace-seeking
forces" to raise their voices in opposition to the U.S. action.
TANJUG quoted Kardelj as declaring that "acquiescence in U.S.
aggression jeopardizes the independence and sovereignty of every
country, for the plight in which Cambodia finds itself may be
the fate of other people tomorrow."
Yugoslavia's prompt recognition of the Sihanouk government-in-
exile on 6 May, the day after its formation was announced, would
also appear to have some relevance to the forthcoming Lusaka
summit, where the gaestion of accreditation of a Cambodian
delegation may be expected to be an issue. At the Dar es Salaam
preparatory meeting held 13-17 April, neither the Sihanouk
delegation nor the Lon Nol regime's representation was
allowed to take part. A decision on whether or not to seat the
Vietnam PRG delegation must also be made at the Lusaka summit.
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13 MAY 1970
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW ASSAILS ISRAEL FOR INCURSION INTO LEBANON
Moscow promptly denounces Israel for increasing tension in the Middle
East by its 12-13 April raid into southern Lebanon, taking the line
that Washington and Tel Aviv are trying to detach Lebanon from the
"common Arab front" and isolate it from the rest of the Arab world.
According to Shragin in a domestic service commentary on the 12th,
Israel and the United States thus want to use Lebanon as a base for
action against the UAR and other "progressive" Arab countries.
Shragin and other propagandists link the incursion with reported U.S.
plans to reconsider its program of arms supplies to Israel. Vasilyev
says in RED STAR on the 13th, according to TASS, that President
Nixon's "recent statement on U.S. readiness to reconsider additional
deliveries of aircraft to Israel came as a 'stimulant"' for Israel's
attack on Lebanon. TASS on the 9th, reporting the President's press
conference the previous day, noted that he "confirmed the old
policy of supporting the Israeli aggressors and stated that the United
States may review the question of selling new consignments of combat
planes to Israel." Moscow gave the President's statement no further
attention in its very meager broadcast propaganda on the Middle
East over the past week.
In the fir-ct comment on the new Israeli action, TASS commentator Orlov
on the 12th broaches the arms delivery question along the lines of
Moscow's recent evasive propaganda response to Israel's charge that
Soviet pilots were taking part in operational missions in Egypt.
Concurrently with the attack on Lebanon and continuing air strikes
on other Arab countries, Orlov says, "imperialist and Zionist"
circles are waging a propaganda campaign based on allegations about
Arab threats against Israel, using them as a "false pretext" for
U.S. reexamination of the arms deliveries.
An Arabic-language commentary on the 12th also finds the timing. of
the Israeli action "significant" in that it coincides with "flimsy
hints" in the U.S. press regarding Washington's "readiness to
increase militar ind material aid to Tel Aviv." This commentary
claims that the L__ited States and Israel are concerned with the
Lebanese progressive forces' success in consolidating solidarity
with the Palestinian resistance movement, "which is of significance"
in the Arab struggle for liberation of the occupied territories.
The broadcast suggests that Israel suffered such "intense retaliation"
on the Egyptian front that it was forced to select other targets,
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- 20 - 13 MAY 1970
possibly considering Lebanon the least dangerous. But it is
dangerous for Israel, the broadcast adds, to "rely on the
weakness of a particular Arab country" in view of the Arabs'
growing solidarity, which has been "brilliantly manifested" in the
current attack.
Reporting the Security Council's unanimous adoption on the 12th
of a resolution demanding immediate Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanese territory, TASS says that the U.S. and British representa-
tives tried to delay the voting "in the interests of the Israeli
aggressors" but that a U.S.-proposed amendment was rejected.
TASS makes no mention of the Soviet sub-amendment or of any
remarks by Soviet delegate Malik. Reporting the Council's evening
session of the 12th, TASS the following day states that Israeli
delegate Tekoah "impudently" said Israel had not yet carried out
the resolution on withdrawal and that he "boasted of the
destruction and casualties" caused by Israeli troops.
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EAST - LEST RELATIONS
13 MAY 1970
GRECHKO ATTACKS 'IMPERIALISTS," AFFIRMS SOVIET "PEACE" POLICY
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's 8 May keynote speech on the
25th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany balances reaffirma-
tions of Soviet adherence to a policy of peaceful coexistence with
warnings about a continuing "imperialist" threat, predictable for
the occasion. Grechko calls "American imperialism" the "chief
bulwark of international reaction," pointing to the United States'
accumulat4on of :Large stocks of nuclear-missile arms, its support
for Israeli "aggression," and its efforts to "implement armed
intervention against revolutionary Cuba" as well as its actions in
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Both Kosygin and Brezhnev in speeches
in Prague on 6 and 7 May, respectively, had decried U.S. action: in
Southeast Asia, including the incursions into Cambodia. Kosygin
said the U.S. operations in Cambodia compel the Soviet Union and
the other Warsaw Pact countries to do "everything possible to
repulse and halt imperialist aggression."
Grechko underscores the adequacy of the defenses of the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact allies, at one point noting that the imperialists
have been "forced to admit" that a direct clash with the socialist
system, particuarly in a nuclear-rocket war, "must lead to
disastrous consequences for the capitalist system." A third world war,
Grechko says, would "compel mankind to suffer unprecedented trials,
[but] it would inevitably lead to the collapse of imperialism as
a world system." He stops short of declaring, however, that the
socialist system would in fact be the "victor."*
Grechko goes on to state that "a new war is by no means a necessary
prerequisite for the universal victory of socialism" and that war
can be averted by the united actions of the peace-loving forces--a
theme also sounded by Marshal Bagramyan in a talk broadcast by Radio
Moscow for foreign audiences on 9 May. Bagramyan called for unity
in the struggle against war "in a time of lethal weapons of gigantic
destructive capacity" and added that "in our time, war is no longer
a fatal inevitability."
* One of the infrequent Soviet references to socialist victory had
appeared in a 30 August 1969 SOVIET RUSSIA article by Marshal Krylov,
pegged to the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. Krylov
said "victory" in a nuclear war "will be on the side of world
socialism and all progressive mankind."
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- 22 - 13 MAY 1970
Grechko declares that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries
are pursuing "a Leninist policy of peace and friendship" and that their
foreign political activities are permeated with a concern for improving
the political climate in the world, "first and foremost in Europe."
The policy is also directed, he says, at discontinuation "of the
strategic and all other kinds of arms races," at establishing a
reliable system of collective security, and at eliminating without
delay the hotbeds of war in Southeast Asia and the Near East, "for
which imperialist powers are to blame." He remarks further that
the socialist countries, "following the principles of peaceful
coexistence, . . . do not doubt the expediency of this or that
concrete agreement with capitalist states, the possibility and
necessity of settling unsolved problems by means of diplomacy."
Cooperation between countries with different social systems, he
concludes, "can be utilized in solving a whole series of questions
which are of interest both to the socialist and capitalist states"
of the world.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
- 23 - 13 MAY 1970
WEST GERMANY
STOPH TO ATTEND KASSEL SUMMIT DESPITE FRG'S "DISCRIMINATION"
GDR propaganda and leaders' statements indicate that Premier Stoph
will attend the second summit meeting with FRG Chancellor Brandt,
scheduled to be held at Kassel on 21 May, notwithstanding numerous
GDR protests against West German "discrimination" against the East
Germans and increasingly personal attacks on Brandt. There is
no evidence of any change in the GDR's basic demand presented at
the 19 March Erfurt summit: international recognition of the GDR.
This position is restated in numerous commentaries and statements,
including an exchange of letters between Stoph and Brandt, leaders'
speeches and comments surrounding the 25th Victory Day anniversary,
and GDR protests arising from West German efforts to prevent GDR
admission to membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) at
its Geneva assembly that opened 5 May.
KASSEL TALKS Ulbricht personally confirmed that the GDR will not
back out of the second summit at Kassel, declaring
in a 7 May speech to a Berlin teachers' congress that "we are eager
to hear the arguments" Brandt will present to Stoph at Kassel.
Restating the GDR's established line and noting that its draft treaty
has been in Bonn's hands "for a long time," Ulbricht declared that
the second summit would prove whether the FRG Government "is willing
at long last" to accept the GDR as an equal and recognize it and
accede to other GDR proposals.
GDR media continue to report the activities of GDR officials negotiating
on "technical protocol prerequisites" in Bonn and Kassel, as they
had done prior to the meeting in Erfurt, and ADN notes on 12 May
that GDR officials expect to make one more visit to Kassel before
the summit takes place.
STOPH-BRANDT Late on 6 May, GDR media publicized Stoph's
CORRESPONDENCE 5 May letter to Brandt expressing concern about
"necessary conditions to insure equal negotiations
without any discrimination." Couched in relatively nonpolemical terms,
Stoph's letter explained that his doubt that essential conditions for
the Kassel summit existed stemmed from the continued existence of
the so-called "handcuff law" treating GDR citizens as subject to FRG
laws and the fact that a West German "fascist" had filed a charge--
Stoph did not acknowledge that it was a murder charge--which was
"treated provocatively" by FRG judicial authorities. Stoph also
protested FRG efforts to prevent GDR admission to the recent ;session
of the UN Economic Commission for Europe and to membership in WHO,
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-24 ?. 13MAY1970
concluding that the "contradictions" between Brandt's Erfurt
decln,rations and the actual policy of the FRG "are not conducive
to promoting the consultations in Kassel."
Stoph said the GDR stresses that all FRG laws infringing on
"elementary principles of equality and nondiscrimination" must be
eliminated. And he expressed "hope" for "a binding assurance" from
West Germany that the GDR delegation will enjoy in Kassel all the
"rights, privileges, and immunities" granted "equal-ranking
representatives of other sovereign states" in accord with international
law.
Brandt's 6 May reply, according to ADN on the 7th, "merely gives
the assurance" that Stoph and his party will get the same treatment
Brandt had received at Erfurt, ignoring the GDR's demand for rights
due heads of "other sovereign states." ADN also says Brandt's
reply "defended" discriminatory FRG laws, "expressly affirmed" the
FRG's intentions to continue a discriminatory policy and "blatant
interference" in GDR affairs, and "arrogantly" mad;, It clear that the
FRG would not change its policy until the GDR submits to its
"revanchist demands." This "blackmail concept utterly contradicts"
FRG declaratior;s and international law, ADN complains.
GDR ATTACK GDR media have contrasted the Victory Day anniversary
ON BRANDT speeches by GDR leaders with an 8 May Bundestag
statement by Brandt on the same occasion. As quoted
by ADN on the 10th, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused Brandt of failing to
"dissociate himself from those responsible" for World War II, of
"covering up the crimes of German imperialism before and after
8 May 1945," and of "glossing over present-day war crimes--the U.S.
attack on neutral Cambodia." ADN also reports that BERLINER ZEITUNG
called Brandt's speech one of "revanchism and nationalism" and
charged that Brandt's "embrace" of former Chancellor Adenauer's
policies was "tantamount to revanchism,"
Stoph's own Victory Day speech at Berlin ceremonies, broadcast by the
East Berlin radio on the 8th, covers familiar ground in praising the
Soviet role in crushing Hitlerite fascism, tracing the GDR's develop-
ment as a peace-loving state that has eliminated "imperialism and
militarism forever," and impugning FRG intentions. Stoph does not
attack Brandt by name, but refers to statements by "leading politicians
in Bonn" who, Stoph charges, still seek to camouflage an old policy
aimed at "revenge and conquest" with statements lacking the substance
of a "truly new policy."
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CONF?DENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
- 25 - 13 MAY 1970
GDR PROTESTS ON The GDR protests West German attempts to prevent
WHO ADMISSION GDR admission to the World Health Organization in
a delegation statement issued on 8 May at the
Geneva World Health Assembly and in a GDR Foreign Ministry statement
issued the same day, both reported by ADN. The latter statement
describes the FRG's attempts to keep the GDR out of WHO as "an
intolerable burden for the Kassel talks," adding that "whoever makes
troubles in Geneva also makes troubles for the preparations for the
planned meeting of the heads of governments of the FRG and the GDR
in Kassel." The statement labels the FRG's memorandum to WHO
"discriminatory, hostile interference" in GDR affairs and a violation
of international law representing a relapse "into the a,.,_?st time
of the cold war." The GDR "rejects with the utmost deter.nination"
the FRG's "arrogation" of the right to represent the GDR in
international affairs and calls the FRG memorandum a "crass contradiction"
of Brandt's first government statement in October 1969.
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- 26 - 13 MAY 1970
USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
NEW TREATY INCORPORATES LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
The new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, cooperation, and
mutual assistance signed in Prague on 6 May, as released in full by
TASS the same day, incorporates Moscow's ex post facto rationale
for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in a clause--the first of its
kind to appear in a Soviet treaty with an East European ally--binding
the signatories to undertake "the necessary measures to defend the
socialist gains" of the two countries. The preamble reinforces the
thrust of this proviso in terming the protection of socialist gains
"a common internationalist duty of socialist countries"--the now
standard formula advanced in the Bratislava Declaration of
3 August 1968, imposed on Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw 3ive shortly
before the invasion. The Bratislava statement declared "support,
consolidation, and protection" of socialist gains to be "a common
internationalist duty of all socialist countries." Czechoslovakia's
vassal status is underscored in the new treaty by a provision, without
precedent in such a documert, for expansion of "direct ties between
bodies of state power and the public organizations of working people
of the two countries."
Brezhnev highlighted the treaty's inclusion of the limited sovereignty
doctrine in his Prague Castle speech at the signing, noting, according
to the Moscow domestic service text, the+ the pact expresses both
countries' "firm will to take all measures necessary to defend the
socialist gains" of the two peoples. He warned in the same context:
"May our foes never forget that any attempts to violate the
territorial integrity of socialist Czechoslovakia will meet with an
effective, powerful rebuff from our joint forces." These remarks are
featured in the 10 May PRAVDA editorial on the new treaty.
The Prague trade union daily PRACE on 7 May promptly defended the
incorporation of the provision on protection of socialist gains,
citing as its forerunner not the Bratislava Declaration but "the
appropriate conclusions" drawn by the June 1969 international party
conference in Moscow, Predicting that the new treaty clause would
"be the object of the strongest clamor of enemy propaganda," the
paper proceeded to rebut such "clamor" in advance with the stereotyped
rationale about socialist states having the "duty" to assist any
of their number whose "workers' class is unable to overcome the
attack of the enemy forces on its own." Articles by RUDE PRAVO's
chief editor and in Bratislava PRAVDA on the 12th, reviewed by CTK,
are more forthright in rebutting Western talk about "limited
sovereignty" and in citing the Bratislava Declaration as the
antecedent of the statement in the preamble on protection of socialist
gains.
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- 27 73 MAY 1970
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DELETION OF "IN EUROPE" PHRASE FOLLOWS TWO PRECEDENTS
Against the background of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the new
Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty follows a three-year-old Soviet practice
in the renewal of such pacts by deleting the phrase "in Europe"
from an article binding each contracting party to rome to the
other's aid in the event of an attack.
The preamble states that the new treaty takes into account "the
present situation" in the two countries' relations as well as
changes in Europe "and in the whole world" since the original
Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was concluded on 12 December 1943.
The renewal of that 20-year pact had been accomplished merely by a
protocol, signed 27 November 1963, which updated the 1943 text by
referring to peaceful coexistence and to the Warsaw Treaty of
14 May 1955. The latter document provides for mutual assistance
"in the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states
participating in the Treaty, by any state or group of states ... ."
An "in Europe" clause comparable to the one in the Warsaw Treaty
was incorporated in the USSR's new bilateral 20-year treaty with
East Germany, signed 12 June 1964. The new Soviet treaty with
Poland, signed 8 April 1965, altered the formula to specify an
attack by West Germany "or any other state which would enter into an
alliance" with that country.
Geographical confines were removed entirely from the formula in the
new USSR-Bulgarian pact of 12 May 1967 and the new USSR-Hungarian
pact of 7 September 1967, both of which refer simply to "an armed
attack by any state or group of states." The new treaty with
Czechoslovakia follows suit. Moscow's demand for such an open-ended
commitment from its treaty partners may be assumed to be one factor
underlying the absence of an announced renewal of the Soviet-
Romanian 20-year treaty, which expired on 4 February 1968 and remains in
force under an automat;.c five-year extension clause.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
13 MAY 1970
PCI USES LENIN CENTENARY TO REASSERT AUTONOMOUS STANCE
Italian Communist Party (PCI) spokesmen have used the Lenin centenary
celebrations in Rome and Moscow to reassert the party's thesis of
"national" paths to socialism. An extraordinary session of the PCI
Central Committee and Central Control Commission on Lenin Day in Rome
was marked by an indirect exchange on the issue between CPSU Central
Committee member and Deputy Chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences
A.N. Rumyantsev and PCT Politburo member Giorgio Napolitano. At the
Moscow celebrations, PCT Politburo member Gian Carlo Pajetta argued
the need for communists to give prime consideration to specific national
conditions in formulating their strategy. Napolitano's and Pajetta's
remarks were in keeping with PCI efforts since last October to use the
Lenin centenary as a peg for exposition of the party's heterodox
views: Articles iii the PCI press invoked Lenin's teachings to justify
the espousal of diverse roads to socialism and counterposed Leninism
to Stalinism, going so far as suggest that the CPSU is still organized
along Stalinist lines while the PCI is a truly Leninist party.*
POLEMIC Rumyantsev's remarks in Rome on 22 April, summarized by
IN ROME the PCI organ L'UNITA on the 23d, seemed contrived as an
oblique rebuke to the PCI for failure to take due account
of the Soviet revolutionary "model." He described the Soviet revolu-
tionary experience as something that "no people can fail to consider";
and while granting the relevance of national conditions, he stated
that "many general laws" which have universal validity are applicable
to the process of building socialism. He also contended that the
closer a country comes to launching a socialist revolution, "the more
precious, actual, and important for them become the experience and
conclusions drawn by those who have already gone through that stage
of political and socialist development."
In an indirect rejoinder, Napolitano affirmed that the PCI was able
to hew to Leninist concepts "without withdrawing into an absurd
obedience to a rigid and unchangeable model" which would have been
"contrary" to Lenin's teachings. His party, he said, had always
placed stress on "a diversity of conditions and historical experiences
which must be recognized openly and on a variety of paths of access
to socialism and of building socialism." While conceding that the
"historical context" was different, he cited asrelevant today a
statement by Lenin that "socialism is inconceivable without democracy."
He pointedly credited the 20th CPSU Congress with providing a great
imretus to the PCI's development of "an original prospect of advance
toward socialism" and at a later point deplored Stalin's "deforming
and opportunist" simplification of Lenin's thinking.
* For a discussion of some of these articles, see the FBIS SURVEY of
12 March 1970, pages 4-9.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 29 -
FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 1970
The Rumyantsev-Napolitano exchange had been foreshadowed in a
discussion of the Leninist concept of the state at a Soviet-
Italian historical meeL?:Lng in Florence in mid-April. According
to a 15 April account of the meeting in L'UNITA, Italian and
Soviet scholars registered "differences of interpretation" on
the concept of socialist democracy. PCI Central Committee member
Luciano Gruppi's remarks, as cited in this account, seemed a
transparent criticism of the Soviet model of socialism: the
soviets which were supposed to be a government of the workers,
he said, "were in fact a government for the workers exercised
by the vanguards," and the "bureaucracy" which arose after the
Bolshevik revolution was "wedded to 'Great Russian' chauvinism,"
causing Lenin to be coacerned that "the rights of nations to
separation should not be a formal one but real." Perhaps with
Czechoslovakia in mind, Gruppi concluded that "internationalism
can only be the result of the unity of the workers, which can
only be achieved when national claims have been satisfied."
OBSERVANCE Speaking at the Moscow ceremonies on 22 April Paletta
IN MOSCOW was considerably more circumspect than Napolitano as
in Rome in pressing for distinctively national roads
to socialism. He did argue that for the PCI being Leninist means
giving prime emphasis to "securing a profound connection between the
party and the reality of one's country," and he invoked Lenin's
authority in noting the party's rejection of "the schematism of
those who have tried to turn Marxist teaching from an instrument for
recognizing reality . . . into a dogma." Paj tta cited among factors
contributing to Lenin's stature among revolutionaries his insistence
on careful analysis "of the special conditions of each separate .:ountry
and each separate historical period." He concluded that "Leninist
internationalism" entails firm backing for "the self-dependence of
e'rery party, regard for a given country's particular features, and
the independence of every country."
BACKGROUND PCI leaders on past occasions have been explicit in
rejecting Italian communist emulation of Soviet
experience. PCI Secretariat member Paolo Bufalini, for example,
writing in the 17 April issue of the PCI theoretical journal
RINASCITA on a 1951 clash between Stalin and Togliatti, declared:
We are struggling for the democratic and socialist renovation
of Italy on a path and perspective which are profoundly different
than those of the USSR and other socialist countries. We are
struggling to arrive at socialism by a democratic path, to
arrive at a pluralistic socialist society. History cannot be
repeated . . . .
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CONFIDENTIAL FBA S TRENDS
- 30 - 13 MAY 1970
The PCI has persistently and directly censured Moscow for ignoring
the question of democratization of Soviet society. For example, a
lli April L'UNI'T'A article by the paper's Moscow correspondent, after
discussing recent debates in the USSR on economic reform, observed:
"What has been lacking up to now, at least in the public debate, . . .
is a speech which would broaden the debates to include problems of
a more specifically political nature, taking up, for example, the
study of, the reasons which actually limited the debate at the 20th
CPSU congress to a mere denunciation of the errors of Stalin without
tackling the problems of the structure and expansion of socialist
democracy."
STRESS ON PARTY AUTONOMY SERVES DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENDS
Emphasis by PCI spokesmen on the party's complete autonomy has seemed
calculated in considerable measure to bolster the party's domestic
political position, with regional elections slated for 7 June.
Frequently citing the PCI's opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia
as proof of its independence, party spokesmen have on occasion
contrasted this position with the alleged subservience of center-left
Italian parties to U.S. dictates. PCI Deputy General Secretary
Berlinguer on 21 April, contended that "no other Italian party has
given more proof of its independence than the PCI" and concluded,
recalling the party's opposition to the August 1968 intervention,
that the Czechoslovak events had afforded "new reasons" to justify
PCI opposition to the division of Europe into rival military blocs
which "severely limit the independence and free development of every
country."
Berlinguer made it clear in that speech that the PCI's vision of
democratic socialism had nothing in corimon with the socialism
practiced in Eastern Europe. "We intend," he said, "to follow the
path of a novel and modern socialism, one which is not bureaucratic,
one which is based on the protection and exaltation of all individual
and collective liberties," with "the concurrence of a plurality of
political forces."
In a 3 May speech condemning the U.S. intervention in Cambodia,
Berlinguer scored the Italian ruling parties' "timid silence" on
the issue while highlighting the PCI's "autonomous positions" on
problems affecting socialist countries. PCI spokesmen have used
much the same approach in arguing for a severance of Italian ties
with NATO. Thus a L'UNITA article on 15 April, recalling the PCI's
firm opposition to "limited sovereignty" in any form and most recently
in Czechoslovakia, went on to ask rhetorically "who among the men of
the noncommunist left" were prepared to take a comparable position
"in the face of the 'limited sovereignty' imposed on the Italian state
by Atlantic military integration."
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CONFiDI NTtAL Fl1IS THENDS
- 31. - 1.3 MAY 1970
USSR INTERIJAL AFFAIRS
MAY DAY PHOTOGRAPHS REFLECT RANKINGS OF SOVIET LEACERS
Comparison of May Day photos of Soviet leaders with the last photo-
graphic lineups published in the central press late last year
(7, 8, and 26 November, 7 and 17 December) suggests some shifts in
the fortunes of junior Politburo members. Polyanskiy, mos.'
frequently ranked sixth in late 1969, has now slipped below Pelshe
and Mazurov. Pelshe has risen to No. 6--his highest ranking since
Joining the Politburo. Pelshe's status in the past has been
unclear; for example, PRAVDA's 8 November 1969 photo showed him in
seventh place while all the other central papers showed him last.
Voronov is again shown standing last, as in PRAVDA's 7 December
picture.
The May Day standings appear to set the six older men--from the 71-year-
old Pelshe to the 64-year-old Brezhnev and Kirilenko--apart from
the four younger men. Those in the younger group, from the 60-year-
old Voronov to the 52-year-old Shelepin, are relegated to the lower
positions.
There is a more marked change in the Ukrainian press rankings of
Moscow Politburo members. The lineup of portraits published in
the 2 May Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAINA strikingly favors Shelepin, placing
him far higher than in Moscow's lineup and far higher than the
Ukrainians had been ranking him:
Moscow Press
Brezhnev
Kosygin
Podgornyy
Suslov
Kirilenko
Pelshe
[Shelest not present]
Mazurov
Polyanskiy
Shelepin
Voronov
Ukrainian Press
Brezhnev
Kosygin
Podgornyy
Kirilenko
Suslov
Shelepin
Shelest
Mazurov
Voronov
Polyanskiy
Pelshe
Shelepin has consistently ranked next to last, No. 10, for the last
two years in the Ukraine. He had been favored briefly in late 1967--
raised to No. 6 in the 8 November and 25 December 1967 RADYANSKA UKRAINA--
but dropped back to tenth place on May Day 1968 and subsequently.
Since late 1967 the Ukrainians have consistently ranked Suslov below
Kirilenko and have consistently listed Mazurov, Voronov, and Polyanskiy
in that order. The Ukrainians always rank their leader, Shelest,
No. 7 and Pelshe last. Suslov and Polyanskiy are always less favored
in the Ukraine than in Moscow. S elep'n' s ups
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INFIGHTING CONTINUES IN UKRAINIAN WRITERS UNION
Recent reports in the Ukrainian literary press indicate continuing
turmoil in the Ukrainian Writers Union and complicated maneuvering
among its feuding moderate and conservative leaders. There is
evidence that after setbacks suffered in late 1969 and early 1970,
the moderates have won a few rounds themselves.
Last December the moderates lost ground when conservatives engineered
the expulsion of dissident writer Ivan Dzyuba from the Writers Union
as well as the removal of Marharita Malinovaka,a defender of Writers
Union Chairman Oles Honchar's novel "Sobor," from her post as deputy
editor of the main Ukrainian literary newspaper, LITERATURNA UKRAINA.
Although Ionchar's first deputy, conservative Yuriy Zbanatskiy, now
appears to be playing a bigger role, especially in organizational work,
the moderate Honchar is himself still very much in evidence. In April
Honchar took advantage of the Lenin birth centenary celebrations to
call again for a tolerant policy toward writers' creative work. Also
in late April, one of Honchar's leading critics and the initiator of
public attacks on Dzyuba, Oleksiy Poltoratskiy, was forced to make a
public confession that his own work lacked ideological demandingness.
VICTORIES FOR Although Ivan Dzyuba's openly anti-Russian book
CONSERVATIVES "Internationalism or Russification?" was published
in the West in 1968, the Ukrainian Writers Union
failed to take any action against him. Writers Union chairman Oles
IIonchar failed to criticize Dzyuba or to participate in action against
other Ukrainian dissidents. The attacks on the signers of Ukrainian
protest petitions circulating in early 1968 were made by Vasyl
Kozachenko, Ukrainian Writers Union secretary and Kiev writers' party
committee secretary (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 21 and 24 May 1968), and
VSESVIT editor Oleksiy Poltoratskiy (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 16 July 1968).
At a December 1968 meeting of Kozachenko's Kiev writers' party
organization, Poltoratskiy initiated the attack on Dzyuba and also
criticized the defenders of Honchar's novel "Sobor" (LITERATURNA
UKRAINA, 27 December 1968). For many months Poltoratskiy remained
the only one on record publicly attacking Dzyuba's book.
Finally, in late 1969, the conservatives moved against Dzyuba without
the cooperation of Writers Union Chairman Honchar. The Kiev writers
organization board, of which Kozachenko is chairman, expelled Dzyuba
from the Writers Union. In late December 1969 the presidium of the
Ukrainian Writers Union met to consider confirmation of Dzyuba's
expulsion. The meeting was conducted by Kozachenko and conservative
Writers Union first Deputy Chairman Yuriy Zbanatskiy, with Chairman
Honchar not participating. After obtaining a partial recantation
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FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 1970
from Dzyuba, the presidium decided to allow him to remain in the
union if he changed his ways (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 6 January 1970).
Dzyuba was again admonished at a 15 January 1970 Writers Union
board plenum, where keynoter Pavlo Zahrebelnyy complained of the
"many unpleasantnesses" Dzyuba had caused the union by his speeches
and book (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 16 January 1970). Belated attempts
were undertaken by the Ukraine's foreign propaganda organ, the
Society for Cultural Ties With Ukrainians Abroad, to counteract the
damage done by Dzyuba's book. At a 12 February meeting the society's
chairman, Yuriy Smolich, announced that the society had published a
book by Bohdan Stanchuk to refute Dzyuba's book (VISTI Z UKRAINI,
19 February 1970). It was also published in English under the title
"What I. Dzyuba Stands For, and How He Does It" and was described in
the society's English-language paper NEWS FROM UKRAINE, No. 4,
February 1970.
Moderat-9 received another blow at the beginnin(; of January with the
removal of LITERATURNA UKRAINA's deputy editor Marharita Malinovska.
Malinovska had been the first to laud Honchar's "Sobor" when it was
published in January 1968; her review appeared on the 19th of that
month in LITERATURNA UKRAINA, and in RADYANSKA UKRAINA of 26 April 1968
she was attacked by M. Yurchuk and F. Lebedenko for praising "Sobor"
even before the novel had reached the reader.
Signs of trouble in LITERATURNA UKRAINA's editorial board had first
appeared in October 1969. On 21 October chief editor I. Zub's name
was removed from the list of editorial board members, and Malinovska's
name was moved up to head of the board, although she was still listed
only as deputy editor. On 21 November LITERATURNA UKRAINA carried an
account of a meeting of Kozachenko's Kiev writers' party organization
at which LITERATURNA UKRAINA was criticized for publishing material
which "lacks ideological sharpness and party principledness." The
same issue listed Zub again as chief editor, after a month with no
chief editor listed. A few days later Malinovska lost her title of
deputy editor and from 5 December on was simply another editorial
board member. A month later--in the same 6 January 1970 issue which
announced the expulsion of Dzyuba and his recantation--Malinovska was
dropped from the editorial board altogether.
Four days later the Ukrainian Central Committee organ RADYANSKA UKRAINA
carried writer Boris Buryak's criticism of LITERATURNA UKRAINA for
"praising clear artistic failures" and not reflecting the "tastes of
readers and the writers' organization." In March the Writers Union
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party committee discussed LITERAT'URNA UKRAINA's work and took it to
task for not criticizing recent literary works of V. Drozd,
R. Ivanichuk and I. Chendey.* LITERATURNA UKRAINA was warned to
raise its ideological demandingness and was admonished that "Lenin
was implacable to what he called 'literary disguising' of anti-
socialist ideas . . ." (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 13 March 1970).
GAINS SCORED Honchar and the moderates appear to be holding their
BY MODERATES own. In January a defender of Honchar's novel became
chief of the Writers Union bool: advertising; in April
Honchar made a speech urging a policy of toleration in literary work;
and at the end of April Honchar critic and hardliner Poltoratskiy was
publicly humiliated for himself publishing ideologically objectionable
material.
At a meeting of the presidium of the Writers Union on 20 January 1970
Vitaliy Petlyovanyy resigned as director of the Writers Union literary
advertising bureau for reasons of health, and V. Pyanov replaced him
(LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 23 January). Conservative Petlyovanyy had
generally concurred in criticisms of "Sobor," in LITERATURNA UKRAINA
on 27 December 1968), while Pyanov had highly praised "Sobor" in the
22 February 1968'ROBITNICHA HAZETA. After a 26 April 1968 article in
the Central Committee organ RADYANSKA UKRAINA had attacked "Sobor"
and Pyanov's review, ROBITNICHA HAZETA admitted on 28, April that
Pyanov's article had been a "mistake."
HONCHAR APPEAL Speaking on behalf of the Writers Union at a 9 April
FOR TOLERATION 1970 joint plenum of Ukrainian creative unions on
Lenin's 100th anniversary, Honchar delivered a strong
appeal for tolerance and nonintervention in literary life. Noting the
frequent rebukes to young authors, he declared that no one has exact
answers for all new phenomena and "life cannot be laid in a Procrustean
bed of dogmatism." He stated that it is in the interests of foreign
eneries to have Soviet literature appear dry, dogmatic, and schematic
and for Soviet literature to "lose the readers' faith." The party
"orients us to create highly-talented literature" which can win the
reader "by the strength of artistic images," he said, quoting Lenin
to the effect that talent must be carefully protected. While "we must
accept readers' demandingness without irritation," he admonished, the
"readers must also be taught deeper understanding of the specific
features of literary and, in general, artistic work," since, for example,
"among the youth some have superficial bourgeois ideas about the hard
* Ivanichuk's .'Melva" was attacked in the 7 February 1970 PRAVDA
UKRAINY by N. Ravluk. A historical novel about the 1600's, it
allegedly failed to contain characters with a positive attitude toward
Russia. One of Chendey's works was attacked in the 7 September MOLOD
UKRAINY for presenting religion in a positive light.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 MAY 1970
work of creative intelligentsia." People can be educated "only
by truth," he declared, and "the time of vulgar criticism has
passed, and unfounded critical willfulness is an unpopular
thing now."
Honchar also appeared to aim a jibe at russified oblasts like
Dnepropetrovsk, where Ukrainian literature is sometimes discriminated
against. He declared that Ukrainian literature enjoys aide popularity
outside the Ukraine and is honored everywhere--"which, unfortunately,
cannot be said about some of the oblasts of our own republic, where
carelessness stubbornly shows itself, say, in the fitting out of
children's, school and factory libraries." Dnepropetrovsk officials
led the persecution of Honchar's "Sob or," and according to a
purported April 1969 letter from a Ukrainian citizen published in
the October 1969 emigre journal SUCHASNIST, there is a ban on "Sobor"
in Dnepropetrovsk oblast.
In another instance of Dnepropetrovsk leaders' support of a hard
line, Dnepropetrovsk ;ity First Secretary A. A. Ulanov, a foe of
Honchar,* wrote an article published 12 March 1970 in Moscow's
SOVIET CULTURE defending interference in art and telling of a
new crackdown on Dnepropetrovsk theaters.
That Honchar's views enjoy a measure of party support seems apparent
from the publication of his long speech not only in LITERATURNA
UKRAINA but also--fully--in the Ukrainian Central Committee organ
RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 10 April 1970.
HONCHAR CRITIC Moderates apparently could take some satisfaction
UNDER ATTACK from the misfortune of one of their most outspoken
critics, Oleksiy Poltoratskiy, who wars subjected
to criticism by fellow-conservatives. On 24 April a meeting of the
Writers Union board presidium was held to discuss the work of the
journal VSESVIT, which publishes foreign literature in Ukrainian.
A meeting of the Writers Union party committee shortly before had
made "serious criticisms" of the work of chief editor Poltoratskiy
and of the journal's party organization and editorial collegium.
Zbanatskiy, who delivered the 24 April report, berated VSESVIT for
printing works of "second-rate foreign writers" and works "of
doubtful value by adherents of modernistic trends," as well as
novels and stories of "low ideological-artistic quality." Its
See his 4 June 1968 SOVIET CULTURE attack on Hon char and "Sobor."
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- 36 - 13 MAY 1970
poetry selections were "even worse," and its political. articles
"lack aggressiveness" (LITERATURNA UIRAINA, 28 April 1970).
Poltoratskiy acknowledged the criticism as "correct and timely."
Writers Union party committee secretary Yakiv Bash called for
more interference in the work of VSESVIT by the journal's party
organization as well as by the Writers Union leadership. Four
members of VSESVIT's editorial board accused Poltoratskiy of
running the journal singlehandedly. Even conservative Kozachenko
criticized Poltoratskiy's "mistakes" and "loss of a high sense
of demandingness."
Although there was no indication that Poltoratskiy would lose his
post, the notably severe treatment of him personally suggests
that he was the victim, of infighting. VSESVIT had been criticized
in the past for poor ideological standards in choosing works for
publication--an occupational hazard in a journal reprinting
noncommunist literature. But the present criticism is more
serious. It appears to stem from the January 1970 Writers Union
board plenum on "international ties of Ukrainian literature."
Plenum keynoter Zahrebelnyy, who has himself been attacked by
conservatives in the past, noted VSESVIT's popularity and its many
awards but criticized its "mistakes and its "inconsistent" attitude
toward representatives of "bourgeois modernism" (LITERATURNA
UKRAINA, 16 January 1970). At the plenum, Poltoratskiy defended
his choice of foreign works presented in his journal--noting, for
example, that in mid-1968 "we were reproached" for publishing
Remarque, yet soon afterward PRAVDA itself described Remarque
as a "talented antifascist writer" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA,
20 January).
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
REBUILDING OF PARTY STRUCTURE CONTINUES AT CAUTIOUS PACE
PRC central and provincial radio reports suggest that the year-long
campaign to rebuild the Chinese Communist Party into a disciplined
organizational structure continues to make slight progress at the
county level. While central press editorials and RED FLAG articles
have clearly asserted the authority of rebuilt party committees over
established revolutionary committees, as well as the need to set party
members apart from the masses, implementation has apparently been
slowed by misunderstandings at the local level.
A 19 April NCNA report which has recently become available cited a
Harbin factory as a model for restoring party authority. The report
criticized members of mass organizations, including members of the
Young Communist League (YCL), who act only "on Chairman Mao's teachings
and the instructions of the party Central Committee" and do not comply
with the decisions of the local party branch. The party branch in the
factory, the report said, organized study classes which taught that
the party's authority, inspired by Mao's thought and leadership, "is
carried out through party organizations" and that "we must obey the
correct leadership of the party branch." To aid the party branch in
avoiding "doing whatever the masses want to do," which "harms the
cause of the revolution," NCNA said the masses should be limited to
regular meetings with party members once every two weeks.
Provincial reports reflect central concern for establishing the
correct relationship between :party units and mass organizations,
while claiming that some progress is being made. On 9 May Harbin
radio reported that Wargkuei and Ningan counties had established
new party committees; Heilungkiang had previously reported a county-
level committee for Hulin county as well as one for the Hulin YCL.
An article written by the Wangkuei party committee, arguing forcefully
for improvement of the party's organizational discipline, claimed
that in the rebuilding process it was necessary to criticize the
incorrect idea" that "rebels win merits and have a chance to be
admitted to the party" and that "whoever takes part in the three-
in-one combination should join the party." It added that standards
for party membership should not be lowered and that activists
applying for party membership should be judged according to the
party constitution to insure "the fine quality of party members."
All mass organizations must accept the concept that the party
leadership is superior "and must be respected by everybody," it
concluded.
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Hangchow radio on 7 and 9 May mentioned new party committees for
Lanchi and Teching counties; Chekiang had previously reported no
new party units at the county level. After more than a year of
party building efforts, only Hunan, Heilungkiang, Kansu, Anhwei,
Hupeh, Chekiang and Kwangtung have now claimed one or more
reconstructed county-level party committees. Only Kwangtung
has rebuilt a city-level committee.
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