TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 27, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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IIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIII~I
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Illlllll~~~uiiiiu~~llllll
RENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
Confidential
27 May 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 21)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from oulomolic
downp:ading and
dccloirificollon
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Victories Claimed in Cambodia During Past Two Months . . . . . . . .
1
Activities of "Patriotic" Forces in Cambodia Reported . . . . . .
.
3
Delegates at Paris Session Again Score U.S. "Escalation"
. . . . . .
4
Rallies Throughout China Support Mao Statement . . . . . . . . . . .
6
Moscow Radio Commentaries Attack Mao Statement . . . . . . . . .
7
USSR Cautions "Phnom Penh Authorities" on War Policies . . . . . . .
9
Sihanouk Lists Regimes That Recognized New Government .
9
Vietnamese Communists Thank Mao for His Statement . . . . . . . . . .
10
PRC-DRV Supplemental Aid Agreement Signed in Peking . . . . . . . . .
11
Sihanouk Delegation Visits Hanoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Continued Criticism of Djakarta Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
Peking Notes Kuznetsov Presence at Rally on Mao Statement . . . . . .
15
Moscow Steps Up Attacks in Wake of PRAVDA Editorial Article . . . . .
16
MALAYSIA
Malayan Communist Party Presses Maoist Case for Armed Struggle . . .
18
MIDDLE EAST
Kosygin Affirms Continued "Extensive" Assistance to Arabs . . . ?
21
Eban U.S. Visit Seen as Step Conducive to New Escalation . . .
23
Moscow Decries New Israeli "Provocations" Against Lebanon . . . .
24
NATO MEETING
USSR Sees Attempts to "Torpedo" European Security Conference . . .
25
WEST GERMANY
GDR Leaves Door Open for More Talks after Kassel Summit . . . . . . .
27
Moscow Reports End of Gromyko-Bahr Talks, Avoids Comment . . . . . .
30
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Polyanskiy Urges More for Agriculture in New Five-Year Plan
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Provincial Leadership Turnouts Indicate Some Changes . . . . . . . .
32
Editorial Stresses Party Leadership Over Creative Arts . . . . . . ?
33
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1.8 - 24 MAY 1970
Moscow (3766 items)
Peking (3189 items)
Indochina
(21%)
17%
Indochina
(55%)
78%
[Laos
[Cambodia
(1%)
(15%)
7%]
5%]
[Mao Statement
[Cambodia
(--)
(53%)
42%']11
24%]
China
(5%)
12%
[Vietnam
(2%)
9%]
Middle East
(4%)
8%
[Laos
(0.3%)
1%]
Upcoming Supreme
(8%)
8%
Domestic Issues
(24%)
14%
Soviet Elections
[28th Anniversary
(--)
3%]
Komsomol Congress
(0.5%)
6%
Mao's Statement
at Yenan Forum on
Literature and Art
Indonesian Communist
Party Anniversary
(--) 3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* Includes rebroadcasts of the Mao statement (more than half of the
figure) as well as comment in support of the statement.
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27 MAY 1970
INDOCHINA
Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement expressing support for Sihanouk's
Cambodian government and the "revolution" gets voluminous publicity
in PRC media, with accounts of a 21 May rally in Peking where
Lin Piao read the statement and Sihanouk spoke as well, as reports of
provincial rallies throughout the country. DRV and Front riedia
have carried the text of Mao's statement, accompanied by approving
comment which notes Chinese support and assistance. Soviet
propaganda on Mao's statement says that "deeds" not "words" are
what is needed and repeats the standard charge that the PRC
has refused "Joint action" on Indochina.
Moscow's failure so far to recognize Sihanouk's new government is
pointed up on the 25th when TASS carries a statement made "on
behalf of the Soviet Government to the Phnom Penh authorities"
by Ambassador Kudryavtsev in Cambodia. Warning that Cambodia
will be p,.unged into a "long fratricidal ciVi] war" if measures are
not taken to withdraw U.S. and Saigon troops, the statement says
"those who connive" with the intervention "will bear responsibility
for this." It goes on to say that the USSR "will make conclusions
for its policy" on the basis of developments--whether Cambodia
"returns to the road of peace and neutrality" or "turns to unity
with the forces o aggression and war."
Hanoi's first word of Sihanouk's visit to the DRV came early on the
25th--the day he arrived-.-when VNA quoted a DRV Foreign Ministry
communique of the 23d as saying he would visit the DRV "in the
near future" at the invitation of President Ton Duc Thang. DRV
press articles and editorials on thc. 25th and 26th hailing the
visit call the Prince the "great friend" of the Vietnamese people
and reaffirm Vietnamese friendship and solidarity wi?'',b the Khmer
and Lao peoples, as manifested during the April Indochinese summit
meeting.
Current Vietnamese communist propaganda reviews the two-month-old
"Cambodian people's patriotic struggle," claiming that "over 40
district capitals and military subsectors and hundreds of hamlets
have been liberated" and more than one million people in those areas
"freed." Current Hanoi propaganda. also reviews U.S. "aggressive"
policy on Indochina since World War II.
VICTORIES CLAIMED IN CAMBODIA DURING PAST TWO MONTHS
The second month's anniversary of Sihanouk's 23 Aarch call to arms
to overthrow the Lon Nol government prompts a flurry of Vietnamese
communist propaganda on 22 May reviewing the "Cambodian people's
patriotic struggle." A VNA review of activity is typical in claiming
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that "over 40 district capitals and military subsectors and hundreds
of hamlets hav. been liberated" by the Cambodian liberation forces
in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Kompong Speu, Kompong Chhnang,
Takeo, Kampot, Mondulkiri, Kratie, Stung Treng, Battambang, and
Siem Reap provinces. NHAN DAN's 22 May editorial says that the areas
liberated "embrace over one million people" and t%iat "people's
power" has be.n set up in many provinces and districts and hundreds
of hamlets. The editorial also claims that more than 24,000 enemy
troops, nearly 2,000 of them American, "have been put out of action
or disbanded."
The NHAN DAN editorial says the allies did not accomplish their aim
of reversing the situation by a "surprise attack" and by dispatching
to Cambodia "nearly 100,000 U.S. and Saigon puppet troops."
Persisting in the fiction that Vietnamese communist troops are not
among the protagcnists. NhAN DAN claims that the Cambodian patriotic
forces have developed rapidly and that "many units of the national
liberation army have been formed along with hundreds of guerrilla
arigades." A measure of the effort to maintain the fiction is
evident in a 25 May Hai.ni 'broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam
which cites foreign r us dispatchrs on the allied aim of clearing
out "communist" sanctuaries in Cambodia. The broadcast not only
obscures the fact that the sanctuaries are Vietnamese in quoting
AFP as saying "the communists have proven they have the combat
initiative by launching a series of violent attacks in the Kompong
Cham area," it goes so far as to insert an editorial note to the
effect that "communists" means "the Cambodian patriotic armed forces."
A Liberation Radio commentary on th~, 26th is even more blatant:
discussing the operations in Cambodia since 30 April, it says the
Americans have grossly exaggerated the quantity of weapons
captured and their alleged annihilation of et,e.,.iy troops--"that is,
troops of the Khmer Patriotic Armed Forces."
On the 25th VNA reviews a NHAN DAN commentary which repeats the
statistics in the NHAN DAN editorial on allied losses and goes on
to discuss the "political isolation" of the United States which has
resulted from the intervention in Cambodia. The commentary says
that "for the time being, the Nixon clique is unwilling to withdraw
from the new morass in Cambodia" and that Defense Secretary Laird
"has stated that after 30 June the United States would continue its
air strikes and Saigon puppet troops would continue their operations
on Cambodian soil." The commentary sets out to "expose" U.S.
actions against Cambodia over the past 15 years. Other, similar
comment includes a NHAN DAN commentary on the 23d which reviews
U.S. policy on Indochina as far back as the 1943 Casablanca conference
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and concludes that President Nixon's "sophistries and lies show
that Nixon is the most stubborn, brutal, and stupid among the U.S.
warmongers in Indochina."
There is little propaganda attention to specific, current operations.
But Liberation Radio on the 26th carries a brief report on the 23 May
allied air strikes against facilities of the French-managed rubber
plantation in Chup, Kompong Cham Province. Citing an undated
AGENCE KHMER DE PRESSE dispatch, Liberation Radio says that a
large number of the personnel were killed and that the plantation
is completely inoperative.
ACTIVITIES OF "PATRIOTIC" FORCES IN CAMBODIA REPORTED
Liberation Radio on 22 May recounted a 7-8 May meeting held in a
Cambodian "liberated area" by an organization affiliated with the
United National Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). Citing the FUNK's
Information Bureau as its source, the broadcast said that delegates
of the "Cambodian People's Movement of Militant Solidarity,"
affiliated with the FUNK, met for the purpose of endorsing the
3-4 May conference held in Peking in connection with the formation
of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union," the FUNK's
Political Bureau, and its political progress.
The three individuals who reportedly are in Cambodia as representatives
of the FUNK and as government ministers were mentioned as being
present: Khieu Samphan, identified as movement representative in
eastern CamLcdia and PLAF representative; Hou Youn as representative
in northwestern Cambodia; and Hu Nim as representative of south-
western Cambodia. Other individuals were named as representatives
of the People's Group (Pracheachon), as well as of such typical
"front" bodies as the Kampuchea peasants association, the trade
unions association, the democratic youth association, and the
ethnic minorities association.
On the 24th Liberation Radio carried the text of an appeal issued
in the name of Khieu Samphan in his role as Minister of National
Defense in Sihanouk's government. Dated the 15th, the appeal calls
on the Cambodian people and combatants to rally behind the FUNK.
and its armed forces and resist the "U.S. aggressors and their
henchmen." Khieu Samphan also ridicules the notion that the Viet
Cong headquarters is in Cambodia and that Viet Cong forces in
Cambodia are threatening U.S. troops in South Vietnam. The appeal
says these allegations "have proven . . . false and deceitful"
and aimed at concealing the collusion among the United States,
Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
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- 4 -
DELEGATES AT PARIS SESSION AGAIN SCORE U.S. "ESCALATION"
The VNA account of the 67th session of the Paris talks on 21 May
notes that the PRG and DRV delegates "vehemently condemned" U.S.
intensification of the war in South Vietnam and expansion of the
war in Cambodia and Laos. Both delegates also scored alleged
U.S. provocations against the DRV.* VNA reports that PRG deputy
delegation head Dinh Ba Thi, speaking first, pointed out that the
actual number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam has increased over
the past month "by 5,000 men or so," notwithstanding President
Nixon's 20 April announcement that 150,000 troops will be withdrawn
by next spring. Thi also complained that sweep operations continued
along with B-52 strikes "even in provinces next door to Saigon."
VNA glosses over most of Thi's statements on Cambodia, but it does
report him as saying that the dispatch of U.S. troops there
"cannot save the Saigon and Phnom Penh puppet regimes."
LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY,** but not VNA, reports that Thi,
citing "concrete evidence," refuted the Nixon Administration's
"claims" that "it is pulling American and Saigon troops out of
Cambodia and that it has recorded a big victory." But VNA does
report that Vy said the Nixon Administration is trying to pave the
way both for a "prolonged military occupation" of Cambodia by
U.S. forces, in disregard of its own 30 June deadline for an
American pullout from Cambodia, and for the indefinite stationing of
U.S. or Saigon "puppet" troops on Cambodian territory.
Neither VNA nor LPA notes Thi's remarks on an anticommunist
alliance of the Phnom Penh, Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok regimes.
But VNA says DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy "exposed" U.S. maneuvers
in setting up an alliance between those four "stooge" administrations.
The VNA account also says Vy "exposed" the recent Djakarta conference
on Cambodia, but it does not go on to note that he quoted at length
from the 17 May statement of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National
Union" denouncing the Djakarta meeting. In reporting the give-and-take
Hanoi reported on the 25th that the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
"energetically protested" U.S. "strafing" of Vinh Quang village, Vinh
Li.nh area, on the 24th and the dispatch of aircraft to intensify
encroachments on the DRV air space "during the past few days."
** Liberation Radio in the past has usually broadcast the full text
of the PRG delegate's prepared statement, but no account of the
21 May session has been monitored.
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portion of the session, VNA says typically that the DRV and PRG
delegates "laid bare the hypocritical allegations of the U.S. and
Saigon delegates and denounced the so-called 'Asian conference on
Cambodia' as essentially intended to serve the U.S. scheme of
aggression."
VNA says that Vy "denounced" the Nixon Administration for "its
obstinate neocolonialist position at the Paris conference, thus
blocking it after 16 months of negotiations," but the account
fails to acknowledge that in this context Vy quoted former Defense
Secretary Clark Clifford as saying in his current LIFE article
that President Nixon "still seeks to gain the military victory
that cannot be won." The only available reference to Clifford's
article in regular DRV media* is in a Hanoi radio domestic service
news item on 18 May which quotes the article as saying that the
United States cannot achieve a military victory in Vietnam and
that a political solution is the only practical way to peace.
The item also notes that Clifford appealed for a withdrawal of
U.S. troops by the end of 1971 and "urged the U.S. people to
pressure Nixon into changing U.S. policy in Vietnam."
VNA does not acknowledge that Vy cited, and ridiculed, Ambassador
Habib's reference at the 14 May session to President Nixon's
30 April remark that the time came long ago to end the Vietnam
war through peaceful negotiations. And VNA's account of the
allied delegates' remarks at the session simply says they "rehashed
their allegations aimed at covering up the U.S. war of expansion
in Indochina and the traitorous nature of the Thieu-Ky-Khiern stooge
administration."
LAOS VNA's account states that at one point GVN delegate Lam
"had to admit the fact that Saigon puppet troops had
frequently intruded into Laos." (VNA does not indicate the context
in which Lam made this remark, which is not in his prepared statement.)
DRV delegate Vy said in his prepared statement, as reported by VNA,
that in addition to the 12,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos
"the United States has ordered many American units as well as units
of Saigon mercenaries commanded by U.S. advisers to cross the
border and attack Laos." Vy did not refer specifically in this
connection to the remarks on ARVN ground incursions by GVN Foreign
Minister Tran Van Lam in a Djakarta press conference. But Lam's
* A 26 May message in VNA's service channel from its headquarters
in Hanoi to Paris requested the English text of the Clifford article.
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disclosure and subsequent remarks by Secretary Laird, prompted
statements by spokesmen of the NLHX Central Committee and the
DRV Foreign Ministry on 21 May and of the PRG Foreign Ministry on
the 22d.
Peking and Moscow have both reported the Vietnamese and Laotian state-
ments, and TASS also carries brief reports of the comments by Lam and
Laird. TASS acknowledges that Laird said the U.S. operations were
"short-term" and "defensive," but an IZVESTIYA article charges that
they are part of U.S. plans to escalate the war in Indochina.
XUAN THUY Hanoi radio on the 21st carried a report on the
IN HANOI activities of Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV delegation
at the Paris talks, since his return to the DRV on
17 May. The account says Xuan Thuy reported to the party's Politburo
and Secretariat and the DRV Council of Ministers on the status of
the Paris talks. It indicates that he defended the "fair and
reasonable" stand of the DRV and PRG and "sternly" condemned the
"obdurate, warlike, and perfidious" Nixon Administration. It
also notes that the Council of Ministers "unanimously endorsed''
Xuan Thuy's findings and held that the DRV delegation at the talks
during the past two years had "acted in accordance with the policy
lines mapped out by the party an( government."
On his previous trip to the DRV in mid-1969 Xuan Thuy had also
appraised the status of the negotiations in reports during June to
Ho Chi Minh, the Politburo, the National Assembly Standing Committee,
and the Council of Ministers.
RALLIES THROUGHOUT CHINA SUPPORT MAO STATEMENT
Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement on Cambodia and Indochinese
developments is supported by a massive Peking propaganda campaign
which includes publicity for a 21 May Peking rally and provincial
rallies throughout the country.* At the Peking rally Lin Piao
read Mao's statement, which had been released by NCNA some 12 hours
earlier, and other speakers vowed "firm support" and "powerful
backing" for the Indochinese people's struggle. Sihanouk thanked
the Chinese for their "invaluable support and many-sided and decisive
assistance" and pointed to the determination of the three Indochinese
* Mao's 16 April 1968 statement following the assassination of
Martin Luther King got similar. treatment. The most recent spate of
regional Chinese rallies came in August and September 1969 in
connection with the Sino-Soviet border clashes.
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peoples to continue the fight against the invaders in a "unified
struggle." He also stressed that the Khmer people are "prepared
to persevere in a protracted people's war."
The PRC provincial reaction to Mao's statement has been "unprecedented
in scale," according to NCNA, which reports a major rally in every
province and independent municipality. Most of the rallies were
attended by large numbers of provincial leaders. The accounts of
the rallies reflect the rhetoric of the national media, expressing
confidence that the United States, beset with its own revolution,
will soon be thrown out of Cambodia by the Cambodians. Few of
the speakers are quoted as going beyond Mao's expression of "firm
support" for the Indochinese people by means of "concrete actions"
(defined merely as increased production at home), although some
do call U.S. aggression in Indochina "a serious provocation to the
people of China."*
MOSCOW RADIO COMMENTARIES ATTACK MAO STATEMENT
Moscow condemns Mao's statement in some routine-level radio comment
which repeats standard charges that the Chinese follow a splittist
line and that Mac's words on support for the Indochinese people do
not accord with Peking's actions. Recalling the 4 May Soviet
Government statement's call for strengthened unity, a 23 May
Mandarin-language commentary says Mao's statement shows up his
stand as that of "a false revolutionary who vociferously clamors
for opposing imperialism but who in reality is giving up such a
struggle." Struggling against imperialism with concrete action
means giving "all-round aid" to the revolutionary fighters of the
world and strengthening the solidarity of the socialist community,
the commentary says, and it notes that Mao did not mention the
international socialist movement or the "big socialist community
of friendship." The broadcast concludes with the charge that Peking
"synchronizes" its activities with the imperialists, asserting
that the United States invaded Cambodia soon after the publication
of the 22 April Peking joint editorial which opposed the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries.
* The 4 May PRC Government statement assailing U.S. actions in
Cambodia and the "resumed bombing" of the DRV termed the U.S.
moves a provocation against China, and the 28 April ?RC Government
statement supporting the Indochinese people's summit conference
renewed the charge that the Americans were trying to turn
Indochina into a "base for aggression against China and other
Asian countries."
CONFIDENTIAL
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Another commentary broadcast in Mandarin on 22 May charges that Mao's
statement is aimed at deceiving world opinion, exploiting world
protests against U.S. aggression, and projecting an image of the
Peking leaders .as "uncompromising fighters" in the struggle against
U.S. imperialism. The commentary denounces Mao's "pseuderevolutionary
nature" and says his statement points up his splittist activities and
his "hypocritical appeal for unity of the peoples of the world." It
notes that Mao has rejected suggestions made by the socialist countries
for united action, and it recalls that at the international communist
conference in Moscow last June Gomulna had said Peking's anti-Soviet
policy made the Chinese anti-imperialist declarations "meaningless."
Other Moscow comment, not pegged to the Mao statement, also continues
to score Peking's policies in Indochina. A domestic service commentary
by Kapitsa on 23 May, charging that the United States takes advantage
of Peking's splittism in various parts of the world, recalls that
Peking refused a CPSU-VWP suggestion that the USSR, the DRV, and the
PRC "iss.ue a joint warning against American aggression" (ICapitsa offers
no further elaboration), as well as other proposals by socialist
states for united action in Vietnam., Kapitsa repeats the charge that
Peking's anti-Sovietism created the circumstances for the coup that
overthrew Sihanouk in Cambodia.
Moscow also castigates Peking for its absence from the international
conference to support the Laotian people's struggle, held in Cairo
19-21 May under the sponsorship of the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Organization. A 24 May Radio Peace and Progress commentary in
Mandarin notes that 160 delegates from 70 national and regional
organizations attended and that "in view of the Maoist propaganda
machinery's publications containing many statements supporting
the world people's struggle," China should have sent a delegation.
Criticizing the Chinese leaders for the "inconsistency" of their
words and deeds;, the commentary repeats the allegation that Mao
has "flatly rejected" the proposal for a "united front of the
anti-imperialist forces" to aid Vietnam. It adds that Mao is
intensifying the "anti-Soviet, anti-socialist frenzy in China
in an attempt to alienate the people of the Indochinese countries
from their loyal friends, the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries."
* Gomulka also charged at the conference that Peking had "broken
the solidarity" of the world communist movement and said that the
USSR now formed the "main barrier" to imperialist aggression. He
concluded with a call for unity of the world communist movement as
the vanguard of the world anti-imperialist front.
CONFIDENTIAL
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USSR CAUTIONS "PHNOM PENH AUTHORITIES" ON WAR POLICIES
Moscow's cautious attitude toward the Lon Nol regime and its
failure to recognize the new Sihanouk government are pointed up by
the "statement on behalf of the Soviet Government" made on
24 May by the USSR Ambassador in Cambodia to the "Phnom Penh
authorities." TASS, in releasing the statement on the 25th,
says it was published in IZVESTIYA that day; the TASS press
review on the 26th reports that it was published in the Moscow
"papers."
Expressing concern that "Cambodia is being increasingly drawn
into the military conflict in Indoch:"na," the statement warns
that "unless measures are taken to withdraw the U.S. and Saigon
troops, Cambodia will be plunged into a long fratricidal civil
war." The statement says that "those who connive with the U.S.
and Saigon intervention will bear responsibility for this," but
it fails to name the Lon Nol government. Similarly, without
mentioning Sihanouk by name, the statement praises the "peaceful
neutralist policy that was earlier conducted by Cambodia." It
concludes by warning that the Soviet Union "closely follows the
development of the situation" in Cambodia and Indochina and
will "make conclusions for its policy from the direction in which
this situation develops--toward Cambodia's return to the road of
peace and neutrality or toward its unity with the forces of
aggression and war and the turning of Cambodia into a base of
war against the neighboring peoples."
This seeming veiled threat that the USSR might recognize the
Sihanouk government if the Lon Nol regime does not follow policies
acceptable to the Soviet Union is reminiscent of a remark by
Kosygin at his 4 May Moscow press conference. Asked which
Cambodian government the USSR recognizes, he answered evasively:
"We recognize the neutralist government of Cambodia. We recognize
as the government of Cambodia the one which pursues a policy of
peace and not a policy of war."
SIHANOUK LISTS REGIMES THAT RECOGNIZED NEW GOVERNMENT
In his speech at the Peking rally on the 21st, Sihanouk stressed
the legitimacy of his Royal Government of National Union, noting
among other things that Mao's statement said the government had
been recognized by "nearly 20 countries." Sihanouk named 19--
including Guinea, which was not previously known to have announced
recognition--and also listed "the Laotian people represented by
the NLHX." The others named by Sihanouk had previously announced
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recognition: the PRC, DPRK, Cuba, Albania, PRG, DRV, Romania, Syria,
Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Algeria, South Yemen, Congo (B),
Mauritania, and the UAR.
In a remark that could be interpreted as critical of the USSR,
Sihanouk expressed hope that in the days to come "the governments
of other socialist, progressive, anti-imperialist, and antifascist
countries" will give the Khmers "effective support," but he did
not explicitly ask for recognition. Sihanouk is not known to have
mentioned his reported response to Kosygin's message greeting the
formation of the united front of Cambodia; AFP's Moscow correspondent
reported in a 12 May dispatch that Sihanouk "immediately" thanked
Kosygin for his telegram but formally requested official Soviet
recognition of his new government.
DIPLOMATS' RETURN The "triumphant" return to Peking of the Chinese
TO CHINESE CAPITAL and North Korean diplomatic personnel formerly
in Phnom Penh, who had "overcome many obstacles"
placed in their way by the U.S. imperialists and the "Lon Nol-Sirik
Matak clique," was reported by NCNA on 25 May. On the 27th NCNA
reported a banquet for the diplomats hosted by Vice Premier Li
Hsien-nien, at which Li stressed. the "unity" of the people of China,
Korea, and the three Indochinese countries in their "common struggle"
against U.S. imperialism. He noted that all these countries are
"fraternal neighbors linked by mountains and rivers" and that the
current struggle against U.S. aggression "forges a closer link
between us." He reiterated that the 700 million Chinese people are
the "reliable friend and powerful backing" and that the land of
China is the "dependable rear" of the peoples of the Indochinese
countries and of Korea.
On the 26th the Phnom Penh domestic service reported the return
home of the Cambodian diplomats formerly in China and North Korea.
On 9 May Peking and Pyongyang had scored the Phnom Penh authorities
for holding their diplomatic personnel as "hostages" until the
return home of the Cambodian diplomats representing the Lon Nol
government in China and North Korea.
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS THANK MAO FOR HIS STATEMENT
ic,~ording to NCNA on the 25th, DRV President Ton Due Thang and
First Secretary Le Duan sent a telegram to Mao expressing
'heartfelt thanks" for his "firm support" to the Vietnamese people's
war of resistance. The telegram also says that the Vietnamese
people, along with the Laotian and Cambodian peoples, regard
Mao's statement as a document of "tremendous political significance"
and are forever grateful for the PRG's "tremendous and valuable
support and assistance."
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On the 27th NCNA reported that NFLSV Chairman Nguyen IIuu Tho and
PRG President IIuynh Tan Phat also sent a message expressing their
"deep heartfelt thank" to Mao for "the new and most valuable
support and assistance he has extended" in his 20 May statement.
At this writing, Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged
either message.
A Hanoi domestic service commentary on 21 May and a NHAN DAN
editorial carried by VNA on the 22d also praise the Mao statement.
The editorial warmly thanks the Chinese for their support and
assistance but also stresses the importance of support and
assistance given by "the fraternal socialist countries and the
people the world over." Similarly, an LPA editorial on 22 May
concludes that the Indochinese peoples will be victorious with
the support and assistance of "the people of China, the Soviet
Union, the other socialist countries, the nationalist countries,
and the progressive people the world over, including the American
people."
PRC-DRV SUPPLEMENTAL AID AGREEMENT SIGNED IN PEKING
Hanoi and Peking media reported on 26 May that a new protocol on
"China's supplementary nonrefundable economic and military aid to
VietnFun for 1970" was signed in Peking the preceding day by DRV
Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban and PRC Vice Foreign Trade
Minister Li Chiang. The last regular annual PRC-DRV aid agreement
was signed by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi last September.
This is the first known special PRC-DRV agreement.* In line
with customary practice, the September 1969 agreement did not
include trade, and a separate trade agreement was signed in Peking
by Ly Ban in November.
The current agreement represents the first instance in which Peking
media are known to have specified military aid, although in 1968 and
1969 Hanoi had described the agreements with Peking as providing for
military as well as economic assistance. In the past Peking
acknowledged only that the agreements provided economic and technical
assistance.
* Le Thanh Nghi made a special trip to the USSR in November 1968
to sign an extra aid agreement in addition to the ones signed during
his usual tours.
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2'T MAY 197 0
VNA says the Ly Ban delegation arrived in Peking "recently," but
NCNA specifies that Ly Bari arrived in Peking on 2 May.* Both
VNA and NCNAi?eport that he left Peking on 26 May, having been
received by Chou En-lai during his visit.
SIHANOUK DELEGATION VISITS HANOI
On 25 May Hanoi media released a DRV Foreign Ministry communique--
dated the 23d--announcing that Sihanouk would visit the DRV "in
the near future" at the inviation of President Ton Due Thang.
Sihanouk and his 18-member entourage arrived at 11:15 am local
time on the 25th, according to VNA and Hanoi reports the next day.
Soviet and PRC media have also announced his arrival.
VNA says Sihanouk arrived at Hanoi's Gia Lam airport "on a special
plane," but it does no,,t specify that lie had come from Peking.
He was met by an official delegation including Premier Phan Van
Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh, and a group of
Young Pioneers presented flowers to "Uncle Sihanouk." Later, a
welcoming reception at the Municipal Theater was hosted by
President Thang and attended by Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and other
leaders.
In his welcoming address Thang praised the Prince and extolled the
"great significance" of his visit to the DRV, adding that the
visit is a good opportunity for the Vietnamese people to express
their "deep feelings and sincere gratitude" toward the Cambodian
people and Sihanouk for their "powerful support" of the Vietnamese
struggle against the United States. In response Sihanouk recalled
his visit to the DRV for Ho Chi Minh's funeral last September
and thanked his hosts for their current warm welcome--a "brilliant
symbol of the total support" which the DRV and the Vietnamese
people have "always accorded to the brother Khmer people and their
legitimate government." The Prince went on to assert that the
three Indochinese peoples did not want this "second Indochina war,"
but "it has been imposed on them by Nixon." He added that
acceptance of the U.S. challenge and unity-in-struggle among the
Indochinese peoples constitute the "only way" left to achieve a
total American withdrawal and U.S. respect for the three peoples'
right to self-determination.
* The negotiations were presumably going on during Le Duan's
10-12 May official visit to China after his attendance at the Lenin
centenary celebrations in Moscow and his "rest" in Poland. The
first known mention that Ly Ban was in Peking was an 8 May NCNA
report that he was among those who attended a performance the
previous evening of a visiting DRV amateur art ensemble.
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A flurry of propaganda ti?elcoming Sihanouk includes articles and
editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN on the 25th and 26th
and Liberation Radio commentaries which stress Indochinese solidarity
and recall the April summit meeting.
CONTINUED CRITICISM OF DJAKARTA CONFERENCE
Communist propaganda continues to score the communique issued by
the 11-nation Djakarta conference on Cambodia held 16-17 May,
but only the DRV has issued an official statement. A 25 May DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement echoes the foreign ministry
statement of the 14th in saying that the conference had not
competence to deal with the issues. Like a NHAN DAN article of
the 24th, it acknowledges that the conference communique called
for reactivation of the ICC as well as the reconvening of the
Geneva conference and a UN role in Cambodia. Initial Hanoi comment
after the meeting had ignored the communique's reference to the ICC.
Sihanouk denounced the Djakarta conference in his 21 May speech at
the Peking rally, describing it routinely as a gathering of U.S.
lackeys and satellites. He also Axplicitly rejected the call for
reactivation of the ICC and convocation of a Geneva--type conference,
saying that the ICC and the advocates of a conference should
simply compel President Nixon to respect the Geneva agreements
and withdraw his troops from Cambodia and the rest of Indochina.
The conference had been scored earlier in a 17 May statement of the
Royal Government of National Union.
Initial Moscow comment on the conference had termed the call for a
Geneva conference "untimely" but did not mention the ICC. The
reference to the ICC is noted in a PRAVDA article, -ummarized by
TASS on the 20th, which says cryptically that "one can raise the
question of the revival of the ICC" but "one should not forget
that many of the present participants" in the meeting are "active
allies" of the United States and are "directly responsible for the
frustration of the Geneva agreements."
A 21 May Moscow commentary in English to South Asia reacts negatively
to the notion of a conference on Cambodia without mentioning the
Djakarta meeting. It cites a Malaysian paper as seeking to "blame
the Soviet Union for the aggression carried out by the ruling
quarters of the United States," claiming that "if the Soviet Union
had heeded the proposal of a number of countries to call another
conference in order to insure Cambodia's neutrality" the United
States might not have interfered in Cambodia. The commentator
remarks only that the paper has "naive" ideas about U.S. imperialism
and that it is the United States which has failed to live up to the
Geneva agreements.
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The Bombay PTI reported on 23 May that Kosygin had met the Indian
Ambassador and that the major topic of their conversation was
developments in Cambodia "in the light of the recent Soviet
Government statement and pronouncements of the Indian Prime
Minister Mrs. Indira Ghandi." TASS' report of the meeting, on
the 22d, merely notes that there was a "friendly conversation,"
with no mention of the substance.
Soviet media have not acknowledged Western press reports, citing
British officials, of a recent exchange of letters between London
and Moscow, in their roles as Geneva conference cochairmen,
regarding a new conference.
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SINO - SOVIET R ELATI0NS
FBIS TRENDS
27 MAY 1970
PEKING NOTES KUZNETSOV PRESENCE AT RALLY ON MAO STATEMENT
Peking has again signalled its interest in sustaining the Sino-Soviet
talks despite the recent bitter and authoritative polemical exchange.
NCNA's report on the 21 May Peking rally in support of Mao's statement
on Cambodia and worldwide anti-U.S. struggle singled out the presence
of Soviet chief negotiator Kuznetsov and his deputy at the talks,
General Gankovskiy. Earlier, NCNA had similarly taken note of the
presence of Gankovskiy at Peking's May Day celebrations, at a time
when Kuznetsov was back in Moscow. NCNA's 21 May mention of
Kuznetsov is the first report on his whereabouts to appear in either
side's media since before his visit to Moscow. There have been no
announcements on the border talks themselves.
While drawing on the authority of Mao's name to pose as champions of
people's war in Indochina and revolutionary struggle throughout the
world--a posture that is evoking defensive sniping from the Soviet
side--the Chinese have largely refrained from joining battle with
Moscow since their attacks on the Soviets on May Day. Propaganda
pegged to the Mao statement, including nationwide rallies, has
lacked any anti-Soviet dimension, as has recent Chinese comment on
Indochina and the revolutionary movement generally. A CCP message
on the Indonesian CF's anniversary, transmitted by NCNA on 22 May,
did raise one point in the ideological dispute by attributing the
Indonesian communists' 1965 debacle to the line of peaceful
transition "advocated by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique."
This point was echoed in a statement on the anniversary by the
Indonesian communist delegation in Peking, released by NCNA on
the 23d, which also picked up Maoist cudgels to attack "Soviet
revisionist social imperialism" as the "arch renegade to Leninism."
Peking's efforts to break out of its isolation, which have been
especially in evidence since Chou En-lai's visit to the DPRK in
early April, are reflected in recent references -to ambassadors from
Romania and Yugoslavia, two countries which followed the PRC's lead
in supporting Sihanouk's government-in-exile. NCNA's report on the
21 May rally listed the Romanian ambassador among a group of favored
guests, including envoys from such countries as Albania, the DRV,
and North Korea. On 23 May NCNA announced the arrival of a Yugoslav
ambassador to the PRC, the first representation on this level since
1958.
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MOSCOW STEPS UP ATTACKS IN WAKE OF PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE
PRAVDA's authoritative indictment of the Maoist leadership in the
18 May editorial article sparked a flurry of attacks on Chinese
policies in Soviet central media and renewed emphasis on the theme
of Chinese war preparations and anti-Sovi'~- hysteria, muted in
recent weeks. Articles critical of the Chinese appeared in
LITERARY GAZETTE on 20 and 27 May s.nd in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and
TRUD on the 21st, and a succession of commentaries in Radio Moscow's
domestic service beginning on the 20th presented a sustained assault
on Peking's domestic and foreign policies for Soviet audiences.
A report to a Komsomol congress by Komsomol leader Tyazhelnikov on
the 26th declares that Soviet youth cannot remain indifferent to the
fate of the younger generation in China and expresses regret at the
rupture of contacts between Soviet and Chinese youth which occurred
"not through the Komsomol's fault." The report endorses Soviet
efforts to normalize Sino-Soviet relations but does not mention the
Peking talks.*
Press comment portrays China as suffering under military repression
and economic chaos and accuses Peking of fostering a myth of an
imminent armed invasion to put the screws to the Chinese people.
Without directly mentioning the Chinese space satellite, the papers
take note of Peking's emphasis on rapid development of the war
industry and branches of the economy connected with it; KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA and TRUD both say resources are being used to develop a
"nuclear missile potential" at the expense of consumer goods
production. The thrust of the criticism has been directed at the
burdens being placed on the Chinese people rather than at depicting
a threat to China's neighbors.
Soviet sensitivity over Japanese bridgebuilding propensities toward
the PRC is reflected in the LITERARY GAZETTE article on the 27th,
which takes note of the role played by leaders of the ruling Liberal-
Democratic Party in promoting Sino-Japanese trade relations. Addressing
what must be a particularly worrisome prospect for the Soviets, the
article points out that American and Japanese leaders hope Japan may
play a special role in building bridges between Pekiiag and Washington.
* Brezhnev also addressed the congress, but his brief remarks on
international affairs did not single out any specific area other than
to mention the youth movement in the capitalist -countries.
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Commentaries carried by the domestic radio criticize Chinese polici,:s
along the lines of the PRAVDA editorial article, including charges
that Peking substitutes ultrarevolutionary rhetoric for united act.; on
and favors war as a means of advancing its interests. A commentazy
on 21 May sounded a note of alarm in taking Mao to task for
irresponsible views on the role of war. In the light of these
views the process of militarization now taking place in China
assumes an "especially ominous significance," according to the
commentator, who went on to cite Chinese appeals to prepare for war
against the Soviet Union, expenditures channeled into creating a
nuclear-missile potential, and the use of threats and provocations
against the "socialist and developing states." A warning that
domestic difficulties "may push Peking into new foreign policy
adventures" was followed by the comment that "no one can guess
the limits of these adventures."
Characteristically, Moscow has limited publicity for Mao's 20 May
statement by confining its comment to broadcasts beamed to China
(discussed in the Indochina section of this TRENDS).
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MALAYSIA
MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY PRESSES MAOIST CASE FOR ARMED STRUGGLE
A thoroughly Maoist analysis of the revolutionary situation in
Malaysia is advanced by the "Communist Party of Malaya" (MCP) in a
Central Committee statement dated 25 April, broadcast in installments
at both regular and dictation speeds by the China-based clandestine
"Voice of the Malayan Revolution" (VMR) beginning on the 26th.
Commemorating the 40th anniversary of the party's founding on 30 April.
1930, the statement recasts the party's history in terms of the MCP's
current, solidly pro-Poking orientation, presenting past periods of
Soviet influence as aberrations and tracing the emergence of the
present strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside
and seizing political power by armed force. The necessity to wage
violent revolution has been a dominant theme of the "Voice" since
it began broadcasting in November 1969. Two companion themes of
these broadcasts--the class basis of the antiregime struggle in
Malaysia* and the need for a united front of members of the Chinese,
Malay, and Indian communities under MCP leadership--are also
elaborated in the statement.
ARMED STRUGGLE The statement's detailed review of the party's
40-year history highlights two "serious errors,"
both involving "giving up armed struggle." The first, in the
1945-48 period, is traced to the "right capitulationist line" of a
"hidden traitor" in party ranks. The second, in the late 1950's,
is dubbed a consequence of collusion between "the renegade cliques
of Khrushchev and Liu Shao-chi." Overcoming both deviations, the
statement declares, the party has affirmed that "only through violent
revolution can the people of our country win complete liberation."
It has exposed "the fallacy of the so-called 'peaceful transition,"'
and it has reemphasized the need to pursue the road of surrounding
the cities from the countryside in an armed struggle for political
power.
Consistent with Peking's refusal to recognize the formation of
Malaysia, the VMR refers to the country as Malaya. In a rare use
of the term Malaysia, the statement refers to "our country" as
currently consisting of two "so-called independent countries--the
Federation of Malaysia and the Republic of Singapore."
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CLASS VERSUS The statement depicts a long period of controversy
NATIONALITIES over tactics toward the various ethnic groups in
Malaysia, stating that the MCP was unable "for a
long time" to definitively settle the question of whether class or
nationality is the motive force. The Central Committee reasserts
the conclusion, applied consistently in VMR broadcasts, that "in
reality, the question of nationali.ties.'.is in the final analysis one
of classes" and that "the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Tsetung Thought is applicable without exception to the analysis and
resolution of the race problem of our country." Accordingly, the
statement calls for a struggle by "the people of all nationalities"
and characterizes the 13 May 1969 race-riots in Malaysia--as Peking
media did at the time--as "a massacre of the nationalities" rather
than picturing them as specifically anti.-Chinese. Neither Peking
nor monitored VMR broadcasts have taken notice of the first anniversary
of the riots.
Within the framework of the class analysis of the revolutionary
situation, the statement elaborates,on the need for an MCP-led
"national united democratic front" representing the interests of
the people of all nationalities who make up the working class,
farmers, petty and national bourgeoisie, and the "anti-imperialist
patriotic" element. Together with the MCP-led National Liberation
Army, this united front is ranged against the landlord and bureaucratic-
capitalist classes represented by "the Rahman-Razak and Lee.Xuan Yew
cliques," the "faithful lackeys" of the United States and Britain
and "Soviet revisionist social imperialism."
BACKGROUND The Voice of the Malayan Revolution began broadcasting
on 15 November 1969 with reports and commentary in
Malay and Mandarin, adding programs.5.in Tamil on 1 February. It is
currently on the air six hours a day, with broadcast time divided
about equally among the three languages. In keeping with the class
approach that cuts across ethnic groupings, VMR does not tailor its
broadcasts in the respective languages for the-specific ethnic
audiences. A daily monitored sample indicates that programming is
identical in Malay, Mandarin, and Tamil.
As a principal propaganda outlet for the MCP, the "Voice" gives full
publicity to party statements. It regularly protests the allegedly
repressive policies of the "chauvinist" Rahman-Razak "clique"
against "the people of all nationalities." And it reports--with a
time-lag of a few days to more than six weeks after the alleged
event--successful actions by the party's "liberation army" against
regime forces, crediting Mao's thought as the inspiravicn behind the
movement.
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FBIS TRENDS
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Peking, in turn, bases about three fourths of its propaganda output
on Malaysian developments on VMR broadcasts, citing VMR as the source.
While Peking media have not so far been heard to carry the lengthy
MCP 1-0th anniversary statement, they have carried other items on the
anniversary, credited to the "Voice," and a Chinese Central Committee
message to the MCP Central Committee on the anniversary--dated 19 April
and carried by NCNA on the 29th--illust rates the identity of the
Chinese and Malayan Communist lines. The CCP message, pledging the
Chinese party and people's "resolute support of the Malayan people's
revolutionary struggle," expresses the conviction that the MCP will
persist in "the correct road of using the villages to surround the
cities and seizing political power by armed force" and will continue
to "frustrate the reactionaries' effort to sow national discord" and to
rally "the people of various nationalities." It also hails the MCP
for upholding revolutionary principles and struggling against "modern
revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its center."
In hailing the party's historical struggles against British imperialism
and the "liberation army's" more recent struggles against "Joint attacks
by the Malayan and Thai reactionaries," the Chinese message reflects
another recurrent theme of VMR broadcasts, which seek to discredit
the Malaysian Government by linking it with the U.S., British, Japanese,
and other "imperialist" powers and with such "reactionary puppets" as
the leaders of Indonesia and Thailand.
VMR's comment on international events follows Peking down the line.
Thus the "Voice" plays up successes of armed revolutionary movements
in India, Indonesia, Burma, the Middle East, and Latin America as well
as in South Vietnam and Cambodia, concurrently assailing such policies
as the parliamentary road to socialism, associated with Soviet tutelage.
An 11 May MCP Central Committee statement on Indochina, carried by both
the "Voice" and Peking's NCNA, calls the U.S. move into Cambodia "a
frenzied provocation against the people in Southeast Asia" which
revealed the United States as a "paper tiger" and showed the "complete
bankruptcy" of the U.S. "frauds" regarding peace talks and troop
withdrawal. Charging U..S. collusion with "Soviet revisionist social
imperialism," the MCP statement hails the summit conference of the
Indochinese peoples and the formation of Sihanouk's government-in-
exile and forecasts the final victory of the three Indochinese peoples.
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MIDDLE EAST
KOSYGIN AFFIRMS CONTINUED "EXTENSIVE" ASSISTANCE TO ARABS
Moscow has widely publicized Kosygin's 20 May reply to the joint
message sent to him and to President Nixon on the 7th by the heads
of state of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan following the annual summit
meeting of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in Izmir,
Turkey, on 6-7 May. TASS carried the message on the 20th--without
mentioning that it was also sent to President Nixon--along with
Kosygin's reply.
ISSUE OF Kosygin regrets, in his reply, that there are "still
WITHDRAWAL serious obstacles to relaxation of tension and the
establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East,
adding that the Israeli Government "frustrates all efforts aimed at
a political settlement" of the crisis and is "supported and
encouraged by certain circles in the West." Contrary to the
22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, Kosygin says, the
Israeli Government "still avoids making a clearcut statement on
withdrawal of its troops" and on its agreement to comply with other
provisions of the resolution.
While elsewhere in his reply Kosygin agrees with the three heads of
state that "it is necessary to.have undelayed withdrawal" of the
Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, his phraseology
on Israeli avoidance of a "clearcut statement on withdrawal" is
atypical and could conceivably signal some degree of modification
of Soviet insistence on actual withdrawal as the key element in
a settlement. At a luncheon for a visiting UAR delegation in
December Kosygin had called withdrawal an "imperative condition,"
and in the 1 May PRAVDA Belyayev had reiterated the more explicit,
recurrent Soviet line that "fulfillment" of withdrawal is the
"cornerstone" of a peaceful settlement. Kosygin's "clearcut
statement" formula has not been repeated in routine-level Moscow
comment and may have represented no more than an effort to exploit
and fuel the recent debate in Israel over the government's
refusal to commit itself to a withdrawal policy. Subsequent
to the release of Kosygin's statement, Podgornyy was quoted by TASS
on 25 May as repeating the standard Soviet position in remarks to the
new Syrian ambassador: "We believe withdrawal of Israeli troops
from all occupied Arab areas is absolutely essential for a settlement."
There is no indication of any flexibility on the withdrawal question
in TASS accounts of the Security Council debate on Israel's 12-13 May
incursion into Lebanon. On the 20th TASS cited Soviet UN delegate
Malik as stating that withdrawal "to the positions held before
5 June 1967"--one of the rather infrequent recent Soviet stipulations
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of the 5 June lines--is a "key matter for a peaceful political settle-
ment." Malik complained that "unwillingness to begin solving this
central, main question" is the principal obstacle holding back an
agreement of the big four in the consultative meetings. He charged
the U.S. representative in the Council with "steering clear of the
question of complete withdrawal," which means, he said, that the
United States is opposed to such a withdrawal. TASS commentator
Orlov msde the same point in observing on the 20th that the
withdrawal question stands "at the center" of the Middle East crisis.
Washington adopts a double-handed policy, Orlov said, professing
readiness to agree in principle on withdrawal while "hastening to
make stipulations demanding 'changes' or 'corrections' of the
borders," in effect blocking the possibility of achieving a settle-
ment.
AID TO ARABS Kosygin's reply to the three heads of state goes
beyond the u;iual vag'?.e Soviet propaganda pledges of
"necessary" aid to the Arabs t,, strengthen their "defense potential";
he had said in his speech last I-ecember that the USSR would combine
a struggle for a political settlement "with the adoption of active
measures to strengthen the defense potential" of the UAR and other
Arab states. He now declares that the Soviet Union is rendering the
Arab states "extensive" assistance "so that they can successfully
defend their legitimate national rights," and "we intend to continue
exerting our efforts in this direction" with the aim of a settlement
in compliance with all provisions of the November resolution.
There have been propaganda references recently to growing Arab
resistance to Israeli "aggressive acts" and to the increasing "defense
potential" of the UAR and other Arab states. Belyayev commented in
the 17 May domestic service roundtable that things "are not going as
smoothly and brilliantly as before" for the Israeli military on the
Egyptian front, with "every provocation" meeting with a "firmer
rebuff." In reporting Nasir's May Day speech TASS had noted his
assertion that the initiative now rested with the UAR; and a
foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 13th observed that
Israel "has obviously began to lose the initiative in the conflict."
Moscow failed to give further publicity to Kosygin's acknowledgment,
in his I May press conference, that Soviet "military advisors" are
attached to the UAR troops. But another such acknowledgment appears
in a TASS English report on the 20th of a press conference statement
in Cairo by the UAR official spokesman. TASS quotes the spokesman
as saying, with regard to the Middle East situation and Soviet
military assistance to the UAR, that "we have never denied the
presence of Soviet military experts. But at the same time we should
like to point out that both the Soviet and UAR military efforts
are defensive in nature."
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Soviet media apparently took no cognizance of recent statements by
Soviet military attaches in the Arab countries, reported by Arab
sources. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 6 May reported the Soviet
attache in Baghdad as declaring at a press conference that the
Soviet Union provides the Arab armies "with the same arms that the
Soviet armed forces use." The next day Baghdad radio reported
the attache as stating that the Soviet Government is embarked on
"major action" to promote the Arab armies' military capabilities.
He claimed, according to Baghdad, that the increased military
strength of the Arab armies had so alarmed the "Zionist aggressors"
as to "induce them to make false allegations about Soviet pilots
participating in the defense of Arab territories." The Soviet
military attache in Amman was reported by Baghdad radio on the
8th as stating at a press conference that the Arab countries are
now strong enough to reply to any offensive and that the USSR
"is prepared to extend any aid" to these countries' struggle
against "Zionist aggression."
EBAN U.S. VISIT SEEN AS STEP CONDUCIVE TO NEW ESCALATION
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's 20-24 May visit to the United
States--to seek deliveries of more Phantom jets, a big loan,
and "wider military-political support," according to TASS commentator
Tyssovskiy on the 20th--is viewed by PRAVDA's Belyayev on 24 May
as "a step leading to a new escalation of the war in the Middle
East." This time, Belyayev adds, "Israel is likely to get the
fighter planes it asks for, even though the White House declared
that it has not yet passed a decision to this effect."
A panelist in the domestic service roundtable on the 24th commented
that President Nixon had declined "for tactical reasons" to
give Prime Minister Meir a definite answer to her request for
Phantoms last September, which Eban had come to renew. Another
panelist remarked that although nothing was stated officially about
the outcome of E'ban's talks with the President and Secretary Rogers,
"there can be no doubt that Israel was given an actual agreement on
the delivery of new weapons. Moreover, regardless of what is or is
not stated officially in Washington, the Israeli aggressors receive
everything they need from the United States." In a 25 May foreign-
language commentary, Soltan says Eban left Washington in a "good
mood" and cites among contributory factors the scale of promised
U.S. aid and Washington's "intention" to "force" its NATO allies
at the 26-27 Rome meeting to grant Israel military aid.
Various Soviet commentators have played up the report by Jack
Anderson in the 19 May Washington POST on "secret deliveries of
American bombs to the Israeli air force." TASS commentator
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Tyssovokiy on the 20th, for example, said. Anderson's article lmpl!ed
that Israel gets other armaments bcsicia., bombs, and a 23 May foreign-
language talk claimed that "many observers" believe other arms are
being supplied.
On the matter of a political settlement, Moscow comment on the Eban
visit notes that the foreign minister emphasized Israel's intention
to defend and hold its positions along the cease-fire line.
Soltan's commentary on the 25th says Eban indicated thaL Israeli
withdrawal from the cease-fire line "would be lunacy" and calls this
typical. of "the arguments of the Tel Aviv extremists,"
MOSCOW DECRIES NEW ISRAELI "PROVOCATIONS" AGAINST LEBANON
True to form, Moscow has not reported the 22 May attack on an Israeli
school bus by Arab guerrillas operating out of Lebanon. TASS did
report on the 22d, however, the Israeli artillery barrage on towns
in southern Lebanon which took place less than an hour after the
Arab attack. The Israelis' "barbaric action," TASS said, was the
second "provocation" against Lebanon in 10 days. A Moscow broadcast
to North America on the 23d remarked that this "new crime" occurred
before the ink had dried on the Security Council resolution
condemning the 12-13 May incursion--a "repetition of aggression"
which can only be viewed as an Israeli retaliation against the
Security Council resolution and as "a challenge to the United Nations
and world public opinion." Apparently, the broadcast added, "Israel
intends to make such crimes a daily practice so as to cut off all
roads to a peaceful political settlement of the conflict." On 25 May,
TASS cited the Lebanese military command for a report that Israeli
armored units, supported by aircraft and artillery, had intruded
into Lebanon on the 25th and that fighting was continuing.
While Moscow remained silent on the guerrilla attack on the 22d, a
panelist in the 24 May roundtable show commented that "at present
tension is again being created on the Israeli-Lebanese border" and
"we may expect a flareup of serious conflicts on this sector of
the front." The commentator said "there will certainly be a new
provocation by Israel against its Arab neighbors." A domestic
service commentary on 26 May says the Israeli press is developing
a "pretext for the next armed provocation," using "the hackneyed
theme about actions of Palestinian partisans."
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NATO
USSR SEES ATTEMPTS TO "TORPEDO" EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
A spate of Moscow comment on the 26-2'( May NATO foreign ministers'
meeting in Rome features routine charges that Wawhingtorr in using
the gathering to "dustily" the "nggreusion" In Cambodia. Co-mncnta-
tors also assail alleged U.S. efforts to involve the alliance further
in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and deplore what is described
as a negative NATO posture on the key question of European security.
A lengthy TASS report on the 25th said that the gathering would discuss,
"besides the question of spreading the military efforts of NATO," the
Warsaw Pact proposal for the convening of an all-European conference on
security. Citing the U.S. and West European press, TASS added that
alliance leaders would prefer not to discuss this question at all, or
at least not to give priority to it, but have been forced to show a
regard for European public opinion, which gives "increasing support"
to the conference proposal. To make the convening of a conference
more difficult, '.PASS said, its opponents are resorting to various
"ruses"--among others, suggesting balanced force and armament reduc-
tions by the two alliances and proposing the creation of a permanent
commission at the ambassadorial level for talks between NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries.
The following day, a Kozyakov commentary for North America touched
on both pending proposals in the course of an attack on Washington
for trying to "torpedo" the conference idea. Kozyakov said that
the first propcaal was already under consideration at the now-recessed
Geneva disarmament talks and that the second "can hardly substitute"
for a European security conference. Like TASS, the commentary suggest-
ed that both proposals are inter-bloc in nature and that a conference
must include neutral states in Europe as well as members of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact.
The 25 May TASS dispatch was critical of those NATO circles who have
suggested that a conference not be convened until the results of the
FRG's bilateral talks with the USSR, the GDR, and Poland are clear.
The "absurdity" of this attitude is obvious, the dispatch concluded,
since the lumping together of these problems could mean an
indefinite delay of the European security conference. Earlier, a
22 May PRAVDA article by Beglov on NATO's attitude toward a confer-
ence had said that such a European meeting "will in no way hinder
the parallel course of bilateral talks between individual states
and also talks on disarmament through various channels."
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Several Soviet commentaries have pointed up alleged efforts to involve
NATO further in the Middle East, Kozyakov charging that the Rome
meeting "is working to knock together a new bloc in the Mediterranean."
Kozyakov said Washington is showing interest in the Mediterranean for
the same reason that it supports Israel--"to clamp down on the
liberation movement in the area." A commentary broadcast to Italian
listeners on the 26th says an attempt is being made to restrict the
session to a discussion of "artificial and even provocative questions,
such as . . . the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean." Asserting
that the situation in the Mediterranean in recent years has worsened
because of the "gross interference" of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the
commentary says the call for a unified NATO naval force is linked
with Israeli "aggression" against the Arab countries and serves to
prepare public opinion "for more active NATO Interference in the
Middle East." In defense of the Soviet presence, the commentary
repeats the familiar arguments that the Mediterranean lies "close
to the frontiers of the Soviet Union" and that Soviet forces there
are hailed by Fall the Arab peoples."
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WEST GERMANY
27 MAY 1970
GDR LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR MORE TALKS AFTER KASSEL SUMMIT
The relatively mild tone of the 25 May statement by the GDR Council
of Ministers on the 21 May Kassel summit meeting between Premier
Stoph and FRG Chancellor Brandt suggests a twofold purpose: to leave
the door open for future talks should the FRG become "realistic" and
to regain a more reasonable posture for the GDR in the wake of its
highly negative, sharply polemical attacks before, at, and immediately
after Kassel. Stoph. introduced no new proposals at Kassel, devoting
his three formal statements almost entirely to bitter attacks on
the FRG. GDR media have made extensive use of several incidents--
arising from disruptive crowds, the tearing down of a GDR flag, and
alleged threats to murder Stoph--to depict the FRG as an unreliable
negotiating partner brimming with revanchism.
Soviet media, while accurately reporting the substance of Stoph's
attacks, omitted many of the stronger expletives and gave some
balance to the picture by providing brief summaries of Brandt's
press conference evaluations of the Kassel meeting. GDR media
carried no such reports of Brandt's appraisal. Available comment
from East European media concludes, as Moscow does, that despite
the "more heated" polemics at Kassel as compared with Erfurt, the
dialog will continue at some future date and Kassel should not be
termed a failure.
GDR STATEMENT The GDR Council of Ministers concludes on 25 May,
on the basis of Stoph's report on Kassel, that
the FRG's "unrealistic attitude" as revealed, in the summit talks
proves that the FRG needs more time to "reflect on its attitude
and to arrive at a realistic viewpoint." The statement asserts GDR
readiness to continue "conversations by the heads of governments"
(but by implication not by lower-level negotiators as Brandt
proposed) "as soon as" the FRG Government "indicates a realistic
attitude" on the basic question---the establishment of relations of
equality under international law.
The statement lays new, urgent stress on "equal membership" of the
GDR and the FRG in the United Nations "forthwith." This point is
given new prominence in Stoph's final formal statement at Kassel,
so far available only in a summary released by his press representative
and broadcast by East Berlin's Deutschlandsender on the 21st.
STOPH AT An unscheduled statement by St oph, prior to Brandt's
KASSEL formal opening statement of his 20 points, expressed
"astonishment" that FRG security forces had not stopped
"fascist machinations" and "direct campaigns inciting to murder"
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27 MAY 1970
against Stoph on his way to the summit meeting. Stoph added,
according to ADN, that such machinations would "necessarily
encumber our meeting today."
Stoph's major statement at the talks, carried textually by ADN,
restates the stock demand for recognition by the FRG and reiterates
willingness to sign the GDR's draft treaty "immediately." Virtually
the entire statement, however, is devoted to cataloging complaints
and charges against the FRG, including accusations that Brandt
remains "evasive," that his government has "revanchist aims,"
that his words and deeds are "grossly contradictory," and that he
has alined FRG policy with U.S. global strategy. Stoph again
denounces Brandt's proposals for "special intra-German relations"
as "absolutely unacceptable" and rejects Brandt's concept of a
continuing "unity of the German nation" as "fictional." He says
Brandt has shown nothing to indicate a "real change" or "genuine
basic renovation" in FRG policy either in his speeches or in the
actions of his administration.
Stops rejects out of hand Brandt's proposals to set up lower-level
negotiating commissions, arguing that "things being what they are,
it would hardly be meaningful and would ignore the essence of the
matter" to establish such working groups on matters of "second- or
third-rate importance" before GDR recognition has been agreed upon.
BRANDT'S Stoph's first comment on Brandt's 20-point proposal
"20 POINTS" appears in his third formal statement, summed up by
GDR spokesman Lorf at a press conference late on the
21st. Stoph says Brandt's statement of principles for a settlement
shows that the FRG's "destructive attitude" will continue and
"can only be regarded as a veiled but definite no" to the establish-
ment of relations of equality under international law. Stoph accuses
Brandt of again evading this decisive point. The conclusion of Stoph's
third statement foreshadowed the Council of Ministers statement,
suggesting that if the FRG Government "used the time ahead to
ponder and reflect" on the establishment of normal relations with the
GDR, "ways and means would be found to continue to exchange views."
Stoph reiterated this view in his first interview after the summit
late on 21 May, carried by the East Berlin radio, in which he
claimed that "the most important point "--international recognition
of the GDR--was missing from Brandt's points. Stoph reiterated the
GDR's readiness to continue the talks when the .?RG "gives evidence
of a realistic attitude" on relations, but he d?d not spell out
what such evidence might be.
There has been little GDR comment on Brandt's 20 points, which were
published as part of the text of Brandt's main statement at Kassel
in the 22 May NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, according to the Hamburg DPA. East
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27 MAY 1970
Berlin commentator Leuschner on tie 21st termed the 20 points an
"evasive maneuver" and "a collection of various minor issues"
intended "to avoid international law, torpedo the draft treaty
submitted by the GDR, and leave the basic question open."
Moscow commentators have adopted a similar view of Brandt's proposal.
Glazunov on the 23d told German listeners that the attitude expressed
by the 20 points is full of contradictions and actually amounts to
a rejection of the GDR's basic demand for recognition. Panelists
in the 24+ May Moscow domestic service roundtable spoke of the "total
inconsistency" of Bonn's policy, adding that the attitude expressed
at Kassel by Brandt revealed "still large vestiges of the past" and
"a continuing strong dependence on-the policy of revanchism"
inherited from his predecessors. Brandt's concept of special
relations between the two German states, one panelist said, represents
an ultimatum-like stand intended to coerce the GDR and prevent its
recognition in international organizations.
EVALUATION OF GDR and Soviet media take issue with numerous
KASSEL RESULTS West German commentators who called the Kassel
summit a failure, arguing that its positive
results included another meeting "as equals" of the heads of the
two German states, another opportunity for Stoph to present the GDR
viewpoint for West German and world public consideration, and
finally the fact that the Kassel talks perhaps compelled Brandt
and his advisers to realize the validity and firmness of the GDR
stand. Radio Moscow commentator Zakharov, addressing German listeners
on the 25th, denied that the GDR has a "hard line" on recognition,
as claimed by West German papers, and suggested that perhaps now
Bonn will reconsider whether its own nonrecognition line is the
real impediment to progress.
Available East European comment on Kassel includes some expreosions
of disappointment at the "meager results" but optimism that the
talks will be resumed later, although no definite date was set for
a third meeting. A 22 May Prague CTK dispatch says the talks have
"only been interrupted for a time" and have not ended fruitlessly,
but Czechoslovak commentaries find little evidence yet that Bonn
has "recognized realities." Warsaw's PAP commentator Guz criticizes
Brandt's 20 points for omitting the "one most important point,"
GDR recognition, calling them a "blurred formulation" with the
"distinct features of a bargaining element." Other Polish press
comment on the 22d, reported by PAP, sees "no visible effects"
from the talks at Kassel, which appeared to be a "tougher" East-West
German confrontation than the one at Erfurt and to have produced
"weaker" prospects for an understanding.
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27 MAY 1970
MOSCOW REPORTS END OF GROMYKO-BAHR TALKS. AVOIDS COMMENT
TASS reports the conclusion of the May round of talks between Foreign
Minister Gromyko and FRG State Secretary Bahr on 22 May but continues
to avoid commenting on their progress. The 22 May announcement simply
noted the "exchange of views" on questions connected with the
"intention" of the two countries to conclude an agreement on
renunciation of the use of force--the identical language used in
TASS' 22 March announcement on the windup of the earlier round.
There has been no Moscow pickup of widespread West German press
and DPA reports of "optimistic" opinions by Bahr about the future
success of the talks, Bahr's "favorable" assessment of progress,
or speculation that Foreign Minister Scheel may soon go to Moscow
to continue the negotiations.
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27 MAY 1970
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
POLYANSKIY URGES MORE FOR AGRICULTURE IN NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN
First Deputy Premier Polyanskiy, agriculture's leading spokesman in
the Soviet leadership, has appealed for increased stress on agriculture
in the five-year plan now being drafted. The new plan "must be a five-
year plan for considerable upsurge in agriculture," he declares.
Polyanskiy's present appeal is reminiscent of his repeated public
demands for reallocations in favor of agriculture during a long
Politburo debate over resources in 1967.
Writing in the April SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES (signed to press
20 March), Polyanskiy affirms that the Central Committee and the
Soviet Government are "now considering the preliminary materials
connected with working out the new five-year plan." Kirilenko also
mentioned the upcoming debate on the plan in a 14+ April speech in
Yerevan: "The Central Committee and Council of Ministers are already
considering the direction" of the new plan, he said, and Gosplan and
other organs are now completing the draft, "which will soon be debated"
by the Politburo and government.
Although Polyanskiy states that "the party and government are now
doing the maximum possible" for improving agriculture and rural
living standards in the new plan, he simultaneously argues that
previous policy was less than fair to agriculture and should be.
altered. He says "it would be incorrect to attribute the dispropor-
tions and disparities between the development of industry and
agriculture and the lagging of the light, food, meat and dairy
industries behind growing needs only to objective factors" such as
"complicated international circumstances; . . . one must also
distinctly see the shortcomings of a subjective character and
eliminate them in good time." The "tasks of creating an abundance
of agricultural products" and "bringing the level of life of city
and village closer together" require an alteration of priorities,
he adds, and must find "a clearer expression" in the new five-year
plan "than in the past."
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FBIS TRENDS
27 MAX 1970
PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP TURNOUTS INDICATE SOME CHANGES
Accounts of provincial rallies held to commemorate Mao's 20 May
statement on Cambodia, the first event to produce a widespread
turnout of provincial leaders since National Day on 1 October,
indicate that a number of military leaders may have been shifted
from their previous duties. The rallies also brought forth some
civilian leaders absent from public view in recent months--notably
Li Hsueh-feng, Hopei chief and alternate member of the Politburo.
In Inner Mongolia, which recently lost half of its territory to its
neighbors, there was a further indication that the former military
region is now a district under the Peking region. The chief speaker
and some of the other leaders present were identified by NCNA on
23 May as "leading members of the Peking units of the PLA." Inner
Mongolia chairman Teng Hai-ching, who has not appeared in the region
since October, remained absent.
In Shansi, where almost the entire leadershipstructure seems to have
been altered as a result of factional struggles since the days when
it was a model revolutionary province, Hsieh Chen-hua was identified
as the new PLA commander in an NCNA account on the 22d. The long
absence of Chairman Liu Ko-ping continued.
Only in Heilungkiang and Shanghai, among the first half-dozen
provinces and special municipalities to form revolutionary
committees in the spring of 1967, did ?h^ old leaders appear. In
addition to Liu Ko-ping of Shansi, Peking chief Hsieh Fu-chih,
Shantung chairman Wang Hsiao-yu, and Kweichow chairman Li Tsai-han
failed to appear. The only other provincial-level chief who did
not appear, Li Yuan of Hunan, is a military commander and may have
been transferred to other duties--as may also be the case with
Inner Mongolia's chairman.
One possible explanation for the absence of some provincial chiefs is
that they are temporarily working in the countryside in line with
recent exhortations in the national media. On 25 May, however, NCNA
took pains to note that Kwangsi chairman Wei Kuo-ching, "who is now
working in selected basic units to get experience to guide overall
work," attended a rally in Liuchou. And on the 24th NCNA reported
that Sinkiang chairman Lung Shu-chin is "carrying out investigations"
in Akosu district, where he attended a rally.
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27 MAY 1970
EDITORIAL STRESSES PARTY LEADERSHIP OVER CREATIVE ARTS
A joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial,
released by NCNA on 22 May, highlighted this year's unusual
celebration of the 28th anniversary of Mao's "Talks at the Yenan
Forum on Literature and Art." Except on the 25th anniversary in
1967, observances of the occasion in recent years have been low-
keyed affairs; in 1969 the anniversary drew no comment in central
media, and in 1968 there was only one NCNA report. This year's
anniversary, by contrast, is receiving extensive national and
provincial publicity. RED FLAG No. 5 marked the 'nniversary by
publishing a revised libretto for the opera "Red. Lantern" as well
as a new piano concerto entitled "Yellow River." The journal
lauded Chiang Ching for her role in reforming literature and art.
The joint editorial, on the other hand, neither mentions Chiang
Ching nor dwells on revolutionary art and literature, but uses
the occasion to push for greater party control over intellectuals
while also attempting to revitalize the ideological rebuilding of
the party. Stressing a general need to remold one's world outlook
through proletarian literature and art, the editorial refers
specifically to sections from Mao's 1942 article which relate to
current efforts to rebuild the party and overcome factionalism.
The editorial condemns those cadres who joined the party organiza-
tionally but "who have not yet joined the party ideologically"
and hold to a "me first" attitude, form factions, seek personal
advancement, and feel "contempt for physical labor." To overcome
these shortcomings, all party members as.well as revolutionaries
who desire to join the party must remold their ideology "through
a long and even painful process" of more class struggle and
integration with workers, peasants, and soldiers, the editorial
says.
Reports on provincial rallies marking the anniversary spell out
the intention to strengthen party control over intellectuals and
to use the Yenan "Talks" as a guide for future party-building
activity. NCNA on 23 May, reporting on nationwide celebrations
of the anniversary, noted that party members throughout the country
expressed their determination "to solve the question of joining the
party ideologically" by study of ti-is "important editorial." NCNA
pointed specifically to a Hunan provincial conference on party
building--not previously mentioned in Hunan's pro-incial media--
which after study of the joint editorial concluded that priority
must be given to ideological rectification in the process of party
building and that study of the "Talks" was "the fundamental way" to
CONFIDENTIAL
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acquire the correct ideological outlook necessary for party membership.
On 24 May Shenyang radio reported on a local rally at which the
chairman of the Shenyang Municipal Revolutionary Committee stated
that the article "is by no means limited to literary and art problems"
and can be used in strengthening "the party leadership over cultural
and educational work."
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