TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
1 July 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 26)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carr.zd in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This documenc contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
E,cI d.d from eeIamelie
dewnprndi'; end
d.,Io Ree ien
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CONTENTS
FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970
Topics and Events Given Major Attention i
Presideiit's 30 June Report, Cambodian Pot icy Scored . . . . . . . 1
Communist Claims of Military Success in Cambodia . . . . . 5
Paris Talks: Routine Claims, Charges at 25 June Session . . . . . 7
Sihanouk .Concludes Slate Visit to North Korea 9
Ministers of Sihanouk Government in TSSR, UAR . , . . . , , 9
Djakarta Conference Mission's Moscow V??.sit Noted. by USSR, PRC . . . l0
:-ioscow Continues Polemic on Peking's Indochina Str..nd . . . . . . 12
DRV National Assembly Delegation Stops iii PRC, USSR . . . . . . . . 12
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Attacks on DRY . , , 13
Instructions on Attacking Vietnam District Capitals . . . , . , . 14
KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY
Fanfare From Peking and Pyongyang, Routine Moscow Observance . . . 16
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
PRC Decries U.S. "Occupation" of Taiwan on Anniversary . . . . . ? 19
Peking Calls for Peaceful Coexistence With United States . . . . . 21
Routine Calls for Taiwan Liberation Show Little Urgency . . . . . . 22
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Low-Volume Soviet Comment on SALT Continues Attacks on Laird . . . 24
EUROPEAN SECURITY
Pact Document Breaks New Ground on Conference Makeup, Agenda . . 25
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Restrained on New U.S. Peace Initiative . . . . . . . . . . 28
Nasir Arrives in Moscow for "Friendly Visit" 30
U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY
Treaty Extension Occasions New Warnings of Threat to Peace . . . . 33
LATIN AMERICA
Havana Applauds Tactics of Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay . . . . . . 36
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY ].970
C C INTENT 3 (Continued)
Hardliners Denounce Dubcek; Husak Hints at Trial . . . . . . . . .39
Italian, British CommL,iists "Regret" Dubcak Expulsion . . . . . . 40
YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR
Ribicic Moscow Visit Reflects Improvement in State Relations . . .42
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Brezhnev's War Role Played Up by OGONEK, Otherwise Ignored . . . 45
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Joint Editorial Released for Party Anniversary . . . . . . . . . .47
Topics in Brief 47
Status of Yeh Chun
Leap Forward Planning
Summer Crops
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OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIL TRENDS
1 JULY 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 JUNE 197O
Moscow (3812 items)
Peking (2774 it
)
ems
Pakistan President
Khan in USSR
(0.2%)
110
Korean War & Taiwan
Anniversaries
(--)
51%
Soyuz 9
(12%)
8%
U.S...Japanese Treaty
(2%)
17%
China
(6%)
6%
Extended
Indochina
(7%)
6%
Domestic Issues
(21%)
11%
Warsaw Treaty Foreign
(--)
6%
Indochina
(lib%)
5%
Ministers' Budapest
Meeting on European
Wheelus Base
Closing
(0.06%)
3%
Se cuuri ty
Sukarno Is Death
(--)
1%
Yugoslav President
Ribicic in USSR
(--)
4%
Anniversary of Nazi
(3%)
5%
Invasion of USSR
Supreme Soviet Elections
(18%)
4%
Middle East
(3%)
3%
These statistics are based on the, voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention i,-[i terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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1 JULY 1970
INDOCHINA
Initial Vietnamese communist reaction to President Nixon's
30 June report on the two-month U.S..operation in Cambodia
comes on 1 July in a Hanoi radio commentary which say: the
report shows that the Administration is bent ::r pursuing its
"aggression" despite "serior.,- military defeats" throughout
Indochina and political isolation. Hanoi and Front comment
on the eve of the final troop withdrawal from Cambodia cited
the continuing U.S. air strikes and the ARVN presence as
evidence of aggression and went so far as to charge that U.S.
troops may be sent back in.
Moscow reacts typically with a brief' TASS dispatch on the 30th
describing the President's report as an effort to justify the
United States' "invasion." Noting that the President said he
seeks a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, TASS interjects the
remark that "despite rumors" he failed to announce the appoint-
ment of a high-level representative at the Paris talks.
The day before the President's report was made public, VNA
released a communique from the "Defense Ministry" in Sihanouk's
government rounding up alleged feats of the Cambodian
"patriots" during the past three months, including attacks on
12 out of 19 provincial capitals and the complete "liberation"
of four of them. A Sihanouk statement publicized on the 30th
claims that "many" provinces are now totally controlled and
lists five. Earlier references to the cutting off of Phnom
Penh are repeated, and Liberation Radio on the 26th says the
Lon Nol-Matak regime is worried about the prospect of an
attack on the capital.
Sihanouk concluded his state visit to North Korea on 1 July
after having participated in the events marking the 20th
anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. Chinese speakers
at the anniversary observances repeated the implicit criticism
of Soviet policy expressed in Peking's 25 June joint editorial--
"certain persons" are even "maintaining dirty relations with
Lon Nol and his like." Moscow has ignored the Chinese attack,
but routine Soviet comment co.itinues to score the PRC for block-
ing joint communist action on Indochina.
PRESIDENTS 30 JUNE REPORT, CAMBODIAN POLICY SCORED
HANOI AND The 1 July Hanoi radio commentary on President
THE FRONT Nixon's report on the U.S. operation in Cambodia
says the President continued to "boast" of
victories and released statistics on "booty seized from the
enemy." But it losses over the fact that the targets were
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Vietnamese communist sanctuaries and speaks only of "aggression"
against Cambodia. A 29 June Hanoi radio commentary discussing
the U.S. withdrawal mentions the objective of "capturing the
communist command staff on Cambodian territory and launching
search-and-destroy missions," but it implies that the communists
are Cambodian and makes no re: rence to any Vietnamese role.*
Hanoi's comment on the President's report echoes earlier prop-
aganda in seeing evidence of continued U.S. "aggression" in the
fact that U.S. air strikes will continue, that ARVN forces
will remain in Cambolia, and that other "mercenaries" will be
sent. Comment prior to the release of the report had charged
that the President plans to return U.S. troops to Cambodia after
their withdrawal at the end of June. Most notably, a 25 June
NHAN DAN article, publicized by Hanoi radio and VNA, calls
attention to the 22 June Pentagon acknowledgment of U.S. air
strikes in Cambodia beyond the 21-mile limit for U.S. ground
operations and cites press reports that U.S. pl,~.nes are flying
combat-support missions in Cambodia and that B-52's are being
used there.
The paper claims that the decision to expand the air raids was
taken to shore up the Lon Nol regime and Saigon forces in the
face of the U.S. withdrawal., as well as to "maintain the
presence of direct U.S. military action in that country in
order to provide for a later return of U.S. troops." The
article says that the "punishment" of U.S. "agg'::essors" in
Vietnam was used as an excuse to invade Cambodis and that "if
U.S. pilots are killed in Cambodia, Nixon will not hesitate
* Hanoi and Front propaganda has been inconsistent regarding
the Vietnamese communist presence in Cambodia. The 2 May DRV
Government statement on the President's 30 April speech referred
only to his "slanders" against the DRV, while the PRG statement
on the same occasion said the President "slanderously accused
the DRV and PRG of waging aggression against Cambodia." Some
comment following the President's 3 June TV speech acknowledged
his reference to Vietnamese communist sanctuaries, with some
items going so far as to ridicule his failure on that occasion
to mention the objective of "razing VC headquarters"--for
example, Hanoi radio on the 4th, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 5th,
and NHAN DAN on the 12th. A NHAN DAN commentary on the 5th
said that the President's real aim was to save the Lon Nol
regime from collapse.. See the TRENDS of 10 June, pages 1-2.
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to use the piratic right to act freely." NHAN DAN buttresses
this judgment by citing a comment in the 1 June issue of
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT to the effect that "in November
and December when the rainy season ends, President Nixon
again must decide whether to return U.S. troops to Camb dia."
A 28 June Liberation Radio commentary also raises the question
of the return of U.S. troops to Cambodia and, like NHAN DAN,
quotes U.S. NEWS AND WORLD-REPORT as saying that the President
must decide in November and December about sending U.S. troops
back across the border. The commentary goes on to claim that
the allies have sustained "bitter setbacks" in Cambodia and
that the "Lon Nol clique" is doomed. "The Cambodian people's
patriotic forces," it says,"have developed by leaps and
bounds, liberating half the country and directing their guns
at Phnom Penh."
Sharp attacks on the President appear in the 29 June Hanoi
radio commentary and in a NHAN DAN article the same day pegged
to the Senate vote to repeal the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
Glossing over the fact that it was pro-Administration Senators
who moved to bring the resolution to a vote now, NHAN DAN
says the vote "is indicative of the bitter dispute in the
U.S. ruling class as a result of heavy U.S. defeats in
Indochina" and of strong pressure from the antiwar forces.
The article adds that by the Cambodian action, "Nixon has
further cast slurs on U.S. honor . . . and has appeared
in his true colors as an international gendarme, a callous
warmonger who during the Eisenhower Administration urged the
dispatch of U.S. troops to Vietnam. He now becomes the most
protested and most hated President in U.S. history."
The radio commentary cites a French paper as having said that
on 30 June the President would be either a vanquished man or
a liar and sets out to demonstrate that he is both, having
"failed" in his mission in Cambodia and still pursuing aggression
against that country.
MOSCOW The initial brief TASS report on the President's
Cambodia report cites tin AP correspondent for the
observation that the report contained no surprises but was
the most elaborate explanation to date of the Cambodian move.
It goes on to note that the U.S. air strikes will continue
anc? that aid to Lon Nol will be increased. Another TASS report
a few hours later repeats this and adds that the ARVN will
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continue its operations. Both reports note the President's
support for a political settlement but observe that he said
nothing about appointing a new U.S. delegation head at Paris
and that he "repeated threats to the South Vietnamese patriots."
It is in a commentary in English to the United Kingdom that
Moscow broaches the question of the Vietnamese presence in
Cambodia: The President "tried to whitewash American actions
when he claimed, contrary to the facts, that aggression
against Cambodia was unleashed not by the United States but
by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front."
Routine Moscow propaganda during the week stressed that a
withdrawal of U.S. ground forces on the 30th would not mean
the end of U.S. action in Cambodia, and there are continuing
references to the "admissions" by Pentagon spokesmen, Secretary
Laird, and Secretary Rogers that U.S. air strikes will
continue throughout the country, that the Saigon troops will
remain, and that Thai troops will be sent in. A domestic
service commentary on the 27th ridicules the background
briefings of journalists by the President and his advisors in
San Clemente, calling them part of an "advertising campaign"
to coax the press into presenting Administration policy on
Indochina in a favorable light. The commentary notes that
representatives of the New York TIMES and the Washington POST,
among others, were excluded from the briefing because, "not
wanting to lose subscribers," they have opposed the incursion
into Cambodia.
Secretary Rogers' remarks at his Washington press conference
as well as in California are cited as evidence of U.S. intent
to pursue "aggression" in Cambodia. And a domestic service
commentary by Moscow radio's military analyst Col. Aleksey
Leontyev on the 28th says Rogers' Asian trip and his participa-
tion in the SEATO meeting in Manila will be used to seek
cannonfodder in pursuit of the President's Guam Doctrine of
"letting Asians fight Asians." Leontyev points to the likely
dispatch of Thai troops, and a brief Washington-datelined
TASS dispatch on the 30th says that Rogers, addressing the
National Conference of Editors and Broadcasters in
San Francisco the day before, made the first flat statement
by a high-ranking U.S. official that Thai troops will wage
combat operations in Cambodia together with Saigon forces.
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SIFIANOUK A statement issued by Sihanouk in Pyongyang on
STATEMENT 30 June, covered in DPRK, DRV, and PRC media,
denounces the U.S. "deception" of a troop withdrawal
and terms the President's decision to withdraw all American
ground forces from Cambodia by 1 July "a machiavellian maneuver
by an ambitious politician" to dupe the electorate. Withdrawal,
it says, will not efface the "crimes" of the U.S. troops in
Cambodia, and in any case "Thieu-Ky" troops will continue to
"occupy" Cambodian territory. Moreover, it charges, an
"invasion" by Thai forces will no doubt compensate for the
withdrawal of American troops.
The statement says that although President Nixon promised the
American people "a rapid end" of the Indochina war, his
aggression in Cambodia has only prolonged it, with the United
States suffc:...ng "shameful defeats." It cites Senator Mansfield
as "confirming" this view and as stating that the "sanctuaries
of the patriots" are "multiplying" and that "more than half"
the country has been liberated.
COMMUNIST CLAIMS OF MILITARY SUCCESS IN CAMBODIA
COMMUNIQUE FROM VNA on 29 June carried a 20 June
"DEFENSE MINISTRY" communique on communist feats in
Cambodia during the past three months,
issued by the Defense Ministry of the Royal Government of
National Union and distributed by the information bureau of
the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK).
The communique claims that the "Cambodian national liberation'
armed forces" and people have annihilated or captured 25,000
soldiers of the Lon Nol army and that 20,000 more government
troops have disbanded. It further claims that in combat from
1 May to 20 June they have eliminated nearly 20,.00 U.S. and
ARVN troops, including nearly 10,000 GI's; shot down nearly
300 planes; destroyed 1,400 military vehicles, 150 artillery
pieces and mortars, and 15 war vessels; captured or destroyed
thousands of tons of ammunition, food, and other military
supplies; and attacked five of the six corps area headquarters.
The com..iunique alleges that the forces have attacked 12 of
the 19 provincial capitals, completely "liberating" four of
them, and have liberated many townships, district capitals,
and hundreds of.villages totalling more than one million
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inhabitants, "which form a large liberated zone, solid rear
bases of the resistance war." These victories, it says,
"mark a big stride forward of the Cambodian revolution."
Acclaiming the establishment of "the democratic power of the
people" and a "patriotic people's army," the communique
expresses the confidence of the armed forces in head of
state and Front chairman Sihanouk and in Penn Nouth, chairman
of the Front politburo and premier.
CURRENT VNA claimed on 27 June that the Cambodian National
ACTION Liberation Army (CLNA) had forced the withdrawal
of government forces from Thbeng Meanchey, the
capital of Preah Vihear Province, on the 20th and that three
districts in the province have been "liberated" along with
the provincial capital. Feats in Preah Vihear Province are
also cited in a 28 June VNA commentary on President Thieu's
27 June speech, which dealt wi+:i Cambodian policy. The
commentator says further that AFP on the 27th reported the
complete liberation of the four northern provinces of Ratanakiri,
Mondulkiri, Stung Treng, and Kratie. (Sihanouk's 30 June
statement adds P:yeah Vihear to this list.) The commentary
cites an unidentified Western press dispatch dated 14 Jime
for the report that half the country is under the control of
the "Cambodian patriotic forces," that all the main roads to
Phnom Penh are interdicted, and that the railroad to "Sihanouk
port" has been mined and cut. On the 26th, Liberation Radio
asserted that Phnom Penh was isolated and that "Lon Nol and
Matak have been very much worried about the prospect that
Phnom Penh may be attacked."
ANGKOR WAi On 25 June NCNA publicized two statements by
Sihanouk's government on the temples of Angkor.
The first, dated 23 June, declares that the "national
liberation armed forces," in conformity with Sihanouk's
instructions, are protecting the relics of Angkor from pillage
or use for military purposes. it charges that allied forces
have caused the destruction of religious buildings and other
property elsewhere in Cambodia and that air bombing and
artillery bombardment by allied forces in the vicinity of
the temples of Angkor "lready constitute a grave menace of
destruction of these Khmer historical relics." The statement
appeals for the support of world opinion, but adds that "the
Royal Government of National Union wishes to make it clear
that it rejects the right of any third country &.1.1d any
international organization to interfere in Cambodia under the
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deceptive pretext of protecting Cambodia's historical relics."
The second statement, dated 24 June, refutes an AP report
that forces of the liberation army are entrenched in the Angkor
temples.
VNA reported the two statements on 27 and 28 June. Hanoi and
Pathet Lao media had earlier denied news reports that
Vietnamese communist troops, including Pathet Lac and
Chinese elements, were quartered in the temple complex.*
Allied "encroachment" or, the Angkor temple area is also
scored in a statement by the FUNK information bureau--
publicized by Hanoi on the 29th--which charges that the
allies bombed the Udong temple area, the old capital of the
kingdom of Cambodia, on 26 June.
PARIS TALKS: ROUTINE CLAIMS, CHARGES AT 25 JUNE SESSION
Vietnamese communist media again give cursory and inconsistent
accounts of the 72d session of the Paris talks on 25 June.
Thus LPA, but not VNA, in reporting PRG delegate Nguyen Van
Tien's statement notes his remark that President Nixon's
pledge to withdraw U.S. troops from Cambodia by 30 June is
"simply a maneuver to cover up" a U.S. scheme to expand and
prolong the war. VNA similarly fails to report DRV delegate
Nguyen Minh Vy's comments on the President's withdrawal
pledge, but both accounts note Tien's assertion that the
United States has ordered the indefinite occupation of
Cambodia by South Vietnamese forces, is making preparations
to dispatch Thai "mercenaries" there, and is planning to
continue to provide air and logistical support for GVN forces.
The VNA account of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement
reflects his attack on U.S. delegate Habib's argument at the
last session that President Nixon's 20 April address was "an
invitation to negotiate" and showed a "flexible attitude."
VNA notes that in rebuttal Vy said the Administration still
insists on a mutual withdrawal and tries to maintain the
Saigon administration and that he cited U.S. aggressive acts
See the `..'RENDS of 17 June, page 6, and 24 June, page 2.
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which, he charged, belie the U.S. delegate's claim of a
flexible attitude. The account records Vy's charge that
the Nixon Administration "persistently opposed" the NFLSV's
10-point program, gave priority to Vietnamization, and at
the same time "downgraded the importance of and thereby
sabotaged" the Paris talks. On the other hand, neither the
VNA nor the LPA account acknowledges Tien's remark casting
doubt on allied intentions or his pro forma reassertion
that the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution is "the honorable and
safe way out of South Vietnam" for the United States.
Both the VNA and LPA accounts indicate that Tien devoted the
major part of his statement to describing the "abominable
crimes" committed in the GVN's pacification program, but
they do not mention in this regard that Tien pegged his
remarks to a recent statement by GVN President Thieu to the
effect that a "special pacification program" will be
initiated in South Vietnam effective 1 July. Tien's
typically graphic description of alleged GVN and allied crimes
and atrocities, as well as of the PLAF "victories," are
partially noted in the accounts.
Where the VNA accounts of the sessions on the 11th and 18th
had not given any description of the allied delegates'
statements, the account of the 25 June session reverts to
the practice of at least identifying the delegates and giving
a one-sentence description of thir remarks. Thus VNA,
totally obscuring the substance of Lam's address, says that
he "again resorted to perfidious allegations in an attempt
to deceive world public opinion, which is condemning the
United States for expanding the war to the whole of Indochina
and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration for serving as a tool
of the U.S. aggression." As for Habib, VNA says he "repeated
his absurd proposal on 'mutual troop withdrawal' and
stubbornly rejected the South Vietnamese people's just
demand that the United States withdraw unconditionally its
troops from South Vietnam and cast off the Thieu-Ky-Khiem
administration."
With no explanation of the context, VNA says at the end of
its account that in their supplementary speeches Tien and
Vy "stressed that the so-called Djakarta conference on
Indochina had been in fact wirepulled by the United States
with the aim of covering up and justifying the U.S.
aggressive acts against the Indochinese peoples."
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SIHANOUK CONCLUDES STATE VISIT TO NORTH KOREA
Continuing his state visit to North Korea, Sihanouk took part
in the events marking the 20th anniversary of the Korean War.
He addressed the 25 June Pyongyang city rally aid attended
several anniversary banquets. On the 27th, Sihanouk hosted
a banquet in honor of Kim Il-song at which both leaders spoke
and which was attended by the PRC, DRV, PRG, and Pathet Lao
delegations that were in Pyongyang for the anniversary. Kim
Il-song hosted a dinner for Sihanouk on the 30th, and Sihanouk
left the DPRK on 1 July; he was seen off at the railroad
station by Kim Il-song in a farewell ceremony at which both
leaders spoke. KCNA reported on 30 June that a DPRK-Cambodian
joint statement was signed, but a text is not yet available.
In his 27 June banquet speech, according to KCNA, Sihanouk once
again warmly thanked the DPRK for its support, recalling that
at a 15 June banquet Kim Il-song had promised "active support
by all necessary means" and that President Choe Yong-kon had
repeated the promise at a rally on the 18th. Sihanouk added
that the Khmers are'also grateful for the support of the PRC,
Vietnam, and Laos and that the American imperialists cannot
destroy "this anti-U.S. joint front of the revolutionary peoples
of Asia." In a similar vein,, Kim Il-song said Sihanouk's
visit had "consolidated the friendship and solidarity
between our peoples on a new basis and cemented still further
the anti-U.S. common front covering a vast region from Korea
to China, Vietnam, Laos, and popular and anti-imperialist
Cambodia." He again promised the Cambodians continued moral
and material "active assistance."
MINISTERS OF SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT IN USSR, UAR
TASS reported on 26 June that "representatives of the Soviet
public" met with FUNK Political Bureau members Thiounn Mumm
and Chea San.* The report was printed in PRAVDA and carried
in the domestic service the next day. This report gives no
* Paris AFP had reported on the 24th that Thiounn Mumm
arrived in Moscow that day for a week-long visit, after
which he will visit Warsaw and other East European capitals.
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CON1I I)Is'NT IAI 101110 ThEN
1 JULY 1970
other titles for the guests, but U. br1,otf 'CAS,; Item oil the
29th, in reporting that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
I'lryubi.n received !t'hiounu Mturun, acknowlcdgcu that he is
"minister of economy and finance of the Royal National
Unity Government." This Is Lhc first explicit reference
to the Sihanouk government noted in Moscow propaganda
since 6 May, when 'PASS briefly reported the proclamation
of Sihanouk's government and the FUNK political program.
Thus far, Soviet propaganda has not mentioned that Chea
San is the Sihanouk gove,nment'o ambassador to Moscow
as well as its minister of justice.
'T',ASS does not indicate the substance of any talks with
Firyubin but does note that at the meeting with the public
on the 26th the deputy chairman of the Scvict Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committee expressed "sympathy" for the "Just
struggle of the Cambodian patriots."
NCNA on 25 June reported the arrival in Cairo the day before
of the foreign minister of the Royal Government of National
Union, Sarin Chhak, who recently visited India and Ceylon.
The Cairo MENA on the 25th quoted him as claiming that
20 countries have now recognized the new government, adding
to the list "Palestine"--presumably the Palestine Liberation
Organization. On 30 June MENA reported that foreign minister
Sarin Chhak said he will act concurrently as ambassador to
Cairo until a new ambassador is named. Ambassadors of
Sihanouk's government have thus far been accredited in the
DRV, DPRK, and PRC.
DJAKARTA CONFERENCE MISSION'S i1 COVI VISIT NOTED BY USSR. PRC
The first known Soviet acknowledgment of the 17 June Moscow
visit of the Djakarta Conference three-nation mission* comes
on the 28th in an IZVESTIYA article which says that despite
tho negative Soviet attitude toward the Djakarta Conference,
* On 24 June the Djakarta domestic service reported that
the three-nation mission arrived in Warsaw and met the same
day with Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski. From Warsaw,
according to the report, the group is to go on to London.
Warsaw media are not known to have mentioned the mission's
visit.
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CONP'1I-1?il'1'IAI, I"Ii1.:3 't'rip;NU:;
.1. IUL'Y l rO
newnpaperu in "it number of Ani.an court rir.u" have come, up
with vurlour- conjectures in connect ion with Lhe viult,.
1ZV1;CTIYA nuyu that the three .reprcucnl,t-t.t.ven--from Indonesia,
Japan, and Mt.Luynta--were "received prcciuely au the
representatives of' Lhote cour-trieu with which the, Soviet,
Union maintains normal. diplomatic rulut;ionn." The paper
uayu nothing about either an l.nterna tonal conference or the
role of the ICC when It, iLaLen that, the tlovict attitude
toward U.S. irrtcrvent,ion in Crunbodia 1.u "well. known," having
been net, out in the 4 May t;ovieL Government statement. The
paper reiterates the pou[tion that the "only way" to rentore
peace in Cambodia and Indochina is to "swiftly and unconditionally"
withdraw U.S. and allied troops and grunt the Indochinese people
the opportunity to decide their own destiny.
PEKING Peking attacks the group's talks with Gromyko in a
25 June NCNA commentary pegged Lo the recent meeting
of the ASPAC Council in Wellington, New ';caland. It notes
that the ASPAC communique lauded the "sinister" Djakarta
conference which is designed to put out the flames of
revolution in Indochina, and it says that the Japanese
and Malaysian delegates reported to the meeting on their "talks
on the convening of a new Geneva conference" with the Soviet
foreign minister. There is no further reference to the Soviet
Union; the commentary goes on merely to sc)re Japan for its
role in the Djakarta conference.
TIRANA The visits of U Thant and the three-nation Djakarta
mission to Moscow are cited in a ZERI I POPULLIT
article--carried by Tirana's ATA on 24 June--which denounces
U.S. "maneuvers" to achieve peace in Indochina, allegedly
carried out with the assistance of the "Moscow revisionists."
(Moscow's reports of U Thant's 17-2i. June visit said little about
Indochina and avoided the issue of a political settlement.
Peking is not known to have commentea or, Thant's Moscow visit,
but it did pick up LPA and VNA commentaries denouncing his
11 June call for an international conference on Indochina.)
ZERI I POPULLIT acknowledges U Thant's reported statement in
Moscow that his attitude and that of the USSR on Cambodia
"coincide almost completely." The article asserts that during
the talks in Moscow new "maneuvers" were made to induce the
Indochinese people to "lay down their arms and accept
humiliating capitulation during talks in some international
forum (UN, Geneva conference on Indochina, etc.)." The
article says that the presence in Moscow of the Djakarta
three-nation mission at the same time was part of a "previously
CONFIDENTIAL
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CC)Nl'1UI.M'I'i.AI, PUI111 'L'ItI.NI)S
I .11JLY 1970
roc)rdIlift ted plrttt" and that t.hc' three reprenentutlvcn, "conunun
CrLendn of, Witt; l-t.ttgtoll and Muucow," were abi( to coordinate
their counterrevolutionary plann In Aui.a.
MOSCOW CONTINUES POLEMIC ON PEKING'S INDOCHINA STAND
Moncow'u continuing attack on :1ek1ng'n Indochina policies
includcu it ;18 June Mandarin-Itutguagc broadcast recalling
uuutruction of ntd to Vietnr_un. It ueyt, that railway care
were t,omctimen d2iaycd I'or several month: and that "Soviet
Lrari:,port, plant wcr(, not permitted to fly over Chinese
territory."
A - 7 June broadet'st in Lndarin for the I'LA says that when
the situation in Indochina "becomes so serious as to require
united action," the Chinese talk about a "threat from the
North" arid intensify their anti-Soviet propaganda. As a
resuLt, says the commentary, the United States has spread
aggression to Cambodia, resumed some bombing of the DRV, and
continues "opecial warfare" in Laos. A Mandarin-language
commentary on the 20th similarly charges the "false revolutionaries"
in China with encouraging U.S. aggression. Although events in
IridocLina, "which is adjacent to southern China," do "affect
China's security to a certain extent," the commentary says, the
Chinese leaders merely "talk big but never take concrete action";
and the 20 May Mao statement that "a small. nation can defeat a
big" merely shows that China wants to allow the small nations to
shoulder the responsibility of war. The commentary also cites
Kuo Mo-jo as having said at a reception marking the PRG
anniversary that "the war in Indochina is the affair of the
peoples of the three nations."*
DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION STOPS IN PRC, USSR
VNA and Hanoi radio reported on 29 June that the DRV National
Assembly delegation headed by Standing Committee Vice
Chairman Hoang Van Hoan had arrived in Peking on the 23d
* NCNA quoted Kuo Mo-jo, at a friendship association reception,
as expressing the PRC's conviction that the Indochinese peoples
can win their protracted aar, but as adding that the Chinese
people "have always regarded the Vietnamese people's struggle
as their own" and give them "firm support."
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CONK' I.1)XN'I' I Al. P'B L(; '1'1fl*l1X,
i. JU1,Y .L9 (0
"for it ntolrovor" on Itn way to L;ttut Nu rope. This Lu Hanoi. mcdaa's
first mention of the delegation wince the visit was anncunccd on
f'3 June and a NIHAN DAN editorial Lit(! next day pointed t;o Its
"srit9nll'icarrcc." The i?9 Junc reporte noted that the delegatc.'u
were welcomed at LI-e airport: by L1 llaien-nictr, vice premier
of the 03ttt' Council, who gave a bariquet later In the day in
their honor. Ntuioi said the delegates a].uo attended the grand
mect.ing marking the 20th anniversary of the Korean War otnd
were guests of horror at a reception given by Chou En-lad for
the DP1tK delegation visiting Peking for the anniversary. Both
items reported that the delegation left Peking on the 27th, but
only VNA mentioned that their dectlration was Moscow.
NCNA had reported the delegation'u departure on the 27th, noting
that it had been in Peking since 23 June. Also on the 27th, 'PASS
reported that the delegation had arrived in Moscow, "en route
to Sofia," and was met at the airport by chairman of the USSR
parliamentary group Ivan Spiridonov and other officials.
On the 30th Moscow reported that the delegation had left by air
for Sofia. Moscow radio's domestic service noted that the group
was seen off by Spiridonov and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Firyubin. Hanoi media have not mentioned the delegation's
arrival or departure from Moscow to date and have given no
additional information on its itinerary.
FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DENOUNCES U.S. ATTACKS ON DRV
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements issued on 27 and
30 June charge the United States with bombing DRV territory
on thc 25th and 26th, respectively. The 30 June statement claims
that U.S. aircraft on the 26th bombed Huong Lap village while
U.S. artillery south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) shelled
Vinh Son village--both targets being located in the northern part
of the DMZ. The spokesman routinely denounces the "crimes" and
demands the cessation of all U.S. encroachments on the DRV.
The 25 June attack by U.S. aircraft "on a place in Dien Chau
district, Nghe An Province," is "severely condemned" in the
statement of 27 June. This statement also routinely condemns
the continued violation of DRV airspace by U.S. aircraft. The
VNA account of the statement says that the spokesman "flatly rejected
the argument about the so-called 'protective react'ion' resorted to by the U
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1"I3.[ '''IZLNDS
- LIi -
.1. JULY 1970
Comilla -d to ,J uc- L1 I y the U.0. pir. aL.Le seta. " Claiming that,
Lhuue "acLu of' war" are a "flagrant cncrouchment?" on DRV
:.overe.LgnLy and i.-ccurlLy, the upokooman demanded that the
UnI.ted f.;i;atwi "stop those acts at once."
Hanoi claimu the downing of an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance
plane over 2uang Ninh Province on 1 July, bringing its
total of dowr-cd American planes to 3,353. The last previous
downing o.l' it U.S'. plane was said to have been on 31 May over
flit Tinh Province.
INSTRUCTIONS ON ATTACKING VIETN/IM DISTRICT CAPITALS
Liberation Radio broadcast in thrr:e daily installments
from 23 through 25 June an "unsigned commentary" explaining
the importance to the allies of district capitals and
military subsectors and detailing instructions can how to
attack them. The article explains that the allies use
the capitals and subsectors as bases for consolidating
the armed forces and administration at the basic level,
for oppressing the people, harrassing the revolutionary
movement, and strengthening the defense of areas adjacent
to the cities. To counter these schemes, the article says,
"we must rush forward in the flush of successes to continue
to attack many more district capitals and military subsectors
so as to efficiently assist the masses in rising up to gain
control, to liberate each rural area, and to consolidate
and vigorously develop our offensive position . . ."
* The U.S. command in Saigon on the 26th had reported that an
American bomber hit an anti-aircraft installation in North
Vietnam in response to "hostile actions" against U.;.
reconnaissance aircraft. The command said that st.ch raids
constitute "protective reaction" and are an inherent right of
self-defense.
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CON1'ILTh:NTJ:AL 1"I1IS T'IANW!
.1. JULY 1970
The article acknowledges that the allies "enjoy many advantages"
in the capitals and subnectors, uayinr that they are numerically
strong, are surrounded Ly a security system, can quickly deploy
troops in the area, have strong permanent fortifications, and are
supported by strong artillery firepower and motorized reinforcements.
By contrast, I t cites as allied weakpoirito only the low morale
and "complex composition" of allied forces, gaps in the allied
defense caused by the large size of the capital or ouboector,
and the people's "hatred" of the "enemy." Later the article
notes that since attacks on district capitals and military
subsectors sometimes involve "intense" and drawn-out fighting,
it is important to forge and maintain a high level of determination.
The article offers statistics on the number of district capitals
and military subsectors attacked since the start of the 1968
Tet offensive, in some cases listing the names of specific
targets. It claims that prolonged attacks as well as brief
ones have been carried out, citing cases of attacks lasting more
than 60 and 90 days.
The article stresses the use of regional armed forces as the
core for such attacks. Regional units, along with guerrilla
forces, are credited with most of the successes in past attacks;
and in spelling out correct methods to be used, the article pointedly
contrasts the advantages of regional forces over main force units.
In a passage which could reflect limitations on the effectiveness
of troops from the DRV, the article states that the regional armed
forces "are closely bound to their native places" and have an
advantage "over forces coming from far away."
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CONI I.DENT1A], l''CIl3 TRENDS
I JULY 1970
KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY
FANFARE FROM PEKING AND PYONGYANG, ROUTINE MOSCOW OBSERVANCE
LEVEL AND NATURE The 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the
OF CELEBRATIONS Korean War has been celebrated with
propaganda fanfare in Pyongyang and Peking,
while Moscow marked the event in routine fashion.* Pyongyang
opened its propaganda barrage with the release of a lengthy
government memorandum, followed by publicity for a Pyongyang
city rally attended by Premier Kim I1-uorig and addressed by
First Vice Premier Kim I1. Foreign speakers at the rally, in
addition to Prince Sihanouk, included delegates from the PRC,
DRV, South Vietnwn'u PRG, and the Pathet Lao. These delegations
were all received by Kim I1-song for "friendly talks," were
entertained at a DPRK Cabinet banquet attended by Kim Il-song,
and jointly hosted a banquet for Kim in return.
The high level of the observance in Pyongyang is in keeping with
treatment of a decennial anniversary. Kim Il-song does not
normally appear at the annual observances but attended the
rally on the 10th anniversary. There is no known precedent
for the appearance of the foreign delegations in Pyongyang.
Peking's effusive treatment of the anniversary seems in keeping
with the recent warming of Sino-Korean relations and with
Peking's initiative in backing Sihanouk and the Cambodian
"revolution." In the past three years Peking had either totally
ignored the occasion or acknowledged it only cursorily in
brief NCNA reports. Peking's last normal observance of the
anniversary was in 1966, before Sino-Korean relations began
to deterioriate seriously; the occasion was marked with the
usual Peking rally and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial that year.
This year for the first time the Chinese directly linked
commemoration of the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June with
observance of the anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of
Taiwan--dated 27 June by Peking, recalling the U.S. Seventh
* Propaganda on the anniversary will be reviewed in greater
detail in a Supplement to the TRENDS under separate cover.
Treatment of the Taiwan question in anniversary propaganda is
discussed in the Sino-U.S. Relations section of this issue.
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P13IS '.L'RENDS
1 JULY 1970
Plcet'u Interdiction of military actions involving Taiwan by
either the Chinese conununisto or the Nationalists. The two
anniversaries, both ignored from 1967 through 1969, had been
commemorated separately by Peking In the pact. Pyongyang
thiu year followed its customary practice of celebrating
a "day of struggle for the withdrawal of the United States
from South Korea" on 25 June, marking the Taiwan anniversary
with separate observances including a rally on the.27th and
a NODONG SINMUN editorial the same day expressing support for
the PRC's claim to Taiwan.
DPR'C Foreign Minister Pc Song-chol went to Peking to take
part In the anniversary ceremonies there. A lower-ranking
Korean group had gone to Peking for the 15th anniversary.
Pak was received by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao and greeted
with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. He addressed a Peking
rally along with PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and was
entertained at a banquet by Chou En-lai. He also visited
Shanghai and the deputy head of the DPRK delegation went
to Shenyang, both being feted by revolutionary committee
chairmen. Many of China's provinces also held local rallies.
Moscow marked the Korean War anniversary with the usual
rally in the capital addressed by the chairman of the
USSR-DPRK friendship society and by the deputy chairman
of the DPRK-USSR friendship society, who is currently
leading a visiting delegation. The Soviet press and
radio have cnrrie d the customary routine-level comment.
KOREAN The content of Pyongyang's propaganda on the
COMMENT Korean War anniversary is routine in substance.
The DPRK Government memorandum and the other
speeches and propaganda from Pyongyang are replete with
the usual militant formulations blaming the United States
for maneuvering to provoke a "new war," reiterating North
Korea's determination to defend itself, and recalling the
"lessons" of the Korean War. At the same time, the
propaganda reaffirms North Korea's dedication to the notion
of "peaceful" unification, and the government memorandum
reviews Pyongyang's frequently repeated proposals in this
regard. The propaganda also praises the South Korean
"anti-U.S. national salvation struggle," and the usual
"appeal to the South Korean people," calling on them to
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1 JULY 1970
drive out the Americana and overthrow the Pak Chong-hut
"clique," war, adopted at the Pyongyang rally. There are
come references to the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist
party in the South, which Pyongyang had announced on 20 June.
Pyongyang balances its thanks for Chinese support.and the
dispatch of volunteers to fight in the war with thanks to
the USSR and other socialist countries for their aid and
support. Pyongyang avoids anti-Soviet remarks on its own
authority, although it duly reports polemical remarks by
Chinese spokesmen.
Throughout, North Korean as well as Chinese propaganda extolls
the "anti-imperialist united front of the revolutionary
Asian people" encompassing the PRC, DPRK, DRV, PRG, Pathet
Lao, and "liberated" Cambodia--a theme that has become
increasingly prominent in Pyongyang's propaganda, as in
Peking's, since the overthrow of Sihanouk and especially
since Mao 'T'se-tung's 20 May statement on the Indochina
situation.
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- 1.9 -
SIN0-U.S. RELATIONS
FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970
Peking has used the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the
outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan
to reaffirm its determination to recover Taiwan and to put on
record its first comment on the Warsaw talks since the meetings
were resumed this year. While the Chinese have used tough
language to charge the United States with persisting hostility,
they have not exhibited a strong sense of urgency in pledging
the "liberation" of Taiwan p.nd, most notably, have again
expressed their interest in basing PRC-U.S. relations on the
five principles of coexistence. At the same time, the Chinese
have taken the occasion to reassert the primacy of the Taiwan
issue as the crucial obstacle to improved relations with the
United States.
PRC DECRIES U.S. "OCCUPATION" OF TAIWAN ON ANNIVERSARY
Chinese comment during observances jointly marking the Korean
and Taiwan anniversaries* followed routine lines in pledging
the liberation of Taiwan and denouncing the United States for
its alleged intrusions into PRC territory and its support of
the Chiang Kai-shek regime. It was in comment on the Taiwan
anniversary alone that Peking addressed' itself directly to
Sino-U.S. bilateral issues. In addition to low-level NCNA
reports and commentaries in the domestic media, authoritative
comment was made by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, a
Politburo member, who addressed a rally in Pyongyang on
27 June devoted to the Taiwan anniversary. Citing the Warsaw
talks, Huang declared that relaxation of Sino-U.S. relations
is "out of the question" in light of the U.S. refusal to
withdraw its troops from Taiwan and to "cease interference in
China's internal affairs." Since the United States "persists
in making itself the enemy" of the Chinese, he asserted, the
PRC has "no choice but to resolve to deal with it accordingly
to the end." He added that Taiwc.ii "will certainly be liberated."
* Peking dates the outbreak of the Korean War as 25 June and
the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan as 27 June 1950.
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1 JULY 1970
Two NCNA reports sought to-document Peking's charges of U.S.
hostility. On the 27th NCNA recounted the series of "serious
warnings" against U.S. intrusions into PRC territory and
likened President Nixon to his predecessors since Truman as
"Jackals of the same lair" who have "not in the least" changed
the U.S. policy of "aggression toward China." An NCNA
correspondent's report on the 26th, claiming in a similar
vein that the Nixon Administration has persisted in traditional
U.S. policies of "forcible occupation of Taiwan and hostility
to China," took exception to visits to Taiwan by Vice
President Agnew and Secretary Rogers and their reaffirmation
of U.S. treaty commitments to the Nationalist regime. Like
Huang, NCNA brought up the question of relaxation of PRC-U.S.
tensions, dismissing the President's call for improving
relations as "nothing but a trick" to deceive public opinion.
In an unusual allusion to agitation in the United States for
a conciliatory line toward Peking, the report claimed that
the "bankrupt anti-China policy" has become "even more
unpopular" and that this induced the President to assume a
more flexible stance.
Peking's tough approach at the time of the anniversary comports
with its practice of using milestone occasions to restate a
strong case against an adversary and to enhance its image of
"principled" revolutionary militance. Thus Peking's joint
editorial on the 22 April Lenin centenary blasted Soviet
positions across the board, though shortly afterwards the
Chinese signalled their intent so persist in the Sino-Soviet
talks and began an extended period of polemical restraint
toward the Soviets. Moreover, the circumstances. surrounding
the Taiwan anniversary are such as to reinforce Peking's urge
to stake out a hard bargaining position. Peking's current
campaign playing on themes of Asian revolutionary unity
against the U.S. presence, including efforts to associate
the PRC's claim on Taiwan with North Korean and North
Vietnamese aspirations to reunify their countries, dictates
a tough stance toward the United States; at the same time,
the Chinese are being taunted by Moscow for failing to match
their anti-imperialist pretensions with actions to recover
Taiwan and Hong Kong. And as its announcements regarding
the postponed session of the Warsaw talks scheduled for
20 May indicated, Peking finds it expedient to defer
negotiations with Washington during a time of broadened
military activity in Cambodia.
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1 JULY 1970
PEKING CALLS FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH UNITED STATES
Peking's comment on Sino-U.S. relations contains two ideological
cues which point To a. more flexible stance in the long run than
the harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric might suggest. In referring to
the Warsaw talks, Huang Yung-sheng citeC the two principles--
that the United States must withdraw all its troops from Taiwan
and that Sino-U.S. relations must be based on the five
principles of peaceful coexistence--which had.been . formulated
in the 26 November 1968 PRC Foreign Ministry statement
proposing that the talks be resumed after the inauguration
of the Nixon Administration. Introduction of the concept
of peaceful coexistence in that statement represented a
striking shift in Peking's longstanding polemical assault
on the lines of Soviet-U.S. detente. Indicative of Peking's
former position was Chen I's remark, in a speech at a Soviet
embassy reception on 15 February 1965 marking the Sino-Soviet
treaty anniversary, that peaceful coexistence with "U.S.
imperialism" is "out of the question."
Huang's call for peaceful coexistence with the United States
is the first since the November 1968 statement.* In the
first Chinese comment on the Warsaw talks since they were
resumed this year, he has reaffirmed a significant ideological
shift and declared that what is "out of the question" is--in
contrast to Chen I's formulation--relaxation of Sino-U.S.
relations while the United States maintains its military
presence on Taiwan. In defining this as the "crucial" issue
in Sino-U.S. relations, Huang has echoed the earlier
statement's insistence on the primacy of questions of
principle in the negotiations. The November 1968 statement
had been even more explicit in complaining that the United
States has "kept on haggling over side issues" and in
warning that the PRC "will never barter away principles."
In the manner of Huang's remarks, the statement said "no
* A PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 18 Mvy 1969, during a period
in which Peking was taking a notably tough line toward the
United States, derided the President ^r talking "loudly
about so-called 'peaceful coexistence' and [playing] the
trick of sham relaxation."
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FRIL., TRENDS
1 JULY 1970
result whatsoever" would come of the Warsaw talks unless
the United States was willing to tackle issues of principle.*
Peking's comment has shown flexibility in another respect in a
trend away from a portrayal of congruent and collusive Soviet
and U.S. interests to contain China. This contrasts with the
tough line taken by Peking on Sino-U.S. relations last year
which was marked by a stress on themes of collusion between
the PRC's major adversaries. Though the Chinese used the
occasion of the Korean War anniversary this year to take
several digs at the Soviets for their dealings with the
United States and Japan, there has been no attempt to
depict the international environment as being dominated
by joint Soviet-U.S. efforts to "encircle" the PRC. It
may be indicative that in his 27 June speech on the Taiwan
question, in contrast to his 25 June speech at the Pyongyang
rally on the Korean War anniversary, Huang avoided the
anti-Soviet remarks that recurred through other speeches
by the Chinese.
Peking's portrayal of an environment in which U.S. and
Soviet interests diverge at significant points, combined
with calls for peaceful coexistence both with the United
States and with the Soviet Union (in the 7 October 1969
PRC statement announcing agreement to hold border talks),
provides an ideological rationale for the Chinese to take
the negotiating track and to seek to acquire leverage in
the triangular power relationship. The manner in which
Peking left the door open to renewing the Warsaw talks
after the recent postponement reflects an appreciation
of this situation.
ROUTINE CALLS FOR TAIWAN LIBERATION SHOW LITTLE URGENCY
The 20-year milestone in the "occupation" of Taiwan has not
been accompanied by a sense of urgency in Peking's calls
for "liberation." The only note of urgency was put in the
Peking has not mentioned the specific measures and proposals
by the United States to relax tensions. In a characteristic
allusion, NCNA's account on 28 February of the President's
foreign policy report to Congress charged that he talked
"hypocritically about his desire to improve 'relations'
with China," but the account did not cite the President's
references to the Warsaw talks and to unilateral U.S.
measures to normalize relations.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL I013IS TRENDS
1. JULY 1970
mouth of impatient youth, a Red Guard speaking at -chc 25 June
Peking rally commemorating the anniversary. "We.Red Guards,"
the youth proclaimed, "will not tolerate the protracted
occupation" of Taiwan by the United States. Other statements
on the anniversary routinely voiced a determination. to take
over Taiwan without indicating any limits of patience.
Pledges in leaders' speeches to liberate Taiwan were presented
in the name of "the Chinese people," with one exception.
Speaking at a rally in Shenyang on 27 June, Chen Hsi-lien,
one of the military figures on the Politburo, declared that
the PLA as well as the Chinese people are determined to
liberate Taiwan. The PLA's mission in this cause was given
explicit sanction when the Chinese last marked the occasion,
in 1966. A LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial at that time
termed the liberation of Taiwan the PLA's "sacred duty."
A rally held in Foochow on 27 June was attended by commanders
of the PLA Fukien Front units--the troops standing opposite
Taiwan. In the principal address, a provincial revolutionary
committee official declared that the "Chinese people" are
determined to liberate.Taiwan. Alluding to the province's
strategic location, the speaker said the Fukien people
would build the southeastern coast into "an iron bastion"
and would "wipe out all enemy intruders and drive U.S.
imperialism out of Taiwan." NCNA's report on the rally
said it was followed by a mammoth demonstration by troops,
civilians, "and fully armed militiamen at the front line"
of the coastal defense. There was no reference to a PLA
role in liberating Taiwan.
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CONF1DEATiAL
.I JULY 1970
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
LOW-VOLUME SOVIET COMMENT ON SALT CONTINUES ATTACKS ON LAIRD
Mouccw cont.inucn to treat the utruLe is arms :Limitation talks
(;;ALT) in Vienna in a low volume of propaganda and to date hau
failed to acknowledge the return of the top U.S. ncgotiutoru to
Washington for consultations on 22 Junne. ComrncnLurie a by
Matveycv and Stolpovskiy, however, react, to Cccretary Laird'u
remarks at recent NATO meetings in Venice and Brussels on
SALT and on the existence of' a Soviet thrra.t.
The Matveyev article, oiened to the press on 17 June and
appearing in LIFE AI3ROAD (No. 25, 19-25 June), sustains the
Soviet attack against Laird as the chief opponent of a
relaxation of t.!nsion. Matveycv expresses; concern over a
U.S. press report that Laird spoke at the NATO meetings of a
time limit on the Vienna talks and said it is possible the
United States "will have to take 'harsh and difficult decisions'
about new strategic armaments after July 1972 or in the second
half of 1973 should the Vienna talks break down." These are
"strange" words, Matveycv says, since Secretary Rogers recently
said the negotiations were continuing "in a normal and business-
like atmosphere" and President Nixon had earlier expressed the
conviction that the talks would culminate in an agreement.
Matveyev charges that Laird is in effect "resorting to blackmail
formulas" with his talk about a "'breakdown'" in the
negotiations.
In an international review article in TRUD on the 16th,
Stolpovskiy attacked Laird in a similar vein for playing up
the "fable" of a Soviet threat and setting a "time limit"
for the Vienna talks. Like Matveyev, Stolpovskiy emphasized
the sincerity of the Soviet quest for disarmament.
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(;t)IIFII) 1.;tl'I'IAI F IS1;; '1'11 h;iI!):;
I III1,Y .I')'~O
EUROPEAN SECURITY
PACT DOCUMENT BREAKS NEW GROUND ON CONFERENCE MAKEUP, AGENDA
'!'he nu'morandurn of the Jute rnc'rt,.1.t of Warsaw Pact foreign
mirrlutcr; in Ittulapet;L, rcleatfcd on the formalizes the bid
for U.; and Cturndl.an participation in the proposed Europea,rr
security conference t.hi.r,t, had been an(.lcIpated by Moscow's public
endorucmenI, of American par Licipation In .January. The memorandum,
which a communique on the meeting Lhrce dayu earlier had said
would be "comrntiwrlcatcd to Lhe governments of all interested
c)tatcu," also expander the agenda for the conference proposed by
the fact foreign ministers last October- in Prague. Like the
Prague declaration, the memorandum suggests Helsinki as the
site for the conference.
U.S., CANADIAN The memorandum declares that every European
PARTICIPATION state, the two Germanies Included, as well
as the United States and Canada can take
part in the conference on a basis of equality. It also drops
the previously standard reference to an "all-European" or "pan-
European conference."
The Pact foreign ministers' declaration in October had seemed
to leave the possibility of U.S. participation open, stating
that t' 're matter of participants could be solved with good will.
Prior Pact documents had registered a long history of vacilla-
tion and ambiguity on the U.S. role. While some formulations
seemed to exclude the United States, the Bucharest declaration
of July 1966--following a Pact Political Consultative Committee
meeting--asserted the Pact's readiness to take part in a
conference at a time convenient "to the other interested states,
both members of NATO and neutrals," and observed that "countries
on other continents cannot be indifferent to how things develop
in Europe."
The Soviet Union's own equivocation and ambivalence on the
issue was finally resolved on 13 January 1970, when a foreign
ministry spokesman said Moscow had informed Washington "of its
favorable attitude to the participation of the United States
in an all-European conference" and added that this view was
shared by the other socialist states. Subsequent Soviet
propaganda, however, only infrequently broached the possibility
of U.S. participation. Followup comment on the 26 June
memorandu..i now gives play to the invitation to the United States
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r'orlP'lUI;II'IA1, FIiIi; 'L'IIP;NU,;
1. ,JULY 1070
runt ( rnacla, r.I hough at, .Lcntrt, two notnuu.!nttttor?u--MrtyuVUltly and
reupcc:t Lvcl_?y--ul. ti I.
110clk.1yurlu-1.kov In 1'1(AVt)A oil :18 and 30 -111tiv,
III;(, tho teruru "rt.L L-I;urol)enn" and ")rttn-(;tu opcrtrr" Ill r?efcrcnce
to thr Irrol_roucd Coll l'r.rencc.
AGENDA P;ndoru ing the two-point agenda propoucd at the,
October Prague meetLng, renurrclatJon of the use of
force and the broadening o(' economic and other tics, the
:rc,tnorcurdum propoueu that the second point be supplemented
by discussion of problems of the human environment and the
development of cultural rel.utlonu. "Prompted by the dcuire
to have every state agree on the agenda," the memorandum
continues, the Pact member states now propose a third agenda
item--diucuuuion of "the cutabliu}unent of a body concerned
with questions of European security and cooperation." I3rczhnev
had hinted at the new item in his 1.2 June election speech when
he stated, in discussing the European security conference
proposal, that "the nations concc-rncd could set up also some
sort of a permanently functioning mechanists for the practical
elaboration and implementation of concerted measures."
Brezhnev's remark seemed at the time to be responsive to a
proposal advanced by the British at the 26-27 May NATO foreign
ministers' meeting In Rome for creation of a permanent
commission at the ambassadorial level for talks between NATO
and Pact states. Participants in the 28 June domestic service
roundtable now make a point of the differences between the
memorandum's proposal and "the superficially similar proposal
by Britain" at the Rome meeting. The British plan, they say,
calls for a "bloc approach" which would allow only token
representation from nonalined European states, while the
Pact is suggesting that "all European countries without
exception take part in this organ." Moreover, the commentators
add, the British plan calls for the creation of a mechanism
before the conference is convened, seeking thereby to "postpone"
the conference.
Concern to counter the appearance of direct Pact responsiveness
to a NATO initiative seems reflected also in Soviet comment on
the issue of mutual force cuts. The memorandum states that in
the Pact members' view, "it would help to lessen tension and
promote security in Europe if the reduction of foreign armed
forces on the territory of European states were discussed,"
either in the newly proposed permanent body "or in other ways
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1. JULY 19',70
acceptable to the utatcu concerned." The NATO proposal for mutual
and balruiced force reductions in Europe, long under fire from
Moscow, in unmentioned in the memorandum but broached in
followup propaganda. A panelist in the commentators' roundtable
chow on the 27th, remarking that the NATO meeting in Home had
urged that the question of a balanced force reduction "head"
the work of a European conference, grantu that the question is
"important" but goes on to argue that it in connected with the
"whole complex of disarmament" and is "beyond the framework of
European security alone."
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UONl 1DLN'1'JA1, f'13IU 'PHENUS
11 .1ULY 1.9'r0
MID1)LE EAST
MOSCOW RESTRAINED ON NEW U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE
Moscow has responded cautiously to Secret' ry Rogers' 25 June
preuu conference announcement of a U.S. political initiative to
encourage the parties "to stop uhootini, arid start talking" under
the auspices of U Thant's representative, Ambassador Jarring.
Limited Soviet comment cites Arab and West European press reac-
tion in concluding that the propouuls--which Rogers did not spell
out in detail--contain nothing new wton compared with the U.S.
proposals of last December. Soviet propagandists make a point of
professing no direct knowledge of the substance of the plan and
do not acknowledge that Rogers said it had been presented to the
USSR, among other countries.
U.S. ARMS In the 28 June domestic service commentators' round-
TO ISRAEL table, one of the participants remarked that "our Arab
colleagues are evidently informed about some of the
points" in the U.S. proposal, out "so far those ii. the rest of the
world can only guess at its content." One participant observed
that Washington was experiencing pressure from American political
leaders for stepped-up "interference on behalf of Israel" while
at the same time open aid to Israel "angers a whole host of states"
and makes this policy "risky." Another expressed hope that the
new U.S. initiative is not merely a smokescreen to cover up suppl;es
of "of.iensive weapons" to Israel. The fact that the United States
"is preparing some kind of peaceful initiative" and at the same time
saying that a new consignment of arms will be sold to Israel "right-
ly puts one on guard," he said, and "makes one regard talk about
this new peaceful initiative with a certain amount of caution.
Time alone will tell." Other Soviet comment suggests that the
United States intends to continue material support to Israel, but
from now on as "covertly as possible."
Promptly reporting the Secretary's press conference, TASS notes
that he said U.S. policy with respect to Israel remains unchanged
and that he declined to answer questions on further deliveries of
U.S. military equipment to Israel, saying it would not be useful
to publicly discuss military aid at this time.
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CON1011) 1,:N'1.'1 AL, i"BIt.; PH NDS
1 JULY 19'(0
WITHDRAWAL Comment touching on the U.S. Initiative continues
to press for Israeli withdraws-1 from "all" occupied
tcrr.itorics.. I3roadcactu in Arabic on the 25th and in English to
North Aitirica on the 36th said that judging by Secretary Rogers'
utatement, Washington still objects to the unconditional withdrawal
of luraell forces from the occupied territories, although this is
the "main proviuion" of the November 1967 '.iccurity Council resolu-
tion. The latter broadcast also asserted that the Secretary
"reduced the question of a political settlement" to a 'temporary
cease-fire and tied a settlement to Arab-Israeli negotiations.
A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 26th said one "looks
in vain" for an answer to the "essential question" of whether the
United States considers that the withdrawal of "all Israeli
troops from all occupied Arab territories" is necessary for
reestablishing peace. As long as Washington delivers arms to
Israel and does not "unequivocally announce" that the road to
peace lies in an Israeli obligation for complete withdrawal,
Tsoppi concluded, neither the Arabs nor international opinion
will believe in the sincerity of U.S. intentions or its initia-
tive. Citing Nasir on the subject of withdrawal, both TASS on
the 26th and IZVESTIYA on the 28th reported that the UAR President
in his 25 June speech in Benghazi, "speaking about the 'new
American proposals,'" stressed that the Egyptian people would
not agree to any bargaining over the question of Israeli with-
drawal. (In the speech as broadcast live by Bayda radio, Nasir
in fact did not specifically mention the U.S. initiative, re-
ferring only to "what has been reiterated today about agree-
ments for evacuation from the occupied territories excluding
the Golan.")
ARAB The Moscow Arabic-language commentary on the 25th
CcDMMENT declared that the first reaction to the Secretary's
statement was one of "severe criticism" and that
the Palestinian resistance organizations "rejected it completely."
However, in reviewing Arab press comment on the 26th and 27th,
TASS said merely that the papers note the "ambiguity of the
statement" and cited Cairo press complaints that any proposals
not envisaging the return of all occupied territories will not
lead to the establishment of peace.
A Mayevskiy review in PRAVDA on the 28th attributed to the Arab
press the view that the "backstage" U.S. Proposals again put the
aggressor and his victim on the same footing and signify attempts
to weaken Arab anti-Americanism and to undermine Soviet-Arab
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CONV1.DI,1N'C.CAli 1.'131 TR ND:3
]. JULY 19'(0
friendship, to justify armu del:lver:leu to :lurucl, and to -place
rerponuibility for the continuation of the crisis on the Arabs
and the Soviet Union.
NASIR ARRIVES IN MOSCOW FOR "FRIENDLY VISIT"
UAR President Nasir's unheralded arrival in Moscow on 29 June for
a "friendly visit" is hailed in Soviet comment as an event of
great significance for UAR-Soviet solidarity, cooperation, and
"cordial relations.'k Reporting his arrival at the invitation
of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium,
and the Soviet Government, 'PASS noted that Nasir "plans to
stay in Moscow for several days."
Reporting the first session of the talks on the 30th, TASS
listed Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, Ponomarev, Gromyko, and
Grechko among those present on the Soviet side and ASU Execu-
tive Committee member Ali Sabri, Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad,
War Minister Fawzi, and National Guidance Minister Haykal among
those on the UAR side. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) noted
on the 29th that Muhammad Riyad, minister at the UAR foreign
ministry, would be arriving from New York to join the delegation.
MENA said the talks would center on the Middle East problem,
particularly developments resulting from Israel's "refusal to
implement" the November 1967 Security Council resolution. The
talks, MENA added, would also deal with the recent U.S. plan:
The Soviet role in this respect "will be mainly to hear the
UAR's views." TASS did not mention the U.S. initiative in report-
ing that the first day's talks, held "in an atmosphere of cordia-
lity and complete mutual understanding," concerned bilateral rela-
tions as well as an "all-round exchange of views" on the M.1.sdle
East situation and a discussion of "some other important problems"
of the present international situation.
SPEECH by Speaking at a 30 Ju.ie banquet for Nasir, Podgornyy
PODGORNYY called for settlement of the Middle East conflict
on the basis of the November 1967 Security Council
resolution, "with due account for the legitimate rights and
interests of all peoples of the area," phraseology signifying
* Apart from his visit to the Soviet Union in January this year,
never publicly acknowledged by either side, Nasir's last formal
visit to Moscow was in early July 1968; he returned for medical
treatment in Soviet Georgia from 26 July to 17 August that year.
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CONI"IUL:NTiAL 1"l310' T! END .3
1 JULY 19'(0
Israel's right to exist. lie did not take the occasion to repeat
the propaganda refrain that the resolutiork calls for Israeli
withdrawal, although he went on to note that the "Israeli
extremists" still occupy Arab territories and "drag out" a
settlement.
Expressing conviction that a "just political settlement" will
be achieved, Podgornyy cited as "guarantees" the "strengthening
eco.%iomic and defense potential" of the UAR and other Arab states,
growing Arab unity, and the "aid and all-round support" of the
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. He pledged
continued Soviet help to the Arab countries in their struggle
"to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression" and
attain a just and lasting peace, adding that there was "every
ground to express satisfaction" over the friendly relations
between the USSR and the UAR. Assessing the UAR's "progressive
development," Podgornyy stated that "there are and possibly still
will be obstacles," but these can be overcome "if the correct
road of development" is 'hosen and if "one leans on sincere and
reliable friends."
BILATERAL Soviet commentators predictably emphasize Soviet
RELATIONS solidarity with the Arabs and assistance to the
UAR. A Koryavin article in IZVESTIYA on the 29th
points to economic projects which have become symbols of Soviet-
Egyptian friendship, and a Tsoppi. foreign-language commentary
the same day stresses in addition the "anti-imperialist" content
of the "political task" to which development is subordinated.
While Tsoppi notes only in passing that the UAR has "restored
its defense potential," a 29 June commentary in Arabic focuses
more on the improvements in Egyptian defense. The UAR, it
says, has managed to rebuild its defense power quickly and
"move to the stage of active defense." The commentary adds
that Tel Aviv been compelled to abandon its bombing of
UAR positions in the rear and is being "appropriately repelled"
in its attacks in the Suez Canal area: Soviet-UAR cooperation
has helped make the UAR defense "invulnerable to the enemy"
and a "new basic situation" has been created in which the anti-
Arab forces have been forced to resort to "donning the garb of
peace advocates."
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Perhaps the most explicit Soviet reference to the nature of
Moscow's military assistance to the UAR is made by NOVOSTI poli-
tical commentator Vadim Ardatovskiy, in an article printed !n
the Beirut DAILY STAR on 21 Juno but not carried in monito. ,ed
Soviet media. Ardatovskiy says ouch assistance has consis *,ed of
"antiaircraft defense equipment and interceptor aircraft, both
means of defense." With regard to the presence in the UAP, of
what Kosygin on 4 May called "our military advisers," thi, NOVOSTI
commentator explains that if the technical. level of the UAR and
the Soviet Union is taken into account, "the presence of special-
ists to teach men how to handle the supplied means of defense is
perfectly natural." Rejecting the possibility of an Arab-
Israeli truce, Ardatovskiy declares that the "only thing possible
is peace," the establishment of which would have a favorable
effect on "the general complex of international relations and
the relations between the great powers as well as between the
Soviet Union and the United States."
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U,S, - JAPAN SECURITY TREATY
TREATY EXTENSION OCCASIONS NEW WARNINGS OF THREAT TO PEACE
The long-anticipated automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty at midnight 22 June drew renewed propaganda blasts against
the treaty from Moscow and the Asian communist countries, with
authoritative signed comment in the Soviet central press,
editorials from Peking and Hanoi, and a government statement
from Pyongyang.
MOSCOW'S Moscow propaganda for the most part recapitulates
REACTION themes prominent at the time of Japan's basic
decision last October to extend the duration of
the treaty. The prolongation of the pact is said to serve. U.S.
plans to use Japan as a tool in an aggressive Asian policy,
creating a threat to Asian security and redounding chiefly to
the detriment of the Japanese people's own interests.
A 23 June article by PRAVDA's Mayevskiy adds a new dimension in
picturing "the American people" as also threatened by a pact that
abets the revival of Japanese militarism. Mayevskiy, who also
authored the most authoritative Soviet comment on the treaty in
October, argues that the American people's interests are being
harmed by the efforts of U.S. "imperialist circles," under cover
of the treaty, to "build up Japanese revanchism" just as they
encouraged "German militarism" after World War I and "are doing
now" in West Germany.
Mayevskiy pursues standard lines in linking the extension of the
treaty with a U.S. desire to turn Japan "into a center for
implementing the 'Guam doctrine' and into a gendarme of Asia"
as part of a scheme to make Asians fight Asians. Japan's
territory is being used now, he says, "for the development of
the U.S. intervention in Indochina." This charge recurs in
other Soviet comment.
In IZVESTIYA on 23 October, Kudryavtsev depicts a threat to the
Soviet Union inherent in U.S.-Japanese military cooperation--a
theme raised in the central press in PRAVDA's 16 December 1969
editorial article a month after the Nixon-Sato talks and broached
recurrently before and since that time primarily in Moscow
broadcasts to Japan. Kudryavtsev says U.S. bases maintained on
Japanese soil under the terms of the treaty are "spearheaded
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against the Soviet Union and other neighbors" and asserts that
"it would be naive" to suppose that such a situation "does not
hamper the further development of good-neighborly relations
between the Soviet Union and Japan." The notion that Soviet
security interests are menaced is also brought up in a routine-
level broadcast to Southeast Asia and in several commentaries
tailored for the Japanese.
Moscow sustains the practice of attacking Japanese "ruling
circles" and avoids criticizing Prime Minister Sato personally.
CHINESE Peking, assailing the "reactionary Sato government,"
COMMENT has played on current themes of Asian communist unity
with charges that the treaty constitutes a provocation
against the peoples of China, Korea, and Indochina as well as
against the Japanese themselves. PEOPLE'S DAILY's 23 June
editorial calls the "unequal" treaty "an indentured selling out"
of Japanese sovereignty and national interests, "a chain biLtding
Japan to the chariot of U.S. imperialist aggression," and a
"serious threat," to peace in Asia and the pacific. Alleging that
U.S. military bases in Japan are used to launch provocations
against Indochina, China, and Korea, the editorial says the treaty
extension "is meant primarily to suit the urgent needs of U.S.
imperialism" and can only bring "calamity" for Japan. It sees
abolition of the treaty and overthrow of "the forces of Japanese
militarism" as the only way out for the Japanese.
Support for efforts by the Japanese people to abolish the treaty
had been expressed in a communique--carried by NCNA on the 20th--
on talks between delegations of the Fishery Association of China
and the Japan-China Fishery Association. The communique called
the Sato government's decision to extend the treaty a serious
provocation against the Japanese people and against "the peoples
of China, Korea, Indochina, and Asia as a whole." On 25 June,
speaking at a banquet for a visiting North Korean delegation,
Chou En-lai mentioned the treaty extension briefly in charging
that the Sato government "has become even more unbridled in its
reactionary arrogance."
As in October when the decision to extend the treaty was made
known, Peking media featured accounts of protest rallies and
demonstrations in Japan.
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PYONGYANG Typically egocentric North Korean reaction is expressed
STATEMENT in the DPRK Government statement of 19 June and in an
echoing NODONG SINMUN editorial of the 22d, both of
which call Korea the treaty's "primary target of aggression."
Decrying the "vicious maneuvers" of Japan and the United States to
reinforce their alliance "against the socialist countries and the
national liberation movement in Asia and jointly expand aggressive
war throughout Asia," the government statement calls the
extension of the treaty "a grave challenge to peace in Asia
and the world" and charges the Japanese "militarists" with
aggressive designs on China and North Vietnam as well as Korea.
The Korean people, the editorial says, "cannot watch with folded
arms" the "outright challenge to the Korean people and wanton
attack on peace in Asia and the world" represented by the treaty
extension.
DRV COMMENT A 23 June editorial in Hanoi's NHAN DAN denounces
the treaty extension as "an important landmark
in the history of criminal collaboration between aggressive U.S.
imperialism and Japanese militarist imperialism" and as "a
dangerous development" which "holds a great danger for the
Japanese people as well as for peace and security in Asia."
Among several items carried by VNA surrounding the date of the
treaty's extension was a 24 June report on a Hanoi meeting of
several' organizations in support of Japanese action to secure
abrogation of the treaty. VNA quoted Mme Le Thi Xuyen, a
functionary of the Vietnam Peace Committee, as saying the treaty
was "chiefly intended to oppose the Soviet Union and the Asian
socialist countries and counter the national liberation movement
in Asia."
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LATIN AMERICA
HAVANA APPLAUDS TACTICS OF URBAN GUERRILLAS IN URUGUAY
Recent Cuban comment on the "Tupamaros," a Uruguayan urban
guerrilla organization has gone beyond routine praise for
the group's military exploits to allege that its tactics are
exemplary and are being used by revolutionaries throughout
the southern cone of South America. Havana now also suggests
that the Tupamaros, viewing their revolutionary activities in
a continental context, are prepared to coordinate their actions
with revolutionary groups in neighboring countries.
Cuban media's treatment of the Tupamaros accords with Castro's
newly flexible approach to revolutionary strategy, modifying
prior insistence on rural-based guerrilla warfare as virtually
the only path to continental "liberation." The Cuban leader's
new flexibility was crystallized in his Lenin Day speech on
22 April when he remarked that there have never been "two
identical cases" in history and commented, with respect to
revolutions, that "new possibilities and new ways are being
born." The emergent new approach had been reflected over the
past two years in Havana media's favorable publicity for 'rban-
based guerrilla activities. In now ascribing an exemplary
character to the Tupamaros, Havana comment pictures the group
as inspired by the Cuban revolution and by the writings of
Che Guevara.
TUPAMAROS the portrayal of the Tupamaros as a model for other
AS MODEL revolutionaries has been drawn most clearly in the
Cuban communist youth organ JUVENTUD REBELDE, in
a front-page commentary on 8 June and in an article in the same
issue by Uruguayan leftist journalist Carlos Maria Gutierrez.
Applauding the Tupamaros' "tactical ability," the commentary
alleged that their tactics have been adopted "in various parts
of the southern cone: the great port cities of Argentina, Chile,
and southern Brazil." Citing a forecast in the New York TIMES
in January 1969 that Uruguay and the Tupamaros would become the
United States' major problem in Latin America, the commentary
alleged that this "fact" had now been "verified." The Tupamaros'
"contagiousness," JUVENTUD REBELDE said, had been a matter of
concern of U.S. "experts" for some time, and the New York TIMES
had warned that the Uruguayan urban guerrillas could trigger "a
new Vietnam."
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Gutierrez' article, outlining the Tupamaros' strategy, noted
that the orgaaization advocated if coordination of a liberation
struggle for all Latin America"--a struggle which must be
waged "without respecting the sometimes artificial borders
imposed by the Balkanization of the colonial era or by imperial-
ism."
The JUVENTUD REBELDE commentary did not elaborate on how
revolutionaries in neighboring countries had been influenced
by the Tupamaros. A 22 November 1969 Radio Havana commentary,
however, was more specific. It declared that such groups as
the Brazilian revolutionaries who kidnapped U.S. Ambassador
Elbrick last September and the Chilean Leftist Revolutionary
Movement, which has recently engaged in armed actions, owe
"a moral debt" to the Tupamaros for having "started a new form
of struggle" within the cities.
INSPIRATION The Gutierrez article emphasized the Tupamaros'
FROM HAVANA ideological affinity with Havana, stating that
their "tactical concepts" have been "most
influenced" by "the example of the Cuban revolution and . . .
the theoretical works of Che Guevara." He observed that in
subscribing to a coordinated continental revolutionary struggle,
the Tupamaros "agree with the thesis" of the Latin American
Solidarity Organization (LASO), an organization founded in
Havana in 1967 which now appears to be moribund.
Gutierrez said the Tupamaros group advocates "creation of
armed groups prior to the appearance of proper conditions for
armed struggle" and believes that "revolutionary action in
itself . . . generates awareness, organization, and revolution-
ary conditions." This thesis in fact parallels one that Castro
articulated prior to the debacle suffered by Che Guevara's
Bolivian venture in 1967. Gutierrez went on to m&intain, in
opposition to the orthodox Latin American communist view, that
proper revolutionary-conditions are not a necessary prerequisite
to launching an armed struggle because the struggle itself will
generate the necessary "subjective" conditions.
The question of possible Cuban material aid to the Tupamaros
has never been broached directly in Havana propaganda. A leaf-
let distributed by the Tupamaros after carrying out an assault
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on the city of 1'ando on U October, in honor of the: annivcruary
of Che Guevara'u death, was quoted by 11fiENUA LATINA on 1'( October
as stating: "We take from the enemy the weapons we need. We do
nit seek funds from abroad with which to finance our revolution.
We take from our enemies the money we need to act up our revolu-
tionary apparatus." P1iENSA LATINA's correopondcnt in Montevideo,
however, adviucd hiu Havana office in an information dispatch on
18 June of "quite an objective study" of the Tupamarou in the
Brazilian press which stated that "many Tupamaros cadres, several
dozen, . . . went to Cuba and were duly trained."
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HARDLINERS DENOUNCE DUBCEK: HUSAK HINTS AT TRIAL
Following has final expulsion from the Czechoslovak Communist
Party, arrnourrccd In a Central Committee plenum resolution on
._6 June, Alexander Dubcek has been subjected to vicious public
attacks by hardlining CI'CZ Secretariat members Miroulav Moc
and Alois .1ndra. First Secretary Iluoak, while refraining from
ouch direct attacks, huu pointedly utrusucd that the pvrt-y
has been too lenient until now in punishing "violators."
The Central Committee, according to CTK's excerpts of the plenum
resolution, "confirmed the expulsion of Alexander Dubcek from
the ranks of members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia"--
from which he raid previously been "suspended"--as well as "his
recall from the post of deputy of the House of the People and
recall from his post as Czechoslovak ambassador to Turkey."
The party dramatized the expulsion by making it the only major
party personnel action of the session; the only other shift of
any consequence was the elevation of CSSR Deputy Premier
Miloslav Hruskovic to the rank of CPCZ Secretary.
ATTACKS BY RUDE PRAVO Chief Editor Moc, writing in the issue
MOC.. INDRA of the 29th, descends to the level of charging
that Dubcek "failed to fulfill his duties ensuing
from his position as Czechoslovak ambassador abroad." Moc calls
the expulsion "only a logical consummation of Dubcek's violation
of party rules" and his "double-faced policy"--an epithet here-
tofore applied only to Smrkovsky--and adds such charges as
"ideological capitulation," "capitulation to counterrevolutionary
forces," and "responsibility for violating internationalist
relations and the alliance with the CPSU" and its allies. Moc
concludes with a warning that "we shall not allow antisocialist
forces to decide that Dubcek's expulsion concludes another
chapter."
A 29 June CTK report quotes CPCZ Presidium candidate and Secretary
Indra as telling a party aktiv in Usti nad Labem that the plenum
"made a definitive full-stop to the case of Alexander Dubcek,
whose responsibility for the disastrous developments in the
years 1968 and 1969 has been fully proved after thorough party
investigation." A briefer account of Indra's speech carried
in the Prague domestic service the same day, however, does not
include the direct attack on Dubcek.
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COMMENTS L'peakiug at a peace rally in Brno-Linen on the
BY HUSAK 28t?h, curried live in the Prague domestic service,
Gustav Iluoak manifested his greatest sensitivity
to date to "Western" opposition to the CPCZ's hardline course
as exemplified by the plenum actioc. against Dubcck. lie assured
his listeners that nobody need fear "for his own security, even
though the people from thci West continuously talk about what
trials we would hold in our country and what terror we are
making here." But he aC,led that "we have been in certain cases
too generous toward certain people" who "do not deserve such
generosity an we have displayed in the past year." In a
transparent allusion to his former Presidium colleague Dubcek,
liusak invoked a saying by the Stalinist Gottwald: "Brother
or not, come down from the pear tree," declaring in this
context that "the weight of the law will strike the violator
of the law and this could not, as a matter of fact, be other-
wise."
The CPCZ Presidium report delivered by Husak at the 25 June
session of the Central Committee plenum, printed in full in
RUDE PRAVO on the 27th, is relatively moderate overall. It
decries "manifestations of liberalism and of a conciliatory
attitude" in interviews connected with the "exchange of party
cards," a recurrent theme of recent Prague propaganda. It also
claims successes in overcoming the 1968-69 depredatinns of the
"rightist opportunists" in political affairs, the communications
media, the economy, and foreign affairs.
In what is apparently his major public rationale for the recall
of Dubcek as ambassador to Turkey, Husak declares: "The
exper'_nce of 1968 showed that the implementation of the
party line in the field of external political and commercial
relations can be ensured only by people who stand firmly on the
position of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and
who are personally convinced of the correctness of the party
policy. This must be a permanent lesson for us."
ITALIAN. BRITISH COMMUNISTS "REGRET" DUBCEK EXPULSION
The ouster of Dubcek, reported without comment by the Soviet
radio and central press, has drawn prompt public condemnation
from two West European communist parties.
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In the 27 June issue of the Italian CP'O L'UNITA, party Secretary
General Longo declared: "We regret and deplore the expulsion."
He commented that such actions cannot contribute in a positive
way to solving the political situation in Czechoslovakia. On
29 June, under the heading "Deep Regret at Expulsion of Dubcek,"
the British CP's MORNING STAR recalled "Comrade" Dubcek's "long
service to the party and the cause of socialism, including his
role in the anti-Ilitler struggle." Tak'ag dote of Longo's
statement in L'UNITA on the expulsion, MORNING STAR added a
reminder that Dubcek's contribution to eradicating the "deforma-
tions" of Novotny had been "publicly acknowledged by the new
leadership" of the Czechoslovak party.
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YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR
RIBICIC MOSCOW VISIT REFLECTS IMPROVEMENT IN STATE RELATIONS
Yugoslav Premier Ribicic's 24-30 June visit to Moscow--the
first high-level official Yugoslav visit to the Soviet Union
since the intervention in Czechoslovaki a--underscores mutual
efforts to improve relations on the state level despite
continuing serious differences in ideology, interparty
relations, and foreign policy.
Soviet assurances that the 1955 Belgrade declaration and
other documents on relations between the two governments are
still valid constitute a further attempt to repair the damage
done to relations with Yugoslavia by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.*
Moscow's moves to improve its ties with Belgrade have coincided
with efforts to counter Chinese attempts to gain leverage in
Eastern Europe. Belgrade and Peking have been normalizing
economic and diplomatic ties in recent months. The development
of Moscow's conciliatory posture also camps at a time when
preparations are underway for the thii'_t. nonalined summit in
Lusaka in September, when the Yugoslavs may be expected to
reiterate their traditional antipathy to power blocs; Moscow
may hope to forestall or mitigate use of the meeting as a
forum for censure of Soviet policies specifically.
The Yugoslavs, for their part, appear willing to mute their
criticism of Soviet policies and to play down areas of discord
in exchange for improved economic relations with the Soviet
Union and its allies.
COMMUNIQUE ON TALKS The 30 June communique on Ribicic's.
WITH SOVIET LEADERS visit, which included. talks with
Kosygin and Po igornyy, reasserts the
principles of "respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity,
equality, noninterference in each other's affairs, and mutual
respect." The existence of "certain differences of approach
to certain questions," the document says, "should not hinder
* During his September 1969 visit to Belgrade, Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko gave similar assurances of Soviet adherence to
the 1955 Belgrade declaration.
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the development of normal and friendly mutual relations." Both
sides registered a desire to develop further economic cooperation
and stressed "the importance of joint efforts to formulate a new
five-year trade agreement for the 1971-75 period."
Describing the atmosphere of the talks as "frank and friendly,"
the communique adds that views were "exchanged" on bilateral
relations, political and economic cooperation, and "urgent
international problems." Pointing to areas of agreement on
foreign policy, it records joint support for the Vietnamese
and all Indochinese peoples and condemns Israe14 "aggressive"
actions. It also reaffirms both sides' support for a European
security conference. and notes the "great importance" both attach
to improving relations with West Germany.
Obscuring the areas of disagreement, the communique says merely
that the Yugoslav Government '.'acquainted" the Soviet side with
the principles of its nonalinement policy and the importance
of the forthcoming Lusaka summit. The document predictably
ignores the sensitive issue of China and steers clear of any
reference to interparty relations. Premier Kosygin, the
document concludes, has accepted an invitation to visit
Belgrade at a date to be fixed later.
KOSYGIN, RIBICIC A mutual desire to seek further cooperation
LUNCHEON SPEECHES despite persisting differences was also
the central theme of speeches by Kosygin
and Ribicic at a luncheon in Moscow on 24 June. The Soviet
Premier, as quoted by Radio Moscow on 24 June, called for
"comradely discussion of all questions to enable us to
remove by joint effort all that hampers the development
of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation." He.went on to point "with
satisfaction" to the "closeness or coincidence" of views
between the two countries on European security, the Middle
East, and Indochina. He concluded by assuring the Yugoslavs
that the USSR is "firmly resolved to continue to be guided"
by the principles of "socialist internationalism, -equality,
mutual respect, and noninterference in the domestic affairs
of others."
In a similar vein, the Yugoslav Premier expressed . a. readiness
for improved Soviet-Yugoslav relations but made it clear
that this could not occur at the expense of Belgrade's
independent, nonalined policy. In his remarks as reported
in PRAVDA on the 25th, he acknowledged that "certain
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differences" remain between the two countries, advocating
further talks as the best way to promote understanding and
laying particular emphasis on Belgrade's desire to?intensify
economic cooperation. He went on to declare that the
"criteria" for such cooperation must be "mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference,
and equality."' Predictably, he made no mention of "socialist
internationalism.
Without naming any countries, but with Belgrade!s conspicously
improved relations with Peking and the forthcoming Lusaka
summit clearly in the background, Ribicic emphasized that
to pursue good relations with "all" countries. In an apparent
dig at Moscow's Indochina policy, he pointed out that
Yugoslavia had supported the Vietnamese people from the
beginning and has recognized the new Sihanouk government as
well as the PRG in South Vietnam. Although he went on to
cite 'ietnam as confirmation that "no outside force can
crush the resistance of a people struggling for their
freedom and independence," the implications of his remark
for the Soviets seemed obvious.
as a socialist and nonaline,L' state Yugoslavia will continue
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
BREZNNEVIS WAR ROLE PLAYED UP BY OGONEK, OTHERWISE IGNORED
The mass-circulation magazine OGONEK, in its issue dated 13 June,
published an article on a 12 May reunion of World War II veterans
of the 18th Soviet Army. The author is Col. S.A. Borzenko,
formerly a reporter with the 18th Army and in recent years
Brezhnev's most faithful panegyrist. True to form, Borzenko
devoted the bulk of his article to Brezhnev, who attended the
reunion; he lauded especially Brezhnev's role in the
Novorossiysk operation, the only battle in which Brezhnev was
prominently involved.
Recalling Brezhnev's presence in the thick of the Novorossiysk
battle, Borzenko declared that
the entire army, from commander to private, knew
Brezhnev; he was their favorite, he knew their
attitudes and thoughts and was able to kindle
their desire for victory. How many times the
will of this man made the impossible possible!
At the most critical moments of the battle he
found fiery words which had a quick and powerful
effect. On the beachhead the chief of the
political department cemented the steadfastness
of the troops and more than once displayed
personal bravery and iron coolness.
The article was accompanied by a picture of Brezhnev surrounded
by the other veterans.
The OGONEK article was, however, unique, and as on other similar
occasions in past years the central press in general passed up
the opportunity to try to build up Brezhnev's wartime role. The
only other lengthy report on the reunion, in LITERARY GAZETTE
on 3 June, contained no praise for Brezhnev, although it did
refer several times to his leading role at the meeting. RED
STAR on 13 May reported the meeting in three paragraphs, noting
that Brezhnev was present. The other central papers did not
report on the reunion at all.
In September 1968, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of
the Novorossiysk operation, OGONEK carried an article that played
up Brezhnev's wartime role in similar fashion and called on
CONFIDENTIAL
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journalists and historians "not to forget to portray the
impressive panorama of battles" at Novorosriiysk. At that time,
PRAVDA's anniversary article also stressed Brezhnev's heroism
during the campaign, but the other central papers did not do
so and Grechko's IZViSTIYA article seemed even to belittle
Brezhnev's role.
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PRC I iJTERNAL AFFAIRS
JOINT EDITORIAL RELEASED FOR PARTY ANNIVERSARY
A joint REI) FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial,
released on 30 June, marked this year's undramatic celebration
of the 49th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party. The editorial claims no new advances in the protracted
campaign to rebuild the party, nor does it break any new ground
in the propaganda surrounding the party-building effort. It
fails to reiterate the demands in the joint anniversary editorial
last year for the formation of strong cores of leadership within
revolutionary' committees at all levels and for'the rebuilding
of the Young Communist League. Concentrating largely on a
hackneyed repetition of the ideological criteria for now party
members, the editorial concludes by calling for "great
achievements in party consolidation and party building" to
greet the party's 50th anniversary next year. The implication
is that party rebuilding will continue to be a very gradual
process.
Although the editorial.contains the usual verbiage about
reliance on the masses for guidance in party building, it
is not as firm on this point as last year's editorial,
which made public a Mao. instruction specifically calling
for the rebuilding of each party branch with the participation
of masses outside the party. Approaching the subject more
cautiously, perhaps with the aim of insulating party members
against undisciplined factional groups, this year's editorial
sets limits on the volume.of criticism the masses may direct
at party members. It argues that "if a man makes mistakes"
but conducts self-criticism and accepts criticism by others,
"he is a good comrade" and additional criticism is unnecessary.
STATUS OF An airport reception for delegations returning
YEH CHUN from the Korean War anniversary observance in
Pyongyang provides the first, indicator since
the Ninth Congress of the standing of Yeh Chun, Lin Piao's
wife. Prior to the congress, she had been listed toward the
end of the "top 14," and since that time she has appeared
only on occasions when leaders were listed in stroke order.
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For the airport reception, however, she followed Chiang Ching
and Yao Were-yuan in the Politburo rankings, which were divided
into groups. The Chiang-Yao-Yeh grouping, all considered
cultural revolution "leftists," was listed first after the
Standing Committee. Li Hsien-nien followed, ahead of army
deputy chiefs of staff Wu Fa-hsien and Chiu Hui-tso. During
May Li was listed behind Wu; now he is apparently ahead of
Wu, at least for civilian functions.
LEAP FORWARD Provincial broadcasts continue to stress the
PLANNING necessity for an economic "leap forward" in
industrial aid to agriculture. A Heilungkiang
conference on local industries publiciv,:d by Harbin radio on
22 June specified that local industry must "make overall
plans," while the provincial authorities must in turn be
responsible for unified ar-,angements in order to guarantee
"balanced development of various industries." But a joint
HUPEH DAILY-YANGTSE DAILY article broadcast on 19 June
seems to imply disagreement with those who stress the need
for careful planning and orderly development. The article
admits that the campaign to increase productivity "may seem
a little chaotic," but indicates that chaos may be necessary
"to foster the activism and initiative of the working
class." Revolutionary workers "have broken the conventions
and set aside old frames of reference, foreign ways and old
methods . . . . What is so bad about chaos?" While the
article then backtracks with the comment that chaos is
correct only if it does not deviate from Mao's thought, its
acceptance of short-term economic disorder seems at variance
with the general concentration on the need for speedy results
economically, as typified by the common argument that small
local industry must be supported because it can produce much
in very little time.
SUMMER CROPS Although "leap forward" rhetoric persists in
the propaganda, harvest claims made recently
by Peking do not suggest that leap forward results are being
achieved in agriculture. An NCNA report on 19 June claimed
only "good" harvests for Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, and
Shensi; it was noted that each province had to "overcome
natural disasters." Wheat yields were said to exceed last
year's in Kiangsu and Honan, but there were no claims of
record crops. "Estimated" wheat yields were said to be up
for Peking and Hopei, according to a 21 June NCNA survey,
but Shansi was said to have achieved only a "fairly good"
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wheat harvest after numerous natural disasters. On 23 June
NCNA released a statement claiming "rich" harvests in the
major grain-growing areas of China, but again there was no
claim of record harvests. Areas in southeast China,
including the Szechwan breadbasket, are said.to have
achieved gains in total output of 20 percent this summer
over last year, but the absence of enthusiastic adjectives
to describe the harvest.may indicate that.last year's
harvest was very poor, not that this year's crop is
exceptional.
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