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September 10, 1970
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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1:~) Confidential FOREIGN' BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~~Ililllll~~~ulllllllll~~ TRENDS in Communist Propaganda Confidential 10 September 1970 (VOL. XXI, NO. 36) Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL This propaganda analysis report is based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United Stntes, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents tc or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro- hibited by law. GROUP I E,,cI. ded N. aolon,oUc downR?odinp and d.clovi'colion Approved For,Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 CONTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Stock Charges Voiced as Xuan Thuy Returns to Paris Talks 1 Sihanouk Imputes Remark on DRV Presence to "False" Radio . . . 3 RGNU Protests to Prague; Diplomat Leaves Embassy for PRC . . . . 4 Vietnamese, Cambodian Representatives at Nonalined Conference 5 LPA Denies Attack on Orphanage in South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . 6 Hanoi Observes Anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's Death . . . . . . . . 6 Moscow Attacks PRC on Ho Anniversary; Peking Comment Minimal . . 7 Laos: Souphanouvong-Souvanna Phouma Messages Continue . . . . . 8 U.S. Statement on Cease-Fire Violations, Israeli Stand Noted . 10 Moscow Publicizes UAR Refutation of Cease-Fire Violations . . . . 13 USSR Cites Cairo Press Disapproval of Palestinian Hijackings . . 14 Moscow's East European Allies Deplore Hijackings . . . . . . . . 16 Peking Scores Soviet Policies, Promotes Asian "United Front" . . ' 19 Moscow s Broadcasts to China Respond to Anti-Soviet Comment . . . LUSAKA CONFERENCE 21 I Tito Presses Case for Nonalinement, Restates Stock Positions . . GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALICS 23 Moscow Hails Seabed Treaty, Attacks U.S. on CB-Weapons Ban . . . CHILEAN ELECTION 25 Cuban Media Air Allende Statement of Confidence in Victory . . . 26 Moscow Mails Outcome as Product of Broad United Front'. . . . . . CZECHOSLOVAKIA 29 Prague Names Hardliner as New Ambassador to USSR . . . . . . . . USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS 31 Brezhnev Receives Mixed Treatment at Kazakh Celebration . . . . . PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS 33 Second Session of Party Central Committee Reported . . . . . . . 35 New Director of PLA General Political Department . . . . . 36 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CI R 8 T 0 7 0 30038-1 R F C A FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 31 AUGUST - 6 SEPTEMBER 197(, Moscow (4032 items) Indochina (4%) [Vietnam (2%) VJ Day 25th (2%) Anniversary Kazakh ASSR 50th Anniversary (50%) China (6%) Middle East (5%) Brezhnev's Tadzhik (--) Speech Peking (2797 items) 17% Indochina (26%) 50% 15%] [DRV National Day (6%) 34%] 10% [Cambodia (11%) 8%] Domestic Issues (37%) 19% 7% VJ Day 25th (--) 7% Anniversary 5% Vice President's (1%) 5% 4% Asian Tour 3% Middle East (9%) 4% These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary outpu` of the Mos:.,_ and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 I N D 0 C H I N A in his first appearance at the Paris talks since December, DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the 82d session on 3 September delivered a lengthy attack on the Nixon Administration's alleged lack of goodwill and serious intent with respect to a negotiated settle- ment. There is still no indication of when PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh will return to Paris. Her arrival in Lusaka, Zambia,for the nonalined conference was reported by NCNA on the 8th. The issue of the legitimacy and recognition of Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) gets ccntinuing publicity as more complaints are aired about Prague's attitude toward the diplomat who seized the Cambodian embassy in Czechoslovakia on behalf of the FUNK .tst month. Somalia beccmes the 24th regime reported by NCNA an- the FUNK radio to have recognized Sihanouk's government. A spate of propaganda denies that Sihanouk, in a broadcast over the FUNK radio, discussed the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. A statement by the RGNU, carried by NCNA on the 8th, says the alleged remarks by Sihanouk were fabricated and broadcast over "a false radio station purporting to be the Voice of FUNK which was set up several weeks ago by the CIA." In addition to the usual reports of military action in Cambodia, VNA on the 7th rounds up alleged feats of the Cambodian '.'Liberation Armed Forces" during August. It claims that more than 10 enemy battalions were either wiped out or "heavily trounced," and'it comments that the Cambodian "patriots" are following up victories scored in the last dry season by defeating the enemy in the current rainy season. There is also a spate of press and radio comment on victories in South Vietnam, much of it pegged to the 2 September DRV National.Day and to the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death on 3 September 1969. Hanoi observed the death anniversary with a wreath-laying ceremony and an exhibit of models of Ho's future tomb. Peking has publicized the Hanoi ceremonies but has originated little comment. Moscow marked the anni- versary with a meeting sponsored by the USSR-Vietnam Friendship Society. Routine Soviet comment lauds Ho's revolutionary example and his friend- ship for the USSR, while also using the occasion to criticize the Chinese and to recall the plea for socialist unity in Ho's testament. S'? K CHARGES VOICED AS XUAN THUY RETURNS TO PARIS TALKS The VNA account the 82d session of the Paris talks on 3 September says tersely that GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam "a ain rehashed his Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 brazen contentions" and that U.S. delegate Bruce "repeated his argumentation used at the previous sessions and Nixon's old contentions." Both the VNA and LPA accctuzts* note that PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien, the third speaker at the session, "exposed" the United States' argument in support of its "general view" that the negotiators should put aside preconditions and give consideration to both sides' legitimate concerns. Tien said the United States in fact clings to "utterly absurd conditions" for troop withdrawals and a settlement of the political problem in South Vietnam, giving consideration only to its own "selfish, colonialist interests." Both accounts report that Tien repeated. the standard demand that if the United States is interested in genuine negotiations it must give up its "aggression" and seriously respond to the 10-point solution. But neither !ANA nor LPA reports his lengthy discussion of various points in the NFLSV/PRG position on troop withdrawal and political settlement issues; thus the accounts do not report his remarks to the effect that the Vietnamese people will never accept and have categorically rejected the U.S. position on a mutual troop withdrawal, that the existence of the GVN is a "major obstacle" to the restoration of peace, and that the South Vietnamese are "entitle? to require U.S. abandonment of it." In his first participation in the Paris talks since last Eecember, DIV delePn.t, Xuan Thuy delivered a lengthy statement in which he set out to documer:' the Nixon Administration's alleged lack of good faith reg ding a negotiated settlement. The VNA account notes Thuy's r..nark that what the Administration has done can be summarized in what he termed its three policies of Vietnamization, negotiations from a position of strength, and using Asians to fight Asians. The account glosses over most of the details of Thuy's a-utacks on Administration policy, but it dons report that he ridiculed--in standard fashion--the President's "pretext" that the spread of the war to Cambodia was * Liberation Radio last month had reverted to its past practice of broadcasting full texts of the PRG statements, carrying the 6 and 13 August statements on tYe 10th and 17th, respectively. But for the past three weel.s he FRG statements have been briefly summarized by LPA. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 necessary to protect the lives of American troops in South Vietnam, his refusal to announce a deadline for total U.S. troop withdrawal, and his argument that "millions of people would be subjected to reprisals" in Vietnam if U.S. troops were withdrawn. VNA notes that in conclusion Thuy reaffirmed the DRV's goodwill and serious intent at Paris and that he said it "is prepared to come together with the other parties" on the basis of the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution. As in the case of Tien's statement, however, the account reports none of Thuy's remarks on specific points in the PRG proposal. VNA also fails to acknowledge his remarks on support for Laos and Cambodia, including his quotation from Pham Van Dong's 2 September National Day speech. SIHANOUK IMPUTES REMARKS ON DRV PRESENCE TO "FALSE" RADIO NCNA on 7 September carried a statement by Sihanouk's private secretariat, dated the 3d, which refutes "lies" told by Phnom Penh Chief of State Cheng Heng on 28 A'agust to Vice President Agnew regarding the "invasion by Vietnamese communists." The secretariat repudiates this charge by citing reports from various Western correspondents who have been released by the FUNK which stress that the fighting F,gainst the Lon Nol regime is being carried on by "Cambodian patriots." On 8 September NCNA carried a statement by the RGNU which repudiates "despicable rumors fabricated by the CIA" about a "so -called appeal" by Sihanouk concerning the "so-called intervention by 'North Vietamese' troops in Cambodia." (The RGNU statement says that AFP dispatches from Phnom Penh carried the purported Sihanouk remarks, but it obscures the fact that AFP--and other news agencies --quoted the Cambodian High Command as claiming on 7 September that the prince's purported remarks were broadcast over the FUNK radio on 28 August.) The RGNU statement goes on to say that the so-called "Sihanouk appeal" was made over a "false" radio station purporting to be the Voice of FUNK but in fact set up several weeks ago by the CIA in an effort to "split the solidarity of the Indochinese people," "create confusion in the minds of our friends," and "sow discord among the members of the front of anti-imperialist struggle." The FUNK radio carried the RGNU statement on the 10th, and VNA summarized 4t on the same day. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 - 11 - The Hanoi domestic service on the 8th carried a commentary attributed to the FUNK radio which denounces the "false" radio for alleging that Sihanouk "intends to turn Cambodia into a communist country having close relations with other communist countries in Asia." It also scores the VOA., BBC, and Saigon radio stations for reporting that the military spokesman of the Lon Nol government claimed that Sihanouk said North Vietnamese troops are present in Cambodia. The commentary says the "false" radio station was established in an attempt to uistort the line of the FUNK, to sow dissension between Sihanouk and the Khmer people and between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples, and to deceive world opinion during the Lusaka conference of nonalined nations. The FUNK radio and Liberation Radio carried the commentary on the 9th. On 9 September a Hanoi domestic service broadcast commented in a similar vein on its own authority, scoring the "slander" of the "fake" radio. The commentary notes that the statement attributed to Sihanouk acknowledged that North Vietnamese troops fighting in Cambodia had "ransacked pagodas and pillaged the Khmer people" but called on the Khmer people to have a tolerant attitude. Hanoi cites UPI as reporting that U.S. officials in Phnom Penh "did not question the accuracy" of a document on the alleged statement handed to newsmen by the "Lon Nol clique," and it notes a REUTERS comment that the release of the report was timed to coincide with the Lusaka conference. RGNU PROTESTS TO PRAGUE; DIPLOMAT LEAVES EMBASSY FOR PRC The RGNU continues to air complaints about Prague's attitude. An official protest dated 2 September, carried by NCNA on the 4th, decries the Czechoslovak Government's measures, "counter to international law," against the diplomat who seized the Cambodian embassy on behalf of the FUNK last month. The RGNU statement says that the Prague authorities "wrongly" termed the seizure an illegal occupation and that since the Czechoslovak Government has not recognized de jure the Phnom Pexih government, the measures taken against the Cambodian embassy constitute "interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia." It complains that messages from Sihanouk to President Svoboda and from Prime Minister Penn Nouth to his Prague counterpart asking for an end to the "inhuman measures" against the embassy were never answered, and it adds that the RGNU also asked the embassy in Peking of "a country friendly to both parties" to intervene, to no avail. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 The RUNU statement acknowledges that the diplomat subsequently evacuated the embassy. It declares that although the Czechoslovak Government has not declared him persona non grata and has not taken measures to expel the students who took part in the seizure, the FUNK and RGNU consider their presence on Czechoslovak territory "undesirable" and have asked "friendly embassies to aid and, if necessary, to grant them the right of exile at their request." NCNA reported on 9 September that the Cambodian.diplomat arrived that Peking, where he was welcomed by members of Sihanouk's government and by PRC officials. Peking had supported the RGNU statement with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, carried by NCNA on 5 September, which said that although the Czechoslovak Government has verbally expressed support for the Cambodian people's struggle, its actions oblige the "so-called ambassador of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique" and slander the "patriotic" diplomat. Commentator asked rhetorically if it is.not "perfectly clear" on which side the Czechoslovak Government stands-- on the side of the Cambodian people or on the side of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. VIETNAPIESE, CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATIVES AT NONALINED CONFERENCE THE RGNU NCNA reports that the "delegation" of Sihanouk's RGNU, headed by Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak, arrived in Lusaka, Zambia on 2 September for the nonalined conference. The first explicit acknowledgment of controversy over the seating of this delegation comes in a 4 September NCNA report of a statement by a spokesman of the RGNU, dated 31 August, which refutes "slander" by "Malayan" deputy prime minister Abdul Razak concerning "the admission to the conference" in Lusaka of an RGNU representative. The statement once again denounces Razak's contention that the RGNU controls no territory, repeating claims that more than two-thirds of Cambodian territory are governed by three RGNU ministers who are in the "liberated areas." A similar statement, dated the 29th and carried by NCNA on the 3lst, had denounced such "slanders" by Indonesia and "Malaya" but had not specifically mentioned the Lusaka conference. On 9 September VNA summarized an "open letter" from Sihanouk to heads of state of nonalined countries "on the occasion of" the Lusaka conference. The content, as briefly summarized by VNA, is like that of Sihanouk's lengthy "open letter" which Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 19'(0 -6- ;TCNA had carried from 9 to 14 August. It argued the case for ti..,- illegality of the Lon Not regime and the legitimacy of the RGNL 'hut did not explicitly mention the Lusaka conference. THE PRG NCNA reports the arrival in Lusaka, Zambia of Le Quang Chanh, special envoj and deputy foreign minister of the PRG, and of PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh on 5 and 7 September, respectively.* The reports fail to mention a "delegation," merely noting that both individuals arrived "to attend" the conference. There is no acknowledgment so far from either Peking or Liberation media of the reported agreement at the conference to accord the PEG "observer" status. LPA DENIES ATTACK ON ORPHANAGE IN SOUTH VIETNAM Reacti.g to Western press reports that communist forces attacked an orphanage in Quang Nam Province on 30 August, killing a number of children, LPA on 3 September issued an authorized statement that "completely rejects this brazen, familiar, slanderous argument of the U.S.-puppet clique." The LPA statement does not take note of Western reports, instead asserting that Saigon Radio on 30 August had reported the incident as away of coping with the increased wave of public condemnations against the GVN's "crimes"--especially at Con Son prison. (The last LPA authorized statement, on 10 July, similarly denied a Saigon report that the PLAF near Pleiku had killed a clergyman and six children.) HANOI OBSERVES ANNIVERSARY OF HO CHI MINH'S DEATH The first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death on 3 September 1969 was observed with a wreath-laying ceremony in Hanoi.** According to Hanoi radio, the ceremony was attended by the same top leaders who were present at the 31 August meeting marking DRV National Day--all the regular members of the VWP Politburo except Pham Hung Mme. Binh's activities were not reported following her latL: July visit to India and Ceylon. On 3 September TASS reported that she had stopped in Moscow from 29 August to 3 September en route to Dar Es Salaam, and communist media reported her it September arrival in Tanzania for what TASS called a "private" visit. ** The communique on observance of Ho's death anniversary is covered in the TRENDS of 26 August, page 13. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 and alternate Politburo member Tran Quoc Hoan, but not Van Tien Dung.* NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the 3d, as broadcast by Hanoi radio that day, paid tribute to.Ho and urged that the teachings in his testament be implemented, with NHAN DAN recalling the Politburo's 29 September 1969 instructions on study of the testament. Hanoi radio on the 3d also reported the preceding day's opening of a pictorial exhibit of models of Ho's future tomb, which it says the party and government decided to build "in order to fully preserve his corpse for a long time." Hanoi notes that those present at the opening included Truong Chinh, Vice President Nguyen Luong Bang, Hoang Van Hoan, and Tran Quoc Hoan. The broadcast states that the people's comments on the models will be welcomed, and it quotes Minister of Architecture Bui Quang Tao as saying that the exhibit will tour other parts of the DRV before the final design is selected. MOSCOW ATTACKS PRC ON HO ANNIVERSARY; PEKING COMMENT MINIM L MOSCOW Moscow marked the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death with publicity for a meeting in the capital sponsored by the USSR-Vietnam Friendship Society and routine-level propaganda. A brief domestic service report of the meeting on 3 September says speakers praised Ho as a staunch Marxist-Leninist and a "true friend of our party and our country." Commentaries similarly laud Ho's revolutionary example and his friendship for the USSR. A Radio Peace and Progress commentary broadcast in Mandarin on 3 September recalls that Ho's testament called for socialist unity and grieved over the "current dissonances among the various fraternal parties.'.' In this context the commentary recalls Soviet aid to the Vietnamese and attacks Chinese "splittist activities" aimed at "sabotaging" Soviet-Vietnamese ties. It complains that Peking used the forum of the mass rally on the DRV's 25th anniversary to attack the USSR, "the best friend" of the DRV. This commentary makes no specific reference to Li Hsien-nion's speech when it labels Peking's attack disrespect for the internationalist revolutionary principles to which.Ho dedicated his life. But another Radio Peace and Progress talk in * See the TRENDS of 2 September, pages 1-2. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 Mandarin on the same day, pegged to the DRV anniversary, expressed "indignation" over Li's attack on the "loyal friend and ally" of the DRV, calling it a "horrible act of blasphemy."* Earlier comment on the DRV anniversary also scored the Chinese, with a Mandarin-language broadcast on the 2d repeating the charge that the United States was encouraged in carrying out aggression by the Chinese policy of refusing united action with the other socialist countries to repulse aggression. A Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin on the same day reviewed Soviet aid to the DRV and scored the Chinese for rejecting the call by the USSR and other socialist countries to form a united front to support Vietnam. It claimed chat the PRC is intensifying splitting activities, attacking the USSR and. other socialist countries; and for the first time in Soviet media sine June it repeated the charge that the Chinese authorities have even "detained military materials sent from the Soviet Union to the DRV through China." PEKING Peking carries, of Hanoi's commemoration of the anniversary of Ho's death and reports that the PRC ambassador laid a wreath before the shrine of Ho in the Ba Dinh meeting hall in Hanoi. There is no indication of any ceremony in Peking. The only Chinese comment is a report by PRC correspondents on a "recent" visit to ?io's native province, Nghe An, in which they praise the military and economic achievements of the people in response to Ho's teachings. LAOS: SOUPHANOWONG-SOUVANNA PHOUMA MESSAGES CONTINUE Pathet Lao media report that on 1 September Souphanouvong's emissary, Tiao Souk Vongsak, delivered a 30 August message calling on Souvanna Phouma to appoint a plenipotentiary and keep to his 25 June proposal that the representatives of the two princes meet in Khang Khay. Souphanouvong's message states that he has appointed Gen. Phoune Sipraseuth as his plenipotentiary.** * In his rally speech Li Hsien-nien repeated the charge that "social. imperialism" and U.S. imperialism are "colluding," specifically to promote a "so-called peace settlement" in the Middle East and Indochina. ** The Patriotic Neutralist Radio on 1 September had reported that this appointment was made as an outcome of Souphanouvong's talks with Soth Pethrasi, the NLHS permanent representative in Vientiane, who had returned to Sam Neua to report. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 The media, also publicize a 1 September message from 5ouk.Vorgsak rejecting a 29 August proposal by Souvanna Piiouma that during the latter's trip abroad Souk meet with a Souvanna plenipotentiary in Vientiane. Souk explained that he is not a plenipotentiary but only a special envoy and that Souvanna's suggestion would mean abandoning the projected meeting of plenipotentiaries in Khang Khay. Pathet Lao media have not been heard to mention that Souk did in fact meet with Souvanna Phouma's plenipoiCcubiary on the 8th. According to the Vientiane domestic service on the 9th, Souk went to the plenipotentiary's residence during nonworking hours, not wishing to recognize his official status in the Vientiane government by meeting him at his office. On 7 September the Pathet Lao news agency carried an interview with Souphanouvong's plenipotentiary Gen. Phoune Sipraseuth who, among other things, rejects a suggestion by Souvanna Phouma that Souphanouvong come to Parr to meet him. Phoune calls this merely another effort to postpone talks between plenipotentiaries. A "press communique" by Tiao Souk Vongsaks. dated the 7th, carried by Pathet Lao radio on the 10th, comments on a meeting in Paris between the two princes without flatly rejecting the idea. Souk reviews the NLHS ccir.jlaints that Souvanna Phouma has gone back on his suggestion of a meeting of plenipotentiaries in Khang Kbay and has appointed a "government delegation" for talks, and he notes that Souvanna Phouma has suggested a meeting in Paris. Souk says he has reported the "above problems" to Souphanouvong and is awaiting instructions, expressing the belief that Soth Pethrasy will soon return to Vientiane with Souphanouvong's views. In his interview reported on the 7th, Phoune Sipraseuth also notes that during exchanges of views Souvanna Phouma's.side had "threateningly hinted" that the NLHS participation in the Indochinese people's conference is a violation of the 1962 Geneva agreement. Calling this "slander," he says that the conference is not a military alliance but merely an effort of the three peoples to gain their fundamental national rights and safeguard the principles of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTLMBEit 1970 MIDDLE EAST Moscow continues to portray Israel, particularly "extremists" such as Defense Minister Dayan, as responsible for "sabotaging" the Arab-Israeli talks under Jarring. Accusations of UAR cea.3e- fire violations are again rejected as part of Israel's attempt to put the blame on the Arabs for failure of the talks, to obtain-- mid justify--new U.S. arms deliveries, and ultimately to retain occupied Arab territory. Moscow poiui,s to a "UAR Government memorandum" to the United States--not made public by Cairo--as contending that all the missiles on the western bank of the Suez Canal were installed befove the cease-fire began. While Moscow is critical of reported U.S. arms deliveries to Israel and says the United States bears "grave responsibilities," propagandists are in general relatively restrained in dealing with the U.S. role. At the same time, Moscow depicts the Arabs as behaving "calmly," insists that Cairo is committed to a search for a peaceful solution, and pointedly reports meetings of Egypt's UN representative Dr. az-Zayyat with Jarring to demonstrate the UAR's adherence to efforts for a peaceful settlement. Commentators continue to echo Brezhnei's call, in his 28 August Alma-Ata speech, for honest compliance with the cease-fire agree- ment and real steps toward peace; PRAVDA's Belyayev in a It September domestic service commentary urges that no time be lost, but that "constructive proposals" be made toward a political settlement. U.S. STATEMENT ON CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS, ISRAELI STAND NOTED In Moscow's first reference to the 3 September State Department state- ment which confirmed "violations of the cease-fire standstill agree- ment," TASS on the 4th recalled that American officials "stated more than once that they had no data which would confirm the Israeli alle- gations," but Washington "resolved to meet the Tel Aviv ultras half- way." strengthening tLi.ierican support for the "ultras," TASS added, is borne out by the recent U.S. decision on more arms deliveries to Israel. TASS did not mention that the statement said the United States is continuing to watch the balance and has no intention of permitting Israel's security to be adversely affected. Predictably, Moscow has not acknowledged that the violations were to be taken up with the USSR, but it has reported U.S.-Egyptian contacts in Cairo on the matter. While the brief TASS report does not take the occasion to spell out the nature of the violations, and propagandists Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS 'T'RENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 do not on each occasion detail the charges, Moscow has freely ac- knowledged that the Tel Aviv "fabrications" entail the UAR's in- stallation of new antiaircraft missiles in the Suez Canal. zone. The statement's reference to the importance of continuing the talks under Jarring was mentioned by Mikhailov in the 6 September PRAVDA. Mikhailov observed that the State Department "has yielded to Tel Aviv's solicitations and 'confirried' these provocative Israeli fabrications." It is true, he conceded, that the State Department spokesman said at the same time that the United States considers it of primary importance that the talks in New York should be continued immediatt;ly, but as soon as Tel Aviv received "its indulgence," reports from Israel said it would not participate in the talks until the question of violations was settled. Propagandists, in assessing the U.S. action in issuing the state- ment confirming violations, seem cautious in reproaching Washington for a move which they say con only give support to Israeli "extremist circles" and "obstructionist policies." Some commentators present the United States as being "led on" by Israel, others portray a U.S.-Israeli "game" wherein the two seemingly had differences until Washington "followed Tel Aviv's wishes" and came out in open support of Israel. An Arabic-language commentary on the 7th accuses the United States of "helping its stooge cover up its crimes," and complains that if Washington sincerely desires to rectify these "crimes" it should have used all its influence so Israel could not have opposed a settlement. Ryzhikov in a domestic service commentary on the 9th cited the Egyptian press and radio as saying the next move must be made by the United States, and will show the seriousness of its peaceful initiatives. ISRAELI STATEMENT Moscow's domestic service on the 7th carried ON JARRING TALKS the first Soviet, report on the Israeli state- ment of the 6th announcing that Israel will not participate in the Jarring talks "as long as the cease-fire agreement and the standstill are not fully observed and while the situation is not returned to what it was previously." Ignoring the second condition, Moscow said Israel is refusing to take part in the Jarring consultations until its accusations against Egypt of cease-fire violations "are accepted," and it pointed out that the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS 10 SE!-i'EM13ER 19'(0 accusations have been "resolutely repudiated by the UAII." The report cited Cairo radio as calling the decision another step to thwart Jarring's mission, and as placing responsibility for the decision on the United States, since Israel "is sure of Washington's unconditional support." In an Arabic-language broadcast later on the 7th, Moscow indicated further :Israeli conditions but still failed to spell them out, citing Israeli Prime Minister Meir as calling for acceptance of Israel's conditions, "one of which" is to admit that Egypt violated the cease-fire agreement. `PASS on the 8th, in reporting that Israel's UN representative Tekoah nad informed Jarring that Israel is "abandoning" the talks, called the step a logical con- clusion of Israel's tactic of procrastination aimed at wrecking a peaceful solution of the conflict. Other comment subsequent to the Israeli decision has described it in similar terms. Ryzhikov in a domestic service commentary on the 7th, noting that a White House spokesman said President Nixon had expressed profound regret in connection with the delay signified by the Israeli de-.sion, claimed that such U.S. Government regrets "savor strongly of hypocrisy." RECTIFICATION Moscow hab apparently failed to acknowledge the OF VIOLATIONS statement by State Department spokesman McCloskey on It September that the United States is "seeking rectification" of the violations of the military standstill.. But domestic service commentator Ryzhikov, in his broadcast on the 7th, observed in regard to the return of Israel's UN representative to New York 'that Tekoah "brings with him the ultimatum decision" of the Israeli cabinet "not to take part in preparatory talks until Egypt dismantles its antiaircraft defense system on the west bank of the Suez canal." In a domestic service commentary the following da,- Ryzhikov again made a reference to the issue of removal of the missiles in assailing an Israeli "ultimatum" attributed to Defense Minister Dayan. Judging from Tel Aviv press reports, Ryzhikov said, Dayan's "ultimatum" is formulated as a plan for the total demilitarization of a 60-kilometer zone on both sides of the Suez Canal. But in fact, Ryzhikov said, "it is the same absolutely unjustified demand" that Cairo "dismantle the whole system of Egyptian antiaircraft defense on the western bank of the canal." Dayan, he added, intends to confront the Egyptians with a simple choice: "either take away the ack-ack missiles or regard any agreement on a cease-fire as nonexistent." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 ? Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL F13I0 TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 MOSCOW PUBLICIZES UAR REFUTATION OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS PASS on' the 5th cited the Ciro AL-AIIRAM for the retort that UAR Foreign Minister Riyad had told Donald 13ergus, head of the U.S. interests section at the Spanish Embassy in Cairo, that th e accusations of UAR violations of the cease-fire agreement were "'absolutely groundless' and 'far from the true state of affairs.'" Both 'PASS and an Arabic-language broadcast on the 5th noted that Riyad said the United States did not mention Israel's "numerous violations" of the cease-fire agree- ment, and that he drew the U.S. Government's attention to the fact that it itself violates the agreement by supplying Israel with Phantoms while the agreement is in force. (TASS on the 9th picked up without comment a report in the Washington POST that day that the United States has agreed to sell Israel 16 to 18 more Phantoms. And on the '0th it reported from Cairo that UAR official circles stressed the?; the U.S. actions "contravene the commitments which the United States assumed" by supporting the contacts through Jarring. Cairo radio on the 9th had reported a statement by a UAR official source declaring that the United States had "categorically pledged that it would refrain from giving Israel more planes" during the cease-fire period.) UAR MEMORANDUM On the j th TASS and Moscow's Arabic service reported a UAR Foreign Ministry memorandum which, according to the Arabic-language broadcast, had been sent to the State Department "a few days ago and was announced in Cairo today." Curiously, the memorandum has not been carried in monitored Cairo media; Moscow normally follows Cairo's lead in reporting Egyptian statements or developments first made public by the UAR. The broadcast in Arabic said that the memorandum declares that all the missiles on the western bank of the Suez Canal "were installed before 8 August" and that "at present, only measures to consolidate the security of the missile sites and the troops are taking place there." Both accounts reported the memorandum as saying that Israel is the violator of the cease-fire agreement by restoring and strengthening the Bar-Lev line, TASS additionally noting that the UAR drew U.S. attention to recent deliveries of large quantities of U.S. "offensive weapons" to Israel. TASS quoted the memorandum as stressing that "Egypt did. not bring new missile launchers into the Suez Canal zone after the temporary cease-fire agreement came into force," and that the UAR will continue to observe the agreement. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CCN1'IDEIN'TIAI, FI3IS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1.97C -14 - Gub:aqu'.nt continent also points to the "UAR Government memoranda m" as refuting Israeli allegations. A Tsoppi conunentary in foreign-' language broadcasts on the 7t?h not-d that the memorandum was "announced today" and a talk by the same commentator in the Arabic service on the 8th reiterated that the Egyptian antiaircraft defense remained "where. it was on 8 August, from where it shot down raiding Israeli Phantoms and Skyhawks." (Moscow had earlier cited President Nasir's statement to a World Peace Council delegation on 30 August that the missiles were in the Suez.Cana.l zone before the cease-fire agreement came nto force, and that it was these batteries which shot down Israeli Phantoms.) A Swnilovskiy foreign-language commentary on the 9th, also referring to the UAR memorandum, says that the UAR is determined to insist on a peaceful settlement; an Arabic-language commentary the same day, however, points out that Cairo cannot disregard statements by Israeli ministers that Israel must be prepared for war, as if no cease-fire exists. While also declaring that the PAR is determined to secure a peaceful solution, the broadcast says Egypt is also fully determined to "repel the aggressors" if they commit new armed aggression.* USSR CITES CAIRO PRESS DISAPPROVAL OF PALESTINIAN HIJACKINGS The first reference in Soviet media to the Palestinian hijackings of TWA, Pan American, and Swiss aircraft on 6 September came belatedly on 9 September in the Moscow domestic service at 1500 GMT, shortly followed by a TASS Russian-language dispatch and a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast. TI'::re is no mention of the abortive hijacking of an El Al airliner on the 6ti:, or the hijacking of a BOAC plane a few hours prior to the Moscow reports. According to U.S. press reports, the 9 September RED STAR, not yet available here, cited the memorandum as saying that the Egyptian side has the full right to carry out a redeployment of missiles already in the Suez Cana] zone to avoid a surprise attack on them from the Israeli side. (The cease-fire agreement says that activities in the cease-fire zone "will be limited to the maintenance of existing installations in their present area and positions and to the rotation and supply of forces now in these regions.") Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS T:iEN1S 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 The initial domestic service report says merely that many foreign agency reports are devoted to the seizure of the three aircraft by Palestinian guerrillas. It cites AFP .s carrying e, statement by the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), George Habbash, saying that his organization takes respon- sibility for the hijacking in reply to the "criminal conspiracy aimed at the liquidation of the rights of the Palestinian people." Implicitly conveying Soviet disapproval, all three Soviet reports cite the Cairo AL-AKIIBAH as criticizing the actions of the fedayeen and declaring that such acts damage the Arabs in the eyes of world public opinion. The TASS and Arabic-language items further quote AL-AKHBAR to the effect that no one, regardless of nationality, believes that such dangerous acts against means of transportation linking the capitals of various countries fall within the program of the revolutionary liberation movements. The TASS item, datelined Cairo, cites the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as reporting that Cairo is investigating "an explosion" aboard the PanAm 747 at Cairo airport which "was seized while airborne by several Palestinian guerrillas." TASS adds that on the same day Palestine guerrillas seized TWA and Swissair planes which later "landed on Jordanian territory." The item says that a PFLP 6tatement published in Cairo says the passengers on the planes which landed in Jordan will not be released until "three Palestinian guerrillas confined in Switzerland for an attack last year on an Israeli airline plane at Zurich airport are set free." Moscow's belated acknowledgment of the hijackings may have been prompted by the Security Council adoption on the 9th of a "consensus " appealing to all parties concerned for immediate release of passengers and crews without exception, held as a result of "hijack- ings and other interference in international travel," and calling on states to take all possible legal steps to prevent "further hijackings or any other interference with international civil air travel." TASS on the 10th, in reporting the Council decision which was "passed without discussion and voting," makes no men- tion of the circumstances or the reasons for the decision. * Arab sources have attributed PFLP statements on the hijacking to unnamed spokesmen and representatives. Habbash himself arrived in Pyongyang on 2 September for a visit to the DPRK, according to KCNA that day; his delegation's activities on the 4th and 5th were summed up by KCNA on the 7th. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDEN'i'IA1, FBIS TRENDS 10 51!,PTEMBER 1970 - 16 - BACKGROUND Moscow's delayed and obscured reports on the hijackings are consistent with its treatment of similar incidents in the past which elicited equally reluctant, reserved, and implicitly disapproving comment, if acknowledged at all. The December 1968 Palestinian attack on an El Al aircraft at Athens airport was given somewhat more attention than other incidents have received, in that it was followed two days later by Israel's retaliatory destruction of civilian aircraft at Beirut airport, and this action was debated in the Security Council. The propaganda dismissed Israeli arguments that the Beirut action represented a reply to the Athens incident, and commentators obF,cured the Palestinians' affiliation with a fedayeen organization. The incidents of the Swissair crash and the explosion aboard an Austrian airliner on 21 February this year also were given more notice by Moscow than other incidents; in this case, Soviet propaganda stressed Palestinian and Arab denials of responsibility and thus was able to come to the defense of Palestinian resistance organizations, at the same time pointedly confining its support to fedayeen operations on "occupied Arab territory." The initial Palestinian hijacking, of an El Al aircraft from Rome to Algiers in July 1968, was promptly reported by TASS, but Moscow ignored subsequent developments. Other actions, such as the August 1969 hijacking of a TWA plane to Damascus and various incidents involving El Al offices abroad, are not known to have been acknowledged by Moscow. MOSCOW'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES DEPLORE HIJACKINGS Qualified by professions of sympathy for the Palestinian Arab cause, comment uniformly critical of the guerrilla hijackings has appeared in the media of the Soviet-oriented East European allies. Bucharest media, fol!Dwing Romania's independent and traditionally cautious line on the Middle East, have limited themselves so far to carrying factual accounts of the hijackings, emphasizing reports of the diplomatic efforts to obtain release of the passengers. Extensive news coverage in Belgrade media has been accompanied by sparse comment critical of the hijackers. Tirana has not been heard to mention the hijackings so far. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 SOVIET ALLIES In the most critical treatment of the guerrillas to date, the Czechoslovak news agency CTK commented on 7 September that the hijacking of four passenger planeE; by the fighters of "the so-called Popular Front for the Libere.tion of Palestine" is "according to all international law an act, of terrorism." CTK added that "it is difficult to imagine how these acts could ameliorate the fate of millions of Palestinian Arabr; quite definitely, they have nothing in common with politics." Stating that there can be "no other than a negative response in the world to sit-4 actions," the agency warned that "American public opi.ninn's 'nfluence on the formulation of Nixon's stand at this delicate stage of the [Jarring] talks should not be underestimated." The commentary appeared in Loth the European and African services of the Prague radio, and portions of it--including the passages branding the hijackings an act of terrorism--were carried in the Czechoslovak central press. The East Berlin radio picked up CTK's commentary in arguing on 9 September the hijackings. coupled with the destruction of aircraft and threats to the lives of the passengers, "do not benefit the just cause of the Palestinian guerrillas but harm it considerably." It added: "On this many papers in the Arab wor'__' and commentaries of the socialist camp today agree; CTK says it is difficult to see how these acts can help improve the fate of millions of Palestinian Arabs." Warsaw's ZYCIE WARSZAWY, as quoted by the Polish news agency PAP on the 10th, expressed understanding of some of the guerrillas' motivations and noted that two Algerians had been taken off a transit flight in Tel Aviv, but commented that "despite all that, no one can recognize she Palestinian partisans' right to exert pressure by means of threatening the lies of innocent travelers." And Budapest's MTI, in a commentary on the 9th described as "issued by the central press servi^e," called the hijackings "immensely harmful tr the Arr:a cause, including the international forces which support Palestinian liberation." By actions that divert attention from their cause, MTI added, the guerrillas "are doing a great service to Israel and its backers." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL P131S TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 Radio Sofia on 9 September noued briefly that a British plane had been hijacked by the "Palestinian partisans to put pressure on the British Government so that Leila Khaled might be released." On the same day the radio carried a one-sentence report from Cairo noting that "AL-AHRAM condemns the hijacking of passenger aircraft by .he Palestinian partisans." No original Bulgarian comment is available. BELGRADE Extensive news coverage in Belgrade media includes pickups of UAR press comment critical of the commando actions, but original Yugoslav comment is sparse. While blaming Israel for the absence of a Middle East settlement in his remarks at the Lusaka nonalined conference, Tito mentioned neither the guerrillas nor the hijackings. A Radio Belgrade talk on the 7th, the only one to pass judgment on the guerrilla actions, remarked that the hijackings would only add grist to the Israeli propaganda mill and deflect attention from Israel's rejection of a peace settlement. Noting a Washington report that the Unit(d States has dispatched six transport planes to Turkey to stand by in case the hostages are released by the guerrillas, Radio Belgrade on 9 September questioned "whether the U.S. Government will conclude that the internationa' atmosphere and the situation in the inter-Arab relations enable it to interfere directly in a military way in the increasingly confused situation in Jordan with the excuse that its own citizens are threatened and must be saved." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDEN'T'IAL, FBIS 'T'RENDS 1.0 SEPTEMBER 1970 - 19 - S I CVO-SOV I E T RELATIONS The communique on the CCP plenum ending 6 September contains the first direct attack on Moscow on an authoritative level since Pek g!:._22. APril. ~.oint citorial on_the__Lenin .centenary. The communique does not, however, signal a renewal of an all-out polemical campaign against the Soviets. On the whole, Peking has sustained its partial propaganda standdown toward the Soviets while seeking common ground with a variety of countries and groups in opposition to the interests of the superpowers. The communique registers Peking's resurgent diplomatic activity in declaring that the PRC's foreign relations "are daily developing" land that it has "friends all over the world," After playing up foreign reaction to Brezh:iev's conciliatory remarks in his 28 August Alma-Ata speech, Soviet central media have again fallen silent on China. However, the Soviets have not abated their polemical pressure on Peking in their broadcasts to the Chinese in the wake of the Brezhnev speech. While avoiding direct attacks on Mao, Moscow has used this channel to respond to anti-Soviet thrusts in Peking's treatment of the DRV's national day and the 25th anniversary of V-J Day. PEKING SCORES SOVIET POLICIES, PROMOTES ASIAN "UNITED FRONT" The CCP plenum communique, dated 6 September and released on the 9th, praises the Albanian party and unnamed "other genuine Marxist-Leninist" organizations for their struggle against "modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its center"-- a reference that is little more than a ritualistic gesture, in such a party document, to the enduring ideological conflict. Otherwise, the communique reflects the polemical restraint shown in recent months by referring to "social imperialism" (without naming the Soviets, a measure of Peking's effort to keep tensions at a low level. In taking note of the PRC's revived diplomatic activity, the communique reaffirms the country's fealty to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Previous authoritative statements have called for relations with the United States and the Soviet Union to be based on these principles.* * Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial, which contained slashing anti-Soviet attacks, qualified an endorsement of peaceful coexistence with a warning that the Chinese could not tolerate "invasion and occupation" of their territory by "imperialism or social im e i " Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : C~A-iZI '00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONI''ID,.N'1IAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 19'TO The plenum communique records prominent themes in recent Chinese propaganda, citing Mao's 20 May statement as a programmatic document and referring to the Indochina-conflict, "Japanese militarism," and persisting "armed struggle" in the Middle East. During the period of the plenum, which began on 2311s, Peking made use of these issues to press its case against Moscow and to play up its own role in promoting Asian unity. While avoiding last year's direct attacks on Moscow, the Chinese took advantage of the DRV anniversary to accuse the Soviets of collaborating with the United States in seeking peaceful settlements in Indochina and the Middle East. In the harshest anti-Soviet remarks, Li Hsien-nien told a rally on 2 September that the United States and its "accomplice"-- "jackals of the same lair"--were "contriving Munich plots" in these areas and were reviving "Japanese militarism" and "West German revanchism," The reference to West Germany hints at a rebuke to the soviets for con,::- uding the treaty with the FRG, a subject on which Peking has abstained from direct comment. The 25th anniversary of the defeat of Japan has provided another occasion for anti-Soviet thrusts. A joint PEOPLE'S DAILY/ LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on 3 September accused the "social imperialists" of flirting with a revived Japanese militarism and seeking to enlist it in an Asian collective security system against China. Recent Soviet comment on Japan has included several references to Asian collective security, a subject which had been dormant rafter being a source of sharp polemical exchanges in mid-1969. Counter- posing a call for an Asian "united front" extending from "Korea to Indochina and from East Asia to West Asia," the editorial played a theme which at once accents Peking's diplomatic initiatives in recent months and implicitly rejects Soviet influence in these areas. Peking has sought to exploit the theme of Asian unity to emerge from its isolation while carrying on its competition with Moscow for influence in the communist and revolutionary movements. Chou En-lai's visit to North Korea in early April signalled a major campaign to associate Peking's interests with those of Pyongyang and the anti-U.S. forces in Indochina; after the U.S. incursion into Cambodia this campaign was given a further impetus. The keynote of the campaign was sounded in the title of Peking's major joint editorial on the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 Korean War on 25 June, "People of Asia, Unite and Drive the U.S. Aggressors Out of Asia." The anti-Soviet dimension of tho campaign was reflected in the editorial's statement that "at a time when the people of Asian countries are xitrengthening their unity . . . there are certain persons" collaborating with the United States, fraternizing with Japanese rea'-,tionaries, "and even maintaining dirty relations with Lon Nol and his like." The editorial introduced a claim that an anti-U.S. "united front" was rapidly developing in Asia. During this period the Chinese publicized a statement by North Korea's Kim Il-song calling for an Asian united front including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnem, China, and Korea. Huang Yung-sheng, heading a PRC delegation in the DPRK to mark the Korean War anniversary, quoted Kim's appeal in one speech and made a similar pitch in subsequent speeches during his visit, taking special note of the presence of "the anti-imperialist comrades- in-arms from six parties of five countries" and naming the same five countries. Peking sometimes specifies these countries as composing the "united front," while at other times--as in the quotation from the V-J Day editorial--it defines the term more broadly. MOSCOW'S BROADCASTS TO CHINA RESPOND TO ANTI-SOVIET COMMENT Brezhnev's 28 August speech in Alma-Ata stands as the authoritative exposition of current Soviet foreign policy. According to Soviet reports, he delivered other speeches during his Central Asian tour, but the substance of his comments on foreign affairs has not been published, Soviet media followed up the Alma-Ata speech by citing foreign reaction chosen to underscore the conciliatory element: in Brezhnev's remarks on China. Moscow has not originated any additional comment in its central media. The Soviets have continued to use their broadcasts to the Chinese to sustain their side of the polemical crossfire. Peking's implicit anti-Soviet attacks on the occasion of the DRV and V-J Day anniversaries have drawn sharp retorts from Moscow, which has rebuked Peking for seeking to sow discord between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam and for perniciously ignoring the Soviet role in the defeat of Japan and in the Chinese communist revolution. One comm' -tary, a M- --.dari.n broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on 3 September, invoked the appeal in Ho Chi Minh's testament for Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 an end to fraternal strife in scolding Peking for its anti- Soviet attacks on DRV national day. Another commentary, broadcast by Radio Moscow in Mandarin on the same day, blamed the Chinese for failing to contribute to the normalization of Sino?.Soviet relations and cited Brezhnev's appeal at Alma-Ata for an improvement of relations. The Soviets are remaining silent about the Peking talks, however. A commentary ?.n Mandarin on the 4th lectured the Chinese on the folly of their doctrine of self-reliance in military affairs and on the decisive advantages of being a part of the socialist camp. The commentary underscored this point by observii,g that the "socialist community" is safeguarded by Soviet nuclear- missile power and that Peking's doctrine that a weak country can defeat a strong one--an allusion to Mao's 20 May statement-- is absurd in. the nuclear age. A Peace and Progress broadcast on the 4th expressed indignation over Peking's refusal to permit Soviet embasrry officials to visit monuments in provincial cities dedicated to Soviet soldiers killed in World War II. In the previous three years this had been reported in the central media. By now confining its polemics to broadcasts to the Chinese, Moscow evidently seeks to minimize any detraction from its stance as a willing partner in negotiations while at the same time conveying to the Chinese its displeasure over their failure to reach an accommodation and their persisting efforts to undercut Soviet policies in a variety of areas. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 - 23 - LUSAKA CONFERENCE Thu PRESSES C:'-SE FOR NONALINEMENT. RESTATES STOCK POSITIONS In an effort to pump life into the "lagging nonalined movement, President Tito told the Lusaka summit on 8 September that nonalinement--"whether the protagonists of force and domination, like it or not"--is a policy favored by the majority of mankind and represents "the only possible way to set the world on a new democratic road." As reported by Radio Zagreb, he defined "the essence" of nonalinement as "open and uncompromising opposition to force and aggression, joint resistance to pressure, intervention, and the imposition of the will of one upon another." Tito generally hewed to familiar Yugoslav positions on specific foreign policy issues, but in apparent deference to his African hosts he seemed to come down especially hard on the need to take action against "racist" regimes in southern Africa.--a central theme in speeches by Zambian President Kaunda.and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. The Yugoslav leader declared that support by the nonalined should include "the most efficient material support for those who, with arms in hand, are fighting colonial oppression and racial discrimination." He did not elaborate on what form such "material support" might take. In line with Yugoslavia's current propaganda standdown toward Moscow, Tito made no mention of Czechoslovakia. He did, however, take an indirect swipe at the Brezhnev doctrine and appeared to have the interests of his Romanian friends in mind when he remarked that the policy of force and. interference in the internal affairs of other countries represents a threat "not only to the nonalined, but also to those countries which fellow a foreign policy based on equality and which do not want their sovereignty, security, and progress to depend on the benevolence and goodwill of any foreign power." His only direct mention of the Soviet Union came in.a passing reference to the Soviet-FRG treaty, which he described as "the first concrete result" of bilateral talks on complex.. European problems. Although he voiced support for talks between the major powers, he reiterated Yugoslav opposition to "any dialogue among them that would work to the detriment Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 of third countries" or promote divisions into spheres of influence. He rejected "often heard objections" that the nonalined countries are trying to set up their own bloc, arguing that "we are working to overcome the existence of the present blocs and for their disappearance." Without naming the United States, Tito went on to condemn the "flagrant" policy of force and intervention presently being. pursued in Indochina. He pointed in particular to "the inter- vention" in "nonalined" Cambodia, stressing that Sihanouk's government is "the only legal" one. He also welcomed the "inclusion" of South Vietnam's PRG in the conference* as "very significant both for the nonalined movement and the principle of unreserved support to the peoples against foreign intervention." His only reference to China came in his call for the PRC's admission to the United Nations. Tito placed the entire blame on Israel for "preventing a peaceful solution of the crisis" in the Middle East and remarked that recent developments have shown that Israeli acceptance of the Rogers plan "was only a maneuver, since Israel interrupted the talks before they had actually begun." He made no mention of the Palestinian guerrillas. In an obvious pitch to improve Yugoslavia's. trade ties with the developing states, Tito stressed that "the policy of nonalinment should be concerned with development of economic relations to a far greater degree than they are at present." He added that the developing countries should "utilize the advantages which economic integration and cooperation offer them." * Liberation Radio has yet to mention the reported agreement at the conference to grant the PRG "c")server" status. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENT] Al, 11'1ill" '11fil;Nb;l 10 U}:1".I'I;M131'1 1910 GENEVA D`VsARMAMENT TALKS MOSCOW HAILS SEABED TREATY. ATTACKS U.S. ON CB-WEAPONS BAN Consistent with Moscow's low-key treatment of the Geneva diuarma- ment talks since their resumption in mid-June, there to minimal propaganda attention to the recessing of the talks on 3 September. The TASS account of the cloning meeting, reviewing the major issues that had come under discu.nsion, notes that chief Soviet delegate Roshchin has called the adoption of a revived draft treaty banning deployment of nuclear and other ;nano-annihilation weapons on the seabeds the "main result" of the talks. Roohchin's remark is also quoted in a 5 September IZVESTIYA article which hails the joint U.S.-Soviet draft as an important step toward the "complete demilitarization" of the seabed. There is no doubt, IZVESTIYA says, that UNGA approval of the accord would facilitate the adoption of necessary measures to ban both mass-annihilation weapons and conventional types of arms on the seabed, as well a~ promoting international cooperation in the peaceful '.tses of seabed resources. An article in PRAVDA on the 7th also welcomes the adoption of the seabed treaty. Unlike IZVESTIYA, however, PRAVDA goes on to complain about U.S. opposition to the communist countries' proposal for a simultaneous ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons, asserting that the United States insists on a ban on bacteriological weapons only in order to retain "the chemical weapons which the U.S. Army is now using in Vietnam." Roshchin, in remarks on the 2d report-d by TASS, had also criticized American insistence that the two types of weapons be dealt with separately, alleging that the motive is to keep open the U.S. option to use chemical weapons in Vietnam. The TASS account adds that Roshchin expressed concern about the failure of the United States to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical and bacteriological weapons.* * In his remarks as reported by TASS, Roshchin did not take note of President N4.xon's 19 August message to the Senate urging ratification of the Protocol. For a discussion of Moscow's reaction to the President's message, see the TRENDS of 26 August 1970, page 30. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONF11)P,N'I'I AI, CHI LEAN ELECT I ONS 1,13I1C '1'W 1 N W 1.0 U1;l"I'l lIJE'It :19'ro With l"idcl Castro now on record--in it l August interview with a visiting Chilean delegation--as endorsing the Chilean electoral path to socl.u turn, Cuban media have given predictably heavy play to the plurality won by leftist candidate Salvador Allende ir. the -t September Chilean el.ectAon. Welcoming the outcome in commentaries and aii-ng interviews with Allende, Havana at the uciine time evinces concern over alleged rightist machinations to deprive Allendc of his victory. To win the presidency, he must be chosen over ccnoervative candidate Jorge Aleusandri in a vote by the Chilean Congress slated for 24 October. Moscow has welcomed Allende's victory in a much more moderate volume of comment, emphasizing that it was a product of a broad coalition of leftist forces and generalizing on the effectiveness of the united-front approach. Like Havana, Moscow warns of "reactionary" efforts to deprive `llende of the fruit of his electoral triumph, and like Havana it mentions the possibility of a military coup. Peking media have not been heard to report the election outcome, although Allende has named the PRC in his listings of communist countries--headed by Cuba and including the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and North Korea--with which he would seek cordial relations if elected. Chinese media report strikes, protests, and disorders in Latin America from time to time but generally ignore organized political activity in the hemisphere. They did not report or comment on the Chilean election campaign. CUBAN MEDIA AIR ALLENDE STATEMENT OF CONFIDENCE IN VICTORY Havana media on 5 September featured interviews with Allende, who commented that in view of the statements of defeated Christian Democratic Party Candidate Radomiro Tomic greeting him as the President-elect, it would be "a political impossibility" for Christian Democratic and rightist congressmen to collaborate to defeat him in next month's balloting. He also expressed confidence that the Chilean armed forces would "respect the people's verdict." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONP'.I.1)NN'I'[A1_, P'13I111 'PHEND:1 10 SEP'1.'LM13P,R .L9'(0 Allende has had close personal ties wiLh Castro for some time and reiterated, after his clectora'.l victory was announced, his intention to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba and establish relations with other communist regimes. In his 1. August intervier' with the visiting Chilcano,* Castro had expressed his Interest "in opening relations with only a few countries, among them Chile," and added that "perhaps in the case of Chile we have the mor't Interest." The Madrid 1FE reported under a Santiago dateline on the 5th that Castro sent a congratulatory mcsut,ge to Allende, and REUTERS the next day cited Socialist Party sources as stating that he telephoned Allende to "congratulate him on the electoral victory and extend Cuba's recognition of his election as President ri Chile." Havana media have not carried either report as yet. Despite his avowed admiration for Castro and the Cuban revolution, Allende has emphasized in public statements that Chile's path to socialism would differ from Cuba's. In post-election interviews with Havana r:cuia re effusively lauded Cuba but stressed that Chile would purst'e its own path: "We who have seen in Cuba an expression of dignity and the struggle to build socialism find it significant to be able to say that in the cone of South American today there are also people who will begin to advance along their own path, different from that of Cuba, but with the same goal." Allende also referred obliquely to Castro's endorsement of the Chilean electoral path to socialism, praising "the Cuban people, who have learned that each nation has its own reality and its own path." In a press conference in Santiago on the 5th, duly reported by PRENSA LATINA's correspondent to his home office, Allende affirmed his belief in a multiparty system and his commitment to free elections: "We are going to do something that is ours, authentically ours according to Chile's reality, history, and idiosyncrasies. We are not anybody's parakeet." In the course of the 1 August interri ew--parts of which were carried in Cuban media and shown on Chilean TV--Castro had expressed concern over use of the Cuban revolution as an issue * For a discussion of the interview, see the TEENDS of 19 August 1970, pages 38-41. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CON1' IIEN'J'lA1, F13111 'J'UI'NUC :10 13EPTEM13' li 1970 by rightintu cwnpaigning against Allende. Chilean TV carried remarks in which Castro appeared anxious to counter charges that Allende planned to convert Chile Into another Cuba and seemed particularly anxious to reassure the Chilean armed forces: I believe that conditions are different than those in Cuba. I believe that things cannot be done there as in Cuba. I heard a speech by Allende, and it appears that this was very clear on the different circumstances of the process in Chile and the Cuban process. Truly they would be different. We made a, revolution in an open struggle, a guerrilla struggle, . . . and we destroyed the army here. Then our relations with the armed forces were determined by those things. Relations in Chile with military institutions will be determined by other factors. Allende made a similar point when questioned at his post-election press conference about the possibility of a military coup. In Cuba Castro defeated the armed forces of a dictator, he said, so "it was logical th;-~, those armed forces could not continue to exist"; but in Chile "no war" has occurred, and "there is no dispute between the armed forces and the people." Expressions of Cuban concern over efforts`by conservative forces to deprive Allende of the presidency are typified by comments in an 8 September Radio Havana discussion program, in which panelists charged that "Alessandri's spokesmen have been practically encouraging a coup d'etat" and that "a climate of raistrust is being created--a climate of uneasiness in the nation that would prompt a military coup." A radio commentary on the 6th, hailing the election outcome as a major defeat for both the United States and the Chilean "oligarchy ," cautioned that "the Yankee imperialists and the Chilean reactionary forces will resort to all means to c:,ce more try to evade the people's decision." Observing that the Chilean Congress in the past has always ratified the victory of the candidate receiving a plurality of the votes, the 6 September commentary declared that "any other course taken on this occasion, when the candidate is of the left, would be a bloody farce." It recalled that the Chilean Socialist Party has called for a general strike if Allende is not chosen. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 ("ONf'1I)EN'1'tAL 11310 TR1t;NDS 10 SEP`iEM13ER 1970 MOSCOW HAILS OUTCOME AS PRODUCT OF BROAD UNITED FRONT Moscow's limited comment welcoming the election outcome is typified by a 7 September 'PASS commentary which finds in Allendc's victory "great implications both for Chile and the entire national liberation movement in Latin America." Moscow has not singled out the role of the Soviet-oriented Chilean CP, picturing the electoral victory rather as an exemplary product of a broad coalition of leftist forces. Thus the TASS commentary stated: Salvador Allende's success was made possible only by the unity of all democratic and anti-imperialist forces in Chile which acted in a unite', front for the first time in many years. Of great importance was the establishment of the popular action bloc which included the Communist, Socialist, Radical, and Social Democratic Parties as well as "Independent Popular Action" and the "Movement of United Popular Action." In a similar vein, a Radio Moscow commentary on the 5th noted that despite efforts by the "dominating classes" to prevent unification of the left, "the leftwing parties managed to form a wide democratic coalition which has fully justified its name of Popular Unity." A series of three articles by Ernst Henry which appeared .4n LITERARY GAZETTE in July had drawn a glowing picture of prospects for a political alliance of leftist forces in a number of capitalist countries, citing Chile as a vase in point. In the second article, on 8 July, Henry noted that the Chilean CP had withdrawn from consideration the candidacy of communist poet Pablo Neruda for the sake of leftist unity even though it was "generally acknowledged" that Neruda would have been "the strongest" candidate the left could present. This demonstrated, according to Henry, "how dear" unity is to the communists and "how necessary it is to meet one another halfway and to make reciprocal concessions." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDE NTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 Post-election comment in Soviet media points to "reactionary" designs to block Allende's I;ath to power, T--SS mentioning on the 7th that some "imperialist press organs . . . even talk about the possibility of a military coup." Soviet propagandists had warned of such a possibility in pre-election comment, a 31 August broadcast saying that "domestic and foreign reactionary forces" were planning to stage "a military takeover" if the left won. A number of Moscow commentaries allege n,aw that Chilean rightists are trying to "create economic chaos" and blame it on the left. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL F1310 TRENDS 10 SEPTEMI3ER 1970 CZECHOSLOVAKIA PRAGUE NAMES HARDLINER AS NEW AMBA3SADCZ TO USSR The Prague domestic service reported briefly on 8 September that Bohuslav Chnoupek, heretofore Central Director of Czechoslovak Radio, has been appointed by President Svoboda as ambassador to the USSR replacing Vladimir Koucky. Thus an out-an-out pro-Moscow hardliner takes over the po. from a man who had held a high party position tinder Novotny but to all appearances made strenuous efforts to adapt to the 1968 liberalization. The report said Koucky was being "entrusted with other tasks." BACKGROUND Under Novotny, Koucky had chaired the CPCZ Central ON KOUCKY Committee's Ideological Commission until he was replaced by Hendrych in 1965. He stayed on as a party Secretary some three months after Dubcek's takeover as First Secretary in January 1968. Koucky was removed as secretary at the April 1968 plenum and was appointed. ambassador to the USSR in May. In his self-criticism at that plenum, he indicated that his removal from the high party post stemmed chiefly from his alleged shortcomings prior to 1965 when, as head of the Ideological Commission, he was "forced" by Novotny to impose "a complete unanimity of views on almost everything." He defended his subsequent record as party Secretary in charge of relations with foreign CP's as "positive," and he recalled Dubcek's praise at the plenum for the work of the Czechoslovak delegation--headed by Koucky--at the February-March 1968 13udapest preparatory meeting for the Moscow international party conference. Koucky conscientiously pursued the CPCZ's then liberal, independent line at the Budapest meeting, publicly opposing adoption of any "single all-inclusive document" for the impending Moscow conference and criticizing to newsmen the handling of mediation efforts in the incident that led to Romania's walkout from the preparatory meeting. His public statements during his two years and three months as ambassador to Moscow, as reported in the media of both countries, have faithfully reflected the status of bilateral relations under the leadership first of Dubcek and then of Husak. In his last publicized remarks, reported in Soviet media on 26 August, he "emphasized the decisive role of the Soviet Army" in World War II at a Moscow meeting on the anniversary of the 194 anti-Nazi Slovak National Uprising, whose "legacy" was a regime pledged to "guard, strengthen, and develop" friendship with the USSR. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONVID19N'T:i11L 1"1IIS 'i'101ND 10 UIEP.L'EMBNU 1970 Koucky'u replacement had been anticipated on 1 September when TASS reported that he was received by Soviet Doputy Premier Novikov for a "friendly" talk "in connection with his coming departure for home." Soviet media reported that he held "friendly" talks with a variety of other second-echelon figures during the next three days, without mentioning his impending departure. BACKGROUND Ambassador-designate Chnoupek had publicly ON CHNOUPEK voiced pro-Soviet sentiments and criticized the 1968 liberalization even in its early stages. In an interview with IZVESTIYA on 30 March 1968, as deputy minister of culture and information heading a visiting delegation, Chnoupek hailed the new cultural-exchange protocol as reflecting the "further extension and deepening of our friendly relations" and pointedly indicated concern over "which part of our national culture is best re,: esented to our Soviet friends." At the April 1968 CPCZ plenum, Chnoupek apparently struck the only discordant note in roundly denouncing anti-Soviet aspects of the liberal course, its alleged persecution of conservatives, and the new activation of noncommunist political parties in Czechoslovakia. The speech was reported at length in RUDE FRAVO on 7 April 1968 and rebutted the next day by the Socialist Party daily, SVOBODNE SLOVO. Chnoupek was named director of the Czechoslovak radio in May 1969, a month after Husak's take- over as CPCZ First Secretary. Like Koucky, he is a member of the CPCZ Central Committee. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL I''ll:la; 11'R ENDS 10 UEP'I'EMIJEB 1970 -33- USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS EREZHNh' RECEIVES MIXED TREATMENT AT KAZAKH CELEBRATION Brezhnev was both lavishly praised and conspicuously slighted at the Kazakh semicentennial celebration in Alma Ata on 28 August. Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev, a longtime Brezhnev admirer and protege, paid exceptional homage to his patron's political accomplishments, while other prominent leaders in attendance-- from Moscow, Azerbaydzhan, Armenia, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, and the Ukraine--either praised Brezhnev's speech at the gathering or referred to him in higl??y favorable terms. On the other hand, Brezhnev's speech was totally ignored by the representatives from Belorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Turkmenistan, and it was conspicuously downgraded by the representative from Leningrad. BREZHNEV Kunayev devoted four paragraphs of his opening EULOGIZED speech to Brezhnev, calling him an "outstanding" leader not only of the Soviet party and government but of the international communist movement as well and characteriz- ing him as a "true Leninist who heads the Central Committee" (PRAVDA, 29 August). He recalled Brezhnev'sa leadership of the Kazakh party during "one of the responsible. periods" of Kazakh history and his "enormous personal contribution"'in developing the virgin lands. Kunayev's praise was published in all the central papers. The only other visiting dignitary praised by Kunayev was Defense Minister Grechko, who was termed "one of the glorious military leaders." Kazakhstan also demonstrated its pro-Brezhnev stance by announcing the publication of a Kazakh translation of Brezhnev's two-volume collected works on the day before his arrival in Alma-Ata (PRAVDA, 25 August). Kazakhstan is the only republic so far to issue a local translation of the recently published collection. The speeches of the leaders of the visiting delegations were published in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on 29 August. Moscow City First Secretary Grishin characterized Brezhnev's speech as "brilliant"--as he has on similar occasions in the past--and he joined Kunayev in calling Brezhnev an 'outstanding " leader of the international communist movement and in recalling Brezhnev's achievements as party leader of Kazakhstan. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-F ,[ 3 P.Tff200030004QAq ~1Ii NDG 1.0 SEPTEMBER 1970 -311- Azerbaydzhan First Seeret'iry Aliyev called 13vezhtiev's speech "brilliant and de,;pp in content" and important "not only for Kazakhstan but for all union republics." In addition he attributed "the successes in the foreign policy arena and inside the country" to the "fruitful work" of the Politburo and the "energetic, tireless activities" of Brezhnev. Armenian First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan, while ignoring Brezhnev's speech, staked out a pro-Prezhnev position by mentioning the "Politburo headed by" Brezhnev--a highly controversial formulation previously used only by Kunayev. Brezhnev's speech was also labeled "brilliant" by Kirgiz First Secretary T. Usubaliyev, Tadzhik First Secretary D. Rasulov and RSFSR President M.A. Yasnov; it was termed "remarkable" by Moldavian First Secretary I.I. Bodyul, Uzbek First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov and Ukrainian President A.P. Lyashko. SPEECH By way of contrast, Brezhnev's speech was totally IGNORED ignored by Belorussian Premier T. Ya. Kiselev, Latvian First Secretary A. E. Voss, Turkmen First Secretary M. Gapi.rov and Estonian First Secretary I.G. Kebin. It was mentioned without comment by Lithuanian President M. Yu. Shumauskas. Leningrad city 'xecutive committee chairman A.A. Sizov appeared to dowz::Zrade Brezhnev's speech by listing it after Kunayev's and characterizing it as an "evaluation." He noted that Kazakhstan's achievements "were brilliantly described today in the report of Comrade Kunayev D.A. and in the evaluation given by L.I. Brezhnev." Only four other speakers hLl,d even mentioned Kunayev's report, and Brezhnev's "speech"--a nationally televised address--clearly outranked it. Moreover, Sizov not only failed to use Brezhnev's title of general secretary but--in an obvious violation of etiquette--failed to place the prefix "comrade" before his name. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 - 35 - PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS SECOND SESSION OF PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORTED On 9 September, Peking gave wide publicity to a communique on the second plenum of the Ninth CCP Central Committee held from 23 August through 6 September.* The communique portrays Mao and Lin Piao, the only Central Committee members named, as in full control of the session, which was attended by 255 of the Central Committee's 279 full and alternate members. Mao "personally presided" over the plenum, and he and Lin delivered speeches, the contents of which have not been disclosed. Mao also made speeches, still unpublicized, at the two previous plenums, in April 1969 and 0^tober 1968. Amid rumors of an imminent convening of the fourth National People's Congress (NPC), the plenum merely proposed "that necessary preparations be made so that the fourth NPC will be convened at an appropriate time." Provincial radios have not yet mentioned any preparations for the NPC in their local areas. The plenum approved "the State Council's report on the national planning conference a,..d the national economic plan for 1970," as well as a report on strengthening preparations against war presented by the Central Committee's Military Commission. This is the first notice given of these reports, and no further information is supplied. PARTY The need to continue both "ideological and BUILDING organizational" party rebuilding was expressed in the communique, while at the same time it claimed that "the whole party has achieved unprecedented unity and unification." The 18-month attempt to rebuild the party as c. 9.isciplined organizational structure continues to mark time, however, particularly in establishing new committees above the county level. During July and August, Kwangtung, Kirin, Kansu, Heiluilr-kiang and Chekiang, all provinces which had previously claimed rebuilt county party committees, reported or more new county party committees; one additional province, Liaoning, reported * The three-day gap between the closing day of the plenum and release of its communique is unusual. In the case of the last three plenums the communique was released on the final day or Approved Fi -eRg ,aspo?294409 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER 1970 - 36 - its first county-level party committee; but there were no further reports of city-level committees, with Heilungkiang and Kwangtung remaining the only areas that have claimed any. A ne,T push to speed up party building in Kirin was reflected in a KIRIN DAILY editorial, broadcast by Changchun radio on 3 September, celebrating the formation of the Tungfeng county party committee, only the second new county committee set up in Kirin since the Ninth Party Congress. The editorial firmly urged that the PLA's experience in building the army be used to quicken the pace of party building and predicted that "party committees at all levels will soon be gradually established" in Kirin. Another 8 September Changchun radio report on the Tungfeng committee specified that "local party committees at and above the county level" should be established. NEW DIRECTOR OF PLA GENERAL POLITI CAL DEPARTMENT Recent NCNA reports marking Peking celebrations for the 25th anniversary of the DRV's founding identify Li Te-sheng e director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA, a post vacant for the past three years. The GPD, responsible for maintaining party control over the army, ti -came deeply involved in political struggles early in the cultural revolution, and its former director, Hsiao Hua, was removed in late 1967. I:i.'s appointment as director, following previous media reports indicating gradual rebuilding of the GPD, appears to signal its reemergence as a functioning, active office. Little is known of Li's political coloring although his career profited after he clamped down on Red Guard activities in Anhwei during the cultural revolution. Originally a field commander, Li was sent into Anhwei in 1967 to restore order among factional Red Guard units. From his 1967 position as commander of the Anhwei Military District, he became chairman of the Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Committee in April 1968, positions he has continued to hold. At the Ninth Party Congress he was elected an alternate member of the Politburo, and he became a member of the Military Affairs Commission. Rebuilding the GPD has been a slow process. After the fall of Hsiao Hua, it received no official media attention for three years until last November when MINA, reporting on a Peking Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1 CONFIDENTIAL F'i3IS TRENDS 10 SEPTEMBER :1.970 reception for a visiting Albanian army art troupe, identified Huang Chih-yung as a deputy director of the GPD. The department was not then, however, portrayed as performing any important functions. Organizational rebuilding of the department was not indicated until 26 December when Nanking radio named Yang Kuang-li, vice chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee and chairman of the Nanking Military Region, which includes Li's Anhwei bailiwick, as vice chairman of the Political Department of the PLA Nanking units. Recent media references to the GPD depict it as revitalized and functioning normally. On 1 September Harbin radio reported on an activists congress attended by representatives of companies of the PLA. Shenyang units and representatives "from the PLA General Political Department." Kunming radio, also on 1 September, reported on a similar meeting for Kunming army units at which "the PLA General Political Department sent a representative to attend the opening ceremony." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1