TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 24, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidentiai
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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~IlNlll~uuu~~~~~~lllllll~~~
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
24 FEBRUARY 1971
(VOL. XXlT, N--,
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10,
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 1E, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Eulud.d from au'wna'.e
dorng,adinp end
d.[boifimlion
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Communists Claim Massive Allied Losses on Lao s-Quung Tri Front .
1
Comment Says Laos Operation Stalled, GVN Units "Annihilated" . .
2
DRV, PRG Foreign Ministries Score President's Press Confer.snce .
6
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes at North . .
10
Pe_%ing Challenges President's Denial of Threat to China . . . . .
11
Moscow Sustains Cautious Approach to Indochina Events . . . . . .
15
Pathet Lao-Neutralist Meeting Urges Greater Victories . . . . . .
18
PRG Council of Ministers Meeting Publicized Belatedly . . . . . .
20
Sinu-Soviet Treaty Anniversary Passes Without Notice . . . . . .
21
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Sees UAR as Constructive, Israel as Blocking Peace . . . . .
23
USSR-CUBA
Soviet Admiral Denies Calls at Foreign Ports Pose Threat . . . .
27
Soviet Attache Mentions Help to Cuba on USSR Armed Forces Day . .
28
BERLIN
Soviet, GDR Media Avoid New Four-Power "Negotiations" Formula .
30
EUROPEAN SECURITY
Warsaw Pact Renews Calls for Multilateral Talks on Conference .
31
SALT
Soviet, Polish Commentaries Assail U.S. Negotiating Stand . . . .
33
POLAND
Regime Levels First Attack at Conservative Obstructionism . . . .
36
(Continued)
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24 FEBRUARY 1971
Podgornyy's Protege Titov Removed from KK:zakhstan Post . . . . . .
38
Belgograd Leader Vasilyev Becomes RSFSR Agriculture Chief . . . .
40
Party Cormittees Are Established for Kwangsi and Kansu . . . . . .
42
PEOPLE'S DAILY Warns of Overemphasis on Grain Production . . . . .
44
Restri.,tions on Inner Mongolia Radio Loosened Slightly . . . . . .
45
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 FEBRUARY 1971
Moscow (3378 items)
CPSU 24th Congress
(10%)
33%
[Draft Directives
(5%)
28%]
Indochina
(16%)
11%
China
(4%)
5%
Warsaw Pact Foreign
(--)
4%
Ministers' Meeting
Zionism & Soviet Jews
(1%)
4%
Middle East
(3%)
3%
Indochina
(64%)
70%
[PIJAF 10th Anniversary
(3%)
12%]
(Sihanouk Tour of
(--?)
5%)
South China
[DRV Economic Delega-
(4%)
4%]
tion in PRC
Domestic Issues
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Tronds. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
(15%) 18%
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c.~orrr'rt)l;rrr[nL F'fl^ 'CHENUEi
211 F1:11HUARY 1971.
IND0C:HINA
Vletntuncuc communist, mcdla s:lalm tlittt thy. n.l.l)E 1 : ncurclon Into
Lacs has been halted ,L'ul Its objcctiveu ;hwvrt^(l, and that the
allied forces have suffered enormouri losses bath in t.aon and in
South Victnnm's Quang Tri Province. While gennritlly sustaining
the Pict;ion that no Vic';namene communist; forces tire involved in
Lao.-,, propagandists do credit the cnpLtire of it position of the
39th AHVN Hanger battalion in Ltiou to the "Quang TH. PLAH'" rather
than to the "Lnotian people's liberation army." lfign-level
condemnation r,f U.S. "escalation" in general anu the Laoa
ineur:iion in prirticular was voincd by Defense Minir:ter Giap at a
23 February reception marking Sovict armed forces c!ay. Routinely
pled&_ng continued struggic, Giap added that "the strength inherent
in the militant solidarity" of the peoples o^ the socialist
countries will dereat all of "the U.S. imperialists' provocations
and acts of war."
The President's statement--at his presto conference on the 17th--
on the broad use of U.S. air power in Indochina is singled out by
Giap as well as in DRV anu PRG foreign ministry statements on the
20th and 21st, renpectivcly. The propaganda also continues to
warn of new action against the North, but there is no echo of DHV
Paris delegate Xuan Thuy's claim on the 181,h that recent U.S.
actions threaten China es well as North Vietnam.
Peking's reaction to the President's press conference took a
standard form for authoritative comment, a heavily editorialized
NCtA report on the 19th and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
the next day. Peking has ignored Xuan Thuy's statement, but
Commenta'or claimed that the United States is "spreading the
flames of war to the door of China." The article interpreted the
President's avowal that U.S. actions in Laos present no threat to
China rs an attempt to "tie Chinese hands" in giving support to
the Indochinese. At the same time, Peking maintains its posture
of offering only rear area suppcrt for the Indochinese "persisting
in a protracted people's war."
Moscow propaganda on Indochina continues to be cautious. In tLe
only original press comment on the President's press conference,
IZVESTIYA deplores his remarks on unrestricted air power and hi s
"ultimatum" to the DRV, but it ignores- his assurances that current
operations present no threat to the PRC.
COMMUNISTS CLAIM MASSIVE ALLIED LOSSES ON LAOS-QUANG TRI FRONT
Offering a new communist tally of total losses allegedly inflicted
on allied forces involved in the incursion into Laos, VNA on
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CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
211 FEE;T'UARY 1971
23 February claims that from 30 January to 20 February U.S,
and South Vietnamese forces "on the Highway 9 battlefront"
lost more than 4,000 men killed, wounded, or captured, including
nearly 900 Americans. On the "battlefront" stretching from
northern Quang Tri in South Vietnam to Savannakhet Province in
Laos, according to VNA, the South Vietnamese and Laotian
"liberation" forces also shot down or destroyed more than 170
aircraft and destroyed or damaged more than 210 military
vehicles, half of them armored cars and tanks.
Breaking down the total of alleged allied losses, the VNA
report and a 23 February communique of the Khe Sanh PLAF
command--broadcast on the 24th--clp,im that 1,500 of the allied
troops, including the "nearly 900" Americans, were wiped out
by the FLAF in Quang 'Ire. The PLAT is also credited with
dcwning or destroying 4't aircraft and with destroying or damag-
ing more than 150 military vehicles, including 50 tanks and
armored cars.
Claims of allied losses in Laos are updated in a 24 February
"communique No. 22" of the Lao "liberation army" command,
broadcast by Hanoi on the 24th. The communique says that some
3,000 U.S.-Saigon forces have been put out of action since the
start of the "aggression against southern Laos." It specifies
that four battalions and 15 companies were "destroyed or badly
mauled" and that more than 160 aircraft were downed.
COMMENT SAYS LAOS OPERATION STALLED, GVN UNITS "ANNIHILATED"
The initial South Vietnamese thrust ?:sto Laos is detailed in a
16 February QUAN DOI KHAN DAN article which describes the
incursion as a three-pronged attack, with forces deployed on
Highway 9 and to the north and south of the highway. The
* The claimed allied casualties are thus almost doubled between.
14 and 20.February: Lao and Vietnamese media on 14 February.
reported a communique (labeled No. 1) of the Lao "liberation
army" which said the insurgents.in Savannakhet had "put out of
action" more than 1,500 U.S. and Saigon troops. On the 15th
the propaganda reported that from 30 January to 14 February,
attacks on allied forces massing in Quang Tri to move into
Laos resulted.in the killing or wounding of more than 600 U.S.
and Saigon troops.
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24 FEBRUARY 1971
23 February VNA report totaling allied losses adds that "the
United States also sent a mobile regiment of the Vientiane
army, supported by Thai mercenaries and directly commanded by
CIA officers, to carry out a coordinated action from Savannakhet
town with the intention of capturing the town of.Phalane, also
on Highway 9." The "virtual annihilation" of this Vientiane
regiment on 11 February had been claimed in a VNA report on the
16th.
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 21st provides the
most detailed description of alleged allied plans. Commentator
claims that allied forces were to reach Tchepone on 9 February
and to advance to Seno, about 30 kilometers from the Mekong
River, then quickly cover the remaining stretch of Highway 9 to
the town of Savannakhet. He maintains that the allied force in.
fact has not advanced beyond Ban Dong, having covered only 25
kilometers since the operation began on the 8th.
Commentator discounts the suggestion that the allied advance
has been slowed by rough terrain and the discovery of many
supply depots and weapons. He asks sarcastically: "Is the
terrain so rough that in two weeks' time more than 300 U.S.
helicopters could not transport troops to Tchepone--only one-half.
hour by air from their encampments?" And he cites Western press
reports that no depots have been found, although the capture of
"a few hundred bicycle tires, hens, and ducks" was claimed. The
article also ridicules GVN commander Hoang Xuan Lam's reported
remark on the 17th that Tchepone is not strategically important,
noting that when the operation started the allies said "Tchepone
is a 'nerve center' of the enemy activities in southern Laos, an
important liaison center, and a big military supply center."
Another QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, broadcast on the 21st and said
to have been "recently" published in the army paper, ridicules
the suggestion that South Vietnamese forces in Laos have been
slowed by bad weather and, like an article in the paper on the
15th, denies GVN reports on the 10th that some of its forces
had reached Tchepone. The article, attributed to "B-40," asks
a series of rhetorical questions ridiculing the notion that
allied problems can be binmed on bad weather, concluding with
the query: "Is the weather along Highway 9 so bad that on
16 February Abrams had to fly to Quang Tri to meet puppet General
Lam for 90 minutes, and that Nixon had to meet with his a'9.visers
for two hours in the White House before they came to the conclusion
that the military operations in southern Laos will face rough
times in the days ahead?"
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Communist downings of allied helicopters get particular attention,
with a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 20th, for
example,.observing that the downing of helicopters by the
"southern Laos armed forces and people" has "contributed toward
drastically slowing down the speed of the Saigon puppet troops'
operation," has created difficulties in insuring mobility, in
logistics and supply, and has struck a blow at U.S. heliborne
tactics and caused a decline in allied morale. The army paper
discounts allied efforts to counter the attacks on the heli-
copters and adds that the "victories" in downing them testify
to the strength, determination, and "adequate technical equip-
ment and fighting methods" of the Laotian forces. A Liberation
Radio commentary on the 22d confirms Western news reports that
the "liberation troops" have used "radar-guided antiaircraft
weapons."
"DESTRUCTION" OF 39TH RANGER Sustaining the fiction that no
BATTALION, OTHER GVN UNITS DRV forces are involved in
actions related to the Laos
operation,."Quang Tri forces" have been credited with attacks
on the allies. in South Vietnam, and the "Laotian people's
liberation army" is. said to.be fighting in Laos. An apparent
departure from this pattern, however, occurs in propaganda on
the overrunning of the 39th Ranger battalion of South Vietnam's
1st Ranger Group on 20 February: The "victory" is attributed
to the Quang Tri PLAF or the PLAF of the "Khe Sanh front"
rather than to Laotian forces. The propaganda describes the
location.of.the fallen Ranger.outpest as three kilometers
northeast of Lang Sen, which would place it well inside Laos
on allied maps. (Lang Sen is a Laotian village at least five
miles from the border.)
VNA on the 21st describes the 39th battalion as part of "the
northern prong of the U.S.-puppet forces engaged in the
invasion of Laos," and a Hanoi domestic broadcast on the
battle praises the."Khe Sanh Front's liberation troops" for
having "effectively coordinated with the brotherly Laotian
army and people to fiercely attack and encircle and destroy
this notably cruel Ranger battalion." The 22 February NHAN
DAN commentary, which supplies the most detail on the engage-
ment, reports that "in coordination with the fraternal Laotian
armed forces.and people, unit X of the northern Quang Tri PLAF
rapidly and secretly encircled the enemy troops, repeatedly
launched many waves of assaults, and annihilated them." It
goes onto describe the communist assaults on the position on
the 19th and 20th.
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The NHAN DAN commentary claims that this is the second Ranger
battalion to be "completely annihilated," explaining that it
belongs to the 1st Ranger Group which had "hastily retreated
to the hills" and built "defensive positions" following Laotian
forces' "annihilation" of the 21st Ranger battalion in Kaki
on 13 February. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 22d,
recounting alleged allied losses, lists the following units as
having been "completely annihilated": the 6th airborne
battalion, the 21st and 39th Ranger' battalions, five GVN
airborne companies, and "a number" of units of the 37th Ranger
battalion.
Despite the alleged annihilation of the 21st Ranger battalion,
a Hanoi broadcast to the South on "che 23d reports "recent"
attacks on this unit, noting th.c it is stationed about three
kilometers from the base of the 39th battalion which was
"already annihilated" and that the 21st battalion "is now in
a perilous situation." It goes on to claim that Col. Nguyen
Van Hiep, the commander of the 1st Ranger Group is so concerned
about the serious situation of his forces that he will no
longer talk with correspondents. Ridiculing a reported state-
ment on the operation by President Thieu on the 22d that "two
communist regiments were annihilated P.rd another regiment will
be destroyed if it appears," the broadcast suggests that Thieu
should get a more accurate report and says that if he "does not
dare to go back to Khe Sanh once more" he could at least "get
a clear picture of events by interviewing Col. Hiep."
HO CHI MINH TRAIL The mission of the allied operation to
interdict the communist supply routes
is mentioned in some comment, but the fact that the routes
provide logistics support for insurgents in South Vietnam is
generally ignored. Atypically, VNA quotes a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial on the 23d as observing that "Nixon has hoped to
destroy the adversary's logistic and supply base and thus to
check the attacks by the Southern Vietnames3 People's Liberation
Armed Forces." However, a longer account of the editorial,
broadcast by Hanoi in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, takes note
6f the allied intention to cut supply lines without mentioning
that the purpose is to check the insurgents in the South.
Allied efforts to cut supply lines are also touched on in the
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 21st. In document-
ing the alleged failure of the allied operation in Laos,
Commentator notes that the allies had not maintained the
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
elements of secrecy and surprise necessary for an operation aimed
at destruction of "supply and logistics routes." Other attention
to the subject includes a 23 February Liberation Radio commentary
which cites President Thieu's 8 February statement--9.n his
announcement of the Laos operation--that the operation is limited
in time, contrasting it with a statement attributed to operation
commander Hoang Xuan Lam on the 14th that "we will remain until
the Ho Chi Minh trail network is completely paralyzed." The
commentary ridicules. this and other statements by U.S. and GVN
spokesmen and maintains that the allied operation is hopelessly
bogged down.
DRV. PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES SCORE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE
Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's 17 February press
conference is capped by foreign ministry statements from the
DRV and the Front, on the 20th and 21st respectively, which say
that in the face of worldwide protest he tried to justify U.S.
war escalation and the. invasion of Laos. This is the first time
the Vietnamese communists. have reacted to a prer3idential press
conference.with.statement at such an official level. They were
apparently -prompted to do so because the press conference
contained. the.President! s first public discussion of the
incursion. into Laos. A.HanoL.radio commentary on the 18th
observed that this was the. first.time.the President had 'officially
raised..his_voice since the U.S.-Saigon puppet troops' armed
aggression against Laos on 8 February."
Hanoi and-the Front have regularly issued official statements.on.
major. pronouncements. by the-President related to Vietnamization
since November-1969. Government statements were issued on the
President'.s..3 November. 10,69. speech. outlining his Vietnamization
and troop. withdrawal policy and on.his 30 April 1970 speech
announcing.the U.S. andARVN incursions into Cambodia. Foreign
ministry.. statements. were. issued following his 20 April 1970
speech.announcing the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 troops
by May.1971 and his.30..June 1970.speech (and.l July TV interview)
reporting. on. theU.S..operation and withdrawal from Cambodia.
Most.recently, on 14 October 1970 the DRV issued a foreign
ministry statement rejecting the President's 7 October five-point
peace proposal. His eight-point peace.proposal of 14 May 1969--.
before.he outlined the Vietnamization policy--did not prompt any
such high-level official statement.
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CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
211 FEBRUARY 1971
HANOI The DRV Foreign Ministry statement is notably ambiguous
in acknowledging details of the President's remarks.
It charges that he "slandered the DRV and rehashed deceitful
allegations, such as that the United States would not use its
ground forces and advisers in Laos, that the operation in Laos
is limited in time and space and is for the purpose of protect-
ing the lives of U.S. troops, assuring the withdrawal of U.S.
troops, shortening the war, and so forth."
Like routine comment, the statement takes particular issue with
the President's statement that he would place no limits on the
use of U.S. air power anywhere in Indochina, and it says in this
regard that the United States is directly threatening DRV
security. Unlike other comment, however, it does not acknowledge
the exchanges with reporters on the possibility of an ARVN
invasion of the DRV. Its only other mention of a threat to the
DRV is in a passage accusing the *President of "scheming to carry
out new military escalation against . . . Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia, wrecking peace in Asia and the world."
The issue of an invasion of the DRV was brought ui specifically,
however, on the 19th--the day before the foreign ministry
statement--in a NHAN DAN Commentator article and a QUAN DOI
NHAN D.4N commentary. Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
referred specifically to an invasion of the DRV, unlike the
foreign ministry statement. NHAN DAN charged that the President
"spoke ambiguously about, the Americans' attitude" toward the
possibility of an invasion of North Vietnam, which it said
represents an "insolent threat against the Vietnamese and
Indochinese peoples." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cited an AFP report
of the 17th in noting that in response to a question about
speculation that the Saigon army might send a number of troops
across the DMZ into the North,, Nixon said "evasively that he
does not forecast what Saigon feels it is obliged to do to
protect its own security." The army paper went on to ridicule
the notion that The press conference was impromptu, calling it
"merely a prearranged farce by the Nixon clique to prepare
public opinion for its escalation of the war by bombing North
Vietnam and a threat to further expand the ground war."
The QUAN DOl NHAN DAN article appeared to display special
concern to demonstrate that more bombing of the DRV is almost
inevitable. The paper said that for over a year the Nixon
Administration "has repeatedly advanced deceitful arguments
in order to justify the bombing of the North: Sometimes it
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
A FEBRUARY 1P71
said that U.S. aircraft would retaliate when they were fired at
by Nc'-tl, Vietnamese antiaircraft; sometimes it said. that it had
to r..%iu in self-defense even when U.S. aircraft were tracked
by No..ch Vietnamese radar; and sometimes it said that it had to
bomb to protect the safety of U.S. troops in Indochina."
Describing the Americans' arguments as "extremely irrational,"
the commentary recalled that the United States bombed North
Vietnam in May 1970 in coordination with Cambodian operations
and stated that "at present, in coordination with the aggressive
operations in southern Laos, where the Americans have become
bogge down, Nixon again tried to prepare public opinion for
,iom'bing North Vietnam."
The NHAN DAN Commentator article is the only availabie Hanoi
comment to not:- the President's remarks tht there would be
no further coi:cessions at the Paris talks .and that U.S. troops
would remain in South Vietnam as long as U.S. prisoners are
detained.. Other reaction to the press conference included the
very brief statement by the DRV delegation spokesman in Paris-
dated the 18th and carried by Hanoi media the next day--which
scored the President's statements as "new evidence" that the
Nixon Administration is "extremely bellicose and stubborn,"
refuses to seek a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese problem,
and persists in its "frantic illusion of a military victory."
It said the statements prove that the President "is feverishly
implementing new schemes of military adventures against the
DRV." Like other comment, it.asserted that the Vietnamese,
closely uniting with the Lao and Cambodian people, will
"resolutely carry on their resistance" and that "no threat by
the Nixon Administration can shake the firm determination of
the Vietnamese people."
A passing reference to the President's press conference also
appeared in a Vietnam Fatherland Front statement, issued on.the
19th and carried by the media that day, which condemned the
latest "escalation" in Laos as well as in Cambodia. The state-
ment did-not mention the press conference when it went on to
say that the-United States is "threatening the security" of
the DRV and "scheming to invade" it with a large military force
massed immediately south of the 17th parallel. The single
reference to the press conference came in the observation that
the President made "impudent and brazen statements that he would
place no limits on the use of American air power and that he
would use all available forces when necessary."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
211 FEBRUARY 1971
THE FRONT The PRG Foreign Ministry statement, issued on the
21st, echoes the DRV statement in charging that
the press conference was held "to plead for the war escalation
and invasion of Laos." It charges that "to save the failure"
of Vietnamization, the Administration has "brazenly invaded
Cambodia and is now using U.S. and Saigon puppet forces to
massively invade Laos and seriously threaten the sovereignty
and security of the DRV." Decrying what it describes as the
President's argument that the United States "has the right to
attack the DRV and any other region in Indochina," the statement
accuses him of uttering "a most cynical contention of a pirate,
laying bare the Nixon Administration's extremely bellicose and
cruel nature." And It echoes the DRV statement in saying that
the way to protect American lives is to end the war and
unconditionally withdraw U.S. troops.
In declaring that "no threat nor brutal moves" can shake the
South Vietnamese people's determination, the PRG statement
adds routinely that the South Vietnamese people will "never
tolerate any war acts committed by the United States" against
the North. It also reiterates the old formula that the
southern armed forces and people will return five or 10
blows to the United States for every one it strikes against
the North.
A Liberation Radio commentary, also on the 21st, charges that
the President "tried to conceal his armed aggression against
Laos" and accuses him of "deceit" in saying that there are
no U.S. troops or military advisers there, that the operation
was planned rind carried out by the ARVN, and that the
Americans are in charge only of air support and logistic
supply. "Fearing that people still did not believe him," it
adds, "Nixon revealed the 'sensational' details that the
operational plan had been worked out by puppet generals in
Vietnam and claimed that he knew nothing about the plan."
A Liberation Radio commentary on the 20th saw further evidence
of intent to maintain U.S. troops in Indochina "for a long
time" in the President's "arrogant" statement that as long
as there are U.S. prisoners in Indochina there will be U.S.
troops. This commentary also acknowledged the President's
declaration that there would be no "concessions" in Paris
beyond those advanced in previous peace plans.
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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT NORTH
A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 22 February protests
in vague and general terms against the bombing of "certain areas"--
unspecified--of Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province from 17 to
21 February.* Atypically, however, the protest does include the
complaint that a number of reconnaissance flights were conducted
over "a certain number of provinces" in North Vietnam. The more
usual practice is to issue generalized protests against "encroach-
ments".on DRV sovereignty and security, without specifying
reconnaissance.
The current statement also notes the alleged downing of two
unmanned U.S. reconnaissance planes in Haiphong and Nghe An.
The downing in Haiphong had been claimed on the 21st in a report
which said it brought the total of U.S. planes downed over the
DRV to 3,373; the claiii of the downing over Nghe An was made on
the 18th. The spokesman "Ptrongly denounced and condemned
these acts of war" and staid that the Vietnamese people are
"resolutely determined to justly punish all acts of the U.S.
aggressors violating the sovereignty and security of the DRV."
* The.U.S. command announced on the.23d that 50 U.S. fighter-
bombers accompanied by 20 support pl,ines--the largest attack
since the massive bombings on 21 November--attacked surface-to-
air missile -sites and other antiaircraft positions in North
Vietnam on the.20th.and 21st. A U.S. spokesman said the strikes
were near the Laotian border, below the 19th parallel, and were.
made after "repeated hostile acts and firings" against U.S.
aircraft interdicting supplies on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.
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PEKING CHALLENGES PRESIDENTS DENIAL OF THREAT TO CHINA
Reacting to the President's press conference on the 17th, Peking
has sharply challenged his denial that the Incursion into Laos
poses a threat to the PRC and has underscored its concern over
an expansion of military operations in Indochina. For the first
time in recent comment, Peking has hinted at an analogy between
the Chinese role in the Korean War and the Indochina conflict,
though it has carefully avoided drawing a parallel on its own
authority. At the same time, Peking has avoided signaling a change
in Its posture of offering reav area support for its Indochinese
allies "persisting in a protracted people's war."
Peking's reaction to the press conference took a standard form
for authoritative comment on a current development, a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article on the 20th preceded by a heavily
editorialized NCNA news report the previous day.* The Commentator
article interpreted the President's avowal that the actions in
Laos present no threat to the Chinese as an attempt "to tie the
hands of the Chinese people in giving support" to the Laotian
and other Indochinese peoples. Commentator gave a sharper edge
to the 12 February PRC Government statement's charge that the
Laos operations pose "a grave menace to China," claiming that
the United States is "spreading the flames of war to the door of
China" and lecturing the President on the geographical realities
of a common PRC-Laotian border of several hundred kilometers.
But while expressing height.esned concern over a threat to China's
security interests, the Commentator article did not go beyond
earlier pronouncements in vaguely warning that the Chinese "can-
not be indifferent" to developments in Laos and "will never allow
you to run amuck in Indochina." Commentator did not repeat
Peking's pledges of support, but the companion NCNA report on
the 19th reiterated the government statement's promise to take
"all effective measures to give all-out support and assistance" to
the Indochinese peoples.
PRC LEADERS In the first major speech by a Chinese leader
since the President's press conference, Politburo
member and Shanghai chief Chang Chun-chiao, speaking at a Shanghai
rally for Sihanouk on the 22d, termed recent actions in Indochina
* Recent previous examples of this pattern were Peking's response
to the Polish disturbances:.in December and its belated reaction to
the Soviet-FRG treaty signed last August.
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"a grave provocation" against not only the Indochinese but
also the people of China and of the world--a formulation used
in the PRC'a 4 May 1970 statement on the incursion into Cambodia
and in the 8 February foreign ministry statement'on Laos. Chang
omitted any mention of Chinese security in pledging that the
people of Shanghai, "in the great rear of the three Indochinese
peoples' war," will better perform their ongoing tasks of
"supporting the front by concrete deeds." He expressed confi-
dence that the Indochinese, by "supporting each other and per-
severing in a protracted people's war," will defeat the United
States.
In the week before Chang's speech, top leaders in the provinces
and municipalities--with the exception of Tientsin, near Peking--
were absent during rallies and visits by the DRV economic dele-
gation and e, touring Sihanouk delegation in the week beginning
the 14th. NCNA disclosed on the 20th that the Chekiang Revolu-
tionary Committee (RC) chairman, "who has just returned to Hangchow,"
made a call on Sihanouk there that day. Sihanouk had been greeted
on arrival in Hangchow on the 17th and in transit in Tsinan and
Shanghai by the respective RC vice chairmen. Similarly, the DRV
delegation had been met by a vice chairman on its arrival in
Canton on the 16th. Whether or not the provincial leaders were
gathered in Peking for a meeting covering Indochina developments,
Chang Chun-chiao's speech broke no new ground in Chinese comment
and, in fact, pulled back from claims that the PRC's security
was threatened.
ANALOGY BETWEEN The 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
KOREA, INDOCHINA article began its discussion of China's
security interests by warning the Nixon
Administration that it is "highly dangerous" to escalate the
Indochina conflict "in a big way" and by citing the "U.S. bour-
geois press" as saying that the Administration "is following the
beaten track of the Truman Administration in Korea." An NCNA
report on the 20th quoted the New York, TIMES as saying "Nixon
is moving along the path followed by General MacArthur in Korea."
In a still more explicit analogy between Korea and Indochina,
also drawn indirectly by Peking, an NCNA dispatch datelined
Paris, 20 February quoted the pro-Peking L'HUMANITE ROUGE as
warning the United States not to forget "the punishment inflicted
on you by the Korean people and the Chinese People's Volunteers."
The journal was also quoted as saying Chinese support for Laos
"is not an empty :;ord" and as raising the possibility of a third
world war.
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Peking has not, in its own name, evoked a threat of Chinese
intervention in Indochina. Propaganda flaunting Ciii:!,eoe exploits
during the Korean War, as in a commentary by a veteran of that
war broadcast by Peking to Taiwan on the 23rd, has drawn on
the Korean experience to show that the United States is "a paper
tiger" while expressing confidence that the Indochinese people
will be able to rope with the situation. In the most authorita-
tive recent review of the Korean War, Politburo member and PLA
Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, delivering the keynote address
in the commemoration last October of the 20th anniversary of
Chinese entry into the war, gave a carefully circumscribed reading
of the conditions leading to Chinese intervention. Huang defined
the threshold as the point where the United States had "flagrantly
extended the flames" of war to the Yalu River "in disregard of the
repeated stern warnings" by Peking and had "gravely menaced the
security of China." Before this point had been reached, according
to Huang's account, the Chinese had "firmly supported and assisted"
the Koreans in their liberation war--a formulation of rear area
support which Peking has consistently used in its pronouncements
on Indochina.
PRC INTEREST Peking's adherence to its long-standing line of
IN LAOS rear area support while challenging Washington's
denials of a threat to Chinese security from the
Laos operations suggests an effort to keep the United States off
balance--and to arouse pressure on the Administration' --withoi'.
prematurely spelling out warnings in circumstances which might
debase their credibility. While sustaining its posture of pledging
rear base backing for the Indochinese, Peking's warnings that its
security has been menaced and that the conflict is spreading to
China's doorstep underscore its special concern over military
developments in Laos.
It is noteworthy that the question of Chinese security interests
was first raised--in the 12 February government statement--in
* Characteristically, Peking has played up American press and
congressional criticism of U.S. policy in Indochina, as in an
NCNA report on the 13th quoting Senators Fulbright, Mansfield,
and McGovern and citing REUTERS as saying most of the members
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "view the Laos opera-
tion as a dangerous gamble." There have been no reports in PRC
media of American comment mentioning the China factor. Peking
is generally wary about taking note of American leaders' comment
on Sino-U.S. relations and has remained silent about calls for
new directions in U.S. China policy.
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reaction to developments in Laos and that Peking has introduced
the Korean War parallel in this context. The incursion into
Cambodia last year, which prompted a more prominent Chinese
propaganda campaign--highlighted by a Mao statement--designed
to capitalize politically on direct American participation on
the ground, did not cause Peking to link the PRC's security to
military developments in Indochina. Current comment has persis-
tently charged that the United States is plotting a surprise
attack on the DRV?, but Peking has not associated its security
interests directly with those of the North Vietnamese. PRC
media have not reported Xuan Thuy's remark in Paris on the
18th that U.S. actions threaten China as well as the DRV.
Despite its aversion to the Paris talks, Peking occasionally
reports statements by the communist delegations.
NUCLEAR Neither the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article nor
WEAPONS the NCNA report took note of the President's remark
at his press conference ruling out the use of nuclear
weapons in Indochina. Since a reference in a 15 February
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, the issue has been broached
only in passing in low-level reports quoting foreign sources.
Thus, the 20 February NCNA dispatch from Paris quoted L'HUMANITE
ROUGE as saying that the President--a "war criminal worse than
Hitler"--"iP preparing public opinion for the eventual use of
nuclear weapons; in Indochina."
Peking's failure to mention the President's remark and the
flagging interest it is showing in the issue could indicate that
Chinese fears, if they were genuine, have been allayed. It is
also possible that Peking simply believes the President's remark
has made the issue less exploitable. The subject may be regarded,
in any event, as particularly sensitive by elements in Peking or
among its Indochinese allies. None of the latter, except Sihanouk's
government in a-statement carried by NCNA, has raised the issue.
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MOSCOW SUSTAINS CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO INDOCHINA EVENTS
Soviet reaction to President Nixon's press conference on the 17th
has been limited and generally cautious, consisting chiefly of
reports on foreign criticism. Soviet media have ignored the
President's statement that tactical nuclear weapons would not be
used in Indochina, but an article in IZVESTIYA on the 13th
sought to exploit the nuclear issue; it charged, on the basis
of Western press speculation, that "irresponsible circles in the
United States" were "trying to exert nuclear blackmail" in
Indochina.
Moscow media predictably play up Western and communist press
reports to portray "Laotian patriotic victories" as "thwarting"
the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos. TASS on the 22d
promptly picked up the DRV Foreign Ministry's charges that U.S.
planes raided the DRV from 17 to 21 February, but there has
been no Soviet comment yet on the renewed air strikes.
In the only original Soviet press comment on the President's
news conference, Barsukov in IZVESTIYA on the 18th interpreted
the President's statements as "an ultimatum to the DRV." The
commentator says the President used his press conference to
"directly declare that the U.S. Administration was lifting all
restrictions on the use of its air power in Indochina, making
it clear that the United States intends to resume bombings over
DRV territory." According to Barsukov, the President also said
the United States "does not expect a political settlement from
the Paris negotiations, thus giving the most official blessing
to further procrastinations and sabotage of the negotiations by
the U.S. delegation." The commentator relied on the "U.S. press,"
however, for a more personal swipe at the President--the
observation that "Nixon's statements on U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia have been particularly undiplomatic, unceremonious, and
imbued with the ideas of strength."
Soviet media are not known to.have broached the question of a
Soviet role'in a political settlement in Indochina since the
17th, when a Mayevskiy PRAVDA article commented critically on
reports of a Japanese initiative with the 1962 Geneva conference
cochairman.* Moscow has not acknowledged a KYODO item from
Tokyo on the 19th which reported that Soviet Ambassador to Japan
* See the TRENDS of 18 February 1971, pages 14-15.
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Troyanovakiy had rejected Japan's "initiative aimed at restoring
peace in Laos." KYODO reported that Troyanovskiy, commenting
on the Japanese move at a press club meeting in Tokyo, said
"the only solution to the Indochina crisis is the complete
withdrawal of foreign troops."
On 24 February TASS reported cryptically that representatives of
the Soviet and French foreign ministries had held consultations
"on the situation in Indochina" _n Paris on February 22-23 and
that the discussions took place in the spirit of the Soviet-
French protocol of 13 October 1970. The protocol, signed during
President Pompidou's visit to the USSR, provided that foreign
ministry officials should consult regularly, twice annually or
"whenever necessary," on situations which would create a "threat
to peace" or "international tension" as well as major inter-
national problems of mutual interest.
ROLE OF CHINA Moscow continues to emphasize a portrayal of
communist unity on Indochina for domestic
and Western consumption, :,chile sustaining the polemical treatment
of this issue in broadcasts to China. TASS on the 19th picked
up remarks by DRV and PRG officials at their Paris press
conference on the 18th, including a statement that the PRC and
DRV are "side by side." The account also included the remark
that the expansion of the war by the United States "threatens
China," just as it threatens "other socialist countries." On
the 22d Moscow's domestic service summarized the 20 February
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the President's press
conference, including the comment that the spread of the war "at
China's doorstep . . . created a grave threat to China," as
well as the derisive reference to the President's "claim" that
the "escalation does not endanger China."
A broadcast in Chinese on the same day, however, accused the PRC
of playing into the hands of the United States in Indochina.
The broadcast pointedly noted that while President Nixon is
"making provocative threats that he will not limit the use of
air power in Indochina" and has "indicated the possibility of
invading North Vietnam," Peking's leadership is following a
splittist, anti-Soviet policy that "can only benefit imperialism."
ISSUE OF USE OF In an apparent propaganda effort to exploit
NUCLEAR WEAPONS the issue of possible use of nuclear weapons
in Indochina, an article by Sagatelyan in
IZVESTIYA on the 18th--ignoring the President's exclusion of
atomic weapons in the context of Indochina--charged "irresponsible
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circles in the United States with an attempt at nuclear black-
mail" in that area of the world. As evidence of ouch
"blackmail," the article belatedly cited articles by
C.L. Sulzberger in the New York TIMES (the first appeared
last November and the most reccnt on 3 February of this year)
on an alleged scenario created by Defense Department
consultant Edmund Stillman which envisaged U.S. use of nuclear
weapons against the PRC following Chinese intervention in
Indochina. It "must be assumed," Sagatelyan said, that this
"mad plan" was publicized "with agreement in the Pentagon,"
and its existence confirms "that there are s;,ill atomic
maniacs in the United States who have forgotten what times they
live in." The article concluded with a vague warning drawn
from the 17 December Soviet Government statement, which had
belatedly endorsed the 10 December DRV joint party-government
appeal: "Attempts to carry out new military threats with
regard to the peoples of Indochina will lead to an ever greater
co'aplication of the situation in Southeast Asia."
Although routine-level Moscow comment has sporadically raised
the possibility of use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, most
recently in a passing reference to this possibility by Radio
Moscow on 11 February, .he Sagatelyan article is the first
Soviet ca;nmentary to focus on the subject. Moscow's exploita-
tion of this new anti-U.S. propaganda theme may have been
prompted in part by the flurry of attention Peking has
recently given to the issue, as well as by the motive of
stepping up propaganda support for Hanoi during the Laotian
operation.
OIL MONOPOLIES Other notable Soviet comment includes a PRAVDA
IN INDOCHINA article on the 23d by Yuriy Zhukov which
departed from the usual Soviet theme that the
United States is in Vietnam to suppress the national liberation
movement, focusing instead on the theme that the United States,
in addition to its political motivations, is there "to defend
the selfish interests of the U.S. oil monopolies." According to
Zhukov, U.S. oil companies are carrying out preparations for
large-scale extractions of oil from seabeds in the countries of
Southeast Asia, and they hope the U.S. forces in Indochina will
protect their interests. Although Zhukov went on in effect to
depict U.S. soldiers as dying for U.S. monopolies, a standard
general theme in communist propaganda, his linkage of the
presence of U.S. troops in Vietnam with alleged U.S. attempts to
exploit Asian national resources seems designed to fan Asian
opposition to U.S. economic penetration of the area.
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PATHET LAO-NEUTRALIST MEETING URGES GREATER VICTORIES
An "extraordinary meeting" of the standing committee of the NLHS
Central Committee and the Alliance Committee of the Patriotic
Neutralist Forces (PNF) chaired by Prince Souphanouvong was held
in Sam Neua on 22 February, according to Pathet Lao media on the
23d.* The communique on the meeting says that the session
"considered the change in the present tense situation in the
country in the face of the new invasion of lower Laos by U.S.
and Saigon puppet troops." Asserting that the "direct participa-
tion of U.S. troops" is "an open act which cannot be concealed,"
the communique claims that "U.S. green berets and officers
joined with Saigon puppet troops in conducting various operations"
and that U.S. helicopter pilots transported "Saigon puppet troops,
armored cars, and U.S. artillery units."
Charging that the Nixon Administration staged the operation in
the hope of "recouping the ignominious defeats of the Nixon
doctrine," the communique says among other things that the
Americans have "sabotaged all attempts of the NLHS to solve the
Laotian question by peace)'ul means." It again attacks the
"Vientiane puppet powerholders headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma"
as a "tool" of the United States, charging that they "secretly
discussed" the plans for the incursion with the United States
and Saigon.
The communique concedes that the incursion "may cause some
difficulties and obstacles for the Laotian people," but it says
the national salvation struggle is coming to "new and great
favorable conditions" while the United States and its allies
are being isolated by public opinion. Besides, ands the
communique, the "contradictions among the U.S. lackeys in
Vientiane are becoming more violent," with both Vientiane and
Saigon "puppet" officers and enlisted men becoming "fed up"
with the war. The commi.nique urges the "patriotic forces" to
win still greater victories, and it hails the outcome of the
9 February talks between Princes Souphanouvong and Sihanouk,
reiterating praise for the "unshakeable fighting solidarity"
of the three Indochinese people based on the Indochinese
peoples' summit conference.
A similar NLHS-PNF "extraordinary conference" had been held
from 6 to 8 June in Sam Neua. Addressed by the two organizations'
respective chairmen, Prince Souphanouvong and Khamsouk Keola,
the meeting denounced the expansion of U.S. aggression in all of
Indcchina,.particularly the move into Cambodia and intensified
bombing of Laos, and praised victories of the Pathet Lao forces
in ground operations in Laos.
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The "extraordinary meeting" had been proposed at a "special
session" of the NLHS Central Committee standing committee on
19 February, according to NCNA on the 20th. That session
reportedly analyzed the "new situation in Laos" and set forth
"the new task of smashing the war venture" of the United
States and its allies.
Continuing official Pathet Lao statements on the Laos situation
include a letter from Prince Souphanouvong to the American
people carried by the Pathet Lao news agency 20 February.
Souphanouvong informed the American people ol the "serious
situation in Laos" caused by new acts of U.S. aggression. He
said among other things that President Nixon's decision to
introduce into southern Laos "a great number of Saigon troops
and American GI's and military advisers wearing green berets
and Saigon troops' uniforms, with massive U.S. air support,
contrasts with the U.S. Government's commitment before Congress
on 30 June 1970 rot to use U.S. air and ground forces and
military advisers to support the Saigon troops' operations in
Cambodia and Laos." The message welcomes the recent protests
in the United States against the Laos move and calls upon
"American friends" to make further efforts to oppose the Laos
operation.
A 21 February statement by an LPLA Supreme Command spokesman,
carried by Pathet Lao radio the following day, denounces
intensified B-52 strikes in the Sam Thong-Long Cheng area
and southern Xieng Khouang Province. Radio Pathet Lao on the
19th reported another message to the Geneva conference cochairmen
from NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit--dated 18 February--
which protests the dir-,a,tch of additional Thai troops to Laos,
following up the 17 February NLHS Central Committee spokesman's
statement on the subject. The NLHS Central Committee spokesman's
statement was also formally endorsed in PRG and DRV foreign
ministry spokesmen's statements on 20 February.
An NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement, carried by
VNA on 24 February, takes issue with President Nixon's.,,
17 February press conference remark that he would not place
any limitation on the use of American air power and that he would
use all existing and necessary forces to defend U.S. troops in
Indochina. Without acknowledging any of the President's other
statements, the NLHS says his remarks chow that he is "plotting
new military adventures." It repeats demands that the United
States stop aggression in Laos and withdraw U.S. and Saigon
troops, and it reiterates the determination of the Laotian people
to fight resolutely against continued aggression.
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PRG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING PUBLICIZED BELATEDLY
Liberation Radio on the 19th broadcast a 10 February communique
on a session of the PRG Council of Ministers which met under
the chairmanship of President Huynh Tan Phat to review the
situation of the past year and set forth "immediate tasks"
in stepping up the resistance. The common .que says the
ministers heard "reports on the movement to foil the enemy's
pacification plan, our PLA.F's activities on alp battlefields,
and the struggle movement of our compatriots of all strata in
southern cities." The last known meeting of the PRG Council
of Ministers was in mid-January 1970, publicized in a
communique dated 25 January 1970.E Similarly chaired by Phat,
it also reviewed the previous year and set forth tasks for
the coming year.
The "immediate tasks" cited in this year's communique include
mobilization of the armed forces and people to step up
resistance, heighten determination to fight end win. destroy
a large amount of allied war potential and materiel, :,iaintain
and develop the "mass struggle movement," smash Vic;tnamiz ation,
expand the "anti-U.S. national salvation unity front," increase
strength, and advance to "ever greater victories." Consistent
with the diminished propaganda attention to "revolutionary
administration" in the past year, the communique does not
repeat the call in the communique on the January 1970 meeting
for extending and consolidating the "revolutionary administra-
tion system."
Paying special attention to the question of land reform, the
communique notes that the Council of Ministers condemned "the
extremely reactionary and deceitful land reforms" of the
Saigon regime and called for struggle against them. It
goes on to explain the PRG's position on the question,
reiterating that the PRG recognizes "the ownership right
of the peasants, legally as well as practically, over the
lands distributed to them by the revolution during the
years of resistance against the French colonialists as
well as in the present struggle against the U.S.
imperialists."
* The January 1970 Council. of Ministers meeting and earlier
meetings in July and August 1969 were discussed in the
4 February 1970 TRENDS, page 12.
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24 FEBRUARY 1971
- 21 -
SIN O-SOVIET RELATIONS
SINO-SOVIET TREATY ANNIVERSARY PASSES WITHOUT NOTICE
The 14 February anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance
passed without notice by either side for the fifth successive year.
Soviet broadcasts it Mandarin in the 13th and 14th discussed
Sino-Soviet cooperation and "united action" in the 1950's, but
there was no direct mention of the treaty. One Mandarin broadcast,
over Radio Peace and Progress on the 13th, made the absence of any
mention of the 1950 treaty the more conspicuous by paying respects
to a 1957 Sino-So%riet statement pledging cooperation and unity.
After expressing ;'egret over the subsequent deterioration of
relations, the broadcast cited Kosygin as appealing for a restora-
tion of normal relations and a settlement of problems. It did n~+
mention the Peking talks, a subject being avoided by both sides.
Peking has largely ignored the Soviets while devoting extensi%'f-
propaganda attention to Indochina. Consistent with its policy
of cultivating Hanoi while playing down its rivalry with Moscow,
Peking's propaganda on Indochina has been free of anti-Sovi~,t
polemics except for an occasional jab at Moscow in Albanian cornuuen'
reprinted in PRC media.
SOVIET COMMENT While avoiding major polemical attacks, apart
ON CHINA from the steady flow of anti-Chinese propaganda
in Soviet broadcasts to the Chinese, Moscow has
balanced its neutral reports on PRC statements and bilateral
meetings with low-level press articles conveying Soviet displeasure,
over events in China. Thus, PRAVDA and other papers on 30 January
carried a TASS report on the CCP provincial congresses, and
IZVESTIYA on 3 February reprinted a Polish article on current
developments in China. The impression left on the reader is that
the Maoist regime is seeking to consolidate its unorthodox,
illegitimate control in the wake of the cultural revolution.
A TASS commentary carried in IZVESTIYA on 6 February discussed
with distaste the Peking "model operas" refashioned by Mao's wife,
who is identified as a former actress who..achieved notoriety as an
inspirer of Red Guard destruction of universities, theaters, and
other cultural centers.*
* Peking can hardly have been pleased with the article's slur on
Madame Mao. NCNA on 19 February reported that the .PRC ambassador
in Moscow gave a diplomatic reception-the previous evening
featuring a film of one of the model operas. The.. film was "warmly
received and praised" by the diplomats present.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
211 FEBRUARY 1971
SOVIET ARMED Articles in the central press marking Soviet
FORCES DAY armed forces day have avoided mentioning China.
Last year Marshal Yakubovskiy took note of the
Chinese "war psychosis"--a major Soviet theme at that time--in
his article on the occasion. Sino-Soviet tenr,:ions, :hough
substantially reduced in the past year, were reflected on this
year's armed forces day in a talk over the Khabarovsk radio by
a deputy chief of staff of the Far Eastern military district opposite
the T'RC. The Chinese were rebuked in the talk for rendering
a "shameful service" to the imperialists by pursuing "a counter-
revolationary, anti-Soviet, and nationalistic course." The
talk also referred to Soviet operations along the border during
fighting in 1929 and 1939. These events had been recalled in an
IZVESTIYA article on 17 February recounting recent combi..t
exercises by troops of the Transbaykal military district.
NCNA reported on the 23d that the military attache of the Soviet
embassy in Peking gave a reception that day on the occasion of
armed forces day. Those attending included Soviet bnbassador
Tolstikov and Chai Cheng-wen, who is deputy head.of the PRC
delegation at the border talks. As has happened ou other
occasions, Moscow reported that the Chinese refused permission
for Soviet embassy personnel to visit various cities to lay
wreaths on graves of fallen Soviet soldiers. A brief TASS
report was carried in the Soviet press on the 20t,h under the
heading "To Be Regretted."
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C0Nh'IDE'N'TIA1., F'13I5 'T'RENDS
2h FF13fUAItY 1.9'(1.
MIDDLE EAST
USSR SEES UAR AS CONSTRUCTIVE, ISRAEL AS BLOCKING PEACE
Moscow continues to praise the UAR's "constructive" attitude
displayed in its expression of readiness to recognize Israel's
sovereignty and to settle the problem of navigation on inter-
national waterways. Propagandists say this attitude creates a
favorable climate for the success of the Jarring mission and
makes a political. settlement on the basis of Security Council
Resilution 2t2 "realistic and feasible." Soviet commentaries
again approve the UAR'c proposal for opening the Suez Canal,
pointing out--in broadcasts to ouch audiences as India,
Indonesia, and Japan--the consequences of the canal's closure
for the developing countries.
A
11 t the same time, .Ttcrael is criticized for continuing its
obstructionist" and "shortsighted" attitude in maintaining
an "annexationist" course, refusing to return :- ~o the pre-
5 June 1967 borders, and failing to respond to Jarring's
memorandum. PRAVDA on the 19th said that if the Israeli
leaders were not "reasonable and sensible" enough to stop
sabotaging a peaceful settlement, they would bear the
consequences of their obstructionist "and indeed aggressive"
attitude in the Jarring contacts.
Charging Israel with seeking to consolidate its control over
the occupied territories, TASS on the 18th cited the "openly
provocative" deci6ion on construction of housing units in
Jerusalem for new J9wish settlers. While not mentioning the
16 February State Department statement that the United States
cannot accept unilateral action by any party to decide the
city's final status, both 'PASS and a 22 February foreign-
language commentary by Tsoppi noted criticism of the Israeli
plan by the New York TIMES. A Vasilyev article in PRAVDA,
reported by TASS on the 23d, accused the Israeli "occupationists"
of "intimidation" of the Arab population to "make it easier to
'develop"' the occupied territories.
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CONVIDFN'I'IAL 1.'J315 'l'R0:NUS
213 l''LBIUUARY 1911
- 211 -
ISRAELI Thuu far Moncow hnu given ncrunt attention to the
STATEMENT 21 February Inrush cabinet statement addressed to
the IJAR's 15 February reply to Jarring's memorandum.
A short Moscow domestic service item on the 22d said it follows
from the Israeli statement that Israel "virtually comes out ugainnt."
Jarring'u miuuion. In the only reference to the contents of the
statement, the broadcast singled out, Ioracl's refusal to withdraw
from all occupied Arab territorieu--the "ncccuuary condition" for
a just and stable peace. The Tuoppi commentary on the 22d, focusing
on the awns point, Interpreted the refusal to withdraw as meaning
that Iuruel wants to speed up measures for annexing the occupied
territorieu and wishes to sabotage a peaceful settlement through
political talks bused on Resolution 2h2. In a commentary on the
20th, T'uoppi had noted that the Israeli Government had decided
"simply to ignore" Jarring's memorandum to Israel.
With regard to the Egyptian reaction, Moscow apparently has not
picked up AL-AHRAM's 22 February complaint that Israel was asked
to respond to Jarring's proposals themselves, not to Egypt's reply
to the Jarring memorandum addressed to the UAR. A TASS dispatch
from Cairo on the 22d c:r.ted the assessment of UAR "official
circles" that Israel's "reply to Jarring's latest rroposal"
shows that Tel Aviv is adhering to its "expansionirt policy."
'PASS noted Cairo's belief that the Security CouncU should
take strong measures to prevent Israel from disregarding UN
resolutions.
On the 23d TASS attributed to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY a
report that UAR Foreign Minister Riyad received the diplomatic
representatives of the Big Four and drew their attention to the
"serious situation" resulting from Israel's "continuing
expansionist actions." Riyad pointed out, TASS said, that
the Israeli statement, confirming Israel's unwillingness to
evacuate its forces, shows that Tel Aviv rejects Jarring's
recent proposal on terms for a peace settlement. TASS reported
Riyad as stressing that peace can only be achieved if Israel
withdraws from all occupied territories, but the account
failed to note that he asked the big powers to "face their
responsibilities concerning Israel's rejection of Jarring's
proposals and its defiance of peace."
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CO1Il'IULN'J'IA 1. I'1i1.1 TRENDS,
24 FE1i1ilJARY 19'(1-
PRA I SE FOR A Mrttvcyev art ic.lr In .l'I,VI,i'I'.IYA, reviewed by TA;:;;;
UAR POLICY and the domestic uervlce on the 19111 and 20th, sriyr?
Ml Important landmark has been reached In the
crlulu, calling more than ever befot?e for the adoption of
dec tuionu opening it wtty to genuine normalization of' the 111 tuatl on .
Commenting that It In difficult to overestimate tile ImporLonce
of the UAlt'u "new peace initiative," Mntveycv points out that
Israel haw repeatedly alleged that Wth unwillingness to rc~~c~f?nl ;:??
Its uoverelgnty stud to settle the problem of navigation on Inter-
national waterways hall been the stumbling block to it ueLtlement.
'1'htue "false rumo,:u and diutortion;" have been done awtty with "?rcc
and for all, he declares.
A Lo:;cv PIIAVDA article broadcast in Arabic on the 19th and
T.,;oppi's roretgn-language, commentary on the 20th both undcrucorc'
the UAR':; orricial statement, in its reply to Jarring, of
rcadineun to guarantee lurael'n uovercignty on condition that,
both ride; recognize and respect the pr(,.-5 June 1967 borders.
Both recall UAR President as- adat'n stnt.erncnt in his NEWSWEEK
interview that Calro will guarantee resumption of shipping
through the Sue:: Canal within six months provided Israeli
forces withdraw from the cast bank, that it will also
guarantee freedom of navigation through the '{'Iran Strait,
and that I t will not object to the stationing of international
ob:;crver force; In Sharm ash-Shaykh.
`i'soppi additionally mentions that the UAR agrees to Israel
using both the Suez Canal and the Tiran Strait, with the
proviso that Israel fulfill its obligations under Resolution
2142. Re seems to draw a distinction between Suez and Tiran
navigation in his commentary on the 22d, however; he says that
If Israel withdraws from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal,
"international navigation" could start in the canal and "free
navigation" could start in the strait.
In the commentary on the 20th Tsoppi turns to the U.S. attitude,
given little propaganda attention since the 10 February PRAVDA
attack on the American position in the Big Four consultations.
Remarking that the U.S. attitude should be viewed with "caution,"
he says that Washington's recent verbal reaction to the UAR's
steps "has in general been positive, and it is even pretending
to be irritated by and dissatisfied with Israel's stubbornness."
But he routinely points to Western press reports of further
U.S. aid to Israel and asserts that support of such dimensions
can only strengthen Israel's "aggressive expansionist aims"
and its "counteraction" to a political settlement.
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CONFIDEN'T'IAL 113IU THENUO
211 FEBRUARY 1971
SYRIAN Tuoppi'u .10 February commentary also calls attention
POSITION to Arab uupport? for the UAR position, citing Egyptian
Presidential Affairs Minister Sami Uharaf as declaring
that Syria, i,ibya, and Sudan--the other three Tripoli Charter
utatcs--"fully support" thr EKyptian policy. Taoppi adds that
forthcoming alku in Cairo between King Ilus ayn and President
au-Uadat--now "canceled" by ltusayn, according to Cairo's AL-AIIRAM
on the 22d--would also be dedicated to coordination of actions
aimed at settling the conflict.
In reporting Syrian Prime Minister al-Aaad'a 22 February speech
at the first session of the People's Council, 'L'ASS did not mention
his reiteration of Syrian refection of Resolution 2112 and his stress
on "armed battle" as the decisive factor in the Arab struggle. Not
unexpectedly, there was no reference to Resolution 2112 or a
political settlement In the 3 February Soviet-Syrian communique
on al-Aaad'a Moscow visit. But Moscow continued to press its views:
A 3 February 'L'ASS commentary on the visit echoed Kosygin's 1 February
luncheon speech in calling for implementation of Resolution 242
with due regard for the legitimate rights of the peoples of "all"
Middle Eastern states, including the Palestinians.
In a few instances Moscow has seemed to link Syria indirectly with
the concept of a political settlement. Thus NEW TIMES, on the
"Comment" page of its 12 February Russian edition, noted that
al-A3ad's visit took place "at a crucial moment in the Arabs'
struggle for a dust political settlement." And PRAVDA's
Belyayev, in the Moscow domestic service commentators' round-
table on 7 February, remarked that the UAR had agreed tc an
extension of the cease-fire and that neither Jordan nor Syria
had violated the cease-fire; consequently, Belyayev said, the
"Arab states" have demonstrated their devotion "to a cause
linked wit'1 preparations for a settlement of the crisis, and
not vice versa."
Twice last August, Soviet c ommentators--Belyayev on the 7th and
Kudryav-tsev on the 23d--had noted in passing that if a
settlement were reached, Damascus would not hinder it.
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CUN1 1DI,NT1Ai, F1310 T1t1ENUJ
24 FEBRUARY 1971
SOVIET ADMIRAL DENIES CALLS AT FOREIGN PORTS POSE THREA"
In remarks evidently reomptcd by the U.S. press publicity for the
latest visit of a Soviet naval squadron to Cuba, Admiral Alcxcycv,
deputy chief of the mtin headquarters of the Soviet navy, took the
occasion of the USSR's :3 February armed forces day to defend the
right of Soviet ships to cull at foreign ports during long-distance
voyages and to insist that such calls pose no threat. Alexcycv's
remarks appear in an interview in the weekly NEDELYA No. 8, dated
24 February; they were summarized by TASS on the 19th.
In keeping with Moscow propaganda's portrayal of the latest calls
at Cuban ports as normal and routine,* Alexeyev pointed out that,
"at present one of the Soviet naval squadrons is completing its
stay at the ports of Cuba" while another has made an official
call at Massawa to take part in a traditional Ethiopian naval
festival. He went on to note that Soviet ships had made more
than 100 calls at the ports of "almost 60" countries over tht
past two years and to reject "statements appearing in the foreign
press that long-distance voyages by Soviet ships are a threat.."
Alexeyev imputed "allegations like the myth of a Soviet threat"
to "aggressive circles of the imperialist states"--he did not
name the United States--who are concerned about the growth of
Soviet naval power. Reiterating that the Soviet Union "is not
going to threaten anyone," he concluded that Soviet ships "have
plied and will ply . . . the world ocean, which is known to be
nobody's possession."
Alexeyev's reference to a Soviet naval squadron "completing its
stay" in Cuba is the only monitored mention of the squadron in
Moscow media since 11 February, when TASS announced in a single
terse sentence that "Soviet naval ships, on a practice cruise
in the central Atlantic, called at Hevana port on 10 February
in accordance with an arrangement." A 4 February Moscow broad-
cast in English announcing the "routine" training voyage had
* See the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 27-29, for an
examination of the Soviet and Cuban-announcements of the visit
and for background on Soviet comment late last year reacting to
the public speculation about construction of a Soviet submarine
base in Cuba and insisting on the right of Soviet ships to call
at Cuban ports.
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CONFIDENTIAL FI3I[3 'T'RENDS
211 FEBRUARY 1971
similarly said the "business calls" at Cuban ports would be
"in accordance with an agreement reached." Havana radio announced
on the 13th that the squadron, consisting of "a submarine chaser,
a mother chip [buque madre], a submarine, and a. tanker," was
"in the port of Havana after having finished a training cruise
In the middle Atlantic."
While REUTER reported under a Havana dateline on the 16th that the
antisubmarine chip which made port in Havana on the 10th had left
on the night of the 15th, Cuban and Soviet media took no notice
of its departure. Neither Havana nor Moscow, in announcing that
the visit would take place, had specified an arrival or departure
date. Neither reported any of the movements of Soviet ships
between Cuban ports during the earlier visits of Soviet naval
squadrons in September and December 1970, and neither reported
any of the chips' final departure.
SOVIET ATTACHE MENTIONS HELP TO CUBA ON USSR ARMED FORCES DAY
Cuba marked Soviet armed forces day with an apparently live
telecast on 23 February featuring a talk by the Soviet.military
attache in Cuba, Capt. Igor A. Amosov,.on the Soviet armed
forces' exploits in defense of socialism since the founding of
the Red Army in 1916. Declaring that "the United States is
threatening Cuba," Amosov paid tribute to the successes scored
by the Cuban armed forces in "upgrading their combat-readiness,"
in "daily perfecting their mastery over combat skills," and in
"assiduously learning to handle modern combat weapons" in the
cause of defense of the: country. He concluded vaguely: "We
Soviets will apply all our strength and possibilities to help
our Cuban brothers fulfill their historic mission."
Amosov was also the chief Soviet speaker at Cuban observances of
the USSR's armed forces day last year. Havana radio on 21 February
1970 quoted him as speaking more generally of the Soviet armed
forces' solidarity with all "victims of aggression" and comradeship
with the Cuban armed forces. But a Cuban speaker on the same
occasion, armed forces vice minister for political work Maj. Antonio
Perez Herrero, referred to the Soviet "advisers" and "specialists"
who were helping "to increase the capabilities of our cadres and
combatants in the use of the most modern and complex combat
equipment."
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
Assuring his Cuban audience of the strength and efficacy of Soviet
military protection, Amosov mentioned in this year's telecast, in
the course of a review of the Soviet armed forces' growth, that
the' Soviet army and navy "are equipped with nuclear missiles aimed
at various targets, supersonic planes, new tanks, atomic submarines,
and many other modern methods for armed struggle." He was reported
as referring last year, at a press conference in connection with
armed forces day, to the USSR's "powerful rockets capable of
annihilating the industrial and military potential of any capitalist
state."
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CONFIDENNT'IA1., T'B1L T1d;NDS
21- FEBRUARY 1971
SOVIET, GDR MEDIA AVOID NEW FOUR-POWER "NEGOTIATIONS" FORMULA
In summarizing the communique on the 15th four-power ambassadorial
meeting held 18 February in Berlin, neither Soviet nor GDR media
registered the new formula adopted in the communique, which for
the first time describes the talks as "ncgotiationo." Where the
communique says the four ambassadors "continued their negotiations,"
the TASS Russian service* hewed to the old formulation, used in
the communiques on prior meetings, in saying they met "within the
framework of an exchange of views on questions connected with the
situation in West Berlin." TASS duly picked up the standard
report that they continued their "businesslike discussions of
the questions under examination"--contained in the current communique
as in the prior ones--and noted that the next meeting is schedules
for 9 March, following the usual consultations at the expert level.
The TASS report, transmitted promptly on the 18th, was printed in
PRAVDA the next day. The East German ADN used it almost verbatim,
attributed to TASS, on the 18th. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 19th
carried an ADN-attributed paraphrase of the communique that was
full and accurate except for the operative sentence on negotiations:
The paper said the ambassadors continued their "talks" (Gespraeche)
rather than "negotiations" (Verhandlungen).
IZVESTIYA political observer Matveyev, participating in the
21 February Moscow domestic service roundtable, also avoided using
the term "negotiations" in an atypical discussion of the four-power
talks--seldom the subject of more than passing mention in Moscow
comment. Matveyev remarked that another "routine meeting" had
taken place and that the ambassadors "continued their businesslike
discussions of the questions under examination." He wanted to
"stress," he said, that the "discussions" were "businesslike."
As if to underscore the idea that there. was still no significant
forward movement, he cautioned that it would be "premature to draw
conclusions now about the possible outcome of such discussions."
* Inexplicably, TASS' English. service, which normally carries the
same items as TASS Russian, did not carry the item at all.
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 31 -
EUROPEAN SECURITY
FI3I3 'i'Ii1 ND;3
24 FEI3HUAI2Y 1971
WARSAW PACT RENEWS CALL FOR MULTILATERAL TALKS ON CONFERENCE
In the first formal Warsaw Pact statement since the December NATO
Council meeting in Brussels, the communique on the 18-19 February
Bucharest meeting of the Pact foreign ministers atepo up the
propaganda pressure for "multilateral" contacts preparatory to the
convening of a European security conference. The last Pact state-
ment, issued 2 December by the Political Consultative Committee
after its meeting in Berlin, had stated that "along with bilateral
contacts, the holding of multilateral consultations" by all
interested states was necessary to prepare for a conference. The
current communique, carried by TASS on 19 February, follows up
with the statement that "conditions" have been created during
bilateral contacts for the "transition to preparatory work on a
multilateral basis for convening the all--European conference."
The communique formalizes the Pact members' support for the
Finnish Government's initiative of 25 November 19'(0 to host
"preparatory meetings of all interested states." Soviet media
on 28 January, reporting on "the reply of the European socialist
countries to Finland's initiative," had noted that the USSR, its
six Pact allies, and Yugoslavia had all informed the Finnish
Government of their readiness to attend such meetings. The
communique, now terming multilateral meetings a matter of
"urgency," asserts the readiness of the Pact states to participate
in the meetings proposed by Finland "at any time and to empower
their appointed representatives for this purpose."
elacing the onus on the NATO bloc for the slow progress toward a
conference, the communique replays a recurrent propaganda theme
in charging "circles not interested in a further detente in
Europe" with intensifying their opposition to a conference by
raising "preliminary conditions" and trying to link "other
problems" to its convocation. The linkage theme has been picked
up in followup comment on the communique, most notably by
IZVESTIYA observer Matveyev in the 21 February domestic service
roundtable program. Matveyev cited a New York TIMES article by
Fellows as indicating that the United States was seeking to
block a conference by raising preconditions an,l by linking its
convocation to SALT, the Middle East, and the Berlin problem--all
issues having "nothing in common" with a European security
conference. Czechoslovak and Polish followup commentaries have
similarly decried efforts to link the conference issue to SALT
as well as other problems.
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CONFIDEN'I'IAL FIllS TREND:1
24 FEBRUARY 1971
The Pact communique reasserts the member states' concern for peace
and detente in Europe and welcomes, without specifying the Soviet
and Polish treaties with the FRG, the recent "positive develop-
ment" in European relations. It also points out "with satisfaction
that certain shifts have been achieved" toward easing tensions in
Europe through the efforts of the socialist and "other states."
Like the Pact's December statement, it includes a gesture of
reassurance to the East Germans: The final paragraph says the
foreign ministers stressed the "significance" of all states,
specifically including West Germany, establishing equal and
internationally recognized relations with the GDR; it calls for
GDR membership in the United Nations and other international
organizations; and it pledges the Pact states' "fraternal assist-
ance" to the GDR in achieving these goals.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
SALT
SOVIET, POLISH COMMENTARIES ASSAIL U.S. NEGOTIATING STAND
Soviet propaganda on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) ,
scheduled to resume In Vienna on 15 March, sustains the pattern
of open--if still infrequent--ccn^ure of the U.S. negotiating
posture signaled by the Shestov PRAVDA article on 3 February.*
Soviet commentators have not repeated Shestov's specific attack
on the American position regarding U.S. forward bases; but the
article's basic charge that the United States is seeking one-
sided advantage, echoed by NOVOSTI commentator Gerasimov in
LITERARY GAZETTE on 10 February, is picked up again in a Moscow
international service broadcast on the 23d. The forward bases
issue is : aised, however, in a broad-ranging attack oi, the
U.S. position in the 17 February Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU,
embellishing recent Soviet themes and asserting that U.S.
rejection of two Soviet proposals at the last SALT round in
Helsinki, ^oupled with statements made by Ambassador Smith
and Secretary Laird, "do not attest to the flexibility of
the U.S. position" and "promise protracted negotiations at
best."
MOSCOW COMMENT The 23 February Moscow radio commentary,
monitored so far only in Finnish, echoes
Gerasimov's complaint in LITERARY GAZETTE about Western press
airing of issues supposedly being negotiated behind closed doors.
The commentary points to "the many clearly fab..' -ated articles"
in the U.S. press which "misinterpret the course of the talks
and describe the Soviet stand as inflexible and unconstructive."
Like Gerasimov, it blames the press leaks on elements of the
military-industrial complex who are "not pleased with the
prospects of a limitation of the nuclear arsenal."
Reiterating Shestov's complaint that the American side "is
trying to achieve one-sided military superiority for the
United States," the commentary portrays the U.S. stand at
the talks, much as Gerasimov did, as "two-faced and
conflicting." It repeats the standard Soviet line that
an agreement is possible only on the basis of equal security
for all states and reiterates the Soviet Union's desire for
"serious and sincere talks" leading to an agreement on that
basis.
* The Shestov article, which broached a substantive SALT
issue for the first time in Soviet comment, is discussed in the
TRENDS of 10 February, pages 22-24.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
- 311 -
There is otherwise only passing Soviet mention of SALT as one
of the issues, along with a West Berlin settlement and a Middle
East solution, which the United States is allegedly trying to
link with a European security conference as a means of stalling
its convocation. The latest such routine complaint about
"linkage" came from Matveyev in the 21 February domestic service
roundtable, and the theme is echoed in Czechoslovak and Polish
comment.
TRYBUNA LUDU The Polish party organ's 17 February dispatch
leads off with the statement that Senator
Muskie, "tile leading pretender to the presidential office,"
has related "some details" of his talks with Premier Kos;,rgin
in Moscow in January, then states--as fact, without directly
quoting Muskie--that Kosygin "expressed his doubts whether
Washington is treating the SALT talks on the limitations of
strategic armaments seriously." (Moscow media had reported
on 15 January that Kosygin received Muskie, but said only
that their "unofficial talk" dealt with "a number of topical
questions of the contemporary international situation and
Soviet-American relations.") Using the reported Kosygin
statement as a take-off point for a broad-ranging attack on
the U.S. position in SALT, TRYBUNA LUDU nowhere returns to
the subject of Senator Muskie.
Criticizing Ambassador Smith and Secretary Laird for statements
registering U.S. inflexibility, the dispatch presses the
stock theme that President Nixon is dominated by the influence
of Pentagon circles seeking to build up the U.S. military
arsenal and recoup the superiority which the United States
has "lost in recent years." Specifically, it objects to
military requests for expansion of the antimissile system
and for "another auxiliary system."
The United States has "for the time being" rejected two Soviet
proposals advanced in Helsinki, the paper says--an agreement
confined to restricting ABM's "as an easier agreement,
and one that would be an introduction" to subsequent ones,
and a "wider agreement concerning mutual limitations on
offensive and defensive arsenals." It says the latter
proposal was "tripped up" by the definition of strategic
weapons, citing the forward bases issue in this context; it
adds that U.S. rejection of a Soviet proposal limiting ABM
systems, on the other hand, was motivated, by Washington's
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
"willingness to have a broader agreement." It charges that Laird
"complicated the dialog" by demanding "mutuality in the form of
a reduction of Soviet medium-range missiles, which cannot reach
U.S. territory."
The Polish paper also raises the MIRV issue, saying the United
States had removed "an extremely important problem from the
SALT agenda when it began to install MIRV warheads on missiles
last summer" and asserting that MIRV is designed as a "first--
preventive--strike weapon" and will bring about yet "another
series of anti-armaments."
Available monitored Polish comment on SALT has included no
previous substantive discussion of this kind. Well before
Moscow broke its silence on the negotiating issues, however,
at least one Czechoslovak commentsa-y--in the Bratislava PRACA
on 26 November--cited the question of what constitutes a
strategic weapon as a stumbling block. "The White House,"
PRACA said, "has allegedly instructed the U.S. negotiators
to challenge the thesis that every type of missile or aircraft
which can fly over and strike the territory of one of the two
superpowers with a nuclear weapon can be classified as a
strategic armament. Although the Americans admit that the
limiting of strategic arms is necessary and logical, they
apparently are unwilling to accept such logic as the basis
for the treaty." PRACA saw the third round of the talks
in Helsinki as taking place "in a worse atmosphere" than the
two preceding ones and concluded that it was difficult to
judge what would happen.
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CONFIDENTIAL F13IS '.'RENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
-36-
POLAND
REGIME LEVELS FIRST ATTACK AT CONSERVATIVE OBSTRUCTIONISM
An article in the 19 February iss1:e of the government daily ZYCIE
WARSZAWY by Ryszard Wojna, a member of the paper's editorial
staff, contains the first direct acknowledgment in monitored
Polish media of a power struggle between the Gierek regime and
ho].d-.,ver conservative elements. Heretofore the official
pro,iaganda had blamed the continuing unrest on lack of discipline
s:nong; the workers and on the Gomulka regime's high-handed methods
of decision-making. Now the ZYCIE WARSZAWY article, entitled
"Responsibility for State," says candidly that the election of
Gierek and the changes he introduced have been received with
"almost unanimous" approval and adds that "the word 'almost'
applies to dll those who, as a result of the changes, felt
themselves endangered in their positions and in their methods
of exercising authority" or who "are simply incapable of ridding
themselves of the burdens of conservatism." These people, the
article says, "ar' not followers of the new leadership of the
Polish state." PAP's lengthy summary of the article includes
these passages.
The article refers almost in so many words to the existence of
a power struggle: "We should realize that at present an acute
struggle between the old and the new at very many levels is
going on in our country," with the representatives of the old
"ready through their actions to bring about a reaffirmation"
of their thesis that "society should be ruled, but should not
co-rule."
These remarks appear to allude to opposition elements in the
higher echelons of the central patty and government structure--
more firmly entrenched than the regional party first secretaries,
who are currently being reshuffled with increasing rapidity.
Following the ouster of the Lodz city party leader on the 16th,
Warsaw media have reported replacement of the first secretaries
of the voivodship party committees of Warsaw and Krakow on the
17th, Opole on the 18th, and Wroclaw on the 20th.
The Wojna article portrays the conservatives as the main
beneficiaries of the disruption resulting from pressure for
new wage increases despite the-15 February decision to cancel
the December food price rise: "One cannot rule out," Wojna
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CONFIDENTIAL F13IU1 TRENDS i
214 FEBRUARY 19' L
declares, "that it is grist for the mills of thene people to
submit extremist demands, ouch as wage increases of 20 percent."
Defensively, the article insists that the price rollback r.ctually
amounts to a real wage increase: "In the case of Lodz. where
the average wage is relatively low, the restoration c'.' the
previous food prices is equivalent to a real incrca?.e in wages
of about 15 percent."
The strain on the new leadership in trying to make good its
promises to improve the people's lot and bring them in on decision-
making is evident in the article's assertion that "the conviction
that the possibilities of further economic pi.e:ssure on the state
have been exhausted must become universal." Wojna adds testily
that "the leading representatives of the party and state are
simply unable to rush all of a sudden to individual plants and
to explain the hard economic facts, or, what is.worse, to
ascertain on the spot that ineptitude of portions of the manage-
ment, false local decisions, or even bad will are at the root of
the protests."
In hailing anew the Soviet credits which the regime says made
possible the decision to roll back food prices, the article
treads in the same context on the sensitive ground of "sovereignty."
Indicating that Poland must ultimately rely on its own efforts,
it c'bserves that "the independence of the .state manifests 'trelf
not only in the political affirmation of its sovereignty, but also
in the ability to organize its economic life."
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CO ti FI1)LN'I'IAI.,
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FLiiLt 'I'ItL;NU'J
Ph FLI3ItUAItY 19'(i
PODGORNYYIS PROTEGE TITOV REMOVED FROM KAZAKHSTAN POST
V. N. Titcv, t'ormcr CPSU Centrrii Committee cadre secretary and
longtime protege of Podgornyy, han been removed from his post
as Kazakh second secretary. A Kuzukh Central Committee plenum
on 22 February -released Titov and replaced him with V. K. Mesyats,"
according to Amu-Atu radio on 23 February.
Actually, Tltov had apparently been stripped of his title somewhat
earlier. The clearest indication came on 10 February when
KAZAK[STAN SKAYA PRAVDA, in listing, the Aktyubinsk oblast delega-
tion to the 24th CPSU Congress, identified him only as first
deputy representative to CEMA.
Titov's fall appears to be related to the removal last December
of the Kazakh Komsomol first secretary, U. Dzhanibekov, who
worked under T'itov's supervision. Since that time, other Kazakh
secretaries have taken over Titov's organizational duties.
Whatever the reasons behind his fall, his removal now by Kazakh
First Secretary (and Brezhnev protege) Kunayeir points to the
possibility of a further exacerbation in the relationship
between Brezhnev and Podgornyy. The strains between these
two in 1965 led to 'i'itov's ouster as a Central Committee
secretary and his assignment to Kazakhstan.
Recently exposed shortcomings in the Kazakh Komsomol may have
been the immediate pretext for Titov's removal. On 17 November
a Kazakh Central Committee plenum was called to hear Titov
report on improving the party leadership of Komsomol work.
His long report contained the usual criticisms of shortcomings
in Komsomol work (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRA jA, 18 November). The
plenum's decree, however, formulated the criticisms much more
sharply and cited shortcomings not mentioned by Titov. In
particular, the decree condemned the party's leadership of
the Komsomol organizations for "not fully meeting the demands
of the 23d Party Congress" and of the 1968 CPSU Central
Committee decree on the Krasnoyarsk party organization's
leadership of the Komsomol (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 19 November).
* Mesyats has been first deputy agriculture minister of the
RSFSR since December 1965. Prior to that time he held various
posts as an agricultural leader in Moscow oblast, including the
position of obkom secretary for agriculture.
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CONFIDENTIAL 1111310 'l'RLNll;
21 FEBRUARY 1911(1
Two weeks later, Komsomol First Secretary U. 1)zhan1bekov was
removed at it Kuziddi Komuomol Plenum which discussed the November
Kazakh Central Committee decree (KAZAKIIS'T'ANSKAYA PRAVDA,
3 December). Dzhanibckov was not disgraced, however, as he
was later elected party third secretary of the tiny new T'urgay
oblast. lilu uucccncor as Kazakh Komsomol leader was an outsider,
Z. Kamalidenov, chief of the trade union council of the small
Gurev oblaut. Significantly, this Komsomol plenum was
supervised by Central Committee Secretary S. N. Imashev
rather than by Titov.
Titov'u only subsequent appearance was at the Gecond day of
the December Kazakh Supreme Soviet session (KAZAKIIST'ANSKAYA
PRAVDA, 24 December). Ilia last identification as a Kazakh
leader was as signatory to the obituary of a Kazakh official
in the 25 December KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA. He apparently left
Kazakhstan or surrendered his leadership functions by early
January; an obituary in the 14 January KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
included the names of all Kazakh leaders except Titov, and
the omission recurred in another obituary on 7 February.
Titov did not participate in the rayon and oblast party
conferences and elections in January and February. His
organizational duties were performed by Kazakh secretaries
S. N. Imashev, A. S. Kolebayev and G. A. Melnik.
Titov's uncert.monious fall is reminiscent of his 1965 demotion.
In April 1965 he was elected Kazakh second secretary, although
he was not formally relieved as CPSU Central Committee cadre
secretary until the September 1965 CPSU Central Committee
plenum. T'itov had been Podgornyy's assistant in Kharkov it the
early 1950's and succeeded him as Kharkov first secretary. As
Central Committee cadre secretary, he again worked with
Central Committee Secretary Podgornyy in 1963-1965, but was
sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary following Brezhnev's
victory over Podgornyy. Titov's transfer was apparently not
welcomed by Brezhnev's Kazakh proteges since KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA, in announcing his election as second secretary on
6 April 1965, differed from all other papers in onitting
his title of CPSU Central Committee secretary.
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CON1''iD1:NTI.AI, F13IS '1.'HENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
BELGOROD LEADER VASILYEV BECOMES RSFSR AGRICULTURE CHIEF
Belgorod First Secretary N. F. Vacllyev, ambitous promoter of
the Belgorod system of upecialized liveutoc'.; farming, has been
named to succeed Voronov'u protege K. G. Pysin as RSFSR first
deputy premier for ugric.uiturc (SOVIET RUSSIA, 19 February).
Vasilyev's rise, apparently linked with controversial July
plenum decisions to create a system of large specialized
livestock complexes, appears to mark a further weakening in
Voronov's position. Vasilyev had early career ties with
Brezhnev and other leaders in the Ukraine, and he has
conspicuously failed to endorse agricultural innovations
promoted. by Voronov and his protege Pysin. Voronov in
turn has in the past ignored the Belgorod system of
specialization and instead favored the methods developed
in his former bailiwick Orenburg.
Although Brezhnev and Polyanskiy also have not endorsed
Vasilyev's system, Vasilyev presumably can count at least on
Brezhnev's support. He served under Brezhnev, Kirilenko and
Shcherbitskiy in Dnepropetrovsk, eventually becoming oblast
executive committee chairman in 1961. Ironically, Vasilyev
got his big break as a result of the May 1964 purge of
Voronov's Orenburg proteges. Belgorod First Secretary
A.V. Kovalenko was sent to Orenburg to replace Voronov's
appointee, while Vasilyev replaced Kovalenko in Belgorod.
On his arrival in Belgorod, Vasilyev initiated a program of
specialization which concentrated on the creation of new
facilities for raising livestock rather than on the renova-
tion or expansion of old livestock facilities. Many
delegations have studied Belgorod's work through the years,
with some approving and others complaining about the neglect
of the old facilities. Vasilyev himself admits that his
system is very costly (PRAVDA, 25 June 1970) and requires
the concentration of investments in new specialized farms to
the neglect of other farms. This practice was criticized by
RSFSR Gosplan deputy chairman G. Smirnov, who complained
that the nonspecialized farms in the oblast were neglected
and as a result the oblast as a whole lagged behind its
neighbors (ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, No. 7, 1969).
uring 1968 and 1969 Belgorod suffered sharp setbacks due to
mistakes in specialization, and as Yuriy Chernichenko wrote
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CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1.971
in the June 1970 YUNOS'T', "the Belgorod experience was never as
open to criticism no at the beginning of 1970." But, according
to Chernichenko, the "daring strategy" paid off as a triumph
of large-scale specialization.
The turning point for Vacilyev's Belgorod system came in mid-1970
when the CPSU agricultural plenum decided in favor of a costly
program for construction of large-scale livestock complexes.
This program was approved after a debate over its cost erupted
in the central press. Estonian First Deputy Premier Tynurist
objected to the new complexes as overly expensive in the
10 April IZVESTIYA.
Vasilyev was invited to speak at the July agricultural plenum,
and after the plenum Belgorod's work in creating new industrial
livestock complexes began receiving more recognition. Belgorod's
work was praised by Central Committee agriculture section deputy
head N.P. Rudenko at an October livestock conference (ECONOMICS
OF AGRICULTURE, No. 12, pp 113-114), and PRAVDA's 23 January 1971
editorial praised thn construction of large livestock complexes
and declared that Beigorod, Moscow, Penza, and Tambov "are
setting the tone" for the RSFSR.
Voronov's RSFSR apparatus also became more responsive to the
Belgorod initiatives. Vasilyev had complained in a June ECONOMIC
GAZETTE (No. 29) article that the RSFSR agriculture ministry had
obstructed Belgorod's specialization, by refusing to permit the
oblast to create a joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz association for poultry
production. Yet a 16 September RURAL LIFE editorial praised the
RSFSR agriculture ministry for creating a special unit to aid
quick construction of a complex at a Belgorod sovkhoz. A
17 November SOVIET RUSSIA editorial praised Belgorod's specializa-
tion as one of a number of valuable innovations in the RSFSR.
And finally Voronov himself, in his 2 October KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA interview on livestock raising, praised a Belgorod kolkhoz's
breeding experiment and urged wide study of this initiative.
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CONFI')L;N'i'iAL
- 42-
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FBIS TRENDS
211 T'IEBRUARY 1971
PARTY CC '1ITTEES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR KWANGSI AND KANSU
Ten of the nation's 29 provincial-level subdivisions and 40 percent
of its population now come under the new provincial. party
committees. New committees for Kwangsi and Kansu were announced
by NCNA on 20 and 21 February, following a 21-day hiatus when no
new provincial-level committees were reported.
Establishment of a party committee for Kwangsi, the scene of
violent factional clashes during the summer of 1968, completes
provincial party-building tasks within the Canton Military
Region (MR), Huang Yung-sheng's old bailiwick. The Nanking
MR, led by Politburo members Hsu Shih-yu and Chang Chun-chiao,
was the first military region to set up new committees for
all provincial units within its juristiction, on 30 January.
KWANGSI The Kwangsi committee, the first to be established
COMMITTEE in an autonomous region, was elected at a party
congress attended by 853 delegates. It consists
of 78 full and 16 alternate members, larger than the pre-cultural
revolution committee of 46 full and alternate members. The four-
man group--three military men and one veteran cadre--which heads
the new committee is smaller than the former 14-man secretariat.
As with all the other provincial committees, NCNA noted that the
new committee members were selected according to the formula of
old, middle-aged and young.
Out of public view since 16 November, Kwangsi powerholder Wei
Kuo-ching, former first secretary and governor of Kwangsi, emerged
as first secretary of the new committee; he was identified as
past leader of the party nucleus group for the first time. Wei
holds concurrent positions as chairman of the provincial revolu-
tionary committee and first political r.cmmissar of the Kwangsi
Military District (MD). Wei Tsu-chen, a :::?:iltary man recently
transferred to Kwangsi from the Fukien MD, was named secretary.
Liu Chung-kuei, a vice chairman and deputy commander of the
Kwangsi MD, was named a deputy secretary as was An Ping-sheng,
a vice chairman and an old secretary from the former provincial
committee.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
In his congress address, Wei spoke quite firmly on the need for
war preparedness. After noting that fulfillment of local economic
goals would make Kwangsi "an iron bastion on the southern
frontier," lie pointed out that Kwangsi "is an outpost in
supporting the Vietnamese people." "We strongly condemn U.S.
imperialism for its new crimes in expanding its war of
aggression in Indochina," he declared, and "we are closely
watching the development of the situation."
Of the 10 NCNA reports so far on the keynote congress addresses
(all but -the last two given prior to the GVN push into Laos), the
report on Wei's address indicates he was the strongest on the
issue of war preparedness. But speakers in the other border
provinces of Kansu and Liaoning also noted the special need
for war preparedness in a frontier' area. Of the remaining
seven, four speakers referred briefly to the need for war
preparedness in connection with economic tasks.
KANSU In the Northwest, the 68 full and 24 alternate
COMMITTEE members of the Kansu committee were elected in
accordance with the familar "old, middle--aged,
and young" combination at a Lanchow meeting of 1,098 party
delegates held from 11 to 17 February. Kansu's previous
conunittee, as set up in 1956, was smaller, containing only
37 full and alternate members. Immediately prior to the
cultural revolution,however, its secretarict had grown to
22 men, much larger than the streamlined three-man leadership
group which heads the new committee. ,/"
The top party post in Kansu went to Hsien Heng-han, chairman
of the provincial revolutionary committee and first political
commissar of the Lanchow MR. Pi Ting-chun, former deputy
commander of the Foochow MR and first vice chairman on the
F-,aien Revolutionary Committee, was named secretary; he
recently transferred to Kansu, where he has been identified
as a vice chairman with responsibilities within the Lanchow
MR. Hu Chi-tung, vice chairman and a secretary on the old
Kansu committee, was also named secretary.
A 22 February KANSU DAILY editorial welcomed the new provincial
committee and argued for stronger party leadership over the
government and the masses. Reflecting continuing widespread
media calls for additional cadre rectification, even in areas
with new provincial committees, the editorial firmly called
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CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1971
upon all cadres, particularly at "uenlor and medium levels,"
to increase t`eir study of Mao's Thought "no matter how busy
they are with their work."
PROGRESS Both the Kwangsi and ICansu committees, as well
ELSEWHERE as 'those for Hunan, Kwangtung, Anhwei and
Chekiang, were announced just a few days after
their respective provincial radios had claimed substantial
progress in rebuilding the party at lower levels. Judging
by this indicator, Shensi appears next in line to set up its
committee. Sian radio on 17 February declared that "the
great majority of basic-level party organizations in the
province have been established." And apart from various
references to new county committees in Shensi, Sian radio
on 21 February reported the formation of a new cc,mmittee
for the Shanglo special district, the second special district
committee it has publicized.
Provinces that have already rebuilt their provincial party
committees continue to form lower-level party units, filling
in holes remaining in the provincial party apparatus. 1,T=achang
radio on 18 February announced establishment of new special
district committees for Chingka.ngshan, Mao's revolutionary
base area during the late 1920's, and Kanchow. The Liaoning
provincial radio on 21 February reported the formation of a
view committee for the major port city of Luta. Numerous
county-level committees continue to be mentioned for the first
time in various provinces.
PEOPLE'S DAILY WARNS OF OVEREMPHASIS ON GRAIN PRODUCTION
Several recent broadcast articles have indicated that Peking
is looking again at the manner in which localities have
implemented its decree that grain is the "key link" in
agricultural development. Most of the previous articles
were carried in the provincial press, but a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editor's note published on 15 February adds a strong
central voice to the argument that the concentration on
grain has slowed the course of general development in
some instances.
PEOPLE'S DAILY states that "some units simply grasp grain
production and neglect diversified economy," primarily
because of "one-sided" thinking by local cadres unable
to distinguish between "socialist diversified economy" and
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1911
-h5-
"'putt.Ing money In command.'" Other "selfish" cadres, for reasons
of personal prestige, strive for high grain production statistics
to the detriment of actual requirements. The PEOPLE'S DAILY
editor's note reiterates that the relationship between grain
and other crops must be correctly set in order to promote general
development.
The propaganda ha3 made it clear that the primary measure for
Judging the success of a production unit in agriculture is
through grain output; even areas specializing in other crops
have been expected to become at least partially self-sufficient
in grain. Thus few cadres are likely to risk a decline in grain
production unless the leadership can convince them that they
will suffer no retribution through trying for all-round
development.
Even if grain is not to be the ultimate standard, its importance
obviously remains central. A Canton city broadcast on
12 February praised a Maoming decision to grow grain rather
than vegetables on the outskirts of town. Cadres who argued
that guaranteeing the town's vegetable supply was necessary to
a diversified economy were overruled. The ruling group held
that since grain is the key link Maoming must try to reduce
its dependence on the state for grain even if it means going
short on vegetables. But another Canton broadcast noted on
.it February that "crops must be planned and developed in the
light of local conditions," and it listed a number of non-
grain crops in which production must be raised.
RESTRICTIONS ON INNER MONGOLIA RADIO LOOSENED SLIGHTLY
The Inner Mongolia regional radio has taken the first cautious
step toward resumption of local broadcasting. For more than
a year, since 5 January 1970, the Inner Mongolia Mandarin-
language service had relayed Radio Peking throughout its
broadcast day, except for brief weather forecasts and other
nonpolitical announcements. Beginning 15 February, and
continuing through the 24th, the radio has broadcast three
half-hour programs a da,.- from its own studios. So far the
programs have consisted only of centrally authored articles
on Inner Mongolia--NCNA-PEOPLE'S DAILY articles on the
excellent progress being made in socialist revolution and
construction--interspers-ad with music.
The other two provincial-level radios that have done nothing
but relay Radio Peking solidly over the past year and more,
those of Szechwan and Kweichow, still show no signs of coming
back to life.
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