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February 24, 1971
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Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R00030 9gP0 $ 3 Confidentiai IIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIII~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~~IlNlll~uuu~~~~~~lllllll~~~ in Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential 24 FEBRUARY 1971 (VOL. XXlT, N--, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 10, This propaganda analysis report is based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.B. Government components. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 1E, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro- hibited by law. GROUP I Eulud.d from au'wna'.e dorng,adinp end d.[boifimlion Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 M a Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 CONTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention INDOCHINA Communists Claim Massive Allied Losses on Lao s-Quung Tri Front . 1 Comment Says Laos Operation Stalled, GVN Units "Annihilated" . . 2 DRV, PRG Foreign Ministries Score President's Press Confer.snce . 6 DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes at North . . 10 Pe_%ing Challenges President's Denial of Threat to China . . . . . 11 Moscow Sustains Cautious Approach to Indochina Events . . . . . . 15 Pathet Lao-Neutralist Meeting Urges Greater Victories . . . . . . 18 PRG Council of Ministers Meeting Publicized Belatedly . . . . . . 20 Sinu-Soviet Treaty Anniversary Passes Without Notice . . . . . . 21 MIDDLE EAST USSR Sees UAR as Constructive, Israel as Blocking Peace . . . . . 23 USSR-CUBA Soviet Admiral Denies Calls at Foreign Ports Pose Threat . . . . 27 Soviet Attache Mentions Help to Cuba on USSR Armed Forces Day . . 28 BERLIN Soviet, GDR Media Avoid New Four-Power "Negotiations" Formula . 30 EUROPEAN SECURITY Warsaw Pact Renews Calls for Multilateral Talks on Conference . 31 SALT Soviet, Polish Commentaries Assail U.S. Negotiating Stand . . . . 33 POLAND Regime Levels First Attack at Conservative Obstructionism . . . . 36 (Continued) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 Podgornyy's Protege Titov Removed from KK:zakhstan Post . . . . . . 38 Belgograd Leader Vasilyev Becomes RSFSR Agriculture Chief . . . . 40 Party Cormittees Are Established for Kwangsi and Kansu . . . . . . 42 PEOPLE'S DAILY Warns of Overemphasis on Grain Production . . . . . 44 Restri.,tions on Inner Mongolia Radio Loosened Slightly . . . . . . 45 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 FEBRUARY 1971 Moscow (3378 items) CPSU 24th Congress (10%) 33% [Draft Directives (5%) 28%] Indochina (16%) 11% China (4%) 5% Warsaw Pact Foreign (--) 4% Ministers' Meeting Zionism & Soviet Jews (1%) 4% Middle East (3%) 3% Indochina (64%) 70% [PIJAF 10th Anniversary (3%) 12%] (Sihanouk Tour of (--?) 5%) South China [DRV Economic Delega- (4%) 4%] tion in PRC Domestic Issues These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is used to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Tronds. Some may have been covered in prior issues; In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. (15%) 18% Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 c.~orrr'rt)l;rrr[nL F'fl^ 'CHENUEi 211 F1:11HUARY 1971. IND0C:HINA Vletntuncuc communist, mcdla s:lalm tlittt thy. n.l.l)E 1 : ncurclon Into Lacs has been halted ,L'ul Its objcctiveu ;hwvrt^(l, and that the allied forces have suffered enormouri losses bath in t.aon and in South Victnnm's Quang Tri Province. While gennritlly sustaining the Pict;ion that no Vic';namene communist; forces tire involved in Lao.-,, propagandists do credit the cnpLtire of it position of the 39th AHVN Hanger battalion in Ltiou to the "Quang TH. PLAH'" rather than to the "Lnotian people's liberation army." lfign-level condemnation r,f U.S. "escalation" in general anu the Laoa ineur:iion in prirticular was voincd by Defense Minir:ter Giap at a 23 February reception marking Sovict armed forces c!ay. Routinely pled&_ng continued struggic, Giap added that "the strength inherent in the militant solidarity" of the peoples o^ the socialist countries will dereat all of "the U.S. imperialists' provocations and acts of war." The President's statement--at his presto conference on the 17th-- on the broad use of U.S. air power in Indochina is singled out by Giap as well as in DRV anu PRG foreign ministry statements on the 20th and 21st, renpectivcly. The propaganda also continues to warn of new action against the North, but there is no echo of DHV Paris delegate Xuan Thuy's claim on the 181,h that recent U.S. actions threaten China es well as North Vietnam. Peking's reaction to the President's press conference took a standard form for authoritative comment, a heavily editorialized NCtA report on the 19th and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article the next day. Peking has ignored Xuan Thuy's statement, but Commenta'or claimed that the United States is "spreading the flames of war to the door of China." The article interpreted the President's avowal that U.S. actions in Laos present no threat to China rs an attempt to "tie Chinese hands" in giving support to the Indochinese. At the same time, Peking maintains its posture of offering only rear area suppcrt for the Indochinese "persisting in a protracted people's war." Moscow propaganda on Indochina continues to be cautious. In tLe only original press comment on the President's press conference, IZVESTIYA deplores his remarks on unrestricted air power and hi s "ultimatum" to the DRV, but it ignores- his assurances that current operations present no threat to the PRC. COMMUNISTS CLAIM MASSIVE ALLIED LOSSES ON LAOS-QUANG TRI FRONT Offering a new communist tally of total losses allegedly inflicted on allied forces involved in the incursion into Laos, VNA on Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS 211 FEE;T'UARY 1971 23 February claims that from 30 January to 20 February U.S, and South Vietnamese forces "on the Highway 9 battlefront" lost more than 4,000 men killed, wounded, or captured, including nearly 900 Americans. On the "battlefront" stretching from northern Quang Tri in South Vietnam to Savannakhet Province in Laos, according to VNA, the South Vietnamese and Laotian "liberation" forces also shot down or destroyed more than 170 aircraft and destroyed or damaged more than 210 military vehicles, half of them armored cars and tanks. Breaking down the total of alleged allied losses, the VNA report and a 23 February communique of the Khe Sanh PLAF command--broadcast on the 24th--clp,im that 1,500 of the allied troops, including the "nearly 900" Americans, were wiped out by the FLAF in Quang 'Ire. The PLAT is also credited with dcwning or destroying 4't aircraft and with destroying or damag- ing more than 150 military vehicles, including 50 tanks and armored cars. Claims of allied losses in Laos are updated in a 24 February "communique No. 22" of the Lao "liberation army" command, broadcast by Hanoi on the 24th. The communique says that some 3,000 U.S.-Saigon forces have been put out of action since the start of the "aggression against southern Laos." It specifies that four battalions and 15 companies were "destroyed or badly mauled" and that more than 160 aircraft were downed. COMMENT SAYS LAOS OPERATION STALLED, GVN UNITS "ANNIHILATED" The initial South Vietnamese thrust ?:sto Laos is detailed in a 16 February QUAN DOI KHAN DAN article which describes the incursion as a three-pronged attack, with forces deployed on Highway 9 and to the north and south of the highway. The * The claimed allied casualties are thus almost doubled between. 14 and 20.February: Lao and Vietnamese media on 14 February. reported a communique (labeled No. 1) of the Lao "liberation army" which said the Savannakhet had "put out of action" more than 1,500 U.S. and Saigon troops. On the 15th the propaganda reported that from 30 January to 14 February, attacks on allied forces massing in Quang Tri to move into Laos the killing or wounding of more than 600 U.S. and Saigon troops. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 23 February VNA report totaling allied losses adds that "the United States also sent a mobile regiment of the Vientiane army, supported by Thai mercenaries and directly commanded by CIA officers, to carry out a coordinated action from Savannakhet town with the intention of capturing the town of.Phalane, also on Highway 9." The "virtual annihilation" of this Vientiane regiment on 11 February had been claimed in a VNA report on the 16th. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 21st provides the most detailed description of alleged allied plans. Commentator claims that allied forces were to reach Tchepone on 9 February and to advance to Seno, about 30 kilometers from the Mekong River, then quickly cover the remaining stretch of Highway 9 to the town of Savannakhet. He maintains that the allied force in. fact has not advanced beyond Ban Dong, having covered only 25 kilometers since the operation began on the 8th. Commentator discounts the suggestion that the allied advance has been slowed by rough terrain and the discovery of many supply depots and weapons. He asks sarcastically: "Is the terrain so rough that in two weeks' time more than 300 U.S. helicopters could not transport troops to Tchepone--only one-half. hour by air from their encampments?" And he cites Western press reports that no depots have been found, although the capture of "a few hundred bicycle tires, hens, and ducks" was claimed. The article also ridicules GVN commander Hoang Xuan Lam's reported remark on the 17th that Tchepone is not strategically important, noting that when the operation started the allies said "Tchepone is a 'nerve center' of the enemy activities in southern Laos, an important liaison center, and a big military supply center." Another QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, broadcast on the 21st and said to have been "recently" published in the army paper, ridicules the suggestion that South Vietnamese forces in Laos have been slowed by bad weather and, like an article in the paper on the 15th, denies GVN reports on the 10th that some of its forces had reached Tchepone. The article, attributed to "B-40," asks a series of rhetorical questions ridiculing the notion that allied problems can be binmed on bad weather, concluding with the query: "Is the weather along Highway 9 so bad that on 16 February Abrams had to fly to Quang Tri to meet puppet General Lam for 90 minutes, and that Nixon had to meet with his a'9.visers for two hours in the White House before they came to the conclusion that the military operations in southern Laos will face rough times in the days ahead?" Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 Communist downings of allied helicopters get particular attention, with a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 20th, for example,.observing that the downing of helicopters by the "southern Laos armed forces and people" has "contributed toward drastically slowing down the speed of the Saigon puppet troops' operation," has created difficulties in insuring mobility, in logistics and supply, and has struck a blow at U.S. heliborne tactics and caused a decline in allied morale. The army paper discounts allied efforts to counter the attacks on the heli- copters and adds that the "victories" in downing them testify to the strength, determination, and "adequate technical equip- ment and fighting methods" of the Laotian forces. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 22d confirms Western news reports that the "liberation troops" have used "radar-guided antiaircraft weapons." "DESTRUCTION" OF 39TH RANGER Sustaining the fiction that no BATTALION, OTHER GVN UNITS DRV forces are involved in actions related to the Laos operation,."Quang Tri forces" have been credited with attacks on the allies. in South Vietnam, and the "Laotian people's liberation army" is. said fighting in Laos. An apparent departure from this pattern, however, occurs in propaganda on the overrunning of the 39th Ranger battalion of South Vietnam's 1st Ranger Group on 20 February: The "victory" is attributed to the Quang Tri PLAF or the PLAF of the "Khe Sanh front" rather than to Laotian forces. The propaganda describes the location.of.the fallen Ranger.outpest as three kilometers northeast of Lang Sen, which would place it well inside Laos on allied maps. (Lang Sen is a Laotian village at least five miles from the border.) VNA on the 21st describes the 39th battalion as part of "the northern prong of the U.S.-puppet forces engaged in the invasion of Laos," and a Hanoi domestic broadcast on the battle praises the."Khe Sanh Front's liberation troops" for having "effectively coordinated with the brotherly Laotian army and people to fiercely attack and encircle and destroy this notably cruel Ranger battalion." The 22 February NHAN DAN commentary, which supplies the most detail on the engage- ment, reports that "in coordination with the fraternal Laotian armed forces.and people, unit X of the northern Quang Tri PLAF rapidly and secretly encircled the enemy troops, repeatedly launched many waves of assaults, and annihilated them." It goes onto describe the communist assaults on the position on the 19th and 20th. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 The NHAN DAN commentary claims that this is the second Ranger battalion to be "completely annihilated," explaining that it belongs to the 1st Ranger Group which had "hastily retreated to the hills" and built "defensive positions" following Laotian forces' "annihilation" of the 21st Ranger battalion in Kaki on 13 February. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 22d, recounting alleged allied losses, lists the following units as having been "completely annihilated": the 6th airborne battalion, the 21st and 39th Ranger' battalions, five GVN airborne companies, and "a number" of units of the 37th Ranger battalion. Despite the alleged annihilation of the 21st Ranger battalion, a Hanoi broadcast to the South on "che 23d reports "recent" attacks on this unit, noting th.c it is stationed about three kilometers from the base of the 39th battalion which was "already annihilated" and that the 21st battalion "is now in a perilous situation." It goes on to claim that Col. Nguyen Van Hiep, the commander of the 1st Ranger Group is so concerned about the serious situation of his forces that he will no longer talk with correspondents. Ridiculing a reported state- ment on the operation by President Thieu on the 22d that "two communist regiments were annihilated P.rd another regiment will be destroyed if it appears," the broadcast suggests that Thieu should get a more accurate report and says that if he "does not dare to go back to Khe Sanh once more" he could at least "get a clear picture of events by interviewing Col. Hiep." HO CHI MINH TRAIL The mission of the allied operation to interdict the communist supply routes is mentioned in some comment, but the fact that the routes provide logistics support for insurgents in South Vietnam is generally ignored. Atypically, VNA quotes a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 23d as observing that "Nixon has hoped to destroy the adversary's logistic and supply base and thus to check the attacks by the Southern Vietnames3 People's Liberation Armed Forces." However, a longer account of the editorial, broadcast by Hanoi in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, takes note 6f the allied intention to cut supply lines without mentioning that the purpose is to check the insurgents in the South. Allied efforts to cut supply lines are also touched on in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 21st. In document- ing the alleged failure of the allied operation in Laos, Commentator notes that the allies had not maintained the Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 elements of secrecy and surprise necessary for an operation aimed at destruction of "supply and logistics routes." Other attention to the subject includes a 23 February Liberation Radio commentary which cites President Thieu's 8 February statement--9.n his announcement of the Laos operation--that the operation is limited in time, contrasting it with a statement attributed to operation commander Hoang Xuan Lam on the 14th that "we will remain until the Ho Chi Minh trail network is completely paralyzed." The commentary ridicules. this and other statements by U.S. and GVN spokesmen and maintains that the allied operation is hopelessly bogged down. DRV. PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES SCORE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's 17 February press conference is capped by foreign ministry statements from the DRV and the Front, on the 20th and 21st respectively, which say that in the face of worldwide protest he tried to justify U.S. war escalation and the. invasion of Laos. This is the first time the Vietnamese communists. have reacted to a prer3idential press conference.with.statement at such an official level. They were apparently -prompted to do so because the press conference contained. the.President! s first public discussion of the incursion. into Laos. commentary on the 18th observed that this was the. first.time.the President had 'officially raised..his_voice since the U.S.-Saigon puppet troops' armed aggression against Laos on 8 February." Hanoi and-the Front have regularly issued official statements.on. major. pronouncements. by the-President related to Vietnamization since November-1969. Government statements were issued on the President'.s..3 November. 10,69. speech. outlining his Vietnamization and troop. withdrawal policy and on.his 30 April 1970 speech announcing.the U.S. andARVN incursions into Cambodia. Foreign ministry.. statements. were. issued following his 20 April 1970 speech.announcing the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 troops by May.1971 and his.30..June 1970.speech (and.l July TV interview) reporting. on. theU.S..operation and withdrawal from Cambodia. Most.recently, on 14 October 1970 the DRV issued a foreign ministry statement rejecting the President's 7 October five-point peace proposal. His eight-point peace.proposal of 14 May 1969--. before.he outlined the Vietnamization policy--did not prompt any such high-level official statement. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS 211 FEBRUARY 1971 HANOI The DRV Foreign Ministry statement is notably ambiguous in acknowledging details of the President's remarks. It charges that he "slandered the DRV and rehashed deceitful allegations, such as that the United States would not use its ground forces and advisers in Laos, that the operation in Laos is limited in time and space and is for the purpose of protect- ing the lives of U.S. troops, assuring the withdrawal of U.S. troops, shortening the war, and so forth." Like routine comment, the statement takes particular issue with the President's statement that he would place no limits on the use of U.S. air power anywhere in Indochina, and it says in this regard that the United States is directly threatening DRV security. Unlike other comment, however, it does not acknowledge the exchanges with reporters on the possibility of an ARVN invasion of the DRV. Its only other mention of a threat to the DRV is in a passage accusing the *President of "scheming to carry out new military escalation against . . . Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, wrecking peace in Asia and the world." The issue of an invasion of the DRV was brought ui specifically, however, on the 19th--the day before the foreign ministry statement--in a NHAN DAN Commentator article and a QUAN DOI NHAN D.4N commentary. Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN referred specifically to an invasion of the DRV, unlike the foreign ministry statement. NHAN DAN charged that the President "spoke ambiguously about, the Americans' attitude" toward the possibility of an invasion of North Vietnam, which it said represents an "insolent threat against the Vietnamese and Indochinese peoples." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cited an AFP report of the 17th in noting that in response to a question about speculation that the Saigon army might send a number of troops across the DMZ into the North,, Nixon said "evasively that he does not forecast what Saigon feels it is obliged to do to protect its own security." The army paper went on to ridicule the notion that The press conference was impromptu, calling it "merely a prearranged farce by the Nixon clique to prepare public opinion for its escalation of the war by bombing North Vietnam and a threat to further expand the ground war." The QUAN DOl NHAN DAN article appeared to display special concern to demonstrate that more bombing of the DRV is almost inevitable. The paper said that for over a year the Nixon Administration "has repeatedly advanced deceitful arguments in order to justify the bombing of the North: Sometimes it Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS A FEBRUARY 1P71 said that U.S. aircraft would retaliate when they were fired at by Nc'-tl, Vietnamese antiaircraft; sometimes it said. that it had to r..%iu in self-defense even when U.S. aircraft were tracked by Vietnamese radar; and sometimes it said that it had to bomb to protect the safety of U.S. troops in Indochina." Describing the Americans' arguments as "extremely irrational," the commentary recalled that the United States bombed North Vietnam in May 1970 in coordination with Cambodian operations and stated that "at present, in coordination with the aggressive operations in southern Laos, where the Americans have become bogge down, Nixon again tried to prepare public opinion for ,iom'bing North Vietnam." The NHAN DAN Commentator article is the only availabie Hanoi comment to not:- the President's remarks tht there would be no further coi:cessions at the Paris talks .and that U.S. troops would remain in South Vietnam as long as U.S. prisoners are detained.. Other reaction to the press conference included the very brief statement by the DRV delegation spokesman in Paris- dated the 18th and carried by Hanoi media the next day--which scored the President's statements as "new evidence" that the Nixon Administration is "extremely bellicose and stubborn," refuses to seek a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese problem, and persists in its "frantic illusion of a military victory." It said the statements prove that the President "is feverishly implementing new schemes of military adventures against the DRV." Like other comment, it.asserted that the Vietnamese, closely uniting with the Lao and Cambodian people, will "resolutely carry on their resistance" and that "no threat by the Nixon Administration can shake the firm determination of the Vietnamese people." A passing reference to the President's press conference also appeared in a Vietnam Fatherland Front statement, issued on.the 19th and carried by the media that day, which condemned the latest "escalation" in Laos as well as in Cambodia. The state- ment did-not mention the press conference when it went on to say that the-United States is "threatening the security" of the DRV and "scheming to invade" it with a large military force massed immediately south of the 17th parallel. The single reference to the press conference came in the observation that the President made "impudent and brazen statements that he would place no limits on the use of American air power and that he would use all available forces when necessary." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 ~WW Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 211 FEBRUARY 1971 THE FRONT The PRG Foreign Ministry statement, issued on the 21st, echoes the DRV statement in charging that the press conference was held "to plead for the war escalation and invasion of Laos." It charges that "to save the failure" of Vietnamization, the Administration has "brazenly invaded Cambodia and is now using U.S. and Saigon puppet forces to massively invade Laos and seriously threaten the sovereignty and security of the DRV." Decrying what it describes as the President's argument that the United States "has the right to attack the DRV and any other region in Indochina," the statement accuses him of uttering "a most cynical contention of a pirate, laying bare the Nixon Administration's extremely bellicose and cruel nature." And It echoes the DRV statement in saying that the way to protect American lives is to end the war and unconditionally withdraw U.S. troops. In declaring that "no threat nor brutal moves" can shake the South Vietnamese people's determination, the PRG statement adds routinely that the South Vietnamese people will "never tolerate any war acts committed by the United States" against the North. It also reiterates the old formula that the southern armed forces and people will return five or 10 blows to the United States for every one it strikes against the North. A Liberation Radio commentary, also on the 21st, charges that the President "tried to conceal his armed aggression against Laos" and accuses him of "deceit" in saying that there are no U.S. troops or military advisers there, that the operation was planned rind carried out by the ARVN, and that the Americans are in charge only of air support and logistic supply. "Fearing that people still did not believe him," it adds, "Nixon revealed the 'sensational' details that the operational plan had been worked out by puppet generals in Vietnam and claimed that he knew nothing about the plan." A Liberation Radio commentary on the 20th saw further evidence of intent to maintain U.S. troops in Indochina "for a long time" in the President's "arrogant" statement that as long as there are U.S. prisoners in Indochina there will be U.S. troops. This commentary also acknowledged the President's declaration that there would be no "concessions" in Paris beyond those advanced in previous peace plans. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDEXIAL FBIS TRENDS 2! FEBRUARY 1971 DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT NORTH A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 22 February protests in vague and general terms against the bombing of "certain areas"-- unspecified--of Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province from 17 to 21 February.* Atypically, however, the protest does include the complaint that a number of reconnaissance flights were conducted over "a certain number of provinces" in North Vietnam. The more usual practice is to issue generalized protests against "encroach- ments".on DRV sovereignty and security, without specifying reconnaissance. The current statement also notes the alleged downing of two unmanned U.S. reconnaissance planes in Haiphong and Nghe An. The downing in Haiphong had been claimed on the 21st in a report which said it brought the total of U.S. planes downed over the DRV to 3,373; the claiii of the downing over Nghe An was made on the 18th. The spokesman "Ptrongly denounced and condemned these acts of war" and staid that the Vietnamese people are "resolutely determined to justly punish all acts of the U.S. aggressors violating the sovereignty and security of the DRV." * The.U.S. command announced on the.23d that 50 U.S. fighter- bombers accompanied by 20 support pl,ines--the largest attack since the massive bombings on 21 November--attacked surface-to- air missile -sites and other antiaircraft positions in North Vietnam on the.20th.and 21st. A U.S. spokesman said the strikes were near the Laotian border, below the 19th parallel, and were. made after "repeated hostile acts and firings" against U.S. aircraft interdicting supplies on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 C0NI"II7'`,N`i'IAL FBIS 'T'RENDS 211 F1-,T1);VARY 1971 PEKING CHALLENGES PRESIDENTS DENIAL OF THREAT TO CHINA Reacting to the President's press conference on the 17th, Peking has sharply challenged his denial that the Incursion into Laos poses a threat to the PRC and has underscored its concern over an expansion of military operations in Indochina. For the first time in recent comment, Peking has hinted at an analogy between the Chinese role in the Korean War and the Indochina conflict, though it has carefully avoided drawing a parallel on its own authority. At the same time, Peking has avoided signaling a change in Its posture of offering reav area support for its Indochinese allies "persisting in a protracted people's war." Peking's reaction to the press conference took a standard form for authoritative comment on a current development, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 20th preceded by a heavily editorialized NCNA news report the previous day.* The Commentator article interpreted the President's avowal that the actions in Laos present no threat to the Chinese as an attempt "to tie the hands of the Chinese people in giving support" to the Laotian and other Indochinese peoples. Commentator gave a sharper edge to the 12 February PRC Government statement's charge that the Laos operations pose "a grave menace to China," claiming that the United States is "spreading the flames of war to the door of China" and lecturing the President on the geographical realities of a common PRC-Laotian border of several hundred kilometers. But while expressing height.esned concern over a threat to China's security interests, the Commentator article did not go beyond earlier pronouncements in vaguely warning that the Chinese "can- not be indifferent" to developments in Laos and "will never allow you to run amuck in Indochina." Commentator did not repeat Peking's pledges of support, but the companion NCNA report on the 19th reiterated the government statement's promise to take "all effective measures to give all-out support and assistance" to the Indochinese peoples. PRC LEADERS In the first major speech by a Chinese leader since the President's press conference, Politburo member and Shanghai chief Chang Chun-chiao, speaking at a Shanghai rally for Sihanouk on the 22d, termed recent actions in Indochina * Recent previous examples of this pattern were Peking's response to the Polish December and its belated reaction to the Soviet-FRG treaty signed last August. ? Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL Fi3IS TRENDS 24 FEBRUM Y 1971 "a grave provocation" against not only the Indochinese but also the people of China and of the world--a formulation used in the PRC'a 4 May 1970 statement on the incursion into Cambodia and in the 8 February foreign ministry statement'on Laos. Chang omitted any mention of Chinese security in pledging that the people of Shanghai, "in the great rear of the three Indochinese peoples' war," will better perform their ongoing tasks of "supporting the front by concrete deeds." He expressed confi- dence that the Indochinese, by "supporting each other and per- severing in a protracted people's war," will defeat the United States. In the week before Chang's speech, top leaders in the provinces and municipalities--with the exception of Tientsin, near Peking-- were absent during rallies and visits by the DRV economic dele- gation and e, touring Sihanouk delegation in the week beginning the 14th. NCNA disclosed on the 20th that the Chekiang Revolu- tionary Committee (RC) chairman, "who has just returned to Hangchow," made a call on Sihanouk there that day. Sihanouk had been greeted on arrival in Hangchow on the 17th and in transit in Tsinan and Shanghai by the respective RC vice chairmen. Similarly, the DRV delegation had been met by a vice chairman on its arrival in Canton on the 16th. Whether or not the provincial leaders were gathered in Peking for a meeting covering Indochina developments, Chang Chun-chiao's speech broke no new ground in Chinese comment and, in fact, pulled back from claims that the PRC's security was threatened. ANALOGY BETWEEN The 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator KOREA, INDOCHINA article began its discussion of China's security interests by warning the Nixon Administration that it is "highly dangerous" to escalate the Indochina conflict "in a big way" and by citing the "U.S. bour- geois press" as saying that the Administration "is following the beaten track of the Truman Administration in Korea." An NCNA report on the 20th quoted the New York, TIMES as saying "Nixon is moving along the path followed by General MacArthur in Korea." In a still more explicit analogy between Korea and Indochina, also drawn indirectly by Peking, an NCNA dispatch datelined Paris, 20 February quoted the pro-Peking L'HUMANITE ROUGE as warning the United States not to forget "the punishment inflicted on you by the Korean people and the Chinese People's Volunteers." The journal was also quoted as saying Chinese support for Laos "is not an empty :;ord" and as raising the possibility of a third world war. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 2 FEBRUARY 1.971 Peking has not, in its own name, evoked a threat of Chinese intervention in Indochina. Propaganda flaunting Ciii:!,eoe exploits during the Korean War, as in a commentary by a veteran of that war broadcast by Peking to Taiwan on the 23rd, has drawn on the Korean experience to show that the United States is "a paper tiger" while expressing confidence that the Indochinese people will be able to rope with the situation. In the most authorita- tive recent review of the Korean War, Politburo member and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, delivering the keynote address in the commemoration last October of the 20th anniversary of Chinese entry into the war, gave a carefully circumscribed reading of the conditions leading to Chinese intervention. Huang defined the threshold as the point where the United States had "flagrantly extended the flames" of war to the Yalu River "in disregard of the repeated stern warnings" by Peking and had "gravely menaced the security of China." Before this point had been reached, according to Huang's account, the Chinese had "firmly supported and assisted" the Koreans in their liberation war--a formulation of rear area support which Peking has consistently used in its pronouncements on Indochina. PRC INTEREST Peking's adherence to its long-standing line of IN LAOS rear area support while challenging Washington's denials of a threat to Chinese security from the Laos operations suggests an effort to keep the United States off balance--and to arouse pressure on the Administration' --withoi'. prematurely spelling out warnings in circumstances which might debase their credibility. While sustaining its posture of pledging rear base backing for the Indochinese, Peking's warnings that its security has been menaced and that the conflict is spreading to China's doorstep underscore its special concern over military developments in Laos. It is noteworthy that the question of Chinese security interests was first raised--in the 12 February government statement--in * Characteristically, Peking has played up American press and congressional criticism of U.S. policy in Indochina, as in an NCNA report on the 13th quoting Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, and McGovern and citing REUTERS as saying most of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "view the Laos opera- tion as a dangerous gamble." There have been no reports in PRC media of American comment mentioning the China factor. Peking is generally wary about taking note of American leaders' comment on Sino-U.S. relations and has remained silent about calls for new directions in U.S. China policy. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 211 FEBRUARY 1971 reaction to developments in Laos and that Peking has introduced the Korean War parallel in this context. The incursion into Cambodia last year, which prompted a more prominent Chinese propaganda campaign--highlighted by a Mao statement--designed to capitalize politically on direct American participation on the ground, did not cause Peking to link the PRC's security to military developments in Indochina. Current comment has persis- tently charged that the United States is plotting a surprise attack on the DRV?, but Peking has not associated its security interests directly with those of the North Vietnamese. PRC media have not reported Xuan Thuy's remark in Paris on the 18th that U.S. actions threaten China as well as the DRV. Despite its aversion to the Paris talks, Peking occasionally reports statements by the communist delegations. NUCLEAR Neither the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article nor WEAPONS the NCNA report took note of the President's remark at his press conference ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina. Since a reference in a 15 February LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, the issue has been broached only in passing in low-level reports quoting foreign sources. Thus, the 20 February NCNA dispatch from Paris quoted L'HUMANITE ROUGE as saying that the President--a "war criminal worse than Hitler"--"iP preparing public opinion for the eventual use of nuclear weapons; in Indochina." Peking's failure to mention the President's remark and the flagging interest it is showing in the issue could indicate that Chinese fears, if they were genuine, have been allayed. It is also possible that Peking simply believes the President's remark has made the issue less exploitable. The subject may be regarded, in any event, as particularly sensitive by elements in Peking or among its Indochinese allies. None of the latter, except Sihanouk's government in a-statement carried by NCNA, has raised the issue. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 211 FEBRUARY 1971 MOSCOW SUSTAINS CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO INDOCHINA EVENTS Soviet reaction to President Nixon's press conference on the 17th has been limited and generally cautious, consisting chiefly of reports on foreign criticism. Soviet media have ignored the President's statement that tactical nuclear weapons would not be used in Indochina, but an article in IZVESTIYA on the 13th sought to exploit the nuclear issue; it charged, on the basis of Western press speculation, that "irresponsible circles in the United States" were "trying to exert nuclear blackmail" in Indochina. Moscow media predictably play up Western and communist press reports to portray "Laotian patriotic victories" as "thwarting" the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos. TASS on the 22d promptly picked up the DRV Foreign Ministry's charges that U.S. planes raided the DRV from 17 to 21 February, but there has been no Soviet comment yet on the renewed air strikes. In the only original Soviet press comment on the President's news conference, Barsukov in IZVESTIYA on the 18th interpreted the President's statements as "an ultimatum to the DRV." The commentator says the President used his press conference to "directly declare that the U.S. Administration was lifting all restrictions on the use of its air power in Indochina, making it clear that the United States intends to resume bombings over DRV territory." According to Barsukov, the President also said the United States "does not expect a political settlement from the Paris negotiations, thus giving the most official blessing to further procrastinations and sabotage of the negotiations by the U.S. delegation." The commentator relied on the "U.S. press," however, for a more personal swipe at the President--the observation that "Nixon's statements on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia have been particularly undiplomatic, unceremonious, and imbued with the ideas of strength." Soviet media are not known to.have broached the question of a Soviet role'in a political settlement in Indochina since the 17th, when a Mayevskiy PRAVDA article commented critically on reports of a Japanese initiative with the 1962 Geneva conference cochairman.* Moscow has not acknowledged a KYODO item from Tokyo on the 19th which reported that Soviet Ambassador to Japan * See the TRENDS of 18 February 1971, pages 14-15. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 Troyanovakiy had rejected Japan's "initiative aimed at restoring peace in Laos." KYODO reported that Troyanovskiy, commenting on the Japanese move at a press club meeting in Tokyo, said "the only solution to the Indochina crisis is the complete withdrawal of foreign troops." On 24 February TASS reported cryptically that representatives of the Soviet and French foreign ministries had held consultations "on the situation in Indochina" _n Paris on February 22-23 and that the discussions took place in the spirit of the Soviet- French protocol of 13 October 1970. The protocol, signed during President Pompidou's visit to the USSR, provided that foreign ministry officials should consult regularly, twice annually or "whenever necessary," on situations which would create a "threat to peace" or "international tension" as well as major inter- national problems of mutual interest. ROLE OF CHINA Moscow continues to emphasize a portrayal of communist unity on Indochina for domestic and Western consumption, :,chile sustaining the polemical treatment of this issue in broadcasts to China. TASS on the 19th picked up remarks by DRV and PRG officials at their Paris press conference on the 18th, including a statement that the PRC and DRV are "side by side." The account also included the remark that the expansion of the war by the United States "threatens China," just as it threatens "other socialist countries." On the 22d Moscow's domestic service summarized the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the President's press conference, including the comment that the spread of the war "at China's doorstep . . . created a grave threat to China," as well as the derisive reference to the President's "claim" that the "escalation does not endanger China." A broadcast in Chinese on the same day, however, accused the PRC of playing into the hands of the United States in Indochina. The broadcast pointedly noted that while President Nixon is "making provocative threats that he will not limit the use of air power in Indochina" and has "indicated the possibility of invading North Vietnam," Peking's leadership is following a splittist, anti-Soviet policy that "can only benefit imperialism." ISSUE OF USE OF In an apparent propaganda effort to exploit NUCLEAR WEAPONS the issue of possible use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, an article by Sagatelyan in IZVESTIYA on the 18th--ignoring the President's exclusion of atomic weapons in the context of Indochina--charged "irresponsible Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 circles in the United States with an attempt at nuclear black- mail" in that area of the world. As evidence of ouch "blackmail," the article belatedly cited articles by C.L. Sulzberger in the New York TIMES (the first appeared last November and the most reccnt on 3 February of this year) on an alleged scenario created by Defense Department consultant Edmund Stillman which envisaged U.S. use of nuclear weapons against the PRC following Chinese intervention in Indochina. It "must be assumed," Sagatelyan said, that this "mad plan" was publicized "with agreement in the Pentagon," and its existence confirms "that there are s;,ill atomic maniacs in the United States who have forgotten what times they live in." The article concluded with a vague warning drawn from the 17 December Soviet Government statement, which had belatedly endorsed the 10 December DRV joint party-government appeal: "Attempts to carry out new military threats with regard to the peoples of Indochina will lead to an ever greater co'aplication of the situation in Southeast Asia." Although routine-level Moscow comment has sporadically raised the possibility of use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, most recently in a passing reference to this possibility by Radio Moscow on 11 February, .he Sagatelyan article is the first Soviet ca;nmentary to focus on the subject. Moscow's exploita- tion of this new anti-U.S. propaganda theme may have been prompted in part by the flurry of attention Peking has recently given to the issue, as well as by the motive of stepping up propaganda support for Hanoi during the Laotian operation. OIL MONOPOLIES Other notable Soviet comment includes a PRAVDA IN INDOCHINA article on the 23d by Yuriy Zhukov which departed from the usual Soviet theme that the United States is in Vietnam to suppress the national liberation movement, focusing instead on the theme that the United States, in addition to its political motivations, is there "to defend the selfish interests of the U.S. oil monopolies." According to Zhukov, U.S. oil companies are carrying out preparations for large-scale extractions of oil from seabeds in the countries of Southeast Asia, and they hope the U.S. forces in Indochina will protect their interests. Although Zhukov went on in effect to depict U.S. soldiers as dying for U.S. monopolies, a standard general theme in communist propaganda, his linkage of the presence of U.S. troops in Vietnam with alleged U.S. attempts to exploit Asian national resources seems designed to fan Asian opposition to U.S. economic penetration of the area. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 PATHET LAO-NEUTRALIST MEETING URGES GREATER VICTORIES An "extraordinary meeting" of the standing committee of the NLHS Central Committee and the Alliance Committee of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces (PNF) chaired by Prince Souphanouvong was held in Sam Neua on 22 February, according to Pathet Lao media on the 23d.* The communique on the meeting says that the session "considered the change in the present tense situation in the country in the face of the new invasion of lower Laos by U.S. and Saigon puppet troops." Asserting that the "direct participa- tion of U.S. troops" is "an open act which cannot be concealed," the communique claims that "U.S. green berets and officers joined with Saigon puppet troops in conducting various operations" and that U.S. helicopter pilots transported "Saigon puppet troops, armored cars, and U.S. artillery units." Charging that the Nixon Administration staged the operation in the hope of "recouping the ignominious defeats of the Nixon doctrine," the communique says among other things that the Americans have "sabotaged all attempts of the NLHS to solve the Laotian question by peace)'ul means." It again attacks the "Vientiane puppet powerholders headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma" as a "tool" of the United States, charging that they "secretly discussed" the plans for the incursion with the United States and Saigon. The communique concedes that the incursion "may cause some difficulties and obstacles for the Laotian people," but it says the national salvation struggle is coming to "new and great favorable conditions" while the United States and its allies are being isolated by public opinion. Besides, ands the communique, the "contradictions among the U.S. lackeys in Vientiane are becoming more violent," with both Vientiane and Saigon "puppet" officers and enlisted men becoming "fed up" with the war. The commi.nique urges the "patriotic forces" to win still greater victories, and it hails the outcome of the 9 February talks between Princes Souphanouvong and Sihanouk, reiterating praise for the "unshakeable fighting solidarity" of the three Indochinese people based on the Indochinese peoples' summit conference. A similar NLHS-PNF "extraordinary conference" had been held from 6 to 8 June in Sam Neua. Addressed by the two organizations' respective chairmen, Prince Souphanouvong and Khamsouk Keola, the meeting denounced the expansion of U.S. aggression in all of Indcchina,.particularly the move into Cambodia and intensified bombing of Laos, and praised victories of the Pathet Lao forces in ground operations in Laos. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY .1971 The "extraordinary meeting" had been proposed at a "special session" of the NLHS Central Committee standing committee on 19 February, according to NCNA on the 20th. That session reportedly analyzed the "new situation in Laos" and set forth "the new task of smashing the war venture" of the United States and its allies. Continuing official Pathet Lao statements on the Laos situation include a letter from Prince Souphanouvong to the American people carried by the Pathet Lao news agency 20 February. Souphanouvong informed the American people ol the "serious situation in Laos" caused by new acts of U.S. aggression. He said among other things that President Nixon's decision to introduce into southern Laos "a great number of Saigon troops and American GI's and military advisers wearing green berets and Saigon troops' uniforms, with massive U.S. air support, contrasts with the U.S. Government's commitment before Congress on 30 June 1970 rot to use U.S. air and ground forces and military advisers to support the Saigon troops' operations in Cambodia and Laos." The message welcomes the recent protests in the United States against the Laos move and calls upon "American friends" to make further efforts to oppose the Laos operation. A 21 February statement by an LPLA Supreme Command spokesman, carried by Pathet Lao radio the following day, denounces intensified B-52 strikes in the Sam Thong-Long Cheng area and southern Xieng Khouang Province. Radio Pathet Lao on the 19th reported another message to the Geneva conference cochairmen from NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit--dated 18 February-- which protests the dir-,a,tch of additional Thai troops to Laos, following up the 17 February NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement on the subject. The NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement was also formally endorsed in PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesmen's statements on 20 February. An NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement, carried by VNA on 24 February, takes issue with President Nixon's.,, 17 February press conference remark that he would not place any limitation on the use of American air power and that he would use all existing and necessary forces to defend U.S. troops in Indochina. Without acknowledging any of the President's other statements, the NLHS says his remarks chow that he is "plotting new military adventures." It repeats demands that the United States stop aggression in Laos and withdraw U.S. and Saigon troops, and it reiterates the determination of the Laotian people to fight resolutely against continued aggression. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 PRG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING PUBLICIZED BELATEDLY Liberation Radio on the 19th broadcast a 10 February communique on a session of the PRG Council of Ministers which met under the chairmanship of President Huynh Tan Phat to review the situation of the past year and set forth "immediate tasks" in stepping up the resistance. The common .que says the ministers heard "reports on the movement to foil the enemy's pacification plan, our PLA.F's activities on alp battlefields, and the struggle movement of our compatriots of all strata in southern cities." The last known meeting of the PRG Council of Ministers was in mid-January 1970, publicized in a communique dated 25 January 1970.E Similarly chaired by Phat, it also reviewed the previous year and set forth tasks for the coming year. The "immediate tasks" cited in this year's communique include mobilization of the armed forces and people to step up resistance, heighten determination to fight end win. destroy a large amount of allied war potential and materiel, :,iaintain and develop the "mass struggle movement," smash Vic;tnamiz ation, expand the "anti-U.S. national salvation unity front," increase strength, and advance to "ever greater victories." Consistent with the diminished propaganda attention to "revolutionary administration" in the past year, the communique does not repeat the call in the communique on the January 1970 meeting for extending and consolidating the "revolutionary administra- tion system." Paying special attention to the question of land reform, the communique notes that the Council of Ministers condemned "the extremely reactionary and deceitful land reforms" of the Saigon regime and called for struggle against them. It goes on to explain the PRG's position on the question, reiterating that the PRG recognizes "the ownership right of the peasants, legally as well as practically, over the lands distributed to them by the revolution during the years of resistance against the French colonialists as well as in the present struggle against the U.S. imperialists." * The January 1970 Council. of Ministers meeting and earlier meetings in July and August 1969 were discussed in the 4 February 1970 TRENDS, page 12. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875ROOt,9g0t9-3 CONFIDENTIAL T 24 FEBRUARY 1971 - 21 - SIN O-SOVIET RELATIONS SINO-SOVIET TREATY ANNIVERSARY PASSES WITHOUT NOTICE The 14 February anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance passed without notice by either side for the fifth successive year. Soviet broadcasts it Mandarin in the 13th and 14th discussed Sino-Soviet cooperation and "united action" in the 1950's, but there was no direct mention of the treaty. One Mandarin broadcast, over Radio Peace and Progress on the 13th, made the absence of any mention of the 1950 treaty the more conspicuous by paying respects to a 1957 Sino-So%riet statement pledging cooperation and unity. After expressing ;'egret over the subsequent deterioration of relations, the broadcast cited Kosygin as appealing for a restora- tion of normal relations and a settlement of problems. It did n~+ mention the Peking talks, a subject being avoided by both sides. Peking has largely ignored the Soviets while devoting extensi%'f- propaganda attention to Indochina. Consistent with its policy of cultivating Hanoi while playing down its rivalry with Moscow, Peking's propaganda on Indochina has been free of anti-Sovi~,t polemics except for an occasional jab at Moscow in Albanian cornuuen' reprinted in PRC media. SOVIET COMMENT While avoiding major polemical attacks, apart ON CHINA from the steady flow of anti-Chinese propaganda in Soviet broadcasts to the Chinese, Moscow has balanced its neutral reports on PRC statements and bilateral meetings with low-level press articles conveying Soviet displeasure, over events in China. Thus, PRAVDA and other papers on 30 January carried a TASS report on the CCP provincial congresses, and IZVESTIYA on 3 February reprinted a Polish article on current developments in China. The impression left on the reader is that the Maoist regime is seeking to consolidate its unorthodox, illegitimate control in the wake of the cultural revolution. A TASS commentary carried in IZVESTIYA on 6 February discussed with distaste the Peking "model operas" refashioned by Mao's wife, who is identified as a former actress who..achieved notoriety as an inspirer of Red Guard destruction of universities, theaters, and other cultural centers.* * Peking can hardly have been pleased with the article's slur on Madame Mao. NCNA on 19 February reported that the .PRC ambassador in Moscow gave a diplomatic reception-the previous evening featuring a film of one of the model operas. The.. film was "warmly received and praised" by the diplomats present. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 211 FEBRUARY 1971 SOVIET ARMED Articles in the central press marking Soviet FORCES DAY armed forces day have avoided mentioning China. Last year Marshal Yakubovskiy took note of the Chinese "war psychosis"--a major Soviet theme at that time--in his article on the occasion. Sino-Soviet tenr,:ions, :hough substantially reduced in the past year, were reflected on this year's armed forces day in a talk over the Khabarovsk radio by a deputy chief of staff of the Far Eastern military district opposite the T'RC. The Chinese were rebuked in the talk for rendering a "shameful service" to the imperialists by pursuing "a counter- revolationary, anti-Soviet, and nationalistic course." The talk also referred to Soviet operations along the border during fighting in 1929 and 1939. These events had been recalled in an IZVESTIYA article on 17 February recounting recent combi..t exercises by troops of the Transbaykal military district. NCNA reported on the 23d that the military attache of the Soviet embassy in Peking gave a reception that day on the occasion of armed forces day. Those attending included Soviet bnbassador Tolstikov and Chai Cheng-wen, who is deputy head.of the PRC delegation at the border talks. As has happened ou other occasions, Moscow reported that the Chinese refused permission for Soviet embassy personnel to visit various cities to lay wreaths on graves of fallen Soviet soldiers. A brief TASS report was carried in the Soviet press on the 20t,h under the heading "To Be Regretted." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 C0Nh'IDE'N'TIA1., F'13I5 'T'RENDS 2h FF13fUAItY 1.9'(1. MIDDLE EAST USSR SEES UAR AS CONSTRUCTIVE, ISRAEL AS BLOCKING PEACE Moscow continues to praise the UAR's "constructive" attitude displayed in its expression of readiness to recognize Israel's sovereignty and to settle the problem of navigation on inter- national waterways. Propagandists say this attitude creates a favorable climate for the success of the Jarring mission and makes a political. settlement on the basis of Security Council Resilution 2t2 "realistic and feasible." Soviet commentaries again approve the UAR'c proposal for opening the Suez Canal, pointing out--in broadcasts to ouch audiences as India, Indonesia, and Japan--the consequences of the canal's closure for the developing countries. A 11 t the same time, .Ttcrael is criticized for continuing its obstructionist" and "shortsighted" attitude in maintaining an "annexationist" course, refusing to return :- ~o the pre- 5 June 1967 borders, and failing to respond to Jarring's memorandum. PRAVDA on the 19th said that if the Israeli leaders were not "reasonable and sensible" enough to stop sabotaging a peaceful settlement, they would bear the consequences of their obstructionist "and indeed aggressive" attitude in the Jarring contacts. Charging Israel with seeking to consolidate its control over the occupied territories, TASS on the 18th cited the "openly provocative" deci6ion on construction of housing units in Jerusalem for new J9wish settlers. While not mentioning the 16 February State Department statement that the United States cannot accept unilateral action by any party to decide the city's final status, both 'PASS and a 22 February foreign- language commentary by Tsoppi noted criticism of the Israeli plan by the New York TIMES. A Vasilyev article in PRAVDA, reported by TASS on the 23d, accused the Israeli "occupationists" of "intimidation" of the Arab population to "make it easier to 'develop"' the occupied territories. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONVIDFN'I'IAL 1.'J315 'l'R0:NUS 213 l''LBIUUARY 1911 - 211 - ISRAELI Thuu far Moncow hnu given ncrunt attention to the STATEMENT 21 February Inrush cabinet statement addressed to the IJAR's 15 February reply to Jarring's memorandum. A short Moscow domestic service item on the 22d said it follows from the Israeli statement that Israel "virtually comes out ugainnt." Jarring'u miuuion. In the only reference to the contents of the statement, the broadcast singled out, Ioracl's refusal to withdraw from all occupied Arab territorieu--the "ncccuuary condition" for a just and stable peace. The Tuoppi commentary on the 22d, focusing on the awns point, Interpreted the refusal to withdraw as meaning that Iuruel wants to speed up measures for annexing the occupied territorieu and wishes to sabotage a peaceful settlement through political talks bused on Resolution 2h2. In a commentary on the 20th, T'uoppi had noted that the Israeli Government had decided "simply to ignore" Jarring's memorandum to Israel. With regard to the Egyptian reaction, Moscow apparently has not picked up AL-AHRAM's 22 February complaint that Israel was asked to respond to Jarring's proposals themselves, not to Egypt's reply to the Jarring memorandum addressed to the UAR. A TASS dispatch from Cairo on the 22d c:r.ted the assessment of UAR "official circles" that Israel's "reply to Jarring's latest rroposal" shows that Tel Aviv is adhering to its "expansionirt policy." 'PASS noted Cairo's belief that the Security CouncU should take strong measures to prevent Israel from disregarding UN resolutions. On the 23d TASS attributed to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY a report that UAR Foreign Minister Riyad received the diplomatic representatives of the Big Four and drew their attention to the "serious situation" resulting from Israel's "continuing expansionist actions." Riyad pointed out, TASS said, that the Israeli statement, confirming Israel's unwillingness to evacuate its forces, shows that Tel Aviv rejects Jarring's recent proposal on terms for a peace settlement. TASS reported Riyad as stressing that peace can only be achieved if Israel withdraws from all occupied territories, but the account failed to note that he asked the big powers to "face their responsibilities concerning Israel's rejection of Jarring's proposals and its defiance of peace." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CO1Il'IULN'J'IA 1. I'1i1.1 TRENDS, 24 FE1i1ilJARY 19'(1- PRA I SE FOR A Mrttvcyev art In .l'I,VI,i'I'.IYA, reviewed by TA;:;;; UAR POLICY and the domestic uervlce on the 19111 and 20th, sriyr? Ml Important landmark has been reached In the crlulu, calling more than ever befot?e for the adoption of dec tuionu opening it wtty to genuine normalization of' the 111 tuatl on . Commenting that It In difficult to overestimate tile ImporLonce of the UAlt'u "new peace initiative," Mntveycv points out that Israel haw repeatedly alleged that Wth unwillingness to rc~~c~f?nl ;:?? Its uoverelgnty stud to settle the problem of navigation on Inter- national waterways hall been the stumbling block to it ueLtlement. '1'htue "false rumo,:u and diutortion;" have been done awtty with "?rcc and for all, he declares. A Lo:;cv PIIAVDA article broadcast in Arabic on the 19th and T.,;oppi's roretgn-language, commentary on the 20th both undcrucorc' the UAR':; orricial statement, in its reply to Jarring, of rcadineun to guarantee lurael'n uovercignty on condition that, both ride; recognize and respect the pr(,.-5 June 1967 borders. Both recall UAR President as- adat'n stnt.erncnt in his NEWSWEEK interview that Calro will guarantee resumption of shipping through the Sue:: Canal within six months provided Israeli forces withdraw from the cast bank, that it will also guarantee freedom of navigation through the '{'Iran Strait, and that I t will not object to the stationing of international ob:;crver force; In Sharm ash-Shaykh. `i'soppi additionally mentions that the UAR agrees to Israel using both the Suez Canal and the Tiran Strait, with the proviso that Israel fulfill its obligations under Resolution 2142. Re seems to draw a distinction between Suez and Tiran navigation in his commentary on the 22d, however; he says that If Israel withdraws from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, "international navigation" could start in the canal and "free navigation" could start in the strait. In the commentary on the 20th Tsoppi turns to the U.S. attitude, given little propaganda attention since the 10 February PRAVDA attack on the American position in the Big Four consultations. Remarking that the U.S. attitude should be viewed with "caution," he says that Washington's recent verbal reaction to the UAR's steps "has in general been positive, and it is even pretending to be irritated by and dissatisfied with Israel's stubbornness." But he routinely points to Western press reports of further U.S. aid to Israel and asserts that support of such dimensions can only strengthen Israel's "aggressive expansionist aims" and its "counteraction" to a political settlement. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDEN'T'IAL 113IU THENUO 211 FEBRUARY 1971 SYRIAN Tuoppi'u .10 February commentary also calls attention POSITION to Arab uupport? for the UAR position, citing Egyptian Presidential Affairs Minister Sami Uharaf as declaring that Syria, i,ibya, and Sudan--the other three Tripoli Charter utatcs--"fully support" thr EKyptian policy. Taoppi adds that forthcoming alku in Cairo between King Ilus ayn and President au-Uadat--now "canceled" by ltusayn, according to Cairo's AL-AIIRAM on the 22d--would also be dedicated to coordination of actions aimed at settling the conflict. In reporting Syrian Prime Minister al-Aaad'a 22 February speech at the first session of the People's Council, 'L'ASS did not mention his reiteration of Syrian refection of Resolution 2112 and his stress on "armed battle" as the decisive factor in the Arab struggle. Not unexpectedly, there was no reference to Resolution 2112 or a political settlement In the 3 February Soviet-Syrian communique on al-Aaad'a Moscow visit. But Moscow continued to press its views: A 3 February 'L'ASS commentary on the visit echoed Kosygin's 1 February luncheon speech in calling for implementation of Resolution 242 with due regard for the legitimate rights of the peoples of "all" Middle Eastern states, including the Palestinians. In a few instances Moscow has seemed to link Syria indirectly with the concept of a political settlement. Thus NEW TIMES, on the "Comment" page of its 12 February Russian edition, noted that al-A3ad's visit took place "at a crucial moment in the Arabs' struggle for a dust political settlement." And PRAVDA's Belyayev, in the Moscow domestic service commentators' round- table on 7 February, remarked that the UAR had agreed tc an extension of the cease-fire and that neither Jordan nor Syria had violated the cease-fire; consequently, Belyayev said, the "Arab states" have demonstrated their devotion "to a cause linked wit'1 preparations for a settlement of the crisis, and not vice versa." Twice last August, Soviet c ommentators--Belyayev on the 7th and Kudryav-tsev on the 23d--had noted in passing that if a settlement were reached, Damascus would not hinder it. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CUN1 1DI,NT1Ai, F1310 T1t1ENUJ 24 FEBRUARY 1971 SOVIET ADMIRAL DENIES CALLS AT FOREIGN PORTS POSE THREA" In remarks evidently reomptcd by the U.S. press publicity for the latest visit of a Soviet naval squadron to Cuba, Admiral Alcxcycv, deputy chief of the mtin headquarters of the Soviet navy, took the occasion of the USSR's :3 February armed forces day to defend the right of Soviet ships to cull at foreign ports during long-distance voyages and to insist that such calls pose no threat. Alexcycv's remarks appear in an interview in the weekly NEDELYA No. 8, dated 24 February; they were summarized by TASS on the 19th. In keeping with Moscow propaganda's portrayal of the latest calls at Cuban ports as normal and routine,* Alexeyev pointed out that, "at present one of the Soviet naval squadrons is completing its stay at the ports of Cuba" while another has made an official call at Massawa to take part in a traditional Ethiopian naval festival. He went on to note that Soviet ships had made more than 100 calls at the ports of "almost 60" countries over tht past two years and to reject "statements appearing in the foreign press that long-distance voyages by Soviet ships are a threat.." Alexeyev imputed "allegations like the myth of a Soviet threat" to "aggressive circles of the imperialist states"--he did not name the United States--who are concerned about the growth of Soviet naval power. Reiterating that the Soviet Union "is not going to threaten anyone," he concluded that Soviet ships "have plied and will ply . . . the world ocean, which is known to be nobody's possession." Alexeyev's reference to a Soviet naval squadron "completing its stay" in Cuba is the only monitored mention of the squadron in Moscow media since 11 February, when TASS announced in a single terse sentence that "Soviet naval ships, on a practice cruise in the central Atlantic, called at Hevana port on 10 February in accordance with an arrangement." A 4 February Moscow broad- cast in English announcing the "routine" training voyage had * See the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 27-29, for an examination of the Soviet and Cuban-announcements of the visit and for background on Soviet comment late last year reacting to the public speculation about construction of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba and insisting on the right of Soviet ships to call at Cuban ports. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FI3I[3 'T'RENDS 211 FEBRUARY 1971 similarly said the "business calls" at Cuban ports would be "in accordance with an agreement reached." Havana radio announced on the 13th that the squadron, consisting of "a submarine chaser, a mother chip [buque madre], a submarine, and a. tanker," was "in the port of Havana after having finished a training cruise In the middle Atlantic." While REUTER reported under a Havana dateline on the 16th that the antisubmarine chip which made port in Havana on the 10th had left on the night of the 15th, Cuban and Soviet media took no notice of its departure. Neither Havana nor Moscow, in announcing that the visit would take place, had specified an arrival or departure date. Neither reported any of the movements of Soviet ships between Cuban ports during the earlier visits of Soviet naval squadrons in September and December 1970, and neither reported any of the chips' final departure. SOVIET ATTACHE MENTIONS HELP TO CUBA ON USSR ARMED FORCES DAY Cuba marked Soviet armed forces day with an apparently live telecast on 23 February featuring a talk by the Soviet.military attache in Cuba, Capt. Igor A. Amosov,.on the Soviet armed forces' exploits in defense of socialism since the founding of the Red Army in 1916. Declaring that "the United States is threatening Cuba," Amosov paid tribute to the successes scored by the Cuban armed forces in "upgrading their combat-readiness," in "daily perfecting their mastery over combat skills," and in "assiduously learning to handle modern combat weapons" in the cause of defense of the: country. He concluded vaguely: "We Soviets will apply all our strength and possibilities to help our Cuban brothers fulfill their historic mission." Amosov was also the chief Soviet speaker at Cuban observances of the USSR's armed forces day last year. Havana radio on 21 February 1970 quoted him as speaking more generally of the Soviet armed forces' solidarity with all "victims of aggression" and comradeship with the Cuban armed forces. But a Cuban speaker on the same occasion, armed forces vice minister for political work Maj. Antonio Perez Herrero, referred to the Soviet "advisers" and "specialists" who were helping "to increase the capabilities of our cadres and combatants in the use of the most modern and complex combat equipment." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 Assuring his Cuban audience of the strength and efficacy of Soviet military protection, Amosov mentioned in this year's telecast, in the course of a review of the Soviet armed forces' growth, that the' Soviet army and navy "are equipped with nuclear missiles aimed at various targets, supersonic planes, new tanks, atomic submarines, and many other modern methods for armed struggle." He was reported as referring last year, at a press conference in connection with armed forces day, to the USSR's "powerful rockets capable of annihilating the industrial and military potential of any capitalist state." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENNT'IA1., T'B1L T1d;NDS 21- FEBRUARY 1971 SOVIET, GDR MEDIA AVOID NEW FOUR-POWER "NEGOTIATIONS" FORMULA In summarizing the communique on the 15th four-power ambassadorial meeting held 18 February in Berlin, neither Soviet nor GDR media registered the new formula adopted in the communique, which for the first time describes the talks as "ncgotiationo." Where the communique says the four ambassadors "continued their negotiations," the TASS Russian service* hewed to the old formulation, used in the communiques on prior meetings, in saying they met "within the framework of an exchange of views on questions connected with the situation in West Berlin." TASS duly picked up the standard report that they continued their "businesslike discussions of the questions under examination"--contained in the current communique as in the prior ones--and noted that the next meeting is schedules for 9 March, following the usual consultations at the expert level. The TASS report, transmitted promptly on the 18th, was printed in PRAVDA the next day. The East German ADN used it almost verbatim, attributed to TASS, on the 18th. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 19th carried an ADN-attributed paraphrase of the communique that was full and accurate except for the operative sentence on negotiations: The paper said the ambassadors continued their "talks" (Gespraeche) rather than "negotiations" (Verhandlungen). IZVESTIYA political observer Matveyev, participating in the 21 February Moscow domestic service roundtable, also avoided using the term "negotiations" in an atypical discussion of the four-power talks--seldom the subject of more than passing mention in Moscow comment. Matveyev remarked that another "routine meeting" had taken place and that the ambassadors "continued their businesslike discussions of the questions under examination." He wanted to "stress," he said, that the "discussions" were "businesslike." As if to underscore the idea that there. was still no significant forward movement, he cautioned that it would be "premature to draw conclusions now about the possible outcome of such discussions." * Inexplicably, TASS' English. service, which normally carries the same items as TASS Russian, did not carry the item at all. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL - 31 - EUROPEAN SECURITY FI3I3 'i'Ii1 ND;3 24 FEI3HUAI2Y 1971 WARSAW PACT RENEWS CALL FOR MULTILATERAL TALKS ON CONFERENCE In the first formal Warsaw Pact statement since the December NATO Council meeting in Brussels, the communique on the 18-19 February Bucharest meeting of the Pact foreign ministers atepo up the propaganda pressure for "multilateral" contacts preparatory to the convening of a European security conference. The last Pact state- ment, issued 2 December by the Political Consultative Committee after its meeting in Berlin, had stated that "along with bilateral contacts, the holding of multilateral consultations" by all interested states was necessary to prepare for a conference. The current communique, carried by TASS on 19 February, follows up with the statement that "conditions" have been created during bilateral contacts for the "transition to preparatory work on a multilateral basis for convening the all--European conference." The communique formalizes the Pact members' support for the Finnish Government's initiative of 25 November 19'(0 to host "preparatory meetings of all interested states." Soviet media on 28 January, reporting on "the reply of the European socialist countries to Finland's initiative," had noted that the USSR, its six Pact allies, and Yugoslavia had all informed the Finnish Government of their readiness to attend such meetings. The communique, now terming multilateral meetings a matter of "urgency," asserts the readiness of the Pact states to participate in the meetings proposed by Finland "at any time and to empower their appointed representatives for this purpose." elacing the onus on the NATO bloc for the slow progress toward a conference, the communique replays a recurrent propaganda theme in charging "circles not interested in a further detente in Europe" with intensifying their opposition to a conference by raising "preliminary conditions" and trying to link "other problems" to its convocation. The linkage theme has been picked up in followup comment on the communique, most notably by IZVESTIYA observer Matveyev in the 21 February domestic service roundtable program. Matveyev cited a New York TIMES article by Fellows as indicating that the United States was seeking to block a conference by raising preconditions an,l by linking its convocation to SALT, the Middle East, and the Berlin problem--all issues having "nothing in common" with a European security conference. Czechoslovak and Polish followup commentaries have similarly decried efforts to link the conference issue to SALT as well as other problems. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDEN'I'IAL FIllS TREND:1 24 FEBRUARY 1971 The Pact communique reasserts the member states' concern for peace and detente in Europe and welcomes, without specifying the Soviet and Polish treaties with the FRG, the recent "positive develop- ment" in European relations. It also points out "with satisfaction that certain shifts have been achieved" toward easing tensions in Europe through the efforts of the socialist and "other states." Like the Pact's December statement, it includes a gesture of reassurance to the East Germans: The final paragraph says the foreign ministers stressed the "significance" of all states, specifically including West Germany, establishing equal and internationally recognized relations with the GDR; it calls for GDR membership in the United Nations and other international organizations; and it pledges the Pact states' "fraternal assist- ance" to the GDR in achieving these goals. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 SALT SOVIET, POLISH COMMENTARIES ASSAIL U.S. NEGOTIATING STAND Soviet propaganda on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) , scheduled to resume In Vienna on 15 March, sustains the pattern of open--if still infrequent--ccn^ure of the U.S. negotiating posture signaled by the Shestov PRAVDA article on 3 February.* Soviet commentators have not repeated Shestov's specific attack on the American position regarding U.S. forward bases; but the article's basic charge that the United States is seeking one- sided advantage, echoed by NOVOSTI commentator Gerasimov in LITERARY GAZETTE on 10 February, is picked up again in a Moscow international service broadcast on the 23d. The forward bases issue is : aised, however, in a broad-ranging attack oi, the U.S. position in the 17 February Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU, embellishing recent Soviet themes and asserting that U.S. rejection of two Soviet proposals at the last SALT round in Helsinki, ^oupled with statements made by Ambassador Smith and Secretary Laird, "do not attest to the flexibility of the U.S. position" and "promise protracted negotiations at best." MOSCOW COMMENT The 23 February Moscow radio commentary, monitored so far only in Finnish, echoes Gerasimov's complaint in LITERARY GAZETTE about Western press airing of issues supposedly being negotiated behind closed doors. The commentary points to "the many clearly fab..' -ated articles" in the U.S. press which "misinterpret the course of the talks and describe the Soviet stand as inflexible and unconstructive." Like Gerasimov, it blames the press leaks on elements of the military-industrial complex who are "not pleased with the prospects of a limitation of the nuclear arsenal." Reiterating Shestov's complaint that the American side "is trying to achieve one-sided military superiority for the United States," the commentary portrays the U.S. stand at the talks, much as Gerasimov did, as "two-faced and conflicting." It repeats the standard Soviet line that an agreement is possible only on the basis of equal security for all states and reiterates the Soviet Union's desire for "serious and sincere talks" leading to an agreement on that basis. * The Shestov article, which broached a substantive SALT issue for the first time in Soviet comment, is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 February, pages 22-24. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 - 311 - There is otherwise only passing Soviet mention of SALT as one of the issues, along with a West Berlin settlement and a Middle East solution, which the United States is allegedly trying to link with a European security conference as a means of stalling its convocation. The latest such routine complaint about "linkage" came from Matveyev in the 21 February domestic service roundtable, and the theme is echoed in Czechoslovak and Polish comment. TRYBUNA LUDU The Polish party organ's 17 February dispatch leads off with the statement that Senator Muskie, "tile leading pretender to the presidential office," has related "some details" of his talks with Premier Kos;,rgin in Moscow in January, then states--as fact, without directly quoting Muskie--that Kosygin "expressed his doubts whether Washington is treating the SALT talks on the limitations of strategic armaments seriously." (Moscow media had reported on 15 January that Kosygin received Muskie, but said only that their "unofficial talk" dealt with "a number of topical questions of the contemporary international situation and Soviet-American relations.") Using the reported Kosygin statement as a take-off point for a broad-ranging attack on the U.S. position in SALT, TRYBUNA LUDU nowhere returns to the subject of Senator Muskie. Criticizing Ambassador Smith and Secretary Laird for statements registering U.S. inflexibility, the dispatch presses the stock theme that President Nixon is dominated by the influence of Pentagon circles seeking to build up the U.S. military arsenal and recoup the superiority which the United States has "lost in recent years." Specifically, it objects to military requests for expansion of the antimissile system and for "another auxiliary system." The United States has "for the time being" rejected two Soviet proposals advanced in Helsinki, the paper says--an agreement confined to restricting ABM's "as an easier agreement, and one that would be an introduction" to subsequent ones, and a "wider agreement concerning mutual limitations on offensive and defensive arsenals." It says the latter proposal was "tripped up" by the definition of strategic weapons, citing the forward bases issue in this context; it adds that U.S. rejection of a Soviet proposal limiting ABM systems, on the other hand, was motivated, by Washington's Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 "willingness to have a broader agreement." It charges that Laird "complicated the dialog" by demanding "mutuality in the form of a reduction of Soviet medium-range missiles, which cannot reach U.S. territory." The Polish paper also raises the MIRV issue, saying the United States had removed "an extremely important problem from the SALT agenda when it began to install MIRV warheads on missiles last summer" and asserting that MIRV is designed as a "first-- preventive--strike weapon" and will bring about yet "another series of anti-armaments." Available monitored Polish comment on SALT has included no previous substantive discussion of this kind. Well before Moscow broke its silence on the negotiating issues, however, at least one Czechoslovak commentsa-y--in the Bratislava PRACA on 26 November--cited the question of what constitutes a strategic weapon as a stumbling block. "The White House," PRACA said, "has allegedly instructed the U.S. negotiators to challenge the thesis that every type of missile or aircraft which can fly over and strike the territory of one of the two superpowers with a nuclear weapon can be classified as a strategic armament. Although the Americans admit that the limiting of strategic arms is necessary and logical, they apparently are unwilling to accept such logic as the basis for the treaty." PRACA saw the third round of the talks in Helsinki as taking place "in a worse atmosphere" than the two preceding ones and concluded that it was difficult to judge what would happen. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL F13IS '.'RENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 -36- POLAND REGIME LEVELS FIRST ATTACK AT CONSERVATIVE OBSTRUCTIONISM An article in the 19 February iss1:e of the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY by Ryszard Wojna, a member of the paper's editorial staff, contains the first direct acknowledgment in monitored Polish media of a power struggle between the Gierek regime and ho].d-.,ver conservative elements. Heretofore the official pro,iaganda had blamed the continuing unrest on lack of discipline s:nong; the workers and on the Gomulka regime's high-handed methods of decision-making. Now the ZYCIE WARSZAWY article, entitled "Responsibility for State," says candidly that the election of Gierek and the changes he introduced have been received with "almost unanimous" approval and adds that "the word 'almost' applies to dll those who, as a result of the changes, felt themselves endangered in their positions and in their methods of exercising authority" or who "are simply incapable of ridding themselves of the burdens of conservatism." These people, the article says, "ar' not followers of the new leadership of the Polish state." PAP's lengthy summary of the article includes these passages. The article refers almost in so many words to the existence of a power struggle: "We should realize that at present an acute struggle between the old and the new at very many levels is going on in our country," with the representatives of the old "ready through their actions to bring about a reaffirmation" of their thesis that "society should be ruled, but should not co-rule." These remarks appear to allude to opposition elements in the higher echelons of the central patty and government structure-- more firmly entrenched than the regional party first secretaries, who are currently being reshuffled with increasing rapidity. Following the ouster of the Lodz city party leader on the 16th, Warsaw media have reported replacement of the first secretaries of the voivodship party committees of Warsaw and Krakow on the 17th, Opole on the 18th, and Wroclaw on the 20th. The Wojna article portrays the conservatives as the main beneficiaries of the disruption resulting from pressure for new wage increases despite the-15 February decision to cancel the December food price rise: "One cannot rule out," Wojna Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL F13IU1 TRENDS i 214 FEBRUARY 19' L declares, "that it is grist for the mills of thene people to submit extremist demands, ouch as wage increases of 20 percent." Defensively, the article insists that the price rollback r.ctually amounts to a real wage increase: "In the case of Lodz. where the average wage is relatively low, the restoration c'.' the previous food prices is equivalent to a real incrca?.e in wages of about 15 percent." The strain on the new leadership in trying to make good its promises to improve the people's lot and bring them in on decision- making is evident in the article's assertion that "the conviction that the possibilities of further economic pi.e:ssure on the state have been exhausted must become universal." Wojna adds testily that "the leading representatives of the party and state are simply unable to rush all of a sudden to individual plants and to explain the hard economic facts, or, what is.worse, to ascertain on the spot that ineptitude of portions of the manage- ment, false local decisions, or even bad will are at the root of the protests." In hailing anew the Soviet credits which the regime says made possible the decision to roll back food prices, the article treads in the same context on the sensitive ground of "sovereignty." Indicating that Poland must ultimately rely on its own efforts, it c'bserves that "the independence of the .state manifests 'trelf not only in the political affirmation of its sovereignty, but also in the ability to organize its economic life." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CO ti FI1)LN'I'IAI., -38- USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS FLiiLt 'I'ItL;NU'J Ph FLI3ItUAItY 19'(i PODGORNYYIS PROTEGE TITOV REMOVED FROM KAZAKHSTAN POST V. N. Titcv, t'ormcr CPSU Centrrii Committee cadre secretary and longtime protege of Podgornyy, han been removed from his post as Kazakh second secretary. A Kuzukh Central Committee plenum on 22 February -released Titov and replaced him with V. K. Mesyats," according to Amu-Atu radio on 23 February. Actually, Tltov had apparently been stripped of his title somewhat earlier. The clearest indication came on 10 February when KAZAK[STAN SKAYA PRAVDA, in listing, the Aktyubinsk oblast delega- tion to the 24th CPSU Congress, identified him only as first deputy representative to CEMA. Titov's fall appears to be related to the removal last December of the Kazakh Komsomol first secretary, U. Dzhanibekov, who worked under T'itov's supervision. Since that time, other Kazakh secretaries have taken over Titov's organizational duties. Whatever the reasons behind his fall, his removal now by Kazakh First Secretary (and Brezhnev protege) Kunayeir points to the possibility of a further exacerbation in the relationship between Brezhnev and Podgornyy. The strains between these two in 1965 led to 'i'itov's ouster as a Central Committee secretary and his assignment to Kazakhstan. Recently exposed shortcomings in the Kazakh Komsomol may have been the immediate pretext for Titov's removal. On 17 November a Kazakh Central Committee plenum was called to hear Titov report on improving the party leadership of Komsomol work. His long report contained the usual criticisms of shortcomings in Komsomol work (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRA jA, 18 November). The plenum's decree, however, formulated the criticisms much more sharply and cited shortcomings not mentioned by Titov. In particular, the decree condemned the party's leadership of the Komsomol organizations for "not fully meeting the demands of the 23d Party Congress" and of the 1968 CPSU Central Committee decree on the Krasnoyarsk party organization's leadership of the Komsomol (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 19 November). * Mesyats has been first deputy agriculture minister of the RSFSR since December 1965. Prior to that time he held various posts as an agricultural leader in Moscow oblast, including the position of obkom secretary for agriculture. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL 1111310 'l'RLNll; 21 FEBRUARY 1911(1 Two weeks later, Komsomol First Secretary U. 1)zhan1bekov was removed at it Kuziddi Komuomol Plenum which discussed the November Kazakh Central Committee decree (KAZAKIIS'T'ANSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 December). Dzhanibckov was not disgraced, however, as he was later elected party third secretary of the tiny new T'urgay oblast. lilu uucccncor as Kazakh Komsomol leader was an outsider, Z. Kamalidenov, chief of the trade union council of the small Gurev oblaut. Significantly, this Komsomol plenum was supervised by Central Committee Secretary S. N. Imashev rather than by Titov. Titov'u only subsequent appearance was at the Gecond day of the December Kazakh Supreme Soviet session (KAZAKIIST'ANSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 December). Ilia last identification as a Kazakh leader was as signatory to the obituary of a Kazakh official in the 25 December KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA. He apparently left Kazakhstan or surrendered his leadership functions by early January; an obituary in the 14 January KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA included the names of all Kazakh leaders except Titov, and the omission recurred in another obituary on 7 February. Titov did not participate in the rayon and oblast party conferences and elections in January and February. His organizational duties were performed by Kazakh secretaries S. N. Imashev, A. S. Kolebayev and G. A. Melnik. Titov's uncert.monious fall is reminiscent of his 1965 demotion. In April 1965 he was elected Kazakh second secretary, although he was not formally relieved as CPSU Central Committee cadre secretary until the September 1965 CPSU Central Committee plenum. T'itov had been Podgornyy's assistant in Kharkov it the early 1950's and succeeded him as Kharkov first secretary. As Central Committee cadre secretary, he again worked with Central Committee Secretary Podgornyy in 1963-1965, but was sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary following Brezhnev's victory over Podgornyy. Titov's transfer was apparently not welcomed by Brezhnev's Kazakh proteges since KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, in announcing his election as second secretary on 6 April 1965, differed from all other papers in onitting his title of CPSU Central Committee secretary. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CON1''iD1:NTI.AI, F13IS '1.'HENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 BELGOROD LEADER VASILYEV BECOMES RSFSR AGRICULTURE CHIEF Belgorod First Secretary N. F. Vacllyev, ambitous promoter of the Belgorod system of upecialized liveutoc'.; farming, has been named to succeed Voronov'u protege K. G. Pysin as RSFSR first deputy premier for ugric.uiturc (SOVIET RUSSIA, 19 February). Vasilyev's rise, apparently linked with controversial July plenum decisions to create a system of large specialized livestock complexes, appears to mark a further weakening in Voronov's position. Vasilyev had early career ties with Brezhnev and other leaders in the Ukraine, and he has conspicuously failed to endorse agricultural innovations promoted. by Voronov and his protege Pysin. Voronov in turn has in the past ignored the Belgorod system of specialization and instead favored the methods developed in his former bailiwick Orenburg. Although Brezhnev and Polyanskiy also have not endorsed Vasilyev's system, Vasilyev presumably can count at least on Brezhnev's support. He served under Brezhnev, Kirilenko and Shcherbitskiy in Dnepropetrovsk, eventually becoming oblast executive committee chairman in 1961. Ironically, Vasilyev got his big break as a result of the May 1964 purge of Voronov's Orenburg proteges. Belgorod First Secretary A.V. Kovalenko was sent to Orenburg to replace Voronov's appointee, while Vasilyev replaced Kovalenko in Belgorod. On his arrival in Belgorod, Vasilyev initiated a program of specialization which concentrated on the creation of new facilities for raising livestock rather than on the renova- tion or expansion of old livestock facilities. Many delegations have studied Belgorod's work through the years, with some approving and others complaining about the neglect of the old facilities. Vasilyev himself admits that his system is very costly (PRAVDA, 25 June 1970) and requires the concentration of investments in new specialized farms to the neglect of other farms. This practice was criticized by RSFSR Gosplan deputy chairman G. Smirnov, who complained that the nonspecialized farms in the oblast were neglected and as a result the oblast as a whole lagged behind its neighbors (ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, No. 7, 1969). uring 1968 and 1969 Belgorod suffered sharp setbacks due to mistakes in specialization, and as Yuriy Chernichenko wrote Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1.971 in the June 1970 YUNOS'T', "the Belgorod experience was never as open to criticism no at the beginning of 1970." But, according to Chernichenko, the "daring strategy" paid off as a triumph of large-scale specialization. The turning point for Vacilyev's Belgorod system came in mid-1970 when the CPSU agricultural plenum decided in favor of a costly program for construction of large-scale livestock complexes. This program was approved after a debate over its cost erupted in the central press. Estonian First Deputy Premier Tynurist objected to the new complexes as overly expensive in the 10 April IZVESTIYA. Vasilyev was invited to speak at the July agricultural plenum, and after the plenum Belgorod's work in creating new industrial livestock complexes began receiving more recognition. Belgorod's work was praised by Central Committee agriculture section deputy head N.P. Rudenko at an October livestock conference (ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, No. 12, pp 113-114), and PRAVDA's 23 January 1971 editorial praised thn construction of large livestock complexes and declared that Beigorod, Moscow, Penza, and Tambov "are setting the tone" for the RSFSR. Voronov's RSFSR apparatus also became more responsive to the Belgorod initiatives. Vasilyev had complained in a June ECONOMIC GAZETTE (No. 29) article that the RSFSR agriculture ministry had obstructed Belgorod's specialization, by refusing to permit the oblast to create a joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz association for poultry production. Yet a 16 September RURAL LIFE editorial praised the RSFSR agriculture ministry for creating a special unit to aid quick construction of a complex at a Belgorod sovkhoz. A 17 November SOVIET RUSSIA editorial praised Belgorod's specializa- tion as one of a number of valuable innovations in the RSFSR. And finally Voronov himself, in his 2 October KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview on livestock raising, praised a Belgorod kolkhoz's breeding experiment and urged wide study of this initiative. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFI')L;N'i'iAL - 42- PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS FBIS TRENDS 211 T'IEBRUARY 1971 PARTY CC '1ITTEES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR KWANGSI AND KANSU Ten of the nation's 29 provincial-level subdivisions and 40 percent of its population now come under the new provincial. party committees. New committees for Kwangsi and Kansu were announced by NCNA on 20 and 21 February, following a 21-day hiatus when no new provincial-level committees were reported. Establishment of a party committee for Kwangsi, the scene of violent factional clashes during the summer of 1968, completes provincial party-building tasks within the Canton Military Region (MR), Huang Yung-sheng's old bailiwick. The Nanking MR, led by Politburo members Hsu Shih-yu and Chang Chun-chiao, was the first military region to set up new committees for all provincial units within its juristiction, on 30 January. KWANGSI The Kwangsi committee, the first to be established COMMITTEE in an autonomous region, was elected at a party congress attended by 853 delegates. It consists of 78 full and 16 alternate members, larger than the pre-cultural revolution committee of 46 full and alternate members. The four- man group--three military men and one veteran cadre--which heads the new committee is smaller than the former 14-man secretariat. As with all the other provincial committees, NCNA noted that the new committee members were selected according to the formula of old, middle-aged and young. Out of public view since 16 November, Kwangsi powerholder Wei Kuo-ching, former first secretary and governor of Kwangsi, emerged as first secretary of the new committee; he was identified as past leader of the party nucleus group for the first time. Wei holds concurrent positions as chairman of the provincial revolu- tionary committee and first political r.cmmissar of the Kwangsi Military District (MD). Wei Tsu-chen, a :::?:iltary man recently transferred to Kwangsi from the Fukien MD, was named secretary. Liu Chung-kuei, a vice chairman and deputy commander of the Kwangsi MD, was named a deputy secretary as was An Ping-sheng, a vice chairman and an old secretary from the former provincial committee. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 In his congress address, Wei spoke quite firmly on the need for war preparedness. After noting that fulfillment of local economic goals would make Kwangsi "an iron bastion on the southern frontier," lie pointed out that Kwangsi "is an outpost in supporting the Vietnamese people." "We strongly condemn U.S. imperialism for its new crimes in expanding its war of aggression in Indochina," he declared, and "we are closely watching the development of the situation." Of the 10 NCNA reports so far on the keynote congress addresses (all but -the last two given prior to the GVN push into Laos), the report on Wei's address indicates he was the strongest on the issue of war preparedness. But speakers in the other border provinces of Kansu and Liaoning also noted the special need for war preparedness in a frontier' area. Of the remaining seven, four speakers referred briefly to the need for war preparedness in connection with economic tasks. KANSU In the Northwest, the 68 full and 24 alternate COMMITTEE members of the Kansu committee were elected in accordance with the familar "old, middle--aged, and young" combination at a Lanchow meeting of 1,098 party delegates held from 11 to 17 February. Kansu's previous conunittee, as set up in 1956, was smaller, containing only 37 full and alternate members. Immediately prior to the cultural revolution,however, its secretarict had grown to 22 men, much larger than the streamlined three-man leadership group which heads the new committee. ,/" The top party post in Kansu went to Hsien Heng-han, chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and first political commissar of the Lanchow MR. Pi Ting-chun, former deputy commander of the Foochow MR and first vice chairman on the F-,aien Revolutionary Committee, was named secretary; he recently transferred to Kansu, where he has been identified as a vice chairman with responsibilities within the Lanchow MR. Hu Chi-tung, vice chairman and a secretary on the old Kansu committee, was also named secretary. A 22 February KANSU DAILY editorial welcomed the new provincial committee and argued for stronger party leadership over the government and the masses. Reflecting continuing widespread media calls for additional cadre rectification, even in areas with new provincial committees, the editorial firmly called Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1971 upon all cadres, particularly at "uenlor and medium levels," to increase t`eir study of Mao's Thought "no matter how busy they are with their work." PROGRESS Both the Kwangsi and ICansu committees, as well ELSEWHERE as 'those for Hunan, Kwangtung, Anhwei and Chekiang, were announced just a few days after their respective provincial radios had claimed substantial progress in rebuilding the party at lower levels. Judging by this indicator, Shensi appears next in line to set up its committee. Sian radio on 17 February declared that "the great majority of basic-level party organizations in the province have been established." And apart from various references to new county committees in Shensi, Sian radio on 21 February reported the formation of a new cc,mmittee for the Shanglo special district, the second special district committee it has publicized. Provinces that have already rebuilt their provincial party committees continue to form lower-level party units, filling in holes remaining in the provincial party apparatus. 1,T=achang radio on 18 February announced establishment of new special district committees for Chingka.ngshan, Mao's revolutionary base area during the late 1920's, and Kanchow. The Liaoning provincial radio on 21 February reported the formation of a view committee for the major port city of Luta. Numerous county-level committees continue to be mentioned for the first time in various provinces. PEOPLE'S DAILY WARNS OF OVEREMPHASIS ON GRAIN PRODUCTION Several recent broadcast articles have indicated that Peking is looking again at the manner in which localities have implemented its decree that grain is the "key link" in agricultural development. Most of the previous articles were carried in the provincial press, but a PEOPLE'S DAILY editor's note published on 15 February adds a strong central voice to the argument that the concentration on grain has slowed the course of general development in some instances. PEOPLE'S DAILY states that "some units simply grasp grain production and neglect diversified economy," primarily because of "one-sided" thinking by local cadres unable to distinguish between "socialist diversified economy" and Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1911 -h5- "'putt.Ing money In command.'" Other "selfish" cadres, for reasons of personal prestige, strive for high grain production statistics to the detriment of actual requirements. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editor's note reiterates that the relationship between grain and other crops must be correctly set in order to promote general development. The propaganda ha3 made it clear that the primary measure for Judging the success of a production unit in agriculture is through grain output; even areas specializing in other crops have been expected to become at least partially self-sufficient in grain. Thus few cadres are likely to risk a decline in grain production unless the leadership can convince them that they will suffer no retribution through trying for all-round development. Even if grain is not to be the ultimate standard, its importance obviously remains central. A Canton city broadcast on 12 February praised a Maoming decision to grow grain rather than vegetables on the outskirts of town. Cadres who argued that guaranteeing the town's vegetable supply was necessary to a diversified economy were overruled. The ruling group held that since grain is the key link Maoming must try to reduce its dependence on the state for grain even if it means going short on vegetables. But another Canton broadcast noted on .it February that "crops must be planned and developed in the light of local conditions," and it listed a number of non- grain crops in which production must be raised. RESTRICTIONS ON INNER MONGOLIA RADIO LOOSENED SLIGHTLY The Inner Mongolia regional radio has taken the first cautious step toward resumption of local broadcasting. For more than a year, since 5 January 1970, the Inner Mongolia Mandarin- language service had relayed Radio Peking throughout its broadcast day, except for brief weather forecasts and other nonpolitical announcements. Beginning 15 February, and continuing through the 24th, the radio has broadcast three half-hour programs a da,.- from its own studios. So far the programs have consisted only of centrally authored articles on Inner Mongolia--NCNA-PEOPLE'S DAILY articles on the excellent progress being made in socialist revolution and construction--interspers-ad with music. The other two provincial-level radios that have done nothing but relay Radio Peking solidly over the past year and more, those of Szechwan and Kweichow, still show no signs of coming back to life. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040008-3