TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 10, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIIIIU~uuiiiii~~lllll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~IIIIIII-I~~uiii~~lllllllll~~
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
10 MARCH 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 101
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by on unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
on,
GROUP
leeluded from euremerk
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 MARCH 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
Chou En-lai Leads PRC Delegation on Surprise Visit to DRV . . . . 1
Communique Says DRV, PRC Agree on Response to U.S. "Adventures" . 2
DRV Assembly Calls For "Every Sacrifice" Until "Total Victory" . 6
Communists Claim More Victories in Laos, Deny Loss of Tchepone . 8
Communique Cites Alleged Allied Losses in Cambodian Operation . . 12
Hanoi, Front Score U.S. "Acts of War," "Threats" Against DRV . . 13
DRV, PRG Assail President's Press Conference, Policy Report . . . 15
DRV, PRG Delegates at Paris Focus on President's Report . . . . . 19
Moscow Dwells on President Nixon's "Threats" to DRV . . . . . . . 22
Britain Scored for Release of Souvanna Letter to Cochairmen . . . 25
Hanoi Protests "Provocations" Against DRV Embaiisy in Laos . . . . 25
Foreign Minister in Sihanouk Government Visits North Korea . . . 26
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Guarded on Chances for Success of Jarring Mission . . . . 27
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
Moscow Calls Ban on CB Weapons Main Issue at Geneva Talks . . . . 32
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR Media Ignore Limitations Placed on Talks with Senat . . . . . 34
Soviet, GDR Media Adopt Four-Power "Negotiations" Formula . . . . 35
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
PRC Decries "Aggressive" Thrust of Nixon Foreign Policy Report . 37
PRC SATELLITE
Launch Unreported by Peking, Noted by Havana, Belgrade . . . . ? 39
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shensi Forms Its Party Committee, Eleventh in Nation . . . . . . 4:
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Editor of Slavophile Journal MOLDAYA GVARDIYA Is Removed . . . . 45
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
10 MARCH 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 MARCH 1971
Moscow (3713 items)
Peking (2662 items)
CPSU 24th Congress
(19%)
18%
Indochina
(47%)
37%
Indochina
(11%)
10%
[Battle Reports
(15%)
15%]
International Women's
Day
(--)
7%
[Sihanouk Tour of
PRO
(14%)
7%]
Middle East
(3%)
6%
Domestic Issues
(35%)
33%
[Soviet Government
Statement, 27 Feb.
(2%)
2%]
President Nixon's
State of World
(--)
7%
Mongolian Revolution,
(0.3%)
5%
Report
50th Anniversary
PRC-Japanese Trade
(2%)
4%
China
(5%)
4%
Talks
U.S. "Provocations"
in Korea
(--)
3%
Thee statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attentioxi in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propagende content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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INDOCHINA
Propaganda surrounding the surprise weekend visit to Hanoi of the
PRC party-government delegation led by Chou En-lai dramatizes
Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and reaffirms communist determination
not to let the struggle in Indochina be deterred by U.S.
"escalation" in Laos and Cambodia or by threats of action against
the DRV. The joint communique, released on 10 March, said the
two sides "have held discussions on questions as to how to deal
with possible military adventures by U.S. imperialism and have
reached completely identical views."
The communique also stated that the Chinese are determined to give
all-out support, "not flinching from the greatest national
sacrifices"--a phrase used by Chou in a speech on the 6th and
pointedly noted by Pham Van Dong on the 7th. In this reg'ed
Dong warned "the U.S. imperialists" to "remember the well-deserved
lessons of their miscalculations all along the years." He went
on to declare that the Indochinese have the backing of "700 million
Chinese people" and "the militant solidarity of the entire socialist
camp," a statement in line with Hanoi's practice over the years of
stressing the importance of communist unity.
North Vietnamese resolve to persist in the war is also highlighted
in publicity for the seventh session of the Third National Assembly,
held from 2 to 4 March. The political report, delivered by Phan
Van Dong, and other propaganda condemn U.S. "escalation and threats"
and call for vigilance along the lines of the 10 December joint
party-government appeal.
Vietnamese and Laotian communist propaganda on the Laos operation
denies that South Vietnamese forces captured the crossroads town
of Tchepone on 6 March and continues to claim a series of victories
against allied. forces. Persistent rebuttals of U.S. statements
that the Laos operation shows the success of Vietnamization are
sharpened in a 1+ March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by military
commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant): The "successive annihilation
of a series of the mcst seasoned puppet battalions," he says, is
"a thorough negation of the illusion about the Saigon army's
independent strength which Nixon has tried to create for the past
few years."
CHOU EN-LAI LEADS PRC DELEGATION ON SURPRISE VISIT TO DRV
The visit from 5 to 8 March of the PRC party-government delegation
led by Chou En-lai has highlighted Peking's pledge of rear area
"support and assistance" to its Indochinese allies. For the first
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time in recent years the Chinese have associated their security
interests with the DRV and Indochina as a whole, thus broadening
Peking's authoritative statements last month terming the
incursion into Laos a grave menace to China. The North Vietnamese,
who took the occasion to stress their concern over a threat to
their security posed by current military operations near their
borders, effusively hailed the visit as a great encouragement in
their struggle and as "a stern warning" to the United States.
Chou's visit, announced only after his departure from Hanoi on
the 8th, was his first foreign trip since visiting the DPRK last
April. He had briefly visited Hanoi in September 1969 after Ho
Chi Minh's death. Chou's delegation included two other Politburo
members, Yeh Chien-ying, vice chairman of the party's military
commission, and Chiu Hui-tso, a deputy chief of staff in charge
of the PLA's rear services; Keng Piao, former ambassador to
Albania and now formally identified as director of the CCP's
international liaison department; the deputy foreign minister in
charge of Far Eastern affairs; the director of the armament
department of the PLA general logistics department; and various
other officials. The presence of the logistics officers points
up one purpose of the visit, though there was no announcement of
a new aid agreement. An agreement on supplementary economic
and military aid from the PRC for this year had been signed on
15 February.
Talks were held between the PRC delegation and Le Duan, Truong Chinh,
Pham Van Dong (who acted as principal host for his Chinese counter-
part), Defense Minister Giap, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh,
and others. President Ton Duc Thang and Le Duc Tho, the only top
leaders not present at the talks, attended some of the ceremonies.
Speeches were exchanged on each of the four days of the visit,
including a welcoming ceremony and a banquet on the 5th, a major
rally on the 6th, a banquet on the 7th, and a farewell ceremony
on the 8th.
W4'IJNIQUE SAYS DRV. PRC AGREE ON RESPONSE TO U.S. "ADVENTURES"
A lengthy joint communique released on 10 March says the two
sides, having studied the "grave situation" resulting from the
expanding war in Indochina, "have taken full account of the reck-
lessness and madness of the Nixon Government" and have reached
"completely identical views" regarding "how to deal with possible
military adventures" by the United States. The communique goes
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on to record the DRV's determination to join with the Laotian
and Cambodian peoples to drive the United States out of Indochina
and declares that "no brute force or truculent threat can shake
the strong will of the three peoples of Indochina to fight tc the
finish."
As for the Chinese side, the communique says the Chinese people
are determined "to take all necessary measures, not flinching
even from the greatest national sacrifices," to render "all-out
support and assistance" to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese
peoples in case the United States should "go down the road of
expanding its war of aggression in Indochina."
The communique registers both sides' support for the Seauth
Vietnamese Front's proposals for a Vietnam settlement, as well
as for the proposals on a Laos settlement advanced by the
Laotian Patriotic Front and Sihanouk's five-point declaration.
Peking had failed to even mention the existence of the May 19691
NFLSV/PRG proposals until October of that year; its first
endorsement of them appeared in the 13 December 19TO panty=government
statement supporting the DRV's appeal issued three days earlier.
LINKAGE OF PRC, The communique is notable tor directly link-
DRV SECURITY ing China's security with that of the DRV,
a linkage which the Chinese have carefully
avoided in recent years. In a passage reviewing current military
developments, the communique says this "new and extremely grave
war escalation" by the United States against South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia "directly menaces the securit; of the DRV and at the
same time the security of the PRC, thus creating a dangerous
situation to peace in Asia and the world."
During the visit the North Vietnamese repeatedly cited military
operations near their borders as posing a threat to the DRV,
though without also linking these developments with China's
security. That Hanoi wished for the Chinese to associate them-
selves with the DRV's security interests was suggested by DRV
Paris delegation head Xuan Thuy's charge at the 18 February
session that China as well as the DRV is threatened by the
operation in Laos, the U.S. buildup near the DMZ, air strikes
against the DRV, and increased naval activities in the Tonkin
Gulf--the very evidence cited in the communique as showing a
threat to both the DRV and China. Unlike DRV media, Peking did
not report Thuy's remarks. Moreover, during the visit Chou was
less explicit than his hosts in citing evidence of a threat to
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-4-
the DRV, having recourse to the vague formulation that the United
States is planning "new military adventures" against North Vietnam.
Chou introduced the question of China's security in his speech at
the 5 March banquet. After pointing out that the three Indochinese
countries are close neighbors of China, he charged that expansion
of the Indochina conflict by the United States poses "a grave threat
to China." Chou's reference to China's security marked the first
time this issue had been raised by Peking in a context broader than
a specifically Laotian one. Peking had first broached this issue
in the 12 February government statement terming the incursion into
Laos "a grave menace to China," but it was ignored for nearly two
weeks following the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
sharply challenging President Nixon's dismissal c' the question of
Chinese security.*
CHINESE SUPPORT The Chinese promise in the communique to take
all necessary measures, "not flinching even
from the greatest national sacrifices," was first offered by Chou
in a major speech at the rally on the 6th. Tn that speech, however,
Chou did not link China's security with that of the DRV, a missing
element that would seem to mute some of the ominous overtones in the
reference to national sacrifices. At the same time, Chou's
discussion of Chinese aid followed standard lines of rear area
support; he invoked Mao's statement that China 3s the "reliable
rear area" of the Vietnamese as "the firm and unshakable
principle . . . as well as a guide to action" of the PRC. In
the communique, on the other hand, this quotation of Mao is passed
over in favor of his 20 May 1970 statement following the incursion
into Cambodia, and there is no explicit reference to China as a
rear area. The communique simply quotes the Chinese as saying
it is their "unshirkable internationalist duty to give support and
assistance" to the Vietnamese.
Pham Van Dong, speaking at a banquet the day after Chou introduced
the formulation about national sacrifices, seized upon Chou's
statement to deliver a warning to the United States to "remember
the well-deserved lessons of (its] miscalculations all along these
years"--a possible allusion to the Korean War. Noting that the
* The charge that the Laos operation menaces China's security was
revived on 7 March in a Peking report alleging U.S. provocations
against Chinese fishing boats in the Tonkin Gulf on 10 and 20 February.
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United States is expanding the Indochina conflict and has
"threatened to invade" the DRV, Dong warned that the Indochinese
peoples hove "the powerful backing" of the Chinese, "the militant
solidarity of the entire socialist camp," and the support of
Lnti-imperialist and peace forces throughout the world. He also
called Chou's visit and "firm statements"--which "will reverberate
far and wide" in Vietnam and on all the Indochina battlefields--"a
stern warning" to the United States.
Speaking at the same banquet, on the 7th, Chou expressed a quite
different mood. He mentioned that in their talks the Chinese
and the North Vietnamese had reached completely identical views
on "further strengthening the friendly cooperation and mutual
support and assistance" between the two countries. Taking note
of North Vietnamese efforts to heighten their vigilance and to
prepare "to face new battles and seize new victories," Chou
exuded confidence over the tide of battle and explained that the
enemy will be driven into a still more passive position from
having spread out its forces to cope with the three peoples of
Indochina.
Chows farewell remarks on the 8th likewise were in keeping with
the long-standing Chinese posture of rear area support for the
Vietnamese. He called the joint communique an important document
and assured his hosts that the Chinese people "in the great rear
area" will redouble their efforts to do even better in giving
support to the Vietnamese and to fulfill the tasks laid down in
the communique. Similarly, NCNA's report on the delegation's
return to Peking said the purpose of the visit was to convey "the
most cordial regards and the highest respects" to the Vietnamese
people "fighting at the frontline" and to express the Chinese
people's "iron will" to aid the Vietnamese and the other peoples
of Indochina "in thoroughly defeating" the United States.
Thus, Peking does not seem to have indicated a change in its
assessment of the Indochina situation or of its own position as a
rear base, and it left to the North Vietnamese the role of draw-
ing out the implications of Chou's visit as providing a warning
to the United States. The divergent approaches reflected in the
two sides' respective statements, viewed against the background of
Peking's marked reticence toward associating Chinese security
interests with the DRV's, suggest that Chou's visit, particularly
as reflected in the communique, represented a move by the Chinese
to meet North Vietnamese needs for reassurance part way. Peking
seems to have acceded to Hanoi's wishes by linking the two
countries' security, and it went so far as to hint at stronger
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measures against the enemy by expressing a willingness to accept
"the greatest national sacrifices." Nonetheless, it expressed
this willingness as being conditioned on a further expansion of
the Indochina conflict to a degree left unspecified.
DRV ASSEMBLY CALLS FOR "EVERY SACRIFICE" UNTIL "TOTAL VICTORY"
The seventh session of the Third National Assembly, held from 2 to
4 March, provided a platform for further authoritative Hanoi
condemnation of U.S. "escalation" and for appeals for continued
vigilance. Hanoi media on the 5th announced that the session had
been held and that same day carried the text of the political
report, delivered at the session by Pharr Van Dong, and an Assembly
statement--described as being issued in connection "with the
current grave situation in Vietnam and Indochina created by the
U.S. acts of war intensification and expansion." NHAN DAN and
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the 7th hail the Assembly's
"important statement."
Dong in the political report makes the routine charge that the
U.S. Vietnamization policy is aimed at "turning South Vietnam
into a U.S. neocolony and military base, perpetuating the
partition of Vietnam and threatening the DRV." And he says that
the current "big operation near the DMZ and in southern Laos
has highly adventurous objectives." He goes on to echo other
propaganda in detailing alleged allied losses.
The Premier says that President Nixon in his foreign policy report
on the 25th had "disclosed in the clearest terns and the most
concentrated manner his perfidious schemes and methods against
the three Indochinese countries." He takes issue particularly
with the President's assessment of Vietnamization and his
assertion that he wants "serious negotiations."
Dong says that "our enemy" has not given up his designs against
the North since it is the "great rear base of a great front" and
has "always been the firm base of the revolution." And he goes
on to appeal for "rock-like determination" on both the military
and economic fronts. After stressing Vietnamese determinatioi
to fight and win, he also expresses gratitude for the support and
assistance from the socialist countries--saying that at present
it has "become firmer and stronger" as an answer to U.S. escalaticn.
He concludes by recalling the exhortation in Ho Chi Minh's testa-
ment that the war may drag on, and new sacrifices of property and
human lives made, but regardless "we must be resolved to fight . .
till total victoz'y."
CONFIDENTIAL
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The statement issued by the Assembly "vehemently denounces and
severely condemns" the Nixon Administration for intensifying and
expanding the war to all of Indochina and placed full responsibility
on the United States for its acts. It demands that the United
States "stop immediately its war of aggression" in South Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia, "stop for good all acts of war" against the
DRV, and totally and unconditionally withdraw all allied troops
from Indochina. It asserts that the Vietnam issue must be settled
on th= basis of the PRG's 10 point solution and eight point
elaboration.
The statement calls on all of the people and armed forces to
''respond actively" to the 10 December party-government appeal and
"strictly implement" the resolution passed at the VWP Central
Committee's 19th plenum in January. Like Dong, it expresses "sincere
thanks" for the support and assistance of the fraternal socialist and
friendly countries. It calls on them and the peoples of the world,
including Americans, "to take timely measures to prevent the U.S.
military adventures" in Indochina and to demand an end to the war.
The editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th both
describe the Assembly statement as a "severe warning" to the
United States. And NHAN DAN says it was issued in the face of
President Nixon's foreign policy report and the 4 March press conf-
erence in which he "most clearly and fully revealed his cunning plots
and maneuvers to intensify and expand the war in Indochina and to
take a new war escalation step against North Vietnam."
NHAN DAN adds that in response to "this important statement," the
people and armed forces of the DRV "under party leadership" are
determined to fulfill their role as "a steady prop for our people's"
struggle and "to fulfill their international obligations" toward
Laos and Cambodia. Asserting that "despite pitiful setbacks" the
"U.S. aggressors and their henchmen are still unwilling to give up
their scheme of intimidating, harassing, and invading" North
Vietnam, it says "we must be more vigilant, stand ready to fight,
and rapidly strengthen our forces in every respect."
Underscoring the DRV's return to a more vigilant stance domestic-
ally, it says "we are determined to fulfill our combat duty in any
part of our country, are ready to overcome all hardships and
sacrifices . . . , satisfactorily carry out the milita-y service,
join the armed forces, participate in the communications and
transportation activities, serve the fighting, always stand ready
to fight, and frustrate all schemes and acts of the U.S. aggressors
and their lackeys that are aimed at violating the airspace,
territorial waters, and territory of the northern part of our
country."
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COM'IUNISTS CLAIM MORE VICTORIES IN LAOS, DENY LOSS OF TCHEPONE
Communist statistics on alleged allied losses in Operation Lam
Son 719 now place total allied casualties in Laos at over 6,000
troops.* The claim is made in a 7 March NLHS Central Committee
statement, released by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 8th and
carried by VNA or the 9th. An earlier communique from the Laotian
"liberation armed forces" command, tallying the results of action
from 1 February to 3 March, had claimed that more than 5,500
allied troops had been put out of action -long Laotian Highuray 9.
The army communique, broadcast by the Pathe.. Lao radio on the
7th, also said that more than 250 aircraft had been shot down and
more than 200 vehicles destroyed--half of them tanks and armored
cars. (The communique, which also reported on alleged achieve-
ments in other parts of Laos, has not jeen monitored from
Vietnamese communist media, although earlier Laotian "liberation
armed forces" communiques on the fighting in southern Laos were
publicized by both Pathet Lao and Vietnamese communist media on
14 and 24 February.)
Alleged allied losses along Highway 9 in Quang Tri are currently
totaled in a 1~ March message of congratulations from the South
Vietnamese PLAF command to the "Khe Sanh fighters." The message,
reported by LPA on the 7th, claims that since the start of the
incursion into Laos in early February the PLAF "on the Khe Sanh
front" have wiped out over 2,000 allied troops, including more
than 1,000 Americans.** In addition, the message says they
"seized a large quantity of weapons," shot down or destroyed nearly
70 aircraft, wrecked more than 200 military vehicles, two-thirds
of which were tanks and armored cars, and "burnt out 14 logistics
depots." A 6 March LPA battle report claims that since the
beginning of the incursion into Laos nine U.S. military convoys
comprising 101 military vehicles have been destroyed on Highway 9
by the Khe Sanh troops.
TCHEPONE FIGHTING Laotian and Vietnamese communist propaganda
uniformly contradicts South Vietnamese
reports that the crossroads city of Tchepone was captured by
South Vietnamese forces on 6 March. An official denial is made
* A VNA commentary on 2 March had claimed that in February alone
the insurgents in Laos had put nearly 4,000 allied troops out of
action.
** The 2 March VNA report claimed a total of 1,700 allied casualties,
including "nearly 1,000" Americans, on the Khe Sanh front.
CONFENTIAL
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in an 8 March statement by a spokesman of tha Laotian "liberation
army" command which states flatly: "Tchepone township is still
under full control of the Lao army ar.1 people. Not a single
American aggressor or Saigon puppet hac been able to set foot in
Tchepone." The statement maintains that the announcement of the
"imaginary victory" was made in an effort to "cover up" allied
"setaacks." The allied forces in Laos, according to the statement
are in fact "seriously bogged down," have lost "an important part
of their strength and war means," and are "facing an extremely
dangerous situation."
Also on the 8th and again ors the 10th, thr' Hanoi press ridicules
the announced entry of South Vietname:,e fo: ,es into Tchepone.
The announcement is denied in commentaries on the fighting in both
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 8 March; the army paper also
publishes a Commentator article deriding the South Vietnamese
claim, as well as a dispatch from a correspondent who says he was
in the town of Tchepone on 7 March and interviewed the chairman
of the administrative committee of Tchepone district. According
to the correspondent, the chairman noted that on the afternoon
of 6 March "U.S. Lircraft came and dropped bombs, striking down
several trees, hampering our traffic for awhile," but that "now
everything has returned to normal" and "our trucks continue to
roll unimpeded."
The 8 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article ridicules the
announcement about Tchepone by recalling a succession of
Western news reports which had previously quoted South Vietnamese
officials as reporting the occupation of Tchepone. The other
commentary in the army paper on the same day claims that the
Laotian insurgents have dealt "stunning blows" to the allied
"'leapfrogging' tactics" used to move South Vietnamese troops by
helicopter toward the Tchepone area. To document its claim, the
paper cites actic- ^3ainst South Vietnamese forces landing on
Ta Pang mountain--three kilometers south of Tchepone--in wh!jh
16 helicopters were allegedly downed, as well as a 6-7 March
attack on Hill 723, 10 kilometers southwest of Ban Dong, in which
300 allied troops were allegedly killed or wounded and "'nany"
others captured. It also recalls antiaircraft attacks on the
3d when the insurgents allegedly downed 15 aircraft involved in
the landing of troops in the area of Hill 723. In addition to
denying that allied troops entered Tchepone, the commentary claims
that the leapfrogging movement of troops to hills "south of
Highway 9 near Tchepone" required the allies both to introduce
"tens of thousands more reinforcements" and to "call off the
prong" of allied forces north of Highway 9.
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An article in the 7 March QUAN DOI NI-IAN DAN had reacted to earlier
South Vietnamese claims to be approaching Tchepone, charging that
"the so-called offensive stage of the U.S.-puppets current invasion
of southern Laos is but a label to cover their critical situation."
The paper also said the allies had "abandoned a prong of their
z.;,ora;:ion and massed troops on several hills to make their deploy-
ment seem longer and to readjust the objectives of their operation."
In this co. action, the article noted Secretary Laird's remark that
Tchepone was not an objective of the allied forces.
REFERENCE TO COMMUNIST The first known acknowledgment in Hanoi
ARMORED FARCES IN LAOS comment of the communist use of tanks in
Laos comes in a 5 March QUAN DOI NT'AN DAN
commentary hailing attacks north of Ban Dong from 26 February to
3 March in which the insurgents allegedly "annihilated" the 17th
Armored Group, the 8th Airborne Battalion, and an element of the
11th Armored Group. A VNA report on the 5th specifies that the
26 February battle involved the 8th battalion of the 2d Airborne
Brigade, under cover of tanks and armored cars of the 17th Armored
Group." The paper claims that 84 tanks and armored cars were
destroyed or seized and "many" troops captured in these engage-
ments. Crediting various branches of the "southern Laos liberation
combatants" with playing a part in these "battles of annihilation,"
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN notes that "she heroic armored troops outstand-
ingly intercepted and annihilated many puppet tanks and airborne
troops."
Accompanying reports on the fighting note that the allied units
involved were attempting to regain control of Hill 456 (designated
by the allies as Hill 31). And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN comments that
the "victories" exposed the allies' "fraudulent claims" that they
had reoccupied Hill 31 and destroyed enemy tanks. "The truth is,"
according to the army paper, "that they could not even approach
Hill 456 or destroy any tanks."
"CHIEN BINH" COMMENT QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's authoritative military
commentator '.'Chien Binh" (Combatant)
comments on the Laos incursion in the 4 March issue of the army
* Initial communist comment on this engagement c'aimed, as does
comment on the 5th, that 17 allied tanks and armored cars were
destroyed and 13 captured but made no mention of the use of
communist armored forces and did not name the allied units involved.
(See 3 March TRENDS, page 9.)
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paper.* Chien Binh maintains that the Laos operation is "of
great importance for the Americans" and comments that "therefore
their failure on this battlefield is of very great significance."
Portraying the allied forces as confused and helpless, he makes
the unusual observation that there was "no violent or vehement
opposition" to the allies during the first three days of the
operation and later quotes AFP for the remark that it was only
after their forces had become endangered by communist attacks
that "thr,y realized they had been lured in when the communists
allowed them to enter their zone so easily."
Chien Binh ridicules the Administration's hope that the Laos
operation would bolster the program of Vietnamization. He
comments at one point that "the fact that a series of the most
seasoned puppet battalions were successively annihilated is an
additional deadly blow dealt to the puppet troops' combat
spirit and is a thorough negation of the illusion about the
Saigon army's independent strength which Nixon has tried to
creE.te for the past few years." The future of the South Vietnamese
army is also discussed in a later passage in which Chien Binh
describes the President as "dazzled by imaginary successes and
infatuated with fallacious optimism," as "stupidly ignoring
advice," and as "engaging in frenzied adventures." In this
context, Chier Binh observes that "Nixon himself has exposed the
weakness of the puppet troops while trying to prove the strength
of the mercenary army. He has dug a grave to bury the puppet
army . . . ."
POLICY ON POW'S Communist policy toward prisoners is spelled
out in an 8 March NLHS Central Committee
statement, publicized by Laotian and Vietnamese communist media
on the 9th and 10th, which promises humane treatment for
prisoners and a warm welcome to all allied combatants who mutiny
or come over to "the revolutionary side." It pledges to help
them "return home" and to help "antiwar GI's" to "seek political
asylum in another country of their choice, if they so request."
Exploiting prisoners allegedly taken in the fighting along
Highway 9, Hanoi media on the 8th and the Pathet Lao news agency
on the 9th carried remarks attributed to Col. Nguyen Van Tho,
the commander of Saigon's 3d Airborne Brigade, said to have been
* Chien Binh discussed the allied use of helicopters in Laos
in a 26 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article.
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captured on 25 February on Hill 31.* The purported statement by
Tho indicates that all the officers and staff of the brigade
surrendered and have been given lenient treatment by the
"liberation troops." It asserts that Lam Son 719 has "in effect
been defeated" and urges other ARVN troops to "take prompt action
in order to avoid a tragic fate, avoid a senseless and useless
death." Hanoi propaganda has noted and ridiculed Western press
reports that Colonel The was not captured and escaped to safety.
COt+IUN I QUE CITES ALLEGED ALLIED LfUSSES IN CAMBODIAN OPERATION
Communist media publicize a 1 Marc2, communique reviewing alleged
communist achievements against the major South Vietnamese sweep
into the Cambodian provinces of Kompong Chan and Kratie begun on
4 February--Operation Total Victory. The communique, issued by
the Sihanouk government (RGNU) defense ministry and supreme
military command, was transmitted by both AKI and VNA on 5 March,
and the "victories" are lauded in a NHAN DAN article on the 6th.
The communique claims tha 2rom 4 to 28 February the insurgents
in Kompong Cham and Kratie provinces launched about 200 attacks
and killed, wounded, or captured 5,500 Saigon troops,**
"annihilating" three Ranger battalions and one regular battalion
and "seriously mauling" several others. In addition, according
to the communique, 500 military vehicles including 300 tanks
and armored cars were burned or destroyed, 32 aircraft were shot
down, 50 guns destroyed, scores of munitions and gasoline depots
set ablaze, 13 warships sunk, and hundreds of arms and a large
amount of other ..iilitary equipment seized.
The NHAN DAN article of the 6th comments that the Ca'bodians'
"victorious attacks are coordinated very well with the Lao and
Vietnamese people's fight against Nixon's new military adventures."
In addition to recounting the alleged achievements against the
* On 1 March Liberation Radio similarly broadcast remarks by
two prisoners allegedly captured on 19 February during an attack
on Hill 500.
** A 25 February LPA editorial had claimed that 2,000 troops were
wiped out by the insurgents in 10 days of fighting against th,.
allied operation.
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South Vietamese operation, NHAN DAN points to other successes,
including the 2 March attack on the oil refinery at Kompong
Som; it claims that 75 percent of the refinery complex was
destroyed. The paper also says the insurgents "have firmly
maintained control over Highway 4" and have "wiped out many
enemy military transport convoys."
Like other communist comment, NHAN DAN credits South Vietnamese
insurgents in Tay Ninh Province with the helicopter crash on
23 February which killed the commander of the South Vietnamese
operation in Cambodia, Gen. Do Cao Tri. The paper comments
that the action was a "good coordinated offensive blow,."
HANOI. FRONT SCORE U.S. "ACTS OF WAR," "THREATS" AGAINST DRV
Following the 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement*, Vietnamese
communist propaganda continues to stress "increasingly serious
acts of war" and alleged U.S. plans for "new military adventures"
against the DRV. Both the DRV and PRG chief delegates to the
Paris talks issued statements denouncing intensification of the
war in Indochina and of U.S. actions against the DRV. Xuan Thuy's
3 March statement echoed portions of the foreign ministry state-
ment in its charges about the massing of U.S. and ARVN forces
near the 17th parallel, the dispatch of ships of the 7th Fleet into
the Tonkin Gulf, and the intensification of "acts of war against
the DRV." It also echoed the claim that these acts "violated" the
U.S. pledge to "unconditionally" halt the bombing of the DRV and
have "seriously threatened the work of the Paris conference." Mme.
Nguyen Thi Binh's statement on the 4th similarly charged that the
United States has committed more "acts of war" against the DRV and
is "relentlessly preparing for a new military adventure against the
DRV." Her statement reiterated the pledge of southern support for
the "northern compatriots."
The VNA account of the Paris session on 4 March--the 105th--noted
that Xuan Thuy and Mme. Binh "had refused to attend this session
and issued statements as a sign of protest against the Nixon
Administration's stepping up of war acts and plotting of new military
adventures against the DRV." At the 104th session the PRG delegate
had denounced the Administration for "scheming to take new military
adventures" against the DRV, and VNA reported the DRV delegate as
charging that the Administration had expanded the war to Cambodia,
escalated the war in Laos, and "is preparing for incursions into
No. th Vietnam. "
See the TRENDS of 3 March, pages 4-6, for an account of the
statement and surrounding comment.
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- 14 -
Hanoi and Liberation radio broadcasts and an LPA commentary, all
on 4 March, denounced President Thieu's remarks the previous day
on a possible South Vietnam invasion of the North. Hanoi and
Liberation Radio suggested that such "threats" are evidence that
President Nixon is planning "new military adventures against
the DRV" made necessary by "heavy setbacks" in other arenas of
the war. Liberation Radio added that "everyone kaows Thieu is
only a loudspeaker for Nixon. He has merely repeated the
slanderous arguments of the United States, denouncing the
North for invading the South while announcing their attempt to
engage in new military adventures against the DRV." All three
commentaries pointed to the 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement
as demonstrating the North's resolve to continue fighting.
Liberation Radio and LPA routinely pledged the southerners'
suppor~ of that struggle.
Official PRG comment c tea., from PRG Vice President PhungVan Cung
in remarks to a PLAF unit at an award ceremony in eastern Nam Bo,
reported by LPA on 6 March. LPA says he "severely condemned the
Nixon Administration's-intensification of its war acts and new
military adventures against the DRV." His specific charges
echoed those in other propaganda.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest
SPOKESMAN'S PROTEST on 9 March charged the United States with
"recent attacks" against Vinh Linh area
and Quang Binh. In routine terms, the spokesman "sternly denounced
and severely condemned these acts of war" and demanded an end to
all U.S. "encro,.chments on DRV sovereignty and security."
The spokesman's statement charges that U.S. aircraft, including
B-52's, "dropped demolition and steel-pellet bombs and fired
rockets on many places in Huong Lap village" from 3 to 7 March.
At the same time, it says, U.S. artillery shelled Vinh Son and
Vinh Giang villages from positions south of the demilitarized
zone. Echoing other recent protests, it emphasizes that these
villages are located in the DMZ "belonging to DRV territory."
The protest also says U.S. aircraft "struck a number of places"
in Quang Binh Province on 6 March, claiming that one of the
planes was downed and that "several U.S. air pirates lost their
lives." The spokesman!s statement does not update Hanoi's
tally of U.S. planes downed over the DRV. It had been placed
at 3,376 as of 4 March, when Hanoi claimed that a U.S. plane
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had been downed in Quang Binh that day and used the same formula
as the one in the foreign ministry spokesman's protest--"several
U.S. air pirates lost their lives."
The reports of the 4 March downing also belatedly claimed that three
"enemy" commando boats "which violated DRV territorial waters"
were sunk or damaged on 19, 20, and 23 February by the armed forces
of Nghe An and Quang Binh provinces and of Con Co island.
DRV. PRG ASSAIL PRESIDENTS PRESS CONFERENCE, POLICY REPORT
HMJOI The DRV reacted promptly on the 5th to the President's
televised press conference with a statement issued by
its Paris delegation spokesman and a Hanoi radio commentary. The
radio commentary was broadcast at 0430 GMT on the 5th--within
two and a half hours after the President spoke. The broadcast
says that the President's "confusion" as the, result of "military
defeats" and opposition to his policy led him to speak three
times within 15 days on the Indochina question--in his 17 February
press interview, his foreign policy report on the 25th, and the
press conference on 4 March. A 6 March Commentator a.&,ticle in
the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN says in a similar vein that the
situation in Indochina has forced the President to "make too
many statements." The paper notes that "on many occasions" he
used "Kissinger, Laird, and the White House press secretary to
ward off public opinion" but that ultimately he had to "intervene
personally" to assuage public opinion.
The initial radio comment cn the press conference said that the
President continued to "make boastful statements on the war
against the DRV" and that he represented Thieu's call-for an
attack on North Vietnam as motivated by self-defense. QUAN.DOI
KHAN DAN's Commentator represents the President as having "ordered"
President Thieu to talk about invading the North and quotes him
as saying the Americans "have not yet" devised a plan to-support
such attacks. The radio commentary also charges that the
President continued to make "bandit allegations" .about the.
unrestricted use of U.S. air power in Indochina and "stated
that intervention elements--that is, U.S. infantry units--
could be sent into North Vietnam in order to rescue U.S.
pilots or prisoners." At the same time, the broadcast scored
his "deceitful remark" that L.S. :troops will stay in the South
as long as American prisoners remain in the DRY.
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16
The statement by the DRV Paris spokesman, publicized on the 5th,
had also called the President's press conference further evideace
of the U.S. policy of "acts of war and preparations for new and
extremely dangerous military adventures against the DRV." The
statement said that the President revealed an intention.to
prolong the U.S. presence in South Vietnam "indefinitely,"
failing to acknowledge his statement on some U.S. troops
remaining as long as U.S. prisoners are held in the North.
The rad:;o commentary of the 5th and the QUAN DOI P'HAN DAN
Commentator article take issue with the President's positive
assessment of the Laos operation. The army papers ridicules
claims that the South Vietnamese are fighting "better than
their enemy," that the operation is progressing successfully, and
that the communists' logistics supplies have been cut off. In
rebuttal of the President, it cites, among other things, an AFP
report that Secretary Laird recognized that the ARVN "has had
to fight against a better army of a resolute and stalwart
enemy."
The Commentator article dismisses the President's statement
that the Laos operation has assured continuation of the
U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam as "a clumsy trick--which
he has used repeatedly--to soothe public opinion" and says
the President must in fact continue to withdraw because of
the 1972 presidential elections. Obscuring the details of
the President's remarks, Commentator claims that he "prepared
public opinion for sending U.S. infantry forces into
southern Laos" and "clamored" to bomb the North and resort
to "other war acts, such as the use of commandos to sabotage"
the DRV. In this regard, the article says the President
claimed that "his clique's offensives are aimed at rescuing
American POW's."
THE FRONT Front propaganda is highlighted by a PRG Foreign
Ministry statement,* carried by LPA on the 6th,
reacting to both the President's press conference and the
foreign policy report. In both cases, the statement says, the
President "noisily boasted about the imaginary successes" of
Vietnamization and the. "U.S. aggressive wars" in Cambodia and
* The DRV Foreign Ministry responded to the President's Foreign
Policy report to Congress with a statement on 2 March. See
the TRENDS of 3 March, pages 1-3.
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Laos while continuing to spread his "peace hoaxes" to appease
public opinion. It further says he "revealed his dark
intention to prolong and extend" the war in an attempt to save
his Vietnamization program. The statement makes no further
specific references to the foreign policy report or the press
conference, going on to claim routinely that Vietnamization "is
going bankrupt and is sure to meet with complete failure,"
that ARV!v forces are losing despite U.S. equipment and trainir,,,
and that the Saigon administration is "increasingly opposed by
the people who are resolved to overthrow it."
Also routinely, the statement says the Administration launched
a war in Cambodia and sent ARVN forces to Laos to try and
''stave off failure in South Vietnam." It goes on to charge
th'.t the Americans have multi. lied their "acts of war" against
the DRV and "continued to arroe.u*e to themselves.the right to
unrestricted use of. U.S. airpower to attack North Vietnam
while contemplating new military adventures" against it. It
says that on U.S. orders, "the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet aiministra-
tion is raving for a 'March to the North.'"
As evidence that the Administration has done its best to block
a search for a political solution, the statement says it has
ignored the "logical and reasonable" NFLSV/PRG proposals, with
their call for "an immediate and unconditional U.S. troop with-
drawal and renunciation of the Saigon administration." The
South Vietnamese people and the PRG, the statement declares,
"categorically denounce the peace fallacies" voiced by the
President, "vehemently condemn" the U.S. Administration for
prolonging and expanding the war, and "sternly warn it against
any attempt to take new military adventures against the DRV."
It expresses resolve to "punish" the United States for acts
against the North and reaffirms the unity of the three
Indochinese peoples.
Liberation Radio on the.5th and an LPA commentary on the 6th
reiterate the notion that the press conference was held to
"Justify the President's policy of aggression" and to "loudly
make warlike boasts." Like Hanoi, both note that this was the
President's third discussion of Indochina in 15 days.
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Again like Hanoi, Liberation Radio says the President tried to
defend "his spreading of the war . . . to Cambodia and Laos,
saying that his act was 'correct' and vas a guarantee of the.
plan for the withdrawal of U.S. troops." Claiming that the
President "invented the imaginary victories" of the allies
in order to "advertise the Vietnamization plan and the
Nixon Doctrine," the radio remarks that "the whole world
is aware of the heavy setbacks" of the allies.
The Liberation Radio commentary is unique in saying that the
President not only demanded "that the two sides withdraw
troops but also requested that the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from South Vietnam be related to the reciprocal withdrawal
of troops from Laos and Cambodia."
Regarding North Vietnam, LPA says the President "threatened
to continue to use U.S. air power to strike the DRV and
insolently said that the United States would send 'rescue
units' into North Vietnam to save cl wned pilots and U.S.
POW's." Liberation Radio adds that he reiterated "threats"
to use the U.S. Air Force to attack missile positions in
North Vietnam and that "with his roundabout allegations, he
appeared to approve" President's Thieu's call to attack the
North. LPA claims further that he "openly encouraged his
Saigon agents to go ahead with their "March to the North
'by saying that it is a necessity.'" LPA and Liberation
Radio both score the Presic-int for "impudently stating"
that some U.S. troops will remain in South Vietnam as long
as there are prisoners in the DRV. "It is clear," LPA
says, "that Nixon has misused the question of POW's to continue
the war."
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DRV, PRG DELEGATES AT PARIS FOCUS ON PRESIDENT'S REPORT
VNA's account of the 105th Paris session on 4 March recounts
both communist delegates' attacks on President Nixon's
25 February foreign policy report. Substituting for
Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh(who boycotted the session along with
chief DRV delegate Xuan Thuy in protest, VNA said, of the
Administration's "stepping.up of war acts and plotting of
new military adventures against th., DRV"), the PRG's Nguyen
Van Tien echoed last week's general propaganda charge that the
President's report "revealed his policy to prolong and expand
the war and maintain the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique." Nguyen Minh
Vy, standing in for Xuan Thuy, called the report "one more
proof" of the President's "bellicose and deceitful policy"
and took issue with its "boasts" about success of the Nixon
Doctrine and Vietnamization, saying that both are in fact
"meeting with failure."
The VNA account reflects portions of both communist delegates'
remarks on the question of negotiations. VNA cites Tien's
routine statement that the correct way to end the war "has
been clearly traced" in the PRG's 10-point solution and eight-
point initiative. It also notes his avowal that the PRG and
the Vietnamese people are "always ready to settle the South
Vietnamese problem peacefully" but are also determined to
fight if the United States pursues the war.
But VNA does not mention Tien's specific attacks on some of
the statements on negotiations in the President's report,
including the references to troop withdrawal, to the retention
of some U.S. troops in South Vietnam as long as there are
U.S. prisoners in the North (an added "condition" for troop
withdrawal, according to Tien), and to the Vietnamese right
to self-determination. Only LPA's account reports that the
PRG delegate scored the President's remarks on the PRG
proposal for a coalition government. It says Tien assailed.
the President's "allegation" that by advocating the formation
of a broadly representative provisional coalition government
made up of three components, the PRG delegation was trying
to "secure political power."
Neither VNA nor LPA reports Tien's charge that the United
States is becoming less and less interested in negotiations
and that the President "affirmed that if the United States
continues to participate in the Paris negotiations, it is
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only to find a solution to the problem of prisoners." Tien
may be alone in Vietnamese communist propaganda in claiming
that the President said the communists may find themselves
negotiating with the South Vietnamese alone. (The President's
report stated that the United States would not give up on
negotiations but added that as U.S. forces decline, "the role
we can play on many aspects of a settlement is also bound to
decline.")
VNA says Tien adduced "concrete facts" to show that the
Administration "has been trying to undermine the Paris
talks," but it does not report Tien's listing of such
examples as the use of U.S. infantry in Laos to protect
"search and rescue" teams and failure to rule out the
dispatch of U.S. and "puppet" troops to North Vietnam.
DRV delegate Vy, according to VNA, denounced the President
for seeking to negotiate from a position of strength.
Although VNA1's account omits it, Vy charged in his text
that the President "continued to harp on his distorting
allegations, saying that the other side put forward
preconditions. Yet he still clung to his 7 October five
points, considering them 'the focal point of the U.S. peace
proposal,"' and was trying to "force the other side to accept
the U.S. arrogant preconditions"--an apparent allusion to the
presidential report's brief recap of the five-point-proposal,
followed by rejection of some elements of the communist
negotiating position. Vy's statement took up the five-point
proposal point by point, rejecting each one and scoring the
President for "stubbornly opposing" the PRG's proposals. The
President "threatened," Vy said, "that if the other side does
not let us choose a negotiated settlement, then we shall
follow another path."
The VNA account quotes Vy as stating: "we have repeatedly
said that if the Nixon Administration is willing to negotiate
seriously, we are prepared to do so too." To the U.S.
authorities, Vy said, "serious negotiations" mean that a
portion of U.S. forces will remain in Vietnam and other
Indochinese countries and that U.S. "puppet" administrations
will continue to exist. Declaring "we entirely reject this
conception of serious negotiations," he said they require
that the United States "fix a reasonable deadline" for withdrawal
from Indochina, and "we shall discuss the conditions" for a
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rapid and total withdrawal; a further requirement is -that the
United States "renounce its agents" so that each Indochinese
country may settle its own affairs. Vy routinely projected
"heavier defeats" for the United States if the.President "pursues
the path of aggression and seeks a military victory," then
cited the 2 March DRV.Foreign Ministry statement on the
President's report.
CONFIDENTIAL
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MOSCOW DWELLS ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S "THREATS" TO DRV
Moscow has reacted to President Nixon's k March press conference
with selective reportage and limited routine-level comment which
concentrates on what it calls the President's "threats" to the
DRV but acknowledges little else of the substance of his remarks.
The initial TASS and domestic service reports, on-the 5th,
asserted that the President said nothing new and that he merely
tried to explain the incursions into Cambodia and Laos in terms
of saving American lives in Vietnam and implementing Vietnamiza-
tion. But he failed to placate American public opinion, Moscow
said, and 'ze "admitted" that the move into Laos had caused
"disagreement and criticism" in the United States. Noting that
he warned of "hard fighting" still ahead in Laos, TASS complained
that he refused to give a timetable for troop withdrawal,
saying rather that the United States "'will have to maintain
a residual force in South Vietnam' indefinitely." TASS thus
ignored the President's remark that the residual force would
remain as long as Hanoi held U.S. prisoners. Another brief
domestic service item on the 5th cited an AFP reporter as
Noting that the President ignored the PRG's proposal for a
political settlement.
"THREATS" TO DRV Reporting that President Nixon repeated his
"threats" to the DRV, TASS and a domestic
service report said he asserted that he would use "air power"
against the North if he concluded there was a danger to the
remaining U.S. forces in the South. Another domestic service
report said he "attempted to prove the need" for an incursion
of Saigon troops into the DRV and "made it quite clear that
if such an adventure took place, it would be supported by the
U.S. Air Force." TASS on the 6th, citing the observations
of several commentators in the United States, noted that
Roger Mudd of CBS had singled out "the President 1-s refusal
to rule out an invasion of the North" as "the most important"
statement of the press conference.
Other Moscow comment also dwells on the alleged U.S. "threat"
to the DRV. A 5 March domestic service commentary complains
that the White.House has not clearly defined its attitude
toward Thieu's "threat" to send Saigon troops into the North.
It notes that large U.S. and Saigon forces are concentrated
near the 17th parallel, that "many" 7th Fleet ships have been
moved into the Tonkin Gulf, and that the U.S. Air Force "daily"
bombs and strafes the demilitarized zone and DRV territory.
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10 MARCH 1971
Regarding Thieu's statement, the commentary says "there is little
doubt as to who calls the tune" and notes that Thieu made his
statement after he had talked with Ambassador Bunker and
General Abrams. A dispatch from Hanoi published in PRAVDA
on the 5th, referring to Thieu's statement, similarly notes
that the Saigon leaders are dependent on the United States
and recalls the 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement which
protested U.S. bombing raids and accused the United States of
preparing "a new military adventure against the DRV." A
6 March RED STAR article by Col. V. Mochalov remarks on the
presence of two divisions in the northern part of South
Vietnam, observing that "the interventionists are leaving
their forces in areas where they could be utilized for an
attack on the DRV."
With respect to Soviet support for the Indochinese in response
to the U.S. "threats," Moscow does not go beyond recalling the
25 February Soviet Government statement's promise of continued
aid to the DRV and "Indochinese patriots." An English-language
commentary by Shakov on the DRV National Assembly appeal,
mentioning the President's press conference "threats" to
use American air power against the DRV, notes that the DRV
National Assembly expressed gratitude for support and.aid
from the socialist countries and recalls the Soviet Government
statement's promises of aid.
Moscow has not been entirely consistent, however, in recalling
the Soviet Government statement's pledge of continued aid. A
3 March IZVESTIYA article by Col. A. Pridybaylo, discussing
the Laotian operation and the U.S. "threat" to resume bombing
of the DRV, underscores the Indochinese people's determination
to defend their freedom and notes that the Soviet Government
statement "stressed" that the United States must halt aggression
and recognize the rights of the people to determine their own
future.
A 2 March RED STAR article by the jurist L. Savinskiy takes
issue with arguments advanced in support of the Laos operation
ir. the State Department's 8 February announcement. Savinskiy
calls the operation a violation of the norms of relations
between states and refers specifically to the declarations on
principles of international law and on strengthening of
international security approved at last year's UN General
Assembly session. He concludes by recalling the warning in
the Soviet Government statement that the actions of the United
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States, "which casts off its international commitments so
lightly," will lead to undermining the foundations of i:iter-
state relations. But Savinskiy does not go on to quote the
statement's reference to the impact on Soviet-U.S. relations
or to mention its promises of Soviet aid to the Indochinese.
CRITICISM A Moscow commentary broadcast in Mandarin on
OF PEKING 9 March, accusing the United States of trying
to maintain the Sino-Soviet schism for its own
advantage, cites among other things Kissinger's remark in his
TV interview that "China would not send troops to help the
Laotian patriotic forces because it has built up its troops
on its other frontiers." While Moscow broadcastain Mandarin
have continued over the past few weeks to criticize the Chinese
for refusing united action in Indochina, taunting them for
passivity in the face of the threat to the PRC posed by the
Laotian operation, Moscow is not known to have directly raised
the issue of Chinese troop participation until now.
While aiming the main thrust of its criticJ.gm at the United
States, the commentary includes some gibes at Peking for
maintaining an "anti-Soviet stand" that gives. the United
States the "excuse" for its.policy of fostering the Sino-
Soviet rift. In other comment in Mandarin Moscow also
continues to attack Peking's "splittist" policy regarding
Indochina. A broadcast on the 7th criticized Chinese
"splittist" policies in the face of Thieu's "threats" to
invade the North and U.S. refusal to comment on Thieu's
remarks.
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BRITAIN SCORED FOR RELEASE OF SOWANNA LETTER TO COCHAIRMEN
An NLHS Central. Committee spokesman'a statement dated 5 March,
reported by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 8th, criticizes
the British Government for unilaterally making public a letter
from Souvanna Phouma to the two chairmen of the 1962 Geneva
conference. The statement takes Britain to task for releasing
on Is March Souvanna Phouma's 5 February letter which "slandered"
DRV troops for attacking various towns in Laos and demanded
that they withdraw from Laos. The NLHS says that the British
circulated the message `in spite of the flat-out disapproval by
the Soviet Government." (Moscow is not known to have reported
the NLHS statement or the British action.) The NLHS spokes-
man scored the British for aiding the United States in
"sabotaging" th.- 1962 Geneva agreements and in widening the
aggression in Indochina, and "flatly rejected" the letter
from Souvarna Phouma, who "styles himself" as Prime Minister
of the RLG.
The NLHS has in the past similarly issued central committee
spokesman's statements denouncing such Souvanna Phouma letters,
British replies and British moves to circulate Souvanna Phouma's
letters, the most recent previous instance being a statement
dated 16 July 1970. On at least one occasion--on 22 March 1969--
Har.oi issued a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement
denouncing a letter from the "Vientiane authorities," although
normally Hanoi has responded only with NHAN DAN articles or has
ignored the exchanges. Moscow normally is silent on the subject,
only rarely acknowledging the exchanges obliquely and belatedly
in routine-level comment.
HANOI PROTESTS "PROVOCATIONS" AGAINST DRV EMBASSY IN LAOS
On 7 March VNA carries a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's state-
ment protesting unspecified "provocative acts" perpetrated
against the DRV embassy in Vientiane on the 5th. According to
the spokesman, the "Vientiane authorities" permitted "reactionaries
to compel a number of persons" to carry out these provocations.
The statement says that by this act, "following the hectic
c&paign of slander against the DRV in recent days," the
"Vientiane authorities" are following a line counter to the 1962
Geneva agreements and harmful to the traditional friendly
relations between the Vietnamese and Lao people. The statement
does not elaborate on the "recent" campaign of slander, but on
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1 March a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman had objected to a press
conference hold in Vientiane at which DRV prisoners were
presented.
Hanoi has previously protested provocations against its embassy
and personnel in Laos. A hand grenade attack on the embassy
in January 1968 was protested by the DRV charge d'affaires to
the Laotian Foreign Ministry and in a NHAN DAN article.
Harassment of DRV embassy personnel was protested by a DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman in March 1969, and an episode in
August 1969, in which a number of DRV embassy personnel were
arrested and expelled by the Vientiane government on espionage
charges, elicited several high-level DRV statements.
FOREIGN MINISTER IN SIHANOUK GOVERMENT VISITS NORTH KOREA
The third high-level Cambodian delegation to visit Pyongyang*
since the formation of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) arrived
there at the invitation of the DPRK Government on 4 March,
according to KCNA and NCNA reports. The delegation--led by
Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak--returned to Peking on the 9th
after having talks with Kim Il-song and DPRK Foreign Minister
Ho Tam, and being feted at banquets and a Pyongyang city rally.
Speeches at the various events were routine in content, Ho Tam
promising continued "material and moral" support and Sarin
Chhak duly expressing gratitude. At a ',s?nquet given by the
DPRK Cabinet on 4 March, Sarin Chhak praised the "support"
received from both Korea and Crlna; he routinely pledged that
the Cambodian people would continue to fight "shoulder to
shoulder" with the Vietnamese and Laotian people, and in this
connection recalled the resol:;tion of the April 19(0 Indo-
chinese people's summit conference. At a banquet he hosted
on the 8th, Sarin Chhak described the DPRK and the PRC as
the "mighty and reliable rear for the Indochina front." On
various occasions both speakers cited Kim I1-song's formulation,
originated during Sihanouk's visit in June, declaring that
victory will be achieved "if the peoplr.s of the various Asian
countries making revolution--including Cambodia, Laor, Vietnam,
China, and Korea--form a common front and join in dealing
collective blows at U.S. imperialism." Both speakers praised
the consolidation of this "common front."
* Sihanouk visited Pyongyang in June 1970, and Ngo Hou, RGNU
minister of public health, religious, and social affairs, led a
delegation there in September 1970.
C(VPIDENTIAL
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10 MARCH 1972
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW GUARDED ON CHANCES FOR SUCCESS OF JARRING MISSION
Moscow propaganda follows the lines of the 27 February Soviet
Government statement, praising Cairo's "realistic" approach and
citing in particular its response to Jarring on readiness to
conclude peace with Israel if the latter undertakes its
obligations. U Thant's 5 March report to the Security Council
on Jarring's mission, TASS says, approves the UAR's "peace-
loving policy" and its positive reply to Jarring while
criticizing Israel's "reluctance to re0pond" to Jarring'd
initiative.
Propagandists again denounce Israel's refusal to withdraw;
echoing the government stateii.ent, they claim that the United
Stctes must share the blame for the impasse, and they draw a
dirbinction between Washington's words and its deeds in
providing Tel Aviv with political and military support. To
buttress this argument, Moscow selectively.cites President
Nixon's press conference remarks, along with the U.S.
position in the Big Four consultations. A Soviet Embassy
statement takes the occasion of a New York TIMES report on
Moscow's passivity in achieving a settlement to set the
record straight, revealing--apparently for the first time
publicly--the existence of Soviet proposals "presented last
June."
Consistent with the recent paucity of Soviet comment on the
cease-fire, Moscow notes as-Sadat's statement that the UAR
will not be bound by any ceas,:-fire agreement but follows
this with only a passing reference to the increased danger
of armed clashes. Predictably, as-Sadat's announcement of
his unheralded 1-2 March talks in Moscow is ignorad.
Moscow commentators reiterate the government statement's vague
call for "active measures" by peace-loving countries, Matveyev
expressing hope in the 4 March IZVESTIYA that pressure.of public
opinion, coupled with "appropriate diplomatic efforts by
interested governments," will force "militaristic and
reactionary circles" to take into account the "real facts."
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There is an occasional guardedly optimistic assessment, as in
the 7 March domestic service commentators' roundtable,* that
prospects for success of the Jarring mission "undoubtedly exist"
despite Israeli policy, but that to achieve success "a consistent
course" for a political settlement is necessary "by all countries
concerned." A domestic service commentary on the 4th contains
the single hint of UN sanctions in commenting that the United
Nations has the duty to "adopt authoritative measures" to force
Israel to comply with UN decisions.
NIXON There is little comment on the President's remarks on
REMARKS the Middir vast in his 4 March press conference other
than T/ March account noting that Mr. Nixon said
the United States ' laJ., I,i everything to urge the parties to talk
and would see that lance of power is maintained. The
President, TASS said re a negative answer when asked if the
United States intent exert influence on Israel to facilitate
a peaceful settlement oscow takes no cognizance of the
President's statement .e'- the United States is prepared to join
the other major powers, iueiuding the USSR, in guaranteeing any
settlement that is made, "whii:h would give Israel the security
of its borders that it might not get through any geographical
acquisition." And Moscow has not been heard to report Mr. Nixon's
7 March telephone interview with UPI in which he said that both
major powers would exert a restraining effort.
Commentaries in Arabic on the 6th and the 8th singled out the
statement "affirming U.S. lack of interest in putting pressure
on Israe.L." The former asserted that the President introduced
nothing new, only promising that the United States would try to
convince the parties to negotiate, when the UAR, it added, has
long expressed its acceptance of negotiations under Jarring.
A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 9th did not totally
reject the notion of direct talks between the sides at some
point, recalling that the President, in his State of the World
* The weekly domestic service roundtable feature of 7 March,
in a second departure from practice in two consecutive weeks,
was rebroadcast apparently for the first time in foreign
languages, over a 2-day period. The program-the preceding
week, on 28 February, had varied from past practice when a
new Middle East section was sub..tituted in the last domestic
service rebroadcast of the feature.
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Report, insisted on direct talks "even at the present stage" of
the dispute. Tsoppi added that this proposal "could not be easily
accepted" with Israel occupying Arab territory and wanting to put
forward "unacceptable conditions."
Noting that in his press conference Mr. Nixon talked about
maintaining the balance of power, Tsoppi remarked that
Washington says it is opposed to the imposition of decisions
on the disputing sides, but nevertheless supports Israel with
arms and strengthens Tel Aviv's efforts to "impose surrender
terms." Similarly, Mayevskiy charged, in a 10 March PRAVDA
article reviewed by TASS, that Israel's "obstructionist policy"
is a "direct result" of wide U.S. military. and political aid.
Facts show, he claimed, that Washington in its deeds does not
support Jarring's mission and "other efforts" aimed at a
political settlement, but would like an imposed settlement
strengthening Israel's position.
Ryzhikov, in a TASS commentary on the 7th noting that President
Nixon was scheduled to receive Israeli President Shazar that
day, said one "would like to think" that Mr. Nixon "might
recommend" that Israel stop obstructing a political settlement
and get down to withdrawing its forces. But a for.ign-language
commentary by Soltan on the 8th claimed that prior to Israel's
entry into the Jarring contacts "constant American-Israeli talks"
were held and Israel received "certain assurances," and now
Foreign Minister Eban was again going to Washington for talks
"about the policy of blackmail."
BIG TWO, A Soviet Embassy statement reported by TASS on the
BIG FOUR 3d defensively rejects a "distorted" New York TIMES
report of a 1 March conversation between Ambassador
Dobrynin and Secretary Rogers which "could hardly help" readers
to gain a correct impression of the "actual positions" of the
sides. Without correcting the readers' impression, the statement
goes on to reject "the allegation that Moscow had broken off
contacts with the United States" on the Middle East about eight
months ago. Describing this as "in full contradiction" with
the real state of affairs, the statement said Moscow is still
waiting for a U.S. reply to "concrete constructive" Soviet
proposals presented last June in the course of a bilateral
exchange of views--proposals heretofore unacknowledged by
Moscow. Infrequent propaganda allusions last July to Soviet
proposals mentioned those "set forth in early 1969."
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In a departure from TASS' usually terse reporting of Big Four
meetings, TASS correspondent Pivovarov on the 6th criticized
the U.S. position in consultations during the week on a four-
power communique "which would promote the -success" of Jarring's
mission.* Pivovarov complained that the United States resisted
the "most important provisions" of the draft communique--the
need for Israeli withdrawal--and protested against reflecting
the difference between the UAR's positive stand and Israel's
negative approach on a peaceful settlement. "LN circles"
point out, he added, that the United States instead insisted
that the communique include a call for prolongation of the
cease-fire agreement. The U.S. position, he concluded,
contradicts Security Council Resolution 242.
CEASE-FIRE There is minimal attention to the 7 March
EXPIRATION expiration of the cease-fire before or after
UAR President as-Sadat's announcement in his
7 March speech that Cairo could not again extend the cease-
fire, and that it did not consider itself bound by the cease-
fire nor bound to hold fire, but that "this does not mean that
political action will stop and the guns alone will speak."
TASS and an Arabic-language broadcast report him as saying
that the UAR is not bound by any cease-fire agreement, but
that it will "continue to work for a political settlement."
TASS had noted on the 6th, in reporting the Big Four negotiations
over a possible four-power communique, that the United States
insisted such a document should include a call for prolongation
of the cease-fire agreement "on terms and in the form suitable
for Israel." Solution of this question, TASS said, is "the
prerogative of the sovereign Arab states whose territories are
held by the aggressor."
The Tsoppi commentary on the 9th provides the only observation
that the danger of armed clashes--"arising from Israel's
aggressive policy and its claims on Arab countries"--has
greatly increased now that the cease-fire agreement no longer
exists. Prior to the expiration there were propaganda
intimations that Cairo was not contemplating a resumption
* The only other recent departure from Moscow's usual reticence
on the substance of the Big Four talks came in a 10 February
PRAVDA article by Kolesnichenko. See the FBIS TRENDS, 10 February,
pages 20-21.
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of fighting. A Yefremov domestic service commentary on the 6th
noted foreign news agency speculation on what would happen if the
cease-fire agreement expired, pointing out that UPI reported
from Cairo that "'the Egyptians will not open fire unless they
are forced to do so by Israeli provocations."' And a report
from Viktor Kudryavtsev, Moscow radio's new correspondent in
Cairo, on the domestic service on 4 March indirectly suggested
that th" UAR was more interested in getting on with domestic
problems: He observed that the blackout had been lifted in
Cairo, a number of restrictions caused by the state of war
had been canceled, and while evidence of war is still present
the people now have a chance to concern themselves with pressing
economic problems.
AS-SADAT Consistent with I:'scow's treatment of Nasir's public
IN USSR acknowledgment last July of his secret visit to
Moscow in January 1970, the TASS account of as-Sadat's
7 March speech fails to mention his announcement that he paid a
secret visit to Moscow on 1-2 March. The Soviet leaders, he7said,
"sent word to me that they thought conditions required
consultations between us," and he added that during his
meetings with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, "we discussed
all matters and all possibilities frankly, clearly, and
truthfully."
Providing details in its 8 March issue, the Cairo AL-AHRAM
said that as-Sadat had received a letter from the Soviet
leaders "toward the end of February" suggesting that the
situation required high-level consultations, and that he
gave Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov his reply on 27 February.
During the two-day stay, the paper added, as-Sadat met a
total of 9 hours with the Soviet leaders and several advisers,
including Defense Minister Grechko. On the lOth.AL-AHRAM
reported that Deputy Premier Dr. 'Aziz Sidqi---who left
for Moscow on the 9th heading an economic delegation--
would deliver a message from as-Sadat to Brezhnev.
The short TASS report on as-Sadat's speech also makes no
mention of as-Sadat's call on the Big Four to continue
following up the crisis, nor his appeal to the United
States "to fulfill the pledge it made" regarding U.S.
objection to seizure of lands by force.
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DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
MOSCOW CALLS BAN ON CB WEAPONS MAIN ISSUE AT GENEVA TALKS
Moscow has devoted only minimal propaganda attention over the
past two weeks to the proceedings of the 26-nation Geneva
disarmament conference,* which reconvened on 23 February after
a recess of nearly six months. Hailing the recently signed
treaty restricting the deployment of mass-destruction weapons
on the seabed as evidence that difficult disarmament problems
can be resolved, Soviet propaganda goes on to stress that a
ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons will
be "one of the main questions" at the current session of the
conference.
Chief Soviet delegate Roshchin, in remarks on the 19th as well
as in his opening statement on the 23d, emphasized the
importance of banning; CB weapons. In both instances, he also
mentioned the need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban
treaty and to resolve the broader problem of general and complete
disarmament. While the bulk of available Soviet comment has
focused on these three issues, there have been some references
to other stock partial disarmament measures. A foreign-
language radio commentary on the 23d, for example, suggested
that attention will also be given to a convention banning the
use of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of foreign military
bases, and the creation of nuclear-free zones "in various parts
of the world."
ATTACK ON Moscow sustains its attack on the U.S. and
U.S. POSTURE British proposal to separate a ban on
bacteriological weapons from a ban on
chemical weapons. An article in PRAVDA by Bragin on the 25th,
for example, charged that Washington and London have "tried to
obstruct a solution" in an effort "to justify the barbaric use
of poisonous matters by the American aggressors in Vietnam and
the stockpiling of chemical weapons in NATO stores in Europe."
* Moscow has noted, without comment, that France continues to
boycott the conference. TASS on the 23d listed the 25 partici-
pating countries and added that France "in recent years has not
been participating in the proceedings" at Geneva.
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Bragin added that President Nixon in his message to the conference
stated the necessity for a'beparate"approach to a ban on CB
weapons, "referring to a put-up thesis that 'at the present
time control over chemical weapons allegedly cannot be implemented.'"
Reporting the 9 March session of the conference, the domestic
service said that the U.S. delegate, in calling for an agreement
on bacteriological weapons only, in fact sought "to guarantee
the Pentagon generals the possibility of further using chemical
weapons in Vietnam." And TASS commentator Kornilov on the 9th
concluded that U.S. "maneuvers" in this regard are not
"accidental" in view of Washington's "wide-scale" use of
chemical weapons in Vietnam.
TASS on the 6th, reporting Secretary Rogers' testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the day before, said
that he urged ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on
CB weapons, but with the reservation that the United States
be allowed to use herbicides and tear gas in warfare. Accord-
ing to TASS, Rogers "could not but admit that the majority"
of the signators to the Geneva Protocol "stood for the
abrogation of the use of any toxic agents in warfare."
CONFIDENTIAL
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GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR MEDIA IGNORE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON TALKS WITH SENAT
East German publicity for the first meeting between West'Berlin
Senat Director Ulrich Mueller and GDR State Secretary and First
Deputy Foreign Minister Guenter Kohrt, in vast Berlin on
6 March, failed to note the Senat's limitation of the talks
to arranging for West Berliners to visit the GDR, including
East Berlin, during the Easter holidays. In proposing the
talks in a letter publicized in East German media on
25 February, GDR Premier Stoph had suggested broader talks
with the Senat on relations between West Berlin and the GDR,
stipulating that if this were not acceptable there could be
talks on the question of Easter visits.
Predictably, GDR media have carried no hint of acknowledgment
that the delay in starting the talks was caused by the
intermittent slowdowns of traffic on the autobahns to
West Berlin on 3 March, staged in response to the 3-5.March
meeting of CDU/CSU Bundestag and landtag chairmen in West
Berlin and to Chancellor Brandt's visit to the city on the
5th for an SPD electoral meeting. The CDU/CSU meeting drew
a GDR Foreign Ministry statement of protest on 26 February,
and Brandt's visit prompted ADN to recall on the 5th t'iat
his appearances in West Berlin had been "recently protested"
by the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman as an act which
"violates the status of West Berlin" and is designed to
create conflict in the center of Europe.
ADN reported on 2 March that the GDR Government had proposed
4 March as the opening date for Senat-GDR negotiations. On
the 3d, coincident with the autobahn slowdown, ADN reported
that West Berlin Mayor Schuetz had responded to Stoph's
proposal to hold the talks but that Schuetz had said "he was
unable to accept the date suggested by the GDR" and would
propose another. On the 5th ADN said Schuetz had proposed
on the preceding day that the talks begin on the 6th, adding
that Kohrt then invited Mueller to come to "the GDR capital"
on 6 March.
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