Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 7, 1999
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 17, 1971
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8.pdf2.65 MB
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R00.&I Il~~~~~lllllllllllliiiiiiii~ll FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~~Illllllliumiuiiiilllllll~~ TRENDS Confidential /7 in Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential 17 MARCH 1771 (VOL. xxll, NO. '11, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/Mgp[t)&.~r DP85T00875R000300040012-8 This propaganda analysis report is based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination v'ith other U.S. Government components. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro- hibited by law. GROUP I Included Irene oulemelle dew.Oredlnp end desleulRwden Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 11 MARCH 1971 CO IJTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Fall of Bases Near Tchepone Prompts Claim of ARVN Rout in Laos . 1 Communists Tally Allied Losses, Praise "Lao Insurgent Strategy". 3 Peking Sees "Unprecedentedly Fine" Situation in Indochina . . . 5 Moscow Stresses Its Aid, Close Relations With North Vietnam . . 10 Communists at Paris Session Routinely Score U.S. "Escalation" . 11 Pathet Lao, DRV Protest Action in Laos, President's Remarks . . 13 Manila Conference of ASEAN Said to Serve Nixon Doctrine . . . . 14 DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes at North . 14 DRV Announces Regular People's Council Electidns''iri,April : . 15 Radio of Cambodian FUNK and RGNU Increases Broadcast Time" . . . 16 Belated Publicity for "Late 1970" RGNU Conference in Cambodia . 16 MIDDLE EAST USSR Calls U.S. Policy Ambiguous, Doubts Pressure on Israel . . 19 TURKEY Moscow Reports Government Resignation, Gives No Background . . . 24 NORTH KOREA Pyongyang Denounces Overflights of U.S. Reconnaissance Plane . . 25 INDIAN ELECTIONS Moscow Hails Victory of "Progressive Democratic Forces" . . . . 27 PRC SATELLITE Belated NCNA Announcement Hails Launch in Standard Terms . . . . 32 SALT Moscow Repledges Serious Effort in Vienna Negotiations . . . . . 33 GERMANY AND BERLIN GDR Publicizes Details of Proposals to West Berlin Senat . . . . 36 (Continued.) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 CONTENTS (Continued) USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS Mixed Treatment of Brezhnev at Republic Party Congresses . . . . . 38 PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS Party CommitteesA?e Announced for Honan and Tsinghai . . . . . . . 42 Moderate Economic Policies Stressed for Spring Planting . . . . . 44 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 8 - 14 MARCH 1971 Moscow (3624 items) Peking (2873 items) CPSU 24th Congress (18%) 23% Indochina (37%) 66% Indochina (10%) 11% [Chou En-tai in DRV (--) 48%] International (7%) 10% [DRV National (--) 3%a Women's Day China (4%) 5% Assembly Session [PRC Fishing Boats (1%) 2%J Middle East (6%) 5% Strafed Ulbricht in USSR (--) 2% PRC Domestic Issues (33%) 23% Luna 17 & Lunakhod (0.2%) 2% President Nixon's (7%) 3% Paris Commune Centenary (0.3%) 2% State of World Report Angela Davis Case' (1%) 2% In3ian Elections (0.4%) 1% These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of e::tensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; iii other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/O9/2?i l ~85T00875R g3pMg012-8 17 MARCH 1971 INDOCHINA Laotian and Vietnamese communist media continue to ridicule reports that South Vietnamese forces entered the Laotian cross- roads town of Tchepone, and the ARVN abandonment of positions near Tchepone on the 12th and 16th is followed by claims that the South Vietnamese have been routed and by calls for assaults on other allied positions. The tactical and strategic leader- ship of the Laotian "liberation army" is praised, and "victories" against allied forces in the operation along Highway 9 are said to have further undercut the Vietnamization program. While Peking had followed up the PRC delegation's 5-8 March: visit to }anoi with an editorial on the 11th repeating some of the stronger language used during the visit, it currently projects a confident stance and has drawn back from statements during the visit which portrayed a threat to China as well as the DRV. Chou En-lai, speaking at a DRV embassy banquet honoring the visit on the 16th, buoyantly pictured an "unprecedentedly fire" situation in Indochina, taking particular note of the fighting in northern South Vietnam and southern Laos. Moscow propaganda in the wake of Chou's visit to Hanoi--mentioned only in a one-sentence TASS report on the 9th--has sought to call attention to close Soviet-DRV relations. Thus, in timing which seems transparently calculated, Soviet media from 10 to 12 March publicized a Pham Van Dong interview granted to Moscow television and radio correspondents in connection with the forthcoming 25th CPSU Congress. Lauding Soviet aid, Dong recalled that the Soviet Government had recently a statement reaffirming its resolve to give the DRV and the "patriots of Indochina" all necessary aid. At the same time, Moscow continues to attack the Chinese in routine broadcasts in Mandarin. DRV followup comment on the Chinese delegation's visit uses language from the joint communique to characterize the "militant solidarity" between the two countries. Hanoi also quotes liberally from the foreign press in describing Chinese statements as "stern warnings" to the Nixon Administrai,ion. There is a marked decline in current propaganda attention to U.S. "threats of new military adventures" against the DRV, although the deputy communist delega- tion heads at the Paris session on the 11th had again called attention to these "threats." FALL OF BASES NEAR TCHEPONE PROMPTS CLAIM OF ARVN ROUT IN LAOS Propaganda in the wake of communist seizure of ARV' positions near Tchepone claims that South Vietnamese forces are in ret-eat and Approved For Release 1999/09I RDP85TOO875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/0 n@j&,,QDP85T008 0NI940012-8 17 MARCH 1971 Im cells for relentless attacks on remaining South Vietnamese positions. The first communist claim of a major victory in the area came on 13 March when Laotian and Vietnamese communist media reported that in the wake of an attack on the 12th, the "patriotic forces" seized Hill 748, a position of the 2d Regiment of the ARVN 1st Division. The propaganda said only that Hill 748 is situated west of Ban Dong, thus leaving it unclear whether the position in question was Fire Base Sophia, three miles southeast of Tchepone, which had been abandoned on the 12th by South Vietnamese troops of the 1st Division. According to-the Pathet Lao news agency, "large numbers" of allied troops were put out of action and 10 helicopters were downed during the assault on Hill 748. The news agency also claimed that the communists captured 10 artillery pieces, many radio transmitters, and a large quantity of other war supplies. It said that "many defenders gave themselves up" and that "Lao patriotic forces are now in full control of the peak and are pursuing the remnants" of the allied force. The communist seizure of Hill 723--presumably Firebase Lolo*--on 16 March was reported by communist media that day. A Pathet Lao news agency report said the capture of the hill came as the climax of a siege which began on the 12th when "patriotic forces" moved in from nearby Hill 748, which they had just overrun. The attackers "annihilated" one battalion, the report said, and "cut to smithereens" three other battalions of the 1st Regiment, ARVN 1st Division. Allied casualties, according to the report, totalled "several hundreds"; it added that "searches for enemy remnants in the jungles around are continuing." Along with reports of the "victory" on Hill 723 on the morning of the 16th, communist media carried an "order of mobilization" from the "Laotian People's Liberation Armed Forces command on the southern Laotian front, Tchepone"--dated 1200 hours, 16 March--declaring that the allied operation in southern Laos "has been doomed" and that the troops are "seeking to flee." The order calls upon the "liberation" forces to surround the enemy an'i stop his flight, to block air and ground routes, and * Hill 723 has been described variously by the communists as being 10 kilometers southwest of Ban Dong and nearly 10 kilo- meters from Tchepone. Firebase :Lolo was located nine miles southeast of Tchepone. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 uo prevent enemy troops from fleeing into the jungle. It directs them to "relentlessly attack," "completely annihilate the enemy," and "control the battlefield." Praising the seizure of Hill 723, a NHAN DAN article on the 17th ridicules reports that the South Vietnamese are moving into the final phase of their operation and will withdraw, stating that this "is but a pretext to beat a retreat." The army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the same day calls the allies' situation in southern Laos "extremely perilous," with their battle position "confused," their "already weakened forces split," and their morale declining. It suggests that the communist forces are "seizing the favorable opportunity" to launch an all-out offensive, and it gives prominence to the role of armored units in this action. reviewing the roles of various units, the commentary leads off with the assertion that the young, stalwart, brave, bold, and wise combatants of armored units are rushing forward to smash all the enemy's troop dispositions, to break his combat position, to crush all artillery emplacements and obstacles, and Lo cooperate with the infantry combatants in quickly annihilating the enemy troops. COMMUNISTS TALLY ALLIED LOSSES. PRAISE"LAO INSURGENT STRATEGY" Communist statistics on "victories" in southern Laos were updated in a 14 March communique of the Lao "liberation army" command, broadcast by Pathet Lao media and summarized by VNA on the 15th. The communique declares that since the start of the allied operation in Laos more than 7,200 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops have been killed or wounded and nearly 300 taken prisoner. Earlier official communist tallies had not specified numbers of prisoners taken, lumping them with total casualty figures. For example, the 7 March NLHS Central Committee statement had set allied troop losses in southe-:r. Laos at over 6,000, including those taken prisoner.* The 14 March communique also cites figures on the number of South Vietnamese units put out of action in southern Laos, * See the TRENDS of 10 March, page 8. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/O91 IIIDP85TOO875R O O?40012-8 17 MARCH 1971 claiming that eight battalions and 20 companies were "wiped out." According to the communique, they also downed or destroyed on the ground nearly 350 aircraft, mostly helicopters; wrecked more than 210 military vehicles; and captured "dozens" of tanks and armored cars, 40 cannon, more than 1,000 rifles and machineguns, a quantity of other war equipment, and many "important papers of the enemy." Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 16th published the Lao army command communique along with editorial comment. The NHAN DAN editorial says the "victories" in Laos "prove that the supreme command of the Lao People's Liberation Army has a correct line, sound judgment about the enemy's plots and tricks, and efficacious tactical and. strategic leadership." Alleged allied losses along Highway 9 in Quang Tri are updated in a 16 March communique of the Khe Sanh front PLAF command. The communique says that after 45 days of fighting, the PLAF "put out of action" more than 3,000 allied troops, including 2,000 Americans. Like the communique on the action in Laos, it departs from past practice in specifying that more than 100 allied troops were taken prisoner. This raiees the number of alleged allied losses from the total of over 2,000, including more than 1,000 Americans, which was claimed by the communists on the 4th. The communique also says the communist forces have shot down or destroyed nearly 100 air- craft and captured "a number of pilots," wrecked 350 military vehicles, including more than 100 tanks and armored vehicles, sunk 23 cargo ships, and burned down 20 logistic depots. The PLAF communique is published in the Hanoi press on the 17th and is commented on in the NHAN DAN editorial, which also praises the 15 March shellings of allied bases at Khe Sanh and Lao Bao. The shellings, according to the editorial, were "effective and timely coordination with the glorious attack launched against the enemy on Hill 723 by the Laotian" forces. Earlier reports on allied losses in Quang Tri and southern Laos drew comment in a 12 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which VNA identified as a "signed frontpage commentary." The army paper claimed that allied losses amount to one-fourth of the battalion-sized units, half of the helicopters, and half of the tanks and armored vehicles involved in the Laos operation. It concluded that "by annihilating part of the strategic reserve forces of the Saigon puppets which as yet must still rely on the U.S. armed forces, the fighters on Highway 9 have dashed Nixon's fondest hope--to withdraw a part of the American troops while both maintaining a military superiority and helping the Saigon army to stand by itself." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 PEKING SEES "UNPRECEDENTEDLY FINE" SITUATION IN INDOCHINA After following up the PRC delegation's 5-8 March visit to Hanoi with an editorial on the llth repeating some of the stronger language used during the visit and issuing a warning to the Nixon Administration, Peking has evinced marked confidence with respect to the situation in Indochina while drawing back from the portrayal of threat to the DRV as well as to China that characterized statements during the visit. Chou En-lai on the 16th, speaking at a DRV embassy banquet honoring the visit, buoyantly described an "unprecedentedly fine" situation in IndochinL, particularly taking note of the fighting in northern South Vietnam and southern Laos. According to Chou, the communists have "frustrated the schemes"--left unspecified--of the allies in the Laos operation and have won "inspiring brilliant victories." Chou repeated the assertion in the PRC-DRV Joint communique. that the two sides reached complete agreement on how to deal with U.S. "military adventures" in Indochina. He vaguely warned the United States that it will suffer an "even more ignominious defeat" if, in disregard of "the stern warnings" of the Chinese and Vietnamese, the Nixon Administration should "cling to its reckless course" in Indochina. But Chou's remarks were notably devoid of any effort to portray a threat to the security of the DRV or of China, and he failed to repeat the Chinese pledge to support the Vietnamese even to the extent of "the greatest national sacrifices" in case of further escalation endangering North Vietnam. Consistent with Hanoi's effort to associate the Chinese with its vital interests, the DRV ambassador took the occasion to cite the Chinese pledge involving national sacrifices while effusively hailing Chou's "very successful visit" as "a political event of tremendous significance" in the relations between the two countries. Expressing a more somber mood than Chou, he .said the visit took place at a time of "extremely grave" military escalation when the enemy was plotting "new military adventures" against the DRV. But like Chou, he trumpeted the "very great victories" won on the three Indochina battlefields, particularly on Highway 9 and in southern Laos. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 -6- PEOPLE'S DAILY In the only authoritative Chinese comment EDITORIAL on the visit before Chou's speech on the 16th, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 11 March repeated the pledge of Chinese national sacrifices in behalf of the Vietnamese. NCNA's transmission of the editorial in its international service in English added to the Chinese pledge a direct warning to the Nixon Administration--not included in the version carried in NCNA's domestic service-- to be "careful about your own necks if you should act recklessly." But while indulging in this tough language to underscore the significance of the Chou visit, the editorial was also notable for the absence of any reference to China's security. PEOPLE'S DAILY mentioned the Laos operation, noted also that President Nixon has "openly threatened" North Vietnam with increased air action, and said that with U.S. support the seeking a chance to invade the DRV. It was in connection with military activities end thre...ts regarded as menacing by Hanoi that the Chinese, during Chou's visit, linked the PRC's security with that of the DRV for the first time in recent years. The joint communique said current military- activity "directly menaces the security of the DRV and at. the same time the security of the PRC,.thus creating a situation dangerous to peace in Asia and the world." A security linkage was also formulated by Chiu Hui-tso, a Politburo member and PLA deputy chief of staff, who spoke to a DRV air defense unit on the 7th. After noting that China and Vietnam are neighbors and their peoples and armies close brothers and comrades-in-arms, Chiu declared that U.S. "encroachment upon the Vietnamese people" is "also a threat to China." Peking's willingness to make this linkage during the visit, followed by its pullback from the security issue afterwards, suggests that one purpose of Chou's visit was to offer reassurance to the North Vietnamese but that Peking remains reticent about associating its security interests with Hanoi's and prefers to express confidence in its allies' ability to cope with the situation. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: qW TOO875ROOPJg0WJ2-8 17 MARCH 1971 MAO INSTRUCTION The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 11th repeated an "instruction" of Mao that Chou introduced in his 6 March Hanoi rally speech--the same speech in which the Chinese first mentioned national sacrifices in support of the Vietnamese. The instruction reads: "If anyone among us should say that we cannot help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, that means muiiny, that means betrayal of the revolution."* This strong language, viewed in the context of Chou's surprise trip and the talk about national sacrifices, suggests that the PRC delegation's visit and its presumed mandate for contingency planning may have been the subject of debate in Peking over the degree to which the Chinese would be prepared to move from their markedly cautious, noninter- ventionist stance since the mid-1960's. Peking may have in7oked the Mao instruction in order to dramatize its commitment to Hanoi, but the wording of the instruction in a discussion of China's internationalist duty--with an implica- tion of reluctance on the part of some Chinese--would seem better calculated to cut the ground from beneath recalcitrant elements than to impress Hanoi or the enemy. PEOPLE'S DAILY prefaced the instruction with an assertion that proletarian: internationalism is the supreme duty and that the Chinese have an obligation to support revolutionary struggles. However, in expressing this support the Chinese have not on their own authority reverted to discarded formulations used in the mid-1960's when Peking debated over the proper posture to assume on Vietnam and how to respond to appeals for communist unity in the face of rising hostilities in Vietnam. Mao's instruction on support for the Vietnam revolution is not quoted in a major Peking joint editorial appearing on 17 March to mark the centenary of the Paris Commune. The editorial, issued jointly by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, discourses on China's role in world revolution today. Declaring that the Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution, it says the Chinese always regard the revolutionary struggles of other peoples as their own and fulfill their duty )f supporting these struggles. In this discussion the editorial quotes Mao as saying victory of socialism in one country involves the victory of the world revolution. * NCNA's English version softened the instruction somewhat to read " . . . that means betrayal, betrayal of the revolution." ? CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/@bil25 dAiRDP85T008 QQ4 j040012-8 17 MARCH 1971 FOREIGN CONN1EN'F ML:h of Peking's propaganda following Chou's visit has consisted of replays of foreign-- including Indochinese--comment, some of which takes a stronger stand than that expressed in Peking's direct comment. The issue of possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, rarely broached in PRC media since a flurry of references in early February, was resurrected in an NCNA dispatch on the 16th. NCNA quoted a pro-Peking Brazilian communist journal as referring to "the U.S. clamor to use atom bombs" in the conflict. Another foreign comment, attributed to a Baghdad paper in an NCNA dispatch dated the ly4,ti, ?z!nt distinctly further than the Chinese had done during Chou's visit in linking Chinese and North Vietnamese security and in suggesting a parallel between Indochina and the Korean War. NCNA quoted the Baghdad commentary as saying a "new attempt of military adventure" by the United States against North Vietnam would be "a direct aggression not only against the DRV but also against China." Recalling the lessons of Korea, the commentary was quoted as warning that "any similar venture" would meet with a "far more disastrous" fate.* In 1965, when the Chinese expressed concern that the Vietnam conflict might escalate into another Korea-type war, PRC statements de ..:red that aggression against the DRV "means aggression against China" and warned that the war might spread to China. At that time Peking publicly offered to send volunteers to fight alongside the Vietnamese, but this approach, with its more interventionist overtones, was abandoned in favor of an emphasis on self-reliant protracted warfare. As late as 22 July 1966, however, Liu Shao-chi issued a personal statement (unique for any leader other than Mao) saying aggression against Vietnam is aggression against China and threatening "Joint blows" by the Vietnamese and the Chinese. As for China's duty to world revolution, Liu declared that proletarian internationalism was the supreme principle governing China's foreign policy and that the Chinese had an obligation to support the Vietnamese and other revolutionary struggles. * Earlier indirect comment carried by Peking suggesting an analogy between Korea and Indochina. is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 February 1971, pages 11-14. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 ROLE OF USSR In the only anti-Soviet reference during the PRC delegation's visit, Chou in his major speech on the Gtr briefly played Peking's theme of opposition to the superpowers by "medium-sized and small countries." He did not, however, mention the Soviets directly, and he made no allusion to the Sino-Soviet dispute over support.for Vietnam. A reference to the Litter did appear after the visit in an NCNA dispatch from Tirana on the 14th quoting an Albanian editorial on the visit. According to the dispatch, the editorial claimed that U.S. political maneuvers on Indochina still find "the active support of the Moscow revisionists." But NCNA omitted the most trenchant anti- Soviet thrusts in the Albanian editorial, which charged that the "Kremlin chieftains" are furthering. their "counter- revolutionary collusion with the murderers of the Vietnamese people" and are practicing "friendship with words and treachery with deeds to the just struggle of the peoples of Indochina." Thus, Peking managed to use enough of the Albanian editorial to express misgivings over Moscow's role in.a political settlement without seriously breaching.ito careful restraint in the past year regarding Vietnam as a subject of Sino- Soviet rivalry. This restraint was also shown in the 17 March joint editorial, which denounced the Soviet leadership for betraying the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune but avoided attacking Moscow for betraying the Vietnamese revolution. Hanoi has used the occasioni of Chou's visit to r%iterate its long-standing emphasis on international communist unity, an emphasis which was given new force after Ho Chi Minh's death and which has undoubtedly had a moderating influence on the Sino-Soviet conflict since that time. Pharr Van Dong in his speech on 6 March took the opportunity to express gratitude to the Soviets for their support; and in his speech on the 7th, warning the United States against an invasion of the DRV, he declared that the Vietnamese have the "powerful backing" of the Chinese and "the militant solidarity of the entire socialist camp." The latter formulation was used by the DRV ambassador at his banquet for Chou on the 16th, though on that occasion Chinese but not Soviet aid was singled out for praise. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS 'TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 In another formulation expressing Hanoi's line on communist unity, Dong on the 6th referred to the DRV as "the outpost of the socialist camp in Southeast Asia." Characteristically eschewing a reference to "the socialist camp," a notion that fell out of favor in Peking following the policy decisions made in 1965, Chou in his speech on the 6th described the DRV as standing at "the southeastern outpost in Asia." MOSCOW STRESSES ITS AID, CLOSE RELATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM In the wake of Chou En-tai's visit to the DRV--mentioned only in a one-sentence TASS report on 9 March--Moscow has taken pains to stress the close ties between the DRV and the USSR. Thus, in timing which seems transparently calculated to serve this end, Soviet media from 10 to 12 March publicized a Pham Van Dong interview with television and radio correspondents, described as being occasioned by the forthcoming 25th CPSU Congress. In the interview, widely broadcast by Radio Moscow and published in PRAVDA on the 11th, Dong routinely praised the Octobe%' Revolution and the CPSU as inspiration for the Vietnamese revolution and went on to hail Soviet support.. He noted that during the resistance against the French and now in the struggle against American "aggression," the Vietnamese people have enjoyed the "enor.mous valuable support and aid" of the USSR. He called attention to the Soviet Government statement--of 25 February--as having confirmed Moscow's resolve to give all necessary aid to the DRV and the "patriots of Indochina." Coincidentally with the publicity for the interview, Moscow broadcasts in Mandarin on the 10th and 12th pointedly quoted the passage in the Soviet Government statement which referred to the DRV's membership in the "socialist family.'.' Neither of these commentaries included the charge, present in other Soviet comment, that Peking has consistently blocked "joint action" of the socialist countries in support of Vietnam. This charge did appear, for example, in a broadcast in Mandarin on the 11th which claimed that the United States felt free to step up aggression in Indochina "near the Chinese border" because of Peking's refusal to cooperate with the USSR and other socialist countries, and also because of the PLA's weakness in the aftermath of the cultural revolution. China was not mentioned explicitly in a foreign-language Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 commentary by Shakhov on the 11th, pegged to Pham Van Dong's interview, which did, however, pointedly recall that the Moscow conference of communist and worker's parties in June .1969 had called for socialist united action in support of Vietnam. Pham Van Dong's expressions of appreciation for Soviet aid were cited in a 13 March Aleksey Leontyev commentary ridiculing President Nixon's statement to the New York TIMES' Sulzberger that the Indochina war is in its final stages. Leontyev called this "boundless hypocrisy," but said it is possible that there may be people innocent enough to believe that the war is "diminishing precisely at a time when its flames are being fed" by the United States. He said that "the aggressors have learned nothing," although they should have realized that the Vietnam problem "cannot be solved by force of arms." He went on to quote the Soviet Government's pledge of continued necessary support and Pham Van Dong's assertion in his interview that the Soviet determination to help is "a powerful source of inspiration" to the Vietnamese people, resolved to persist in the struggle. W11UNISTS AT PARIS SESSION ROUTINELY SCORE U,S1 "ESCALATION" The VNA and LPA accounts of the 106th session of the Paris talks on 11 March suggest that both DRV chief delegate Xuan Thuy and the PRG's Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh refused to attend the session in protest against the Nixon Administration's "escalation" of the war in Indochina and its "threats and war preparations" against the DRV. Mme. Binh in fact left for a "friendship visit" to Romania o.i the llth.* Both the communist delegates scored the President's 1$ March press conference. PRG deputy delegation head Nguyen Van Tien also claimed that the President, both in his 25 February foreign policy report and at the press conference, had "offered nothing new but simply repeated his pleas" for Vietnamization and the "U.S.-puppets' armed incursions into Cambodia and Laos." DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy similarly charged, according to VNA, that the President "was obliged" to hold the press conference "to give further justification" of his Indochina policy. Vy * LPA carried a joint communique on the visit on the 17th. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/061W? YKI DP85T0087 0' -OD40012-8 17 MARCH 1971 added that the press conference further showed that the Administration "talks peace but actually makes war; it speaks about negotiations but actually seeks a military victory." VNA ignores Vy's charge that the President acknowledged that "despite the pullout of U.S. forces, the war would go. on in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."' Vy cited AP as saying that "for the first time Mr. Nixon explicitly admitted that has objective was not to restore peace in Indochina." Both delegates paid some attention to U.S. "threats" against the North. VNA omits much of the detail of Tien's statement, but it notes his charge that %Mthough the Nixon Administration tried by ambiguous allegations to appease public opinion, it is more and more obvious that the United States is feverishly preparing new military adventures against the DRV." VNA notes that Vy "denounced" U.S. bombings and strafings in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh--he cited last week's foreign ministry spokesman's protest--and "laid bare President Nixon's scheme of leaving the door open for Saigon puppet troops to invade North Vietnam with U.S. support, including the use of U.S. ground forces under the pretext of 'rescuing pilots and prisoners of war."' Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/2?okI,PAP85T00875Fg3,Mg012-8 17 MARCH 1971 PATHET LAO, DRV PROTEST ACTION IN LAOS. PRESIDENT'S REMARKS The NLHS Central Committee reacted belatedly on 9 March to President Nixon's 25 February foreign policy report with a statement on the report "and the intensified U.S. war of aggression in Leos and in Indochina as a whole." Carried by the Pathet Lao news agency the following day, the statement reviews U.S. "escalation" moves in Indochina. It does not discuss the subatanca of the foreign policy report, merely scoring President Nixon for "boasting" about successes of the Nixon Doctrine and of Vietnamization on three occasions in less than three weeks. It is clear, says the statement, that the Nixon Doctrine is nothing but a policy of "making Asians fight Asians" and that Vietnamization means a perpetuation of the U.S. "occupation" of South Vietnam and support for Saigon's "invasion" of Laos and Cambodia. The statement repeats demands that the United States put an end to escalation, withdraw American, Saigon, and Thai troops from Laos, and "completely" cease the bombing "in order to create conditions for the Lao parties concerned to meet and peacefully settle the Lao problem." It reiterates that U.S. expansion of the war "has turned the three Indochinese countries into a single battlefield" and that the Lao people, loyal to the commitments of the Indochinese people's summit conference, will stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the Vietnamese and Khmer peoples in resisting "U.S. aggression." Pro forma Hanoi support for the NLHS statement came in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement carried by VNA on 15 March. Denouncing the "intensification by the United States of its war of aggression in Laos," the statement makes no direct reference to the President's foreign policy report, saying only that U.S. acts of aggression reveal the deceitfulness of the President's "talk about 'peace,' 'troop withdrawal,' etc."* * Hanoi had reacted to the President's report officially in a 2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement. See the TRENDS of 3 March 1971, pages 1-3. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/ DLqtDP85TO08? 0P Q040012-8 17 MARCH 1971 -14- MANILA CONFERENCE OF ASEAN SAID TO SERVE NIXON DOCTRINE Vietnamese communist propaganda scoring the 12 March ASEAN conference in Manila as another attempt to serve U.S. war aims includes a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 11th and a NHAN DAN commentary on the 14th, both briefly reviewed by VNA. In raising the question of a discussion of Laos at the Manila conference, the army paper recalled a precedent--the Djakarta meeting of the ASEAN in May 1970 "at which futile attempts were made to justify the U.S. invasion of Cambodia."* It charged that the purpose of this year's meeting was not to bring peace or security but "only to serve U.S. war expansion in Indochina and the Nixon Doctrine to pit Asians against Asians." NHAN DAN similarly recalled last year's ASEAN meeting and stated that the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian problems can only be settled by the respective peoples themselves. Liberation Radio on the 11th broadcast a commentary on the meeting attributed to LPA, not carried by the news agency itself until the 12th. It assailed Nixon's "successive speeches" "pleading" for U.S. actions in Indochina, and echoed Han6i*in likening the meeting to the one last May in Djakarta. The commentary added that Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik had also revealed "that this conference might discuss the war in Laos and the possibility of holding a second Djakarta conference on Indochina." Noting that Saigon, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh would be invited as observers, the commentary rejected the competence of the participants to deal with the Indochina question and repeated the standard line that the keys to the problem are U.S. troop withdrawal and U.S. compliance with the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina and the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos. DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT NORTH Two current DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, released on 15 and 17 March, protest "U.S. air attacks" on Vinh Linh area. The protest of the 15th also claims that U.S. planes "ra'-ded a number of places in Minh Hoa district, Quang Binh Province" on 9 March, causing'Losses in lives and property." * See the TRENDS of 20 May 1970, pages 9-12. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/09/2ko 16ERp 5T00875R@9Q (Na12-8 17 MARCH 1971 Daily U.S. actions against Vinh Linh from 8 to 15 March* are charged in the two protests. The statement of the 15th says that from 8 to 13 March U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village while U.S. artillery from south of the DMZ "fired on Vinh Son and Huong Lap villages." Similarly, the protest of the 17th charges that on 14-15 March U.S. planes, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village while "U.S. heavy artillery from the sea and from south of the DMZ fired hundreds of shells into villages close to the 17th parallel." Both note that the villages "lie in the demilitarized zone belonging to DRV territory." Following standard practice, the protests "sternly denounce and severely condemn the above acts of war" and demand an end to all U.S. encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security. The protest of the 17th alleges that a U.S. plane was downed over Vinh Linh on the 14th. The downing had been claimed by Hanoi the previous day in a report which placed Hanoi's total of downed U.S. aircraft at 3,177. DRV ANNOUNCES REGULAR PEOPLE'S COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN APRIL Hanoi media on 13 March announced the Council of Ministers' decision to hold elections in April for representatives to the people's councils at various levels. In making the announcement, Hanoi radio referred to a 3 February resolution of a conference of the Council of Ministers' Standing Committee. Hanoi said elections to the people's councils in the autonomous regions will take place on 11 April--the day the National Assembly elections are also scheduled--and in the provinces and cities directly subordinate to the central government on 25 April. Elections are to be completed before 30 April for lower-level people's councils-- the provinces in the autonomous zones, cities, urban wards, districts, villages, and townships. * The current protests pick up where the last previous one stopped. That protest, issued by the foreign ministry spokes- man on 9 March, complained of "recent U.S. attacks' on Vinh Linh and Quang Binh from 3 to 7 March. See the TRENDS of 10 March, pages 14-15. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/0 i SRPP85T0087 i0PRMA@i40012-8 17 MARCH 3.971 NHAN DAN'o 13 March editorial notes that the newly elected representatives will replace those elected in 1968 and 1969. Unlike the National Assembly elections, those for the people's councils were not suspended during the years of U.S. bombing in the North.* Thus elections of people's councils at the level of districts, villages, and equivalent urban divisions were held in all provinces and cities in both 1967 and 1969, and elections for the councils in the autonomous zones, provinces, and those cities that are under the jurisdiction of the central government were held in 196b--in accordance with the constitutional proviso of two- and three-year terms, respectively. The NHAN DAN editorial says the elections prove "the stability of the people's democratic state and the constant concern of the party and government to ensure full exercise of the people's right as collective master of the country." It also says that "each election to the National Assembly and the people's councils is an opportunity for the people to show their high consciousness of their role in the building and defense of their own administration." RADIO OF CAMBODIAN FUNK AND RGNU INCREASES BROADCAST TIME The "Voice of the FUNK," the radio of the Cambodian FUNK and RGNU, announced on 10 March that as of the 15th it would increase its time on the air and change its broadcast schedule-- changes resulting in an increase from 21 to 35 hours a`week. This further step in the buildup of the FUNK/RGNU propaganda apparatus follows the inauguration on 2 March of a daily radio- teletype transmission in French by the INFORMATION AGENCY OF KAMPUCHEA (AKI). The FUNK radio began broadcasting on 1 August 1970, and the AKI was established on 10 August. BELATED PUBLICITY FOR "LATE 1970'/ RGNU CONFERENCE IN CAMBODIA On 11, 12, and 13 March the Cambodian Information Agency (AKI) belatedly publicized portions of a report delivered by Khieu Samphan, RGNU deputy premier and defense minister, at a * See the 16 March 1971 Supplement to the TRENDS, "Propaganda Reflects DRV Resumption of Normal Party, Government Procedures," pages 4-7. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 conference held in "late 1970" by "members of RGNU responsible for the interior" in the "liberated areas" of Cambodia. There had been no prior monitored mention of such a conference. In a single available reference to an RGNU "cabinet meeting," NCNA reported belatedly on 21 February that such a meeting had been held 20 January. NCNA gave no details about that meeting but said that at its conclusion the ministers sent a message to Premier Penn Nouth expressing support foi Sihanouk's 18 January appeal to the Cambodian people to wage a prolonged strugjle.* Khieu Samphan's report to the "late 1970" conference, according to AKI, covered the activities of the ministers responsible for the interior in all fields--military, political, economic, financial, cultural, social, and diplomatic. AKI's excerpts quote the military section of the report as claiming that the Cambodian people's armed forces had put out of action nearly 150,000 troops of the United States, Saigon, and the Lon Nol/ Sirik Matak/Son Ngoc Thanh "puppetF" and as asserting that th,,. "puppet" armed forces had been reduced to "less than 20,000." They were forced to retreat into Phnom Penh and "a number of towns of lesser importance," the report said, and were unsuccessful in efforts to escape encirclement and regain the initiative. It claimed that the Saigon troops who had come to aid the Phnom Penh "traitors" were still "encircled" and unable to "go far from their posts." It concluded that "our forces have stretched the enemy thin and reduced him to a passive position, thus creating favorable conditions for our regular forces." The excerpts cite the section on the political situation in Cambodia as pointing to the "isolation" of the "enemy" due to lack of popul?r support. The report claimed that the "enemy" administration at various echelons, especially at village, commune, and district levels, had "mostly been overthrown" or was "in a shaky position" and that there were "internal contradictions" between"the Thieu-Ky cliquE and the Lon Not/ Sirik Matak/Son Ngoc Thanh clique," with clashes between their troops occ>>rring daily. * No RGNU ministers' "conference" or "cabinet meetii'g" is known to have been publicized before that, although a FUNK Central Committee meeting held in the "liberated areas" in August 1970 was said to have "enlarged" the responsibilities of members fighting on the "interior front." That meeting was reported in a FUNK/RGNU communique carried 5y NCNA on 17 September. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09JZSF'rPP85T00874rW@ 40012-8 17 MARCH 1971 With respect to the economic situation, the report stressed the "serious economic and financial crisis" of the "clique," characterized by an "acute shortage" of food and spiraling price increases, in contrast with the "inexhaustible economic and financial resources" of the "large and rich liberated zone." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 MIDDLE EAST USSR CALLS U1S1 POLICY AMBIGUOUS, DOUBTS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL ? Moscow continues to press the line that the United States shares responsibility with Israel for the standoff in the Jarring mission; some propagandists charge that Washington has no inten- tion of pressuring Israel to make concessions, out others adopt a wait-and-see posture. Remarking on the "ambiguous nature" of U.S. diplomacy, a panelist on the domestic service commentators' round- table on the 14th says the chances of success for the Jarring mission depend on the United States. At the same-time, Moscow advises Arab listeners that it is wrong to believe the key to the crisis is in Washington's hands; since the United States will never voluntarily pressure Israel, this argument runs, it is up to the Arabs to force Washington to reconsider its policy by striking at U.S. "imperialist interests" in the Arab world. Prime Minister Meir's remarks on borders in her interview in the 13 March London TIMES are said by TASS that day to outline "with cynical frankness" the government's "program of territorial expan- sion." PRAVDA's Glukhov on the 16th finds it no coincidence that her "map of territorial annexations" emerged just as Abba Eban was leaving for the United States. Eban is quoted as saying before his departure that there are no U.S.-Israeli differences of opinion, and Moscow's domestic service routinely concludes that the visit is aimed at obtaining new guarantees on further U.S. material and moral. support, There is continued praise for the UAR's policy of pursuing a political settlement, along with occasional interjections that its peace-loving policy does not stem from weakness. Cairo is said to have "gone a long way" to meet Israel, and commentators point to as-Sadat's proposal to reopen the Suez Canal. U.S~ ROLE Soviet media cite a spate of statements by U.S. officials to demonstrate that the United States does not intend to pressure Israel to comply with the Security Council Resolution. In the only available Soviet account of Secretary Rogers' 16 March press conference, TASS asserts that it is clear from his replies that the United States will continue giving support to Israel, providing economic and other aid to maintain its security. The Secretary stated "in particular," TASS says, that the United States never insisted that Israel should withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, although this is Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 C NFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1972 demanded by the Security Council Resolution. TASS makes no rention of Rogers' discussion of an international peace-keeping force and of geographical and political considerations with regard to security. TASS on the 11th had said that the U.S. press has pointed out more than once that the Administration has sufficient means of influencing Israel but prefers not to use them. On the 12th, TASS pointed to Sisco's letter to the NEAR EAST REPORT as speaking "of the need of 'reserving the possibility to change'" the 1967 armistice line in Israel's favor and "even stating" that the United States never believedthe Security Council resolution demanded complete Israeli withdrawal. A Ryzhikov domestic service commentary the same day asserted that State Department spokesman McCloskey in effect acknowledged that the United States does not intend and will not try to get Israel to carry out the resolution in full. Ryzhikov also claimed that President Nixon, in his 4 March press conference, said Israel would never be forced to do anything. (The President said the United States would not impose a settlement in the Middle East, but would do everything to urge the parties to talk; he added at a later point, "we can only say that we can make suggestions, but we are going to have to depend upon the parties concerned to reach an agreement.") A foreign-language commentary on the 15th said that Secretary Rogers, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "openly declared" that Washington has no intention of exerting any pressure what- soever on Israel to make concessions in negotiations. Commentcr Ryzhikov makes the only current propaganda allusion to Big Four action. He says that peace-loving mankind "is placing particular hopes" on the four-power talks while the Israeli leaders, "who have long banked" on "certain support" from the United States, are worried at the thought of concerted great-power action. Panelist Shishkin, on the domestic service commentators' round- table on the 11th, finds American Mideast diplomacy "ambiguous" and says it is up to the United States whether or not advantage is taken of the chances of success of the Jarring mission. While the panelists are not optimistic, noting that "all talk of possible U.S. pressure on Israel" so far "has no foundation in fact," Sishkin concludes that the immediate future will show whether "Israel's American patrons will heed the voice of good sense" and persuade Israel to face the question of a political settlement at last. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 Shishkin rejects U.S. press "blackmail" against the Arabs, ^iting the New York TIMES as suggesting that if Egypt re- n?_.unces the demand for full withdrawal as a sine qua non for a peaceful agreement, Israel "may shift from its position of no withdrawal." He similarly denounces a "canard" by TIME ? magazine that the Arabs are insisting only in public on the retu~-n of all territories and have in fact agreed to certain territorial concessions, as well as TIME's story of a secret meeting between King Husayn and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon--an "overt attempt to sow mistrust" between the UAR and Jordan Shishkin points to New York TIMES' criticism of Israel as an iilustrati.on of the "undoubted success" of Arab, primarily UAR, policy in pursuing a political settlement; a foreign-language commentary on the 15th, on the other hand, dismisses "contrived rumors" regarding "alleged growing differences" between Washington and Tel Aviv and "even U.S. condemnation of Israel's obstruction- ist policy." ARGUMENT In commentaries broadcast in Arabic on 12 and FOR ARABS 15 March Moscow warns against the "false conclu- sion" that the key to the Midd1' East crisis is in the hands of Washington and tells the Arabs they must act themselves. They should not heed "imperialist propaganda fabrications" that the U.S. position has "special and decisive importance" and that the Arabs must win U.S. good will. The commentary on the .12th, acknowledging the "generally valid notion" that the United States is capable of pressuring Israel to withdraw, insists that Washington will never do this volun-?,._;. tarily because its policy toward the Arabs is based on thwarting the Arab liberation movement and preserving the position of U.S. monopolies. Noting that the UAR no longer regards itself as bound by the cease-fire agreement but leaves the door open to political settlement, Moscow says this attitude "allows for the use of a variety of means" to remove "the consequences of the aggression." And it points approvingly to Cairo and other Arab press insistence on removing the "imperialist interests and strong- holds" in the Arab countries. The commentary also favorably cites the "important conclusion" being drawn by Arab public opinion that the Arabs themselves hold the key to solution of the Middle East dispute and can influence the United States to reconsider its policy by attacking with increasing intensity U.S. strongholds in the Arab world. The Soviet argument would seem to coincide, at least in part, with AL-AHRAM editor Haykal's thesis, in his 5 March article, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 19WffvIA-RDP85T; M, 91,0300040012-8 M P that the Arabs should seek to "neutralize" the U.S. attitude toward Israel. and. to convince Washington, among other things, that it is facing dangers threatening its interests--as well as the danger of "embarrassing complications" in its relations with Moscow. Haykal's disagreement with the notion that it is the United States, not Israel, which the Arabs are facing on the battlefield was challenged by the Lebanese Communist Party daily AN-NIDA in a 7 March article that insisted the United States cannot be neutral between the Arabs and Israel. And a Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on the 11th may have been implicitly countering Haykal when it agreed with the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH that the Arab conflict with Israel "actually represents a conflict with the United States itself.." UAR-SOVIET President as-Sadat's 1-2 March talks in Moscow RELATIONS are belatedly acknowledged in a 10 March IZVESTIYA article by Koryavin summing up as-Sadat's 7 March speech. In quoting as-Sadat Koryavin contrives, through slight variations in wording, to convey the impression that the decision to go to Moscow was as-Sadat's: "Last week I considered it necessary to meet the leaders of the great Soviet Union. They expressed the opinion to me that conditions demanded the holding of consultations between us. I made the decision myself to go to Moscow without announcing my intention." (As-Sadat actually said: "I found it appropriate last week to meet with the leaders of the great Soviet Union. These leaders had sent word to me that they thought conditions required consultations between us. I decided to travel to Moscow without publicity.") TASS on the 13th cited Cairo's AL-AHRAM as stressing that as-Sadat's "important messages" to the heads of the four powers demonstrate Cairo's desire to take advantage of any opportunity to implement Resolution 242 and to cooperate with the international community. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 16th reports that UAR Vice President 'Aziz Sidqi, heading a delegation which has signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in Moscow, has .received Brezhnev's reply to an as-Sadat message delivered by Sidqi. On the 11th TASS reported--without comment--a UAR official spokesman as denying an "allegation" by Secretary Rogers that there are Soviet troops in the UAR. The spokesman, according to TASS, said the Secretary "knows well that there are only Soviet military experts in the UAR." Asked in a 9 March tele- vision interview about removal of the Soviet military presence Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/O9/ P85T0087 90,R 9940012-8 17 MARCH 19'(1 from Egypt, Rogers had responded that it would be helpful, if a peacekeeping operation could be worked out under UN auspices, for, the Soviet Union to withdraw some cf its forces. If the USSR played a part in a peacekeeping role, he added, it would not need these forces in the UA.R "to that degree." Moscow propaganda has remained silent on the question of Soviet participation in an international peacekeeping force. SYRIAN Reporting an interview by Syria's newly elected STANCE President Hafiz al-Asad, TASS on the 16th--along with noting his statement that the UAR and Syria are "united militarily" and their armed forces have a joint command--said that he "highly appreciated" UAR activities aimed at a political settlement. In the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY account, as reported from uamascus, al-Asad told Egyptian Journalists that he strongly supports the UAR's political activity, viewing political struggle "as a matter which cannot be neglected" and adding that it complements the "requirements of the liberation battle." Panelist Polyanov, on the 7 March Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable, had provided Moscow's most "straight- forward"--as he said--explanation thus far of Syria's position. He acknowledged that at one time the Syrian Government "held a position which, if not negative, did not support the Security Council resolution and so on." Pointing out that "certain changes" have taken place in the Syrian political scene, he said that the present Syrian Government supports the idea of a peaceful settle- ment and "I believe that its position in the main coincides with the positions of the UAR and other countries advocating a peaceful settlement in that area." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1996/d?%t6~"t4A-RDP85TdogV5RMO~ 00040012-8 I.'! MAIt(II L')'( I. TURKEY MOSCOW REPGRTS GOVERNMENT RESIGNATION1 GIVES NO BACKGROUND Moscow, which had given no publicity to the evento in Turkey leading up to the resignation of the Justice Party government, reported without comment on the .12th the resignation that day of Prime Minister Demirel and his cabinet. This was announced, said 'L'ASS, after a cabinet meeting which discussed the memorandum handed to Turkish President Sunay and the chairmen of the National Assembly and the Senate by the military leaders. TABS noted that the memorandum demanded "the formation of 'a new and strong government'" and announced the military's intention of taking over power unless a new government capable, "as the memorandum says, of 'ending the anarchy in the country'" was formed without delay. On the 16th TASS, again in a short editorialized report, noted that. President Sunay in a broadcast to the nation warmed that "any 'anarchy' caused, as he put it, by the extreme left and the extreme right, 'will be suppreFlued as soon as possible.'" TASS said Sunay supported the actions of the army and the necessity, as demanded in the military's memorandum, of "forming 'a new strong government."' Broadcasts in Turkish in recent weeks have been laying the groundwork for celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet-Turkish friendship treaty, extolling the prospects of further fruitful cooperation on the foundations laid by the treaty. A Tarasov article in IZVESTIYA along these lines, as reviewed by TASS on the 15th, observes that "unsolved questions between the two states" can and must be settled in a spirit of cooperation and good- neighborhood, and notes that as a result of mutual efforts the viewpoints of the two countries on a number of major internatloi,c,l issues have drawn closer in recent times. TASS and Ankara radio on the 16th report the exchange of congratulatory mesenges between Kosygin and Demirel--now heading a caretaker government--on the treaty anniversary. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 t'tINIII I )I'N'I'IA1, I"111 ':I90 NI)(l :I'( MAIt JII 1.9'(L NORTH KOREA PYONGYANG DENOUNCES OVERFLIGHTS OF U,S, RECONNAISSANCE PLANE Pyongyang denounced overt'l.ightu of it U.S. 13H-71 recorinaisuanee plane on J.)) March t.n prompt roportu the carne day by KCNA and t,ha domoutic service which claimed that the plane entered DIRK alrnpace on two occasions to conduct "espionage and hostile uctu in wanton violation of the armist?:ice agreement." The reports warned pointedly that the United States must remember "what their acts of infiltration into the territorial air of our aide have brought about in the past." The same warning was made by the North Korean representative at the 15 March meeting of' the Military Armistice Commission, reported in Pyongyang media. A NODONG SINMUN article on the overflight, carried by KCNA on 16 March, uses standard Pyongyang terminology in calling the "provocation" a "link in the chain" of U.S.-machinations to bring the situation to the "brink of war" and "an extremely grave criminal move to speed up preparations for the provocation of an aggressive war in full scale." Reviewing other alleged U.S. maneuvers to provoke a war "under the deceptive slogan of 'U.S. army cutback,'" the article mentions the activation of a tactical fighter wing on 15 March and the 3-5 March Freedom Vault airlift exercise. Kim I1-song, it,has warned that "our people do not want to provoke others first but will never allow anyone to provoke them even a little." Identical language was used in the 23 April 1969 DPRK Government statement protesting the downing of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane on 15 April of that year, by Kim II-song in his speech to the Korean party congress on 2 November 1970, and in a 27 February 1971 DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on the Freedom Vault exercise. Pyongyang propaganda in the weeks prior to the downing of the EC-121 in April 1969 had contained no known warnings of retaliation against reconnaissance aircraft and no unusually bellicose statements. DPRK comment on the U.S. airlift exercise Focus Retina in March 1969, including a 10 March DPRK Foreign Ministry statement, had not gone beyond the standard generalized warnings that the Americans should not forget the "lessons" of their defeat in the Korean War and the Pueblo incident. Asserting that "we do not want war, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 199%pj1,?piq~l~j-; RDPB~, Tj~Q j, 900300040012-8 17 MARCH 1.971 but we are not afraid of one," the statement routinely said the North Koreans had built "steel-wall defenses to cope with any aggression by the U.S. imperialists." The 23 April 1969 DPfK Government statement on the EC-121 downing, however, complained that there was no guarantee that such planes would not intrude into DPfK territorial airspace again and warned that in the event of another intrusion the Korean people "will not sit with folded arms but will take resolute measures for safeguarding their sovereignty as ever." This explicit warning recurred in some official statements, most recently in a 22 June 1970 government memorandum on the Korean War anniversary. Other official statements, both before and since, have contained the stock generalized warning that the United States should not forget the "lessons" of its defeats in the Korean War, the Pueblo incident, and the downing of the EC-121. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 INDIAN ELECTIONS MOSCOW HAILS VICTOiY OF "PROGRESSIVE DEMUCRATIC FORCES" Registering undisguised and unrestrained approval of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's "formidable victory" in the recently concluded elections for seats in the lower house of the Indian parliament, Soviet media have characterized the unexpectedly large majority won by Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress party as "a mandate for the government's policy of economic and social reforms" and "an important event with great significance not only for India but also for all countries of the Asian continent." Moscow sees the victory as evidence of overwhelming Indian approval of Mrs. Gandhi's domestic and foreign policies and thus as a "crushing defeat" for the coalition of "reactionary" parties which had "the sole purpose of overthrowing Mrs. Gandhi's government and preventing the implementation of the proposed social reforms." Peking media did not mention the Indian elections during the entire course of the campaign and have not commented on the results. DOMESTIC On the Indian domestic front, Moscow views the IMPLICATIONS election results as a mandate "to go ahead with reforms and changes defined in the program of the ruling party." Mrs. Gandhi's victory is seen as a turning point, "the beginning of a stage of re.1 changes" in India, when India can undertake "practical measures to do away with the remnants of feudalism," to restrict the economic and political dorninatiou of the Indian "monopolies," to improv, the people's living standards, to complete agrarian reform, to put foreign trade under government control, to expand the state sector, and to conduct "an active anti- imperialist struggle." Bank nationalization, curtailment of "the privileges of the feudalists," and "the implementation of progressive socioeconomic transformations" were singled out by TASS chief foreign editor Shishkin, a participant in the 14 March ^ommentators' roundtable program, as "progressive" steps of the Gandhi government which have now been stamped with approval by the Indian people. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/0~d E %II,kifRDP85TOO875R000300040012-8 F BIB TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 Moscow propagandists--who in 1967 had indicated concern over the reversals suffered by the ruling Congress party in that year's elections--interpret the current results as evidence of "a turning point in the struggle between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction." In a 12 March broadcast for foreign audiences, Yuriy Soltan termed the results "a heavy defeat" for the coalition of rightwing parties and "a major victory for the country's progressive forces." A similar broadcast on 11 March called the defeat of several rightwing "reactionaries" a "vivid indication of the bank- ruptcy" of the rightwing alliance. None of the Moscow commentaries contain the kind of qualifiers that had appeared in 1969 reaction to the defeat of a motion of no-confidence in the Indira Gandhi government. For example, Soltan said then that although the "antigovernment front" suffered a resounding defeat and the "progressive forces" were victorious, "this does not necessarily mean that the reactionaries have given up this time."* The. current comment implies that the contest is over and that the progressive forces have achieved decisive victory. NOVOSTI political observer Beglov, participating in the 14 March roundtable program, remarked that with its "firm absolute majority" the Gandhi government will be able, "with the support of all other democratic forces, to implement its planned program of social transformations." Soviet media reported the electoral manifesto of the Communist Party of India (CPS) and took note of its inclusion in the "progressive front" which gained a majority of the seats in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu. But there has been no monitored Soviet comment on the activities of the Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPI/M) or of its electoral success in West Bengal, where it is the largest--though not the majority--party as a result of the current elections for the state legislature there. Soltan on the 12th contended that "an important part" in the defeat of the rightwing forces was played by the CPI, which stood for "a struggle against the reactionary parties, for preventing them from winning power in the center, and for a parliament with a firm leftwing and democratic orientation." * For a discussion of Moscow's treatment of the November 1969 schism between the two factions of the Congress Party, see the TRENDS of 20 November 1969, pp. 7-9. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDEW,rIAr4 F1313 TUENDO 17 MARCH 197.1 FOREIGN Soviet commentators viewed the Gandhi victory as POLICY an expression of faith in Nehru's foreign policy, a rejection of attacks on the Indian Government's foreign policy by those who advocate "an alliance with imperialism and participation in its foreign policy ventures," and a vote of confidence in a foreign policy based on "the principles of nonalinement and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems." Radio/TV political observer Druzhinin commented in the 14 March roundtable program that the election results were of "great significance" for "all countries of the Asian continent," and Soltan on the 12th said they reflected "the general tendency toward a democratic development in the Asian and African developing countries, where the struggle for national liberation is turning more clearly into a determined struggle for social liberation." A Moscow radio commentary in English to South Asia on the llth called them "fresh confirmation that there is a clear trend for a shift to the left in the developing countries of the third world" and took note of the recent elections in Ceylon, Chile, and Pakistan as well as India. The commentary characterized these elections as.a rejection of internal reaction and a reflection of demands for "radical social and economic changes and a solution of internal problems along the noncapitelist road of development." Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 1.5th contended that the election results "caused outright irritation in the capitals of the Western imperialist countries" and charged--as it had done several times during the campaign--that the United States had "unceremoniously meddled" in India's internal affairs by extending substantial amounts of money to the reactionary parties for c~-Lrnpaign expenses. In early February Radio Peace and Progress in particular saw the visits to India of John Sherman Cooper, Chester Bowles, and General Westmoreland as intended to coincide with the Indian elections and designed to give support to the Indian "reactionaries." Radio Peace and Progress on 11 February, citing Indian press reports, charged U.S. "interference in the internal affairs" of India and contended that various U.S. organizations, particularly CIA, had spent "many a thousand dollars to hinder the successes of the representatives of the leftwing democratic forces at the elections." Approved For Release 1999/09/2vVNF6fkN'85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/0Cf3NIA RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 ' P'13I0 r[IRENDO :1.7 MAUCH 3.971 CAMPAIGN During the election campaign Soviet media had COMMENT sustained a low-profile approach but left no question as to where Moscow's Qentiments lay. Moscow publicized the CPI and ruling Congress party election manifestos, took periodic note of Mrs. Gandhi's electoral activities, and launched broadsides at the coalition of "rightwing" and "reactionary" forces. TABS on 21 January transmitted the CPI's election manifesto, stressing its slogans of "strengthening the unity and cooperation of the leftwing and progressive forces, defeating rightwing reaction, defending the country's national independence and pursuing a policy of peace, nonalinement, and social progress." On 24 January TASS publicized the Gandhi Congress party's election manifesto, noting that the ruling party sought to get "a new mandate from the people so as to eliminate the obstacles on the road to the country's economic and social development." The election campaign, according to Soviet commentators, was characterized as "a polarization of political forces and tense election campaigning." R. Aleksandrov, writing in NEW TIMES (No. 9, 26 February, Russian edition), saw the "real choice" for the Indian voter as one between "definite political platforms"--"between the progressive socioeconomic reforms in the interests of the masses to which the Indian National Congress leadership is committed and the aspirations of the monopolies, big capitalists, and landlords." Aleksandrov contended that the platform of the opposition Congress party and the other parties of the Right "can hardly win wide popular support." He cited the feeling of "a wide section of Indian opinion" that conditions are ripe "for the creation on a new basis of a united national democratic front . . . open to all democratic forces . . . ." Without mentioning the CPI/M by name, Aleksandrov.alluded to its position in arguing against the "bogus Left" view that there is no difference between the two Congress parties and that the CPI should be scorned for cooperating with Mrs. Gandhi. "This erroneous view," Aleksandrov declared, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 stems from a one-sided, sectarian approach to the national bourgeoisie, in particular its nonmonopoly sections, from failure to understand its specific nature and to see that it is undergoing a complex process of differentiation, of which the split in the Congress was a striking manifestation. The CPI, Aleksandrov concluded, is on the other hand anxious to "do everything possible to prevent the alliance of the Right from capitalizing on Left disunity" and prepared "to enter into election alliances wherever other democratic parties are ready to do likewise." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/097725vF:l166OP85T0087 PRC SATELLITE PP012-8 BELATED NCNA ANNOUNC I'1ENT HAILS LAUNCH IN STANDARD TEF 1S The PRC belatedly announced the 3 March launching of its second earth satellite in a 16 March NCNA dispatch, subsequently broad- cast widely by Radio Peking to domestic and foreign audiences. The dispatch is similar in phrasing to the 25 April 1970 press communique on the first satellite, launched on the 24th. Thus the feat is called a "result achieved by the Chinese people" under Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao and a result of the Chinese people's policy of reliance on their own efforts. But NCNA this time does not label the launch a victory for Mao's thought and the Cultural Revolution, as in the April 1970 press communique. The NCNA announcement sheds no direct light on the reasons for the delay in making the launch public. Some of the speculation in the Western press, however, may have been a factor: The notation in the first paragraph of the NCNA announcement--giving the weight and flight path--that the satellite sent back scientific data on various experiments between 3 and 15 March may have been calculated to counter speculation that the satellite was not functioning properly after the launch. The timing of the announcement suggests another possible factor: It may be more than coincidental that the NCNA dispatch, with its implications regarding PRC missile capability, was released the day after the opening of the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna. Peking has remained characteristically silent on the current SALT round, but the PRC is on record as branding SALT a "superpower scheme" directed against the peoples of the world. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : cOIA D AT00875R000. OQ. 12-8 17 MARCH 1971 SALT MOSCOW REPLEDGES SERIOUS EFFORT IN VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS Publicity for chief Soviet delegate Semenov's arrival statement in Vienna on 14 March highlighted Moscow's propaganda attention to the reopening, on the 15th, of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in the Austrian capital. As reported by TASS, Semenov said that the USSR has consistently sought effective measures in disarmament and the limitation of the arms race. The Soviet Government, he declared, has instructed the delega- tion to hold talks "in a constructive spirit, striving for positive results." In pro forma language, he observed that an acceptable agreement on strategic arms limitation would ease international tension and would benefit the peoples of the USSR, the United States, and other nations. Notably absent from Semenov's arrival remarks is any reference to the activities of "imperialist circles," a phrase he has used in statements at opening ceremonies of earlier sessions of SALT.* However, participants in the 14 March Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable--the sole available comment on the eve of the negotiations--warned of allegedly detrimental U.S. actions. The roundtable discussion sustained Moscow's criticism of Secretary Laird's 9 March defense posture state- ment, with one panelist asking rhetorically if "Washington really wants to create a suitable climate for the successful conduct" of the negotiations in Vienna. One of the panelists said that to all appearances the U.S. Government "has already begun preparing public opinion for the possible failure of these talks." He cited the U.S. press for the observation that in contrast to a year ago, when U.S. spokesmen "were falling over each other with statements that they put great * Semenov did not refer to "imperialist circles" in his state- ment at the opening of the talks in Helsinki on 17 November 1969. But at Vienna on 16 April 1970--on the heels of Moscow's then ongoing propaganda attack on U.S.. plans to move forward with the second phase of the Safeguard system and the announcement that MIRV deployment would begin in June--he warned of "aggressive imperialist circles" interested in stepping up the strategic arms race. And in Helsinki on 2 November 1970, he said that the arms race was being "fanned up by certain imperialist circles." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release I 999/O9t mCik-RDP85TOO87 t,9O1Q Q 4OO12-8 17 MARCH 1971 -34- hopes in the Vienna talks," these same officials "are full of pessimism and are instilling the thought in newsmen that nothing can be expected from the Vienna talks." Neither the roundtable show nor limited available reportage has dealt with the question of U.S. forward bases or the Soviet proposal for a limitation on ABM's as a separate, initial step--substantive issues broached in Soviet press articles in mid-February.* On the latter issue, the TASS account of President Nixon's 4 March press conference had omitted his observation, in response to a question about a possible separate agreement on ABM's, that such a suggestion has been made and "we respect that proposal." The ~_ccount did note that the President said the United States will be participat- ing in SALT "with a view to achieving agreement." Soviet media have said nothing so far about President Nixon's 15 March statement, including comment on the "realistic dialog" at SALT, which accompanied the annual report to Congress on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Budapest's MTI took note of it on the 16th, however, with the equivocal comment that the President's statement "about the 'encouraging and hopeful strategic arms limitation talks' is noteworthy at a time when the American leadership can hardly claim positive features in global policy." CZECHOSLOVAK While the Soviet press abstains from comment PRESS COWENT on issues connected with SALT, portions of an article by retired Maj. Gen. B.L. Teplinskiy that had appeared in the Soviet journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY in December are used almost verbatim--without attribution-- in a 4 March article in the Prague RUDE PRAVO criticizing an alleged gap between U.S. words and deeds with respect to strategic arms limitation. Teplinskiy's reference to U.S. press "allegations" about buildup of a Soviet antimissile system is included in the passages RUDE PRAVO lifts from his article. Thus RUDE PRAVO says Secretary Laird and the American press have sought to justify the enormous costs of strategic arms by "alleging, for example, that the Soviet Union 'is building up forces for a first strike' or * For a review of the February articles, in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, see the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 22-24. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 that the installation of MIRV's is allegedly in response to the creation of the Soviet missile defense system." Explicit references to a Soviet antimissile system, even passing and ostensibly second-hand ones such as this, have been rare in Moscow propaganda. Teplinskiy's is the only one since armed forces day 1970. Soviet press comment during the period between the last Helsinki round of SALT and the opening of the current round in Vienna is also echoed in the Bratislava SMENA on 12 March. In the vein of the IZVESTIYA dispatch of 7 February that had contained Moscow media's first direct criticism of Ambassador Smith, SMENA remarks on Smith's "curious" effort to convince Congress that the United States should not conclude a separate agreement on ABM's. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/q& LRDP85TOO Z15SR0003300040012-8 17 MARCH 1971 - 36 - GERMANY AND BERLIN GDR PUBLICIZES DETAILS OF PROPOSALS TO WEST BERLIN SENAT Details of proposals made to the West Berlin Senat at the first meeting between GDR State Secretary Kohrt and Senat Director Mueller on 6 March were made public by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 13th through the device of quoting the West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL. Publishing excerpts from a TAGESSPIEGEL article of the 12th, the East German paper added no comment of its own beyond the prefatory observation that "obviously, material concerning these talks was passed into the hands" of TAGESSPIEGEL's editorial office by "official quarters." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's excerpts include the West Berlin paper's appraisal of the GDR proposals as "a relatively generous offer." Publication of the excerpts was timed on the eve of the 14 March West Berlin elections. As outlined in the excerpts from TAGESSPIEGEL, the GDR proposals would allow West Berliners to visit "the GDR, including East Berlin," six times a year for two-day periods or once a year for 30 days, with the proviso that the Senat "would have to accept the most important GDR demands" as a prerequisite for such an arrangement. Mueller, according to the article, had to "reject negotiations on such a far-reaching arrangement," despite the fact that the GDR proposal "largely agrees with the ideas of Bonn," because the proposal went beyond the matter of holiday visits or "visits to East Berlin." Mueller, TAGESSPIEGEL pointed out, "is not authorized to negotiate an arrangement with a political content" until there is a "four-power agreement on a general Berlin settlement." In announcing the opening of the talks, East German media had obscured the fact that the Senat had agreed to talk only about Easter visits to East Berlin. GDR propaganda sought rather to convey the impression that the talks were opening on the lines of the original East German bid for broader negotiations on problems affecting GDR relations with West Berlin--to proceed in parallel with the four-power ambassadorial talks, with the understanding that whatever agreements they might reach would have to await four-power agreement before being implemented. Now taking note of the Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 - 37 - limitations on Mueller's mandate in the GDR-Senat talks, NEUES DEUTSCHLA.ND cites TAGESSPIEGEL's observation that Mueller "adopted the same position as the Federal Government in its talks with the GDR"--an allusion to the series of talks between East and West German State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND went on to cite the West Berlin paper's exposition of what the GDR considers "conditions" for its proposed arrangement on visits: "The Berlin Senat would have to act like the government of an independent state"; it would also--in contravention of the Western powers' position--"have to recognize the affiliation of East Berlin with the GDR"; and it "should assume the obligation to prevent political activities in West Berlin which have scandalized the GDR for a long time." The paper notes TAGESSPIEGEL's view of the last condition as referring to "the Federal presence on which the three Western powers are now conducting negotiat4.ins with the Soviet Union." There has been no discussion of the GDR proposals by East German media on their own authority. ADN and TASS both briefly reportr:d on the 12th that Mueller and Kohrt had held their second meeting that day and agreed to continue "negotiations on questions of mutual interest" in "the near future." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONI"'II)I N'I':LA1., 1"1I31U 1I'10INI)[3 1.7 MARCH .1971. - 38 - USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS MIXED TREATMENT OF BREZHNEV AT REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES At the 12 republican party congresses held in February and early March--returns on the Azerbaydzhan and Ukrainian congresses are not yet in--there was no general buildup for Brezhnev, little discussion of controversial issues, and few personnel changes. Brezhnev was accorded unusual attention only in Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Moldavia. The only personnel changes that appear possibly aimed at foes of Brezhnev involved the replacement of the second secretaries of Kazakhstan, Georgia., and Estonia. NO BANDWAGON The personal buildup for Brezhnev over recent FOR BREZHNEV mon?chs failed to develop into a bandwagon movement at the republican congresses. Although .ach congress elected an honorary presidium consisting of the Politburo, only in Kirgizia was it a matter of electing the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev. While Brezhnev's two- volume collection of speeches has been translated into the local languages of a number of republics, only Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan, Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev, and Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov mentioned the local translations. The first secretaries of most republics cited Brezhnev a few times in their reports but with little or no praise (Armenia, Belorussia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan), while Est the Estonian congress no reference was made to Brezhnev by anyone. In Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, and Moldavia, however, Brezhnev was clearly accorded a special role above and independent of the collective. (Spokesmen for these three republics were among those who lavishly praised Brezhnev at republican semicentennial celebrations last autumn.) Brezhnev protege Kunayev spoke of the Politburo "headed by the outstanding figure of the international Communist and workers movement comrade L. I. Brezhnev," and he declared that "all questions raised by the Kazakh Central Committee and government have found full support on the part of the CPSU Central Committee and comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally." He also stated that "we have direct orders" from Brezhnev to work out a wide program for using Kazakh water sources for agriculture (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Coll i1':LUl N';I'.IAL IPI3:L0 P!il NDS 17 MARCH :1.973. 25 February). Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev spoke of the "fatherly attention and concrete help" of -the Central Committee, the Politburo, and. Brezhnev "personally," and praised the publication of Brezhnev's two-volume collection of speeches as "an important event in the ideological life of the party" (SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, Ii March). Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul declared that the work of the Moldavian party organizations is guided by the directives of the CPSU Central Committee, "by the everyday help of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, and by the attention and valuable instructions of Central Committee General Secretary comrade L. I. Brezhnev" (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 26 February). On the other hand, Latvian First Secretary Voss, Lithuanian First Secretary Snechkus, and Belorussian First Secretary Masherov--who have rarely praised Brezhnev in the past-- stressed collectivity. Voss declared that the activities of the Central Committee and Politburo "show an unbending will to develop and strictly observe Leninist norms of party life and principles of leadership of political and economic activity. The scientific approach, collectivity and efficiency in conducting the internal and foreign policy of the Soviet state have become firmly consolidated in the work style of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee's Politburo and are warmly approved by Communists and all workers" (SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 26 February). Snechkus stressed the observance of collectivity in the Lithuanian Central Committee and Bureau and condemned local leaders who expand their authority and ignore opinions of others (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 4 March). Masherov declared that "the principle of collective leadership has been fully restored" (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 23 February). DISCUSSION MUTED Compared with the local congresses in 1966, there were very few indications of controversy during the latest series. The Stalin issue, raised in 1966 at the Belorussian, Moldavian, Azerbaydzhan, and Georgian congresses, was conspicuously avoided. While the 1966 Georgian, Belorussian and Tadzhik congresses had attacked shortcomings in literature and had focused criticism on specific dissident writers (Sinyavskiy, Daniel and Tarsis), Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS 'T'RENDB 17 MARCII 1.971 the current complaints about ideological errors were largely routine and unspecific. Solzhenitsyn was mentioned only once, by Moldavian writers union chairman P. P. Botsu, who applauded a LITERARY GAZETTE article for rebuffing "the apostate Solzhenitsyn, who was expelled from the writers union" (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 2 March). Botsu also criticized the recent works of Moldavian writer Ion Drutse-- the only other instance of a writer being singled out for attack. Only the three Baltic republic first secretaries concentrated on ideological errors in the press, literature and the theater. The issue of Zionism was raised only at the Turkmen and Lithuanian congresses. Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov condemned "the activization of international Zionism" and domestic "Zionistically inclined renegades" (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 20 February). Lithuanian First Secretary Snechkus assailed "international Zionism" and foreign attempts to portray those guilty of "treason" as heroes (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 4 March). The economic reform was praised by several first secretaries (Kebin, Mzhavanadze, Kunayev and Rashidov), while Estonian Premier Klauson defended the reform in rather unusual terms. Noting that "recently many criticisms of certain shortcomings in economic reform have been expressed," he declared that "any criticism not backed by practical recommendations and practical measures can bring harm instead of good, since it discourages people. Therefore we expect from scientists and economists the most active assistance in improving some features of the reform" (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 20 February). Creation of production associations was endorsed by Kebin, Masherov, Voss, Snechkus, and Rashidov. The use of unregulated mechanized links in agriculture was endorsed by Belorussian First Secretary Masherov and Grodno First Secretary Mikulovich at the Belorussian congress. PERSONNEL CHANGES Apart from the replacement of Podgornyy's protege V. N. Titov as Kazakh second secretary (see FBIS TRENDS for 24 February), the most note- worthy personnel change occurred in Georgia, with second secretary P. A. Rodionov being replaced by Krasnodar second secretary A. N. Churkin. The 57-year old Rodionov--the most Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 - 41 - prolific writer of r.rticles favoring collective leadership-- was demoted to the post of deputy director of the Marxism- Leninism Institute Ln Moscow (so identified at ceremonial meetings reported by TASS on 4 March and RABOCHAYA GAZETA on 11 March). Minor shifts occurred in Belorussia, Moldavia, Kirgizia and Uzbekistan. Belorussian ideology secretary S. A. Pilotovich, one of the few officials to attack Solzhenitsyn publicly (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 18 November), was replaced by Belorussian agitprop chief A. T. Kuzmin at the Belorussian congress and appointed ambassador to Poland (PRAVDA, 11 March). Moldavian ideology secretary D. S. Kornovan was replaced by Moldavian Komsomol first secretary P. K. Luchinskiy. The Kirgiz second secretary, A. P. Chubarev, was replaced by Chita second secretary N. N. Tartyshev, and Kirgiz agriculture secretary A. D. Duysheyev was demoted to first secretary of the new Issyk-Kul oblast and replaced by P. I. Naumov. The only personnel change linked directly to shortcomings was the replacement of Uzbek Premier R. K. Kurbanov prior to the Uzbek congress. Kurbanov was apparently the scapegoat for the lag in industrial growth noted in First Secretary Rashidov's congress report. According to IZVESTIYA's 5 March account of the Uzbek congress, the delegates approved "timely measures to strengthen the leadership of the republic Council of Ministers" (but this actt5n was nowhere reported in the Uzbek press coverage of the congress). Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 -42- PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS PARTY C(Wr1ITTEES ARE ANNOUNCED FOR HONAN AND TSINGHAI One of the nation's most populous provinces, Honan, and one of its most thinly settled, Tsinghai, have established their provincial party committee in recent days. Of the PRC's 29 provincial-level subdivisions, 13 have now set up their party committees, covering approximately half the nation's population. HONAN Formation of Honan's party committee was proclaimed COMMITTEE by NCNA on 11 March, 8 days following a sweeping claim by Chengchow radio that county and municipal party units throughout the province had been rebuilt. The new committee was elected by 1,300 party delegates gathered in Chengchow from 2 to 8 March. The congress, adhering to the familiar formula of "a three-in-one combination of old, middle- aged, and young," selected 82 full and 19 alternate members to form the Honan committee. A five-man leadership group made up of four men of primarily civilian back3round and one military commander head the new committee. Liu Chien-hsun, chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, first political commissar of the Honan Military District (MD) and deputy political commissar of the Wuhan Military Region (MR), was named first secretary. Liu was also first secretary on the old Honan party committee, 1962-67. Along with Kwangsi's party leader, Wei Kuo-ching, he has thus managed to maintain his pre-cultural revolution position as first secretary of the provincial party structure.* In his speech to the congress, Liu called for overcoming arrogance and complacency in order to strengthen the centralized leadership of the party. Strengthening ties to his provincial bailiwick, alternate Politburo member Chi Teng-kuei also spoke to the congress and was named a secretary. Chi, an alternate secretary on the * Pan Fu-sheng, in Heilungkiang, is the only other former first secretary (1966) who became chairman of his province's revolutionary committee and who will thereby, if the present pattern holds, become first secretary in Heilungkiang. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 -43- previous party committee, is also a vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Wang Hsin, vice chairman and second political commissar of the Honan MD; Keng Chi-chang, a vice chairman and former chairman of a special district revolutionary committee within Honan; and Chang Shu-chih, commander of the Honan MD, were also named secretaries. TSINGHAI Tsinghai's new committee consists of 45 full COMMITTEE and 10 alternate members elected during a party congress held in Sining from 6 to 11 March. In its 13 March announcement, NCNA again specifically noted adherence to the formula of old, middle-aged, and young in selecting the new committee. Making a surprise public appearance in Tsinghai--the first since his March 1968 transfer to the administrative unit of the Military Affairs Commission in Peking--Liu Hsien-chuan emerged as first secretary of the new committee. Prior to hid move to the central military apparatus in Peking, Liu was chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, a position he never officially gave up, and also commander of the Tsinghai MD. He is also a deputy commander of the Lanchow MR. Liu made the usual speech to the congress on behalf of the party nucleus group. Presumably, because of his central military duties in Peking, Liu will continue to delegate considerable authority to first vice chairman Chang Chiang-lin, named second secretary on the new committee. (Except for Shanghai and Liaoning, none of. the other new provincial-level party committees has designated the position of second secretary.) Since Liu's departure from Tsinghai, Chang has functioned as the unofficial acting chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and was identified as commander of the Tsinghai MD--a position Liu held before his transfer to Peking. Sung Chang-keng, political commissar of the Tsinghai MD, was named secretary. Hsueh Hung-fa, a vice chairman and a former alternate secretary on the old party committee; Lu Chih-an, listened only as a responsible person within the province during local National Day celebra- tions last October; and Ta Lo, a provincial vice chairman and chairman of a local college revolutionary committee, were named deputy secretaries. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/0%,/gk,,iIDP85T008T,~f0(p%040012-8 17 MARCH 197]. -44- PROGRESS Judging by recent radio reports, Kirin appears to ELSEWHERE be making significant progress rebuilding its party apparatus. The provincial radio on 13 March announced a new committee for Changchun, the provincial capital. And on 14 March Changchun radio claimed a new committee for Peicheng special district, the second special district committee reported in Kirin. Amid the quickened pace of the party building campaign, a 13 March SINKIANG DAILY editorial cautioned that rebuilding the party should not be thought of as a mechanical process. It revealed that some units "are now carrying out the work of party building in haste and perfunctorily, thus ignoring the quality of the work." Complaining that some party units have turned "party building into a mere formality," the editorial strongly argued for improving the quality of party consolidation. "The leadership at a higher level," the editorial declared, should mobilize the masses "to recheck" the party consolidation work in those units which have completed their rectification. Where work is not up to standard, the units must either improve it "or carry out the work again." MODERATE ECONOMIC POLICIES STRESSED FOR SPRING PLANTING Propaganda in preparation for the spring planting season is prescribing economic policies that allow for individual initiative within controlled limits. It is not just a matter of propagandists saying that private plots and sideline occupations are allowed, as was done through most of the cultural revolution; there is now more propaganda stress on the necessity for such phenomena at this stage of development. A Shantung broadcast on 5 March tells of a production brigade in which some members "put forward a demand that private plots be collectivized." Thinking that this represented the mass will, brigade cadres agreed to the demand. The commune party committee investigated the situation, blamed the basic-level cadres for lack of understanding and failure to educate the masses properly, and conducted an education campaign which "guaranteed the implementation of the various policies of the party." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 17 MARCH 1971 - 15 - A similar lack of tolerance for leftist experimentation with economics was evident in earlier broadcasts such as a 6 January Shanghai report on a production brigade that had achieved a good all-round harvest, but in which some teams had done better than others. Some team leaders wished to raise the basis for year-end distribution to the brigade level, but the brigade party committee ran study courses on the problem to convince them that distribution should proceed "in accordance with the actual production conditions and with relevant party policy." During 1968 there was experimentation with the size of distribution units, especially in Kiangsi, but results appear to have been unsatisfactory. Thus the indications that the PRC has achieved grain surpluses--as in Edgar Snow's reports on his recent interview with Chou En-lai--are not being followed by any propaganda signs that Mao will adhere to his past practice of stepping up social and economic experimentation whenever such surpluses become available. There is, however, another kind of propaganda indicator that currently. suggests the grain situation may Ladeed be quite satisfactory (although it may also imply a recognition on the part of the leadership that excessive concentration on grain last year caused economic losses). Propagandists are placing a new emphasis on agricultural crops and activities other than grain. For example, a Shansi broadcast on 26 February took issue with the view that if a unit has not achieved its grain quota "no time should be allotted for afforestation." NCNA on 7 March sounded a similar theme, noting that for a time in an area in Shantung there was "competition for land, fertilizers, and manpower" between peasants who produced cotton and those who grew grain. Some brigades "used their good land for growing grain," and both the quantity and quality of cotton land declined. The article denounced this tendency as well as the opposite tendency of stressing cotton at the expense of grain. An investigation report of a Kansu county broadcast by Peking radio on 12 March and seconded by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editor's note of the same day sounded the keynote to the current line with the injunction, "Develop a diversified economy." The Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS 17 MARC!! 1971 - 46 - peasants are to be encouraged to this goal not only by Tachai-type study of Mao, but also in order that they may "increase the collective wealth and individual incomes." The editor's note stresses the need to "eliminate the metaphysical viewpoint of isolating grain production or setting it against agricultural production, animal husbandry, and sideline occupations." The new emphasis evident this year on crops other than grain is especially obvious because of the singlemindedness with which PRC media have pushed grain production over the past few years. The current trend toward diversification lends some credence to Chou En-lai's statement to Edgar Snow that China now has 40 million tons of grain in state reserves, although this figure and Chou's estimate of a 240-million- ton yield in 1970 may be somewhat inflated. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040012-8