TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 17, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Il~~~~~lllllllllllliiiiiiii~ll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~Illllllliumiuiiiilllllll~~
TRENDS
Confidential
/7
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
17 MARCH 1771
(VOL. xxll, NO. '11,
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination v'ith other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Included Irene oulemelle
dew.Oredlnp end
desleulRwden
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 MARCH 1971
CO IJTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Fall of Bases Near Tchepone Prompts Claim of ARVN Rout in Laos .
1
Communists Tally Allied Losses, Praise "Lao Insurgent Strategy".
3
Peking Sees "Unprecedentedly Fine" Situation in Indochina . . .
5
Moscow Stresses Its Aid, Close Relations With North Vietnam . .
10
Communists at Paris Session Routinely Score U.S. "Escalation" .
11
Pathet Lao, DRV Protest Action in Laos, President's Remarks . .
13
Manila Conference of ASEAN Said to Serve Nixon Doctrine . . . .
14
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes at North .
14
DRV Announces Regular People's Council Electidns''iri,April : .
15
Radio of Cambodian FUNK and RGNU Increases Broadcast Time" . . .
16
Belated Publicity for "Late 1970" RGNU Conference in Cambodia .
16
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Calls U.S. Policy Ambiguous, Doubts Pressure on Israel . .
19
TURKEY
Moscow Reports Government Resignation, Gives No Background . . .
24
NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang Denounces Overflights of U.S. Reconnaissance Plane . .
25
INDIAN ELECTIONS
Moscow Hails Victory of "Progressive Democratic Forces" . . . .
27
PRC SATELLITE
Belated NCNA Announcement Hails Launch in Standard Terms . . . .
32
SALT
Moscow Repledges Serious Effort in Vienna Negotiations . . . . .
33
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR Publicizes Details of Proposals to West Berlin Senat . . . .
36
(Continued.)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 MARCH 1971
CONTENTS (Continued)
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Mixed Treatment of Brezhnev at Republic Party Congresses . . . . .
38
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Party CommitteesA?e Announced for Honan and Tsinghai . . . . . . .
42
Moderate Economic Policies Stressed for Spring Planting . . . . .
44
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
17 MARCH 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 8 - 14 MARCH 1971
Moscow (3624 items)
Peking (2873 items)
CPSU 24th Congress
(18%)
23%
Indochina
(37%)
66%
Indochina
(10%)
11%
[Chou En-tai in DRV
(--)
48%]
International
(7%)
10%
[DRV National
(--)
3%a
Women's Day
China
(4%)
5%
Assembly Session
[PRC Fishing Boats
(1%)
2%J
Middle East
(6%)
5%
Strafed
Ulbricht in USSR
(--)
2%
PRC Domestic Issues
(33%)
23%
Luna 17 & Lunakhod
(0.2%)
2%
President Nixon's
(7%)
3%
Paris Commune Centenary
(0.3%)
2%
State of World Report
Angela Davis Case'
(1%)
2%
In3ian Elections
(0.4%)
1%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of e::tensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
iii other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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17 MARCH 1971
INDOCHINA
Laotian and Vietnamese communist media continue to ridicule
reports that South Vietnamese forces entered the Laotian cross-
roads town of Tchepone, and the ARVN abandonment of positions
near Tchepone on the 12th and 16th is followed by claims that
the South Vietnamese have been routed and by calls for assaults
on other allied positions. The tactical and strategic leader-
ship of the Laotian "liberation army" is praised, and
"victories" against allied forces in the operation along
Highway 9 are said to have further undercut the Vietnamization
program.
While Peking had followed up the PRC delegation's 5-8 March:
visit to }anoi with an editorial on the 11th repeating some of
the stronger language used during the visit, it currently projects
a confident stance and has drawn back from statements during the
visit which portrayed a threat to China as well as the DRV. Chou
En-lai, speaking at a DRV embassy banquet honoring the visit
on the 16th, buoyantly pictured an "unprecedentedly fire" situation
in Indochina, taking particular note of the fighting in northern
South Vietnam and southern Laos.
Moscow propaganda in the wake of Chou's visit to Hanoi--mentioned
only in a one-sentence TASS report on the 9th--has sought to call
attention to close Soviet-DRV relations. Thus, in timing which
seems transparently calculated, Soviet media from 10 to 12 March
publicized a Pham Van Dong interview granted to Moscow television
and radio correspondents in connection with the forthcoming
25th CPSU Congress. Lauding Soviet aid, Dong recalled that the
Soviet Government had recently 1.ss:zed a statement reaffirming
its resolve to give the DRV and the "patriots of Indochina" all
necessary aid. At the same time, Moscow continues to attack the
Chinese in routine broadcasts in Mandarin.
DRV followup comment on the Chinese delegation's visit uses
language from the joint communique to characterize the "militant
solidarity" between the two countries. Hanoi also quotes liberally
from the foreign press in describing Chinese statements as "stern
warnings" to the Nixon Administrai,ion. There is a marked decline
in current propaganda attention to U.S. "threats of new military
adventures" against the DRV, although the deputy communist delega-
tion heads at the Paris session on the 11th had again called
attention to these "threats."
FALL OF BASES NEAR TCHEPONE PROMPTS CLAIM OF ARVN ROUT IN LAOS
Propaganda in the wake of communist seizure of ARV' positions near
Tchepone claims that South Vietnamese forces are in ret-eat and
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Im
cells for relentless attacks on remaining South Vietnamese
positions. The first communist claim of a major victory in
the area came on 13 March when Laotian and Vietnamese communist
media reported that in the wake of an attack on the 12th, the
"patriotic forces" seized Hill 748, a position of the 2d Regiment
of the ARVN 1st Division. The propaganda said only that Hill 748
is situated west of Ban Dong, thus leaving it unclear whether
the position in question was Fire Base Sophia, three miles
southeast of Tchepone, which had been abandoned on the 12th
by South Vietnamese troops of the 1st Division.
According to-the Pathet Lao news agency, "large numbers" of allied
troops were put out of action and 10 helicopters were downed
during the assault on Hill 748. The news agency also claimed
that the communists captured 10 artillery pieces, many radio
transmitters, and a large quantity of other war supplies. It
said that "many defenders gave themselves up" and that "Lao
patriotic forces are now in full control of the peak and are
pursuing the remnants" of the allied force.
The communist seizure of Hill 723--presumably Firebase Lolo*--on
16 March was reported by communist media that day. A Pathet Lao
news agency report said the capture of the hill came as the
climax of a siege which began on the 12th when "patriotic forces"
moved in from nearby Hill 748, which they had just overrun. The
attackers "annihilated" one battalion, the report said, and
"cut to smithereens" three other battalions of the 1st Regiment,
ARVN 1st Division. Allied casualties, according to the report,
totalled "several hundreds"; it added that "searches for enemy
remnants in the jungles around are continuing."
Along with reports of the "victory" on Hill 723 on the morning
of the 16th, communist media carried an "order of mobilization"
from the "Laotian People's Liberation Armed Forces command on
the southern Laotian front, Tchepone"--dated 1200 hours,
16 March--declaring that the allied operation in southern Laos
"has been doomed" and that the troops are "seeking to flee."
The order calls upon the "liberation" forces to surround the
enemy an'i stop his flight, to block air and ground routes, and
* Hill 723 has been described variously by the communists as
being 10 kilometers southwest of Ban Dong and nearly 10 kilo-
meters from Tchepone. Firebase :Lolo was located nine miles
southeast of Tchepone.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 MARCH 1971
uo prevent enemy troops from fleeing into the jungle. It
directs them to "relentlessly attack," "completely annihilate
the enemy," and "control the battlefield."
Praising the seizure of Hill 723, a NHAN DAN article on the
17th ridicules reports that the South Vietnamese are moving
into the final phase of their operation and will withdraw,
stating that this "is but a pretext to beat a retreat." The
army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the same day calls the allies'
situation in southern Laos "extremely perilous," with their
battle position "confused," their "already weakened forces
split," and their morale declining. It suggests that the
communist forces are "seizing the favorable opportunity" to
launch an all-out offensive, and it gives prominence to the
role of armored units in this action. reviewing the roles of
various units, the commentary leads off with the assertion that
the young, stalwart, brave, bold, and wise
combatants of armored units are rushing forward
to smash all the enemy's troop dispositions, to
break his combat position, to crush all artillery
emplacements and obstacles, and Lo cooperate with
the infantry combatants in quickly annihilating
the enemy troops.
COMMUNISTS TALLY ALLIED LOSSES. PRAISE"LAO INSURGENT STRATEGY"
Communist statistics on "victories" in southern Laos were updated
in a 14 March communique of the Lao "liberation army" command,
broadcast by Pathet Lao media and summarized by VNA on the 15th.
The communique declares that since the start of the allied
operation in Laos more than 7,200 U.S. and South Vietnamese
troops have been killed or wounded and nearly 300 taken prisoner.
Earlier official communist tallies had not specified numbers of
prisoners taken, lumping them with total casualty figures. For
example, the 7 March NLHS Central Committee statement had set
allied troop losses in southe-:r. Laos at over 6,000, including
those taken prisoner.*
The 14 March communique also cites figures on the number of
South Vietnamese units put out of action in southern Laos,
* See the TRENDS of 10 March, page 8.
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claiming that eight battalions and 20 companies were "wiped out."
According to the communique, they also downed or destroyed on the
ground nearly 350 aircraft, mostly helicopters; wrecked more than
210 military vehicles; and captured "dozens" of tanks and armored
cars, 40 cannon, more than 1,000 rifles and machineguns, a
quantity of other war equipment, and many "important papers of
the enemy."
Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 16th published the Lao
army command communique along with editorial comment. The NHAN
DAN editorial says the "victories" in Laos "prove that the supreme
command of the Lao People's Liberation Army has a correct line,
sound judgment about the enemy's plots and tricks, and efficacious
tactical and. strategic leadership."
Alleged allied losses along Highway 9 in Quang Tri are updated in
a 16 March communique of the Khe Sanh front PLAF command. The
communique says that after 45 days of fighting, the PLAF "put out
of action" more than 3,000 allied troops, including 2,000 Americans.
Like the communique on the action in Laos, it departs from past
practice in specifying that more than 100 allied troops were taken
prisoner. This raiees the number of alleged allied losses from
the total of over 2,000, including more than 1,000 Americans, which
was claimed by the communists on the 4th. The communique also says
the communist forces have shot down or destroyed nearly 100 air-
craft and captured "a number of pilots," wrecked 350 military
vehicles, including more than 100 tanks and armored vehicles, sunk
23 cargo ships, and burned down 20 logistic depots.
The PLAF communique is published in the Hanoi press on the 17th
and is commented on in the NHAN DAN editorial, which also praises
the 15 March shellings of allied bases at Khe Sanh and Lao Bao.
The shellings, according to the editorial, were "effective and
timely coordination with the glorious attack launched against the
enemy on Hill 723 by the Laotian" forces.
Earlier reports on allied losses in Quang Tri and southern Laos drew
comment in a 12 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which VNA identified
as a "signed frontpage commentary." The army paper claimed that
allied losses amount to one-fourth of the battalion-sized units,
half of the helicopters, and half of the tanks and armored vehicles
involved in the Laos operation. It concluded that "by annihilating
part of the strategic reserve forces of the Saigon puppets which as
yet must still rely on the U.S. armed forces, the fighters on Highway
9 have dashed Nixon's fondest hope--to withdraw a part of the
American troops while both maintaining a military superiority and
helping the Saigon army to stand by itself."
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17 MARCH 1971
PEKING SEES "UNPRECEDENTEDLY FINE" SITUATION IN INDOCHINA
After following up the PRC delegation's 5-8 March visit to
Hanoi with an editorial on the llth repeating some of the
stronger language used during the visit and issuing a warning
to the Nixon Administration, Peking has evinced marked
confidence with respect to the situation in Indochina while
drawing back from the portrayal of threat to the DRV as well
as to China that characterized statements during the visit.
Chou En-lai on the 16th, speaking at a DRV embassy banquet
honoring the visit, buoyantly described an "unprecedentedly
fine" situation in IndochinL, particularly taking note of
the fighting in northern South Vietnam and southern Laos.
According to Chou, the communists have "frustrated the
schemes"--left unspecified--of the allies in the Laos
operation and have won "inspiring brilliant victories."
Chou repeated the assertion in the PRC-DRV Joint communique.
that the two sides reached complete agreement on how to deal
with U.S. "military adventures" in Indochina. He vaguely
warned the United States that it will suffer an "even more
ignominious defeat" if, in disregard of "the stern warnings"
of the Chinese and Vietnamese, the Nixon Administration should
"cling to its reckless course" in Indochina. But Chou's
remarks were notably devoid of any effort to portray a threat
to the security of the DRV or of China, and he failed to
repeat the Chinese pledge to support the Vietnamese even to
the extent of "the greatest national sacrifices" in case of
further escalation endangering North Vietnam.
Consistent with Hanoi's effort to associate the Chinese with
its vital interests, the DRV ambassador took the occasion to
cite the Chinese pledge involving national sacrifices while
effusively hailing Chou's "very successful visit" as "a
political event of tremendous significance" in the relations
between the two countries. Expressing a more somber mood
than Chou, he .said the visit took place at a time of "extremely
grave" military escalation when the enemy was plotting "new
military adventures" against the DRV. But like Chou, he
trumpeted the "very great victories" won on the three
Indochina battlefields, particularly on Highway 9 and in
southern Laos.
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PEOPLE'S DAILY In the only authoritative Chinese comment
EDITORIAL on the visit before Chou's speech on the
16th, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 11 March
repeated the pledge of Chinese national sacrifices in behalf
of the Vietnamese. NCNA's transmission of the editorial in
its international service in English added to the Chinese
pledge a direct warning to the Nixon Administration--not
included in the version carried in NCNA's domestic service--
to be "careful about your own necks if you should act
recklessly."
But while indulging in this tough language to underscore the
significance of the Chou visit, the editorial was also notable
for the absence of any reference to China's security. PEOPLE'S
DAILY mentioned the Laos operation, noted also that President
Nixon has "openly threatened" North Vietnam with increased
air action, and said that with U.S. support the ARVN.is seeking
a chance to invade the DRV. It was in connection with
military activities end thre...ts regarded as menacing by
Hanoi that the Chinese, during Chou's visit, linked the
PRC's security with that of the DRV for the first time in
recent years. The joint communique said current military-
activity "directly menaces the security of the DRV and at.
the same time the security of the PRC,.thus creating a
situation dangerous to peace in Asia and the world." A
security linkage was also formulated by Chiu Hui-tso, a
Politburo member and PLA deputy chief of staff, who
spoke to a DRV air defense unit on the 7th. After noting
that China and Vietnam are neighbors and their peoples
and armies close brothers and comrades-in-arms, Chiu
declared that U.S. "encroachment upon the Vietnamese
people" is "also a threat to China."
Peking's willingness to make this linkage during the visit,
followed by its pullback from the security issue afterwards,
suggests that one purpose of Chou's visit was to offer
reassurance to the North Vietnamese but that Peking
remains reticent about associating its security interests
with Hanoi's and prefers to express confidence in its
allies' ability to cope with the situation.
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MAO INSTRUCTION The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 11th
repeated an "instruction" of Mao that Chou
introduced in his 6 March Hanoi rally speech--the same speech
in which the Chinese first mentioned national sacrifices in
support of the Vietnamese. The instruction reads: "If anyone
among us should say that we cannot help the Vietnamese people
in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national
salvation, that means muiiny, that means betrayal of the
revolution."* This strong language, viewed in the context of
Chou's surprise trip and the talk about national sacrifices,
suggests that the PRC delegation's visit and its presumed
mandate for contingency planning may have been the subject
of debate in Peking over the degree to which the Chinese would
be prepared to move from their markedly cautious, noninter-
ventionist stance since the mid-1960's.
Peking may have in7oked the Mao instruction in order to dramatize
its commitment to Hanoi, but the wording of the instruction in
a discussion of China's internationalist duty--with an implica-
tion of reluctance on the part of some Chinese--would seem better
calculated to cut the ground from beneath recalcitrant elements
than to impress Hanoi or the enemy. PEOPLE'S DAILY prefaced the
instruction with an assertion that proletarian: internationalism
is the supreme duty and that the Chinese have an obligation to
support revolutionary struggles. However, in expressing this
support the Chinese have not on their own authority reverted to
discarded formulations used in the mid-1960's when Peking
debated over the proper posture to assume on Vietnam and how to
respond to appeals for communist unity in the face of rising
hostilities in Vietnam.
Mao's instruction on support for the Vietnam revolution is not
quoted in a major Peking joint editorial appearing on 17 March
to mark the centenary of the Paris Commune. The editorial,
issued jointly by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY
DAILY, discourses on China's role in world revolution today.
Declaring that the Chinese revolution is part of the world
revolution, it says the Chinese always regard the revolutionary
struggles of other peoples as their own and fulfill their duty
)f supporting these struggles. In this discussion the editorial
quotes Mao as saying victory of socialism in one country involves
the victory of the world revolution.
* NCNA's English version softened the instruction somewhat to
read " . . . that means betrayal, betrayal of the revolution."
? CONFIDENTIAL
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FOREIGN CONN1EN'F ML:h of Peking's propaganda following Chou's
visit has consisted of replays of foreign--
including Indochinese--comment, some of which takes a stronger
stand than that expressed in Peking's direct comment. The
issue of possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Indochina,
rarely broached in PRC media since a flurry of references in
early February, was resurrected in an NCNA dispatch on the
16th. NCNA quoted a pro-Peking Brazilian communist journal
as referring to "the U.S. clamor to use atom bombs" in the
conflict.
Another foreign comment, attributed to a Baghdad paper in an
NCNA dispatch dated the ly4,ti, ?z!nt distinctly further than
the Chinese had done during Chou's visit in linking Chinese
and North Vietnamese security and in suggesting a parallel
between Indochina and the Korean War. NCNA quoted the Baghdad
commentary as saying a "new attempt of military adventure" by
the United States against North Vietnam would be "a direct
aggression not only against the DRV but also against China."
Recalling the lessons of Korea, the commentary was quoted as
warning that "any similar venture" would meet with a "far
more disastrous" fate.*
In 1965, when the Chinese expressed concern that the Vietnam
conflict might escalate into another Korea-type war, PRC
statements de ..:red that aggression against the DRV "means
aggression against China" and warned that the war might spread
to China. At that time Peking publicly offered to send
volunteers to fight alongside the Vietnamese, but this
approach, with its more interventionist overtones, was
abandoned in favor of an emphasis on self-reliant protracted
warfare. As late as 22 July 1966, however, Liu Shao-chi
issued a personal statement (unique for any leader other than
Mao) saying aggression against Vietnam is aggression against
China and threatening "Joint blows" by the Vietnamese and the
Chinese. As for China's duty to world revolution, Liu
declared that proletarian internationalism was the supreme
principle governing China's foreign policy and that the
Chinese had an obligation to support the Vietnamese and other
revolutionary struggles.
* Earlier indirect comment carried by Peking suggesting an
analogy between Korea and Indochina. is discussed in the TRENDS
of 24 February 1971, pages 11-14.
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ROLE OF USSR In the only anti-Soviet reference during the
PRC delegation's visit, Chou in his major
speech on the Gtr briefly played Peking's theme of opposition
to the superpowers by "medium-sized and small countries." He
did not, however, mention the Soviets directly, and he made
no allusion to the Sino-Soviet dispute over support.for
Vietnam. A reference to the Litter did appear after the
visit in an NCNA dispatch from Tirana on the 14th quoting
an Albanian editorial on the visit. According to the
dispatch, the editorial claimed that U.S. political maneuvers
on Indochina still find "the active support of the Moscow
revisionists." But NCNA omitted the most trenchant anti-
Soviet thrusts in the Albanian editorial, which charged that
the "Kremlin chieftains" are furthering. their "counter-
revolutionary collusion with the murderers of the Vietnamese
people" and are practicing "friendship with words and
treachery with deeds to the just struggle of the peoples
of Indochina."
Thus, Peking managed to use enough of the Albanian editorial
to express misgivings over Moscow's role in.a political
settlement without seriously breaching.ito careful restraint
in the past year regarding Vietnam as a subject of Sino-
Soviet rivalry. This restraint was also shown in the
17 March joint editorial, which denounced the Soviet
leadership for betraying the revolutionary principles of
the Paris Commune but avoided attacking Moscow for
betraying the Vietnamese revolution.
Hanoi has used the occasioni of Chou's visit to r%iterate its
long-standing emphasis on international communist unity, an
emphasis which was given new force after Ho Chi Minh's death
and which has undoubtedly had a moderating influence on the
Sino-Soviet conflict since that time. Pharr Van Dong in his
speech on 6 March took the opportunity to express gratitude
to the Soviets for their support; and in his speech on the
7th, warning the United States against an invasion of the
DRV, he declared that the Vietnamese have the "powerful
backing" of the Chinese and "the militant solidarity of
the entire socialist camp." The latter formulation was
used by the DRV ambassador at his banquet for Chou on the
16th, though on that occasion Chinese but not Soviet aid
was singled out for praise.
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In another formulation expressing Hanoi's line on communist
unity, Dong on the 6th referred to the DRV as "the outpost
of the socialist camp in Southeast Asia." Characteristically
eschewing a reference to "the socialist camp," a notion that
fell out of favor in Peking following the policy decisions
made in 1965, Chou in his speech on the 6th described the DRV
as standing at "the southeastern outpost in Asia."
MOSCOW STRESSES ITS AID, CLOSE RELATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM
In the wake of Chou En-tai's visit to the DRV--mentioned only
in a one-sentence TASS report on 9 March--Moscow has taken
pains to stress the close ties between the DRV and the USSR.
Thus, in timing which seems transparently calculated to serve
this end, Soviet media from 10 to 12 March publicized a Pham
Van Dong interview with television and radio correspondents,
described as being occasioned by the forthcoming 25th CPSU
Congress. In the interview, widely broadcast by Radio Moscow
and published in PRAVDA on the 11th, Dong routinely praised
the Octobe%' Revolution and the CPSU as inspiration for the
Vietnamese revolution and went on to hail Soviet support..
He noted that during the resistance against the French and
now in the struggle against American "aggression," the
Vietnamese people have enjoyed the "enor.mous valuable support
and aid" of the USSR. He called attention to the Soviet
Government statement--of 25 February--as having confirmed
Moscow's resolve to give all necessary aid to the DRV and
the "patriots of Indochina."
Coincidentally with the publicity for the interview, Moscow
broadcasts in Mandarin on the 10th and 12th pointedly quoted
the passage in the Soviet Government statement which referred
to the DRV's membership in the "socialist family.'.' Neither
of these commentaries included the charge, present in other
Soviet comment, that Peking has consistently blocked "joint
action" of the socialist countries in support of Vietnam.
This charge did appear, for example, in a broadcast in
Mandarin on the 11th which claimed that the United States
felt free to step up aggression in Indochina "near the
Chinese border" because of Peking's refusal to cooperate with
the USSR and other socialist countries, and also because of the
PLA's weakness in the aftermath of the cultural revolution.
China was not mentioned explicitly in a foreign-language
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commentary by Shakhov on the 11th, pegged to Pham Van Dong's
interview, which did, however, pointedly recall that the
Moscow conference of communist and worker's parties in June
.1969 had called for socialist united action in support of
Vietnam.
Pham Van Dong's expressions of appreciation for Soviet aid were
cited in a 13 March Aleksey Leontyev commentary ridiculing
President Nixon's statement to the New York TIMES' Sulzberger
that the Indochina war is in its final stages. Leontyev called
this "boundless hypocrisy," but said it is possible that there
may be people innocent enough to believe that the war is
"diminishing precisely at a time when its flames are being
fed" by the United States. He said that "the aggressors have
learned nothing," although they should have realized that the
Vietnam problem "cannot be solved by force of arms." He went
on to quote the Soviet Government's pledge of continued
necessary support and Pham Van Dong's assertion in his interview
that the Soviet determination to help is "a powerful source of
inspiration" to the Vietnamese people, resolved to persist in
the struggle.
W11UNISTS AT PARIS SESSION ROUTINELY SCORE U,S1 "ESCALATION"
The VNA and LPA accounts of the 106th session of the Paris talks
on 11 March suggest that both DRV chief delegate Xuan Thuy and
the PRG's Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh refused to attend the session in
protest against the Nixon Administration's "escalation" of the
war in Indochina and its "threats and war preparations" against
the DRV. Mme. Binh in fact left for a "friendship visit" to
Romania o.i the llth.*
Both the communist delegates scored the President's 1$ March
press conference. PRG deputy delegation head Nguyen Van Tien
also claimed that the President, both in his 25 February
foreign policy report and at the press conference, had "offered
nothing new but simply repeated his pleas" for Vietnamization
and the "U.S.-puppets' armed incursions into Cambodia and Laos."
DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy similarly charged, according to VNA,
that the President "was obliged" to hold the press conference
"to give further justification" of his Indochina policy. Vy
* LPA carried a joint communique on the visit on the 17th.
CONFIDENTIAL
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added that the press conference further showed that the
Administration "talks peace but actually makes war; it speaks
about negotiations but actually seeks a military victory."
VNA ignores Vy's charge that the President acknowledged that
"despite the pullout of U.S. forces, the war would go. on in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."' Vy cited AP as saying that
"for the first time Mr. Nixon explicitly admitted that has
objective was not to restore peace in Indochina."
Both delegates paid some attention to U.S. "threats" against
the North. VNA omits much of the detail of Tien's statement,
but it notes his charge that %Mthough the Nixon Administration
tried by ambiguous allegations to appease public opinion, it
is more and more obvious that the United States is feverishly
preparing new military adventures against the DRV."
VNA notes that Vy "denounced" U.S. bombings and strafings in
Quang Binh and Vinh Linh--he cited last week's foreign
ministry spokesman's protest--and "laid bare President Nixon's
scheme of leaving the door open for Saigon puppet troops
to invade North Vietnam with U.S. support, including the use
of U.S. ground forces under the pretext of 'rescuing pilots
and prisoners of war."'
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PATHET LAO, DRV PROTEST ACTION IN LAOS. PRESIDENT'S REMARKS
The NLHS Central Committee reacted belatedly on 9 March to
President Nixon's 25 February foreign policy report with a
statement on the report "and the intensified U.S. war of
aggression in Leos and in Indochina as a whole." Carried by
the Pathet Lao news agency the following day, the statement
reviews U.S. "escalation" moves in Indochina. It does not
discuss the subatanca of the foreign policy report, merely
scoring President Nixon for "boasting" about successes of
the Nixon Doctrine and of Vietnamization on three occasions
in less than three weeks. It is clear, says the statement,
that the Nixon Doctrine is nothing but a policy of "making
Asians fight Asians" and that Vietnamization means a
perpetuation of the U.S. "occupation" of South Vietnam
and support for Saigon's "invasion" of Laos and Cambodia.
The statement repeats demands that the United States put
an end to escalation, withdraw American, Saigon, and Thai
troops from Laos, and "completely" cease the bombing "in
order to create conditions for the Lao parties concerned
to meet and peacefully settle the Lao problem." It reiterates
that U.S. expansion of the war "has turned the three
Indochinese countries into a single battlefield" and that the
Lao people, loyal to the commitments of the Indochinese
people's summit conference, will stand "shoulder to shoulder"
with the Vietnamese and Khmer peoples in resisting "U.S.
aggression."
Pro forma Hanoi support for the NLHS statement came in a DRV
Foreign Ministry statement carried by VNA on 15 March.
Denouncing the "intensification by the United States of its
war of aggression in Laos," the statement makes no direct
reference to the President's foreign policy report, saying
only that U.S. acts of aggression reveal the deceitfulness
of the President's "talk about 'peace,' 'troop withdrawal,'
etc."*
* Hanoi had reacted to the President's report officially in
a 2 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement. See the TRENDS of
3 March 1971, pages 1-3.
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MANILA CONFERENCE OF ASEAN SAID TO SERVE NIXON DOCTRINE
Vietnamese communist propaganda scoring the 12 March ASEAN
conference in Manila as another attempt to serve U.S. war
aims includes a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 11th and
a NHAN DAN commentary on the 14th, both briefly reviewed by
VNA. In raising the question of a discussion of Laos at the
Manila conference, the army paper recalled a precedent--the
Djakarta meeting of the ASEAN in May 1970 "at which futile
attempts were made to justify the U.S. invasion of Cambodia."*
It charged that the purpose of this year's meeting was not
to bring peace or security but "only to serve U.S. war
expansion in Indochina and the Nixon Doctrine to pit Asians
against Asians." NHAN DAN similarly recalled last year's
ASEAN meeting and stated that the Vietnamese, Lao, and
Cambodian problems can only be settled by the respective
peoples themselves.
Liberation Radio on the 11th broadcast a commentary on the
meeting attributed to LPA, not carried by the news agency
itself until the 12th. It assailed Nixon's "successive speeches"
"pleading" for U.S. actions in Indochina, and echoed Han6i*in
likening the meeting to the one last May in Djakarta. The
commentary added that Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik
had also revealed "that this conference might discuss the
war in Laos and the possibility of holding a second Djakarta
conference on Indochina." Noting that Saigon, Vientiane,
and Phnom Penh would be invited as observers, the commentary
rejected the competence of the participants to deal with the
Indochina question and repeated the standard line that the
keys to the problem are U.S. troop withdrawal and U.S.
compliance with the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina and the
1962 Geneva agreement on Laos.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT NORTH
Two current DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements,
released on 15 and 17 March, protest "U.S. air attacks" on
Vinh Linh area. The protest of the 15th also claims that U.S.
planes "ra'-ded a number of places in Minh Hoa district, Quang
Binh Province" on 9 March, causing'Losses in lives and property."
* See the TRENDS of 20 May 1970, pages 9-12.
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Daily U.S. actions against Vinh Linh from 8 to 15 March* are
charged in the two protests. The statement of the 15th says
that from 8 to 13 March U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, bombed
Huong Lap village while U.S. artillery from south of the DMZ
"fired on Vinh Son and Huong Lap villages." Similarly, the
protest of the 17th charges that on 14-15 March U.S. planes,
including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village while "U.S. heavy
artillery from the sea and from south of the DMZ fired
hundreds of shells into villages close to the 17th parallel."
Both note that the villages "lie in the demilitarized zone
belonging to DRV territory."
Following standard practice, the protests "sternly denounce
and severely condemn the above acts of war" and demand an
end to all U.S. encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.
The protest of the 17th alleges that a U.S. plane was downed
over Vinh Linh on the 14th. The downing had been claimed by
Hanoi the previous day in a report which placed Hanoi's total
of downed U.S. aircraft at 3,177.
DRV ANNOUNCES REGULAR PEOPLE'S COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN APRIL
Hanoi media on 13 March announced the Council of Ministers'
decision to hold elections in April for representatives to
the people's councils at various levels. In making the
announcement, Hanoi radio referred to a 3 February resolution
of a conference of the Council of Ministers' Standing
Committee. Hanoi said elections to the people's councils
in the autonomous regions will take place on 11 April--the
day the National Assembly elections are also scheduled--and
in the provinces and cities directly subordinate to the
central government on 25 April. Elections are to be
completed before 30 April for lower-level people's councils--
the provinces in the autonomous zones, cities, urban wards,
districts, villages, and townships.
* The current protests pick up where the last previous one
stopped. That protest, issued by the foreign ministry spokes-
man on 9 March, complained of "recent U.S. attacks' on Vinh
Linh and Quang Binh from 3 to 7 March. See the TRENDS of
10 March, pages 14-15.
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NHAN DAN'o 13 March editorial notes that the newly elected
representatives will replace those elected in 1968 and 1969.
Unlike the National Assembly elections, those for the
people's councils were not suspended during the years of
U.S. bombing in the North.* Thus elections of people's
councils at the level of districts, villages, and equivalent
urban divisions were held in all provinces and cities in
both 1967 and 1969, and elections for the councils in the
autonomous zones, provinces, and those cities that are under
the jurisdiction of the central government were held in
196b--in accordance with the constitutional proviso of two-
and three-year terms, respectively.
The NHAN DAN editorial says the elections prove "the stability
of the people's democratic state and the constant concern
of the party and government to ensure full exercise of the
people's right as collective master of the country." It also
says that "each election to the National Assembly and the
people's councils is an opportunity for the people to show
their high consciousness of their role in the building and
defense of their own administration."
RADIO OF CAMBODIAN FUNK AND RGNU INCREASES BROADCAST TIME
The "Voice of the FUNK," the radio of the Cambodian FUNK and
RGNU, announced on 10 March that as of the 15th it would
increase its time on the air and change its broadcast schedule--
changes resulting in an increase from 21 to 35 hours a`week.
This further step in the buildup of the FUNK/RGNU propaganda
apparatus follows the inauguration on 2 March of a daily radio-
teletype transmission in French by the INFORMATION AGENCY OF
KAMPUCHEA (AKI). The FUNK radio began broadcasting on
1 August 1970, and the AKI was established on 10 August.
BELATED PUBLICITY FOR "LATE 1970'/ RGNU CONFERENCE IN CAMBODIA
On 11, 12, and 13 March the Cambodian Information Agency (AKI)
belatedly publicized portions of a report delivered by Khieu
Samphan, RGNU deputy premier and defense minister, at a
* See the 16 March 1971 Supplement to the TRENDS, "Propaganda
Reflects DRV Resumption of Normal Party, Government Procedures,"
pages 4-7.
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conference held in "late 1970" by "members of RGNU responsible
for the interior" in the "liberated areas" of Cambodia. There
had been no prior monitored mention of such a conference. In
a single available reference to an RGNU "cabinet meeting,"
NCNA reported belatedly on 21 February that such a meeting
had been held 20 January. NCNA gave no details about that
meeting but said that at its conclusion the ministers sent a
message to Premier Penn Nouth expressing support foi Sihanouk's
18 January appeal to the Cambodian people to wage a prolonged
strugjle.*
Khieu Samphan's report to the "late 1970" conference, according
to AKI, covered the activities of the ministers responsible for
the interior in all fields--military, political, economic,
financial, cultural, social, and diplomatic. AKI's excerpts
quote the military section of the report as claiming that the
Cambodian people's armed forces had put out of action nearly
150,000 troops of the United States, Saigon, and the Lon Nol/
Sirik Matak/Son Ngoc Thanh "puppetF" and as asserting that
th,,. "puppet" armed forces had been reduced to "less than
20,000." They were forced to retreat into Phnom Penh and "a
number of towns of lesser importance," the report said, and were
unsuccessful in efforts to escape encirclement and regain the
initiative. It claimed that the Saigon troops who had come to
aid the Phnom Penh "traitors" were still "encircled" and unable
to "go far from their posts." It concluded that "our forces
have stretched the enemy thin and reduced him to a passive
position, thus creating favorable conditions for our regular
forces."
The excerpts cite the section on the political situation in
Cambodia as pointing to the "isolation" of the "enemy" due to
lack of popul?r support. The report claimed that the "enemy"
administration at various echelons, especially at village,
commune, and district levels, had "mostly been overthrown" or
was "in a shaky position" and that there were "internal
contradictions" between"the Thieu-Ky cliquE and the Lon Not/
Sirik Matak/Son Ngoc Thanh clique," with clashes between their
troops occ>>rring daily.
* No RGNU ministers' "conference" or "cabinet meetii'g" is
known to have been publicized before that, although a FUNK
Central Committee meeting held in the "liberated areas" in
August 1970 was said to have "enlarged" the responsibilities
of members fighting on the "interior front." That meeting was
reported in a FUNK/RGNU communique carried 5y NCNA on
17 September.
CONFIDENTIAL
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With respect to the economic situation, the report stressed
the "serious economic and financial crisis" of the "clique,"
characterized by an "acute shortage" of food and spiraling
price increases, in contrast with the "inexhaustible economic
and financial resources" of the "large and rich liberated
zone."
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR CALLS U1S1 POLICY AMBIGUOUS, DOUBTS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL
? Moscow continues to press the line that the United States shares
responsibility with Israel for the standoff in the Jarring
mission; some propagandists charge that Washington has no inten-
tion of pressuring Israel to make concessions, out others adopt a
wait-and-see posture. Remarking on the "ambiguous nature" of U.S.
diplomacy, a panelist on the domestic service commentators' round-
table on the 14th says the chances of success for the Jarring
mission depend on the United States. At the same-time, Moscow
advises Arab listeners that it is wrong to believe the key to the
crisis is in Washington's hands; since the United States will
never voluntarily pressure Israel, this argument runs, it is up to
the Arabs to force Washington to reconsider its policy by striking
at U.S. "imperialist interests" in the Arab world.
Prime Minister Meir's remarks on borders in her interview in the
13 March London TIMES are said by TASS that day to outline "with
cynical frankness" the government's "program of territorial expan-
sion." PRAVDA's Glukhov on the 16th finds it no coincidence that
her "map of territorial annexations" emerged just as Abba Eban was
leaving for the United States. Eban is quoted as saying before his
departure that there are no U.S.-Israeli differences of opinion,
and Moscow's domestic service routinely concludes that the visit
is aimed at obtaining new guarantees on further U.S. material and
moral. support,
There is continued praise for the UAR's policy of pursuing a
political settlement, along with occasional interjections that
its peace-loving policy does not stem from weakness. Cairo is
said to have "gone a long way" to meet Israel, and commentators
point to as-Sadat's proposal to reopen the Suez Canal.
U.S~ ROLE Soviet media cite a spate of statements by U.S.
officials to demonstrate that the United States
does not intend to pressure Israel to comply with the Security
Council Resolution. In the only available Soviet account of
Secretary Rogers' 16 March press conference, TASS asserts that it
is clear from his replies that the United States will continue
giving support to Israel, providing economic and other aid to
maintain its security. The Secretary stated "in particular," TASS
says, that the United States never insisted that Israel should
withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, although this is
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demanded by the Security Council Resolution. TASS makes no
rention of Rogers' discussion of an international peace-keeping
force and of geographical and political considerations with
regard to security.
TASS on the 11th had said that the U.S. press has pointed out
more than once that the Administration has sufficient means of
influencing Israel but prefers not to use them. On the 12th,
TASS pointed to Sisco's letter to the NEAR EAST REPORT as
speaking "of the need of 'reserving the possibility to change'"
the 1967 armistice line in Israel's favor and "even stating"
that the United States never believedthe Security Council
resolution demanded complete Israeli withdrawal. A Ryzhikov
domestic service commentary the same day asserted that State
Department spokesman McCloskey in effect acknowledged that
the United States does not intend and will not try to get
Israel to carry out the resolution in full. Ryzhikov also
claimed that President Nixon, in his 4 March press conference,
said Israel would never be forced to do anything. (The
President said the United States would not impose a settlement
in the Middle East, but would do everything to urge the parties
to talk; he added at a later point, "we can only say that we can
make suggestions, but we are going to have to depend upon the
parties concerned to reach an agreement.") A foreign-language
commentary on the 15th said that Secretary Rogers, testifying
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "openly declared"
that Washington has no intention of exerting any pressure what-
soever on Israel to make concessions in negotiations.
Commentcr Ryzhikov makes the only current propaganda allusion
to Big Four action. He says that peace-loving mankind "is
placing particular hopes" on the four-power talks while the
Israeli leaders, "who have long banked" on "certain support"
from the United States, are worried at the thought of concerted
great-power action.
Panelist Shishkin, on the domestic service commentators' round-
table on the 11th, finds American Mideast diplomacy "ambiguous"
and says it is up to the United States whether or not advantage
is taken of the chances of success of the Jarring mission. While
the panelists are not optimistic, noting that "all talk of
possible U.S. pressure on Israel" so far "has no foundation in
fact," Sishkin concludes that the immediate future will show
whether "Israel's American patrons will heed the voice of good
sense" and persuade Israel to face the question of a political
settlement at last.
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Shishkin rejects U.S. press "blackmail" against the Arabs,
^iting the New York TIMES as suggesting that if Egypt re-
n?_.unces the demand for full withdrawal as a sine qua non for
a peaceful agreement, Israel "may shift from its position of
no withdrawal." He similarly denounces a "canard" by TIME
? magazine that the Arabs are insisting only in public on the
retu~-n of all territories and have in fact agreed to certain
territorial concessions, as well as TIME's story of a secret
meeting between King Husayn and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister
Allon--an "overt attempt to sow mistrust" between the UAR and
Jordan Shishkin points to New York TIMES' criticism of Israel
as an iilustrati.on of the "undoubted success" of Arab, primarily
UAR, policy in pursuing a political settlement; a foreign-language
commentary on the 15th, on the other hand, dismisses "contrived
rumors" regarding "alleged growing differences" between Washington
and Tel Aviv and "even U.S. condemnation of Israel's obstruction-
ist policy."
ARGUMENT In commentaries broadcast in Arabic on 12 and
FOR ARABS 15 March Moscow warns against the "false conclu-
sion" that the key to the Midd1' East crisis is
in the hands of Washington and tells the Arabs they must act
themselves. They should not heed "imperialist propaganda
fabrications" that the U.S. position has "special and decisive
importance" and that the Arabs must win U.S. good will. The
commentary on the .12th, acknowledging the "generally valid
notion" that the United States is capable of pressuring Israel
to withdraw, insists that Washington will never do this volun-?,._;.
tarily because its policy toward the Arabs is based on thwarting
the Arab liberation movement and preserving the position of U.S.
monopolies. Noting that the UAR no longer regards itself as
bound by the cease-fire agreement but leaves the door open to
political settlement, Moscow says this attitude "allows for the
use of a variety of means" to remove "the consequences of the
aggression." And it points approvingly to Cairo and other Arab
press insistence on removing the "imperialist interests and strong-
holds" in the Arab countries. The commentary also favorably cites
the "important conclusion" being drawn by Arab public opinion that
the Arabs themselves hold the key to solution of the Middle East
dispute and can influence the United States to reconsider its
policy by attacking with increasing intensity U.S. strongholds in
the Arab world.
The Soviet argument would seem to coincide, at least in part,
with AL-AHRAM editor Haykal's thesis, in his 5 March article,
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that the Arabs should seek to "neutralize" the U.S. attitude
toward Israel. and. to convince Washington, among other things,
that it is facing dangers threatening its interests--as well
as the danger of "embarrassing complications" in its relations
with Moscow. Haykal's disagreement with the notion that it is
the United States, not Israel, which the Arabs are facing on
the battlefield was challenged by the Lebanese Communist Party
daily AN-NIDA in a 7 March article that insisted the United
States cannot be neutral between the Arabs and Israel. And
a Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa
on the 11th may have been implicitly countering Haykal when it
agreed with the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH that the Arab conflict with
Israel "actually represents a conflict with the United States
itself.."
UAR-SOVIET President as-Sadat's 1-2 March talks in Moscow
RELATIONS are belatedly acknowledged in a 10 March IZVESTIYA
article by Koryavin summing up as-Sadat's 7 March
speech. In quoting as-Sadat Koryavin contrives, through slight
variations in wording, to convey the impression that the decision
to go to Moscow was as-Sadat's: "Last week I considered it
necessary to meet the leaders of the great Soviet Union. They
expressed the opinion to me that conditions demanded the holding
of consultations between us. I made the decision myself to go to
Moscow without announcing my intention." (As-Sadat actually
said: "I found it appropriate last week to meet with the leaders
of the great Soviet Union. These leaders had sent word to me
that they thought conditions required consultations between us.
I decided to travel to Moscow without publicity.")
TASS on the 13th cited Cairo's AL-AHRAM as stressing that as-Sadat's
"important messages" to the heads of the four powers demonstrate
Cairo's desire to take advantage of any opportunity to implement
Resolution 242 and to cooperate with the international community.
The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 16th reports that UAR Vice
President 'Aziz Sidqi, heading a delegation which has signed an
economic and technical cooperation agreement in Moscow, has
.received Brezhnev's reply to an as-Sadat message delivered by
Sidqi.
On the 11th TASS reported--without comment--a UAR official
spokesman as denying an "allegation" by Secretary Rogers that
there are Soviet troops in the UAR. The spokesman, according
to TASS, said the Secretary "knows well that there are only
Soviet military experts in the UAR." Asked in a 9 March tele-
vision interview about removal of the Soviet military presence
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from Egypt, Rogers had responded that it would be helpful, if a
peacekeeping operation could be worked out under UN auspices, for,
the Soviet Union to withdraw some cf its forces. If the USSR
played a part in a peacekeeping role, he added, it would not need
these forces in the UA.R "to that degree." Moscow propaganda has
remained silent on the question of Soviet participation in an
international peacekeeping force.
SYRIAN Reporting an interview by Syria's newly elected
STANCE President Hafiz al-Asad, TASS on the 16th--along
with noting his statement that the UAR and Syria
are "united militarily" and their armed forces have a joint
command--said that he "highly appreciated" UAR activities aimed
at a political settlement. In the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
account, as reported from uamascus, al-Asad told Egyptian
Journalists that he strongly supports the UAR's political
activity, viewing political struggle "as a matter which cannot
be neglected" and adding that it complements the "requirements
of the liberation battle."
Panelist Polyanov, on the 7 March Moscow domestic service
commentators' roundtable, had provided Moscow's most "straight-
forward"--as he said--explanation thus far of Syria's position.
He acknowledged that at one time the Syrian Government "held a
position which, if not negative, did not support the Security
Council resolution and so on." Pointing out that "certain changes"
have taken place in the Syrian political scene, he said that the
present Syrian Government supports the idea of a peaceful settle-
ment and "I believe that its position in the main coincides with
the positions of the UAR and other countries advocating a peaceful
settlement in that area."
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TURKEY
MOSCOW REPGRTS GOVERNMENT RESIGNATION1 GIVES NO BACKGROUND
Moscow, which had given no publicity to the evento in Turkey leading
up to the resignation of the Justice Party government, reported without
comment on the .12th the resignation that day of Prime Minister Demirel
and his cabinet. This was announced, said 'L'ASS, after a cabinet
meeting which discussed the memorandum handed to Turkish President
Sunay and the chairmen of the National Assembly and the Senate by
the military leaders. TABS noted that the memorandum demanded "the
formation of 'a new and strong government'" and announced the
military's intention of taking over power unless a new government
capable, "as the memorandum says, of 'ending the anarchy in the
country'" was formed without delay.
On the 16th TASS, again in a short editorialized report, noted that.
President Sunay in a broadcast to the nation warmed that "any
'anarchy' caused, as he put it, by the extreme left and the extreme
right, 'will be suppreFlued as soon as possible.'" TASS said Sunay
supported the actions of the army and the necessity, as demanded in
the military's memorandum, of "forming 'a new strong government."'
Broadcasts in Turkish in recent weeks have been laying the groundwork
for celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet-Turkish
friendship treaty, extolling the prospects of further fruitful
cooperation on the foundations laid by the treaty. A Tarasov
article in IZVESTIYA along these lines, as reviewed by TASS on
the 15th, observes that "unsolved questions between the two states"
can and must be settled in a spirit of cooperation and good-
neighborhood, and notes that as a result of mutual efforts the
viewpoints of the two countries on a number of major internatloi,c,l
issues have drawn closer in recent times. TASS and Ankara radio
on the 16th report the exchange of congratulatory mesenges between
Kosygin and Demirel--now heading a caretaker government--on the
treaty anniversary.
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t'tINIII I )I'N'I'IA1, I"111 ':I90 NI)(l
:I'( MAIt JII 1.9'(L
NORTH KOREA
PYONGYANG DENOUNCES OVERFLIGHTS OF U,S, RECONNAISSANCE PLANE
Pyongyang denounced overt'l.ightu of it U.S. 13H-71 recorinaisuanee
plane on J.)) March t.n prompt roportu the carne day by KCNA and
t,ha domoutic service which claimed that the plane entered DIRK
alrnpace on two occasions to conduct "espionage and hostile
uctu in wanton violation of the armist?:ice agreement." The
reports warned pointedly that the United States must remember
"what their acts of infiltration into the territorial air of
our aide have brought about in the past." The same warning
was made by the North Korean representative at the 15 March
meeting of' the Military Armistice Commission, reported in
Pyongyang media.
A NODONG SINMUN article on the overflight, carried by KCNA
on 16 March, uses standard Pyongyang terminology in calling
the "provocation" a "link in the chain" of U.S.-machinations to
bring the situation to the "brink of war" and "an extremely
grave criminal move to speed up preparations for the
provocation of an aggressive war in full scale." Reviewing
other alleged U.S. maneuvers to provoke a war "under the
deceptive slogan of 'U.S. army cutback,'" the article
mentions the activation of a tactical fighter wing on
15 March and the 3-5 March Freedom Vault airlift exercise.
Kim I1-song, it recal.ls,has warned that "our people do not
want to provoke others first but will never allow anyone to
provoke them even a little." Identical language was used
in the 23 April 1969 DPRK Government statement protesting
the downing of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane on 15 April of
that year, by Kim II-song in his speech to the Korean party
congress on 2 November 1970, and in a 27 February 1971 DPRK
Foreign Ministry statement on the Freedom Vault exercise.
Pyongyang propaganda in the weeks prior to the downing of
the EC-121 in April 1969 had contained no known warnings of
retaliation against reconnaissance aircraft and no unusually
bellicose statements. DPRK comment on the U.S. airlift
exercise Focus Retina in March 1969, including a 10 March
DPRK Foreign Ministry statement, had not gone beyond the
standard generalized warnings that the Americans should not
forget the "lessons" of their defeat in the Korean War and
the Pueblo incident. Asserting that "we do not want war,
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17 MARCH 1.971
but we are not afraid of one," the statement routinely said the
North Koreans had built "steel-wall defenses to cope with any
aggression by the U.S. imperialists."
The 23 April 1969 DPfK Government statement on the EC-121 downing,
however, complained that there was no guarantee that such planes
would not intrude into DPfK territorial airspace again and warned
that in the event of another intrusion the Korean people "will
not sit with folded arms but will take resolute measures for
safeguarding their sovereignty as ever." This explicit warning
recurred in some official statements, most recently in a
22 June 1970 government memorandum on the Korean War anniversary.
Other official statements, both before and since, have contained
the stock generalized warning that the United States should not
forget the "lessons" of its defeats in the Korean War, the Pueblo
incident, and the downing of the EC-121.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 MARCH 1971
INDIAN ELECTIONS
MOSCOW HAILS VICTOiY OF "PROGRESSIVE DEMUCRATIC FORCES"
Registering undisguised and unrestrained approval of Mrs. Indira
Gandhi's "formidable victory" in the recently concluded elections
for seats in the lower house of the Indian parliament, Soviet
media have characterized the unexpectedly large majority won by
Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress party as "a mandate for the
government's policy of economic and social reforms" and "an
important event with great significance not only for India
but also for all countries of the Asian continent." Moscow
sees the victory as evidence of overwhelming Indian approval
of Mrs. Gandhi's domestic and foreign policies and thus as a
"crushing defeat" for the coalition of "reactionary" parties
which had "the sole purpose of overthrowing Mrs. Gandhi's
government and preventing the implementation of the proposed
social reforms."
Peking media did not mention the Indian elections during the
entire course of the campaign and have not commented on the
results.
DOMESTIC On the Indian domestic front, Moscow views the
IMPLICATIONS election results as a mandate "to go ahead
with reforms and changes defined in the
program of the ruling party." Mrs. Gandhi's victory is seen
as a turning point, "the beginning of a stage of re.1 changes"
in India, when India can undertake "practical measures to do
away with the remnants of feudalism," to restrict the
economic and political dorninatiou of the Indian "monopolies,"
to improv, the people's living standards, to complete agrarian
reform, to put foreign trade under government control, to
expand the state sector, and to conduct "an active anti-
imperialist struggle." Bank nationalization, curtailment
of "the privileges of the feudalists," and "the implementation
of progressive socioeconomic transformations" were singled
out by TASS chief foreign editor Shishkin, a participant in
the 14 March ^ommentators' roundtable program, as "progressive"
steps of the Gandhi government which have now been stamped
with approval by the Indian people.
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17 MARCH 1971
Moscow propagandists--who in 1967 had indicated concern over
the reversals suffered by the ruling Congress party in that
year's elections--interpret the current results as evidence
of "a turning point in the struggle between the forces of
progress and the forces of reaction." In a 12 March broadcast
for foreign audiences, Yuriy Soltan termed the results "a
heavy defeat" for the coalition of rightwing parties and "a
major victory for the country's progressive forces." A
similar broadcast on 11 March called the defeat of several
rightwing "reactionaries" a "vivid indication of the bank-
ruptcy" of the rightwing alliance.
None of the Moscow commentaries contain the kind of qualifiers
that had appeared in 1969 reaction to the defeat of a motion
of no-confidence in the Indira Gandhi government. For example,
Soltan said then that although the "antigovernment front"
suffered a resounding defeat and the "progressive forces"
were victorious, "this does not necessarily mean that the
reactionaries have given up this time."* The. current comment
implies that the contest is over and that the progressive
forces have achieved decisive victory. NOVOSTI political
observer Beglov, participating in the 14 March roundtable
program, remarked that with its "firm absolute majority" the
Gandhi government will be able, "with the support of all
other democratic forces, to implement its planned program
of social transformations."
Soviet media reported the electoral manifesto of the
Communist Party of India (CPS) and took note of its
inclusion in the "progressive front" which gained a
majority of the seats in the south Indian state of Tamil
Nadu. But there has been no monitored Soviet comment on
the activities of the Communist Party of India/Marxist
(CPI/M) or of its electoral success in West Bengal, where
it is the largest--though not the majority--party as a result
of the current elections for the state legislature there.
Soltan on the 12th contended that "an important part" in
the defeat of the rightwing forces was played by the CPI,
which stood for "a struggle against the reactionary parties,
for preventing them from winning power in the center, and
for a parliament with a firm leftwing and democratic orientation."
* For a discussion of Moscow's treatment of the November 1969
schism between the two factions of the Congress Party, see the
TRENDS of 20 November 1969, pp. 7-9.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDEW,rIAr4 F1313 TUENDO
17 MARCH 197.1
FOREIGN Soviet commentators viewed the Gandhi victory as
POLICY an expression of faith in Nehru's foreign policy,
a rejection of attacks on the Indian Government's
foreign policy by those who advocate "an alliance with
imperialism and participation in its foreign policy ventures,"
and a vote of confidence in a foreign policy based on "the
principles of nonalinement and peaceful coexistence among
states with different social systems."
Radio/TV political observer Druzhinin commented in the 14 March
roundtable program that the election results were of "great
significance" for "all countries of the Asian continent," and
Soltan on the 12th said they reflected "the general tendency
toward a democratic development in the Asian and African
developing countries, where the struggle for national
liberation is turning more clearly into a determined struggle
for social liberation." A Moscow radio commentary in English
to South Asia on the llth called them "fresh confirmation
that there is a clear trend for a shift to the left in the
developing countries of the third world" and took note of the
recent elections in Ceylon, Chile, and Pakistan as well as
India. The commentary characterized these elections as.a
rejection of internal reaction and a reflection of demands
for "radical social and economic changes and a solution
of internal problems along the noncapitelist road of
development."
Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress
on the 1.5th contended that the election results "caused
outright irritation in the capitals of the Western
imperialist countries" and charged--as it had done several
times during the campaign--that the United States had
"unceremoniously meddled" in India's internal affairs
by extending substantial amounts of money to the
reactionary parties for c~-Lrnpaign expenses. In early
February Radio Peace and Progress in particular saw
the visits to India of John Sherman Cooper, Chester Bowles,
and General Westmoreland as intended to coincide with
the Indian elections and designed to give support to the
Indian "reactionaries." Radio Peace and Progress on
11 February, citing Indian press reports, charged U.S.
"interference in the internal affairs" of India and
contended that various U.S. organizations, particularly
CIA, had spent "many a thousand dollars to hinder the
successes of the representatives of the leftwing
democratic forces at the elections."
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' P'13I0 r[IRENDO
:1.7 MAUCH 3.971
CAMPAIGN During the election campaign Soviet media had
COMMENT sustained a low-profile approach but left no
question as to where Moscow's Qentiments lay.
Moscow publicized the CPI and ruling Congress party election
manifestos, took periodic note of Mrs. Gandhi's electoral
activities, and launched broadsides at the coalition of
"rightwing" and "reactionary" forces.
TABS on 21 January transmitted the CPI's election manifesto,
stressing its slogans of "strengthening the unity and
cooperation of the leftwing and progressive forces,
defeating rightwing reaction, defending the country's
national independence and pursuing a policy of peace,
nonalinement, and social progress." On 24 January TASS
publicized the Gandhi Congress party's election manifesto,
noting that the ruling party sought to get "a new mandate
from the people so as to eliminate the obstacles on the
road to the country's economic and social development."
The election campaign, according to Soviet commentators,
was characterized as "a polarization of political forces
and tense election campaigning." R. Aleksandrov, writing
in NEW TIMES (No. 9, 26 February, Russian edition), saw
the "real choice" for the Indian voter as one between
"definite political platforms"--"between the progressive
socioeconomic reforms in the interests of the masses to
which the Indian National Congress leadership is committed
and the aspirations of the monopolies, big capitalists,
and landlords." Aleksandrov contended that the platform
of the opposition Congress party and the other parties of
the Right "can hardly win wide popular support." He cited
the feeling of "a wide section of Indian opinion" that
conditions are ripe "for the creation on a new basis of
a united national democratic front . . . open to all
democratic forces . . . ."
Without mentioning the CPI/M by name, Aleksandrov.alluded
to its position in arguing against the "bogus Left" view
that there is no difference between the two Congress
parties and that the CPI should be scorned for cooperating
with Mrs. Gandhi. "This erroneous view," Aleksandrov
declared,
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17 MARCH 1971
stems from a one-sided, sectarian approach to the
national bourgeoisie, in particular its nonmonopoly
sections, from failure to understand its specific
nature and to see that it is undergoing a complex
process of differentiation, of which the split in
the Congress was a striking manifestation.
The CPI, Aleksandrov concluded, is on the other hand anxious
to "do everything possible to prevent the alliance of the
Right from capitalizing on Left disunity" and prepared "to
enter into election alliances wherever other democratic
parties are ready to do likewise."
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PRC SATELLITE
PP012-8
BELATED NCNA ANNOUNC I'1ENT HAILS LAUNCH IN STANDARD TEF 1S
The PRC belatedly announced the 3 March launching of its second
earth satellite in a 16 March NCNA dispatch, subsequently broad-
cast widely by Radio Peking to domestic and foreign audiences.
The dispatch is similar in phrasing to the 25 April 1970 press
communique on the first satellite, launched on the 24th. Thus
the feat is called a "result achieved by the Chinese people"
under Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao and a result of
the Chinese people's policy of reliance on their own efforts.
But NCNA this time does not label the launch a victory for Mao's
thought and the Cultural Revolution, as in the April 1970 press
communique.
The NCNA announcement sheds no direct light on the reasons for
the delay in making the launch public. Some of the speculation
in the Western press, however, may have been a factor: The
notation in the first paragraph of the NCNA announcement--giving
the weight and flight path--that the satellite sent back
scientific data on various experiments between 3 and 15 March
may have been calculated to counter speculation that the
satellite was not functioning properly after the launch. The
timing of the announcement suggests another possible factor:
It may be more than coincidental that the NCNA dispatch, with
its implications regarding PRC missile capability, was released
the day after the opening of the strategic arms limitation
talks in Vienna. Peking has remained characteristically silent
on the current SALT round, but the PRC is on record as branding
SALT a "superpower scheme" directed against the peoples of the
world.
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SALT
MOSCOW REPLEDGES SERIOUS EFFORT IN VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS
Publicity for chief Soviet delegate Semenov's arrival statement
in Vienna on 14 March highlighted Moscow's propaganda attention
to the reopening, on the 15th, of the strategic arms limitation
talks (SALT) in the Austrian capital. As reported by TASS,
Semenov said that the USSR has consistently sought effective
measures in disarmament and the limitation of the arms race.
The Soviet Government, he declared, has instructed the delega-
tion to hold talks "in a constructive spirit, striving for
positive results." In pro forma language, he observed that an
acceptable agreement on strategic arms limitation would ease
international tension and would benefit the peoples of the
USSR, the United States, and other nations.
Notably absent from Semenov's arrival remarks is any reference
to the activities of "imperialist circles," a phrase he has
used in statements at opening ceremonies of earlier sessions
of SALT.* However, participants in the 14 March Moscow domestic
service commentators' roundtable--the sole available comment on
the eve of the negotiations--warned of allegedly detrimental
U.S. actions. The roundtable discussion sustained Moscow's
criticism of Secretary Laird's 9 March defense posture state-
ment, with one panelist asking rhetorically if "Washington
really wants to create a suitable climate for the successful
conduct" of the negotiations in Vienna. One of the panelists
said that to all appearances the U.S. Government "has already
begun preparing public opinion for the possible failure of
these talks." He cited the U.S. press for the observation
that in contrast to a year ago, when U.S. spokesmen "were
falling over each other with statements that they put great
* Semenov did not refer to "imperialist circles" in his state-
ment at the opening of the talks in Helsinki on 17 November 1969.
But at Vienna on 16 April 1970--on the heels of Moscow's then
ongoing propaganda attack on U.S.. plans to move forward with
the second phase of the Safeguard system and the announcement
that MIRV deployment would begin in June--he warned of "aggressive
imperialist circles" interested in stepping up the strategic
arms race. And in Helsinki on 2 November 1970, he said that
the arms race was being "fanned up by certain imperialist circles."
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-34-
hopes in the Vienna talks," these same officials "are full of
pessimism and are instilling the thought in newsmen that
nothing can be expected from the Vienna talks."
Neither the roundtable show nor limited available reportage
has dealt with the question of U.S. forward bases or the Soviet
proposal for a limitation on ABM's as a separate, initial
step--substantive issues broached in Soviet press articles in
mid-February.* On the latter issue, the TASS account of
President Nixon's 4 March press conference had omitted his
observation, in response to a question about a possible
separate agreement on ABM's, that such a suggestion has been
made and "we respect that proposal." The ~_ccount did note
that the President said the United States will be participat-
ing in SALT "with a view to achieving agreement."
Soviet media have said nothing so far about President Nixon's
15 March statement, including comment on the "realistic
dialog" at SALT, which accompanied the annual report to
Congress on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Budapest's MTI took note of it on the 16th, however, with
the equivocal comment that the President's statement "about
the 'encouraging and hopeful strategic arms limitation talks'
is noteworthy at a time when the American leadership can
hardly claim positive features in global policy."
CZECHOSLOVAK While the Soviet press abstains from comment
PRESS COWENT on issues connected with SALT, portions of
an article by retired Maj. Gen. B.L. Teplinskiy
that had appeared in the Soviet journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS,
IDEOLOGY in December are used almost verbatim--without attribution--
in a 4 March article in the Prague RUDE PRAVO criticizing an alleged
gap between U.S. words and deeds with respect to strategic arms
limitation. Teplinskiy's reference to U.S. press "allegations"
about buildup of a Soviet antimissile system is included in the
passages RUDE PRAVO lifts from his article. Thus RUDE PRAVO says
Secretary Laird and the American press have sought to justify the
enormous costs of strategic arms by "alleging, for example, that
the Soviet Union 'is building up forces for a first strike' or
* For a review of the February articles, in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA,
see the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 22-24.
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17 MARCH 1971
that the installation of MIRV's is allegedly in response to
the creation of the Soviet missile defense system." Explicit
references to a Soviet antimissile system, even passing and
ostensibly second-hand ones such as this, have been rare in
Moscow propaganda. Teplinskiy's is the only one since armed
forces day 1970.
Soviet press comment during the period between the last
Helsinki round of SALT and the opening of the current round
in Vienna is also echoed in the Bratislava SMENA on 12 March.
In the vein of the IZVESTIYA dispatch of 7 February that had
contained Moscow media's first direct criticism of Ambassador
Smith, SMENA remarks on Smith's "curious" effort to convince
Congress that the United States should not conclude a separate
agreement on ABM's.
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- 36 -
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR PUBLICIZES DETAILS OF PROPOSALS TO WEST BERLIN SENAT
Details of proposals made to the West Berlin Senat at the
first meeting between GDR State Secretary Kohrt and Senat
Director Mueller on 6 March were made public by NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND on the 13th through the device of quoting the
West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL. Publishing excerpts from a
TAGESSPIEGEL article of the 12th, the East German paper
added no comment of its own beyond the prefatory
observation that "obviously, material concerning these
talks was passed into the hands" of TAGESSPIEGEL's editorial
office by "official quarters." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's excerpts
include the West Berlin paper's appraisal of the GDR
proposals as "a relatively generous offer." Publication
of the excerpts was timed on the eve of the 14 March West
Berlin elections.
As outlined in the excerpts from TAGESSPIEGEL, the GDR
proposals would allow West Berliners to visit "the GDR,
including East Berlin," six times a year for two-day periods
or once a year for 30 days, with the proviso that the
Senat "would have to accept the most important GDR
demands" as a prerequisite for such an arrangement. Mueller,
according to the article, had to "reject negotiations on
such a far-reaching arrangement," despite the fact that
the GDR proposal "largely agrees with the ideas of Bonn,"
because the proposal went beyond the matter of holiday
visits or "visits to East Berlin." Mueller, TAGESSPIEGEL
pointed out, "is not authorized to negotiate an arrangement
with a political content" until there is a "four-power
agreement on a general Berlin settlement."
In announcing the opening of the talks, East German media
had obscured the fact that the Senat had agreed to talk
only about Easter visits to East Berlin. GDR propaganda
sought rather to convey the impression that the talks were
opening on the lines of the original East German bid for
broader negotiations on problems affecting GDR relations
with West Berlin--to proceed in parallel with the four-power
ambassadorial talks, with the understanding that whatever
agreements they might reach would have to await four-power
agreement before being implemented. Now taking note of the
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- 37 -
limitations on Mueller's mandate in the GDR-Senat talks,
NEUES DEUTSCHLA.ND cites TAGESSPIEGEL's observation that
Mueller "adopted the same position as the Federal Government
in its talks with the GDR"--an allusion to the series of
talks between East and West German State Secretaries Bahr
and Kohl.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND went on to cite the West Berlin paper's
exposition of what the GDR considers "conditions" for its
proposed arrangement on visits: "The Berlin Senat would
have to act like the government of an independent state";
it would also--in contravention of the Western powers'
position--"have to recognize the affiliation of East Berlin
with the GDR"; and it "should assume the obligation to
prevent political activities in West Berlin which have
scandalized the GDR for a long time." The paper notes
TAGESSPIEGEL's view of the last condition as referring
to "the Federal presence on which the three Western powers
are now conducting negotiat4.ins with the Soviet Union."
There has been no discussion of the GDR proposals by East
German media on their own authority. ADN and TASS both
briefly reportr:d on the 12th that Mueller and Kohrt had
held their second meeting that day and agreed to continue
"negotiations on questions of mutual interest" in "the
near future."
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CONI"'II)I N'I':LA1., 1"1I31U 1I'10INI)[3
1.7 MARCH .1971.
- 38 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
MIXED TREATMENT OF BREZHNEV AT REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES
At the 12 republican party congresses held in February and early
March--returns on the Azerbaydzhan and Ukrainian congresses are
not yet in--there was no general buildup for Brezhnev, little
discussion of controversial issues, and few personnel changes.
Brezhnev was accorded unusual attention only in Kazakhstan,
Kirgizia, and Moldavia. The only personnel changes that appear
possibly aimed at foes of Brezhnev involved the replacement of
the second secretaries of Kazakhstan, Georgia., and Estonia.
NO BANDWAGON The personal buildup for Brezhnev over recent
FOR BREZHNEV mon?chs failed to develop into a bandwagon
movement at the republican congresses.
Although .ach congress elected an honorary presidium consisting
of the Politburo, only in Kirgizia was it a matter of electing
the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev. While Brezhnev's two-
volume collection of speeches has been translated into the
local languages of a number of republics, only Kazakh First
Secretary Kunayev, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan, Kirgiz
First Secretary Usubaliyev, and Uzbek First Secretary
Rashidov mentioned the local translations. The first
secretaries of most republics cited Brezhnev a few times
in their reports but with little or no praise (Armenia,
Belorussia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tadzhikistan,
Turkmenia, Uzbekistan), while Est the Estonian congress
no reference was made to Brezhnev by anyone.
In Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, and Moldavia, however, Brezhnev
was clearly accorded a special role above and independent
of the collective. (Spokesmen for these three republics
were among those who lavishly praised Brezhnev at
republican semicentennial celebrations last autumn.)
Brezhnev protege Kunayev spoke of the Politburo "headed
by the outstanding figure of the international Communist
and workers movement comrade L. I. Brezhnev," and he
declared that "all questions raised by the Kazakh Central
Committee and government have found full support on the
part of the CPSU Central Committee and comrade L. I. Brezhnev
personally." He also stated that "we have direct orders"
from Brezhnev to work out a wide program for using Kazakh
water sources for agriculture (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA,
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17 MARCH :1.973.
25 February). Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev spoke of the
"fatherly attention and concrete help" of -the Central Committee,
the Politburo, and. Brezhnev "personally," and praised the
publication of Brezhnev's two-volume collection of speeches as
"an important event in the ideological life of the party"
(SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, Ii March).
Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul declared that the work of the
Moldavian party organizations is guided by the directives of
the CPSU Central Committee, "by the everyday help of the
Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, and
by the attention and valuable instructions of Central
Committee General Secretary comrade L. I. Brezhnev"
(SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 26 February).
On the other hand, Latvian First Secretary Voss, Lithuanian
First Secretary Snechkus, and Belorussian First Secretary
Masherov--who have rarely praised Brezhnev in the past--
stressed collectivity. Voss declared that the activities
of the Central Committee and Politburo "show an unbending
will to develop and strictly observe Leninist norms of
party life and principles of leadership of political and
economic activity. The scientific approach, collectivity
and efficiency in conducting the internal and foreign policy
of the Soviet state have become firmly consolidated in the
work style of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central
Committee's Politburo and are warmly approved by Communists
and all workers" (SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 26 February). Snechkus
stressed the observance of collectivity in the Lithuanian
Central Committee and Bureau and condemned local leaders who
expand their authority and ignore opinions of others
(SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 4 March). Masherov declared that "the
principle of collective leadership has been fully restored"
(SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 23 February).
DISCUSSION MUTED Compared with the local congresses in
1966, there were very few indications
of controversy during the latest series. The Stalin issue,
raised in 1966 at the Belorussian, Moldavian, Azerbaydzhan,
and Georgian congresses, was conspicuously avoided. While
the 1966 Georgian, Belorussian and Tadzhik congresses had
attacked shortcomings in literature and had focused criticism
on specific dissident writers (Sinyavskiy, Daniel and Tarsis),
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17 MARCII 1.971
the current complaints about ideological errors were largely
routine and unspecific. Solzhenitsyn was mentioned only
once, by Moldavian writers union chairman P. P. Botsu, who
applauded a LITERARY GAZETTE article for rebuffing "the
apostate Solzhenitsyn, who was expelled from the writers
union" (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 2 March). Botsu also
criticized the recent works of Moldavian writer Ion Drutse--
the only other instance of a writer being singled out for
attack. Only the three Baltic republic first secretaries
concentrated on ideological errors in the press, literature
and the theater.
The issue of Zionism was raised only at the Turkmen and
Lithuanian congresses. Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov
condemned "the activization of international Zionism"
and domestic "Zionistically inclined renegades" (TURKMENSKAYA
ISKRA, 20 February). Lithuanian First Secretary Snechkus
assailed "international Zionism" and foreign attempts to
portray those guilty of "treason" as heroes (SOVETSKAYA
LITVA, 4 March).
The economic reform was praised by several first secretaries
(Kebin, Mzhavanadze, Kunayev and Rashidov), while Estonian
Premier Klauson defended the reform in rather unusual terms.
Noting that "recently many criticisms of certain shortcomings
in economic reform have been expressed," he declared that
"any criticism not backed by practical recommendations and
practical measures can bring harm instead of good, since it
discourages people. Therefore we expect from scientists and
economists the most active assistance in improving some
features of the reform" (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 20 February).
Creation of production associations was endorsed by Kebin,
Masherov, Voss, Snechkus, and Rashidov. The use of
unregulated mechanized links in agriculture was endorsed
by Belorussian First Secretary Masherov and Grodno First
Secretary Mikulovich at the Belorussian congress.
PERSONNEL CHANGES Apart from the replacement of Podgornyy's
protege V. N. Titov as Kazakh second
secretary (see FBIS TRENDS for 24 February), the most note-
worthy personnel change occurred in Georgia, with second
secretary P. A. Rodionov being replaced by Krasnodar second
secretary A. N. Churkin. The 57-year old Rodionov--the most
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prolific writer of r.rticles favoring collective leadership--
was demoted to the post of deputy director of the Marxism-
Leninism Institute Ln Moscow (so identified at ceremonial
meetings reported by TASS on 4 March and RABOCHAYA GAZETA
on 11 March).
Minor shifts occurred in Belorussia, Moldavia, Kirgizia and
Uzbekistan. Belorussian ideology secretary S. A. Pilotovich,
one of the few officials to attack Solzhenitsyn publicly
(SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 18 November), was replaced by
Belorussian agitprop chief A. T. Kuzmin at the Belorussian
congress and appointed ambassador to Poland (PRAVDA,
11 March). Moldavian ideology secretary D. S. Kornovan was
replaced by Moldavian Komsomol first secretary P. K. Luchinskiy.
The Kirgiz second secretary, A. P. Chubarev, was replaced by
Chita second secretary N. N. Tartyshev, and Kirgiz agriculture
secretary A. D. Duysheyev was demoted to first secretary of
the new Issyk-Kul oblast and replaced by P. I. Naumov.
The only personnel change linked directly to shortcomings
was the replacement of Uzbek Premier R. K. Kurbanov prior
to the Uzbek congress. Kurbanov was apparently the scapegoat
for the lag in industrial growth noted in First Secretary
Rashidov's congress report. According to IZVESTIYA's
5 March account of the Uzbek congress, the delegates
approved "timely measures to strengthen the leadership
of the republic Council of Ministers" (but this actt5n
was nowhere reported in the Uzbek press coverage of the
congress).
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PARTY C(Wr1ITTEES ARE ANNOUNCED FOR HONAN AND TSINGHAI
One of the nation's most populous provinces, Honan, and one
of its most thinly settled, Tsinghai, have established their
provincial party committee in recent days. Of the PRC's
29 provincial-level subdivisions, 13 have now set up their
party committees, covering approximately half the nation's
population.
HONAN Formation of Honan's party committee was proclaimed
COMMITTEE by NCNA on 11 March, 8 days following a sweeping
claim by Chengchow radio that county and municipal
party units throughout the province had been rebuilt. The new
committee was elected by 1,300 party delegates gathered in
Chengchow from 2 to 8 March. The congress, adhering to the
familiar formula of "a three-in-one combination of old, middle-
aged, and young," selected 82 full and 19 alternate members
to form the Honan committee. A five-man leadership group made
up of four men of primarily civilian back3round and one military
commander head the new committee.
Liu Chien-hsun, chairman of the provincial revolutionary
committee, first political commissar of the Honan Military
District (MD) and deputy political commissar of the Wuhan
Military Region (MR), was named first secretary. Liu was
also first secretary on the old Honan party committee,
1962-67. Along with Kwangsi's party leader, Wei Kuo-ching,
he has thus managed to maintain his pre-cultural revolution
position as first secretary of the provincial party structure.*
In his speech to the congress, Liu called for overcoming
arrogance and complacency in order to strengthen the
centralized leadership of the party.
Strengthening ties to his provincial bailiwick, alternate
Politburo member Chi Teng-kuei also spoke to the congress and
was named a secretary. Chi, an alternate secretary on the
* Pan Fu-sheng, in Heilungkiang, is the only other former first
secretary (1966) who became chairman of his province's revolutionary
committee and who will thereby, if the present pattern holds,
become first secretary in Heilungkiang.
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previous party committee, is also a vice chairman of the
provincial revolutionary committee. Wang Hsin, vice chairman
and second political commissar of the Honan MD; Keng Chi-chang,
a vice chairman and former chairman of a special district
revolutionary committee within Honan; and Chang Shu-chih,
commander of the Honan MD, were also named secretaries.
TSINGHAI Tsinghai's new committee consists of 45 full
COMMITTEE and 10 alternate members elected during a
party congress held in Sining from 6 to 11 March.
In its 13 March announcement, NCNA again specifically noted
adherence to the formula of old, middle-aged, and young in
selecting the new committee.
Making a surprise public appearance in Tsinghai--the first
since his March 1968 transfer to the administrative unit
of the Military Affairs Commission in Peking--Liu Hsien-chuan
emerged as first secretary of the new committee. Prior to
hid move to the central military apparatus in Peking, Liu
was chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, a
position he never officially gave up, and also commander of
the Tsinghai MD. He is also a deputy commander of the
Lanchow MR. Liu made the usual speech to the congress on
behalf of the party nucleus group.
Presumably, because of his central military duties in Peking,
Liu will continue to delegate considerable authority to first
vice chairman Chang Chiang-lin, named second secretary on
the new committee. (Except for Shanghai and Liaoning, none of.
the other new provincial-level party committees has designated
the position of second secretary.) Since Liu's departure from
Tsinghai, Chang has functioned as the unofficial acting chairman
of the provincial revolutionary committee and was identified
as commander of the Tsinghai MD--a position Liu held before
his transfer to Peking. Sung Chang-keng, political commissar
of the Tsinghai MD, was named secretary. Hsueh Hung-fa, a
vice chairman and a former alternate secretary on the old
party committee; Lu Chih-an, listened only as a responsible
person within the province during local National Day celebra-
tions last October; and Ta Lo, a provincial vice chairman and
chairman of a local college revolutionary committee, were
named deputy secretaries.
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PROGRESS Judging by recent radio reports, Kirin appears to
ELSEWHERE be making significant progress rebuilding its party
apparatus. The provincial radio on 13 March
announced a new committee for Changchun, the provincial capital.
And on 14 March Changchun radio claimed a new committee for
Peicheng special district, the second special district committee
reported in Kirin.
Amid the quickened pace of the party building campaign, a
13 March SINKIANG DAILY editorial cautioned that rebuilding
the party should not be thought of as a mechanical process.
It revealed that some units "are now carrying out the work of
party building in haste and perfunctorily, thus ignoring
the quality of the work." Complaining that some party units
have turned "party building into a mere formality," the
editorial strongly argued for improving the quality of
party consolidation. "The leadership at a higher level,"
the editorial declared, should mobilize the masses "to
recheck" the party consolidation work in those units which
have completed their rectification. Where work is not up
to standard, the units must either improve it "or carry
out the work again."
MODERATE ECONOMIC POLICIES STRESSED FOR SPRING PLANTING
Propaganda in preparation for the spring planting season is
prescribing economic policies that allow for individual
initiative within controlled limits. It is not just a
matter of propagandists saying that private plots and sideline
occupations are allowed, as was done through most of the
cultural revolution; there is now more propaganda stress
on the necessity for such phenomena at this stage of
development.
A Shantung broadcast on 5 March tells of a production brigade
in which some members "put forward a demand that private
plots be collectivized." Thinking that this represented
the mass will, brigade cadres agreed to the demand. The
commune party committee investigated the situation, blamed
the basic-level cadres for lack of understanding and failure
to educate the masses properly, and conducted an education
campaign which "guaranteed the implementation of the various
policies of the party."
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A similar lack of tolerance for leftist experimentation with
economics was evident in earlier broadcasts such as a
6 January Shanghai report on a production brigade that had
achieved a good all-round harvest, but in which some teams
had done better than others. Some team leaders wished to
raise the basis for year-end distribution to the brigade
level, but the brigade party committee ran study courses
on the problem to convince them that distribution should
proceed "in accordance with the actual production conditions
and with relevant party policy." During 1968 there was
experimentation with the size of distribution units,
especially in Kiangsi, but results appear to have been
unsatisfactory.
Thus the indications that the PRC has achieved grain
surpluses--as in Edgar Snow's reports on his recent
interview with Chou En-lai--are not being followed by
any propaganda signs that Mao will adhere to his past
practice of stepping up social and economic experimentation
whenever such surpluses become available. There is, however,
another kind of propaganda indicator that currently. suggests
the grain situation may Ladeed be quite satisfactory
(although it may also imply a recognition on the part of
the leadership that excessive concentration on grain last
year caused economic losses).
Propagandists are placing a new emphasis on agricultural
crops and activities other than grain. For example, a
Shansi broadcast on 26 February took issue with the view
that if a unit has not achieved its grain quota "no time
should be allotted for afforestation." NCNA on 7 March
sounded a similar theme, noting that for a time in an
area in Shantung there was "competition for land, fertilizers,
and manpower" between peasants who produced cotton and those
who grew grain. Some brigades "used their good land for
growing grain," and both the quantity and quality of cotton
land declined. The article denounced this tendency as well
as the opposite tendency of stressing cotton at the expense
of grain.
An investigation report of a Kansu county broadcast by Peking
radio on 12 March and seconded by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editor's
note of the same day sounded the keynote to the current line
with the injunction, "Develop a diversified economy." The
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peasants are to be encouraged to this goal not only by
Tachai-type study of Mao, but also in order that they may
"increase the collective wealth and individual incomes."
The editor's note stresses the need to "eliminate the
metaphysical viewpoint of isolating grain production or
setting it against agricultural production, animal husbandry,
and sideline occupations."
The new emphasis evident this year on crops other than grain
is especially obvious because of the singlemindedness with
which PRC media have pushed grain production over the past
few years. The current trend toward diversification lends
some credence to Chou En-lai's statement to Edgar Snow that
China now has 40 million tons of grain in state reserves,
although this figure and Chou's estimate of a 240-million-
ton yield in 1970 may be somewhat inflated.
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