TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 14, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
Confidential
IIIIIIIIUiii~~~iiiii~IIIIIIII
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIII Illllllll~~~i~l
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
14 APRIL 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 15)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999(qW(tDP85T00875R000300040016-4
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthurized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
heluded tram ouio malls'
downpreding end
detle,lIR(ellen
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release I 999/OWg i DP85T0087? A9 840016-4
14 APRIL 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . .
. i
INDOCHINA
DRV, PRG Deprecate President's Speech on Troop Withdrawal . . .
. 1
Moscow Says President Tried to Allay Antiwar Criticism . . . .
. 5
Peking Calls President's Speech "Downright Fraud" . . . . . . .
. 7
Hanoi Hails Blows to South Vietnamese Forces, Pacification . .
. 9
CPSU Congress Documents Reaffirm Support of Indochinese . . . .
. 10
Congress Reveals Major Though Limited Victory for Brezhnev . .
. 12
Resolution Reasserts Basic Foreign Policy Lines . . . . . . . .
. 17
CPSU Congress Documents Affirm Soviet Mideast Policy . . . . .
. 19
Moscow Complains of U.S. Arms to Israel, Defends Aid to Arabs .
. 20
Peking Plays People's Diplomacy with U.S. Table Tennis Team . .
. 23
PRC Reaffirms Tow;h Position on Taiwan Question . . . . . . . .
. 25
BURMA
Communist Party Inaugurates New Clandestine Radio . . . . . . .
. 27
PAKISTAN
Peking Directs Fire at India "In League with Superpowers" . . .
. .0
Moscow Pulls Back to Lnss Prominent Stance as Honest Broker . .
. 32
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR Continues to Publicize Its Stand on Bahr-Kohl Meetings . .
. 34
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
First Talks Held to Pave Way for Prague-Bonn Negotiations . . .
.36
(Continued)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release '@/bVIWL CIA-RDP8R'00300040016-4
1 APRIL 1971
CONTENTS (Continued)
Tito Assails Critics of Reforms, Warns of Party Factionalism . .
37
Croatian Party Sees Conspiracy to Discredit its Leadership . .
38
Croatians Urge Greater Foreign Policy Role for Republics . . . .
39
New Shantung Party Committee Headed by Yang Te-chih . . . . . .
41
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release I 991/0I/25"8IA-R 85 0875FWia 16-4
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 APRIL 1971
Moscow (2766 items)
Peking (1734 items)
CPSU 24th Congress
(82%)
88%
Domestic Issues
(25%)
44%
[Kosygin Speech
(--)
13%]
Indochina
(32%)
19%
[Brezhnev Report
(31%)
7%]
Table Tennis World
(13%)
15%
[Resolution
(--)
4%]
Tournament
Indochina
(2%)
4%
[U.S. Team to PRC
(--)
0.2%]
Middle East
(1%)
3%
East Pakistan Rebellion
(1%)
7%
10th Anniversary
Gagarin Space
Flight
(--)
1%
"Provocations" Against
PRC Embassy in India
(--)
2%
China
(1%)
1%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor signit.cance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 ;CqhP ~ T00875R 3 M@016-4
14 APRIL 1971
I
INDOCHINA
President Nixon's 7 April TV speech--in which he said Vietnamiza-
tion has succeeded and announced that another 100,000 U.S. troops
will be withdrawn from South Vietnam by 1 December--did not
prompt the official statements that have regularly been issued
by the Vietnamese communists on previous major pronouncements by
the President since November 1969. Initial reaction took the
form of broadcast eomme.tt from Liberation Radio and Hanoi on the
8th, with press articles on the 9th and 10th. These commentaries
uniformly deprecate the increased rate of withdrawal and point to
U.3. as well as world public demands that a date be set for
complete withdrawal of American troops. Comment on the speech
echoes other propaganda in insisting that the Vietnamization
policy in fact suffered a major defeat in the Laos operation.
The tone is illustrated in NHAN DAN's Commentator article of the
10th: "On 7 April Nixon did not resort to his past arrogant
allegations but made explanacions as if he was begging the
American people's understanding. This is understandable; a
commander-in-chief who has just been defeated cannot be arrogant."
Soviet media reacted to the President's speech in standard
fashic-i--a prompt TASS account followed by routine comment which
stresses growing demands in the United States for a withdrawal
deadline.
Peking's response to the'speech has also been routine, with an
NCNA commentary on the 10th calling the troop withdrawal
announcement a "downright fraud" aimed at appeasing public
opinion.
The enduring capability of communist forces to launch offensive
assaults is documented in detailed Hanoi accounts of fighting in
South Vietnam and Cambodia. In Vietnam the focus is on central
Trung Bo, with actions reported frcm Quang Nam Province in the
north to Darlac Province in the south. In addition to lauding
such major engagements as the battles around ARVN Fire Base 6
in Kontum Province, propagandists claim that broad attacks at
all levels are undermining the pacification machinery in the
area. Comment on Cambodia focuses on the communists' recapture
of Pich Nil Pass on Highway 4 and attacks on ARVN forces in
Kompong Chain Province.
DRV, PRG DEPRECATE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL
Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's 7 April speech
is most notable for the absence of the high-level statements
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 'ffAIWU 'vT00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/6@ff6R-1RDP85T0
9P040016-4
that have followed all previous Presidential pronouncements
related to Vietnamization and U.S. troop withdrawal since
November 1969. Beginning with the President's 3 November
speech that year, both Hanoi and the Front have reacted to
his major statements with either foreign ministry or govern-
ment statements. Most recently, DRV and PRG foreign ministry
statements responded to the President's 17 February press
conference--in which he discussed the Laos operation for the
first time--and to his 25 February foreign policy report.*
The absence of official statements now, along with the
nature of the radio and press comment, conveys a DRV view
of the speech as reflecting an essentially defensive posture:
and as breaking no new ground.
The initial reaction to the speech, in broadcasts by
Liberation Radio and Hanoi on the 8th, set the general
line for subsequent comment: The withdrawal of another
100,000 U.S. troops from South Vietnam by next December
would still leave from 180,000 to 200,000 troops. And in
the words of the Liberation Radio broadcast, "the speech
ran counter to the demands for total withdrawal and setti::g
a deadline."
Hanoi's first press comment came on the 9th in an article in
the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN entitled "Nixon is Embarrassed,
But Still Obdurate." As reviewed by VNA, it declares that the
speech "from beginning to end was an embarrassing and weak
reaction to public censure." Observing that the speech was
made at a time when the Administration was finding itself
"hard-pressed from all sides," the paper says that American
public opinion has been aroused by the "bitter setbacks" of
the Laos operation and that pre ,,ure is building up for a rapid
and total withdrac-rdl and for an announcement of a definite
withdrawal deadline.
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN says that "confronted with tangible evidence
of the lamentable reverses" in the Laos operation, the
President 'began to toile down his bragging about imaginary
victories. 11 But it goes on to complain that while admitting
the heavy casualties sustained by the Saigon troops, the
*-See the TREiDS of 24 February 1971, pages; of 3 March,
pages 1-3; and of 10 March, pages 16-17.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :c6UT00875R3016-4
14 APRIL 1971
President still contended that they had "disrupted enemy supply
lines and were able to fight effectively." It concludes that
the President apparently still harbors the "illusion" of a
military victory and is still reluctant to get down to serious
negotiations.
The same deprecatory tone marks a Commentator article in the
party paper NHAN DAN on the 10th. Headed "ALrogant Tone is
Lowered But Obstinacy Remains," the article says that while
in late February the President had boasted that "the puppet
troops in southern Laos were powerful enough to decimate the
liberation armed forces," in his latest speech he had to
admit that the Saigon troops suffered heavy casualties in
Laos. Commentator goes on to say, however, that even though
the withdrawal from southern Laos "finally turned into an
ignominous rout," the President went so far as to claim
success for his Vietnamization policy. Commentator takes
issue with the notion that Saigon troops can now fight alone
without U.S. advisers and firepower; the article says flatly
that "Nixon lied shamelessly," since the patriots' victories
on the Highway 9 front were a "striking blow" to the Nixon
Doctrine and Vietnamization. In this connection, it notes
that senators including Mc:Covern, Muskie, and Humphrey have
described the Laos operation as "a serious military defeat
for Nixon."
NHAN DAN describes the President as "not resorting to his past
arrogant allegations" and explains that this is "unc.erstandable"
in "the face of defeat." It goes on to say that "Nixon is
facing the most difficult days of his Presidential term" and is
being attacked in the United States from all directions.
Observing that the majority of the American people received
the speech "with doubt and disappointment," NHAN DAN says
the President's latest speech is in essence part of his program
of seeking votes for reelection in 1972. It concludes that
";,he American people, however, saw a very old Nixon on
television; with this speech, the U.S. electorate's crisis of
confidence in Nixon grew deeper."
AT PARIS: REACTION TO The DRV delegation spokesman in
SPEECH, PRISONER ISSUE Paris reacted to President Ni-;on's
speech promptly on the 8th with a
"declaration," publicized by DRV media late that day, which
ignored the specific substance of the speech but complained
abr!;:t the President's failure to fix a deadline for troop
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999 MWRDP85T
APR 139700040016-4
-4-
withdrawal. Like other comment, the statement said that the
President "still nurtures the illusion of military victory"
and refuses to "negotiate seriously."
The speech was the focus of attention in the communist delegates'
statements at the Paris session on the 8th--the first sazsion
of the talks since 25 March. Beth delegates cast doubt on the
President's statement that U.S. involvement in the war is coming
to an end. PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh said that the
President is in fact intensifying the bombings and shellings
and refuses to announce a timetable for total withdrawal, instead
advocating a "prolonged troop withdrawal" aimed at prolonged
"military occupation" of South Vietnam. DRV deputy delegation
head Nguyen Minh Vy said that "the question is not for the
United States to withdraw now a batch of troops and then
another," but for the United States to "bring home all its
troops." It is a "fallacious allegation" that the United
States is ending its involvement in the war, Vy said, as long
as air, naval, and ground forces participate.
Mme. Binh said that although the President "had to" deal with
peaceful negotiations in his address, he is in fact obdurately
prolonging the war and opposing a "correct peaceful solution."
The only available Vietnamese communist acknowledgments that the
President repeated the five points in his 7 October peace
proposal appear in a Hanoi radio commentary and an LPA commentary,
both on the 8th. Both claim that "he demanded such arrogant
conditions as mutual troop withdrawal, maintenance of the Thieu
regime, and immediate release of U.S. prisoners." Thus there is
no mention of his proposals for a cease-fire or a widened
Indochina conference. Xuan Thuy, in a 9 April interview at
the airport upon his return to Paris from Moscow,* also said
the President's speech proved that he "does not want to settle
the Vietnam issue by negotiations."
* Xuan Thuy's trip to Moscow had been unmentioned in
communist media until the 9th, when the Moscow domestic
service reported his departure from the Soviet capital that
day. In his interview Xuan Thuy noted that he had met with
Le Duan and Nguyen Duy Trinh, in Moscow for the 24th CPSU
Congress; the DRV spokesman at the post-session Paris press
briefing said Xuan Thuy had reported to the two DRV leaders
"on the situation of the Paris conference."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: Cd?TL00875R0(A?Q0W6-4
14 APRIL 1971
The VNA account of the session notes briefly that the GVN
delegate proposed that both sides release prisoners of war
or send them to a neutral country, and it characterizes the
proposal as "an attempt to oppose the PRG's eight-point peace
initiative." VNA also notes that DRV delegate Vy repeated,
the position that the best way for ail. U.S. soldiers, "captured
or not," to get home is by a U.S. dec?aration of readiness to
withdra*s all troops by 30 June 1971 o, some other reasonable
deadline.
Consistent with Vietnamese communist media's general practice
of ignoring the post-session press briefings, there is no
acknowledgment of the PR7 spokesman's report that Mme. Binh,
in her additional remarks, said that both the President and
the U.S. delegate "clamored about the so-called prisoner-of-war
problem" in a "hypocritical crafty maneuver" to avoid discussing
problems aimed at ending the war. Saigon's initiative. she
said, is merely aimed at serving these schemes.
The spokesman avoided a direct reply to a question about a
statement :attributed to Senator I-iartke that the communist
representatives in Paris told him all U.S. prisoners could be
released "the very next day" after the United States announced
a troop-withdrawal deadline. The spokesman merely reiterated
Vietnamese sincerity in wishing for an "early settlement" of
the prisoner question and recalled the 17 September proposal.
MOSCOW SAYS PRESIDENT TRIED TO ALLAY ANTIWAR CRITICISM
Moscow reacted to the President's speech with the usual TASS
report--transmitted some three hours after the first reaction
from Liberation Radio. Acknowledging the announcement that
an additional 100,000 men would be pulled out by 1 December,
the TASS report complains that even if this pledge were
fulfilled, 184,000 m.en would remain. It further complains
that the President failed to set a specific deadline for a
final withdrawal although he "admitted" that such a step
"has a great deal of appeal to the American people." Remark-
ing on the "propaganda nature" of the speech, TASS says
American TV commentators emphasized that the speech had been
prompted by anxiety over intensified Congressional criticism
of the Administration's Indochina policy and by a decline in
President Nixon's personal prestige after the failure of the
"gamble" in Laos.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/O?9 DU DP85TOO ,
14 A
-6-
?0040016-4
9
Moscow's followup comment, like Hanoi's complains that the
President's statements about the success of the Laos operation
and Vietnamization run counter to the facts and that the troop
withdrawal announcement was aimed merely at calming public
opinion while the President continues to seek a "military
victory."
A participant in the 11 April domestic service roundtable
discussion, like other Moscow commentators, pointed out that
a recent public opinion poll shows that some 70 percent of
the American people distrust the President's Vietnam policy;
it was in this atmosphere, the roundtable panelist said,
that the President made his "openly demagogic" speech to
assuage the protesters and justify government policy. He
noted that the President "in effect" blamed the Democrats
for the "tens of thousands" of American deaths in Vietnam,
not mentioning that it all started under the Eisenhower
Administration. Commentators say that despite the President's
efforts to counter domestic dissatisfaction with his war
policy, his speech was received with disappointment and
skepticism, and TASS reports various statements critical
of the speech by senators and the press in the United States.
A 10 April PRAVDA commentary cites Stewart Alsop for an
evaliiation of the Laos operation as not only a military
defeat but also a "political catastrophe" for the Administration.
PRAVDA says that in the situation produced by the resulting
"crisis of confidence," many "American political figures"
called upon the President not to "shut himself off from
practical reality and to take account of the Laos lesson and
the bankruptcy of Vietnamization"; they also urged him to
establish a timetable for total withdrawal that would "open
up a practicable path toward political settlement and rapid
ending of the war." But the President in his speech rejected
these appeals "out of hand" and refused "point blank" to
set such a deadline, PRAVDA says.
In a TASS commentary on the 8th, Kharkov says that the
President's statement that American involvement in Vietnam
"is nearing the end" contradicts the facts and that the United
States has actually escalated the war since the President's
last speech on troop withdrawal, on 20 April 1970. The
President's reluctance to set a deadline for troop withdrawal,
says Kharkov, is just another testimoiy to the fact that
Washington still counts on a "military solution," ignoring a
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: QJQ?j00875RQAN0M16-4
14 APRIL 1971
political settlement. In this context is it no accident, he
adds, that President Nixon's address contained no mention of
the Paris talks.
PEKING CALLS PRESIDENT'S SPEECH "DOWNRIGHT FRAUD"
In Peking's initial reaction to President Nixon's 7 April
address, en NCNA commentary dated 10 April focused on the
President's troop withdrawal announcement as a "hoax" and
termed the speech "a downright fraud" designed to "deceive
the people" and to "cover up the disastrous defeat of the
U.S. aggressor troops on the Indochina battlefield." The
next day Peking buttressed this view with reports of
Vietnamese communist reaction to the speech: the LIBERATION
PRESS AGENCY, NCNA reported, asserted that "Nixon did not
offer anything new this time, but instead rehashed his
shopworn contentions" in an effort "to smooth and deceive
public opinion"; and NCNA quoted the NHAN DAN Commentator
article of the 10th as saying that "Nixon has lied" about
the results of the operation in southern Laos and as warning
that the President "and his cohorts are plotting new
adventures in an attempt to change the situation which is
increasingly unfavorable to them."
Saying "to hell with Nixon's 'troop withdrawal' hoax," the
10 April NCNA commentary contended that the United States
will never withdraw from South Vietnam of its own accord,
since the President's goal "can never be 'a total withdrawal
from Vietnam"' but is in fact "a permanent occupation of
South Vietnam by force and its conversion into a perpetual
U.S. imperialist colony and a military base for aggression
against the whop of Indochina." Raising the possibility
of a future expansion of U.S. military action by claiming
that "every time Nixon juggled with 'troop withdrawal,' the
war of aggression was immediately enlarged," NCNA predicted
vaguely that the Nixon Administration "will embark on a more
rabid adventure."
The NCNA commentary took particular issue with the President's
refusal to set a deadline for removal of all U.S. troops, citing
his own acknowledgment that such an announcement had "great
appeal to the American people." Asserting that "the U.S.
'prisoner of war' issue" was "a ridiculous excuse" for not
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/OWffFEfMRDP85T
0040016-4
setting a withdrawal deadline, NCNA argued that U.S. airmen
shot down over North Vietnam are not prisoners of war--since
no war has been declared--but are "gangsters and murderers
whom the DRV has the right to punish according to law." The
commentary cud not address itself to the 'uestion of the
effect the announcement of a withdrawal date would have on
the prisoner issue. It thus ignored the fact that the
PRG's eight-point proposal introduced at Paris last
September provides for immediate discussion of a release
of prisoners after the United Statee agrees to a withdrawal
date.
Peking has continued to take note of the impact of Indochinese
developments on the U.S. domestic political scene. The NCNA
commentary recalled that the Laos "fiasco" had led to "uproars
in American public opinion and bitter wrangles within the U.S.
ruling circles." It thus portrayed the troop withdrawal
announcement as a. sop to U.S. public opinion, claiming that
it was a "smokescreen designed to parry public opinion, ease
popular pressure at home and abroad, and cover up the U.S.
insistence on the war of aggression." Various NCNA reports
have told of antiwar protest demonstrations in the United
States.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25dc &ftpR$5T00875F Q992A
016-4
14 APRIL 1971
HANOI HAILS BLOWS TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. PACIFICATION
A commentary in the 13 April NHAN DAN provides the most recent
press discussion of communist attacks in central Trung Bo.
Dividing the action into two periods, it claims that the first
"wave" of attacks was launched in late January and early
February and that a second wave of assaults and "uprisings"
occurred in late March and early April. The commentary says
that during the second wave the communists "annihilated a
substantial number" of allied troops, "extensively destroyed"
their war equipment, and "partially destroyed their cortrol
system." A Hanoi radio commentary on the 12th, discuss.L.ig
the fighting throughout central Trung Bo, claimed that in
all provinces in the area "clear progress" is being made in
the movement to foil the pacification plan. The broadcast
added that recent fighting in central Trung Bo and elsewhere
"has dealt a powerful blow to Nixon's deceitful allegations
in his 7 April speech that the operation into southern Laos
had the effect of preventing the communists from launching
offensives . . . . "
In addition to alleging that attacks in the central highlands
this year have dealt a blow to the pacification system, a
10 April NHAN DAN article and an editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN on the 9th reiterated claims that the assaults foiled an
allied plan to launch a major operation in the triborder
area.* A VNA commentary on the 13th elaborates, saying that
in late January and early February the allies moved the head-
quarters of the 2d Corps from Pleiku to Tan Canh "in prepara-
tion for a thrust westward into the triborder area between
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. But that operation was nipped
in the bud."
FIRE BASE 6 The 13 April VNA commentary on action in the
IN KONTUM highlands of central Trung Bo reviews the
fighting around ARVN Fire Base 6 and claims
that from 31 March--when the base was first overrun by the
communists--to 7 April the PLAF in the highlands wiped out
or captured more than 1,000 allied troops. In addition,
* Earlier instances of the claim that such an allied opera-
tion had been aborted by communist attacks included NHAN DAN
editorials on 25 February and 2 March. See the 3 March
TRENDS, page 11.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/6ffiFFF&1RDP85T0
040016-4
according to VNA, they shot down or destroyed nearly 20
aircraft, captured and destroyed 12 artillery pieces, destroyed
10 military vehicles and many storages and barracks, and
captured 23 radio transmitters, more than 100 firearms, and
a large quantity of war materiel.
The VNA commentary spells out the significance of the attacks
on Fire Base 6, noting that the base is located in the area
of Ngoc Rinh Rua and is an outpost at the junction of Highways
18 and 14. It explains further that U.S. strategists wanted
Ngoc Rinh Rua to defend the rear base in Dakto. VNA observes
that "if Ngoc Rinh Rua were lost, the district capital of
Dakto as well as the provincial capita] of Kontum would
immediately be endangered." VNA describes the fighting around
Fire Base 6, including its capture by the communists, attacks
on ARVN forces which reoccupied it, and the interception of
further ARVN units sent to break the communise siege; it says
the PLAF forces held fast to their positions despite "intense
bombing" by aircraft "including B-52's." VNA concludes that
"the siege on Ngoc Rinh Rua keeps tightening."
CPSU CONGRESS DOCUMENTS REAFFIRM SUPPORT OF INDOCHINESE
Soviet support for the Indochinese peoples is reaffirmed in
the CPSU congress appeal on Indochina and the congress resolution,
publicized on 8 and 9 April. The resolution approves the Soviet
policy of giving "all-round support" to the peoples of Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia and supports the proposals of all three
countries as showing "the only possible way" to solve the problem
of Indochina.
The appeal again points to the USSR's "all-round assistance"
to the DRV in building socialism and strengthening its defenses
and reiterates that the USSR has been "standing on the side of"
the liberation movement in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
It refers to the "uninterrupted chain of shameful failures"
being suffered by the United States in Indochina and says
Vietnamization will not help Washington achieve its "criminal
aims." The-appeal also reiterates the conviction that the
proposals of the DRV, the PRG, the NLHS, and the FUNK form.a
"constructive basis" for settling the Indochina problem. It
concludes with a call for strengthening of the "universal move-
ment" for the cessation of imperialist aggression in Indochina,
for the withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops, and for the
right of the peoples of the three countries to be masters of their
own lands.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 i6R85T00875Rfi39016-4
14 APRIL 1.971
CRITICISM A 9 April commentary in Mandarin over Moscow's
OF CHINA Radio Peace and Progress used the appeal as a
peg for routine criticism of Peking's Indochina
stance. It condemned the Chinese not only for refusing to
tai_e concerted measures with the USSR acid other socialist
countries in support of the Indochinese peoples but also for
persisting in "slandering" the Soviet Union with the aim of
separating the Indochinese people from their "loyal friends
and allies." The commentary took note of the congress' call
for strengthening o? the "universal movement" to stop the
aggression in Indochina, characterizing it an "explicit"
call for united action.
VIETNAMESE The Vietnamese communists duly express gratitude
GRATITUDE for the Soviet pledge of continued aenistance
and suppui'; in a NHAN DAN editorial, carried by
VNA on the 10th, and an LPA commentary on the 12th. Observing
that in his 7 April speech President Nixon "proved" that he has
not given up his design to prolong and expand the war and
nurtures "the illusion of winning a military victory," NHAN DAN
calls the congress appeal "a stern warning to the U.S. imperialist
aggressors and a great stimulus to the peoples of the Indochinese
countries to overcome all difficulties and persist in and step up"
their struggle "until complete victory."
In a similar vein, LPA terms the appeal "a new lofty .nanifesta-
tion of the militant solidarity and warm friendship between the
Vietnamese and Soviet peoples and a stimulus to our people to
march forward and score more brilliant feats of arms on all
battlefields." It goes on to say that the Nixon "clique,"
despite "heavy setbacks," has not given up its aggressive
designs and that the President's 7 April speech "was a clear
manifestation of his stubborn nature and schemes of prolonging
the U.S. war of aggression." Nevertheless, LPA continues, with
the "valuable support and assistance" of the USSR and other
socialist countries, the South Vietnamese people are determined
to persist in and step up their struggle.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5.4 APRIL 1971
CPSU CONGRESS
CONGRESS RG40EALS MAJOR 1H000H LIMITED VICTORY FOR BREZHNEV
The 24th CPSU Congress resulted in a significant albeit measured
victory for Brezhnev. The speeches contained fulsome tributes
to Brezhnev, but there was also frequent praise for the Politburo
as a whole and for collective leadership. Four proteges and allies
of Brezhnev were added to the Politburo, but no incumbent was
dropped, and the total composition of the 25-man ruling group--
Politburo and Secretariat--remains intact. And despite an
unusually large number of new Central Committee members, the
number of new Brezhnev adherents seems modest.
TREATMENT Most speakers proffered generous praise for
OF BREZHNEV Brezhnev's report; some went further, crediting
him personally, together with the Central
Committee and Politburo, with achievements in a variety of fields.
Brezhnev's agricultural contributions were cited in this manner
by the --.rst secretaries of Belorussia (Masherov), Lithuania
(Snechkua), Altay Krai (Georgiyev), Moscow Oblast (Konotop),
and Saratov Oblast (Shibayev). He was credited with certain
initiatives in agriculture (Krasnodar First Secretary Zolotukhin
and Latvian First Secretary Voss) and in other fields (Turkmen
First Secretary Gapurov and Bashkir First Secretary Shakirov).
Brezhnev's general leadership--along with that of the Central
Committee and Politburo--was also acclaimed by Leningrad First
Secretary Romanov, Gorkiy First Secretary Maslennikov, Uzbek
First Secretary Rashidov, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan,
Komsomol First Secretary Tyazhelnikov, Tatar First Secretary
Tabeyev, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy, Trade Union Secretary
Prokhorov, RSFSR Gosplan Chairman Gerasimov, Yakutsk First
Secretary Chiryayev, and Kazakh Premier Ashimov.
In addition to the accolades to "the Central Committee, its
Politburo and Comrade Brezhnev personally," Brezhnev's
preeminence in the leadership was accorded special acclaim
by a number of speakers. Kunayev praised Brezhnev's "skill" in
uniting the ruling group and directing the work of the Central
Committee. Brezhnev's "huge role" in the leadership also
received special praise from Azerbaydzhan First Secretary
Aliyev, and his personal qualities of leadership were warmly
acclaimed by Moldavian First Secretary Bodyiil and Kirgiz First
Secretary Usubaliyev.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
l1 APRIL 1971
The subject of collectivity was raised by Brezhnev and 10 other
speakers; but at least half of these were outspoken Brezhnev
supporters (I:unayev, Rashidov, Aliyev, Shakirov, and Shcherbitskiy),
and their assertions that collectivity is being observed were
probably designed to allay fears of a Brezhnev cult. Perhaps
more important than the few direct references to collectivity
was the fact that many speakers, while praising Brezhnev's
report, paid little or no deference to him and praised the
central institutions of power--the Central Committee, Politburo
or Secretariat.
OTHER Brezhnev thus received considerable attention from
LEADERS other speakers, and his major report as well as his
two brief addresses were broadcast and televised live.
Kosygin's report was not broadcast nor televised live, although
the text was subsequently read by an announcer on Radio Moscow;
his report seemed to tea handled as a matter of less importance
than in 1966, with fewer officials taking part in the discussion
of the report. Podgornyy, who had delivered a lengthy,
substantive speech in 1966, this time delivered only the
opening honorific address; it was broadcast live, as part of
the live relay of Brezhnev's report. The only other speech
by a Politburo member, that by Shelest, was broadcast in
near-text by Radio Moscow, read by an announcer. Although
his predecessor as trade union chairman had addressed the
23d congress, Shelepin did not do so; one of his subordinates
spoke on behalf of the trade unions.
As also happened in 1966, the RSFSR was the only republic whose
leader did not address the congress; RSFSR Gosplan Chairman
Gerasimov was again the RSFSR spokesman. Moreover, the
agricultural programs advanced by RSFSR leader Voronov, such
as mechanized links and specialization in meat cattle, were
ignored, even by speakers who had supported these programs
earlier (Zolotukhin, Kulichenko, Kovalenko, and Georgiyev,
first secretaries respectively of Krasnodar, Volgograd, Orenburg,.
and Altay). Kovalenko and Georgiyev even appeared criticial of
Voronov's RSFSR government in regard to such agricultural
matters as fertilizer allotments and measures to improve
Siberian crop yields.
ECONOMIC The congress discussions clearly reflected the
REFORM diminishing support for the economic reform plan.
Although Kosygin defended the reform and even spoke
of working out new "proposals for its further development," it
was in general ignored, with a few speakers criticizing it.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/q%Mn jA DP85T00j. lN 80040016-4
lit APRIL 1971
- 14 -
Brezhnev's report, as published in PRAVDA, contained a brief
statement endor6ing the reform in economic management; this
was, however, one of the passages he omitted in actually
reading the report.* He dwelt at greater length on the short-
comings in the present system and urged measures to encourage
enterprises to adopt higher plan targets, accelerate scientific--
technological progress, stimulate labor productivity, anl improve
product quality and use of resources.
Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul was most openly critical of
the implementation of the reform for reducing the number of
centrally planned indicators. He pointedly endorsed the
methods for improving economic output proposed in Brezhnev's
report. Belorussian First Secretary Masherov also criticized
shortcomings in the reform, but he characterized the reform as
the correct course "as a whole." Lithuanian First Secretary
Snechkus, Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, RSFSR Gosplan Chairman
Gerasimov, and an auto plant director credited the reform
with successes. But most congress speakers conspicuously
ignored the reform in their discussion of economic policy.
On the other hand, production associations, which Brezhnev
endorsed and which Kosygin praised as an extension of the
reform, received wide support at the congress. Many of the
speakers went on record in favor of the innovation, as had
been the case at the republic congresses earlier.
POLITBURO Full Politburo membership was increased from
ENLARGED 11 to 15, with the promotion of three candidate.
members and one secretary, all apparent Brezhnev
supporters. No incumbent was dropped, however, and the
25-man leadership collective--the Politburo and Secretariat--
still consists of the same 25 men.
Promotion of his proteges from Kazakhstan and the Ukraine,.
Kunayev and Shcherbitskiy, to full Politburo membership
marks a clear gain for Brezhnev. The elevation of
agriculture secretary Kulakov, who has worked under
* While the passages omitted from the report in Brezhnev's
reading are mostly explainable- -they consisted largely of
statistical materials and certain elaborations in the latter
portion when an effort was being made tc keep to schedule--
Brezhnev did reveal an ability to skip lightly over items he
is not on record as favoring in the past.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 APRIL 1971
Brezhnev and Poiyanskiy on agricultural matters since late 1964,
will also strengthen Brezhnev's hand. Grishin, also promoted,
has frequently praised Brezhnev's speeches and may owe his 1967
appointment to the Moscow leadership post partly to Brezhnev.
CENTRAL Despite the election of 88 new members ani 84 new
COMMITTEE candidate members to the Central Committee, no
no very marked degree of favoritism toward Brezhnev
followers is evident. Those Brezhnev adherents whose elevation
to 'she Central Committee or promotion from candidate status is
not clearly attributable to their official positions are few in
number. The first secrctary of Brezhnev's home city of
Dneprodzerzhinsk, I. L. Furs, was elected a Central Committee
candidate member, as was his predecessor V. F. Dobryk at the
1966 congress. A handful of Brezhnev's assistants in the
Central Committee Secretariat--administrator of affairs of
the Central Committee G. S. Pavlov, head of the Central
Committee's general section K. U. Chernenko, and Brezhnev
assistant G. E. Tsukanov--were elected Central Committee
members. Another assistant, A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov,
was elected an Auditing Commission member. Pavlov and
Chernenko had been Central Committee candidate members,
and Tsukanov had been on the Auditing Commission. Strangely,
Brezhnev's agricultural assistant V. A. Golikov was not so
honored.
Assistants to Kosygin and Podgornyy were also added to the
central organs, however. A. K. Gorchakov, head of the
secretariat of the Council of Ministers; M. S. Smirtyukov,
administrator of affairs of the Council of Ministers; and
L. M. Shevehenko, assistant to the chairman of the Sup,cme
Soviet Presidium, were elected to the Auditing Commission,
while P. F. Pigalev, head of the Supreme Soviet Presidium's
department for questions of work of soviets, was reelected
to the Auditing Commission.
Podgornyy presumably can claim credit for the reelection of
his former subordinates V. N. Titov to the Central Committee
and Pigalev to the Auditing Commission, even though their
present posts do not rate such high honors. Titov was
recently demoted from Kazakh second secretary to deputy
CEMA representative, while Pigalev had joined the Auditing
Commission in his capacity as first deputy head of the
Central Committee's cadre section (then under Titov). One
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 190NpiIA-RDP85871ffi8q0300040016-4
14 APRIL 1971
-16-
Podgornyy-Titov protege from Kharkov, A. A. Bulgakov, chairman
of the vocational-technical education committee, was promoted
from Central Committee candidate member to full member, while
another, Ukrainian First Deputy Premier N. A. Sobol, was
dropped from the Central Committee.
Brezhnev's adherents in the KGB leadership appeared somewhat
favored. First deputy chairman S. K. Tsvigun and deputy
chairman V. M. Chebrikov--both having apparent ties with
Brezhnev--were elected Central Committee candidate members.
KGB deputy chairman G. K. Tsinev, also appoi..ted after the
removal of the old Shelepin-Semichastnyy leadership, became
an Auditing Commission member. This is a considerable
expansion of KGB representation; at the 1966 congress KGB
chairman Semichastnyy was the sole KnB member of the central
organs.
THE LOSERS In addition to the removal of previously demoted
officials, the new Central Committee and Auditing
Commission lists omit some officials not previously known to be
in difficulty. Those dropped from membership in the central
organs and apparently slated for retirement include the labor
and wages committee chairman, A. P. Volkov; Ambassador to France
V. A. Zorin; people's control committee chairman P..V. Kovanov;
Ukrainian first deputy premiers V. Ye. Semichastnyy and
N. A. Sobol; the first secretary of the Mordvin Obkom,
P. M. Ye].istratov; and Central Committee section heads
N. N. Organov, P. K. Sizov, and A. S. Panyushkin.
Hardest hit by the changes is Shelepin. Not only.were his
demoted former colleagues S. P. Pavlov, V. Ye. Semichastnyy,.
D. P. Goryunov, N. N. Mesyatsev, and V. S: Tikunov dropped
from the Central Committee, but so were two former-subordinates
still in high office: people's control committee chairman
Kovanov and Central Committee light industry-food industry
section head Sizov. In addition, a shakeup in Shelepin's trade
union apparatus appears in the offing. Trade union bouncil
secretaries T. N. Nikolayeva and N. N. Romanov.vere dropped
from the Central Committee, while trade union council
secretaries V. I. Prokhorov and A. P. Biryukova replaced
them.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 APRIL 1971
- 17 -
RSFSR Premier Voronov lost his retired first deputy K. G. Pysin
and also his deputy for construction A?. Ye. Biryukov (dropped
from the Auditing Commission). Apart from the fact that his
rival Shcherbitskiy was promoted to full Politburo membership,
Ukrainian leader Shelest appears to have fared poorly in regard
to the new Central Committee membership. While no one visibly
close to him gained, several men associated with his rivals
Premier Shcherbitskiy and President Lyashko were promoted:
Ivano-Frankovsk First Secretary V. F. Dobryk, Kiev First.
Secretary V. M. Tsybulko, and Ukrainian Secretary A. A. Titarenko
to Central Committee membership, Dneprodzerzhinsk city First
Secretary I. L. Furs, new Ukrainain Secretary Ya. P. Pogrebnyak,
and new Ukrainian trade vnion chief V. A. Sologub to Central
Committee candidate membership. First Deputy Premier Sobol--
a probable ally of Shelest--was dropped from the Cent a,1
Committee, becoming the only Ukrainian Politburo member
not holding CPSU Central Committee membership or candidate
membership.
Several newspaper editors were promoted. Former-RURAL-LIFE--
editor P. F. Alekseyev, who has Just replaced V.. P. Moskovskiy
as SOVIET RUSSIA editor, and LITERARY GAZETTE editor
A. B. Chakovskiy were elected Central Committee candidate
members. SOCIALIST INDUSTRY editor V. N. Golubev and-new
RUhAL LIFE editor N. A. Zokolupin were named Auditing
Commission members.
RESOLUTION REASSERTS BASIC FOREIGN POLICY LINES
The resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress, released on.1O April,
adheres closely to the foreign policy line set foc;;h by
Brezhnev in his Central Committee report on 30 March. It
repledges Moscow to pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence;
in a virtual verbatim repeat of Brezhnev, it says that the
USSR has combined "firm rebuffs to aggression" with a
"constructive line-of settling urgent international problems."
Like Brezhnev's report, the resolution does not explicitly
reassert Soviet advocacy of settlement of international.
questions by negotiations; but Gromyko in his 3 April address
to the congress declared that the USSR supports the resolution.
of outstanding international problems "by peaceful means, by
means of negotiations."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 APRIL 1971
- 18 -
In the pattern of the resolution adopted at the 23dCPSU
Congress in 1966, the current document does not treat -
disarmament--an issue dealt with in some detail by Brezhnev.
in the opening report. It routinely attacks U.S. "aggression"
in Indochina and U.S. "encouragement" of Israel in the-Middle.
East. At one point it singles out "American in-perialism". as
the "greatest danger" to the independence of peoples and to
world peace. and as the chief obstacle on the path to social..
progress. And it observes that the "aggressive-direction"-
of U.S. foreign policy and the "fanning up of militarism
carry . . . the danger of a world war."
The resolution. balances these observations with the
affirmation that the USSR is prepared to develop relations
with the United States. It also says that "one of the key
problems" in strengthening general peace is the insuring
of European security; it hails the FRG's 1970 treaties
with the USSR and Poland as important steps in this
endeavor, and it states that a conference on European
security would further contribute to this struggle.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA~RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/2~0M,)E85T00875RP3(P016-4
14 APRIL 1971
MIDDLE EAST
CPSU CONGRESS DOCUMENTS AFFIRM SOVIET MIDEAST POLICY
The CPSU Congress statement on the Middle East, issued on 8 April,
routinely chastises Israel for its refusal to withdraw from the
occupied Arab territories, again pledges support to the Arabs, calls
for a political settlement, and twice urges satisfaction of the
Palestinian Arabi' "legitimate rights." Similar to the 28 February
Soviet Government statement, the congress statement vaguely prescribes
joint efforts by all peaceloving forces to "curb the Israeli
aggressors" and make them withdraw. The statement makes the standard
charge that Israel's patrons, "the U.S. imperialist circles, hypo-
critically express a desire for peace" while encouraging the Israeli
"ultras." And it approves the "constructive" position of the Arab
countries, first of all the UAR, as creating favorable conditions
for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.
With regard to the Middle East, the 10 April congress resolution on
Brezhnev's report rubberstamps Soviet policy aimed at seeking a
political settlement which would include Israeli withdrawal, the
exercise by each state of its "right to an independent existence,"
and satisfaction of the Palestinian Arabs' legitimate rights.
UAR, ISRAELI TASS on 2 April reported UAR President as-Sadat's
POSITIONS definition of Cairo's position, as broadcast by
Cairo radio that day, noting his statement of
readiness to begin clearing the canal as soon as Israel begins
partial withdrawal, as the first phase of full withdrawal, and to
observe a cease-fire "for the period of practical implementation
of the above proposal." Cairo's version said that the UAR would
agree to extend the cease-fire "for a definite period" in which
Jarring woulO draw up a timetable for implementing Resolution 242.
The TASS account does not mention as-Sadat's statement that UAR
armed forces would cross the canal "to assume their national duties
on the east bank"; Cairo's AL-AHRAM on the 3d, calling attention to
points "worthy of attention" in as-Sadat's statement, mentioned
"its insistence that the Egyptian army cross the canal to Sinai
immediately on completion of partial withdrawal." The TASS account
does note other points also singled out by AL-AHRAM: rejection of
demilitarization of Sinai--while accepting demilitarized zones on
both sides of the borders--and rejection of proposals for the
transfer of Sharm ash-Shaykh to Israel or for Israeli participation
in an international force in that area.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/0RP C1A-RDP85T00
09940016-4
Limited Soviet comment on the Middle East crisis highlights
Cairo's statement of readiness to conclude a peace treaty with
Israel, contingent upon Israel's withdrawal, as well as the UAR
proposal on reopening the Suez Canal--points stressed by Brezhnev
in his 30 March congress report as providing a "real basis" for
a Middle East solution. A foreign-language commentary by Soltan
on the 13th additionally points out that Cairo agrees to allow
Israel "the right to use both the canal and the Tiran Strait."
In the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 14th,
panelist Primakov said that Egypt fully agreed to do everything
it could to guarantee the security of the existence of all
states of the area. Referring to Resolution 2142--which Brezhnev
did not mention--Primakov called it the only document "of a
compromise nature" providing for a just political settlement.
Moscow only briefly takes note of a resolution of the Israeli
Labor Party convention, TASS reporting from New York on the 7th
that the convention approved the government's "aggressive course"
in a resolution stressing the need for substantial change in
Israel's former frontiers. While hypocrit5cally proclaiming its
wish "to hold 'peaceful talks' with the Arabs," TASS said, the
convention reaffirmed the policy of creating Israeli settlements
on the occupied Arab lands.
MOSCOW COMPLAINS OF U.S, ARMS TO ISRAEL, DEFENDS AID TO ARABS
Two Soviet propagandists, in the domestic service commentators'
roundtable and in a foreign-language commentary, profess concern
over continued U.S. deliveries of "offensive" weapons to Israel.
The latter goes on to take guarded note of Western and Israeli
reporte of Soviet military deliveries to Cairo and to repeat
Moscow's standard, but infrequently expressed, justification for
its arms deliveries to the Arabs.
In the roundtable on 4 April, Primakov criticized Washington
for trying "to create the illusion now of a certain modification
of its course," declaring that it would be a real step toward
peace if the United States discontinued its supplies of arms,
"if only of offensive arms," to Israel. And the Soltan foreign-
language commentary on the 13th complains that while efforts
were being made to create a favorable atmosphere for peace
negotiations, the United States "flooded Israel with weapons
of attack are is still pouring them in."
Soltan goes on to make what is apparently Moscow's first,
cautiously worded, rejoinder to Western press reports of
deliveries of Soviet military equipment, including MIG-23
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/2560 A5T00875ROAqgQM016-4
14 APRIL 1971
fighters, to the UAR. He claims that the Americans have many
times "grossly falsified facts in an attempt to whitewash their
action," and says that the State Department--in a statement by
e spokesman on the l2th--complained about an alleged increase
in "Soviet aid" to the UAR "supposedly upsetting a balance" in
the Middle East and hampering a political settlement. It is the
United States and Israel which are frustrating a peaceful
settlement, he routinely charges.
Soltan recalls that the CPSU Congress pointed out that the USSR
is ready to join "any other" permanent member of the Security
Council in international guarantees. He does not attribute the
remark yo Brezhnev, who said in his congress report that the
Soviet Union is prepared to join "other powers" who are Council
members in creating international guarantees. Soltan adds that,
however, the Soviet Union will continue its firm support of the
Arab nations; enlarging on this pledge, made by Brezhnev, he says
the USSR will "grant them all aid, including military aid, as
victims of aggression fighting in a just cause." This is
Moscow's standard argument in defense of Soviet military aid.
Thus Kosygin in a July 1968 press conference in Stockholm had
asserted that deliveries of arms to Arab countries defending
themselves against aggression are "Just" deliveries, but those
to Israel are deliveries of arms to an aggressor and the USSR
condemns and will oppose them.
The Soltan commentary does not repeat Brezhnev's cryptic remark,
following the expression of readiness to join in guarantees for
a political settlement, that "after this is achieved" it would
be possible "to consider further steps aimed at reducing war
tension" in the region, particularly tuning the Mediterranean
into a sea of peace and cooperation. It is possible that
Brezhnev had in mind the question of reduction of arms to the
Middle Eaat; the Soviet position has been that this issue cannot
he solved before withdrawal of Israeli troops, as Kosygin said
in his June 1967 press conference at the United Nations. The
1 July 1968 Soviet Government memorandum on disarmament measures
also noted that the question of measures for lir' ...ng the
Middle East arms race could be considered only after full
Israeli withdrawal.
Brezhnev's reference to the Mediterranean is unclear, although
Soviet propagandists from time to time link U.S. and NATO
presence in the Mediterranean with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Groinyko in his UN General Assembly speech last October had
found it "difficult not to link" Israeli "annexationist"
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release I 0974 8'ATCIA-RDP85TIN-A 0300040016-4
L 1971
ambitions with the "increase in the stream of offensive weapons
they are receiving from their patrons and with the latter's
recent show of naval strength in the eastern Mediterranean.'"
Brezhnev himself had demanded the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth
Fleet from the Mediterranean in his speech at the European CP
conference on European security in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia,
in April 1967.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release I 999/O9/ IRP85TO08 ?FtD99 040016-4
14 APRIL 1971
SINO - U,S, RELATIONS
PEKING PLAYS PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY WITH U.S, TABLE TENNIS TEAM
Peking's current venture into "people's diplomacy" by hosting
an American table tennis delegation has thus far been unencum-
bered by propaganda attacks on U.S. policy. NCNA has reported
he delegation's 10 April arrival at Peking airport, where it
was greeted by officials of the All-China Sports Federation
and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign
Countries; a welcoming banquet given on the 11th by the sports
federation; and a ceremony on the 13th at which Chinese and
American players played "friendly matches."* As of this writing,
Peking has not reported Chou En-tai's meeting on the 14th with
members of the American and other foreign teams now in Peking.
There has been no reference to Sino-U.S. political relations
in Peking'b coverage of the American team's visit. The theme
of people's diplomacy was struck at the 11 April banquet,
where a sport. federation official called the visit "an
expression of friendship of the American people for the
Chinese people" and voiced the hope that it would promote
"understanding and friendship between the sportsmen and
people" of the two countries.
A polemical note had been sounded prior to the delegation's
arrival, in an 8 April NCNA feature on the friendly atmosphere
at the just concluded world table tennic tournament at Nagoya,
Japan. NCNA quoted a Chinese player as saying to an unnamed
American couple: "Though the U.S. Government is hostile to
China, the Chinese and American people are on good terms. We
differentiate the U.S. Government from the American people."
NCNA added that "the two American friends agreed with him."
There has been no echo of this line in propaganda on the U.S.
delegation's visit.
Peking's invitation, coming less than a month after the United
States announced the removal of restrictions on American
* NCNA's report on the matches did not disclose the scores.
According to accounts filed by American correspondents covering
the visit, the Chinese tactfully won by only a moderate margin.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release I 99M A$ IA-RDP8 ORBIWO0300040016-4
1 APRIL 1971
-24-
travel to the PRC, followed extensive publicity for the Chinese
table tennis team's activities at the world championships.
Propaganda on Chinese sports activities has accompanied the
PRC's resurgent diplomatic activity as part of its emergence
from the isolation of the cultural revolution. In addition
to the U.S. delegation, teams from Canada, Colombia, Nigeria,
and Britain have also arrived in the PRC from the world
'r)urnament. Earlier, an NCNA dispatch from Nagoya on the
0th reported a decision by six Asian and African delegations
to sponsor an Afro-Asian table tennis tournament in Peking
at an unspecified future date.
The only references to politi ,l relations in Peking's
coverage of the various team visits have accented the
positive. NCNA's reports on the Canadian and Nigerian
delegations hare taken note of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the PRC and these countries in recent months;
and a ceremony on the 12th, featuring matches between the
Canadian and Chinese players, was attended by Kuo Mo-jo, vice
chairman of the National People's Congress and a ranking PRC
representative in relations with noncommunist countries.
SOVIET Soviet reaction to the U.S. team's visit to the
REACTION PRC has been in a low key, though Moscow's
abiding suspicion regarding any improvement of
Sino-U.S. relations shows through. A TASS dispatch from
Washington on the llth cited the American press as terming
Peking's invitation a significant step "despite all the
Chinese rhetoric and propaganda." TASS quoted a State
Department spokesman who welcomed the entry into the PRC of
American journalists accompanying the team as comporting with
Washington's policy of expanding contacts with Peking.
A Soviet foreign-language broadcast on the 10th juxtaposed a
report on the PRC's 490th "serious warning" to the United
States on 9 April with a report of Peking's decision to
permit U.S. correspondents to cover the table tennis delega-
tion's visit. The broadcast also pointed out that the
invitation to the delegation and the entry permits for the
correspondents had been announced shortly after Washington's
removal of restrictions on American travel to the PRC.
The broadcast's implied linkage reflects Moscow's concern
over what a recent NEW TIMES article (No. 13, dated 26 March)
called "the diplomacy of smiles" between Washington and Peking.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release rF1RP85TOO875ROq,4PR0%99J 6-4
14 APRIL 1971
Taking note of President Nixon's call for a dialogue with
Peking in his recent foreign policy i.eport to Congress, the
article reviewed steps taken by the United States to expand
relations with the PRC and signs that Peking may be willing
to reciprocate. Expressing apprehend on over the effect on
its position in the triangular relationship if the other two
sides improve their relations, NEW TIMES found it "disturbing"
that Washington's overtures to Peking coincide with a resur-
gence of "anti-Soviet hysteria" in China. Moscow's sensitivity
on this matter was underscored by the article's references to
the Sino-Soviet border dispute, a subject which Soviet media
have largely ignored in recent months.
PEKING REAFFIRMS TOUGH POSITION ON TAIWAN QUESTION
Peking's practice of people's diplomacy with the table tennis
teams has undoubtedly been facilitated by the absence from the
world tournament of a Nationalist Chinese team. That the Taiwan
question remains a major impediment was indicated by Peking's
statements on 31 March withdrawing from the International Archery
Federation and the International Lawn Tennis Federation in pro-
test against memberships of Nationalist Chinese organizations in
these bodies. The statements reiterated Peking's claim to Taiwan
and its vigorous objection to any arrangement smacking of a "two
Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" solution. In addition, NCNA
on 30 March publicized remarks by the president of the Japan Table
Tennis Association opposing a Taiwan presence in the International
Table Tennis Federation either in the name of the Republic of China
or of Taiwan.
Peking's tough stance on the Taiwan question was recently reaffirm-
ed in an NCNA commentary on 10 April--the date of the arrival of
the U.S. team in Peking--reacting sharply to statements by the
Japanese premier and foreign minister professing a desire for
better relations with Peking. While acknowledging that Premier
Sato had amended an earlier statement ruling out a change in
Sino-Japanese relations during his incumbency, the commentary came
down hard on the Taiwan question as a core issue. NCNA took note
of ?ecent consultations between U.S. and Japanese officials as
demonstrating "the increasingly close collusion of the U.S. and
Japanese reactionaries in the scheme of creating 'one China, one
Taiwan.'" Expressing Peking's concern lest the PRC's momentum
toward broader acceptance in the international community might
be arrested short of its goal of fully displacing the Chiang
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 19994'1q`4M4-RDP85T00`D=00040016-4
l4 APRIL 1.971
-26-
regime, NCNA equated the effort to produce a new formula for
obstructing the perennial Albanian motion at the United Taations--
which calls for admission of the PRC and expulsion of the ROC--
with the "one China, one Taiwan" approach.
NCNA also took note of recent disclosures that the disputed
Senkakus will be included in the reversion of the Ryukyus to
Japanese jurisdiction. The commentary claimed that "the
Japanese militarists with the support of U.S. imperialism"
have begun preparations for "military occupation" of the dis-
puted islands and "for the encroachment upon China's terri-
torial sovereignty." The commentary again registered Peking's
apprehensiveness over possible Japanese moves to thwart the
PRC's objectives centering on Taiwan rid the Senkakus, parti-
cularly if Tokyo seeks to invoke the .,.-eaty commitments between
Japan, the United States, and the ROC.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/2?0N9IIRRJ?L85TOO875 9
P0 ;9$#0016-4
14 APRIL 1971
27
BURMA
COMUNIST PARTY INAUGURATES NEW CLANDESTINE RADIO
A new communist clandestine radio, the "Voice of the People -of
Burma," has been established to promote the pro-Peking Burmese
Communist Party (BCP) line of revolutionary armed insurgency.
The appearance of the new radio comes on the heels of the
arrival in Rangoon on 22 March of a new PRC ambassador, capping
a two-year trend toward moderation in Peking's treatmcnt of the
Ne Win regime, and occurs during a period in which official PRC
media have vir' ally ceased giving propaganda support to the
BC-Is insur, 'ne. *
In presumab) iding facilities for the new radio while
itself improi, its state relations with Burma, Peking may
be seeking t( iumvent the dilemma posed by the constraints
of its diplom, objectives and the propaganda needs of the
loyally Maoist Lr,ese communists. Peking may hope to keep
the atmosphere of Sino-Burmese relations as clear as possible
by avoiding direct attacks on the Ne Win government in its
own name, in effect creating a division of labor according to
which the BCP's radio propagates the revolutionary line while
the official PRC media observe the diplomatic constraints.
Peking has not thus far reported the existence of the new
clandestine radio. There was a three-week delay before Peking
reported on the clandestine Voice of the Malayan Revolution,
which had been inaugurated on 15 November 1969. PRC media
replay comment attributed to the Voice of the Malayan
Revolution and to the still older clandestine radio of the
pro-Peking Thai Communist Party, the "Voice of the People of
Thailand," which was first heard in 1962.
INAUGURAL A BCP Central Committee statement proclaimed the
BROADCAST inauguration of the Voice of the People of Burma
on 28 March, the 23d anniversary of the launching
of the insurgent movement in Burma--an event ignored by Peking
media for the first time in several years. Transmitting two
hours daily, the radio announced that it will broadcast in
Burmese four days a week and in Northern Shan dialect, Shan,
and Mandarin on the other three days.
* Peking's treatment of the Ne Win government is discussed in
the TRENDS of 37. March 1971, pages 29-30.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release I 999/0fi"' iA RDP85T0 Pi
0040016-4
r~"8~
.. )P
OI
The four-point BCP statement announcing the radio's inauguration
indicated that it will pursue a line of revolutionary armed
struggle against the government and an antirevisionist
ideological line avowedly Maoist in inspiration. The statement
declared as its first point that inauguration of the radio
marked the opening of "a new military front to successfully
fight Ne Win's military government" and that it would contribute
to "organizing and uniting the people, the people's army,
members of communist youth organizations, comrades under the
leadership of the party, and party members along its policy
of military victory and seizure of power."
The statement's second point called for struggle against both
"internal and external revisionists," though it did not mention
the Soviets. It argued that support for Ne Win's "Burmese way
to socialism" represents a revisionist heresy, reviving old
factional disputes by tracing this aberration to the "traitor-
opportunist" Thein Pe Myint's doctrine of peaceful evolution.
In its third point the statement denounced Ne Win's nonaline-
ment as a mask and called for opposition to "U.S. imperialism
and reviving Japanese militarism."
Positing the "ultimate aim" of the BCP--"realization of the
communist system in Burma"--in its fourth point, the statement
acknowledged "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" as the
"ideological basis" of the new radio, which will abide by the
instructions of the late BCP chairman, Thakin Than Tun:
"concentrate on military victory; based on peasantry, organize
the national groups and expand the front; party coi:etruction
is the key."
INITIAL The firL't commentaries of the Voice of the People
COMMENT of Burma, including a BCP Central Committee state-
ment marking the 23d anniversary of the insurgency
and a commentary explaining the "people's army," have attacked
the "Ne Win military clique"--:t term not used by Peking in its
own name since September 1969. They have also stressed the
necessity for hardships and sacrifices, underscored the
importance of the BCP leadership's role, and emphasized that
"the line of winning the war and seizing power is the only way
to liberate the suffering masses."
Recalling that the late chairman, Than Tun, and other comrades
had given their lives for the rF.,oiution, the BCP anniversary
statement appeared to anticipate continued hardship and
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : 9JA. $A T00875Rggq O , jP16-4
14 APHIr1 1.971.
- 29 -
sacrifice for the BCP-led insurgents. Noting that "a revolution
is bound to encounter difficulty and hardship for a long period,"
the statement warned that revolutionaries must "make sacrifices
and undergo shortages of food and clothing and poor living
conditions" and that "they must even give up their lives"; but
it added that "they can sacrifice everything if they are faith-
ful to the BCP."
The commentary entitled "What is the People's Army?" described it
as "a genuine people's army" under the leadership of the BCP,
"which is the vanguard of the proletariat." Claiming that
"acceptance of the sole and direct leadership of the BCP is
essential to the people's army," the commentary said that the
army opposed revisionism and dogmatism and accepted only
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought "as its guiding philosophy."
Other than references to the late Than Tun, who was
assassinated in September 1968, the initial material carried
by the new radio has skirted the question of the current
leadership of the BCP, indicating that the succession has
not yet been settled. Specifically, there is no mention of
Thakin Ba Thein Tin, who has been identified by Peking as BCP
Central Committee vice chairman and head of the resident BCP
delegation in Peking. The last reference to Ba Thein Tin
appeared in a 2 October NCNA report citing his presence at the
PRC's national day celebrations.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 199910 I25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
N1IDE N'.I!IA.T.~ 1~13IS '.CR.Ii~Nl~f3
111 APIZIL 19rt1.
PAKISTAN
Having placed itself officially on record in Podgornyy's
3 April message to Pakistani President Yahya Khan as a
"concerned friend" of Pakistan whose primary interest is
in stopping the bloodshed, Moscow has pulled back to a less
visible stance as a nonpartisan peacemaker ready and able
to lend its good offices through quiet diplomacy. Thus
Soviet media have reverted since the release of Podgornyy's
message to the kind of sparse, balanced reportage that
marked their initial reaction to the Pakistan events,
while noting that Kosygin had met with the ambassadors
of both India and Pakistan.
Peking, on the other hand, has developed the approach
adopted in its first, belated reaction to the Pakistan
events on 3 April, charging India and the Soviet and U.S.
"superpowers" with flagrant intervention and carrying
the text of Podgornyy's message as evidence. Peking
has also publicized Yahya's reply to Podgornyy, which
Moscow media have not mentioned. Peking has not publicized
its own subsequent official. demarche--a Chou En-lai
message to Yahya which, as reported by West Pakistan
sources on 12 April, came down hard on the need for
"unity of the people of East and West Pakistan" and
implicitly attacked the separatist leaders as "a handful
of persons who want to sabotage the unity of Pakistan."
PEKING DIRECTS FIRE AT INDIA "IN LEAGUE WITH SUPERPOWERS"
Chinese media for the first time acknowledged the existence
of widespread civil disorders in Pakistan through the
device of publicizing Podgornyy's 3 April message and
Yahya's reply of the 5th. In line with its failure to
publicize Chou En-tai's message, Peking has publicly neither
condemned the separatist efforts of the East Pakistanis
nor explicitly supported the efforts of Yahya's military
government to restore control over the Eastern wing.
Rather, its treatment of the East Pakistan events has
stressed the improprieties of foreign interference--
Indian, Soviet, and, to a lesser degree, U.S.--in what it
portrays as a purely internal affair of Pakistan, without
clearly defining the internal issues. Thus the thrust
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040016-4
CONFIDJCN'.I'..TAL .F131S 'T'RENDS
.l4 APRILS 1971.
of PRC media's coverage--in particular, NCNA's Juxtaposition
of the texts of Podgornyy's message and Yahya's reply--
and of an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
on 11 April is to present alleged Indian interference,
including military moves, and allegedly anti-Pakistan and
pro-Indian meddling by the Soviet Union as the only legitimate
subject of political concern regarding the Pakistan situation
within the international community.
Contending in careful language that "the relevant measures
taken by President Yahya Khan in connection with the present
situation in Pakistan are the internal affairs of Pakistan
in which no country should or has the right to interfere,"
the Commentator article--the sole Chinese comment on the
Pakistan situation--charged that the Indian "expansionists"
were "in league with the two superpowers" in an effort to
promote "international intervention." After referring to
the U.S. State Department's 7 April statement as "an
attempt to poke its. nose into Pakistan's internal affairs,"
the article asserted that "the Soviet Government acted
more blatantly" in the form of Podgornyy's message to
Yahya. Posing as..a friend, the article said, Podgornyy
neglected to mention:the "threat posed by the Indian
reactionaries to,Pakistan" while "impudently criticizing
the Pakistan Government." Taking the occasion to recall
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Commentator said
"it is not-hard to see what the Soviet leadership supports,
what it opposes, and on whose side after all it stands."
While ignoring any-contentious issues in the internal
conflict in Pakistan, the Commentator article put the
"Chinese Government and people" on record as "resolutely
supporting the Pakistan Government and people in their
just struggle for safeguarding national independence
and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression
and interference."..
On 7 April NCNA puolicized a PRC protest lodged with
the Indian Oovernment in response to a "provocation" in
front of the PRC Embassy-in India against Peking's alleged
assistance to. the Pakistan Government. Following the line
of the 3 April NCNA report on Pakistani protests to India,
NCNA on the 10th cited another "strong protest" by the
Pakistan Government with the Indian Government for "illegal
entry of armed Indian personnel into Pakistan territory for
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040016-4
 Approved For Release 199 5I : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
0 NTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 APRIL 1971
subversive activities." On 12 April NCNA cited Pakistan news
sources for a report that two "intruding soldiers of the
Indian border security force" had been captured on 10 April
and that two companies of Indian "infiltrators" had "retreated
after suffering heavy casualties."
Peking media similarly portray Soviet meddling in Pakistan's
internal affairs and goading of. India into anti-Pakistan
activities. NCNA's release on 8 April of the Juxtaposed
texts of Podgornyy's message and Yahya's reply also served
to convey Yahya's contention that the root of the potential
for South Asian instability was India's interference and his
appeal to the Soviet Government to use its "undeniable
influence with the Indian Government in order to impress
upon it the need for refraining from interfering in Pakistan's
internal affairs." NCNA followed this up on the 9th with a
report from Rawalpindi on Pakistan press reaction to
Podgornyy's message, quoting such comments as "Podgornyy
has taken a one-sided view" and "Podgornyy's viewpoint 'has
encouraged Delhi to pursue its most vicious aims"'; it also
cited the charge.that Podgornyy's letter was "intervention
in the internal affairs of Pakistan."
MOSCOW PULLS BACK TO LESS PROMINENT'STANCE AS HONEST BROKER
Having moved off dead center with the 2 April TRUD article
and the widely broadcast Podgornyy message the following day,
expressing "great alarm" at "the nuherous casualties,
sufferings, and privations" being brought about in East
Pakistan by the "repressive measures and bloodshed" of
Yahya's military-administration, Moscow has reverted to
a stance of studied moderation and neutrality. After
registering its concern, and in the process scoring points
with the Indians, Moscow has carried no followrp comment
cn the Podgornyy message and has taken no public note of
Yahya's reply calling: on the USSR to help prevent India
from interfering in Pakistani affairs.
Apart from prompt reportage of favorable Indian reaction
to Podgornyy's message, the only followup reference to the
message in Soviet media appears in a speech made in the
Soviet Union by the head of the East Pakistan Communist
Party delegation to the CPSU congress: His comments,
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 APRIL 1971
broadcast by Radio Moscow in English to South Asia on
8 April, included a reference to the soviet people's
concern about "the.massacre of thousands of unarmed
innocent people by the reactionary military government"
and an expression of "heartfelt gratitude" for Podgornyy's
message.
Moscow's reporting, in the pattern of its coverage prior
to the publicity for the message, balances Western news
reports of "fierce" battles with official Pakistani
Government claims that the situation in East Pakistan
has "fully returned to normal."
An effort to assume the role of honest broker, reminiscent
of Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent in January 1966, seems
reflected in TASS' successive reports that Kosygin had
met with the ambassadors of Pakistan and India. Noting
that each meeting was at the ambassador's request, the
items were virtually identical. TASS said Kosygin's
conversation with the Pakistan ambassador "passed in a
friendly atmosphere," while Kosygin "had a friendly
conversation" with the Indian ambassador. The meetings
took place on 12 April.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release I 999 ] RDP85TOW75RD 300040016-4
14 APRIL 1971
- 34 -
GERMANY AND Br- RLIN
GDR CONTINUES TO PUBLICIZE ITS STAND ON BAHR-KOHL MEETINGS
In authoritative statements as well as routine propaganda, the
GDR has continued to air its views regarding the ongoing talks
between GDR and FRG State Secretaries Kohl and Bahr, whose 10th
meeting took place in East Berlin on 31 March. ADN reported
routinely on the 31st that the two envoys had met and agreed
to continue the talks in Bonn on 23 April.* For the first time,
however, the GDR labeled the report an "announcement" and noted
that it had been agreed upon by the two delegations.
In the recent period, two authoritative East German statements
strongly denounced Bonn's argument that third countries should
not establish diplomatic relations with the GDR in order "not
to disturb" the talks between the GDR and the FRG and to allow
Bonn to continue its "so-called intra-German dialog." On
26 March, ADN reported that the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the GDR People'- Chamber had "emphatically" decried this West
German "detour of intra-German relations" as an atte.,.pt to
establish relations with the GDR on an "unequal" basis and as
a continuation of Bonn's "revanchist policy" against the GDR
and E::ropean detente. The committee categorically restated
the East German position that there can never be any negotiations
on the "indisputable fact" that the FRG and the.GDR, states of
"opposite social systems," have been "sovereign" for more than
20 years.
0
In the same vein, against the background of a tour of Latin
America by Federal President Heinemann and.Foreign Minister
Scheel and the then pending announcement of the establishment
of diplomatic relations between Chile and the GDR, a 2 April
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article by GDR First Deputy Foreign Minister
Peter Florin vigorously rejected the West German concept of
"intra-German relations." Citing a reported remark.by Scheel.
in Bogota to the effect that recognition of the GDR by third
states would hinder Bonn's effort to normalize relations.with
the East, Florin pointed out that the meetings between Bahr
* On 7 April ADN noted the postponement of the 11th meeting
to 30 April at Bahr's request.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : 1, T00875R%g3QAgfp16-4
14 APRIL 1971
- 35 -
and Kohl are talks between representatives of "sovereign,
independent states" and not an "intra-German dialog." He
stressed that the otccome of the talks does not depend on
their duration, "'jut solely and exclusively on the FRG
Government relinquishing any attempt to subordinate the
GDR to the FRG."
Florin went on to turn Bonn's argument around, maintaining
that if more third countries would recognize the GDR, the
chances for success of the Bahr-Kohl talks would improve, as
would the conditions for ratifying Bonn's treaties with
Moscow and Warsaw, for "normalizing" the West Berlin
situation, and for convening a European security conference.
Underscoring Soviet support for the East German stand, he
cited Brezhnev's remarks at the CPSU congress on the
importance of establishing "relations of equal rights".
between the GDR and FRG based on "generally recognized norms
of international law."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 19 RAP I 6A-RDP851
- 36 -
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
K&
"9R300040016-4
FIRST TALKS HELD TO PAVE WAY FOR PRAGUE-BONN NEGOTIATIONS
After a considerable propaganda buildup for the first round of
"exploratory talks" looking toward FRG-Czechoslovak agreement
to negotiate a normalization of relations, Prague media report-
ed briefly that FRG State Secretary Paul Frank and Czechosluvak
Deputy Foreign Minister Milan Kiusak had met in Prague on
31 March and 1 April and discussed "questions of mutual
relations."
In the preceding weeks, extensive Czechoslovak radio and press
commentaries had outlined the position Prague would take in
such talks: Prague had been ready for years to enter into
negotiations, but Bonn was repeatedly moving to delay them;
the "cardinal issue" was the Czechoslovak side's condition
that the talks could take place only if West Germany recognized
the invalidity of the 1938 Munich Agreement ab initio and "all
the consequences resulting therefrom." Insisting that this
stand was not an "ultimatum" or an obstacle "artificially"
placed at the forefront by Czechoslovakia, the Bratislava
paper ROLNICKE NOVINY on 25 March argued typically that the
Munich Agreement was an "obstacle" created not by Czechoslovakia
but by Nazi Germany and that the Federal Government must now
remove it "if the path to agreement is to be cleared." The
Czechoslovak commentaries stressed the "preparatory" or
"preliminary" nature of the pending talks, which could do
no more than pave the way for later negotiations.
In the two weeks since they reported the Frank-Klusak meetings,
Prague media have made no further reference to the talks and
have ceased all comment on the Munich Agreement. The report on
the opening round contained no inkling of the strong stand
taken by Frank on Bonn's inability to accept the invalidity
of the Munich Agreement ab initio. It said only that the
atmosphere was "businesslike and frank" and that the envoys
agreed to continue the talks.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
lit APRIL 1971
- 37 -
YUGOSLAVIA
TITO ASSAILS CRITICS OF REFORMS, WARNS OF PARTY FACTIONALISM
Against the background of continued squabbling among the
Yugoslav republics over pending constitutional amendments on
government reorganization, President Tito, in speeches during
a tour of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo, has sought to drum
up support for the reforms and to silence critics of the
measures. He also used the tour to warn republican party
chiefs that factionalism will not be tolerated in the League
of Communists. Since Tito announced his proposals for a
collective presidency in SEptember 1970, the constitutional
amendments designed to impl'ment them have been a subject of
heated debate in the republics, particularly between Serbia
and Croatia. The Serbs evidently fear that the Croats will
exploit the planned economic decentralization to further
enhance their autonomy at the expense of the other, less
developed republics. On their part, the Croats have
indicated apprehensiveness that under the new plan the
Serbs, advocates.of strong federal organs, will try to
use the reorganization to limit Croatian autonomy.
In his speech in Bosnia-Hercegovina on 7 April, ao reported
by TANJUG, Tito singled out no rgpublic by name i:i warning
against attempts to "frustrate'Jlthe pending constitutional
amendments, "to foment national hatred, and to conceal
economic problems under a national cloak." He added that
during the discussion of the amendments, "class opponents
have emerged--explicitly antisocialist and anticommunist,
nationalist and chauvinist--which are attacking the course
we have inaugurated."
Seeking to counter such attacks, Tito assumed his role as
champion of Yugoslav unity and offered assurances that
republican rights as well as Yugoslav integrity would be
served by the new amendments. He firmly rejected the
conservative, unitarian idea that the proposed shift of power
to the republics would represent "disintegration of our
socialist state." He added: "That is a very crude error,"
for "self-management cannot develop normally and correctly
unless the republics are given broadest possibilities for
self-management."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONIP I1JJ N;L1I.AL F13I8 TJ 1 NDO
ii, APRII., 1971
- 38 -
In a passage evidently aimed at the more autonomous-minded
republics such as Croatia and Slovenia, Tito expressed "great
fears" that with the devolution of powers from the Federal
Government, "statism" may "become distributed among the
republics." He went on to warn: "No republic can be
sufficient unto itself or enclose itself within some
framework of its own, be it economic, trade, educational,
or some other."
Speaking in Kosovo on the 12th, Tito played similar themes
in bluntly warning the republican party chiefs against
factionalism: "We shall not permit factions to be formed
in the LCY" or permit "diverse lines." Although each
republic has its own party, he said, "there is only one
line of the LCY."
CROATIAN PARTY SEES CONSPIRACY TO DISCREDIT ITS LEADERSHIP
The kind of political dissension Tito may have had in mind
in his recent speeches was reflected in a communique issued
on 8 April by the Central Committee of the League of Communists
of Croatia which attacked "organized activity' by centrist
and hostile foreign forces "aimed at diecrediting the
political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Croatia."
It added that "slanderous allegations" were being propagated
about supposed link-ups of the Croatian leadership with
Ustashi emigres and other hostile elements abroad. And it
went on to link the "intensification of hostile activity
abroad to "strengthened opposition of the unitarist,
centrist, and bureaucratic forces" in the country which
were politically condemned at the fourth Brioni plenum.*
The communique further charged that allegations against
the Croatian leadership are being "disseminated even
through some organs of the Federal Administration."
* The fourth plenum of the LCY Central Committee, held on
the island of Brioni on 1 July 1966, resulted in the ouster
of then Vice President and LCY Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic--
a Serb whose name is synonymous with centralist integration.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FT31B 'T'RENDS
L APRIL 1.971
- 39 -
Noting that the Croatian Central Committee discussion "took
as a point of departure" the conclusions of the Executive
Bureau of the LCY at a 23 March meeting, the communique in
effect challenged the adequacy of the LCY's conclusions by
calling for "an investigation to fix responsibility on the
basis of established facts and to draw necessary conclusions
about the political activity .f the LCY." Croatian
displeasure and hints of dissension at the Executive Bureau's
March meeting seemed indicated in a brief report carried
by Radio Zagreb on the 23d, which noted vaguely that the
Executive Bureau had "examined aspects of hostile activity
against our country and some questions of the activity of
our security service and adopted appropriate conclusions."
The Croatian party's rejection of "slanderous allegations"
that it has ties with Ustashi terrorists abroad also came
against the background of an outcry in the Yugoslav press
against a Croatian emigre attack on the Yugoslav ambassador
to Sweden. Croatian Premier Haramija promptly issued a
statement on 7 April denouncing the "base and loathsome
attack" and demanding punishment of the culprits.
CROATIANS URGE GREATER FOREIGN POLICY ROLE FOR REPUBLICS
Efforts by the Croatian Republic to use the planned government
reorganization to promote its aspirations for autonomy were
reflected in remarks by Croatian Premier Haramija to the
Zagreb daily VECERNJI LIST urging an increased foreign
policy role for the republics. According to a 9 April
Radio Zagreb account of the interview, Haramija commented
that further development of the republics' role in this
area "would be made possible by constitutional changes" and
that "all the socialist republics and provinces should take
an active part in the formulation and realization of
Yugoslavia's foreign policy."
Haramija dismissed "fears" about international activity by
the republics as unfounded, arguing that it would not
mean a separate foreign policy for each republic but
"agreement and accord among all the republics and
provinces." He made it clear that one of his aims would
be to have more Croatians in the diplomatic corps when
he added, in discussing the need for more coordination
with the republics- in foreign affairs: "This applies to
the cadre policy in foreign affairs in Yugoslav diplomacy."
Approved For Release 1999/09/~1vFIST V-R'L)P85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
111 APRIL 1971
- ho -
In effect underlining Croatia's resolve to pursue a more
independent policy, Haramija noted that a Croatian delega-
tion was presently visiting Hungary. Because the visit
represented "the first contacts of a republican government
with Hungary," he said, "there were some dilemmas." Without
elaborating on the difficulties, he went on to declare that
"the Socialist Republic of Croatia is interested in friendly
relations with Italy and is developing them in all spheres."
ARTISTS' CONGRESS: In another manifestation of Croatian
CROATIAN WALKOUT striving for autonomy, a delegation
of Croatian artists staged a walkout
on 11 April from the Belgrade congress of the Federation of
Yugoslav Artists when the gathering decided to keep the
federation headquarters in the Yugoslav capital. According
to TANJUG, the walkout had been foreshadowed by a bitter
debate on the issue between the Serbian and Croatian
delegations. Following the vote to keep the head office in
Belgrade, the Croatians walked out after charging that the
meeting "had violated the principles of self-management,,
cooperation, and consultation."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 APRIL 1971
- Ill -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
NEW SHANTUNG PARTY COI 1ITTEE HEADED BY YANG TE-CHIH
Provincial chief Wang Hsiao-yu failed to secure a leadership
spot on the new Shantung party committee announced by NCNA on
8 April. Wang is the first chairman to fail to survive the
party rebuilding process within his province. Of the 17
committees previously formed, revolutionary committee chair-
men were retained as new party chiefs in all cases.
Backed by radical Red Guard groups, Wang jumped from his minor
post of vice-mayor of Tsingtao to become provincial chairman
in early 1967. Under his leadership Shantung became a leading
revolutionary province during the cultural revolution.
Unofficial sources, however, soon reported tensions developing
between Wang and more conservative PLA spokesmen led by
seasoned field commander Yang Te-chih, first vice-chairman.
Wang disappeared from pubic view just after being named a
full member of the Central Committee at the Ninth Party
Congress. He attended several Peking functions immediately
following the congress and then slipped into rublic limbo,
except for an appearance in Tsinan on 1 October 1969.
Although no acting chairman was officially named, de facto
control of Shantung devolved on Yang Te-chih, and he is now
designated first secretary of the new committee. Yang has
held the concurrent position of commander of the Tsinan
Military Region (MR) since 1958 and was also a member of the
standing committee on the old Shantung party committee.
The second position on the new committee was claimed by
Yuan Sheng-ping, a responsible person within the PLA units
in the MR since 1963, who was named second secretary. Three
men were named deputy secretaries: Chang Chih-hsiu holds
the concurrent post of deputy commander of the Tsinan MR;
Pai Ju-ping, former Shantung governor and secretary on the
previous party committee, is also a vice-chairman; Su Yi-Jan,
a former secretary from the old party committee and former
vice-governor, was identified in February as a vice-chairman.
The Shantung committee was formed at a congress of 1,1+88 party
delegates in Tsinan from 1 to 5 April. The number of delegates
was greater than for any of the prior 1.7 provincial-level
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 APRIL 1971
-42-
congresses--appropriately, since Shantung is the second most
populous province in China. As in all previous cases, the
Tsinan congress adhered to the formula of "old, middle-aged,
and young," in selecting the 90 full and 25 alternate
members on the new committee.
Yang's keynote address to the congress, made on behalf of
the party nucleus group, placed more stress than ue,%l on
the need for continuing party-building activities vithin the
province. Yang's insistence that party building be regat'ded
"as a matter of vital importance" and his call for "stepping
up past"" building" appears aimed at filling in the holes
whicii s:,0.1 exist in Shantung's party apparatus. Although
the provincial radic, on'l April claimed new committees'for
"nearly half of the counties and municipalities" within the
province, Shantung has lagged behind all other.eastern
provinces in reporting rebuilt?party.units. It appears that
for some time to come the new provincial committee in
Shantung--as well as most others--will sit on top of an
incomplete party foundation. Only Hunan h'r claimed new
committees for its entire provincial party r,Lructure.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4