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April 14, 1970
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Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Confidential IIIIIIIIUiii~~~iiiii~IIIIIIII FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIII Illllllll~~~i~l in Communist Propaganda Confidential 14 APRIL 1971 (VOL. XXII, NO. 15) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999(qW(tDP85T00875R000300040016-4 This propaganda analysis report is based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthurized person is pro- hibited by law. GROUP I heluded tram ouio malls' downpreding end detle,lIR(ellen Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release I 999/OWg i DP85T0087? A9 840016-4 14 APRIL 1971 CONTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . i INDOCHINA DRV, PRG Deprecate President's Speech on Troop Withdrawal . . . . 1 Moscow Says President Tried to Allay Antiwar Criticism . . . . . 5 Peking Calls President's Speech "Downright Fraud" . . . . . . . . 7 Hanoi Hails Blows to South Vietnamese Forces, Pacification . . . 9 CPSU Congress Documents Reaffirm Support of Indochinese . . . . . 10 Congress Reveals Major Though Limited Victory for Brezhnev . . . 12 Resolution Reasserts Basic Foreign Policy Lines . . . . . . . . . 17 CPSU Congress Documents Affirm Soviet Mideast Policy . . . . . . 19 Moscow Complains of U.S. Arms to Israel, Defends Aid to Arabs . . 20 Peking Plays People's Diplomacy with U.S. Table Tennis Team . . . 23 PRC Reaffirms Tow;h Position on Taiwan Question . . . . . . . . . 25 BURMA Communist Party Inaugurates New Clandestine Radio . . . . . . . . 27 PAKISTAN Peking Directs Fire at India "In League with Superpowers" . . . . .0 Moscow Pulls Back to Lnss Prominent Stance as Honest Broker . . . 32 GERMANY AND BERLIN GDR Continues to Publicize Its Stand on Bahr-Kohl Meetings . . . 34 FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA First Talks Held to Pave Way for Prague-Bonn Negotiations . . . .36 (Continued) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release '@/bVIWL CIA-RDP8R'00300040016-4 1 APRIL 1971 CONTENTS (Continued) Tito Assails Critics of Reforms, Warns of Party Factionalism . . 37 Croatian Party Sees Conspiracy to Discredit its Leadership . . 38 Croatians Urge Greater Foreign Policy Role for Republics . . . . 39 New Shantung Party Committee Headed by Yang Te-chih . . . . . . 41 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release I 991/0I/25"8IA-R 85 0875FWia 16-4 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 APRIL 1971 Moscow (2766 items) Peking (1734 items) CPSU 24th Congress (82%) 88% Domestic Issues (25%) 44% [Kosygin Speech (--) 13%] Indochina (32%) 19% [Brezhnev Report (31%) 7%] Table Tennis World (13%) 15% [Resolution (--) 4%] Tournament Indochina (2%) 4% [U.S. Team to PRC (--) 0.2%] Middle East (1%) 3% East Pakistan Rebellion (1%) 7% 10th Anniversary Gagarin Space Flight (--) 1% "Provocations" Against PRC Embassy in India (--) 2% China (1%) 1% These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor signit.cance. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 ;CqhP ~ T00875R 3 M@016-4 14 APRIL 1971 I INDOCHINA President Nixon's 7 April TV speech--in which he said Vietnamiza- tion has succeeded and announced that another 100,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam by 1 December--did not prompt the official statements that have regularly been issued by the Vietnamese communists on previous major pronouncements by the President since November 1969. Initial reaction took the form of broadcast from Liberation Radio and Hanoi on the 8th, with press articles on the 9th and 10th. These commentaries uniformly deprecate the increased rate of withdrawal and point to U.3. as well as world public demands that a date be set for complete withdrawal of American troops. Comment on the speech echoes other propaganda in insisting that the Vietnamization policy in fact suffered a major defeat in the Laos operation. The tone is illustrated in NHAN DAN's Commentator article of the 10th: "On 7 April Nixon did not resort to his past arrogant allegations but made explanacions as if he was begging the American people's understanding. This is understandable; a commander-in-chief who has just been defeated cannot be arrogant." Soviet media reacted to the President's speech in standard fashic-i--a prompt TASS account followed by routine comment which stresses growing demands in the United States for a withdrawal deadline. Peking's response to the'speech has also been routine, with an NCNA commentary on the 10th calling the troop withdrawal announcement a "downright fraud" aimed at appeasing public opinion. The enduring capability of communist forces to launch offensive assaults is documented in detailed Hanoi accounts of fighting in South Vietnam and Cambodia. In Vietnam the focus is on central Trung Bo, with actions reported frcm Quang Nam Province in the north to Darlac Province in the south. In addition to lauding such major engagements as the battles around ARVN Fire Base 6 in Kontum Province, propagandists claim that broad attacks at all levels are undermining the pacification machinery in the area. Comment on Cambodia focuses on the communists' recapture of Pich Nil Pass on Highway 4 and attacks on ARVN forces in Kompong Chain Province. DRV, PRG DEPRECATE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's 7 April speech is most notable for the absence of the high-level statements Approved For Release 1999/09/25 'ffAIWU 'vT00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/6@ff6R-1RDP85T0 9P040016-4 that have followed all previous Presidential pronouncements related to Vietnamization and U.S. troop withdrawal since November 1969. Beginning with the President's 3 November speech that year, both Hanoi and the Front have reacted to his major statements with either foreign ministry or govern- ment statements. Most recently, DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements responded to the President's 17 February press conference--in which he discussed the Laos operation for the first time--and to his 25 February foreign policy report.* The absence of official statements now, along with the nature of the radio and press comment, conveys a DRV view of the speech as reflecting an essentially defensive posture: and as breaking no new ground. The initial reaction to the speech, in broadcasts by Liberation Radio and Hanoi on the 8th, set the general line for subsequent comment: The withdrawal of another 100,000 U.S. troops from South Vietnam by next December would still leave from 180,000 to 200,000 troops. And in the words of the Liberation Radio broadcast, "the speech ran counter to the demands for total withdrawal and setti::g a deadline." Hanoi's first press comment came on the 9th in an article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN entitled "Nixon is Embarrassed, But Still Obdurate." As reviewed by VNA, it declares that the speech "from beginning to end was an embarrassing and weak reaction to public censure." Observing that the speech was made at a time when the Administration was finding itself "hard-pressed from all sides," the paper says that American public opinion has been aroused by the "bitter setbacks" of the Laos operation and that pre ,,ure is building up for a rapid and total withdrac-rdl and for an announcement of a definite withdrawal deadline. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN says that "confronted with tangible evidence of the lamentable reverses" in the Laos operation, the President 'began to toile down his bragging about imaginary victories. 11 But it goes on to complain that while admitting the heavy casualties sustained by the Saigon troops, the *-See the TREiDS of 24 February 1971, pages; of 3 March, pages 1-3; and of 10 March, pages 16-17. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :c6UT00875R3016-4 14 APRIL 1971 President still contended that they had "disrupted enemy supply lines and were able to fight effectively." It concludes that the President apparently still harbors the "illusion" of a military victory and is still reluctant to get down to serious negotiations. The same deprecatory tone marks a Commentator article in the party paper NHAN DAN on the 10th. Headed "ALrogant Tone is Lowered But Obstinacy Remains," the article says that while in late February the President had boasted that "the puppet troops in southern Laos were powerful enough to decimate the liberation armed forces," in his latest speech he had to admit that the Saigon troops suffered heavy casualties in Laos. Commentator goes on to say, however, that even though the withdrawal from southern Laos "finally turned into an ignominous rout," the President went so far as to claim success for his Vietnamization policy. Commentator takes issue with the notion that Saigon troops can now fight alone without U.S. advisers and firepower; the article says flatly that "Nixon lied shamelessly," since the patriots' victories on the Highway 9 front were a "striking blow" to the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization. In this connection, it notes that senators including Mc:Covern, Muskie, and Humphrey have described the Laos operation as "a serious military defeat for Nixon." NHAN DAN describes the President as "not resorting to his past arrogant allegations" and explains that this is "unc.erstandable" in "the face of defeat." It goes on to say that "Nixon is facing the most difficult days of his Presidential term" and is being attacked in the United States from all directions. Observing that the majority of the American people received the speech "with doubt and disappointment," NHAN DAN says the President's latest speech is in essence part of his program of seeking votes for reelection in 1972. It concludes that ";,he American people, however, saw a very old Nixon on television; with this speech, the U.S. electorate's crisis of confidence in Nixon grew deeper." AT PARIS: REACTION TO The DRV delegation spokesman in SPEECH, PRISONER ISSUE Paris reacted to President Ni-;on's speech promptly on the 8th with a "declaration," publicized by DRV media late that day, which ignored the specific substance of the speech but complained abr!;:t the President's failure to fix a deadline for troop Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999 MWRDP85T APR 139700040016-4 -4- withdrawal. Like other comment, the statement said that the President "still nurtures the illusion of military victory" and refuses to "negotiate seriously." The speech was the focus of attention in the communist delegates' statements at the Paris session on the 8th--the first sazsion of the talks since 25 March. Beth delegates cast doubt on the President's statement that U.S. involvement in the war is coming to an end. PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh said that the President is in fact intensifying the bombings and shellings and refuses to announce a timetable for total withdrawal, instead advocating a "prolonged troop withdrawal" aimed at prolonged "military occupation" of South Vietnam. DRV deputy delegation head Nguyen Minh Vy said that "the question is not for the United States to withdraw now a batch of troops and then another," but for the United States to "bring home all its troops." It is a "fallacious allegation" that the United States is ending its involvement in the war, Vy said, as long as air, naval, and ground forces participate. Mme. Binh said that although the President "had to" deal with peaceful negotiations in his address, he is in fact obdurately prolonging the war and opposing a "correct peaceful solution." The only available Vietnamese communist acknowledgments that the President repeated the five points in his 7 October peace proposal appear in a Hanoi radio commentary and an LPA commentary, both on the 8th. Both claim that "he demanded such arrogant conditions as mutual troop withdrawal, maintenance of the Thieu regime, and immediate release of U.S. prisoners." Thus there is no mention of his proposals for a cease-fire or a widened Indochina conference. Xuan Thuy, in a 9 April interview at the airport upon his return to Paris from Moscow,* also said the President's speech proved that he "does not want to settle the Vietnam issue by negotiations." * Xuan Thuy's trip to Moscow had been unmentioned in communist media until the 9th, when the Moscow domestic service reported his departure from the Soviet capital that day. In his interview Xuan Thuy noted that he had met with Le Duan and Nguyen Duy Trinh, in Moscow for the 24th CPSU Congress; the DRV spokesman at the post-session Paris press briefing said Xuan Thuy had reported to the two DRV leaders "on the situation of the Paris conference." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: Cd?TL00875R0(A?Q0W6-4 14 APRIL 1971 The VNA account of the session notes briefly that the GVN delegate proposed that both sides release prisoners of war or send them to a neutral country, and it characterizes the proposal as "an attempt to oppose the PRG's eight-point peace initiative." VNA also notes that DRV delegate Vy repeated, the position that the best way for ail. U.S. soldiers, "captured or not," to get home is by a U.S. dec?aration of readiness to withdra*s all troops by 30 June 1971 o, some other reasonable deadline. Consistent with Vietnamese communist media's general practice of ignoring the post-session press briefings, there is no acknowledgment of the PR7 spokesman's report that Mme. Binh, in her additional remarks, said that both the President and the U.S. delegate "clamored about the so-called prisoner-of-war problem" in a "hypocritical crafty maneuver" to avoid discussing problems aimed at ending the war. Saigon's initiative. she said, is merely aimed at serving these schemes. The spokesman avoided a direct reply to a question about a statement :attributed to Senator I-iartke that the communist representatives in Paris told him all U.S. prisoners could be released "the very next day" after the United States announced a troop-withdrawal deadline. The spokesman merely reiterated Vietnamese sincerity in wishing for an "early settlement" of the prisoner question and recalled the 17 September proposal. MOSCOW SAYS PRESIDENT TRIED TO ALLAY ANTIWAR CRITICISM Moscow reacted to the President's speech with the usual TASS report--transmitted some three hours after the first reaction from Liberation Radio. Acknowledging the announcement that an additional 100,000 men would be pulled out by 1 December, the TASS report complains that even if this pledge were fulfilled, 184,000 m.en would remain. It further complains that the President failed to set a specific deadline for a final withdrawal although he "admitted" that such a step "has a great deal of appeal to the American people." Remark- ing on the "propaganda nature" of the speech, TASS says American TV commentators emphasized that the speech had been prompted by anxiety over intensified Congressional criticism of the Administration's Indochina policy and by a decline in President Nixon's personal prestige after the failure of the "gamble" in Laos. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/O?9 DU DP85TOO , 14 A -6- ?0040016-4 9 Moscow's followup comment, like Hanoi's complains that the President's statements about the success of the Laos operation and Vietnamization run counter to the facts and that the troop withdrawal announcement was aimed merely at calming public opinion while the President continues to seek a "military victory." A participant in the 11 April domestic service roundtable discussion, like other Moscow commentators, pointed out that a recent public opinion poll shows that some 70 percent of the American people distrust the President's Vietnam policy; it was in this atmosphere, the roundtable panelist said, that the President made his "openly demagogic" speech to assuage the protesters and justify government policy. He noted that the President "in effect" blamed the Democrats for the "tens of thousands" of American deaths in Vietnam, not mentioning that it all started under the Eisenhower Administration. Commentators say that despite the President's efforts to counter domestic dissatisfaction with his war policy, his speech was received with disappointment and skepticism, and TASS reports various statements critical of the speech by senators and the press in the United States. A 10 April PRAVDA commentary cites Stewart Alsop for an evaliiation of the Laos operation as not only a military defeat but also a "political catastrophe" for the Administration. PRAVDA says that in the situation produced by the resulting "crisis of confidence," many "American political figures" called upon the President not to "shut himself off from practical reality and to take account of the Laos lesson and the bankruptcy of Vietnamization"; they also urged him to establish a timetable for total withdrawal that would "open up a practicable path toward political settlement and rapid ending of the war." But the President in his speech rejected these appeals "out of hand" and refused "point blank" to set such a deadline, PRAVDA says. In a TASS commentary on the 8th, Kharkov says that the President's statement that American involvement in Vietnam "is nearing the end" contradicts the facts and that the United States has actually escalated the war since the President's last speech on troop withdrawal, on 20 April 1970. The President's reluctance to set a deadline for troop withdrawal, says Kharkov, is just another testimoiy to the fact that Washington still counts on a "military solution," ignoring a Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: QJQ?j00875RQAN0M16-4 14 APRIL 1971 political settlement. In this context is it no accident, he adds, that President Nixon's address contained no mention of the Paris talks. PEKING CALLS PRESIDENT'S SPEECH "DOWNRIGHT FRAUD" In Peking's initial reaction to President Nixon's 7 April address, en NCNA commentary dated 10 April focused on the President's troop withdrawal announcement as a "hoax" and termed the speech "a downright fraud" designed to "deceive the people" and to "cover up the disastrous defeat of the U.S. aggressor troops on the Indochina battlefield." The next day Peking buttressed this view with reports of Vietnamese communist reaction to the speech: the LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, NCNA reported, asserted that "Nixon did not offer anything new this time, but instead rehashed his shopworn contentions" in an effort "to smooth and deceive public opinion"; and NCNA quoted the NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 10th as saying that "Nixon has lied" about the results of the operation in southern Laos and as warning that the President "and his cohorts are plotting new adventures in an attempt to change the situation which is increasingly unfavorable to them." Saying "to hell with Nixon's 'troop withdrawal' hoax," the 10 April NCNA commentary contended that the United States will never withdraw from South Vietnam of its own accord, since the President's goal "can never be 'a total withdrawal from Vietnam"' but is in fact "a permanent occupation of South Vietnam by force and its conversion into a perpetual U.S. imperialist colony and a military base for aggression against the whop of Indochina." Raising the possibility of a future expansion of U.S. military action by claiming that "every time Nixon juggled with 'troop withdrawal,' the war of aggression was immediately enlarged," NCNA predicted vaguely that the Nixon Administration "will embark on a more rabid adventure." The NCNA commentary took particular issue with the President's refusal to set a deadline for removal of all U.S. troops, citing his own acknowledgment that such an announcement had "great appeal to the American people." Asserting that "the U.S. 'prisoner of war' issue" was "a ridiculous excuse" for not Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/OWffFEfMRDP85T 0040016-4 setting a withdrawal deadline, NCNA argued that U.S. airmen shot down over North Vietnam are not prisoners of war--since no war has been declared--but are "gangsters and murderers whom the DRV has the right to punish according to law." The commentary cud not address itself to the 'uestion of the effect the announcement of a withdrawal date would have on the prisoner issue. It thus ignored the fact that the PRG's eight-point proposal introduced at Paris last September provides for immediate discussion of a release of prisoners after the United Statee agrees to a withdrawal date. Peking has continued to take note of the impact of Indochinese developments on the U.S. domestic political scene. The NCNA commentary recalled that the Laos "fiasco" had led to "uproars in American public opinion and bitter wrangles within the U.S. ruling circles." It thus portrayed the troop withdrawal announcement as a. sop to U.S. public opinion, claiming that it was a "smokescreen designed to parry public opinion, ease popular pressure at home and abroad, and cover up the U.S. insistence on the war of aggression." Various NCNA reports have told of antiwar protest demonstrations in the United States. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25dc &ftpR$5T00875F Q992A 016-4 14 APRIL 1971 HANOI HAILS BLOWS TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. PACIFICATION A commentary in the 13 April NHAN DAN provides the most recent press discussion of communist attacks in central Trung Bo. Dividing the action into two periods, it claims that the first "wave" of attacks was launched in late January and early February and that a second wave of assaults and "uprisings" occurred in late March and early April. The commentary says that during the second wave the communists "annihilated a substantial number" of allied troops, "extensively destroyed" their war equipment, and "partially destroyed their cortrol system." A Hanoi radio commentary on the 12th, discuss.L.ig the fighting throughout central Trung Bo, claimed that in all provinces in the area "clear progress" is being made in the movement to foil the pacification plan. The broadcast added that recent fighting in central Trung Bo and elsewhere "has dealt a powerful blow to Nixon's deceitful allegations in his 7 April speech that the operation into southern Laos had the effect of preventing the communists from launching offensives . . . . " In addition to alleging that attacks in the central highlands this year have dealt a blow to the pacification system, a 10 April NHAN DAN article and an editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 9th reiterated claims that the assaults foiled an allied plan to launch a major operation in the triborder area.* A VNA commentary on the 13th elaborates, saying that in late January and early February the allies moved the head- quarters of the 2d Corps from Pleiku to Tan Canh "in prepara- tion for a thrust westward into the triborder area between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. But that operation was nipped in the bud." FIRE BASE 6 The 13 April VNA commentary on action in the IN KONTUM highlands of central Trung Bo reviews the fighting around ARVN Fire Base 6 and claims that from 31 March--when the base was first overrun by the communists--to 7 April the PLAF in the highlands wiped out or captured more than 1,000 allied troops. In addition, * Earlier instances of the claim that such an allied opera- tion had been aborted by communist attacks included NHAN DAN editorials on 25 February and 2 March. See the 3 March TRENDS, page 11. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/6ffiFFF&1RDP85T0 040016-4 according to VNA, they shot down or destroyed nearly 20 aircraft, captured and destroyed 12 artillery pieces, destroyed 10 military vehicles and many storages and barracks, and captured 23 radio transmitters, more than 100 firearms, and a large quantity of war materiel. The VNA commentary spells out the significance of the attacks on Fire Base 6, noting that the base is located in the area of Ngoc Rinh Rua and is an outpost at the junction of Highways 18 and 14. It explains further that U.S. strategists wanted Ngoc Rinh Rua to defend the rear base in Dakto. VNA observes that "if Ngoc Rinh Rua were lost, the district capital of Dakto as well as the provincial capita] of Kontum would immediately be endangered." VNA describes the fighting around Fire Base 6, including its capture by the communists, attacks on ARVN forces which reoccupied it, and the interception of further ARVN units sent to break the communise siege; it says the PLAF forces held fast to their positions despite "intense bombing" by aircraft "including B-52's." VNA concludes that "the siege on Ngoc Rinh Rua keeps tightening." CPSU CONGRESS DOCUMENTS REAFFIRM SUPPORT OF INDOCHINESE Soviet support for the Indochinese peoples is reaffirmed in the CPSU congress appeal on Indochina and the congress resolution, publicized on 8 and 9 April. The resolution approves the Soviet policy of giving "all-round support" to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and supports the proposals of all three countries as showing "the only possible way" to solve the problem of Indochina. The appeal again points to the USSR's "all-round assistance" to the DRV in building socialism and strengthening its defenses and reiterates that the USSR has been "standing on the side of" the liberation movement in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It refers to the "uninterrupted chain of shameful failures" being suffered by the United States in Indochina and says Vietnamization will not help Washington achieve its "criminal aims." The-appeal also reiterates the conviction that the proposals of the DRV, the PRG, the NLHS, and the FUNK form.a "constructive basis" for settling the Indochina problem. It concludes with a call for strengthening of the "universal move- ment" for the cessation of imperialist aggression in Indochina, for the withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops, and for the right of the peoples of the three countries to be masters of their own lands. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 i6R85T00875Rfi39016-4 14 APRIL 1.971 CRITICISM A 9 April commentary in Mandarin over Moscow's OF CHINA Radio Peace and Progress used the appeal as a peg for routine criticism of Peking's Indochina stance. It condemned the Chinese not only for refusing to tai_e concerted measures with the USSR acid other socialist countries in support of the Indochinese peoples but also for persisting in "slandering" the Soviet Union with the aim of separating the Indochinese people from their "loyal friends and allies." The commentary took note of the congress' call for strengthening o? the "universal movement" to stop the aggression in Indochina, characterizing it an "explicit" call for united action. VIETNAMESE The Vietnamese communists duly express gratitude GRATITUDE for the Soviet pledge of continued aenistance and suppui'; in a NHAN DAN editorial, carried by VNA on the 10th, and an LPA commentary on the 12th. Observing that in his 7 April speech President Nixon "proved" that he has not given up his design to prolong and expand the war and nurtures "the illusion of winning a military victory," NHAN DAN calls the congress appeal "a stern warning to the U.S. imperialist aggressors and a great stimulus to the peoples of the Indochinese countries to overcome all difficulties and persist in and step up" their struggle "until complete victory." In a similar vein, LPA terms the appeal "a new lofty .nanifesta- tion of the militant solidarity and warm friendship between the Vietnamese and Soviet peoples and a stimulus to our people to march forward and score more brilliant feats of arms on all battlefields." It goes on to say that the Nixon "clique," despite "heavy setbacks," has not given up its aggressive designs and that the President's 7 April speech "was a clear manifestation of his stubborn nature and schemes of prolonging the U.S. war of aggression." Nevertheless, LPA continues, with the "valuable support and assistance" of the USSR and other socialist countries, the South Vietnamese people are determined to persist in and step up their struggle. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 5.4 APRIL 1971 CPSU CONGRESS CONGRESS RG40EALS MAJOR 1H000H LIMITED VICTORY FOR BREZHNEV The 24th CPSU Congress resulted in a significant albeit measured victory for Brezhnev. The speeches contained fulsome tributes to Brezhnev, but there was also frequent praise for the Politburo as a whole and for collective leadership. Four proteges and allies of Brezhnev were added to the Politburo, but no incumbent was dropped, and the total composition of the 25-man ruling group-- Politburo and Secretariat--remains intact. And despite an unusually large number of new Central Committee members, the number of new Brezhnev adherents seems modest. TREATMENT Most speakers proffered generous praise for OF BREZHNEV Brezhnev's report; some went further, crediting him personally, together with the Central Committee and Politburo, with achievements in a variety of fields. Brezhnev's agricultural contributions were cited in this manner by the --.rst secretaries of Belorussia (Masherov), Lithuania (Snechkua), Altay Krai (Georgiyev), Moscow Oblast (Konotop), and Saratov Oblast (Shibayev). He was credited with certain initiatives in agriculture (Krasnodar First Secretary Zolotukhin and Latvian First Secretary Voss) and in other fields (Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov and Bashkir First Secretary Shakirov). Brezhnev's general leadership--along with that of the Central Committee and Politburo--was also acclaimed by Leningrad First Secretary Romanov, Gorkiy First Secretary Maslennikov, Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan, Komsomol First Secretary Tyazhelnikov, Tatar First Secretary Tabeyev, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy, Trade Union Secretary Prokhorov, RSFSR Gosplan Chairman Gerasimov, Yakutsk First Secretary Chiryayev, and Kazakh Premier Ashimov. In addition to the accolades to "the Central Committee, its Politburo and Comrade Brezhnev personally," Brezhnev's preeminence in the leadership was accorded special acclaim by a number of speakers. Kunayev praised Brezhnev's "skill" in uniting the ruling group and directing the work of the Central Committee. Brezhnev's "huge role" in the leadership also received special praise from Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Aliyev, and his personal qualities of leadership were warmly acclaimed by Moldavian First Secretary Bodyiil and Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS l1 APRIL 1971 The subject of collectivity was raised by Brezhnev and 10 other speakers; but at least half of these were outspoken Brezhnev supporters (I:unayev, Rashidov, Aliyev, Shakirov, and Shcherbitskiy), and their assertions that collectivity is being observed were probably designed to allay fears of a Brezhnev cult. Perhaps more important than the few direct references to collectivity was the fact that many speakers, while praising Brezhnev's report, paid little or no deference to him and praised the central institutions of power--the Central Committee, Politburo or Secretariat. OTHER Brezhnev thus received considerable attention from LEADERS other speakers, and his major report as well as his two brief addresses were broadcast and televised live. Kosygin's report was not broadcast nor televised live, although the text was subsequently read by an announcer on Radio Moscow; his report seemed to tea handled as a matter of less importance than in 1966, with fewer officials taking part in the discussion of the report. Podgornyy, who had delivered a lengthy, substantive speech in 1966, this time delivered only the opening honorific address; it was broadcast live, as part of the live relay of Brezhnev's report. The only other speech by a Politburo member, that by Shelest, was broadcast in near-text by Radio Moscow, read by an announcer. Although his predecessor as trade union chairman had addressed the 23d congress, Shelepin did not do so; one of his subordinates spoke on behalf of the trade unions. As also happened in 1966, the RSFSR was the only republic whose leader did not address the congress; RSFSR Gosplan Chairman Gerasimov was again the RSFSR spokesman. Moreover, the agricultural programs advanced by RSFSR leader Voronov, such as mechanized links and specialization in meat cattle, were ignored, even by speakers who had supported these programs earlier (Zolotukhin, Kulichenko, Kovalenko, and Georgiyev, first secretaries respectively of Krasnodar, Volgograd, Orenburg,. and Altay). Kovalenko and Georgiyev even appeared criticial of Voronov's RSFSR government in regard to such agricultural matters as fertilizer allotments and measures to improve Siberian crop yields. ECONOMIC The congress discussions clearly reflected the REFORM diminishing support for the economic reform plan. Although Kosygin defended the reform and even spoke of working out new "proposals for its further development," it was in general ignored, with a few speakers criticizing it. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/q%Mn jA DP85T00j. lN 80040016-4 lit APRIL 1971 - 14 - Brezhnev's report, as published in PRAVDA, contained a brief statement endor6ing the reform in economic management; this was, however, one of the passages he omitted in actually reading the report.* He dwelt at greater length on the short- comings in the present system and urged measures to encourage enterprises to adopt higher plan targets, accelerate scientific-- technological progress, stimulate labor productivity, anl improve product quality and use of resources. Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul was most openly critical of the implementation of the reform for reducing the number of centrally planned indicators. He pointedly endorsed the methods for improving economic output proposed in Brezhnev's report. Belorussian First Secretary Masherov also criticized shortcomings in the reform, but he characterized the reform as the correct course "as a whole." Lithuanian First Secretary Snechkus, Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, RSFSR Gosplan Chairman Gerasimov, and an auto plant director credited the reform with successes. But most congress speakers conspicuously ignored the reform in their discussion of economic policy. On the other hand, production associations, which Brezhnev endorsed and which Kosygin praised as an extension of the reform, received wide support at the congress. Many of the speakers went on record in favor of the innovation, as had been the case at the republic congresses earlier. POLITBURO Full Politburo membership was increased from ENLARGED 11 to 15, with the promotion of three candidate. members and one secretary, all apparent Brezhnev supporters. No incumbent was dropped, however, and the 25-man leadership collective--the Politburo and Secretariat-- still consists of the same 25 men. Promotion of his proteges from Kazakhstan and the Ukraine,. Kunayev and Shcherbitskiy, to full Politburo membership marks a clear gain for Brezhnev. The elevation of agriculture secretary Kulakov, who has worked under * While the passages omitted from the report in Brezhnev's reading are mostly explainable- -they consisted largely of statistical materials and certain elaborations in the latter portion when an effort was being made tc keep to schedule-- Brezhnev did reveal an ability to skip lightly over items he is not on record as favoring in the past. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 14 APRIL 1971 Brezhnev and Poiyanskiy on agricultural matters since late 1964, will also strengthen Brezhnev's hand. Grishin, also promoted, has frequently praised Brezhnev's speeches and may owe his 1967 appointment to the Moscow leadership post partly to Brezhnev. CENTRAL Despite the election of 88 new members ani 84 new COMMITTEE candidate members to the Central Committee, no no very marked degree of favoritism toward Brezhnev followers is evident. Those Brezhnev adherents whose elevation to 'she Central Committee or promotion from candidate status is not clearly attributable to their official positions are few in number. The first secrctary of Brezhnev's home city of Dneprodzerzhinsk, I. L. Furs, was elected a Central Committee candidate member, as was his predecessor V. F. Dobryk at the 1966 congress. A handful of Brezhnev's assistants in the Central Committee Secretariat--administrator of affairs of the Central Committee G. S. Pavlov, head of the Central Committee's general section K. U. Chernenko, and Brezhnev assistant G. E. Tsukanov--were elected Central Committee members. Another assistant, A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, was elected an Auditing Commission member. Pavlov and Chernenko had been Central Committee candidate members, and Tsukanov had been on the Auditing Commission. Strangely, Brezhnev's agricultural assistant V. A. Golikov was not so honored. Assistants to Kosygin and Podgornyy were also added to the central organs, however. A. K. Gorchakov, head of the secretariat of the Council of Ministers; M. S. Smirtyukov, administrator of affairs of the Council of Ministers; and L. M. Shevehenko, assistant to the chairman of the Sup,cme Soviet Presidium, were elected to the Auditing Commission, while P. F. Pigalev, head of the Supreme Soviet Presidium's department for questions of work of soviets, was reelected to the Auditing Commission. Podgornyy presumably can claim credit for the reelection of his former subordinates V. N. Titov to the Central Committee and Pigalev to the Auditing Commission, even though their present posts do not rate such high honors. Titov was recently demoted from Kazakh second secretary to deputy CEMA representative, while Pigalev had joined the Auditing Commission in his capacity as first deputy head of the Central Committee's cadre section (then under Titov). One Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 190NpiIA-RDP85871ffi8q0300040016-4 14 APRIL 1971 -16- Podgornyy-Titov protege from Kharkov, A. A. Bulgakov, chairman of the vocational-technical education committee, was promoted from Central Committee candidate member to full member, while another, Ukrainian First Deputy Premier N. A. Sobol, was dropped from the Central Committee. Brezhnev's adherents in the KGB leadership appeared somewhat favored. First deputy chairman S. K. Tsvigun and deputy chairman V. M. Chebrikov--both having apparent ties with Brezhnev--were elected Central Committee candidate members. KGB deputy chairman G. K. Tsinev, also appoi..ted after the removal of the old Shelepin-Semichastnyy leadership, became an Auditing Commission member. This is a considerable expansion of KGB representation; at the 1966 congress KGB chairman Semichastnyy was the sole KnB member of the central organs. THE LOSERS In addition to the removal of previously demoted officials, the new Central Committee and Auditing Commission lists omit some officials not previously known to be in difficulty. Those dropped from membership in the central organs and apparently slated for retirement include the labor and wages committee chairman, A. P. Volkov; Ambassador to France V. A. Zorin; people's control committee chairman P..V. Kovanov; Ukrainian first deputy premiers V. Ye. Semichastnyy and N. A. Sobol; the first secretary of the Mordvin Obkom, P. M. Ye].istratov; and Central Committee section heads N. N. Organov, P. K. Sizov, and A. S. Panyushkin. Hardest hit by the changes is Shelepin. Not only.were his demoted former colleagues S. P. Pavlov, V. Ye. Semichastnyy,. D. P. Goryunov, N. N. Mesyatsev, and V. S: Tikunov dropped from the Central Committee, but so were two former-subordinates still in high office: people's control committee chairman Kovanov and Central Committee light industry-food industry section head Sizov. In addition, a shakeup in Shelepin's trade union apparatus appears in the offing. Trade union bouncil secretaries T. N. Nikolayeva and N. N. Romanov.vere dropped from the Central Committee, while trade union council secretaries V. I. Prokhorov and A. P. Biryukova replaced them. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 14 APRIL 1971 - 17 - RSFSR Premier Voronov lost his retired first deputy K. G. Pysin and also his deputy for construction A?. Ye. Biryukov (dropped from the Auditing Commission). Apart from the fact that his rival Shcherbitskiy was promoted to full Politburo membership, Ukrainian leader Shelest appears to have fared poorly in regard to the new Central Committee membership. While no one visibly close to him gained, several men associated with his rivals Premier Shcherbitskiy and President Lyashko were promoted: Ivano-Frankovsk First Secretary V. F. Dobryk, Kiev First. Secretary V. M. Tsybulko, and Ukrainian Secretary A. A. Titarenko to Central Committee membership, Dneprodzerzhinsk city First Secretary I. L. Furs, new Ukrainain Secretary Ya. P. Pogrebnyak, and new Ukrainian trade vnion chief V. A. Sologub to Central Committee candidate membership. First Deputy Premier Sobol-- a probable ally of Shelest--was dropped from the Cent a,1 Committee, becoming the only Ukrainian Politburo member not holding CPSU Central Committee membership or candidate membership. Several newspaper editors were promoted. Former-RURAL-LIFE-- editor P. F. Alekseyev, who has Just replaced V.. P. Moskovskiy as SOVIET RUSSIA editor, and LITERARY GAZETTE editor A. B. Chakovskiy were elected Central Committee candidate members. SOCIALIST INDUSTRY editor V. N. Golubev and-new RUhAL LIFE editor N. A. Zokolupin were named Auditing Commission members. RESOLUTION REASSERTS BASIC FOREIGN POLICY LINES The resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress, released on.1O April, adheres closely to the foreign policy line set foc;;h by Brezhnev in his Central Committee report on 30 March. It repledges Moscow to pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence; in a virtual verbatim repeat of Brezhnev, it says that the USSR has combined "firm rebuffs to aggression" with a "constructive line-of settling urgent international problems." Like Brezhnev's report, the resolution does not explicitly reassert Soviet advocacy of settlement of international. questions by negotiations; but Gromyko in his 3 April address to the congress declared that the USSR supports the resolution. of outstanding international problems "by peaceful means, by means of negotiations." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 14 APRIL 1971 - 18 - In the pattern of the resolution adopted at the 23dCPSU Congress in 1966, the current document does not treat - disarmament--an issue dealt with in some detail by Brezhnev. in the opening report. It routinely attacks U.S. "aggression" in Indochina and U.S. "encouragement" of Israel in the-Middle. East. At one point it singles out "American in-perialism". as the "greatest danger" to the independence of peoples and to world peace. and as the chief obstacle on the path to social.. progress. And it observes that the "aggressive-direction"- of U.S. foreign policy and the "fanning up of militarism carry . . . the danger of a world war." The resolution. balances these observations with the affirmation that the USSR is prepared to develop relations with the United States. It also says that "one of the key problems" in strengthening general peace is the insuring of European security; it hails the FRG's 1970 treaties with the USSR and Poland as important steps in this endeavor, and it states that a conference on European security would further contribute to this struggle. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA~RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/2~0M,)E85T00875RP3(P016-4 14 APRIL 1971 MIDDLE EAST CPSU CONGRESS DOCUMENTS AFFIRM SOVIET MIDEAST POLICY The CPSU Congress statement on the Middle East, issued on 8 April, routinely chastises Israel for its refusal to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, again pledges support to the Arabs, calls for a political settlement, and twice urges satisfaction of the Palestinian Arabi' "legitimate rights." Similar to the 28 February Soviet Government statement, the congress statement vaguely prescribes joint efforts by all peaceloving forces to "curb the Israeli aggressors" and make them withdraw. The statement makes the standard charge that Israel's patrons, "the U.S. imperialist circles, hypo- critically express a desire for peace" while encouraging the Israeli "ultras." And it approves the "constructive" position of the Arab countries, first of all the UAR, as creating favorable conditions for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. With regard to the Middle East, the 10 April congress resolution on Brezhnev's report rubberstamps Soviet policy aimed at seeking a political settlement which would include Israeli withdrawal, the exercise by each state of its "right to an independent existence," and satisfaction of the Palestinian Arabs' legitimate rights. UAR, ISRAELI TASS on 2 April reported UAR President as-Sadat's POSITIONS definition of Cairo's position, as broadcast by Cairo radio that day, noting his statement of readiness to begin clearing the canal as soon as Israel begins partial withdrawal, as the first phase of full withdrawal, and to observe a cease-fire "for the period of practical implementation of the above proposal." Cairo's version said that the UAR would agree to extend the cease-fire "for a definite period" in which Jarring woulO draw up a timetable for implementing Resolution 242. The TASS account does not mention as-Sadat's statement that UAR armed forces would cross the canal "to assume their national duties on the east bank"; Cairo's AL-AHRAM on the 3d, calling attention to points "worthy of attention" in as-Sadat's statement, mentioned "its insistence that the Egyptian army cross the canal to Sinai immediately on completion of partial withdrawal." The TASS account does note other points also singled out by AL-AHRAM: rejection of demilitarization of Sinai--while accepting demilitarized zones on both sides of the borders--and rejection of proposals for the transfer of Sharm ash-Shaykh to Israel or for Israeli participation in an international force in that area. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/0RP C1A-RDP85T00 09940016-4 Limited Soviet comment on the Middle East crisis highlights Cairo's statement of readiness to conclude a peace treaty with Israel, contingent upon Israel's withdrawal, as well as the UAR proposal on reopening the Suez Canal--points stressed by Brezhnev in his 30 March congress report as providing a "real basis" for a Middle East solution. A foreign-language commentary by Soltan on the 13th additionally points out that Cairo agrees to allow Israel "the right to use both the canal and the Tiran Strait." In the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 14th, panelist Primakov said that Egypt fully agreed to do everything it could to guarantee the security of the existence of all states of the area. Referring to Resolution 2142--which Brezhnev did not mention--Primakov called it the only document "of a compromise nature" providing for a just political settlement. Moscow only briefly takes note of a resolution of the Israeli Labor Party convention, TASS reporting from New York on the 7th that the convention approved the government's "aggressive course" in a resolution stressing the need for substantial change in Israel's former frontiers. While hypocrit5cally proclaiming its wish "to hold 'peaceful talks' with the Arabs," TASS said, the convention reaffirmed the policy of creating Israeli settlements on the occupied Arab lands. MOSCOW COMPLAINS OF U.S, ARMS TO ISRAEL, DEFENDS AID TO ARABS Two Soviet propagandists, in the domestic service commentators' roundtable and in a foreign-language commentary, profess concern over continued U.S. deliveries of "offensive" weapons to Israel. The latter goes on to take guarded note of Western and Israeli reporte of Soviet military deliveries to Cairo and to repeat Moscow's standard, but infrequently expressed, justification for its arms deliveries to the Arabs. In the roundtable on 4 April, Primakov criticized Washington for trying "to create the illusion now of a certain modification of its course," declaring that it would be a real step toward peace if the United States discontinued its supplies of arms, "if only of offensive arms," to Israel. And the Soltan foreign- language commentary on the 13th complains that while efforts were being made to create a favorable atmosphere for peace negotiations, the United States "flooded Israel with weapons of attack are is still pouring them in." Soltan goes on to make what is apparently Moscow's first, cautiously worded, rejoinder to Western press reports of deliveries of Soviet military equipment, including MIG-23 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/2560 A5T00875ROAqgQM016-4 14 APRIL 1971 fighters, to the UAR. He claims that the Americans have many times "grossly falsified facts in an attempt to whitewash their action," and says that the State Department--in a statement by e spokesman on the l2th--complained about an alleged increase in "Soviet aid" to the UAR "supposedly upsetting a balance" in the Middle East and hampering a political settlement. It is the United States and Israel which are frustrating a peaceful settlement, he routinely charges. Soltan recalls that the CPSU Congress pointed out that the USSR is ready to join "any other" permanent member of the Security Council in international guarantees. He does not attribute the remark yo Brezhnev, who said in his congress report that the Soviet Union is prepared to join "other powers" who are Council members in creating international guarantees. Soltan adds that, however, the Soviet Union will continue its firm support of the Arab nations; enlarging on this pledge, made by Brezhnev, he says the USSR will "grant them all aid, including military aid, as victims of aggression fighting in a just cause." This is Moscow's standard argument in defense of Soviet military aid. Thus Kosygin in a July 1968 press conference in Stockholm had asserted that deliveries of arms to Arab countries defending themselves against aggression are "Just" deliveries, but those to Israel are deliveries of arms to an aggressor and the USSR condemns and will oppose them. The Soltan commentary does not repeat Brezhnev's cryptic remark, following the expression of readiness to join in guarantees for a political settlement, that "after this is achieved" it would be possible "to consider further steps aimed at reducing war tension" in the region, particularly tuning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and cooperation. It is possible that Brezhnev had in mind the question of reduction of arms to the Middle Eaat; the Soviet position has been that this issue cannot he solved before withdrawal of Israeli troops, as Kosygin said in his June 1967 press conference at the United Nations. The 1 July 1968 Soviet Government memorandum on disarmament measures also noted that the question of measures for lir' the Middle East arms race could be considered only after full Israeli withdrawal. Brezhnev's reference to the Mediterranean is unclear, although Soviet propagandists from time to time link U.S. and NATO presence in the Mediterranean with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Groinyko in his UN General Assembly speech last October had found it "difficult not to link" Israeli "annexationist" Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release I 0974 8'ATCIA-RDP85TIN-A 0300040016-4 L 1971 ambitions with the "increase in the stream of offensive weapons they are receiving from their patrons and with the latter's recent show of naval strength in the eastern Mediterranean.'" Brezhnev himself had demanded the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean in his speech at the European CP conference on European security in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release I 999/O9/ IRP85TO08 ?FtD99 040016-4 14 APRIL 1971 SINO - U,S, RELATIONS PEKING PLAYS PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY WITH U.S, TABLE TENNIS TEAM Peking's current venture into "people's diplomacy" by hosting an American table tennis delegation has thus far been unencum- bered by propaganda attacks on U.S. policy. NCNA has reported he delegation's 10 April arrival at Peking airport, where it was greeted by officials of the All-China Sports Federation and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries; a welcoming banquet given on the 11th by the sports federation; and a ceremony on the 13th at which Chinese and American players played "friendly matches."* As of this writing, Peking has not reported Chou En-tai's meeting on the 14th with members of the American and other foreign teams now in Peking. There has been no reference to Sino-U.S. political relations in Peking'b coverage of the American team's visit. The theme of people's diplomacy was struck at the 11 April banquet, where a sport. federation official called the visit "an expression of friendship of the American people for the Chinese people" and voiced the hope that it would promote "understanding and friendship between the sportsmen and people" of the two countries. A polemical note had been sounded prior to the delegation's arrival, in an 8 April NCNA feature on the friendly atmosphere at the just concluded world table tennic tournament at Nagoya, Japan. NCNA quoted a Chinese player as saying to an unnamed American couple: "Though the U.S. Government is hostile to China, the Chinese and American people are on good terms. We differentiate the U.S. Government from the American people." NCNA added that "the two American friends agreed with him." There has been no echo of this line in propaganda on the U.S. delegation's visit. Peking's invitation, coming less than a month after the United States announced the removal of restrictions on American * NCNA's report on the matches did not disclose the scores. According to accounts filed by American correspondents covering the visit, the Chinese tactfully won by only a moderate margin. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release I 99M A$ IA-RDP8 ORBIWO0300040016-4 1 APRIL 1971 -24- travel to the PRC, followed extensive publicity for the Chinese table tennis team's activities at the world championships. Propaganda on Chinese sports activities has accompanied the PRC's resurgent diplomatic activity as part of its emergence from the isolation of the cultural revolution. In addition to the U.S. delegation, teams from Canada, Colombia, Nigeria, and Britain have also arrived in the PRC from the world 'r)urnament. Earlier, an NCNA dispatch from Nagoya on the 0th reported a decision by six Asian and African delegations to sponsor an Afro-Asian table tennis tournament in Peking at an unspecified future date. The only references to politi ,l relations in Peking's coverage of the various team visits have accented the positive. NCNA's reports on the Canadian and Nigerian delegations hare taken note of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and these countries in recent months; and a ceremony on the 12th, featuring matches between the Canadian and Chinese players, was attended by Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the National People's Congress and a ranking PRC representative in relations with noncommunist countries. SOVIET Soviet reaction to the U.S. team's visit to the REACTION PRC has been in a low key, though Moscow's abiding suspicion regarding any improvement of Sino-U.S. relations shows through. A TASS dispatch from Washington on the llth cited the American press as terming Peking's invitation a significant step "despite all the Chinese rhetoric and propaganda." TASS quoted a State Department spokesman who welcomed the entry into the PRC of American journalists accompanying the team as comporting with Washington's policy of expanding contacts with Peking. A Soviet foreign-language broadcast on the 10th juxtaposed a report on the PRC's 490th "serious warning" to the United States on 9 April with a report of Peking's decision to permit U.S. correspondents to cover the table tennis delega- tion's visit. The broadcast also pointed out that the invitation to the delegation and the entry permits for the correspondents had been announced shortly after Washington's removal of restrictions on American travel to the PRC. The broadcast's implied linkage reflects Moscow's concern over what a recent NEW TIMES article (No. 13, dated 26 March) called "the diplomacy of smiles" between Washington and Peking. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release rF1RP85TOO875ROq,4PR0%99J 6-4 14 APRIL 1971 Taking note of President Nixon's call for a dialogue with Peking in his recent foreign policy i.eport to Congress, the article reviewed steps taken by the United States to expand relations with the PRC and signs that Peking may be willing to reciprocate. Expressing apprehend on over the effect on its position in the triangular relationship if the other two sides improve their relations, NEW TIMES found it "disturbing" that Washington's overtures to Peking coincide with a resur- gence of "anti-Soviet hysteria" in China. Moscow's sensitivity on this matter was underscored by the article's references to the Sino-Soviet border dispute, a subject which Soviet media have largely ignored in recent months. PEKING REAFFIRMS TOUGH POSITION ON TAIWAN QUESTION Peking's practice of people's diplomacy with the table tennis teams has undoubtedly been facilitated by the absence from the world tournament of a Nationalist Chinese team. That the Taiwan question remains a major impediment was indicated by Peking's statements on 31 March withdrawing from the International Archery Federation and the International Lawn Tennis Federation in pro- test against memberships of Nationalist Chinese organizations in these bodies. The statements reiterated Peking's claim to Taiwan and its vigorous objection to any arrangement smacking of a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" solution. In addition, NCNA on 30 March publicized remarks by the president of the Japan Table Tennis Association opposing a Taiwan presence in the International Table Tennis Federation either in the name of the Republic of China or of Taiwan. Peking's tough stance on the Taiwan question was recently reaffirm- ed in an NCNA commentary on 10 April--the date of the arrival of the U.S. team in Peking--reacting sharply to statements by the Japanese premier and foreign minister professing a desire for better relations with Peking. While acknowledging that Premier Sato had amended an earlier statement ruling out a change in Sino-Japanese relations during his incumbency, the commentary came down hard on the Taiwan question as a core issue. NCNA took note of ?ecent consultations between U.S. and Japanese officials as demonstrating "the increasingly close collusion of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries in the scheme of creating 'one China, one Taiwan.'" Expressing Peking's concern lest the PRC's momentum toward broader acceptance in the international community might be arrested short of its goal of fully displacing the Chiang Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 19994'1q`4M4-RDP85T00`D=00040016-4 l4 APRIL 1.971 -26- regime, NCNA equated the effort to produce a new formula for obstructing the perennial Albanian motion at the United Taations-- which calls for admission of the PRC and expulsion of the ROC-- with the "one China, one Taiwan" approach. NCNA also took note of recent disclosures that the disputed Senkakus will be included in the reversion of the Ryukyus to Japanese jurisdiction. The commentary claimed that "the Japanese militarists with the support of U.S. imperialism" have begun preparations for "military occupation" of the dis- puted islands and "for the encroachment upon China's terri- torial sovereignty." The commentary again registered Peking's apprehensiveness over possible Japanese moves to thwart the PRC's objectives centering on Taiwan rid the Senkakus, parti- cularly if Tokyo seeks to invoke the .,.-eaty commitments between Japan, the United States, and the ROC. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/2?0N9IIRRJ?L85TOO875 9 P0 ;9$#0016-4 14 APRIL 1971 27 BURMA COMUNIST PARTY INAUGURATES NEW CLANDESTINE RADIO A new communist clandestine radio, the "Voice of the People -of Burma," has been established to promote the pro-Peking Burmese Communist Party (BCP) line of revolutionary armed insurgency. The appearance of the new radio comes on the heels of the arrival in Rangoon on 22 March of a new PRC ambassador, capping a two-year trend toward moderation in Peking's treatmcnt of the Ne Win regime, and occurs during a period in which official PRC media have vir' ally ceased giving propaganda support to the BC-Is insur, 'ne. * In presumab) iding facilities for the new radio while itself improi, its state relations with Burma, Peking may be seeking t( iumvent the dilemma posed by the constraints of its diplom, objectives and the propaganda needs of the loyally Maoist Lr,ese communists. Peking may hope to keep the atmosphere of Sino-Burmese relations as clear as possible by avoiding direct attacks on the Ne Win government in its own name, in effect creating a division of labor according to which the BCP's radio propagates the revolutionary line while the official PRC media observe the diplomatic constraints. Peking has not thus far reported the existence of the new clandestine radio. There was a three-week delay before Peking reported on the clandestine Voice of the Malayan Revolution, which had been inaugurated on 15 November 1969. PRC media replay comment attributed to the Voice of the Malayan Revolution and to the still older clandestine radio of the pro-Peking Thai Communist Party, the "Voice of the People of Thailand," which was first heard in 1962. INAUGURAL A BCP Central Committee statement proclaimed the BROADCAST inauguration of the Voice of the People of Burma on 28 March, the 23d anniversary of the launching of the insurgent movement in Burma--an event ignored by Peking media for the first time in several years. Transmitting two hours daily, the radio announced that it will broadcast in Burmese four days a week and in Northern Shan dialect, Shan, and Mandarin on the other three days. * Peking's treatment of the Ne Win government is discussed in the TRENDS of 37. March 1971, pages 29-30. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release I 999/0fi"' iA RDP85T0 Pi 0040016-4 r~"8~ .. )P OI The four-point BCP statement announcing the radio's inauguration indicated that it will pursue a line of revolutionary armed struggle against the government and an antirevisionist ideological line avowedly Maoist in inspiration. The statement declared as its first point that inauguration of the radio marked the opening of "a new military front to successfully fight Ne Win's military government" and that it would contribute to "organizing and uniting the people, the people's army, members of communist youth organizations, comrades under the leadership of the party, and party members along its policy of military victory and seizure of power." The statement's second point called for struggle against both "internal and external revisionists," though it did not mention the Soviets. It argued that support for Ne Win's "Burmese way to socialism" represents a revisionist heresy, reviving old factional disputes by tracing this aberration to the "traitor- opportunist" Thein Pe Myint's doctrine of peaceful evolution. In its third point the statement denounced Ne Win's nonaline- ment as a mask and called for opposition to "U.S. imperialism and reviving Japanese militarism." Positing the "ultimate aim" of the BCP--"realization of the communist system in Burma"--in its fourth point, the statement acknowledged "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" as the "ideological basis" of the new radio, which will abide by the instructions of the late BCP chairman, Thakin Than Tun: "concentrate on military victory; based on peasantry, organize the national groups and expand the front; party coi:etruction is the key." INITIAL The firL't commentaries of the Voice of the People COMMENT of Burma, including a BCP Central Committee state- ment marking the 23d anniversary of the insurgency and a commentary explaining the "people's army," have attacked the "Ne Win military clique"--:t term not used by Peking in its own name since September 1969. They have also stressed the necessity for hardships and sacrifices, underscored the importance of the BCP leadership's role, and emphasized that "the line of winning the war and seizing power is the only way to liberate the suffering masses." Recalling that the late chairman, Than Tun, and other comrades had given their lives for the rF.,oiution, the BCP anniversary statement appeared to anticipate continued hardship and Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : 9JA. $A T00875Rggq O , jP16-4 14 APHIr1 1.971. - 29 - sacrifice for the BCP-led insurgents. Noting that "a revolution is bound to encounter difficulty and hardship for a long period," the statement warned that revolutionaries must "make sacrifices and undergo shortages of food and clothing and poor living conditions" and that "they must even give up their lives"; but it added that "they can sacrifice everything if they are faith- ful to the BCP." The commentary entitled "What is the People's Army?" described it as "a genuine people's army" under the leadership of the BCP, "which is the vanguard of the proletariat." Claiming that "acceptance of the sole and direct leadership of the BCP is essential to the people's army," the commentary said that the army opposed revisionism and dogmatism and accepted only Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought "as its guiding philosophy." Other than references to the late Than Tun, who was assassinated in September 1968, the initial material carried by the new radio has skirted the question of the current leadership of the BCP, indicating that the succession has not yet been settled. Specifically, there is no mention of Thakin Ba Thein Tin, who has been identified by Peking as BCP Central Committee vice chairman and head of the resident BCP delegation in Peking. The last reference to Ba Thein Tin appeared in a 2 October NCNA report citing his presence at the PRC's national day celebrations. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 199910 I25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 N1IDE N'.I!IA.T.~ 1~13IS '.CR.Ii~Nl~f3 111 APIZIL 19rt1. PAKISTAN Having placed itself officially on record in Podgornyy's 3 April message to Pakistani President Yahya Khan as a "concerned friend" of Pakistan whose primary interest is in stopping the bloodshed, Moscow has pulled back to a less visible stance as a nonpartisan peacemaker ready and able to lend its good offices through quiet diplomacy. Thus Soviet media have reverted since the release of Podgornyy's message to the kind of sparse, balanced reportage that marked their initial reaction to the Pakistan events, while noting that Kosygin had met with the ambassadors of both India and Pakistan. Peking, on the other hand, has developed the approach adopted in its first, belated reaction to the Pakistan events on 3 April, charging India and the Soviet and U.S. "superpowers" with flagrant intervention and carrying the text of Podgornyy's message as evidence. Peking has also publicized Yahya's reply to Podgornyy, which Moscow media have not mentioned. Peking has not publicized its own subsequent official. demarche--a Chou En-lai message to Yahya which, as reported by West Pakistan sources on 12 April, came down hard on the need for "unity of the people of East and West Pakistan" and implicitly attacked the separatist leaders as "a handful of persons who want to sabotage the unity of Pakistan." PEKING DIRECTS FIRE AT INDIA "IN LEAGUE WITH SUPERPOWERS" Chinese media for the first time acknowledged the existence of widespread civil disorders in Pakistan through the device of publicizing Podgornyy's 3 April message and Yahya's reply of the 5th. In line with its failure to publicize Chou En-tai's message, Peking has publicly neither condemned the separatist efforts of the East Pakistanis nor explicitly supported the efforts of Yahya's military government to restore control over the Eastern wing. Rather, its treatment of the East Pakistan events has stressed the improprieties of foreign interference-- Indian, Soviet, and, to a lesser degree, U.S.--in what it portrays as a purely internal affair of Pakistan, without clearly defining the internal issues. Thus the thrust Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040016-4 CONFIDJCN'.I'..TAL .F131S 'T'RENDS .l4 APRILS 1971. of PRC media's coverage--in particular, NCNA's Juxtaposition of the texts of Podgornyy's message and Yahya's reply-- and of an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 11 April is to present alleged Indian interference, including military moves, and allegedly anti-Pakistan and pro-Indian meddling by the Soviet Union as the only legitimate subject of political concern regarding the Pakistan situation within the international community. Contending in careful language that "the relevant measures taken by President Yahya Khan in connection with the present situation in Pakistan are the internal affairs of Pakistan in which no country should or has the right to interfere," the Commentator article--the sole Chinese comment on the Pakistan situation--charged that the Indian "expansionists" were "in league with the two superpowers" in an effort to promote "international intervention." After referring to the U.S. State Department's 7 April statement as "an attempt to poke its. nose into Pakistan's internal affairs," the article asserted that "the Soviet Government acted more blatantly" in the form of Podgornyy's message to Yahya. Posing as..a friend, the article said, Podgornyy neglected to mention:the "threat posed by the Indian reactionaries to,Pakistan" while "impudently criticizing the Pakistan Government." Taking the occasion to recall the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Commentator said "it is not-hard to see what the Soviet leadership supports, what it opposes, and on whose side after all it stands." While ignoring any-contentious issues in the internal conflict in Pakistan, the Commentator article put the "Chinese Government and people" on record as "resolutely supporting the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression and interference.".. On 7 April NCNA puolicized a PRC protest lodged with the Indian Oovernment in response to a "provocation" in front of the PRC Embassy-in India against Peking's alleged assistance to. the Pakistan Government. Following the line of the 3 April NCNA report on Pakistani protests to India, NCNA on the 10th cited another "strong protest" by the Pakistan Government with the Indian Government for "illegal entry of armed Indian personnel into Pakistan territory for CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040016-4 Approved For Release 199 5I : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 0 NTIAL FBIS TRENDS 14 APRIL 1971 subversive activities." On 12 April NCNA cited Pakistan news sources for a report that two "intruding soldiers of the Indian border security force" had been captured on 10 April and that two companies of Indian "infiltrators" had "retreated after suffering heavy casualties." Peking media similarly portray Soviet meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs and goading of. India into anti-Pakistan activities. NCNA's release on 8 April of the Juxtaposed texts of Podgornyy's message and Yahya's reply also served to convey Yahya's contention that the root of the potential for South Asian instability was India's interference and his appeal to the Soviet Government to use its "undeniable influence with the Indian Government in order to impress upon it the need for refraining from interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs." NCNA followed this up on the 9th with a report from Rawalpindi on Pakistan press reaction to Podgornyy's message, quoting such comments as "Podgornyy has taken a one-sided view" and "Podgornyy's viewpoint 'has encouraged Delhi to pursue its most vicious aims"'; it also cited the charge.that Podgornyy's letter was "intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan." MOSCOW PULLS BACK TO LESS PROMINENT'STANCE AS HONEST BROKER Having moved off dead center with the 2 April TRUD article and the widely broadcast Podgornyy message the following day, expressing "great alarm" at "the nuherous casualties, sufferings, and privations" being brought about in East Pakistan by the "repressive measures and bloodshed" of Yahya's military-administration, Moscow has reverted to a stance of studied moderation and neutrality. After registering its concern, and in the process scoring points with the Indians, Moscow has carried no followrp comment cn the Podgornyy message and has taken no public note of Yahya's reply calling: on the USSR to help prevent India from interfering in Pakistani affairs. Apart from prompt reportage of favorable Indian reaction to Podgornyy's message, the only followup reference to the message in Soviet media appears in a speech made in the Soviet Union by the head of the East Pakistan Communist Party delegation to the CPSU congress: His comments, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 14 APRIL 1971 broadcast by Radio Moscow in English to South Asia on 8 April, included a reference to the soviet people's concern about "the.massacre of thousands of unarmed innocent people by the reactionary military government" and an expression of "heartfelt gratitude" for Podgornyy's message. Moscow's reporting, in the pattern of its coverage prior to the publicity for the message, balances Western news reports of "fierce" battles with official Pakistani Government claims that the situation in East Pakistan has "fully returned to normal." An effort to assume the role of honest broker, reminiscent of Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent in January 1966, seems reflected in TASS' successive reports that Kosygin had met with the ambassadors of Pakistan and India. Noting that each meeting was at the ambassador's request, the items were virtually identical. TASS said Kosygin's conversation with the Pakistan ambassador "passed in a friendly atmosphere," while Kosygin "had a friendly conversation" with the Indian ambassador. The meetings took place on 12 April. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release I 999 ] RDP85TOW75RD 300040016-4 14 APRIL 1971 - 34 - GERMANY AND Br- RLIN GDR CONTINUES TO PUBLICIZE ITS STAND ON BAHR-KOHL MEETINGS In authoritative statements as well as routine propaganda, the GDR has continued to air its views regarding the ongoing talks between GDR and FRG State Secretaries Kohl and Bahr, whose 10th meeting took place in East Berlin on 31 March. ADN reported routinely on the 31st that the two envoys had met and agreed to continue the talks in Bonn on 23 April.* For the first time, however, the GDR labeled the report an "announcement" and noted that it had been agreed upon by the two delegations. In the recent period, two authoritative East German statements strongly denounced Bonn's argument that third countries should not establish diplomatic relations with the GDR in order "not to disturb" the talks between the GDR and the FRG and to allow Bonn to continue its "so-called intra-German dialog." On 26 March, ADN reported that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the GDR People'- Chamber had "emphatically" decried this West German "detour of intra-German relations" as an atte.,.pt to establish relations with the GDR on an "unequal" basis and as a continuation of Bonn's "revanchist policy" against the GDR and E::ropean detente. The committee categorically restated the East German position that there can never be any negotiations on the "indisputable fact" that the FRG and the.GDR, states of "opposite social systems," have been "sovereign" for more than 20 years. 0 In the same vein, against the background of a tour of Latin America by Federal President Heinemann and.Foreign Minister Scheel and the then pending announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Chile and the GDR, a 2 April NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article by GDR First Deputy Foreign Minister Peter Florin vigorously rejected the West German concept of "intra-German relations." Citing a reported Scheel. in Bogota to the effect that recognition of the GDR by third states would hinder Bonn's effort to normalize relations.with the East, Florin pointed out that the meetings between Bahr * On 7 April ADN noted the postponement of the 11th meeting to 30 April at Bahr's request. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : 1, T00875R%g3QAgfp16-4 14 APRIL 1971 - 35 - and Kohl are talks between representatives of "sovereign, independent states" and not an "intra-German dialog." He stressed that the otccome of the talks does not depend on their duration, "'jut solely and exclusively on the FRG Government relinquishing any attempt to subordinate the GDR to the FRG." Florin went on to turn Bonn's argument around, maintaining that if more third countries would recognize the GDR, the chances for success of the Bahr-Kohl talks would improve, as would the conditions for ratifying Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, for "normalizing" the West Berlin situation, and for convening a European security conference. Underscoring Soviet support for the East German stand, he cited Brezhnev's remarks at the CPSU congress on the importance of establishing "relations of equal rights". between the GDR and FRG based on "generally recognized norms of international law." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 19 RAP I 6A-RDP851 - 36 - FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA K& "9R300040016-4 FIRST TALKS HELD TO PAVE WAY FOR PRAGUE-BONN NEGOTIATIONS After a considerable propaganda buildup for the first round of "exploratory talks" looking toward FRG-Czechoslovak agreement to negotiate a normalization of relations, Prague media report- ed briefly that FRG State Secretary Paul Frank and Czechosluvak Deputy Foreign Minister Milan Kiusak had met in Prague on 31 March and 1 April and discussed "questions of mutual relations." In the preceding weeks, extensive Czechoslovak radio and press commentaries had outlined the position Prague would take in such talks: Prague had been ready for years to enter into negotiations, but Bonn was repeatedly moving to delay them; the "cardinal issue" was the Czechoslovak side's condition that the talks could take place only if West Germany recognized the invalidity of the 1938 Munich Agreement ab initio and "all the consequences resulting therefrom." Insisting that this stand was not an "ultimatum" or an obstacle "artificially" placed at the forefront by Czechoslovakia, the Bratislava paper ROLNICKE NOVINY on 25 March argued typically that the Munich Agreement was an "obstacle" created not by Czechoslovakia but by Nazi Germany and that the Federal Government must now remove it "if the path to agreement is to be cleared." The Czechoslovak commentaries stressed the "preparatory" or "preliminary" nature of the pending talks, which could do no more than pave the way for later negotiations. In the two weeks since they reported the Frank-Klusak meetings, Prague media have made no further reference to the talks and have ceased all comment on the Munich Agreement. The report on the opening round contained no inkling of the strong stand taken by Frank on Bonn's inability to accept the invalidity of the Munich Agreement ab initio. It said only that the atmosphere was "businesslike and frank" and that the envoys agreed to continue the talks. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS lit APRIL 1971 - 37 - YUGOSLAVIA TITO ASSAILS CRITICS OF REFORMS, WARNS OF PARTY FACTIONALISM Against the background of continued squabbling among the Yugoslav republics over pending constitutional amendments on government reorganization, President Tito, in speeches during a tour of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo, has sought to drum up support for the reforms and to silence critics of the measures. He also used the tour to warn republican party chiefs that factionalism will not be tolerated in the League of Communists. Since Tito announced his proposals for a collective presidency in SEptember 1970, the constitutional amendments designed to impl'ment them have been a subject of heated debate in the republics, particularly between Serbia and Croatia. The Serbs evidently fear that the Croats will exploit the planned economic decentralization to further enhance their autonomy at the expense of the other, less developed republics. On their part, the Croats have indicated apprehensiveness that under the new plan the Serbs, advocates.of strong federal organs, will try to use the reorganization to limit Croatian autonomy. In his speech in Bosnia-Hercegovina on 7 April, ao reported by TANJUG, Tito singled out no rgpublic by name i:i warning against attempts to "frustrate'Jlthe pending constitutional amendments, "to foment national hatred, and to conceal economic problems under a national cloak." He added that during the discussion of the amendments, "class opponents have emerged--explicitly antisocialist and anticommunist, nationalist and chauvinist--which are attacking the course we have inaugurated." Seeking to counter such attacks, Tito assumed his role as champion of Yugoslav unity and offered assurances that republican rights as well as Yugoslav integrity would be served by the new amendments. He firmly rejected the conservative, unitarian idea that the proposed shift of power to the republics would represent "disintegration of our socialist state." He added: "That is a very crude error," for "self-management cannot develop normally and correctly unless the republics are given broadest possibilities for self-management." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONIP I1JJ N;L1I.AL F13I8 TJ 1 NDO ii, APRII., 1971 - 38 - In a passage evidently aimed at the more autonomous-minded republics such as Croatia and Slovenia, Tito expressed "great fears" that with the devolution of powers from the Federal Government, "statism" may "become distributed among the republics." He went on to warn: "No republic can be sufficient unto itself or enclose itself within some framework of its own, be it economic, trade, educational, or some other." Speaking in Kosovo on the 12th, Tito played similar themes in bluntly warning the republican party chiefs against factionalism: "We shall not permit factions to be formed in the LCY" or permit "diverse lines." Although each republic has its own party, he said, "there is only one line of the LCY." CROATIAN PARTY SEES CONSPIRACY TO DISCREDIT ITS LEADERSHIP The kind of political dissension Tito may have had in mind in his recent speeches was reflected in a communique issued on 8 April by the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia which attacked "organized activity' by centrist and hostile foreign forces "aimed at diecrediting the political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Croatia." It added that "slanderous allegations" were being propagated about supposed link-ups of the Croatian leadership with Ustashi emigres and other hostile elements abroad. And it went on to link the "intensification of hostile activity abroad to "strengthened opposition of the unitarist, centrist, and bureaucratic forces" in the country which were politically condemned at the fourth Brioni plenum.* The communique further charged that allegations against the Croatian leadership are being "disseminated even through some organs of the Federal Administration." * The fourth plenum of the LCY Central Committee, held on the island of Brioni on 1 July 1966, resulted in the ouster of then Vice President and LCY Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic-- a Serb whose name is synonymous with centralist integration. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FT31B 'T'RENDS L APRIL 1.971 - 39 - Noting that the Croatian Central Committee discussion "took as a point of departure" the conclusions of the Executive Bureau of the LCY at a 23 March meeting, the communique in effect challenged the adequacy of the LCY's conclusions by calling for "an investigation to fix responsibility on the basis of established facts and to draw necessary conclusions about the political activity .f the LCY." Croatian displeasure and hints of dissension at the Executive Bureau's March meeting seemed indicated in a brief report carried by Radio Zagreb on the 23d, which noted vaguely that the Executive Bureau had "examined aspects of hostile activity against our country and some questions of the activity of our security service and adopted appropriate conclusions." The Croatian party's rejection of "slanderous allegations" that it has ties with Ustashi terrorists abroad also came against the background of an outcry in the Yugoslav press against a Croatian emigre attack on the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden. Croatian Premier Haramija promptly issued a statement on 7 April denouncing the "base and loathsome attack" and demanding punishment of the culprits. CROATIANS URGE GREATER FOREIGN POLICY ROLE FOR REPUBLICS Efforts by the Croatian Republic to use the planned government reorganization to promote its aspirations for autonomy were reflected in remarks by Croatian Premier Haramija to the Zagreb daily VECERNJI LIST urging an increased foreign policy role for the republics. According to a 9 April Radio Zagreb account of the interview, Haramija commented that further development of the republics' role in this area "would be made possible by constitutional changes" and that "all the socialist republics and provinces should take an active part in the formulation and realization of Yugoslavia's foreign policy." Haramija dismissed "fears" about international activity by the republics as unfounded, arguing that it would not mean a separate foreign policy for each republic but "agreement and accord among all the republics and provinces." He made it clear that one of his aims would be to have more Croatians in the diplomatic corps when he added, in discussing the need for more coordination with the republics- in foreign affairs: "This applies to the cadre policy in foreign affairs in Yugoslav diplomacy." Approved For Release 1999/09/~1vFIST V-R'L)P85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 111 APRIL 1971 - ho - In effect underlining Croatia's resolve to pursue a more independent policy, Haramija noted that a Croatian delega- tion was presently visiting Hungary. Because the visit represented "the first contacts of a republican government with Hungary," he said, "there were some dilemmas." Without elaborating on the difficulties, he went on to declare that "the Socialist Republic of Croatia is interested in friendly relations with Italy and is developing them in all spheres." ARTISTS' CONGRESS: In another manifestation of Croatian CROATIAN WALKOUT striving for autonomy, a delegation of Croatian artists staged a walkout on 11 April from the Belgrade congress of the Federation of Yugoslav Artists when the gathering decided to keep the federation headquarters in the Yugoslav capital. According to TANJUG, the walkout had been foreshadowed by a bitter debate on the issue between the Serbian and Croatian delegations. Following the vote to keep the head office in Belgrade, the Croatians walked out after charging that the meeting "had violated the principles of self-management,, cooperation, and consultation." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 14 APRIL 1971 - Ill - PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS NEW SHANTUNG PARTY COI 1ITTEE HEADED BY YANG TE-CHIH Provincial chief Wang Hsiao-yu failed to secure a leadership spot on the new Shantung party committee announced by NCNA on 8 April. Wang is the first chairman to fail to survive the party rebuilding process within his province. Of the 17 committees previously formed, revolutionary committee chair- men were retained as new party chiefs in all cases. Backed by radical Red Guard groups, Wang jumped from his minor post of vice-mayor of Tsingtao to become provincial chairman in early 1967. Under his leadership Shantung became a leading revolutionary province during the cultural revolution. Unofficial sources, however, soon reported tensions developing between Wang and more conservative PLA spokesmen led by seasoned field commander Yang Te-chih, first vice-chairman. Wang disappeared from pubic view just after being named a full member of the Central Committee at the Ninth Party Congress. He attended several Peking functions immediately following the congress and then slipped into rublic limbo, except for an appearance in Tsinan on 1 October 1969. Although no acting chairman was officially named, de facto control of Shantung devolved on Yang Te-chih, and he is now designated first secretary of the new committee. Yang has held the concurrent position of commander of the Tsinan Military Region (MR) since 1958 and was also a member of the standing committee on the old Shantung party committee. The second position on the new committee was claimed by Yuan Sheng-ping, a responsible person within the PLA units in the MR since 1963, who was named second secretary. Three men were named deputy secretaries: Chang Chih-hsiu holds the concurrent post of deputy commander of the Tsinan MR; Pai Ju-ping, former Shantung governor and secretary on the previous party committee, is also a vice-chairman; Su Yi-Jan, a former secretary from the old party committee and former vice-governor, was identified in February as a vice-chairman. The Shantung committee was formed at a congress of 1,1+88 party delegates in Tsinan from 1 to 5 April. The number of delegates was greater than for any of the prior 1.7 provincial-level CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 14 APRIL 1971 -42- congresses--appropriately, since Shantung is the second most populous province in China. As in all previous cases, the Tsinan congress adhered to the formula of "old, middle-aged, and young," in selecting the 90 full and 25 alternate members on the new committee. Yang's keynote address to the congress, made on behalf of the party nucleus group, placed more stress than ue,%l on the need for continuing party-building activities vithin the province. Yang's insistence that party building be regat'ded "as a matter of vital importance" and his call for "stepping up past"" building" appears aimed at filling in the holes whicii s:,0.1 exist in Shantung's party apparatus. Although the provincial radic, on'l April claimed new committees'for "nearly half of the counties and municipalities" within the province, Shantung has lagged behind all other.eastern provinces in reporting rebuilt?party.units. It appears that for some time to come the new provincial committee in Shantung--as well as most others--will sit on top of an incomplete party foundation. Only Hunan h'r claimed new committees for its entire provincial party r,Lructure. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040016-4