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August 18, 1971
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4 rsPEG N r fit {"r "? r: ~. Approved F8r Releas"e'1999/09/26 CIA-RDP8pTOO896ROD0300040034 4 qq [ A 1. e e . Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875R00030344 ' Confidential T ~~~Illllllll~~uuuu~lllllllll~~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~Illlllll~~uuuiiu~lllllll~~~~~ H EN S. in Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential 18 AUGUST 1971 (VOL. XXII, NO. 33) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 This propaganda analysis report is based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by THIS without coordination with other U.B. Government components. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 704, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro- hibited by law. GROUP I Iulud.d 2m ..u.ufq Grid ?wlMat.. NTI Approved For Release 1999/09/25 NGIAERBP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 CONTENTS ? Topics and Events Given Major Attention . DRV Army Paper Broadens Polemic on Dealiigs With United States. 1 DRV Party Journal Uses Anniversaries to J'ress Polemical Lines . 4 Hanoi Publicizes DRV Leaders' Visits to Military Meetings . . . 8 DRV National Assembly Delegation to Visit USSR, East Europe . . 10 Moscow Reports DRV Polemical Article, Assails PRC Policies . 10 USSR Announces "Recent" New Agreement on Aid to DRV . . . . . . 12 PRC Ignores DRV Polemic, Repeats Support for Peace Proposal . . 13 Communist Delegates at Paris Urge U.S. Withdrawal Deadline . 13 Hanoi and Front Media Comment on South Vietnam Elections . . . 15 DTV Scores U.S. Strikes in DMZ, Threats Against North Vietnam . 17 CHINA FOREIGN AFFAIRS Peking Urges Flexible Tactics to Isolate "Principal" Foe . . . 19 CHINA AND BURMA Peking Gives Correct, Restrained Treatment of Ne Win Visit . . 23 BCP's Clandestine Radio Denounces Ne Win for Visiting PRC . . . 23 KOREA DPRK and ROK Agree on Red Cross Contacts on Divided Families . 27 Peking Backs Korean Moves, Signs Economic Agreement With DPRK . 29 Moscow Minimizes Korean Contacts, Marks Liberation Anniversary. 30 SOVIET BLOC AND BALKANS Moscow Warns Against Peking's "Hypocritical" Tactics . . . . . 33 Soviet Allies Stress Impermissibility of Neutralist Course . . 34 Budapest, Prague Pick Up Rumors of Chou Visit to Balkans . . . 35 Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania Respond to Soviet Bloc Pressures . 36 PRC Military Delegation Stops in Bucharest on Way to Tirana . . 38 Moscow Discusses West Berlin Link to Treaty Ratification . . . 40 GDP Backdates Brezhnev Doctrine to iJuilding of Berlin Wall . . 43 (Continued) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/OOd -ICIq-RDP85T0087B5ROTOO0300040034-4 18 AUGUST 1971 C 0 N T E N T S (Continued) Joint Statement, Rapid Treaty Approval Follow Groxyko Visit . . 45 Mutual Consultation Provision Stressed in South Aoyan Context . 46 East European Press Sees Treaty Aimed at Pakistan, PRC . 48 Peking,-Moscow Give Sparse Coverage to Pakistan Events . 49 AFRICA Moscow, East Berlin Attack Banda Visit to South Africa PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS Articles Continue to Stress Steel Priority Over Electronics . . 53 New Party Committee Elected fcr Ali Area in Tibet . . . . . 5; Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 AUGUST 1971 Moscow (3011 iterus) Peking (1128 items) CEMA Council Session (6%) 14% Domestic Issues (30%) 32% USSR-Indian Treaty (0.4%) 12% Indochina (15%) 25% China (6%) 6% [Sihanouk in DPRK (1%) 14%] [Sino-U.S. Relations (3%) 3%] DPRK Economic (--) 3% DPRK Liberation (--) 4% Delegation in PRC Anniversary Ne Win in PRC (2%) 3% Indochina (5%) 4% PRC UN Seat (6%) 2% Middle East (2%) 2% These statistics are based on the voicecoxt commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- anent or -party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in pr-entheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; i other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. FOR. OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 INDOCHINA Hanoi's pole.:.lcizing in the wake of Sino-U.S. moves to improve bilateral relations took on new dimensions with the lengthy 3 August article published in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN under the pseudonym Chien Thang (The Victor). Expounding the theoretical foundation for Hanbi's polemic, the article spelled out a comprehensive indictment of all who would moderate their "struggle" against the United States or shift the focus of that struggle from the "main enemy." Such a line of argumentation, in some ways reminiscent of polemics against revisionism in the Khrushchev era, has not been pressed in Hanoi propaganda in recent years. Unlike recent North Vietnamese comment directed against Peking's flirtation with Washington, the Chien Thang article was not broad- cast by Hanoi radio. And at sharp variance with the normal practice of simultaneous publicity for items carried in more than one DRV propaganda channel, VNA transmitted lengthy extracts eight days after the artl^te appeared in the press. The belated VNA release suggests that there may have been debate within the DRV leadership over further dissemination of the article. And the timing of the release--on 11 August--suggests that the favorable reaction to Sino-U.S. develop- ments from North Korea's Kim Il-song, normally the most militant of revolutionaries, may have been a factor in the decision: At a 6 August rally for Sihanouk, Kim hailed President Nixon's planned Peking visit as "a great victory" for the Chinese people and world revolutionary forces. NCNA carried the text of Kim's remarks, which Li Hsien-nien on the 9th called "an important speech." Hanoi has also pressed its case, including the claim that a major aim of the Nixon Doctrine is to split the socialist camp, in broadcasts on the 15th of an editorial from the August issue of the party journal HOC TAP keyed to the 26th anniversary of the August revolution and DRV National Day. Soviet propagandists continue to assail Peking's Indochina policies in connection with Sino-U.S. developments, and on the 17th Moscow broad- cast extracts of the 3 August Chieng Thang article in its Mandarin service. The extracts reflected the essence of the article's polemic against any relaxation in the anti-U.S. struggle but omitted passages that could be aimed in part at Moscow. DRV ARMY PAPER BROADENS POLEMIC ON DEALINGS WITH UNITED STATES The theoretical base for Hanoi's polemic against moderating the struggle against U.S. imperialism was laid in the Chien Thang article Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/g,-, LJ1J~qtP85T0087P 0,M940034-4 18 AUGUST 1971 in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.* Pointedly titled "The War in Vietnam and the U.S. Imperialist3' Counterrevolutionary Global Strategy," the 3 August article set out to demonstrate that Vietnam is a truly revolutionary country which thoroughly understands and has continued to struggle against U.S. imperialism. And it spelled out a comprehensive indictment against all who would moderate the "struggle" with the United States or shift the focus of the struggle from this "main enemy." The polemical nature, of the article is pointed up by such devices as the use of quotation marks to set off phrases that expresa offending concepts, with the sources of the quotations left unspecified. Thus Chien Thang declared at the outset that obviously the revolutionary struggle in the world over the past years "has not 'cooled down'" and that "the U.S. policy of 'reconciliation' with some countries in some places is but a very perfidious ploy aimed at damming up the offensive position of the revolutionary ftrces." Defending Hanoi's right to ascertaii. the real main enemy of world revolution, Chien Thang in effect dep,'cted the Vietnamese party as a rival to the Chinese and others formulating communist theory. He prefaced his discussion wi.a the reminder that Vietnam has confronted "the U.S. imperialists" for.mcre than a quarter of a century and therefore "is one of the countries which has the best --onditions to shed light . . . on a number of burning questions of the present epoch." Later, in the same nationalistic vein, he maintained that the Vietnamese party's early identification of the United States as the main enemy had proved its "prescience and political insight" and that "the Vietnamese people have never been taken by surprise by the U.S. strategic maneuvers." Chien Thang's discussion of U.S. imperialism was couched in pointedly polemical terns. For example, he caustically declared that "the target of the revolution in a given historic period is an objective reality which one can neither invent nor recognize or reject as one wishes." He also cited the successful Vietnamese struggle against the United States to discount the views of . * The Chien Thang pseudonym hss appeared periodically on articles in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as,vell-va C.on articles published.-3ointiy.i-1-`- in the army paper and the party raper NHAN DAN--for example, a 2 August article this year and a.}.o May 1969 article on the war. Prior to the current article, all known writings attributed to Chien Thang have dealt only military questions. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 "a number of people" who "previously . . . thought the United States could be defeated only by great countries." Similarly, he claimed that the "victorious fight" of the Vietnamese has "overturned" viewpoints on the balance of forces held by "many countries and many military strategists." Chien Thang repeated the warning--conveyed in Hanoi commentaries in the wake of the announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking--that the basic policy of the Nixon Doctrine aims at dividing the socialist camp, and he went on at length to cite U.S. "policies and maneuvers" toward this end such as the expansion of economic, scientific, technical, and cultural contacts, the stirring up of nationalism, and the propagation of "the signboards of 'negotiation' and 'East-West detente."' He claimed that these policies seek to divide the socialist camp, create obstacles for revolutionary forces, and "minimize and prevent the influence of the socialist camp upon the national liberation movement." Making clear Hanoi's concern that it is Vietnam which has the most to lose from socialist disunity, Chien Thang later charged that "Nixon has tried his hardest to divide the nations, restrict and check the socialist countries' assistance to the resistance war of the Vietnamese and Indochinese people in order to weaken the revolutionary forces in Indochina, thereby discouraging the 'opponents' and creating a strong position for the U.S. imperialists." The importance of other socialist countries to the Vietnam war was underlined in another passage citing the socialist camp as first among the factors which had compelled the United States to limit the use of its forces in Indochina as well as "the scale of war expansion and measures for conducting it." Chien Thang mentioned both the Soviet Union and China by name in his discussion of the Nixon Administration's policies toward communist countries, observing that the President must admit the economic and military growth of the socialist countries, "especially that of the Soviet Union and China (which Nixon names 'two communist powers')." Later, in a discussion of U.S. policies in Europe and Asia, Chien Thang pointedly endorsed the Soviet military posture in Europe while ignoring China in his remarks on Asia. Thus he asserted that the United States has concentrated its forces in Europe because there "they have to confront the Warsaw bloc-- specifically Russia, their tough opponent, a powerful socialist country that possesses colossal economic and national defense potentials and that is superior to the United States in various fields." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 1g AUGUST 1971 Chien Thang said that the United States is confronted by the "liberation struggle" in Asia and "bogged down" in the Vietnam war and then went on to portray the "great powers" in Asia as potential targets of U.S. domination. Saying President Nixon has remarked that Asia has been subject to the "influence of most great powers," he asserted that "the Americans therefore have endeavored to dominate the other powers in order to maintain their strong position and interest." DRV PARTY JOURNAL USES ANNIVERSARIES TO PRESS POLEMICAL LINES The themes prominent in propaganda over the past month bearing on Sino-U.S. relations are also pressed in the editorial in the August issue of the party journal HOC TAP, ostensibly marking the 26th anniversary of the August revolution and DRV National Day. It is unusual for these anniversaries to be marked editorially in HOC TAP except on decennials or quinquennials, and such an editorial w..uld normally appear in the September issue of the journal, not the August one.* Hanoi radio broadcast the text of the editorial on the 15th, both in its domestic service and in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, and on the 18th VNA carried lengthy extracts. In addition to its unexpected appearance in a routine anniversary year, its unusual timing, and the publicity for it in various Hanoi media, the editorial was exceptional in that its content did not follow the pattern of past HOC TAP anniversary editorials, which have reiterated standard North Vietnamese propaganda themes. Not only did this one press Hanoi's polemic on the issue of relations with the United States, but it omitted some basic themes of recent DRV comment.,failing to even mention the 19th Central Committee plenum and omitting the now standard description of military victories earlier this year as being of "strategic significance." * An editorial marking last year's 25th anniversary appeared in the September HOC TAP. It was large], internally oriented and its attack on Victnamization was largely pro forma, with no reference to the policy being the first test of the Nixon Doctrine. The last previous HOC TAP editorial on the anniversary had appeared in 1967--also in the September issue. An editorial did appear in the August issue on the 20th anniversary in 1965, and the September issue that year had a,.Zlicles by Ho and Truong Chinh in addition to the usual text of Phan Van Dong's National Day address. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 dDRR5T00875Rg3(g034-4 18 AUGUST 1971 Pursuing the recent polemic, the editorial stressed the theme of DRV independence and self-reliance and said that the Vietnamese are accomplishing "their very important and glorious historic mission of defeating the international gendarme in the present era." Also like the other recent propaganda, it said that tha Nixon Doctrine is aimed at "sowing disunity among the socialist countftes, pitting one component of the socialist camp against another." It added that the Nixon Administration, faced with "serious defeat" from a small country, "has stepped up its perfidious diplomatic activities in the hope of pressuring our people into accepting a solution that is advantageous to the United States." And in even more pointed though still implicit reference to the President's China policy, it brought up the PRG peace proposal: "There is no alternative but to talk directly with the genuine representatives of the people of South and North Vietnam. Only those who are fighting the Americans can raise the decisive voice regarding the future of their own country." Like the Chien Thang article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, the editorial pictured the Vietnamese as in the forefront of the anti-imperialist struggle and said that in "fighting and defeating the Americans we have contributed toward protecting the socialist camp." It also suggested that not all communist countries may have appreciated this; The Vietnamese people have had the great honor of being the shock forces standing on the frontline of the world peoples' struggle against U.S. imperialism. The Vietnamese people's just under- taking has enjoyed the sympathy and support of ell progressive mankind. Many brotherly parties have asserted that their attitude toward the Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. national salvation resistance is a touchstone of proletarian internationalism . . . . While insisting that the Vietnamese have relied mainly on their own strength, the editorial acknowledged the "moral and material support" from the socialist countries, naming the Soviet Union and China. It went on to say that the Vietnamese have maintained a policy of international unity, which it termed one of the victorious factors of the Vietnamese revolution. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 -6- FAILURE TO REFER The absence of any reference to the 19th TO 19TH CC PLENUM Central Committee plenum, publicized at the beginning of February this year, is the more notable in view of the editorial's detailed recollection of the September 1960 Third VWP Congress decisions in connection with the two strategic missions of the revolution. It recalled that the congress specified them as 1) to carry out the socialist revolution in the North and 2) to liberate the South. Without attribution, the editorial went on to quote other passages from the congress resolution, including the assertion that the "revolutionary missions in the two parts of the country are carried out according to two different strategies."* The editorial also recalled that after further U.S. intervention in the war in 1965, the party pointed out that "resistance" was the duty of people throughout the country and spelled out the relationship between the northern "rear" and southern "front." HOC TAP stressed that the "key to the success" of the anti-U.S. struggle is the setting forth of the two strategic tasks and correct delineation of the relationship between them. HOC TAP's failure to mention the 19th plenum in this context is puzzling, since the plenums decision on the party's current tasks have been widely quoted elsewhere. The text of the plenum resolution has never been released, but the February HOC TAP editorial o'i the plenum, to cite one example, described the anti-U.S. resistance as the common task of the nation and the "'foremost task." Defining the tasks of the South and the North, the February editorial said the South was ad-ancing to win new victories while the North was strengthening economic and national defense forces in order to defeat the U.S. "aggressors" by fully and promptly meeting each need of the war. Truong Chinh spoke of the different strategies in clearly polemical terms in his major Marx anniversary speech in August 1968. He said that different conditions called not only for different tactics but, more importantly, for "different strategies for revolution in the two parts of the country. If one fails to recognize this point, he cannot understand either the spirit of the political platform of the NFSLV or very realistic matters such as why the NFLSV has set forth the slogan 'all for the frontline, all for victory' and why, in the North, our party has set forth the slogan 'all to defeat the American aggressors.'" Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: Y& P5A00875ROO0B30004400003S -4 18 AUGUST 1971 NO REFERENCE TO 1971 The editorial in effect downgraded the "STRATEGIC VICTORIES" importance of communist military achievements this year in two separate passages. In tracing the history of the revolution it listed as "important milestones" the general uprising in late 1959 and 1960, the Binh Gia victory in late 196k, and the Tet offensive in 1968, but it did not go on to cite "victories" this year, likened to the Tat offensive in other Vietnamese communist propaganda.* And in its sole reference to the communist successes in Cambodia and against Lam Son 719, the editorial failed to apply to them the standard label "strategic" victories, instead calling them "fatal blows" at Vietnamization. * See the 4 August TRENDS, page 15. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 HANOI PUBLICIZES DRV LEADERSI VISITS TO MILITARY MEETINGS Several appearances of fop DRV leaders at military meetings have been publicized by Hanoi in the last month or more, the latest one--noted in a 16 August report by VNA and Hanoi radio--being a "recent" visit by Truong Chinh to a "course for high- and middle-ranking cadres of the Vietnam People's Army." On 14 August Hanoi mentioned a visit to naval units by Pham Van Dong, and on 3 and 20 July it announced tLr.t Le Duan had v' sited artillery troops and a military cadres conference. The radio account of Truong Chinh's visit to the course for army cadres said he was accompanied by Col. Gen. Van Tien Dung, the VPA chief of staff; Maj. Gen. Le Quarg Dao, deputy director of the VPA's General Political Department; and Maj. Gen. Vuong Thus, Vu, deputy chief of staff of the VPA. There is no known text of Truong Chinh's remarks,' which appear from the VNA and radio accounts to have pressed themes prominent in the recent Hanoi polemical comment emphasizing DRV sovereignty, independence, and self-rel'.ance. He was said to have told the arnr cadres that the Vietnamese people are "foiling" Vietnamization and the global strategy of the United States in Vietnam and to. have termed Vietnamization, the application of the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam, "an extremely wicked and perfidious scheme" that is doomed to defeat. He stated that the VWP, pursuing "a correct and sovereign line," has led the revolution "to overcome untold difficulties and hardships," and he asserted that North Vietnam "has always relied mainly on its own strength" while "trying its best to win the great assistance of the socialist and friendly countries." Noting that the Vietnamese people are carrying out the two "strategic tasks" of resistance and building socialism, he recalled that the 19th Plenum of the Central Committee pointed out that "resisting the U.S. aggression and saving the country is the primary task" at present. * VNA's review of the Hanoi press for 17 August led off with a reference to a "report" on Truong's visit--presumably the VNA report transmitted on the 16th. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 The brief report on 20 July of remarks by Le Duan on his visit to the military cadres conference, where he was accompanied by Defense Minister Giap, Van Tien Dung, Song Hao, and other members of the Central Military Party Committee, had seemed more routine. Le Duan was quoted as saying that the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization "have'met with continuous failures and increasing difficulties" and that the Administration "has deceived public opinion while continuing its adventurous acts." He urged the armed forces and people "to become extremely vigilant." The 3 July report of Le Duan's "recent" visit to artillery troops quoted him as praising their important role in the armed forces and as urging them "to review their precious lesson and to learn from the experiences in the tactical, technical, and organizational fields in order to better train the gunners, to build the artillery force into an ever more powerful force." He told the troops they must be both red and expert. Pham Van Dong's visit to the naval units, according to the 14 August Hanoi reports, was in connection with the observance of the 5 August anniversary of the navy. The reports said Dong praised the navy's achievements and went on to urge the units to "clearly realize the responsibilities and tasks of our people's armed forces in the present situation." Stressing that the United States is being defeated but is "stubbornly struggling," he stated that the armed forces and people must be "extremely vigilant" and must raise their determination to fight and win. In this context he called on the navy units to'step up their studies and improve themselves in every field. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1,071 DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION TO VISIT USSR. EAST EUROPE VNA on 17 August publicized a DRV National Assembly Standing Committee communique of that date announcing the composition of an assembly delegation, headed by Hoang Van Hoan, which would "pay friendship visits to four brotherly socialist countries"--the USSR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia--at the invitation of those countries' legislative bodies. Hanoi radio or the 18th announced that the delegation left that day, having ' 'n seen cuff by Standing Committee chairman Truong Chinh and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Hoang Van Hoan also headed a National Assembly delegation last year which went on a similar tour of Bulgaria, East Germany, Albania, and Hungary--the East European countries not included in this year's itinerary. Whereas this year's announcement indicates the delegation will make an official visit to Moscow, last year the delegation merely had stopovers in the Soviet as well as the Chinese capitals. Plans for the 1970 visit were announced by a National Assembly Standing Committee communique on 11 June, but the delegation's composition was not revealed until its departure from Hanoi on 23 June. The itinerary of the 1970 tour was not announced in advance. A NHAN DAN editorial on 24 June 1970 described the delegation's tour as "an event of important significance for the further consolidation and development of the existing relations of friendship between the DRV National Assembly and people and the national assemblies and peoples of the brother countries."* MOSCOW REPORTS DRV POLEMICAL ARTICLE, ASSAILS PRC POLICIES BROADCAST OF Beginning with the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial CHIENG THANG which first blasted the Nixon Doctrine for its alleged aim of "dividing" the socialist countries, Soviet media have reported in some fashion much of Hanoi's propaganda polemicizing against Sino-U.S. developments.** And on * See the TRENDS of 2 August 19'(0, pages 14-19, for a review of the tour. +-* For example, the 19 July 'NHAiI DA r "editorial was, 'reprinted tex- tually in NEW TIMES No. 31, in addition to earlier summaries by TASS and Mcacow radio. The editorial in the 20 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN was excerpted in Moscow's Mandarin-language broadcasts, and the 22 July NHAN DAN ediiorial'wds summarized by Moscow radio in its foreign languages, including Mandarin and Vietnamese. Approved For Release I 999/0&J D jg{ Al3DP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 17 August Moscow radio in Mandarin carried extracts--some 1,000 out of 7,000 words--of the 3 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by Chien Thang. Mc.zcow's extracts of the Chien Thang article include the essence of his polemic against any relaxation of the "struggle" against the United States. Thus, for example, the broadcast includes his attack on the view that the revolutionary struggle has "'cooled down"' and his claim that U.S. moves toward reconcilia- tion with some countries are a ploy to obstruct revolutionary forces. However, the excerpts do not include passages which could be, in part, aimed at the Soviets: omitted are Chien Thang's references to "people" who incorrectly held that the United States could only be defeated by "great countries," and his observation that Vietnamese victories had overturned viewpoints on the balance of forces held by "many countries and many military strategists." The Moscow broadcast also truncates Chien Thang's most detailed discussion of the Nixon Doctrine's policy of dividing the socialist camp. It omits a reference to President Nixon's recognition of the military and economic strength of the USSR and China as well as Chien Thang's castigation of the President for holding up "the signboards of 'negotiation' arl 'East-West detente'" in order to realize his aims. OTHER MOSCOW Continuing criticism in Soviet media of Peking-Is PROPAGANDA Indochina policies in connection with President Nixon's planned visit to China includes TASS and Moscow radio reports on 13 and 14 August of the U.S. CP organ DAILY WORLD's comments on Chou En-tai's interview with the New York TIMES' James Reston.- According to the Moscow radio report, broadcast in Mandarin, the DAILY WORLD sees the interview as confirming the fears of those who believe that the trip is aimed in part at scuttling the Paris talks. The broadcast notes the paper's further comment that the least Chou could have done was to demand that the U.S. stop "sabotaging" the Paris talks, make it plain that a "normalization" of China- U.S. relations requires restoration of peace in Vietnam on the basis of the PRG's seven points, and demand a U.S. withdrawal. A Radio Peace and Progress Mandarin-language commentary on the 11th once again criticizes China for failing to acknowler?ge Soviet aid and for trying to make the Chinese people believe that the Soviet Union is "selling out." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 USSR ANNOUNCES "RECENT" NEW AGREEMENT ON ATO TO DRV TASS reported tersely in an English-language item on 18 August that "Soviet Vietnamese talks held in Moscow of late were followed by the signing of agreements" on additional aid "to strengthen the DRV defense potentialities." VNA has not yet mentioned the agreements. TASS did not indicate the dates of the talks or of the signing and did not name any of the participants on either side except Vice Premier Novikov, who it said "attended" the signing ceremony. Novikov had normally signed the annual USSR-DRV aid agreements in the past; the most recent one--on 23 October 1970--was signed by Vice Premier Tikhonov. The motives for Moscow's secretiveness about the circumstances surrounding the latest agreements are unclear, but TASS' failure to give any dates may have been contrived to obscure the length of the interval between the talks and the signing of the agreements that "followed" them. Although the brief TASS report did not refer to "supplementary" aid, the new accordaa may include a counte -part of the protocol on PRC supplementary military aid to North Vietnam signed in Peking on 4 July by PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Yen Chung-chuan and DRV Vice Defence Minister Tran Sam, who headed a DRV military delegation. VNA's report of that protocol--four days after the fact--was Hanoi media's first mention of the military delegation's activities over the preceding month, which had not emerged clearly from NCNA's reports. NCNA's reports had, however, revealed that the Tran Sam delegation was in Europe before it signed the protocol in Peking on 4 July. The first Chinese report of its activities, a 9 June NCNA account of a Peking banquet honoring both it and a VWP delegation led by Le Thuc Tho, noted that the "Vietnamese comrades" had stopped over en route "for a visit abroad." On 11 June NCNA said both delegations had left that day "to visit Europe." Le Due Tho's delegation attended the East German party congress, after which Tho went on to Paris to resume his post as adviser to the DRV delegation at the peace talks; but Tran Sam's military delegation received no further publicity until 24 June, when NCNA noted that it had arrived in Peking that day on "a friendly visit to China." The grout departed for home on 5 July after signing the protocol. I 01W Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FEIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 PRC IGNORES DRV POLEMIC, REPEATS SUPPORT FOR PEACE PROPOSAL Peking has continued to ignore Hanoi's polemicizing about the correct way to deal with U.S. imperialism,* but it has periodically repeated its support for the PRG's seven-point proposal. For example, a 13 August Peking domestic service commentary repeated that the Chinese government and people "resolutely and completely support" the PRG initiative. The commentary also cited evidence of worldwide endorsement of that proposal--from Cuba, Algeria, the UAR, Sudan, Chile, and Yugoslavia as well as from the Asian communist countries. Again calling the proposal "a new and significant effort," the commentary chastised the United States for refusing to respond to it while "intensifying its military actions," instigating rumors about holding a new Geneva conference, and singing the "old tune" of implementing a cease-fire throughout Indochina. NCNA also transmitted the text of the RGNUC-DPRK joint statement on Sihanouk's visit to North Korea, including its endorsement of the PRG's 1 July proposal. COM+AVIST DELEGATES AT PARIS URGE U.S. WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE Preoccupied with attacks on the Nixon Doctrine since the President's announcement of his planned trip to China, Hanoi media give minimal attention to the Paris talks. There are still some pickups of favorable world reaction to the PRG's 1 duly seven-point peace proposal, and LPA on the 17th carried PRG President Hunyh Tan Phat's "recent" PRENSA LATINA interview in which he noted the worldwide 'harm welcome, approval and support" accorded the proposal. At Paris in an unusually brief session on 12 August, the communist delegates continued to press for serious negotiations on the part of the United States and a positive U.S. response to the seven-point proposal. PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and ?)RV delegate Phan Hien * Peking has ignored the flurry of Hanoi press comment since the 15 July announcement of the President's plan to visit China. However, NCNA did carry the text of the 21 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement which included the charge that the United States in an attempt to pressure the Vietnamese people was resorting to "insidious tricks" to sow divisions among the socialist countries. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 - -C RDP85T00875ROO 0300040034-4 CONPID FS ENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 14- urged that the United States set a troop withdrawal deadline and cease all support to the Thieu administrLcion. (VNA said DRV delegation head Xuan Thuy was absent from the session,* but the DRV press spokesman in the post-session press briefing said he was "slightly indisposed." It was thus left unclear whether Thuy was ill or whether he was indeed boycotting the session in the absence of a chief U.S. delegate. Vietnamese media have yet to mention the appointment of Ambassador William Porter to succeed Ambassador Bruce.) Speaking first, Mme. Binh scored the .'Tixon Administration for "bragging that it is actively negotiating" at Paris while "eluding a serious response" to the peace initiative. She again addressed the issue of the upcoming elections in South Vietnam and even more harshly charged U.S. interference: According to VNA, she said that while the United States "has ceaselessly spoken of its fence-sitting position regarding the upcoming puppet" presidential election in October, the U.S. Ambassador is "actually orchestrating and masterminding" the election in order to keep Thieu in power. Both of the communist delegates scored alleged recent U.S. war activities in the Indochina arena. Mme. Binh denounced the Administration for claiming that the war is ending and U.S. troops "are going to stand down from their combat role," while U.S. and puppet troops are "continuir; terror raids against the people." Charging that the Nixon Administration "is talking peace "but continues to make war," DRV delegate than Hien concentrated his fire on various U.S. activi':ies in South V1el;nam, Laos, and Cambodia and against the DRV's "sovereignty and security." Like last week, the VNA account again dismisses the statements of the U.S. and GVN delegates in one sentence, saying that they "continued to stick to their absurd stand as before." There is no acknowledgment that Ambassador Habib took exception to the communist charge that the United States has failed to give a serious response to the PRG proposal and that he again asked for clarification of its ambiguities. Nor is there any mention that both allied delegates again pressed the proposal for a cease-fire in place. * Nguyen Minh Vy, deputy head of the DRV delegation, left Paris for Hanoi with Le Due The last month. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 HANOI AND FRONT MEDIA COMMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS The main thrust of the continuing Vietnamese communist comment on the upcoming South Vietnamese lower house and presidential elections is that Thieu will successfully "rig" the elections with the support of the United States. But two Liberation Radio broadcasts, on 15 and 16 August, raise the possibility that Thieu's efforts can be thwarted. Other propaganda takes note of reports that Thieu's only opponent, Duong Van Minh, may withdraw from the election and claims that Washington is attempting to forestall such a development. Comment also continues to speculate that Nguyen Cao Irv, having failed to qualify as a presidential candidate, may attempt a coup. The 15 August Liberation Radio commentary declared that the present situation is not favorable for Thieu to "realize his fraudulent designs as he did in 1967." "Our compatriots," it asserted, are determined to check these maneuvers and create conditions to use their votes "to discard the extremist, bellicose, U.S. lackeys" in the coming elections and to support "those people of good will" who will strive for independence, democracy, peace, and a better life. In the same vein, an article attributed to Ngoc Phu, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 16th, appealed to the people to "correctly use their democratic right to vote in order to foil Thieu's szheme in the election" to the lower house. It observed that in so doing isolate" Thieu in the coming presidential election. our people will have more favorable conditions to further Comment claims that the United States is concerned about Thieu's heavy-handed dealings with his opponents and speculates that Ambassador Bunker's consultations in Washington during the second week of August were prompted by this concern. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 17th credits the United States with spreading a rumor that it would "cut its military and economic aid and would withdraw all U.S. troops from South Vietnam by the end of this year if Thieu did not agree to renounce his intention to exert pressure on and to eliminate all opponents in order to be the only candidate in the forth- coming election." Communist media have taken note of demands by opponents of the Thieu regime that Duong Van Minh withdraw from the presidential race because of Thieu's alleged rigging of the voting. Both Hanoi and the Front reported on 12 August that this demand was Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release I 999/09/2?0 f 1MWL85T00875 ;0WJ0034-4 18 AUGUCT 1971 - 16 - voiced at a meeting of opposition groups outside the An Quang Pagoda on the 10th. The reports also note that Ngo Ba Thanh, leader of the Women's Movement for the Right to Live, addressed the meeting, denouncing Thieu's maneuvers. The possibility of Minh withdrawing was r.lso raised in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 11th which remarked that he had not yet decided whether to take such an action. The commentary, which recalled Minh's role as the leader of the coup which ousted Ngo Dinh Diem, cited the BBC as observing that Washington wishes Minh to run in the election in order to strengthen Thieu's victory. Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the 14th broadcast accounts of an AFP report that Duong Van Minh met on the 12th with U.S. Deputy Ambassador Berger to show him "Thieu'c secret instructions to province chiefs" delineating what must be done to "prepare for the fraudulent elections." VNA on the 12th had quoted Minh as saying that his aides were holding "secret documents, including Thieu's instructions to the provincial governors to paralyze all activities of the 'opposition groups."' Communist media continue to raise questions about possible action by Nguyen Cao Ky since he failed to qualify as a presidential candidate. The Saigon government's order restricting air flights over the capital is said to be related to Thieu's fears of a possible coup, and a Libere+ion Radio commentary on the 11th, speculating that Icy would lead a coup, remarked that Diem also forbade planes from flying over Saigon "yet this order did not save him." It added that "Thieu's order is one thing and the airmen's loyalty to him is another thing." Hanoi and Front media also raise the possibility, as they had earlier, that Ky has documents he may make public to condemn Thieu. A 12 August VNA item referred specifically to a "black book" denouncing Thieu which it said Icy was preparing to publish. On the 14th LPA quoted a Saigon paper as claiming on 9 August that Fly woulC soon publish this "black book," which would include "many secrets related to the 'land to the tillers law' and Thieu's personal affairs." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 34-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 - BIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 DRV SCORES J.S. STRIKES IN DMZ. THREATS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM In the latest in its series of protests against U.S. bombings of North Vietnamese territory, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 16 August routinely denounced U.S. activities against the DRV. But it is left to subsequent radio and press comment to hint that recent U.S. strikes in the demilitarized zone were prompted by enemy activity. The foreign ministry spokesman scored the United States for using B-52's on the 15th against Huong Lap village, described as being north of the 17th parallel and within the demilitarized zone. The spokesman further charged that on the same day, U.S. planes "bombed and strafed" Vinh Thuy village and Ho Xa township in the Vinh Linh area, causing "heavy damage to the local people." The protest claimed that prior to these actions the United States "on many occasions" from 11 to 15 August had launched artillery attacks from positions south of the 17t} parallel against Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Son villages in the DMZ and against Vinh Thach and Vinh Thuong villages. The protest, in language reminiscent of that used at the time of the ARVN invasion of southern Laos and massing of U.S. troops below the DMZ, scored the U.S. military high command in Saigon for "brazenly advancing arguments aimed at preparing public opinion for their scheme to step up the war against the DRV."* In a commentary on the 17th pegged to the foreign ministry spokesman's statement, Hanoi radio explained that because the United States has "recently received painful blows on the southern battlefield," it has "wantonly and successively conducted air bombings and strafings against DRV territory." An 18 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary broadcast by Hanoi * This seems to allude to a statement issued by General Abrams' headquarters on the 15th which viewed with "deep concern" North Vietnamese activity along the DMZ and threatened retaliatory action. The U.S. command also announced a U.S. strike inside North Vietnam that day--after enemy antiaircraft fired on a reconnaissance plane--35 miles southeast of Dong Hoi, approximately five miles above the DMZ. On the 17th, the U.S. command acknowledged that B-52 bombers were striking targets inside the southern half of the DM7, and that the missions would continue whenever allied forces along the DMZ were endangered. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/24 PP85T00875RB OS 33ROO 040034-4 S 18 AUGUST 1971 radio that day puts recent DRV complaints against U.S. bombing in the DMZ in a clearer context, but still obscures the fact of increased DRV military action in the western part of the DMZ. Dealing with recent exploits of the northern Quang Tri armed forces, the commentary says that according to UPI, Abrams, "puzzled by waves of attacks" by the northern Quang Tri armed forces and people, on 15 August "adventurously had many aircraft--including B-52s--and artillery guns aboard the warships continuously and intensely bomb and shell the DMZ and many areas in Vinh Linh and Quang Binh. He also insolently threatened to 'retaliate.'" Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 CHINA FOREIGN AFFAIRS PEKING URGES FLEXIBLE TACTICS TO ISOLATE "PRINCIPAL" FOE In the wake of the invitation to President Nixon to visit the PRC, Peking has taken steps to prepare the ground for practicing its "revolutionary diplomatic line," which might be defined as a line on negotiation as the continuation of revolution by other means. Having previously invoked Maoist scripture to justify negotiating with an adversary as a form of "tit-for-tat struggle," Peking has now delved further into the Maoist canon to explain the new Sino-U.S. developments in the context of its triangular relationship with Moscow and Washington. At the same time, Peking has been blunting the edges of its continuing attacks on U.S. policies and refraining from personal attacks on the President in an evident avoid spoiling the atmosphere surrounding his projected visit. While publicizing foreign comment in support of the PRC's case on the UN representation question, Peking's direct reaction to Secretary Rogers' 2 August statement on the U.S. position has been confined to two NCNA reports. This low-level response, focusing its attack on the Secretary and on "the reactionary Sato government" of Japan, contrasts with Peking's reaction to State Department spokesman Bray's remarks in April on Taiwan's status, which included an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article as well as an NCNA report mocking the Nixon Administration's recent gestures toward improving relations with the PRC. In another dimension of the Chinese demarche toward the United States, Peking's purpose of reassuring its allies regarding the impact of the President's visit seems to have been served by Sihanouk's mission to Pyongyang in late July and early August. Endorsements of the invitation to the President were contained in Sihanouk's 24th "message to the Khmer nation," issued during his visit to Pyongyang, and in a 6 August speech by Kim Il-song which the Chinese have hailed as an "important" address giving "a penetrating analysis of the current international situation." Peking carried the text of Sihanouk's message, Kim's speech, and a NODONG SINMUN editorial which in effect answered criticism of the invitation to the President. Apart from disseminating these texts, Peking media have not mentioned the invitation since carrying the original announcement on 16 July. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 TIT-FOR-TAT While seeking to sustain a propitious atmosphere STRUGGLE for the projected visit as well as reassuring its allies of unwavering support for their anti-U.S. struggles, Peking has undertaken the task of preparing the ground ideologically by explaining how the dialectic of "tit-for-tat struggle" can lead to shifts of line. In the first comprehensive policy statement since the announcement on the President's visit, a joint editorial on the 1 August PLA anniversary offered a significant ideological cue in propounding "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line." Calling on the Chinese to concern themselves with affairs of state (and thus to understand shifts of line), the editorial urged study of "the historical experience of our party in carrying out tit-for- tat struggles" against enemies--an allusion to Mao's 1945 report "On the Chungking Negotiations," a work that figured in the authoritative review of the party's historical experience contained in the 1 July joint editorial article on the CCP's 50th anniversary. Peking has now turned to still another canonical work to justify its opening toward the United States as part of the triangular power rivalry. The Peking domestic radio and PEOPLE'S DAILY on 17 August carried an article appearing in RED FLAG No. 9 by "the writing group" of the Hupeh provincial party committee which calls for study of Mao's 1940 work "On Policy," recommended as excellent guidance for achieving tactical flexibility in the present international situation. Mao's 1940 report, the article points out, helped the party to "remain sober-minded in the thick of an extremely complex situation." The article makes it clear that such a purpose animates the current study of Maoist scripture.. A link with the earlier invocations of Mao's 1945 work on negotiations is suggested by the RED FLAG article's call for "tit-for-tat" struggle, a formulation not appearing in "On Policy" itself. THE PRINCIPAL The RED FLAG article provides a rationale for ENEMY negotiating with the United States by arguing the need for distinguishing among adversaries in order to isolate "the principal enemy"--identified as Japan in 1940 and, by implication in the current context, the Soviet Union today. The article quotes the 1940 work as saying the CCP "opposes all imperialism, but we make a distinction between Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not doing so now." Updated, such a distinction would justify negotiating Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 with the United States in order the better to cope with the more menacing Soviet Union, whose military pressure along the border is a source of major tension and bitter resentment on the part of the Chinese. Following this distinction, RFD FLAG adds a distinction between different policies adopted by "imperialist powers" in different conditions at different times. Where the first distinction is quoted directly from "On Policy," the second one telescopes a passage which includes references to China's attitude toward the United States. That passage distinguishes between U.S. policy in an earlier phase--when the United States "followed a Munich policy in the Far East"-and its abandonment of this policy by 1940 "in favor of China's resistance." A reader following RED FLAG's advice to turn to "On Policy" for current guidance would thus find a reason for Peking's opening to the United States as a Leans of strengthening its hand against the Soviets.* USE OF CONTRADICTIONS The current triangular relationship is addressed most explicitly in RED FLAG's discussion of the "important tactical principle" of making use of contradictions among one's adversaries. The article calls for "a concrete analysis" of the situation in order to seize opportunities to exploit "loopholes and contradictions in the enemy camp" as a means of combatting the principal enemy. After taking note of the four "major contradictions" in the world today (authoritatively formulated in Lin Piao's April 1969 report to the CCP Ninth Congress), the article singles out the Soviet-U.S. relationship in order to analyze current tactics for exploiting these contradictions. While using the standard " Lin Piao's September 1965 tract on people's war similarly made use of the Sino-Japanese war as a means of propounding current strategy. In the implicit analogy used by Lin, Japan's role in the Sino-Japanese war was played by the United States in 1965, and the U.S. role in that war by the Soviet Union at the later date. Lin charged that the United States during the war against Japan had plotted a Far East Munich and offered to help China as part of a sinister design of turning Chiro into its colony. This was Lin's way of charging that tit the time of his tract Moscow's policy on aid to Hanoi was designees to turn Vietnam into a Soviet colony. By the time of the current RED FLAG article, the S.,viet Union had become the analogue of Japan during the Sino-Japanese war as the principal enemy. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/Oft ,,i&li$l DP85TO08MQ992Vg040034-4 18 AUGUST 1971 formula on "social imperialism" and the United States "colluding and contending" with one another, the article makes a point of observing that their rivalry "is becoming more acute with each passing day." In this context the article invokes Mao's 1940 analysis of contradictions among China's adversaries as guidance for the present international situation. RED FLAG's discussion in effect elaborates on Mao's "revolu- tionary diplomatic line," explaining that the tactics outlined represent a dialectical unity of "firm principles and great flexibility." The purpose of flexible tactics, the article states, is "to adhere to firm revolutionary principles." While acknowledging the dogma that "the nature of imperialism" can never change, the article stresses that this is but one side of the picture and that "objective difficulties" facing the enenpr afford opportunities for flexible "tit-for-tat struggle" and "revolutionary dual tactics." These difficulties are what the PLA anniversary editorial meant in portraying the United States as "now declining just as the star of the British Empire did" and what Peking's propaganda seeks to document in depicting crises enveloping the United States at home and abroad. The article concludes this section on current tactics with a discussion of the role of a united front in the effort to "force our principal enemy into a narrow and isolated position." Though the "anti-Japanese united front" of the time of Mao's 1940 work would seem analogous to Peking's current campaign to rally the "small and medium-sized nations" against the two superpowers, the RED FLAG article's treatment of Soviet-U.S. rivalry and of "the principal enemy" seems designed to account for Peking's opening toward the United States in the context of the triangular relationship.; Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 6& FA5T00875R000Nq 4 I g4 18 AUGUST 1971 - 23 - CHINA AND BURMA PEKING GIVES CORRECT, RESTRAINED TREATMENT OF NE WIN VISIT While Chou En-lai offered the judgment that relations between Burma and the PRC "have returned to normal," Peking's treat- ment of Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win's 6-12 August visit suggested that there was no major breakthrough on substantive issues beyond further clearing the atmosphere of the bit-sr- ness of recent years. Peking's dual approach toward Burma was illustrated by continued support for the insurrectionary Burmese Communist Party (BCP) at the same time as Ne Win was invited to Chinese soil. Also during this time the BCP's clandestine radio, which propagates a Maoist line of armed struggle against the Rangoon regime, attacked Ne Win's China visit as a trick to escape his difficulties. The visitor was accorded high-level protocol honors: Chou, PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, Vice Pi-?mier Li Hsien- nien, and Kuo Mo-jo met him on arrival, and he held talks in "a friendly atmosphere" with Chou and Li; he was granted an audience with Mao for "a friendly conversation"; and he was accorded the courtesy of being accompanied by Chou on a trip to Canton. During his previous visit to China, from 24 July to 1 August 1965, Ne Win received extensive fanfare, with NCNA reporting that "hundreds of thousands" of "singing and dancing" people lined the streets and jet fighters saluted him on arrival. PEOPLE'S DAILY published editorials marking both his arrival and departure in 1965, and a lengthy 16-point communique was issued. In contrast, during the recent visit Peking all but avoided any praise for Burma's policies while expressing satisfaction over the return to diplomatic normality and the development of trade. There was no communique--none was required in view of the "informal" nature of the visit--and no editorial or other form of comment in PRC media. Reflecting Peking's reluc- tance to endorse Ne Win's policies, reportage on his visit made no mention of the customary chorus shouting slogans voicing support for the guest's country. The only Chinese comment of substance to appear in PRC media during the visit was contained in NCNA's brief summary of toasts by Chou and Ne Win at Chou's 6 August banquet. Although Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/?;Mrsj&,f R~ 85T00875R000300040034-4 FBI8 TRENDS 18 AUGUST 197]. - 211 - Chou referred to the "profound, traditional friendship" between the Chinese and Burmese peoples and noted that under Ne Win's first tenure as prime minister the two countries "successfully settled the border questions left over by history," he was restrained in his assessment of current Sino-Burmese relations and limited his praise for Burma's policies to an expression of support for Rangoon's "policy of peace and neutrality." Crediting the Chinese Government--but not the Burmese--with "consistently pursuing a friendly and good-neighbor policy," Chou expressed pleasure that "over the past two years" Sino- Burmese relations "have returned to normal, the two,govern- ments have exchanged new ambassadors, and the trade between the two countries has developed." He suggested without ela- boration that with joint efforts "of the two sides" Sino- Burmese relations "will improve further." Notably absent from Chou's remarks were any references to the five principles of peaceful coexistence or to-the Sino- Burmese treaty of friendship and nonaggression, the first such treat-ir negotiated by the PRC. These subjects, as well as those of opposition to imperialism and colonialism, seating of the PRC in the United Nations, and the Vietnam conflict, were all raised repeatedly in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials and in the communique in connection with the 1965 visit. A similar restraint marked Ne Win's toast. As reported by NCNA, he noted that he had "cordially held talks on questions of common concern" with Chou and other "Chinese friends," comment- ing vaguely that such talks are "greatly beneficial to our friendship, mutual understanding, and cooperation" and will further consolidate and develop "the existing understanding and cooperation." Neither side referred to economic aid relations. Fang I, the Chinese aid minister, was present on protocol occasions during the visit, but he did not take part in the talks between the visitors and Chou and Li Hsien-nien. NCNA did not provide even a summary of toasts by Ne Win and Chou at the 8 August banquet given by the guest. There was no report of an invitation for a return visit to Burma by the Chinese. In 1965 Ne Win extended, and Chou and then head of state Liu Shao-chi accepted, an invitation to visit Burma. SUPPORT FOR BCP In parallel wit 'a its development of correct state relations with the Burmese Government, the Chinese have continued to publicize support for the BCP by acknowledging the presence in Peking of Thakin CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREN.DO 18 AUGUST 1971 Ba'Thein Tin, identified as "leaser of the delegation" and vice chairman of the BCP Central Committee. NCNA reported on 31 July--the same day as it carried the announcement of No Win's pending visit to the PRC--that Ba Thein Tin had been among the "distinguished guests on the seats of honor" at the reception in Peking marking the PLA anniversary. Ba Thein Tin had also been noted by NCNA as among the "distinguished guests on the rostrum" with Mao and Lin Piao on 1 May at Peking's May Day calebrations. Otherwise, however, official Peking media during the past year have given only miniscule propaganda support to the BCP and its armed insurgency activities, relying on the clandestine Voice of the People of Burma for propaganda support for the insurgents.* The last Peking-originated commentary on the BCP's exploits was in September 1970; Chinese media have disseminated only two BCP messages in the past 15 months, one on the 3 March 1971 PRC satellite launching and one on the 50th anniversary of the CCP. Transmitted by NCNA on 3 July, the latter message hailed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" as guiding the BCP movement, attacked "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism," and proclaimed that by "seizing power by armed force" the BCP "will surely defeat the Ne Win military regime"--a term that Peking has not used in its own name since September 1969 but which is common in commentaries of the Voice of the People of Burma. BOP'S CLANDESTINE RADIO DENOUNCES NE WIN FOR VISITING PRC In contrast to the restraint shown by official PRC media, the Voice of the People of Burma has been unremitting in its criticism of the Rangoon government and in-'-.its call for * Peking has not acknowledged the existence of the Voice of the People of Burma, inaugurated on 28 March 1971. In contrast, PRC media replay comment attributed to the other two Chinese- sponsored clandestine stations, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution and the Voice of the People of Thailand. On at least two occasions, however, on 26 June and 18 August, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution has rebroadcast commentaries attributed to the Voice of the People of Burma. The inaugural broadcasts of the Burmese clandestine station are discussed in the TRENDS of 14 April 1971, pages 27-29. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDOT'IAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 26 - a BCP-led. armed uprisings to overthrow the "Ne Win military clique." The clandesttne radio's unabating hostility toward Ne Win was underscores by commentaries it broadcast specifically denouncing his trip to the PRC. A commentary on 5 August, observing that "Ne Win's visit to China stems from the foreign policies of the PRC and No Win's military government in Burma," po-;,rayed the visit as "en attempt to relieve the general .rises" in Burma which are "about to explode" and contended that it "indicates absolutely no change in. his class nature, nor doeb it imply that he has given up; ,his anticommunis,;, antipopular poll'ies. His reactionary, nature can n.ver cruinge." Describing difficulties in Burma resulting frc.'m Ne Win's policies, the commentary concluded that the only solute,on is "to complete-the people's. democratic revolution which, is,being waged under the leadership of the BCP" and to establish "people's democratic power" by destroying "Ne Win's military government by an armed uprising." An extensive summary, of this commentary was rebroadcast, with attribution, by the Voice of the Malayan Revolution on 18, August. Ne Win's trip was also, attacked in a 15 August commentary over the Voice of the People of'Burma marking the 32d anniversary of the founding of the BCP. Complete with broadbruah attacks on Khrushchev, L1u :?BhIo cbi,. ~8rezhnev and his "modern revisionist clique," and the "treacherous clique" of BCP revisionists Ba Tin and Maung Htay, the commentary accused Ne Win of using "sly tricks, such,as transformation of the cadre party into the people's party, return of power to the people, and visiting the PRC," in an effort to escape from his difficulties. It accused Brezhnev of "praising the fake socialism of Ne Win's military government but concealing the people's hardships" and of "actively helping" Ne Win. Hailing the road of "armed struggle and power seizure" laid down by Chairman Thakin Than Tun, assassinated in September 1968, the commentary called the prospects for Burma's revolution "very good" if the Burmese people will adopt the policies of concentra- tion on military affairs, (2) peasant base, (3) form alliance with nationalities, (4) expand the united front, and (5) party construction is the key factor." The radio's comment on Ne Win's visit to the PRC avoided any criticism of Peking or even speculation on Peking's motives for the invitation. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 cod A -F gA5T00875R$g30OND0034-4 18 AUGUST 1971 KOREA DPRK AND ROK AGREE ON RED CROSS CONTACTS ON DIVIDED FAMILIES Contacts between the Red Crops Societies of North and South Korea to discuss the fate of families separated by the division of the country were agreed to on 14 August, when the North Korean organization accepted a 12 August proposal for talks by the South Korean society. This agreement on the first North-South bilateral contacts since the end of the Ko.'ean War came in the wake of several nev North Korean pronounce- ments on the question--pronouncements which, taken together, may constitute the initiation of a campaign to reopen negotiations on the Korean question. A seven-point demand on U.S. withdrawal from South Korea, put forward by the North Korean representative at the 29 July meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), included a new demand that the United States stop preventing people of North and South Korea from traveling across the military demarcation line. In a 6 August speech Kim Il-song for the first time held out the prospect of contacts with Pak Chong-hui's Demo- cratic Republican Party (DRP). An 11 August letter from the DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland agreed to a proposal by Ko Pyong-chol, president of the United Front for Korean Democracy in New York, for a third- country conference of overseas Koreans for reunification.* On 18 August KCNA reported a statement by the chairman of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan supporting this proposal and offering to send representatives to such a conference. The North Korean Red Cross statement, carried by Pyongyang media on the 14th, came in a letter to the South Korean organization replying to its 12 August proposal to initiate a "movement" to find separated family members and to hold preliminary talk.a in Geneva before the end of October. The North Korean letter--devoid of proplagandistic epithets--said that the suggestion accords with the DPRK's "reasonable proposals" to rejoin kinsmen and called it a "very fine thing," a "little bit late" but a "matter of great joy and *See the 11 August TRENDS, pages 16-19, for a discussion of these proposals on North-South contacts. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25oN94L85T00875F,9?P040034-4 Z ,NDS 18 AUGUST 1971 -28- pleasure." The statement recalled that at the Supreme People's Assembly last April the DPRK put forward its eight-point program for unification, and pointed out that on 6 August Kim 11-song declared that the DPRK Government is ready to contact "any South Korean political parties, including the DRP." (This was the first explicit mention in Pyongyang propaganda of Kim's proposal since the a August speech itself; a 15 August NODONG SINMUN Observer's article on the Red Cross letter also briefly recalled Kim's remarks.) The North Korean Red Cross reply said that a movement for finding separated family members is "insufficient," and proposed dis- cussion also of the questions of free travel and mutual visits and free correspondence between separated family members, rela- tives, and friends. These suggestions have long been a part of Forth Korean proposals on various North-South contacts as first steps toward unification. The letter further suggested that the preliminary meeting be held in September in Panmunjom rather than Geneva, in a foreign country. It concluded by announcing that it is sending two messengers to Panmunjom on 20 August with an official letter containing this proposal. On 17 August a North Korean Red Cross Central Committee spokes- man complained that although the South Korean organization has agreed to send representatives to Panmunjom to accept the North Korean letter they are not bringing an official letter of their own containing the initial 12 August proposal. The spokesman expressed the dope that the South Koreans will agree to an exchange of official documents, saying that one cannot rely on press agency transmissions and radio announcements alone. The North Korean Red Cross letter was heaviiy,rsp.lsyed by Pyongyang radio and was further publicized in a Pyongyang press conference held on the 15th by the chairman of the DPRK Red Cross. The 15 August NODONG SINMUN Observer's article praised the initiative, as did statements released by leaders of various North Korean public organizations. Pyongyang's propaganda treatment of Pak Chong-hui currently is somewhat inconsistent. Followup comment on the led Cross letter, like the letter itself, was generally couched in moderate language and avoided epithets, referring merely to "South Korean authorities," although some personal attacks on President Pak persisted. The NODONG SINMUN Observer article did once mention the obstructive machinations of the "Pak CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : 4r ,T00875R0003QW409A+ 18 AUGUST 1971 Chong-hui puppet clique," and a statement by the Agriculture Union chairman used atypically strong language in referring to obstructionism by "such despicable traitors as Pak Chong- hui." A vicious attack on Pak and his administration appeared, however, in a 17 August KCNA commentary attacking the presi- dent's 15 August National Day speech. Among other things, it said that his comments on unification were "rubbish" since he said nothing specific about what should be done and how; it added that it is foolish to expect anything concrete on peaceful unification from this "fascist hangman." The cum- mentary a3serted that when the question of contacts and talks between the Red Cross organizations of North and South arose, Pak "cunningly worked to foil them," even instigating his Premier to warn against pinning much hope on a dialog.* PEKING BACKS KOREAN MOVES, SIGNS ECONOMIC AGREEMENT WITH DPRK NCNA on the 16th promptly reported the Pyongyang press confer- ence at which the chairman of the North Korean Red Cross publicized the letter to the South Korean organization, but Peking has not thus far commented. Peking backed the earlier Korean moves, and presumably had a role in their formulation. Peking media reported that the seven-point demand was made by the "Korean-Chinese side" at the 29 July MAC meeting and supported it with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. NCNA carried Kim Il-song's 6 August speech in full, and Li Hsien-nien on the 9th, at a banquet for the visiting Korean economic dele- gation, praised it as an "important speech" although he did not mention the Korean unification question. A "leading member" of NCNA, speaking at a 13 August banquet for a visiting Korean journalists' delegation, echoed Li's praise for Kim's speech, again without mentioning any substance. * According to Seoul's HAPTONG, President Pak said that the ROK is ready to open a dialog if the communists abandon their plot to communize the South by violent means and come up with a "sincere attitude." He further expressed his "best wishes" for the success of the Red Cross talks. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/2poN~NxPAP85TOO875ROO03300040000384-4 18 AUGUST 1971 ECONOMIC China's efforts to reassure the DPRK of its AGREEMENT continuing support in spite of the Sino-U.S. developments are carried forward by the 15 Avgust signing of a Chinese-Korean agreement on "economic cooperation." The economic agreement complements Peking's recent attention to the question of negotiations on?'the Korean issue. Both Peking and Pyongyang announced that an "agreement on economic cooperation" was signed without elaborating on its nature. The Korean delegation, which arrived in Peking on 8 August, was headed by Vice Premier Chong Chun-taek and included officials concerned with state planning, cotton textiles, land and Bea transport, and fuel oil administration. Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien hosted the group in Peking. The most recent agreement for Chinese "economic and technical aid" to Korea was signed last October, with Choug'Chun-taek leading a delegation to Peking for the purpose after signing an aid agreement in Moscow in September.* At the dame time a Smno-Korean trade agreement for 1971-1976 was signed as well as a trade protocol for 1971. The last known previous Sino- Korean aid agreement, signed in October 1960, provided for Chinese loans for 1961-1964 and for supply of Chinese equip- ment and technical aid. MOSCOW MINIMIZES KOREAN CONTACTS. MARKS LIBERATION ANNIVERSARY Moscow has thus far given minimal attention to the issue of North-Sc?"th contacts in Korea. A brief TASS report of the 29 July MAC meeting reported some of the demands but did not acknowledge that they were part of a seven-point program and failed to mention the seventh point regarding civilian travel across the military demarcation line. On 12 August TASS reported without comment the letter from the DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland agreeing to the proposal on a conference of overseas Koreans. TASS has not been heard to mention the exchange between the Korean Red Cross organizations, although a Korean-language Moscow * See the 26 October 1970 FBIS TRENDS Supplement, "DPRK Aid Agreements with PRC and USSR." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : Aj-z I ,T00875R0003%q#0A j 18 AUGUST 1971 raaio broadcast on the 17th did comment that "the public in various countries" welcomes the agreement with "satisfaction," and pictured it as a first step toward Korean unification. LIBERATION The 26th anniversary of Korea's liberation ANNIVERSARY from Japanese domination (15 August) was marked in low-key fashion by both sides. The usual leaders' greetings messages were exchanged, wreath-laying ceremonies were held in Pyongyang, and film shows were held by friendship societies in both capitals and by the USSR charge d'affaires in Pyongyang. Moscow, however, has apparently not reported the usual reception by the DPRK !unbassador in Moscow. Pyongyang failed to issue the usual NODONG SINMUN editorial although both sides carried routine level comment. The more important 25th anniversary last ycnr had been given higher level treatment, including a visit to Pyongyang by a Soviet party-governmen~ delegation led by Mazurov and public meetings in both capitals. The congratulatory mei.sage from Kim Il-song and Choe Yong-kon to the Soviet leaders praised the Soviet Army in customary terms for its help in liberating Korea. It said, much like last year's message, that in the present situation of intensi- fying U.S. and Japanese aggressive maneuvers "further strength- ening" of Korean-Soviet friendship and solidarity "is of very great significance," and it reiterated the hope that traditional friendly relations will further develop on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The message to the Korean leaders from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin was almost perfunctory, however, perhaps reflecting Soviet displeasure with Kim Il-song's approval of Sino-U.S. developments. The message praised the development of relations of "fraternal friendship and cooperation" between the two peoples but did not make the customary references to Marxism- Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and unlike last year's message it did not recall that the USSR had given and continues to give the DPRK aid in the building of socialism. The current message blandly said that the friendship between the two peoples contributes toward "uniting closer the forces of peace and socialism in the struggle against the aggressive wild ambition of imperialism," but it did not add, as did last year's message, that it strengthens the socialist coun- tries' cohesion in the struggle for strengthening peace and security in Asia and the world. The 1969 message was even Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25c tDftp, I5T00875R000,W9 1 4 18 AUGUST 1971 0 stronger, saying that the friendship maintains peace in the Far East and is "an obstacle to U.S. aggressive designs." Routine Moscow comment, however, did as usual point to Soviet economic and technical assistance to Korea and recall that the two countries' treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance guarantees their security. Like last year, a Radio Moscow Mandarin-language commentary used the occasion to criticize Peking's "splittist" policies. It recalled that U.S. aggression in the Korean War was defeated by-concerted actions by the USSR and PRC in support of the DPRK, but that current intensified U.S. and South Korean provocative activity along the DMZ is the result of Chinese failure to take united action with the USSR and other socialist countries in the anti-imperialist struggle. There was no mention in the anniversary comment of the current moves for North-South contacts in Korea. But on 14 August KCNA did briefly report that the DPRK-supported General Association of Korean Residents in Japan proposed to the ROK-sponsored Korean Residents' Union in Japan that they celebrate the anniversary jointly and promote a struggle for Korean unifica- tion. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 SOVIET BLOC AND BALKANS Registering apparent fears that other countries might be responsive to Peking's more flexible tactics in the wake of the announcement of the President's PRC visit, Soviet media have mounted an intensified effort to discredit the Chinese and to iml,ugn the motives behind present and possible future Peking international overtures. Concurrently, Moscow has continued to use the proxy of its hardlining allies to indict the Chinese and to apply psychological pressure on the Romanians. Commentaries in the East European bloc press have carried new lectures on the impermissibility of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, along with warnings against violations of proletarian internationalism and against the sin of nationalism-- codewords for the Romanian deviation from Marxism- Leninism as interpreted in Moscow. Against the background of these commentaries, the Hungarian Government organ MAGYAR HIRLAP on 13 August warned against any effort to build up a Belgrade-Tirana-Bucharest-?eking axis, and C;echoslovak media promptly publicized th,: Hungarian article. Pegged to the "rumor" of an impending Chou En-lai visit to the three Balkan capitals, the article drew an i?_idignant rejoinder from Belgrade. Bucharest, true to form, has reiterated its independent principles along with its dedication to communist unity. And Tirana has just as typically denounced Moscow's efforts to keep its recalc.,;rant "vassals" in line. On the 15th Romanian media reported that a high-ranking Chinese military delegation had "stopped over" in Bucharest that day on its way to Tirana; NCNA said the group was to make "a friendly visit to Albania and Romania" at the invitation of the two countries' defense ministries. MOSCOW WARNS AGAINST PEKING'S "'HYPOCRITICAL" TACTICS As part of the Soviet campaign to discredit the Chinese, a Lukovets article in PRAVDA on 15-August used Chinese- rejection of the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the five nuclear powers to demonstrate that Peking is still on its adventurous course of intensifying international tensions." While the Chinese pledge themselves to wage a persistent Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 34 - struggle against nuclear weapons on the one hand, Lukovets said, they "hyyoeritiil ]y`~ egici~- he .prppoiaj~toi~~~lioldit~ s conference of five nuclear powers. An article in the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES on the 13th, calculated to blacken Peking's communist credentials in the international communist movement, portrayed the PRC as "a tool of the imperialists" who are seeking to soften up and split the movement. Dwelling in this context on Peking's use of Tirana, the article added that the imperialists believe the way to achieve their aims "is for China and Albania, basing their actions on nationalism, to drift away from the socialist community." NEW TIMES sustained Moscow's cautious approach to the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, remarking vaguely that "anticommunist elements of all types" and the present Chinese leaders are using anti-Sovietism as a lever to split the movement. After elaborating at length on the economic and political deficiencies of Chinese communism, the article suggested that Peking's divisive tactics have also "hampered the socialist development" of its Albanian ally, making the point that socialist success is guaranteed only by alliance with the Soviet Union. Another article in NEW TIMES on the 6th reflected apparent Soviet concern that Bonn might follow Washington's lead by sending a delegation to Peking. Noting that the West German press and some Bonn politicians are pressing for improved relations with Peking in the wake of President Nixon's initiative, the article cautioaod against any attempts to assert "pressure" on the Soviet Union by making a deal with the Chinese. The positions of world socialism, it concluded confidently, "are growing stronger, and it can be forseen with complete assurance that this process will not be hindered by any involved deals." SOVIET ALLIES STRESS IMPERMISSIBILITY OF NEUTRALIST COURSE The East Germans, who in recent months have given Moscow only limited propaganda support on the Chinese issue, coined the ranks of the current Soviet proxy commentators in the wake of the Crimea summit in an article in the party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 14 August. The article called for an uncompromising Soviet bloc stand on China's "splittist" policy. In remarks clearly directed at the Romanians, it Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: C;*?i? 00875R00q jPS0g4h0034-4 NDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 35 - lectured; "No community is possible" with the platform of the Chinese leaders . . ..,and anyone who pursues a policy of tolerance and concessions toward Mao's group encourages its splittist policy, violates the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism, and hinders the fight against imperialist.." The paper went on to call for an intensified struggle against"all aspects of opportunism, anti-Sovietism, and nationalism." TASS carried an ADN summary of the article on the day it appeared. The NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article was in the same vein as an earlier warning, also evidently directed at the Romanians, in Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on 30 July. Moscow:s LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published an account of the TRYBUNA LUDU article on 11 August, including its admonition that "there must be no ambiguity or attempts to take a neutral stand on Peking's :.ti-Soviet and splittist line." The most notably blunt and specific warning to Bucharest appeared in the official Slovak youth paper SMENA on 11 August in an article directly criticizing the Romanians' failure to attend the Crimea summit. SMENA argued that at a time when unity is needed to combat China's "anti-Soviet campaign," Romania's absence was "not a contribution toward the development of concord and strength." The paper went on to warn pointedly: "The policy of walking a tightrope will be paid for sooner or later." BUDAPEST, PRAGUE PICK UP RLIIORS OF CHOU VISIT TO BALKANS Pursuing Hungarian media's role as leading proxy spokesman for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet polemic, an article in the Hungarian Government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on 13 August warned Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia against any attempt to form "an anti-Soviet axis in the Balkans." The paper cited the "rumor" that Chou En-lai might visit Tirana, Bucharest, and Belgrade as evidence that Peking is already "exercising influence" in the area. The article stopped short of claiming that such an axis--"beginning in Peking and ending in the Balkans"--is in fact being developed, but it sought to head off any movement in that direction by warning that any such undertaking would be "doomed to failure" and could produce "an extraordinarily dangerous situation in the Balkans." It concluded With the hope that CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 36 - "sober reality will reduce this pessimistic assumption to sheer speculation." A CTK account of the MAGYAR HIRLAP article appeared the next day in the Bratislava PRAVDA, and on 17 August CTK quoted the Czechoslovak youth paper SMENA as stating that Chou's "approaching visit to the Balkans can be looked upon as an action by Peking to exert indirect pressure on the Soviet Union and thus to improve its position in regard to this area." SMENA added: China's new foreign policy course is aimed at extricating Peking from its isolation "even at the price of the .unity of, the:' communist movement, and th1s, f .l1,y corresponds with Washington's policy of a differentiated approach to the individual socialist countries." YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA. ALBANIA RESPOND TO SOVIET BLOC PRESSURES BELGRADE Yugoslav media expressed indignati6n',,t?the MAGYAR HIRLAP article. In an "editorial note" on the 16th, the semiofficial Belgrade daily BORBA declined to speculate on Hungary's motives, but commented: "It is hard to fail to note how incorrect, if not even provocative, it is to link the possible visit of a foreign statesman to our country with such groundless conclusions and impermissible warnings." BORBA added that such an attitude is the more egregious "when it is a question of a country such as Yugoslavia, which is open to all foreign statesmen and to cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect." Radio Zagreb's freewheeling political commentator Milika Sundic, also on the 16th, observed that the view expressed by MAGYAR HIRLAP is "palpably not its own" and saw overtones of the Brezhnev doctrine in its warning about the danger of an anti-Soviet axis in the Balkans. The implication of this line, Sundic said, is that if the warning is ignored, "measures envisaged by the doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist countries could be invoked." Sundic?concluded with advice to "both our neighbors and others to leave Yugoslavia alone," for "such 'concern' for us really worries us--not only the concern manifested in a variety of articles and commentaries, but in the demonstrations of strength along our borders as well." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 37 - BUCHAREST In characteristic response to the Soviet bloc propaganda pressures, Ceausescu has underscored Romanian resolve to resist them by voicing repeated, measured reaffirmations of his country's independent principles. At the same time, he has prudently reaffirmed Romania's solidarity with the national liberation movement and its concern for communist unity, in assurances typically contrived to fend off charges that Romania is defaulting on the obligations imposed by socialist internationalism and is abetting Chinese devisive activities. As in past periods of tension, Ceausescu has gone out to the provinces to drum up support for his policies among the national minorities and to demonstrate to interested foreign parties that his country is unified. In an address in Harghita County (inhabited by Magyars) on the lsLh, he repeated his stock formulations on independence and stated that although Romania is mainly concerned with its own internal development, "we do not forget for a moment the international problems and our obligation to participate actively in the struggle for the unity of the socialist countries." In an apparent swipe at Hungary, which recently expressed concern over the "socialist" status of the Hungarian minority in Romania, Ceausescu declared that the Balkan countries must do all they can to insure that no problem arises between them, "so that nobody can use these countries against each other, so that the Balkans can become a center of peace and cooperation." In a series of speeches in the same county on the 16th, as reported by AGERFRES, Ceausescu strongly reaffirmed Romania's determination to resist outside pressures. Insisting on the right of each people to decide its own fate, Ceausescu said it is "inadmissible for anybody in any way to attempt to dictate to another people how to organize its life, how to secure its economic and social development." He concluded another address on a militantly patriotic note: "We have at the cost of great sacrifices won the right to build socialism, and we are determined to defend our revolutionary gains, our socialist homeland." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 -38- TIRANA Albania has reacted with typically defiant rhetoric. A 14 August Tirana radio commentary on the Crimea summit heaped abuse on the Soviets and their "vassals" and interpreted the meeting as an attempt to bring deviant.-elements into line. The radio said that "the call to the Crimea after the outbreak of differences at the CEMA session and Moscow's simultaneous saber-rattling along the borders of other countries" indicates that "the new Russian Czars are trying to further tighten the screws on their vassals--to tell them that if need be Moscow will not hesitate to embark on ar operation of the type undertaken in Czechoslovakia." PRC MILITARY DELEGATION STOPS IN BUCHAREST ON WAY TO TIRANA Against the background of the Soviet bloc warnings about Chinese maneuvering in the Balkans, Bucharest radio announced on 15 August that a Chinese military delegation headed by Li Te-sheng, alternate Politburo member and head of the PLA's general political section, had "stopped over" in Bucharest that day en route to Tirana. The radio said the delegation was greeted by Romanian Defense Minister Ionita and other high-ranking officers. Peking's NCNA reported on the 16th that the group was making "a friendly visit to Albania a:~ Romania" at the invitation of the Albanian and Romanian defense ministries, thus raising the possibility that it may return to Bucharest for a full-scale visit after its stay in Tirana. Tirana and Peking media have played up the delegation's stay in Albania, underscoring the militant solidarity between the two allies. Tirana radio said the group was welcomed on its arrival at the airport on the 15th by Petrit Dume, alternate Politburo member and ' chief ` of's general staff, and set the propaganda theme for the visit in noting that one of the welcoming banners read: "Long live the militant unity and fraternal friendship between the armies of Albania and China!" Following talks with Defense Minister Balluku, the delegation attended a banquet hosted by the minister in the Central House of Army Men, where the after-dinner speakers played similar themes. Dume emphasized the "great fighting friendship which links our parties, forged in the struggle Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBID T1'UJNDO 18 AUGUST 197]. against imperialism, modern revisionism, and their running dogs." In another allusion to the Soviets, he added that "despite encirclement by various cunning and savage enemies, our people and army have smashed all imperialist-revisionist plans, provocations, and blucicades." Li Te-sheng's speech in reply contained a similar anti-Soviet thrust as well as some anti-imperialist rhetoric apparently designed to assure the militant Albanians that Peking's flirtation with Washington does not mean it has gone soft on imperialism. Wailing the Albanians for their fight against "imperialism, revisionism, and reaction," Li went on to express confidence that "no matter how desperately U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism may struggle, they cannot extricate themselves from their doomed destruction." Pledging loyalty to proletarian internationalism, he concluded: "We shall always be together like blood brcthers, in sunny days or in difficult times." Meanwhile, Peking's broadcasts to the USSR have been bringing the same point home to the Soviets. A broadcast,,on the 16th opened with a declaration of revolutionary friendship between the PRC and Albania and followed up with an NCNA report on the delegation's stopover in Bucharest and the warm welcome it received in Tirana. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 COI0Zn01TIA.L PBZB TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 GERMANY AND BERLIN A week during which the first anniversary of the signing of the USSR-FRG treaty and the l0th anniversary of the construction of the Berlin Wall were celebrated, and in which the four-power negotiations on Berlin Moved for t'.te first time into intensive consecutive multi-day sessions,brought a spate of comment from Moscow and its allies on issues surrounding ratification of the treaty and the Brandt government's linkage of ratification to a Berlin settlement. The greater part of the comment strongly criticizes West German opposition forces for delaying ratifica- tion of the Moscow treaty, and thereby also the Polish-West German treaty. In reiterating the standard complaints on this score and recapitulating the standard arguments, the comment has sustained its restraint toward the Bonn government and Brandt personally. An article by IZVESTIYA Chief Editor Tolkunov is noteworthy for its measured tone and for its depiction of progress in the development of Soviet-West German relations. And for the first time, a Soviet bloc source--the Polish daily ZOLNIERZ W(;LNOSCI on 14 August-- has taken note of President Nixon's remark at his 4 August press conference that the Four Powers are making "very signi- ficant progress" in the ambassadorial negotiations on Berlin. The GDR, meanwhile, took the occasion of the Berlin Wall anniversary to unde'score the solid protection afforded by the Warsaw Pact against any inroads on itrn "socialist" inte- grity. MOSCOW DISCUSSES WEST BERLIN LINK TO TREATY RATIFICATION Two articles in the Soviet central press on the 13th summarized the development of relations between the USSR and the FRG since the signing of the Moscow treaty on 12 August 1970, with empha- sis on the issue of Bonn's linking of a Berlin settlement to West German ratification of the treaty. The lengthy article by IZVESTIYA Chief Editor Tolkunov, who had visited West Germany in June to attend a West German-Soviet colloquium on bilateral relations, cited statements made at the colloquium by both Soviet and West German participants summing up achievements in the year since the signing, including increased economic, scientific, and technical contacts. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/255b'.r,JAL,,~,P35T00875R000R, -4 18 AUGUST 1971 Addressing himself to the West, Berlin.issue, Tolkunov said it was'"difficult"'t6:unUretand whsb.L',the Went German representatives understood to be a "satisfactory solution" because of the varied views expreiised. But many West German representatives believed, he continued, that "without concessions from the Soviet Union" on West Berlin th.1 Bonn government would not be able to garner sufficient public support for ratification. Asserting that "one could sense the artificial nature" of a linkage between ratifica- tion of the treaty anO. the West Berlin problem, he reiterated the Soviet position that the "question of West Berlin is with- in the competence of the Four Powers" and pointed out that West Berlin is not mentioned in either the Moscow or Warsaw treaties. Tolkunov said these arguments are "somehow for- gotten and are occasionally simply cast aside by those who are striving at any cost to get a solution of the West Berlin question with unilateral benefits for themselves." In a similar vein, Tolkunov wrote that at the colloquium the Soviets, "relying on the facts," showed those who oppose the treaty and maintain West Germany had conceded too much in signing both the Moscow and Warsaw treaties that "the FRG had made no concessions" and that the treaties "reflect a balance of the countries' interests." He added that both the FRG and the USSR "observed this principle," recalling parenthetically how difficult and long the talks preceding the signing had been. Reviewing both the support for and the opposition to the Moscow treaty within West Germany, an article by PRAVDA Bonn correspondent Grigoryev asserted that the "overwhelming majority" of the West Germans in.fact support ratification. Citing West German papers for the view that conditions in the FRG are now "ripe" for the Federal Government to submit both the Soviet and Polish treaties to the Bundestag for ratification, he added that, "as is well known, the FRG Government has tied ratification to the achievement of a 'satisfactory settlement' on West Berlin." This approach, Grigoryev said, has caused considerable dissatisfaction in the FRG, and the delay in ratification has given the "rightist forces" led by the CDU/CST time to form a bloc opposed to the treaty. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/250- CIIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 IDENTIAL FBZS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 42 - But Grigoryev pointed out here that even the CDU/CSU ranks are not united in their opposition to the treaty. Citing statements of support for the treaty by CDU officials, the PRAVDA correspondent quoted an article by CDU Bundestag Deputy Majonica as saying "it would be illusory to believe that improvements can be achieved in the West Berlin situation while simultaneously rejecting the treaty." Majonica, acknowledging in his article that the Federal Government has insisted on a satisfactory Berlin settlement as a precondition for ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty, had gone on to ask rhetorically whether, once a Big Four settlement is reached, the Soviet Union might not turn Bonn's tactic around and make ratification of the treaty a precondition for implementation of the settlement. The passage Grigoryev cited came immediately after this rhetorical question, which the PRAVDA correspon- dent of course ignored. FOUR-POWER TALKS, Moscow has sustained its pattern of POLISH COMMENT terse, factual reports on the four- power ambassadorial sessions, con- fined to paraphrases of the sessions' official communiques. There has been no Soviet comment on the negotiations. Moscow's Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak allies, how- ever, have commented at some length on the developing situation surrounding the Big Four negotiations, with much of their comment pegged to Bonn's linkage of the talks to ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty. The most substantial discussion of the negotiations themselves has come from Warsaw, which in April was the instrument of publicity for the Soviet draft proposal presented to the Big Three on 26 March. Referring to the coming second phase, or "German phase," of the Berlin talks, PAP noted on the 16th, for example, that "West Berlin observers give priority to the problem of reaching an understanding among the GDR, the FRG, and the West Berlin Senat." The PAP report said "it is being anticipated that talks will be conducted between the parties directly concerned and that appropriate solutions will be worked out on questions falling within the scope of their powers." It added that after these German talks end, the four-power agreement will be implemented "simultaneously with agreements concluded among the GDR, the FRG, and the West Berlin Senat"--a formulation that gives eque1 weight to the government of West Berlin with Bonn and East Berlin. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL PBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 -43- On 11 August, the day after the intensive ambassadorial sessions began, Warsaw radio had stated that the multi-day sessions "con- firm the rumor" that the negotiations were "entering a final stage." In a similarly optimistic portrayal of the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations, the Polish daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on the 14th quoted President Nixon as stating at his It August press conference that the Four Powers have made "very substan- tial progress." But the paper also mentioned that there was a total embargo on news of the negotiations and cautioned that comment would only be based on "guesswork." GDR COMMENT In a 12 August editorial calling for ratifica- tion of the Moscow-Bonn treaty, the East German party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reasserted the GDR's dedication to the goal of European security and pointed to "a growing public realization that the technical talks" between GDR State Secretary Kohl and FRG State Secretary Bahr will serve that end. The editorial made no mention of the Big Four negotia- tions, as if to divest the Bahr-Kohl talks of any connection with them. SED Politburo member Verner, in a wide-ranging foreign policy speech markiag the centenary of the birth of the German revo- lutionary Karl Liebknecht, reiterated the GDR's hope that the four-power talks would continue in the interests of European "detente" and would put "an end to West Berlin's role as a troublemaker." Recalling that the GDR had submitted proposals to the West Berlin Senat to normalize relations between the GDR and West Berlin, Verner repeated the East Berlin line that an agreement on these proposals "presupposes the good will of all partners; any reasonable person will have to understand that an agreement on these proposals requires the recognition of realities and of the legal position that West Berlin is a city with a special politicE,l status which has never belonged and will never belong to the FRG and must not be governed by the FRG." GDR BACKDATES BREZHNEV DOCTRINE TO BUILDING OF BERLIN WALL On the o%~^asion of the 10th anniversary of the building of the "antifasci8t protective" Berlin Wall, East Berlin propaganda has stressed that 13 August 1961 marked the first opportunity to test the "unbreakable unity and cohesion" of the peoples and countries of the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union. GDR Defense Minister Hoffmann, writing in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 13th, in effect invoked the Brezhnev doctrine retroactively to Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25coi#l1Q5T00875R000PPNp4 18 AUGUST 1971 describe the actions taken in Berlin 10 years ago: "The issues which affected the life of a fraternal country, the GDR, were declared to be the community's very own concern." The thrust of GDR comment on the anniversary was that the construction of the "secure border" had stopped "economic pillage" of the GDR and prevented a West German frontal attack against East Germany, with Hoffman going so far as to charge in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND that Washington and Bonn had been preparing "an aggressive adventure across the only open border of the socialist community." Cautioning routinely that the socialist community must - rain on guard against West German "imperialism" and its "aggressive nature," a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND e~.itorial on the '3th stated that West German tactics, "which are to some ex,ent adjusted to changed condi- tions and which use more cleverly designed methods," call for "constant vigilance in the interests of peace and detente." East Berlin held a public parade of militia workers on the 13th in honor of the Wall, in violation of the four-power agreements on Berlin. It was attended by Honecker and Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov. Both GDR and Soviet media followed standard practice in failing to take note of the protest made by the Big Three military commandants in West Berlin over the East German military parade. East Berlin held a second military parade on the 13th, to honor the Liebknecht centenary, at which Honecker and Abrasimov were also present. TASS failed to report either of the parades, and PRAVDA on the 14th reported only the one honoring Liebknecht. IZVESTIYA on the 15th alone mentioned the military parade commemorating the Wall. TASS did take note of the Wall's anniversary in summarizing a speech made by SED Politburo member Verner on the 12th, at a meeting marking the Liebknecht centenary, in which he praised the construction of the Wall as the decisive step in preventing the "rollback" of socialism and in combat- ting the Adenauer government's "revanchist" policy. On the other hand, the TASS report on a 10 August DPA interview with Brandt omitted all the Chancellor's remarks on the Berlin Wall, as well as his comments linking a Berlin settlement to treaty ratification and to a conference on European security. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIA.i FBIS TRFNDS 18 AUGUST 1911 - 45 - INDIA JOINT STATEMENT, RAPID TR:ATY APPROVAL FOLLOW GROMYKO VISIT The hurried nature of Foreign Minister Gronyko's 8 August trip to India and the signing the next day of a 20-year Soviet-Indian treaty of "peace, friendship, and cooperation" has been matched by the rapidity of ratification procedures by both India and the Soviet Union. In transmissions only 10 minutes apart TASS announced on 13 August that Indian President Giri and Soviet President Pbdgornyy had each signed the decrees of ratification. The-treaty entered into force oh the 18th .with?the. exchange' iii t4M Acow 8f instruments of ratification. In contrast, the 27 May Soviet-L.NR treaty was not ratified by the UAR until 13 June and by the Soviet Union until 28 June; the exchange of ratification documents occurred on 1 July. The joint Soviet-Indian statement issued at the end of Gromyko's 8 to 12 August official visit to India highlighted the treaty, terming it "an outstanding historic event" that "opens up wide prospects for raising fruitful cooperation between the USSR and India to a still higher level." While withholding comment on "other points [of the treaty] referring to bilateral Soviet-Indian relations," the statement took particular note of the provisions for maintaining regular bilateral contacts on major international problems and for "holding mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective steps to safeguard the peace and security of both countries." It declared that "the treaty is not directed against anyone." Nothing that their positions on various problems discussed "are identical or very close," the statement specifically cited the issues of "East Pakistan," Indochina, and the Middle East. Giving prominence to the problem of more than seven million refugees from "East Pakistan"--the selection of nomenclature reflecting Soviet restraint-- both sides declared that "there can be no military solution of this problem" and deemed it necessary that "urgent steps be taken in East Pakistan for the achievement of a political solution and for the creation of conditions of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 -46- The renunciation of a "military solution" encompasses both Indian oppbeition to Pakistan's imposition of a military solution on East Bengal and a Soviet interest-in defusing tensions on the Indian subcontinent. The call for a "political solution," without further elaboration, falls short, however, of the joint GDR-Indian statement, carried by TASS on 24 June, which declarad that a solution to-the basic political problem must be "in accordanc' with the will of the people of East Pakistan and in consultation with their elected representatives." Soviet commentators have on several occasions since that 24 June statement contended that a political settlement must give "due account to the legitimate rights and interests of the population of East Pakistan." The Soviet-Indian joint statement also stated that all international problems "including border disputes"-- applicab].e to Sino-Indian, Sino-Soviet, and Indian- Pakistani points of contention--must be settled by peaceful negotiations and that the use of force or threat of force "is inadmissible." MUTUAL CONSULTATION PROVISION STRESSED IN SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT Soviet propagandists have continued to play on the themes Moscow orchestrated immediately following the signing of the treaty on 9 August. They have stressed that the "peace" treaty is a stabilizing force in international affairs, that it was not precipitated by any particular international situation--PRAVDA on the 11th echoed previous, Soviet contentions that the conclusion of the treaty resulted from the natural evolution of bilateral relations and was not based on "transitory factors or considerations dictated by expediency"--and that it is not directed against any third party. In general, Soviet comment on the treaty-- the 11 August PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials are examples-- has proffered essentially balanced treatment of most, of the substantive points without placing particular emphasis on any of them. Some discussions, however, have put special emphasis on the treaty's provision; for mutual consultations in case of attack or threat of attack, and some of these have pointed to specific geographical areas affected by the treaty. While there has been no direct Soviet treatment of the Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 47 - treaty's applications to the acute Indian-Pakistani tensions, Moscow sources have made unmistakable allusions to that situation. For instance, the 13 August discussion of the treaty by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as reflected by the TASS account, consisted exclusively of comments by Ponomarev and Gromyko, who focused almost entirely on the treaty's security implications. Both speaker=s elaborated in detail on the treaty's provision for mutual consultations and the taking of "appropriate effective measures" in case of attack or threat of attack. Gromyko declared that "the entire treaty is keynoted" by the two states' desire to insure security "in Asia and the whole world," adding pointedly that the treaty is particularly important "in the light of the present international situation, and, in particular, in the light of the situation developing south of the borders of the Soviet Union." "Of particular significance in this respect is the commitment contained in the treaty for consultations in case of attack or threat of attack," Gromyko stressed, noting that "this provision of the treaty has already drawn attention in many capitals and corresponding conclusions are being drawn from it." Gromyko's comments were broadcast in English to South Asia on the 13th. Echoing virtually identical views, a commentator on Moscow Radio's domestic service rrundtable program on 15 August-- which largely ignored all"but the treaty provision dealing with mutual consultation and appropriate action--followed his explanation of the consultation provision, by quoting an Indian paper's contention that the treaty "is aimed at securing peace and stability in Hindustan and in all of Asia." With similar emphasis on the treaty's provision for concerted action in the case of hostilities, Ponomarev in the Presidium discussions singled out U.S. activities in Indochina as the object of the treaty's focus. He declared that the treaty has obvious application "against the background of the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism" in Indochina, and he expressed confidence that the treaty "will help the heroic struggle of the patriots of Indochina." According to the TASS account, Ponomarev addel., abtost as an afterthought, that the treaty will become an historic landmark "also for bilateral Soviet-Indian relations." U.S. presence in Indochina was also focused on by a commentator on the roundtable program who cited a Japanese newspaper's contention that the treaty "will contribute to strengthening the Soviet Union's role in insuring security in Southeast Asia." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 48 - Broaching the subject of big-power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, a commentary for South Asia and Africa by the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress contended that "it goes without saying" that the treaty "strikes a serious blow at the plans of the imperialists everywhere, and in particular in the Indian Ocean region." The commentary went on to denounce U.S. designs in the Indian Ocean area. Moscow's sensitivity to charges that the treaty is directed against some particular third party was reflected in a commentary for Japanese listeners on the 14th, reacting to "certain Japanese newspapers' interpretations of this treaty and their strange speculations about it." Citing one paper's contention that the treaty "is aimed at eventually strengthening the encirclement of China"-- this is the only direct reference to the PRC in connection with the treaty noted in Soviet media--the commentary expressed tale view that "it would be futile to try to offer any refutation to those who cling to such an opinion." In contrast to such stress on the military-security implications of the treaty, some discussions had a different focus. The extensive domestic service and PRAVDA accounts of the 11 August discussions of the treaty before the joint session of the foreign affairs commissions of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet, in particular the comments of Kuznetsov and Ponomarev, focused on the treaty's contributions to the deepening of Soviet-Indian relations and on points of bilateral agreement on various international problems--arms control and disarmament, and the fight against colonialism and racism. These accounts contained no references to the treaty's provisions concerning hostilities and no allusions to the acute tension on the Indian subcontinent. EAST EIROPEAN,PRESS SEES TREATY AWED AT PAKISTAN. PtiC Despite Soviet professions to the contrary, the East European media see the Soviet-Indian treaty as precipitated by heightening Indo-Pakistani tensions and as directed toward Pakistan with Peking as its patron. Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG said on the 10th that the treaty was prompted by an atmosphere on the Indian-Pakistani border "so strained Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 49 - that it threatened to explode," Bratislava's SMENA on the 12th cited the importance of the treaty's provisions renouncing military alliances with or aid to any third party in view of the Indian-Pakistani border conflicts and "the support and one-sided encouragement of Pakistan in this conflict by Peking." Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 12th contended that the treaty had already had "a moderating" influence on the Indo-Pakistani border confrontation. Asserting that the treaty "has a rather clear meaning," Belgrade's BORBA on the 11th expressed the view that "it should compensate for possible negative repercussions [from Nixon's visit to the PRC] on the strategic position of the USSR in the world play of big powers." PEKING, MOSCOW GIVE SPARSE COVERAGE TO PAKISTAN EVENTS From its initial 3 April NCNA report on the Pakistan situation, Peking virtually ignored the internal situation in East Bengal and chose to paint a picture of Indian, and to a lesser extent U.S. and Soviet, interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. NCNA has periodically carried Rawalpindi-datelined dispatches reporting on alleged armed Indian intrusions into East Bengal, the defeat and capture of such "aggressors" by Pakistani forces, and Pakistani notes of protest to India over the incidents. Other Peking items on Pakistan focus on events reflecting closer PRC-Pakistan ties such as trade and aid agreements, visits by various Pakistani groups to China, and festivities marking anniversaries. For instance, NCNA on 16 August reported celebrations in Pakistan marking its 24th anniversary and it cited President Yahya Khan's appeal for unity in the face of "internal subversion and the threat of external aggression." After citing celebrations in Rawalpindi and Karachi, NCNA noted that "the people of East Pakistan also celebrated the independence day with enthusiasm," demonstrating their "indomitable will" to "defend their country's honor, sovereignty, and integrity." Monitored Peking comment has not yet taken note of the Soviet- Indian treaty. While Soviet media in recent weeks have given little direct attention to events in Pakistan--the domestic service on 11 August did report on a soiree in Moscow devoted to Pakistan independence day--Moscow has continued to report Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 developments in regard to East Pakistan Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman.* TASS on 11 August reported 4 tat Indira Gandhi had appealed to the heads of government of 2;, countries "to influence the government of Pakistan and save the life of the eminent statesman and public figure," noting that he is to be tried by a special military court "on a charge of unleashing military action in Pakistan." It also reported Indian Foreign Minister Singh's appeal to U Thant "to take urgent steps to prevent the trial and insure the safety" of Mujibur. * Soviet treatment of the development of the current crisis in Indian-Pakistani relations was updated in the TRENDS of 11 August, pages 30-32. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/250NMAP85T00875R53'OD0034-4 18 AUGUST 1971 A F R I C A MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN ATTACK BANDA VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA Denunciations from Moscow, seconded by East Berlin, have accompanied the start on 16 August of the controversial visit by maverick Malawi President Hastings Banda to the Republic of South Africa--the first official one by a Black African head of state. The visit had been announced by the Malawi and South African foreign affairs ministries on the 11th and is in return for Pretoria Prime Minister John Vorster's visit to Malawi last year. Dr. Banda last month had announced his intention to go to South Africa in line with his policy of "contact and dialog." Moscow first commented on the 14th, in a Tarasov article in PRAVDA which charged that Dr. Banda, "deliberately or not, is turning the state of Malawi into the racists' Trojan horse." Moscow broadcast summaries of the Tarasov article to African audiences in English, French, and Portuguese, and TASS on the 16th carried a commentary by Snegovskiy calling the visit "a challenge to independent Africa." Radio Moscow has also recently denounced a visit by a lower-level Malagasy Republic delegation to South Afr::..a, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Raharijona, which left for home on the 12th. Peking media, which have recurrently denounced the movement for "dialog" with South Africa, have yet to mention the Malawi president's visit to Pretoria. But on 16 August, reporting a dinner given by Congo Brazzaville President Ngouabi for visiting Equatorial Guinea President Nguema, NCNA noted that "on the question of a 'dialog' with South Africa, President Ngouabi once again made it clear that for the People's Republic of the Congo to accept a 'dialog' with South Africa would be a very grave absurdity." MOSCOW The article by PRAVDA's Tarasov, covering about half COVENT a column in the 14 August issue of the paper, charged that Dr. Banda had "long ago" tied his country to South Africa in return for millions of dollars in subsidies--a friendship with Pretoria running counter to the position of thf Organization of African Unity (OAU) and regarded "in Africa as a betrayal of the interests of the peoples of the continent." Pretoria, PRAVDA said, intends to uc rapproachment with "countries like Malawi or the Ivory Coast to launch an economic offensive against independent Africa." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 The TASS commentary by Snegovskiy deplored the visit "by an African, head of an independent African state, to a country whose official doctrine classifies men like Banda" as "second- class people, a race doomed to be oppressed." Like Tarasov, Snegovskiy stressed the "high political price" Dr. Banda has paid for his "pompous welcome" in Pretoria. Pursuing PRAVDA's line in declaring that Malawi had "always" been out of step with the policy of the majority of African states in the OAU toward "the South African racialists and the Portuguese colonialists," the commentator observed that Pretoria was staking ito hopes on "the splitters of African unity." EAST BERLIN In a similar vein, the East Berlin domestic radio on the 16th reviled Dr. Banda for "enjoying the status of a white man 'honoris causal" during his stay in "the country of apartheid." The commentator remarked that Malawi has made "the greatest leap forward" in accommodation with South Africa, in contrast to the police of "the most progressive stated of Africa such as Somalia, Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania." Like the TASS commentary, it cited examples of Malawi-South African military cooperation #nd charged in addition that South African advisers are working in the Malawi radio station "so that a transmitter--made in West Germany--with a capacity of 100 kilowatts can broaauast agitation against neighboring Tanzania and Zaibia." Calling the visit a "betrayal of 12 million oppressed Africans and of the Malawi people," the commentator noted that it was starting "on the very day when a terror trial against 14 South African resistance fighters will be opened in Pietermaritzburg." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENTIAL FRIG T13ENDS 18 AUGUST 1971 - 53 - PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARTICLES CONTINUE TO STRESS STEEL PRIORITY OVER ELECTRONICS The list of those opposed to taking the electronics industry as the key to China's industrial development has been increased by one, to include the electronics industry itself. In an article in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 12 Auauat, the writing group of the elec- tronics industry criticized those who preach that "China should make the electronics industry the center of its industries in order to advance the development of the national economy as a whole." As usual, "Liu Shao-chi and company" get the blame for fomenting the erroneous line, but criticism of this erroneous line has surfaced in PRC media only in the past few months, indicatingthat there have been recen a emp s o rev ve e 'thesis. This article and other earlier ones (by the writing group of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industiy on 12 May and a signed PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 13 June) affirm that electronics are of importance, but stress the priority of basic industries which produce raw materials, especially iron and steel. The articles firmly adhere to the theory that it is necessary to increase the output of products used to produce means of production before increasing production of consumer resources; in Mao's words "if we have grain and iron and steel, every hj g else will easy." 0 The emphasis on iron and steel apparently also assists the machine-building industry. The 12-Lune PEOPLE'S DAILY article stressed the priority of machine building, pointing out the symbiotic relationship of this industry with mining. The electronics industry article highlights machine building Li noting that the "development of our country's machine-building industry and national economy as a whole urgently necessitates a rapid development of the iron and steel industry." The article warns, however, that no industry, even machine tool building, can replace iron and steel manufacture at the center. Indicating that the argument over priorities does not apply only to steel versus electronics, the article by the elec- tronics industry stresses that Liu and his ilk felt free to treat as the "center" anything which attracted their attention: sometimes electronics, sometimes electronics and chemicals, at other periods the machinery industry or even shipbuilding. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 CONFIDENT:f.AL FBIS TIiEN Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T0087WQQ 0 p34-4 Jl1 - 14C Any vacillation which detracts from steel as the center is said to frustrate efforts to build "industry into an independent and integrated system." V he fact that the stress on ion-and steel affects weapons evelopment is frankly acknowledged in the electronics industry article, although it is hazy as to actual policies being imple- mented. The article states that electronics technology, "to ether with atomic technology and jet engine technology, is generally regarded as a criterion used tomeasure the bevel- of-development of a country's industry," but it warns that a'T dvanced and special technology is one thing, while the foundation and center are another; the two cannot be mixed together." Only after the fundamental industry, supplier of raw materials, has been developed can other industries follow suit. Thii convoluted formulation, stressing basic industry, seems designed to in'" ov till a P p er s unresolved areas of dis- cussion, but at least opens the possibility that the PLA is being askedt0_._dvfer. aomA i nru .8 into a.dvanrad Lem g .. P _-p~mZ The ideological aspects of the electronics-versus-steel question were discussed in another .12 August PEOPLE'S DAILY article by an author who seemed extraordinarily unskilled at polemical argumen+. Revealing that Lenin and Stalin are among those who can be quoted to the effect that steel need not be placed above all else, he criticized advocates of a rapid development of advanced technology for having distorted and "blatantly tampered with" Lenin's formula that "communism consists of the soviet system plus nationwide electrification." According to the article, the electronics advocates have misused the theory for their own ends by changing it to include not only electrification but also advanced electronics, thus implying "that Lenin's formula has long since been outdated." The author fails to explain, however, why Lenin, and Stalin also, indicated that electricity rather than steel was the central factor. The author then does just what he accuses the Liuists of doing, by arguing that Lenin's nationwide electrification "means not only electricity, but th-: availability of materials for economic construction, including electronics, atomic power, and jet propulsion technology." Without explaining how steel f? a into the center, the article argues that Lenin's plan was not really technical at all, but a political plan whose funda- mental aspect was insistence on a soviet state, that is, a Maoist continuing dictatorship of the proletariat. Indicating Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 cMdMftT00875RQM@3(WQ4434-4 18 AUGUST 1971 that the championing of electronics is only a.ploy engaged in by,-...those opposed to Mid ..e au or c9.oses with the fervent declaration thaf_ these tricks only expose those persons who, ".frantically attempting to pose as che.mpions of Leninism are actually schemers pro~t3ng usurp party and state authority." NEW PARTY CCt"VII TTEE ELECTED FOR ALI AREA I N TIBET A party congress held frc.. 26 to 29 June elected a new party committee for the vast but thinly populated All area in Tibet, according to Lhasa radio on 15 August. India's Western border with China faces on Ali for three-fourths of its length. The Ali area CCP committee is the first party committee to be formed at the area (district) level in Tibet. Tibet is one of the four provincial-level units in China that have not yet established their top party organs. . Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040034-4