TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040045-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: November 3, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
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II li~ll~~~llllllllllllllllllll~~~ll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
. ~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~
TRENDS
in Communist P ropaganda
Confidential
3 NOVEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 44)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by F13IS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
1.dud.d I,.i. .u,e..1k
d.~.Oraliq ..d
dal.l,i(q.,i..
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FB 1S TRENDS
3 NOVEMBER 1971
- i -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 - 31 OCTOBER 1971
Moscow (3153 items)
Peking (1727 items)
Brezhnev in France
(6%)
34%
Domestic Issues
(40%)
29%
[Brezhnev Speeches
(--)
15%]
[Revolutionary Songs
(--)
3%]
Kosygin in Cuba
(1%)
7%
Campaign
Kosygin in Canada
(13%)
3%
U.S. Vote on China
(2%)
23%
China
(2%)
3%
Afro-Asian Table Tennis
(--)
6%
[U.S. Vote on China
(--)
2%]
Matches
Brezhnev in GDR
(--)
2%
Indochina
(7%)
6%
Indochina
(3%)
1%
PRC-Belgian Diplomatic
(--)
4%
Relations
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terns of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 NOVEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
PRC IN UNITED NATIONS
Peking Names Delegation, Demands Full ROC Expulsion . . . . . . 1
TAIWAN
Peking Reaffirms Claim to Sovereignty over Taiwan . . . . . . . 3
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Evidence Accumulates of Decline in Status of Lin Piao . . . . . 6
Inner Mongolia Radio Resumes Local Broadcasting Pattern . . . . 7
DPRK-DRV Communique Cites Bilateral Solidarity, Friendship . . 9
PRG Proposal Elaborated by Foreign Minister Trinh, Communique . 11
DPRK Delegation Signs Aid Agreements During Visit to DRV . . . 13
Moscow Reaffirms Desire for Peaceful Settlement in Indochina . 14
DRV Scores U.S. Raids in DMZ Area, Northwest Province . . . . . 16
PRG, ARV Offer Aid for Typhoon Victims, Denounce GVN Relief . . 17
Hoxha Rejects Flexible Tactics in Struggle Against U.S. . . . . 18
PRC Sends Greetings, Dispatches Government Group to Tirana . . 21
BREZHNEV IN FRANCE
Voluminous Soviet Comment Plays Up Political Import of Trip . . 23
BREZHNEV IN GDR
Soviet Leader Stresses Coordination of Foreign Policy . . . . . 30
KOSYGIN IN CUBA
Joint Communique Registers "Complete Mutual Understanding" . . 32
Cuban Commentator Takes New Conciliatory Tack Toward U.S. . . . 35
(Continued)
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CONTENT (Continued)
USSR Continues to Disparage U.S. Interim Settlement Proposal 37
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PRC IN UNITED NATIONS
PEKING NAVIES DELEGATION, DEMANDS FULL' ROC EXPULSION
Peking waited four days after the 25 October UN vote on seating
the PRC to announce that it would "soon send its representatives,"
then followed up on 2 November with the namelist of its delegation.
The PRC first announced its intentions in a government statement
on the 29th stipulating that the resolution adopted by the General
Assembly "must be speedily implemented in its entirety" and
specifying that this means expulsion of the ROC from all UN bodies
"and related agencies."
Confidence in compliance with this demand was indicated by Peking's
failure to make it a condition for the dispatch of a PRC delegation.
Shortly after releasing the government statement, Peking disseminated
the text of Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's 29 October
message officially notifying U Thant that the PRC would soon send
its delegation and pointedly citing the language of the secretary
general's 26 October message to Peking to the effect that the
General Assembly had decided to restore to the PRC "all its rights"
and to expel the ROC representatives from the world body and "all
the organizations related to it." Also noting that Thant had
advised "all the bodies and related agencies" of the United Nations
of the UNGA resolution, Chi expressed confidence that the resolu-
tion will be "speedily implemented in its entirety."
The namelist was contained in a second Chi message to Thant, on
2 November, disclosing that the PRC delegation will be headed by
Chiao Kuan-hua, a vice foreign minister whose responsibilities
have included both Soviet and American affairs and who has served
as the chief Chinese negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks.
Huang Hua, the PRC ambassador to Canada, was named as his deputy.
Another message released on the 2d designated Huang as the PRC's
permanent representative on the Security Council. At this writing
Peking media have not acknowledged Chi's 31 October message to
U Thant--reported in the Western press--informing him that the PRC
has chosen to be listed as "China, People's Republic of," thus
appearing alphabetically as a "C" on the UN rolls and sidestepping
the possibility of the PRC's taking over Security Council
chairmanship for November.
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The 29 October government statement called the favorable UNGA
vote a demonstration of the bankruptcy of U.S. policy as well as
"a victory of Chairman Mao Tsetung's proletarian revolutionary
line in foreign affairs and a victory of the whole world and
all the countries upholding justice." Pledging that the PRC
will "never be a superpower bullying other countries," the
statement echoed the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of the 28th when
it said the vote indicates that "one or two superpowers" are
losing their ability to manipulate the United Nations. It
repeated the editorial's warning that the U.S. and Japanese
"reactionaries" are nevertheless continuing to press their two-
Chinas "scheme," adding that this includes attempting "to let
the Chiang Kai-shek clique worm its way back into the United
Nations under the name of a so-called 'independent Taiwan."'
Such a scheme, the statement asserted, "must never be allowed to
succeed."
An NCNA dispatch on 2 November treated at length the official
U.S. reaction to the 25 October vote, charging that Washington,
"turning from abashment to anger, has openly hurled all kinds
of abuse" against those nations supporting the Albanian
resolution and has exerted pressure on them. The dispatch said
White House press secretary Ziegler had conveyed to newsmen
President Nixon's "irritation" over the "glee" expressed on the
floor of the Assembly after the vote. It remarked that Ziegler,
"having a true grasp of the President'3 intention," charged that
this "'shocking demonstration"' could "'very seriously impair"'
U.S. financial support of the organization. Noting the anti-
pathy of many UN representatives to the U.S. reaction, the
dispatch concluded that "no matter how much political pressure"
it is going to exert or "dollar blackmail" it is going to
attempt, "U.S. imperialism can by no means alter the trend of
history." To date Peking has not reported the 29 October Senate
vote killing the foreign aid bill.
Peking has been giving heavy publicity since the 29th to the
stream of congratulatory messages from abroad on tiie UNGA vote,
as well as to favorable comment drawn from friendly organs of
the foreign press.
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T A I W A.
PEKING REAFFIRMS) CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIV!AN
In the wake of the second Kissinger mission and the UN vote on
seating the PRC, Peking has been intent on reasserting its claim
to sovereignty over Taiwan and sustaining the momentum of its
diplomatic drive at the expense of the ROC. The basic thrust of
Peking's comment on the vote has been that a challenge to the
PRC's claim to Taiwan has been defeated in the UN arena but that
this was but one battle in a continuing campaign. Having been
awarded a major victory over the ROC in the contest for recognition
as the legitimate government of China, Peking has indicated that
one of its principal concerns now is to undercut any developing
sentiment in the international community favoring an independent
regime on Taiwan. In this respect Peking has devoted particular
attention to Japan's role, seeking to isolate the pro-Taipei
elements and to generate pressures for a change in Tokyo's
China policy.
Peking's reaction to the UN vote combined expressions of satisfaction
over the defeat of the dual representation formula with calls
for vigilance against further moves by "the U.S.-Japanese
reactionaries" that would perpetuate the alienation of Taiwan from
the mainland. A 29 October PRC Government statement, echoing
Peking's initial reaction to the vote, warned that the United
States and Japan are "not reconciled to their defeat" and will
pursue a two-Chinas policy by promoting an independent Taiwan.
"All indications show," according to a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on the previous day, that the United States and Japan "are
stepping up their maneuvers" in behalf of Taiwan independence
as a means of severing the island from the PRC.
Peking restated the basic elements of its line on Taiwan in
another PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, also on 28 October, hailing the
establishment of diplomatic relations with Belgium. Declaring
that the "liberation" of Taiwan is China's internal affair and
"brooks no foreign interference," the editorial recited Peking's
objections to variants of a two-Chinas approach, including an
independent Taiwan. The list contained a new variant, "one
China, two governments," a formula which would acknowledge that
? Taiwan is a part of China while recognizing the existence of
two viable governments. As quoted in a 1 November NCNA report
on a Japanese Diet debate, Prime Minister Sato pointed out on
the day after the UN vote that "two governments exist in China."
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The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on diplomatic relations with
Belgium reiterated a standard demand that the United States
"must withdraw all its armed forces and military installations"
from Taiwan and the Straits. Also standard was the editorial's
declaration that the "Chinese people are determined to liberate
their sacred territory Taiwan." Historical and legal arguments
for the claim that Taiwan has been "China's sacred territory
since ancient times" had been assembled in an NCNA dispatch
disseminated internationally during the UN debate on China.
Reviewing the historical background, the dispatch said Taiwan
and the Pescadores have been "important strategic regions in
China's coastal defense" since the Ming dynasty. The dispatch
concluded by citing a statement by Chou En-Lai issued on 28
June 1950 in reaction to President Truman's order for the inter-
diction of the Taiwan Straits shortly after the outbreak of the
Korean War. Chou was quoted as charging that the U.S. move
constituted armed aggression against the territory of China and
"total violation of the United Nations Charter"--a possible hint
that Peking might use the United Nations as a forum for pressing
its case on the Taiwan issue.
E
U.S.-ROC RELATIONS Peking's comment on the UN vote has notably
avoided drawing implications for Sino-U.S.
relations from Washington's stand on the China representation
issue, but Peking has taken note of statements from Washington
assessing the effects of the vote on U.S. relations with the
ROC. An NCNA report on 1 November, noting that "some U.S.
personages in power" are not reconciled to the defeat of the two-
Chinas formula, observed that Secretary Rogers "hurriedly" held
a press conference on the day after the UN vote and declared
that the ties between the United States and the ROC remain
unaffected. NCNA also noted that the secretary told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on 27 October that U.S. defense
arrangements with the ROC would continue. In a passage containing
a reference to the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty, the NCNA
report called attention to the Senate's decision on 28 October
not to repeal the 1955 emergency resolution by the two houses of
Congress authorizing the President to use armed force in the
Taiwan Straits. NCNA noted that repeal of the resolution was
proposed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "1.ast July"--
an implicit reminder that the committee's action w?d taken in
the wake of the President's announcement that he would be visiting
Peking.
Reflecting Peking's sensitivity regarding the U.S. commitment
to the defense of Taiwan, the NCNA repurt quoted a senator as
saying, in connection with the decision not to repeal the 1955
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resolution, that "we should not indicate to anybody anywhere in
the world we are in the mind to abandon the protection to those in
Taiwan." This remark was taken by NCNA as an indication that
"U.S. imperialism" hopes to "divide the sacred territory of
China."
NEW RECOGNITION Two recent recognition agreements, with
AGREEMENTS Belgium on 25 October and with Peru on 2
"ovembcr, -everted to a formula on the Taiwan
question that was introduced in the PRC-Canadian agreement in
October 1970--the first in the series of recognition agreements
that is still continuing. Using this formula, the othe? country
"takes note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan without endorsing it.*
As in previous communiques in which the other country "takes
note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan, Belgium and Peru recognized the
PRC Govern-zent as "the sole legal government of China." Peking's
~referr!d terms, used in agreements with countries offering less
resistance to its demands, are for recognition as "the sole legal
government representing the entire Chinese people."
It is not clear why Peking was willing to revert to the Canadian
formula and its variant at this time. Another formula, introduced
in the recognition agreement with Kuwait in March 1971, omitted
any mention of Taiwan while conferring recognition on Peking as
"the sole legal government of China."ft This formula was used in
August 1971 agreements with Turkey and Iran during a period in
which Peking had begun publicizing moves for seating the PRC
in the United Nations. Peking may have introduced the Kuwait
formula out of sensitivity to the speculation aroused by the
formula in which a country merely "takes note" of the PRC's
claim to Taiwan. Thus Peking may have preferred to sidetrack
the Taiwan question while garnering diplomatic support for the UN
vote rather than to use a formula suggesting a willingness to
compromise on the Taiwan question. This consideration may not
apply now that the compromise dual representation arrangement
was defeated in the UN vote.
* Precisely speaking, Peru took note of Peking's "position" on
the Taiwan question--the Canadian formula--while Belgium took note of
Peking's "statement." The latter variant was first used in the
November 1970 agreement with Italy, which evidently believed it
reflect^d a shade stronger resistance to Peking's demands on the
Taiwan issue.
** Previous recognition of the ROC is not a criterion distirguishing
the use of the various formulas.
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PkC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE ACCUMULATES OF DECLINE IN STATUS OF LIN PIAO
There have been no references to Lin Piao in PRC radio broadcasts
since an C October mention by the Kirin provincial radio. Apart
from toasts by foreign visitors--which Peking stopped reporting
from late September--and greetings messages on National Day
(1 October), there has been no mention of Lin by Radio Peking or
NCNA since 15 September. In an indication that Peking's closest
allies have been notified that his status has changed, congratulatory
messages from Albania, Romania, the DPRK, and the DRV on the UN
vote for seating the PRC did not include Lin among the addressees.
While Lin's protocol position would not strictly require that he
be among the addressees, party-state messages from those countries--
and the Albanian message was signed by the full complement of top
leaders--would normally be expected to be addressed to the trinity
of Mao, Lin, and Chou En-lai.
MAGAZINES' TREATMENT An examination of monthly.magazines published
OF LIN in China for both domestic and foreign
consumption reveals indications of a
decline in Lin's status as reflected in military reminiscences
presenting him historically as little more than one among several
leaders around Mao. From July through October CHINA RECONSTRUCTS
carried a serialized reminiscence by one of Mao's bodyguards during
the early and mid-1930's which contained a few references to Lin
without especially singling out his role. The July and August
issues contained other reminiscences which paid greater attention
to Lin. The July issue had a story on the Yenan era which included
several pictures of Lin, and in August there was a story on Lin's
victory at Pinghsingkuan over the Japaners. There were
no special stories devoted to Lin in the September and October issues,
with the October issue mentioning his name only twice, once as
party vice chairman. The November issue i& not available, but a
Peking dispatch by the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG said it con-
tains only one reference to Lin, identifying him merely as vice
premier--a title he did not hold during the historical period
covered and one which has dropped out of use in PRC media since he
became Mao's heir-designate.
The October issue of CHINA PICTORIAL--which has been distributed
in its English edition but which was withdrawn from circulation in
Peking--contains a photograph of Lin and Mao on its cover. This
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issue, which commemorates the party's 50th anniversary on 1 July
this year, was probably printed several weeks in advance and con-
tains no news past late August.
OTHER LEADERS The 1930's reminiscence by one of Mao's body-
guards was also carried in the July issue of
CHINESE LITERATURE but with a few differences--not affecting Lin's
status--which might indicate that some past and present Politburo
members have recently fallen into disfavor. The CHINESE LITERATURE
version carried a reference to Politburo member Liu Po-cheng which
was dropped from the August installment in RECONSTRUCTS, and the
October installment dropped mentions of former Politburo members
Nieh Jung-chen and Chen Yun, both still Central Committee members.
The August issue of CHINESE LITERATURE carried another military
reminiscence, this one dealing with Mao during the Northern Shensi
campaign after the retreat from Yenan in 1947. Since Lin was
not with Mao at the time, his absence from the article reflects
historical fact, even though at the height of praise for Lin
PRC media sometimes made it appear that Mao and Lin had been in-
separable. Assuming Lin's place to some extent is "Vice Chairman"
Chou En-lai, who was with Mao during this period. Chou is presented
quite favorably, to the extent that the author reminisces that
Chou often stayed up later and arose earlier than Mao himself.
Mao, however is presented as physically in better health, as Chou
is forced to ride a stretcher briefly at one point while Mao trods
indomitably on.
Of the other current leaders mentioned in the article, Wang Tung-
hsing receives special notice for his heroism in combat, and Chiang
Ching is shown to have been a person of importance who showed con-
cern for ordinary people. Both this article and the previous one
serialized in RECONSTRUCTS break with precedent in presenting Mao
and Chiang in domestic situations--PRC media never actually state
that they are married. Most of the other leaders praised are now
dead, but Peking chief Hsieh Fu-chih, who has appeared in public
only once in the past year and??a-1alf, was accorded a footnote
clarifying that he was the Hsieh referred to in a passage praising
the "Chen-Hsieh Army."
INNER MONGOLIA RADIO RESUMES LOCAL BROADCASTING PATTERN
On 3 November the Inner Mongolian radio station in Huhehot was
monitored carrying locally originated programs. Since 5 January 1970
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the station had carried a solid relay of the. Peking domistic
service. The resumption of Inner Mongolia's local service leaves
only Kweichow without local broadcasting. Kweichow's provincial
radio had resumed local originations with an announcement of he
formation of its provincial CCP committee on 18 May, but on
8 October the station reverted to a solid Peking relay. Past
practice has indicated that la'k of local broadcasting is a sign
of serious problems within a privince.
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INDOCHINA
The DPRK party-government delegation led by Pak Song-chol left Hanoi
on 30 October after signing agreements on economic and military aid
to the DRV. The joint communique, like other propaganda on the
visit, stresses solidarity and friendship and contains o direct
reflection of the complex situation in the communise: world in the
wake of President Nixon's planned visits to Peking and Moscow.
However, it seems noteworthy that the communique, in contrast to the
one on Podgornyy's early October visit to Hanoi, failed to repeat the
standard Hanoi line on the need to work for the restoration of unity
among the socialist countries. Instead it uses a Pyongyang formula-
tion when it notes the two countries' determination to fight U.S.
"imperialism" in unity with the socialist countries and other anti-
imperialist forces.
Hanoi took the occasion of the North Korean visit to elaborate on the
call for U.S. withdrawal in the PRG's 1 July seven-poii.t peace
proposal. Thus, DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in a banquet
speech on the 24th specified that in addition to "ending aggression"
in Vietnam, withdrawal of personnel and materiel, and the liquidation
of bases, the United States must end all naval and air activity in
South Vietnam and stop military aid to the "Saigon puppet regime."
Trinh's elaboration of the PRG proposal is repeated in the joint
communique.
The damaging typhoon in South Vietnam's northern provinces prompted
messages of condolence and promises of relief from PRC as well as
DRV and PRG leaders. As at the time of the early November floods
lart year, Chou n-lai in a 1 November message to PRG leaders extended
the "deep sympathy" of the Chinese Government and people, and the
Red Cross Society of China announced a donation of relief materials
to the people in the typhoon-stricken coastal areas. Consistent with
past practice, Moscow has given only routine attention to the
disaster and has said nothing about Soviet aid.
Hanoi and Front media dismiss President Thieu's inauguration on
31 October as a "farce" in keeping with his "illegal" election
"farce"; and comment on Thieu's inaugural speech charges that it
"reeked of gunpowder and dupery." Propaganda also characterizes the
GVN's release of Viet Cong prisoners to mark the inauguration as a
"deceitful trick" to mask Thieu's "crimes."
DPRK-DRV CONr1UNIQUE CITES BILATERAL SOLIDARITY, FRIENDSHIP
The DPRK party-government delegation led by Pak Song-chol which
arrived in Hanoi on 24 October returned home on the 30th after
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signing a Joint communique and the annual aid agreement on the
29th. On its way home the delegation stayed overnight in Peking
on 29-30 October and was hosted at a banquet by Chou En-lai and
Li Hs{.en-nien. In typical fashion, talks with the Chinese
leaders were described as having taken place in a "cordial and
friendly atmosphere." En route to Hanoi on the 24th, the delega-
tion had been entertained at an airport luncheon in Peking
hosted by Li.
The joint DPRK-DRV communique noted that the North Koreans had
been received by Ton Duc Thang and Le Duan, and that talks with
Pham Van Dong and other party and government leaders had taken
place in a "cordial atmosphere overflowing with militant
solidarity and fraternal friendship." The communique also said
that a "unanimity" of views was reached during discussions on
bilateral relations and "other questions of common concern." A
similar reference to unanimity of views appeared in the joint
communique on Podgornyy's visit and propaganda suggests that
in both cases this characterization was included at the visitors'
behest. Pak Song-chol, speaking at a banquet on the 28th, said
that the sides reached unanimity on all questions discussed, but
Nguyen Duy Trinh did not echo this assertion. Similarly, DRV
spokesmen avoided any reference to unanimity of views during
Podgornyy's visit, although the Soviets repeatedly so characterized
the talks.
UNITY ISSUE The DPRK-DRV communique--like the one on Podgornyy's
visit--contained a standard reference to satisfac-
tion over the development of friendship'and solidarity of the two
parties and peoples on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and?proletnrian
internationalism. But unlike the Soviet-DRV communique, it said
nothing about efforts by "imperialist reaction".to divide the
socialist countries or about the need to work for-the-restoration
of solidarity among the socialist countries and the communist and
workers parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and- proletarian
internationalism. Instead-it made only a general reference to
the determination of the two sides. to fight U.S. imperialism "in
unity with" peoples of the socialist countries, the world
working class, the African, Asian, and Latin American peoples
and "all progressive peoples of the world."
This is a formulation Kim II-song had. used in. his. speech. at the
Fifth ',.'WP Congress on 2 November 1970. he had also used it in
his 6 August speech this year in which he welcomed Peking's
invitation to the President as a. "great. victory" for the Chinese
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people and world revolutionary forces. The DRV presumably
would have no objection to the formulation, but it seems likely
that they would have preferred the inclusion in the communique
of a statement which at least noted the importance of unity
among the socialist countries. And it is difficult to see how
the Koreans could have objected to that in view of some of their
recent propaganda. Thus, on 15 October KCNA reviewed the
"teachings" of Kim 11-song on the ultimate victory of socialism,
including assertions that "the unity and cohesion of the
socialist countries" guarantees the defense of each socialist
country and therefore must be strengthened. And a 10 October
NODONG SINMUN editorial on the KWP anniversary said that the
party will continue to struggle for "unity of the international
communist movement and for the strengthening and dev-lopment of
the movement."
The North Vietnamese may have sought to include the assertions
that had been in their communique with Podgornyy--and which they
had pressed in their anti-Chinese polemic last summer--on
"imperialist" efforts to split the socialists, and the Koreans
may have objected to that. But the companion assertion in the
Soviet communique on the need to work for the restoration of unity
is similar to a passage in the DPRK-Romanian communique signed
at the conclusion of Ceausescu's visit last June. Possibly the
Koreans for their part pressed for a reference to Asian unity in
the current communique and the Vietnamese demurred, with the
resultant compromise on the reference to "unity" in fighting
imperialism. Kim Il-song had used this vague formulation in
his 6 August speech after reiterating the Pyongyang-Peking line
on the need for unity of the "Asian revolutionary countries."
This Asian unity line, which implicitly excludes the Soviet
Union, was voiced by Pak Song-chol on two occasions during his
Hanoi visit. Hanoi speakers as usual avoided the line. Le Duan
came close to this formulation, however, in Peking on 11 May
during his stop there en route home from his prolonged stay in
the USSR after attending the CPSU Congress in March. Speaking
of China's role as "the great rear" of Vietnam, he went on to
say that "our front extends from Vietnam to Laos, to Cambodia,
to China, and to Korea; and .t is constantly expanding."
PRG PROPOSAL ELABORATED BY FOREIGN MINISTER THIN H, CONMUNIOUE
DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh took the occasion of a
banquet for the Worth Korean delegation on 24 October to elaborate
on the provisions in point one of the PRG's 1 July seven-point
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peace proposal. He closely paraphrased the language of the
formal proposal in nayirg that "the U.S. Government must put an
end to its aggression and withdraw promptly, completely, aad
unconditionally from South Vietnam all the armed forces, advisors,
military personnel, weapons, and other war mear1s of the U.S. and
the other foreign countries in the American camp." But he then
interjected the additional demand that the United States "stop
all activities of the U.S. air force and navy" and "stop U.S.
military aid to the puppet administration in Saigon." Trinh
followed this with the demand that is contained in point one of
the PRG proposal--"remove all U.S. military bases from South
Vietnam." The DPRK-DRV communique, after declaring that the
Vietnam question must be solved on the basis of the PRG's
seven-point proposal, went on to describe the two basic
provisions of the proposal--points one and two--and incorporated
Trinh's elaborations as though they were part of the text of
the formal proposal. In the communique, however, the elabora-
tions come after the call for liquidation of bases.
It is not clear why the North Vietnamese chose this particular
occasion to specify additional demands on the United States in
the context of the PRG proposal, and why they were incorporated
in the joint communique. Pyongyang's special hostility to the
United States may have been a factor, and the Koreans may have
been anxious to demonstrate solidarity with Hanoi in a hardened
stand, particularly against the background of the two countries'
diametrically opposed reactions to Peking's invitation to the
President. Notably, the communique also included an attack on
President Nixon: Attacking continued U.S. aggression in Indochina
and the Vietnamization policy in standard terms, it obeerved that
"since Nixon came to power the U.S. imperialists have become more
obstinate, bellicose, and cunning in their maneuvers."
The North Vietnamese appear to have decided to explicitly harden
theit negotiating terms in light of a belief that their position
has been undercut by Peking, whose invitation to the President
they clearly felt had deflected world attention from the 1 July
initiative and made it easier for the President to avoid a direct
response. Deference to Podgornyy would presumably have prevented
an explicit enunciation of a hardened stand while he was in Hanoi.
Trinh did raise the question of a demand for an end to U.S.
military assistance to the "puppet" administrations in Saigon,
Phnom Penh, and Vientiane in his article--entitled "The Diplomatic
Task in Service of the Anti-U.S. National Salvation Resistance
Struggle"--in the October issue of the DRV's party journal HOC TAP.
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Trinh made this reference in a paragraph purporting to document.
the support for the Indochinese by "the world people's front."
Claiming that each U.S. "escalation" has been greeted by greater
action by the world front, which has used slogans s'ait:able for
each period, he said that previously the slogans concerned the
demand for an unconditional halt of the bombing of the DRV. He
added that the present slogans involve support for the PRG's
seven-point proposal. Trinh described point one of the proposal
cryptically as demanding that the United States fix a deadline
for its withdrawal and did not explain what was involved in
withdrawal. But he went on to say that against the background
of the PRG proposal, the "world people's front" had demanded
that the United States end aggression against all of Indochina
and that the Nixon Administration "withdraw all U.S. troops,
military advisers and military personnel, end U.S. military
assistance to the puppet administrations in Saigon, Phnom Penh,
and Vientiane and withdraw all foreign troops of the U.S. camp
from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia." There is no way of
knowing when Trinh's 110C TAP article was written, and the
journal carries no signed-to-the-press date. But it seems
likely that it was written sometime during September at the
latest.
Vietnamese communist media have consistently obscured U.S.
efforts for clarification or elaboration of the PRG proposal,
and they have not reported statements by Vietnamese communist
leaders to the press. Thus, there was never any acknowledgment
of Le Duc Tho's remarks in his interview with the New York
TIMES' Anthony Lewis on 6 July regarding the question of
military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. (Tho had
said that after U.S. "total" withdrawal, other questions would
be discussed; and when pressed as to whether this would include
assistance, he said that a new basis for U.S.-South Vietnamese
relations would be laid down and that point five which deals,
among other things, with future economic aid "is very explicit
in this connection.")
DPRK DELEGATION SIGNS AID AGREEMENTS DURING VISIT TO DRV
According to VNA and KCNA, Tran Huu Duc, Minister for the DRV
Premier's Office, and Kong Chin-tae, chairman of the DPRK
Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, signed "an agreement
on the i)PRK's nonrefund economic aid to Vietnam in 1972 and an
agreement on goods exchange and payments between the two countries
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in 1972." Tran Sam, DRV Vice Minister of National Defense, and
Chang Chong-hwan, DPRK Vice Minister of National Defense, signed
an agreement on the DPRK's "nonrefund military aid to Vietnam
in 1972." Nguyen Duy Trinh and Pak Song-chol were present at
the signing ceremony.
In the past the DPRK's aid agreements have been signed by DRV
vice premiers during their annual bloc tours. Last year's,
signed on 17 November by Nguyen Con, were described as agreements
on the DPRK's "free economic and military aid" to the DRV and
on mutual delivery of commodities and payments for 1971. The
contents of the agreements have never been elaborated in
propaganda media. Pyongyang's current break with precedent
to send a high--ranking delegation to Hanoi to sign the
agreements accords with Peking's and Moscow's practice this
year. The annual PRC aid agreement was concluded in Hanoi
on 27 September by the Li Hsien-nien delegation, and the
Soviet agreement was signed during Podgornyy's 3-8 October
visit, although thn signators were, as usual, Vice Premiers
Le Thanh Nghi and V. Novikov.
MOSCOW REAFFIRMS DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN INDOCHINA
Soviet support for a political settlement in Indochina was
reaffirmed in the joint communiques on Brezhnev's 25-30 October
visit to France and on Kosygin's visits to Canada (17-26 October)
and to Cuba (26-30 October), with the latter also condemning
U.S. "aggressive actions" to expand the Indochina war. The
Soviet-Canadian communique circumspectly said the two sides
noted that Indochina continues to be a "source of anxiety"
and favored the restoration of lasting peace in the area
through "a political settlement which would guarantee to all
the peoples of Indochina the possibility of shaping their own
destiny, in accordance with their national interests and without
foreign interference."
The Soviet-French communique said that both sides support an
end to "foreign intervention" and a political settlement in
Indochina and will make "active efforts" to facilitate such a
settlement "on the basis of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and
1962." -The Soviet-French "document on cooperation" did not
explicitly mention Indochina, but it did stress that the two
sides will cooperate to help bring about "restoration of peace
in areas of conflict" and "the speediest attainment of a
political settlement" in areas "where peace is being endangered
or violated."
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Speaking on French TV on 29 October, brezhnev passed over
Indochina briefly, much as he had done in his speech on the
25th at a banquet hosted Ly Pompidou, merely asserting that
the USSR Is doing everything in its power to contribute to
the liquidat3- of "dangerous hotbeds of war kindled by the
aggressors in Indochina and the Middle East." He did not, as
in a speech at a banquet he gave for Pompidou on the 27th,
specifically attack U.S. aggression in Indochina as a serious
obstacle to peace. 1t was in the latter speech that he made
a thinly veiled allusion to possible Sino-U.S. collusion on
Indochina, warning that the problem cannot be solved "either
by attempts to impose an alien will on Vietnam by means of
force or by way of behind-the-scenes machinations
(zakulisnykh kombinatskiy] behind the backs of the
Vietnamese people."
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DRV SCORES U.S. RA!DS IN DMZ AREA. NORTHWEST PROVINCE
Alleged U.S. attacks on North Vietnam are condemned in a routine
statement by the, DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 3 November. In
addition to the usual charge of air strikes.and shelling in Vinh.
Linh and Quang Binh--inside and north of the demilitarized zone--the
statement claims that on 30 October planes rocketed "a number of
locations" in Dien Bien district, Lai Chau Province, "nearly 500
kilometers northwest of Hanoi." The DRV last claimed an attack in
Lai Chau Province in an 18 December 1970 spokesman's statement which
charged that rockets had been fired on a village there on 15 December.
The 3 November statement says that from 21 through 31 October, the
United States iient planes, including B-52's, to attack Huong Lap
village and used artillery pieces south of the DMZ and warships off-
shore to shell the villages of Vinh Son, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Thanh--
all located north of the 17th parallel, inside the DMZ. It also
accuses the United States of sending planes to attack "a number of
villages" in western Quang Binh.
The spokesman claims that the attacks "inflicted losses in human
li';es and property on the local people" and routinely demands an
end to "all acts of encroachment on the sovereignty and security of
the DRV." The last protest to mention casualties was the 22 September
DRV Foreign Ministry statement which condemned the large-scale U.S.
air strikes on the 21st.*
The intensive 21 September attacks are currently recalled in a
2 November NHAN DAN editorial which cites the bombing in September
as "proof of the frenzied activities of the Nixon clique." They
had also been recalled in an atypical 23 October Hanoi radio
commentary which endorsed the spokesman's protest of 22 October;
usually only the higher-level DRV Foreign Ministry statements
prompt comment. The editorial on the 2d dc-,s not mention any of
the more recent alleged attacks, but it goes on to urge vigilance
and readiness to "smash all the enemy's adventurous activities,"
and particularly calls attention to the defense responsibilities
of the 4th military region--in the southern part of the DRV.
* Foreign ministry spokesman's protests were issued on 27
September and 5, 9, 16, and 22 October. The most recent protests
were reported in the 28 October TRENDS, pages 14-15.
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PRG, DRV OFFER AID FOR TYPI-100N VICTIMS, DENOUNCE GVN RELIEF
Communist officials in Nc?cth and South Vietnam responded to the
damaging typhoon in South Vietnam's northern provinces--designated
central Trung Bo by the communists--with standard messages of condo-
lence and promises of relief assistance. Following the pattern of
propaganda on similar floods last year, Vietnamese communist broad-
cauts devoted considerable attention to the disaster and there were
reports of regional meetings in both North and South Vietnam offering
support for the typhoon victims. Propaganda routinely charged that
the Saigon government's relief efforts were merely a cover for schemes
to extort money from the populace and repress the people in the flood-
stricken area.
The PRG representation and NFLSV standing committee of central Trung
Bo held a meeting on 24 October, according to broadcasts on the 26th,
at which the conferees instructed organizations at all levels to
muster forces to overcome the consequences of the typhoon and decided
to appropriate 100 million piasters for relief work. Reports on the
meeting routinely called for opposition to the GVN, charging that the
"U.S.-Thieu clique" was "striving to take advantage" of difficulties
to "engage in pacification, people herding, press ganging, and the
scraping up of money through relief tricks."
A 27 October letter from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Hum, Tho and PRG Presi-
:lent Huynh Tan Phat called for further efforts to overcome the
disaster and said that the PRG had decided to make 200 million
piasters of public funds available as relief for the typhoon victims.
It also urged vigilance and efforts to frustrate "the enemy's
perfidious schemes and cruel acts."
On 28 October, North Vietnamese assistance to the typhoon victims was
pledged in a message to Tho and Phat from DRV President Ton Duc Thang
which asked that they "convey to the people in stricken areas our
profound sympathy and a quantity of rice, textiles, and medicine."
On the same day it was reported that DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi
had received the acting head of the PRG representation in the DRV and
requested him to "forward a gift of 40,000 tons of rice, four million
meters of cloth, and 20 tons of medicine to the southern compatriots
to help them solve the difficulties caused by the typhoon." Hanoi
had publicized an identical list of assistance to flood victims in
northern South Vietnam last fall.*
* Propaganda on the flooding in the northern provinces of South
Vietnam last fall was discussed in the 12 November 1970 TRENDS,
pages 12-14. That article erroneously reported that the DRV had
offered 200 tons of medicine, rather than the correct figure of 20
tons.
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ALBANIA
HOXHA REJECTS FLEXIBLE TACTICS IN STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S,
Albania's relative isolation in the international communist
movement and its apparent apprehensions over the course of
Sino-American relations are reflected in initial available
materials on the Sixth Albanian Workers Party Q;iP) Congress
which opened on 1 November. Where the Chinese, the
North Vietnamese, the North Koreans, and the Romanians
were represented at Politburo level at the Fifth Albanian
Congress in 1966, this time the North Vietnamese delegates
represent the only ruling party among the 26 assorted
"Marxist-Leninist" parties and groups reported in attendance.
Peking's absence is in line with its present policy of not
attending foreign party congresses. It did not invite any
guests to the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969, and it did
not send a delegation to the North Korean party congress in
November 1970. The Chinese, however, have sought to offset
the absence of a party delegation at the congress and to
reassure their Tirana ally of continuing friendship by
sending a "special" government delegation led by a vica minister
to the 29 October inauguration of a hydrolectric power station,
which Albanian propaganda has linked to the congress. And
NCNA reported that the CCP leadership sent the "warmest greet-
ings" to the AWP and to Hoxha on the opening of the congress.
Despite such reassuring gestures, Albanian misgivings over
the PRC's pursuit of more flexible tactics in its foreign
policy--which could result in Tirana's further isolation--
seems registered in Hoxha's hardline congress report, which
calls for an uncompromising struggle against the United
States and the Soviet Union and pointedly warns against any
"concessions or retreat" or any "hesitation" in the struggle
against imperialism, cautioning that such approaches could
be "full of dangerous consequences."
The foreign policy portion of Hoxha's lengthy report, avail-
able so far in summary form from the Albanian news agency,
repeats many of the items in Tirana's standard catalogue of
charges against the United States and the Soviet Union. But
against the background of Peking's invitation to President
Nixon and Moscow's current diplomatic offensive, Hoxha's
unrelenting attacks on the United States--"which remains
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the chief enemy"--as well as his unequivocal "no" to Brezhnev's
24th CPSU Congress call for "normalized" relations with Tirana
are especially noteworthy.
Some of Hoxha's most pointed remarks seem to be directed at
China's newly flexible foreign policy, particularly the invi-
tation to President Nixon and the ideological rationale f:,r
it advanced by Peking. Unlike Pyongyang, Tirana has never
endorsed Peking's invitation to the President; on the contrary,
its misgivings about the projected visit seemed to show through
clearly in its treatment of the 15 July announcement. The
party daily ZERI I POPULLIT carried the brief NCNA announcement
of the invitation three days later, while Tirana radio and the
Albanian news agency's service in English ignored it. On the
20th, an article in ZERI I POPULLIT used the occasion of the
17th anniversary of the Geneva agreements to make the point
that the United States could not be trusted in international
negotiations and to warn communists not to be taken in by
"the partners of the revisionists." The article insisted that
the United States is "the main enemy of the peoples; it is
aggressive and will remain aggressive."
In the wake of the announcement of the President's forthcoming
trip to Peking, an article in RED FLAG No. 9, given international
dissemination in late August, had defended Peking's policy shift
toward the United States on grounds of the need for meximum
flexibility jn distinguishing among its adversaries in order to
isolate "the main enemy." By implication, Peking identified the
Soviet Union as iLs principal antagonist and justified its dealings
with the United States on the basis of changes in U.S. policy that
offered s counterbalance to the Soviets.* In sharp contrast to
this approach, Hoxha argues in his report that the United States
and the Soviet Union are equally "dangerous, crafty, and aggres-
sive." Since they are involved in "a counterrevolutionary alli-
ance" directed against the national liberation movement and
against China in particular, his argument runs, the struggle
against them is indivisible:
Since American imperialism and revisionist imperialism
represent the two imperialist superpowers and since they
advertise a common counterrevolutionary strategy, it is
impossible for the people's struggle against them not to
be channelled into a single current. It is not possible
to use one imperialism in order to oppose the other.
* The art?.cle is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August, pages
19-22.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Maintaining that American and Soviet efforts--and by implica-
tion also those of the Chinese--at promoting "tranquility"
are directed at preserving "the status quo and their own
alliances," Hoxha says "the revolutionary peoples do not want
the imperialists' tranquility and peace." He sums up the
lecture in declaring that "true peace and the people's
security can be insured only by struggle against U.S. imperial-
ism and the Soviet social imperialists."
Following a long attack on the United States capped by t.te
dictum that "no free and independent country exists which is
not in some way threatened by American imperialism," Ho:cha
calls for "an uncompromising, unrelenting struggle" against
imperialism--a "confrontation" in which "there cannot be any
period of calm or concessions or retreat, as the revisionists
claim; any hesitation in the struggle against imperialism is
full of very dangerous consequences." With this preface he
drives home the point that
the attitude toward imperialism, and in the first place
American imperialism, is the touchstone of the just
orientation of all political forces in the world. This
is not a question of purely tactical nature, nor a tempor-
ary stand depending on the circumstances. Each force's
attitude toward imperialism originates from the content
of its political line which permits an appreciation of
practical actions. It determines, in short, the dividing
line between those who defend the vital interests of the
people and the future of humanity and those who trample
the people underfoot, the line which separates the revolu-
tionaries from the reactionaries and the traitors.
ALBANIAN-SOVIET Against the background of Brezhnev's call.
RELATIONS at the 24th CPSU Congress for "normalized"
relations with Tirana, Hoxha comments--without
further elaborP.zion, to judge from the ATA summery--that "of late
Soviet leaders have been making a show of wanting to 'normalize'
relations with our country" and dismisses such overtures as
"demagogy and an effort to exonerate themselves." He adds: "We
shall not allow ourselves to be caught in their traps and will
not be intimidated by their saber-rattling, any more than by
the olive branch they wane; for they have great political, ideo-
logical, and economic debts to repay to Albania." As the Albanian
press has done in the past, he goes on tc imply that relations
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between the two countries could improve only if the current
Soviet leadership is replaced: "There can be normalization
only when the Soviet peoples and true Bolsheviks intervene
to establish Marxist-Leninist revolutionary justice in respect
of these questions."
In passages on Moscow's relations in the world moverr',-it, Hoxha
invert: the Soviet line that the test of proletarian interna-
tionalism is loyalr; to the USSR by declaring that the mark
of "a real revo?uti:,nary" is unrelenting opposition to the
Soviet revisioniF;:s and their anti-Marxist, imperialist line.
In this context he launches into a scathing attack on Soviet
"imperialist 'olicies," including a lengthy diatribe against
the Warsaw F.'.ve . s invasion of Czechoslovakia, "the Brezhnev
doctrine," and alleged Soviet efforts to stir up tensions in
the Balkans.
PRC SENDS GREETINGS, DISPATCHES GOVER1t1ENT GROUP TO TIRANA
Peking's greetings message to the Albanian congress reflects
its curr *.t flexible foreign policy line. Where the Chinese
message to the Fifth AWP C3ngress in 1966--during Peking's
isolationist phase at the start of the cultural revolution--
had bitterly assailed both the Soviets and the Yugoslavs as
"flunkies of imperialism" and charged that "every country
where the revisionists are in power has either changed color
or is in the process of doing so," the present message con-
tains only a mild reference to U.S. imperialism and Soviet
revisionism. In line with Peking's present policy, the
1971 message is signed impersonally by "the CCP Ce. tral
Committee," where its 1966 counterpart was signed by Mao.
Differing degrees of anti-imperialist zeal marked the
addresses by Chinese and Albanian speakers at the
29 October inauguration of the Mao Hydroelectric Plant,
to which the Chinese sent a "special" government delega-
tion. Albanian Politburo member Spiro Koleka used the
occasion to hail what he pictured as a joint ~Ictory of
the two countries in the United Nations over the United
States, "the most aggressive chieftain of imperialism,"
adding that the UN vote to seat the PRC wa- also a victory
over "those who plot with" the United Stat.. "against China
and our country." In his remarks in reply, Chinese delega-
tion head Chang Pin, vice minister of water conservancy
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and electric power, depicter Peking's seating in the United
Nations as "a defeat of the plot of the U.S. imperialists for
the isolation of China" but did not reciprocate Koleka's
strong attack on the United States or his allusion to Soviet-
American complicity. He merely noted blandly that "U.S.
imperialism and Soviet revisionism are encountering diffi-
culties both internally and externally."
Albanian media went out of their way to link the inauguration
of the plant with the AWP Congress. Tirana noted that the
event was taking place on the eve of the congress, and it
suggested a link between the presence of the Chinese delegation
and the congress by noting that portraits of Mao and Hoxha as
well as streamers hailing the congress and Sino-Albanian
friendship were in evidence at the inauguration. The impor-
tance attached to the occasion was underscored by the pres-
ence of Premier Shehu and most of the members of the Politburo.
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BREZHNEV IN FRANCE
VOL'~MINOUS SOVIET COMMENT PLAYS UP POLITICAL IMPORT OF TRIP
The extensive Soviet propaganda fanfare surrounding Brezhnev'c
six-day visit to France--his first trip to the West since he
assumed the party leadership--includes a larger volume of radio
comment than has attended any Soviet leader's visit abroad
since the Khrushchev era. Publicity for the 25-30 October
visit, amounting to 34 percent of Radio Moscow's total comment
in the week ending the 31st, falls only a few percentage points
short of the publicity for Khrushchev's 11-day visit to France
in the spring of 1960 during each of the two weeks spanning that
visit and is roughly comparable to the radio propa;;arda atten-
tion to other Khrushchev trips in the early 1960's. Trips of
the post-Khrushchev leaders abroad have normally drawn less than
half this volume. In two notable recent exceptions, Brezhnev's
22-25 September visit to Yugoslavia preempted 20 percent of the
week's Moscow radio comment, and the same volume was accorded
Podgornyy's 3-8 October visit to Hanoi.
Comment reviewing the visit emphasizes the point that the docu-
ments negotiated by Brezhnev have raised French-Soviet relations
to a "qualitatively new level"--the language of Brezhnev's
departure message to Pompidou, sent from aboard the plane en
route to East Berlin. Against the background of Western press
speculation that Brezhnev's aim was to secure French agreement
to the conclusion of a bilateral friendship treaty, Moscow has
sought to depict the documents--a joint declaration, a statement
on "The Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France,"
and a 10-year economic, technical, and industrial cooperation
agreement--as giving a "new impetus" to French-Soviet relations,
raising them to a "higher level," and marking a "new stage" in
growing bilateral cooperation.
In post-visit comment as in the anticipatory propaganda, Moscow
carefully avoided the question of a friendship treaty; TASS
predictably suppressed, in a brief summary of Marseilles'
Socialist Mayor Defferre's speech on the 28th, the passages in
which Defferre publicly--in Brezhnev's presence--expressed his
dissatisfaction over the fact that there would be no friendship
treaty. Obliquely responsive remarks by Brezhnev in his speech
of reply were absent from an initial TASS account of the Soviet
leader's speech bu: included in a k~cond TASS version which quoted
Brezhnev as saying he could not "yet speak about the final
results" of the talks--"they will become known after our talks
are completed."
CONFIDENTIAL
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Moscow has attributed greater importance to the political re-
sults and implications of the visit, as expressed in the
declaration and in the statement of principles, than to economic
relations. A 1 November PRAVDA editorial on the visit ignored
the 10-year economic agreement entirely, limiting its comment
on economic matters to a single sentence noting that Brezhnev
and Pompidou examined "various aspects" of bilateral economic,
scientific-technical, and cultural relations. The official
statements and propaganda have stressed the "special nature" of
Soviet-French relations--attributed to De Gaulle's initiative
of the mid-sixties and his 1966 visit to the USSR, carried
forward by Pompidou's visit to the USSR in 1970 and the result-
ing protocol on political consultations, and now further enhanced
in the statement of principles.
Moscow's treatment of the trip from the outset registered the
special position France holds in Soviet relations with Western
Europe and its importance in the current Soviet diplomatic
offensive, as well as the buildup of Brezhnev's personal leader-
ship role. While giving Kosygin's trip to Canada negligible
propaganda preparation, Soviet media began the buildup for
Brezhnev's trip well in advance. During the week preceding
Kosygin's arrival in Ottawa on 17 October, Radio Moscow broad-
cast eight times as many commentary items on Brezhnev's forth-
coming trip than on Kosygin's more imminent jontruey. The
steadily intensifying propaganda effort consisted of c'aily
radio and press commentaries, backgrounders on the evolution
of Soviet-French cooperation, and interviews with Soviet and
French spokesmen.
Soviet media referred to Brezhnev not only as CPSU General Secre-
tary but also as a "member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium,"
his only governmental position, thus investing the trip with the
status of an official state visit. France granted Brezhnev full
honors due a head of state. Pompidou, in his presentation of his
government's policies at the dinner on the 25th, referred to
Brezhnev both as "Mr. General Secretary" and as "top leader of
the Soviet Union," according to the TASS English text of the
speech. However, indicating a measure of sensitivity with
respect to the latter designation, the Moscow central press on
the 26th rendered it "most responsible figure."
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PRINC11;LL'S and Pompidou on the 30th outlines Lite general
areaw in which France and the USSR will. further
develop their political and economic cooperation. It underacures
the "permanent" nature of Soviet-French cooperation and pledges
both countries to apply their "political cooperation" in efforts
to pacil:; "areas of conflict," case international tensions, and
settle disputes by peaceful. means. The brief Soviet-Franc h
protocol. signed during Pompidou's Moscow visit in October 1970
had called for regular political consultations between the foreign
ministers or their designees "whenever necessary and, in principle,
twice annually" on "major international problems of mutual interest."
The statement now elaborates a "now development" of these consulta-
tions: They will make use of "both conventional diplomatic
channels and special meetings of their representatives" to discuss
issues specifically including European affairs and problems of
international security.
Most notably amou g thn "agreed" principles codified in the state-
ment, the two sides pointed to the "importance" for Europe of
Soviet-Drench cooperation and of cooperation "among all European
states" based on inviolability of present borders (in effect
registering agreement on the need to confirm the postwar status
quo), noninterference in internal affairs, equality, independence,
and renunciation of the use or threat of the use of force. At
the same time, the exigencies of realpolitik are recognized else-
where in the statement in what amounts to a caveat to these five
precepts: Thn two sides record their "due consideration for the
rights and prerogatives of other interested powers in the exer-
cising of the responsibility" borne by France and the USSR--
implicitly taking account of France's role in NATO and c# the
Soviet Union's stated resolve to protect the "socialist" system
in the countries under its "proletarian internationalist" shield.
Where the October 1970 protocol had confined itself to outlining
the forms of French-Soviet political consultation, the statement,
after expanding on the forms, goes on to specify substantive
areas in which fruitful cooperation could take place. These
include general disarmament, first of all nuclear disarmament,
and the elimination of "military-political groupings."
DECLARATION The joint declaration, taking the place of a more
routine "communique" on the talks, registers the
"satisfaction" with the development of Soviet-French relations
that was repeatedly emphasized by both leaders in speeches through-
out the visit. Discussing accomplishments in bilateral relations
in some detail, the document also touches on spheres of agreement
with respect to European security, disarmament, the Middle East,
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Indochina,* India and Pakiutan, and the United Nations--though
without muntioni.nk the I1I4C, whose membership was approved by
the UNGA on the first day of Brezhnev's sojourn in France.
On the matter of bilateral relations, the declaration points
in particular to the "more stable nature" of the 10-year, econo-
mic agreement signed on 27 October. It concludes with the
statement that both leaders confirmed the "special. nature"
of the relationship between the two countries--a reaffirmation
of this long-standing formula against the background of the
developing relations between Bonn and Moscow and of Chancellor
Brandt's Ostpolitik.
Although the declaration makes no mention of an invitation to
Pompidou to visit the Soviet Union, TASS reported on 30 October
that Brezhnev had invited the French President to pay another
official visit to the USSR and noted that Brezhnev also recalled
Mos,..ov's standing invitation to Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas.
EUROPEAN As Kosygin had done during his visit to Canada,
SECURITY Brezhnev in France stressed the need to convene
a conference on European security, treating the
subject at greatest length in his speech at a dinner hosted by
Pompidou on the 25th. Brezhnev referred to efforts of eli.aents
in Europe allegedly seeking to block a conference but concluded
optimistically that the will of the peace-loving torces would
prevail. Recalling that the Warsaw Pact states proposed a con-
ference five years ago,** he observed that more and more states--
See the Indochina suction of this TRENDS.
** While Brezhnev presumably had in mind the July 1966 declara-
tion issued at a Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political
Consultative Committee, Pact endorsement of a European security
conference goes back to January 1965. At that time, a connunique
following a Political Consultative Committee meeting in Warsaw
affirmed "support" of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's December
1964 proposal at the UN General Assembly for a conference to dis-
cuss measures for collective security i. Europe. Subsequently,
Warsaw Pact meetings at various levels have pressed the proposal
and elaborated on it by suggesting an agenda, a list of partici-
pants, and a site.
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Franca included--have supported the proposal and that needed
preparatory work for a conference has begun. Like Kosygin,
he acknowledged that the United States and Canada should
participate, a position in line with the memorandum of the
21-22 June 1970 meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in
Budapest which had formalized the bid for U.S. and Canadian
participation. The 30 October Soviet-French declaration also
registered the hopes of both sides that preparations will be
conducted to allow the convening of the conference in 1972.
It referred to the creation of a system of commitments which
would rule out the use or threatened use of force as one of
the main tasks of the conference, which it said also should
lead to broadened economic, trade, technical, and other ties
on the continent.
In his brief two-day stopover in East Berlin en route home,*
Brezhnev observed in passing in a 1 November dinner speech
that prospects for the convening of a conference were good,
In an apparent sffort to assuage the GDR concerning its
role in the conference, Brezhnev said at a later point in
the address that the "equal participation of the German Demo-
cratic Republic in the solution of all problems involving
the fate of the European continent" is necessary. The
1 November communique on the East Berlin visit contained
similar language. '
Brezhnev also took the occasion in France and the GDR to
reaffirm Soviet interest in the opening of talks on force
and armaments reductio-a in central Europe. He briefly
mentioned the force-cut proposal in his dinner speech in
Paris rn the 25th as well as in his speech on French tele-
vision on the 29th. And in his 1 November address in East
Berlin he evinced cautious optimism when he stated that
"apparently it will be possible in the not so remote suture
to start negotiations on reducing armaments and arme,.: forces
in Europe." Neither the Soviet-GDR communique nor the
Soviet-French declaration mentioned force reductions.
A TASS dispatch on the 31st noted that a French Goverment spokes-
man at a press conference that day indicated that Pompidou and
* The East Berlin visit as a whole is discussed in this TRENDS
under the heading "Brezhnev in GDR."
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3 NOVEMBER 1971
Brezhnev gave consideratiou to the problem of rrrhr^,ing armed
forces in Europe "on which their positions do coincide
and which is not mentioned in the Soviet-French 'eclaration."
TASS added, still quoting the French spokesman, that "in this
connection, consultations will be conducted within the frame-
work of the iranco-Soviet protocol." (The 26 October Soviet-
Canadian cimmunique did treat the force-cut proposal, noting
that since the military confrontation in central Europe ii
"particularly dangerous," it was agreed that early steps
should be taken to seek "a general agreement on the mu;.ual
reduction of armed forces and armaments in that area without
detriment to the participating states.")
Still another European security issue dealt with by Brezhnev
in France was the liquidation of military blocs, a step long
propagandized by Moscow and. ei element in the 31 March CPSU
"peace program." In his speech in Paris on the 25th, Brezhnev
noted with satisfaction the proximity of the USSR and France
on "such cardinal questions as that of overcoming the division
of the world into military-political groupings," observing that
the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies "declared in no indefinite
terms their readiness to work precisely in this direction."
And on French television on the 29th he stated that the USSR
was working for "replacing the opposing military bl-)cs with
peaceful equal cooperation of all states." The Soviet-French
declaration noted that in the view of both sides the convening
of a European security conference could facilitate the "over-
coming of the continent's division into military-political
groupings." And the 30 October Soviet-French cooperation accord
pledged that both sides would work toward ending this division.
MEDITERRANEAN Speaking at a luncheon in Marseilles on
28 October, Brezhnev declared that Soviet
Black Sea ports belong to the Mediterranean, in effect repeat-
ing Moscow's contention--advanced by Gromyko as long ago as a
May 1968 interview--that the USSR, as a Black Sea power, is
therefore a Mediterranean power. Brezhnev expressed the wish
that the Mediterranean become a sea of peace and tranquillity,
routinely adding that due to "Israel's aggression," the
Middle East situation has poisoned the atmosphere in the area.
Reminiscent of his remarks in his 30 March report to the CPSU
Congress, Brezhnev stated that a settlement of the Middle East
conflict would impove the situation in this area, and he
added that Soviet-French cooperation could play an important
role in this respect.
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3 NOVEMBER 1911.
In the CPSU congress report, Brezhnev had said that once a
Middle East political settlement had been achieved it would
be possible, in the Soviet view, to "consider further steps"
at reducing tension in the region, particularly in turning
the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and friendly
cooperation. Similar statements appeared in the recent
communiques on Brezhnev's September visit to Yugoslavia
and Kosygin's October visits to Algeria and Morocco, with
the Soviet-Algerian communique additional?; calling for
removal of military bases in the Mediterranean. Routine
propaganda has periodically repeated Brezhnev's March
formulation as well as his remark, in his 11 June election
speech, that the Soviet Union is prepared to solve "on an
equal basis" the problem created by the navies of great
powers cruising far from their own shores and is "ready
to discuss any proposals." Specifically applying this
suggestion to the Mediterranean, a Moscow commentary broad-
cast in Greek in early September described the "proposal
for limitation of the navies of the great powers" as the
first step toward normalization of the situation in the
Mediterranean.
DISARMAMENT Brezhnev gave only passing attention to disar-
mament issues in his speeches in France, routinely
endorsing the Soviet proposals for a world disarmament confer-
ence and a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss
nuclear disarmament. The derl.aration noted that both sides
support efforts toward rchiev,ng general and complete disarma-
ment under effective international control. After endorsing the
proposals for a world disarmament conference and five-power
talks, it stated that both sides pursue a common goal in seek-
ing the prohibition and destruction of chemical and bacteriolo-
gical weapons.
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3 NOVEMBER 197,1
BREZHNNEV IN GDR
SOVIET LEADER STRESSES COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY
In his main speech during his 30 October - 1 November stopover in
East Berlin on the way home from France, Brezhnev emphasized
Soviet-GDR concord and coordination in the sphere of foreign
policy, in effect assuring his GDR hosts that they will be
serving their own best interests in fulfilling their obligation
to support the Soviet policy of European detente. Radio Moscow
carried the first announcement of Brezhnev's plan to visit the
GDR three days before his arrival there. His departure for home
on 1 November took place "later than scheduled," --.cording to a
Moscor broadcast that day, and the joint communique was
released ii. the evening after TASS announced that he had left
East Berlar.
Discussion of bilateral party i.nd state relations aid of
"topical problems of European aid world politics" took place,
according to the communique, "in a cordial and comradely
atmosphere." At the 1 November luncheon at which the main
speeches were delivered, SED First Secretary Honecker stated
that the talks were marked by "full unanimity," and Brezhnev
asserted in his speech of reply that there was "full unity
of views on all questions discussed." No such formula,
however, appearad in the communique.
Pledging in general terms that the GDR would "continue as
before to work vigorously" for European detente in accordance
with "the decisions of the Eighth SED Congress and the foreign
policy agreed upon with the fraternal socialist states,"
Honecker predictably endorsed the results of Brezhnev's visit
to France, the four-power agreement on "West Berlin," and a
European security conference. While neither he nor Brezhnev
directly mentioned the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with the
FRG, both were endorsed in the joint communique.
Brezhnev was pointed and more explicit than Honecker on the
matter of coordinating foreign policy positions and tactics,
declaring that "the GDR and other fraternal socialist
countries are together with us" and are "coordinating their
foreign policy" and "agreeing on their foreign policy tactics."
He coupled these statements with a strong new appeal for
intrnational recognition of the GDR, and he prefaced them
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CONFIDENTIAL HIS TRENDS
3 NOVEMBER 1971
with a reminder that "the fraternal relations between the GDR
and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty, based on the principles
of socialist internationalism," constitute the "guarantee" of
the GDR's socialist system. Assuring his hosts that "the
positions of socialism in the German Democratic Republic are
inviolable," the Soviet leader declared that "the hopes
entertained by some circles in the West to use the present
political situation in order to try to weaken, to shake the
positions of socialism in the GDR are empty, vain hopes."
TREATMENT In questionable status since his replacement
OF ULBRICHT by ik.necker as SLD first secretary in May,
Walter Ulbricht was accorded correct treatment
during Brezhnev's visit, with precedence over Premier Stoph.
Thus at the conclusion of his l November luncheon speech,
Brezhnev toasted "Comrade Honecker, Comrade Ulbricht, Comrade
Stoph," and the joint communique listed first in the roster
of East German participants in the talks, after Honecker,
"member oL the Politburo of the SED, chairman of the State
Council of the GDR W. Ulbricht." At the same time, Ulbricht's
continued poor health--the stated reason for his stepdown from
the party leadership--seemed indicated by his absence from the
sizeable array of SED Politburo members present at the East
Berlin airport to greet Brezhnev on 30 October and to see him
off on the afternoon of 1 November.
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KOSYGIN IN CUBA
JOINT COMMUNIQUE REGISTERS "COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING"
Soviet Premier Kosygin's 26-30 Oct,ber "friendly visit" to
Cuba proceeded in the spirit of the effusive welcome attend-
ing his arrival at the airport, with large crowds turning
out to greet the visitor as he toured the island with
Castro as guide. PRENSA LATINA described the welcome in
Santiago de Cuba, despite a heavy rain, as "one of the
warmest ever given to anyone in that city," where Kosygin
visited the Moncada barracks and other historical sites
connected with the Cuban revolution. Castro honored Kosygin
at an official reception on the evening of the 28th, follow-
ing the windup that day of two mornings of talks which the
1 November communique says took place in an atmosphere of
"friendship and complete mutual understanding." The Soviet
embassy held a reception on the 29th. While the visit was
heavily and enthusiastically publicized in reportage by both
Moscow and Havana media, scant comment on both sides con-
tained little of substance. There were no major speeches
by either Castro or Kosygin, although both made off-the-cuff
remarks at various stops on their tours.
The single formal substantive item to result from the visit,
the communique of 1 November, deals largely in stock terms
with international topics of mutual concern and treats such
sensitive issues as Latin American revolutionary strategy
in flexible generalities. But the appearance of the
communique of itself, along with the elaborateness of the
Cuban welcome, served to dramatize the marked warming of
Soviet-Cuban relations since their low ebb at the time of
Kosygin's 26-30 June 1967 visit to Cuba, en route home from
the Glassboro talks, when no Cuban crowds turned out to
greet him and no communique was issued.
The wide-ranging document depicts a cordial, "fraternal"
Soviet-Cuban relationship, hails an upsurge of the revolu-
tionary movement in Latin America, and touches in general
terms on international issues including Indochina, Korea,
the Middle East, Europe, and disarmament. A call for the
simultaneous admission of the GDR and FRG to the United
Na~ions precedes a brief expression of satisfaction at the
vote to seat the PRC in the United Nations. On the subject
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of Cuban-U.S. relations, the document merely reiterates Soviet
condemnation of the U.S. blockade "and different U.S.-encouraged
hostile actions, including piratic actions and violations of air-
space," and reaffirms Soviet opposition to the "unlawful" U.S.
military presence at Guantanamo "in Cuban territory."
The communique also contains general statements of support
for the national liberation movement worldwide and for the
struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, a call for
unity of the socialist countries, and a reaffirmation and
acceptance of a Soviet invitation to Castro to visit the
Soviet Union. No date is specified. In his radio feature
on 2 November, Havana commentator Guido Garcia Inclan
remarked that Castro "has said he will visit Chile and from
there, we believe, he will continue on to Moscow because he
has accepted Kosygin's invitation."
STRATEGY FOR The formulations in the communique on Latin
LATIN AMERICA America are sufficiently general to encompass
the stated strategies of both the Soviet
Union and Castro with respect to the revolutionary movement in
the hemisphere. The formulations indicate neither concessions
nor major points of discord. The revolutionary situation in
Latin America is portrayed in standard terms as increasingly
favorable for the struggle against the domination of imperialism
and reactionary "oligarchies connected with it."
Specifically citing only Chile and Peru, the communique declares
Soviet-Cuban "solidarity" with Allende's Popular Unity government
in Chile and with "the structural changes being carried out by
the Government of Peru." Castro in the past has spoken favorably
of "the revolutionary processes" under way in Peru but, as in the
communique, has stopped short of unqualified support for the
Peruvian Government. Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa, in a Lima
interview carried by the Madrid EFE on 2 November, remarked that
Cuba "continues to maintain that the fastest way to seize the
government and the best way to establish changes is by armed
struggle; but we also adm.3.t that there are other ways, such as
the Chilean and the Peruvian."
The communique expresses "resolute support" for the economic and
social measures taken in Peru and Chile to recover their national
wealth and to strengthen their economic and political independence,
and it condemns the imperialist practice of "economic repressions
aimed at preserving the exploitation and oppression of peoples
of these countries."
CONFIDENTIAL
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Panama is the only other Latin American country to be specifically
mentioned in the communique--in the context of support for efforts
of developing countries to achieve "national independence and
full sovereignty." The two sides express "sympathy" with the
Panamanian people's quest for "full sovereignty over the whole of
their national territory."
There is no mention either of the August Bolivian coup or of the
situation in Uruguay, on which Havana has hedged its bets by
supporting both the Tupamaro guerrillas and the electoral Broad
Front pursuing the parliamentary road with Uruguayan Communist
Party participation. A past sore point in Soviet-Cuban relations---
perennially strained over the conflict between militant Castroite
tactics and the via pacifice espoused by the Soviet-lining communist
parties--is skirted by a broad focus on the "revolutionary movement"
in Latin America, with no mention of the communist movement or of
any communist party.
SOVIET-CUBAN After describing the atmosphere of the first
RELATIONSHIP morning of the Castro-Kosygin talks nn 27 October
as one of "fraternal friendship, cordiality,
and comradely frankness," TASS characterized the session on the
morning of the 28th as marked by "a heartfelt comradely atmosphere
which corresponds to the relations of fraternal friendship between
the two countries." Havana media simply reported the talks
without characterizing them. But in reporting that Castro had
persuaded Kosygin to make a few remarks to Cubans during a visit
to a housing project on the 27th, Havana quoted the Soviet premier
as commenting: "You must have noticed how fast we were able to
reach an agreement with Comrade Fidel. I want to tell you that
not only have we been able to reach a fast agreement in this,
but in other matters we have been able to reach a fast agreement
as well." Moscow carried a much briefer account of Kosygin's
remarks, excluding this passage.
Demonstrating the sharp improvement in bilateral relations since
Kosygin's 1967 visit, the communique also registers the progress
made since Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa visited Moscow in
June of this year. The communique on Roa's 10-21 June visit was
cordial but more restrained than the present one. It reported
talks in "an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding,"
as compared with the "complete" mutual understanding this time,
and it expressed satisfaction only that Soviet-Cuban relations
were "continuing to develop successfully in all fields." This
time the Kosygin-Castro document puts on record both sides'
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"profound satisfaction with the active and fruitful all-round
cooperation" between the two countries and notes Cuba's "sin-
cere gratitude" for the USSR's "con,tant assistance and
support," regarded by the Cubans as "an invaluable contribu-
tion" to the country's development. The Soviet side reaffirms
its "readiness to continue all-round support" to the Cuban
people in strengthening socialist gains and coping with
"imperialist provocations." Soviet aid, in similar generalities,
has been a major theme of Moscow's comment on the visit.
The communique is vague on the outlines of future cooperation.
It notes only that the leaders discussed the further strength-
ening of bilateral relations in the political, economic,
cultural, "ard other spheres." Neither Soviet nor Cuban
comment has been more specific.
Both Soviet and Cuban media have publicized the 31 October-
9 November visit to Cuba of a detachment of Soviet naval ships--
publicity perhaps generated by the proximity of that visit to
Kosygin's. The last such naval visit, in late May and early
June of this year, went unmentioned in Soviet and Cuban media
beyond an initial advance announcement that it would take place.
The current squadron is said to consist of two antisubmarine
ships, two submarines, and an oil tanker.
CUBAN COVT1ENTATOR TAKES NEW CONCILIATORY TACK TOWARD U.S,
While the communique on the Castro-Kosygin talks brushes broadly
over the subject of Cuban-U.S. relations in the usual negative
terms, a hint of Cuban receptivity to possible U.S. over*ures for
an improvement in relations has appeared in recent radio features
by the gadfly Havana commentator Guido Garcia Inclan. Garcia
has spoken on many past occasions about subjects ignored in
Cuban comment at large; on some domestic subjects, he has anti-
cipated lines later introduced by Castro, although the precise
nature of his relationship to the regime is unknown.
On 23 October, with reference to Kosygin's visit, Garcia Inclan
noted U.S. speculation and concern whenever a Soviet leader or a
Soviet fleet visits Cuba and declared that "the Yankees cannot
stand our friendship with other peoples of the world" and "they
make every effort under the table to win over Castro." He went
on to say: "Our Fidel has said it may times: face to face, man
to man, under the same terms, under the same rules, with mutual
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respect, under the same conditions, we are always ready to talk."
More recently, on 2 November, Garcia used his device of a
"Letter From Freddy"--a fictional itinerant correspondent--to
reinforce the point with the general observation that "diplomacy
has greatly changed. The men who could not tolerate each
other yesterday, today are shaking hands."
"Freddy" also took a notably conciliatory line toward the United
States as compared with other Cuban comn!nt on the issue raised
by the dispatch of a Cuban delegation to the in*ernational
sugarcane technicians' conference which opened in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana on 26 October. Where other Cuban comment on the inci-
dent has charged the U.S. Government with "one more act of
aggression," a "new infamy," and "arbitrary and discriminatory"
action against the Cuban delegation, Garcia Inclan's "Freddy"
said in his 2 November letter "I cannot blame the immigration
department" and suggested that "maybe those who have done wrong"
are the other participants in the meeting, "because there
should have been no meeting and the international organization
should have protested before Nixon and the UN."
If Garcia Inclan's remarks indeed represent trial balloons
inspired by the regime, the dispatch of the Cuban delegation
to New Orleans without the proper visas could have been under-
taken for more complex motives than a mere desire to embarrass
Washington. Castro may have wished'. to test U.S. reactions in the
climate marked by new developments in U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Soviet
relations, against the background of Cuba's movement toward
improvements in relations with some Latin American governments.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 NOVEMBER 1971
MIDDLE EAST
USSR CONTINUES TO DISPARAGE U1S, INTERIM SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL
Moscow continues to denigrate U.S. effurts to promote an interim
Middle East settlement on the Suez Canal on the grounds that
Washington aims at separating the Suez issue from an overall
settlement and at impeding solution of the "key problem" of
Israeli withdrawal. Thus a 28 October. TASS dispatch from New
York, reporting Jarring's departure from the United Nations
for his ambassadorial post in Moscow, claims that the Jarring
mission has been impeded not only by Israel's "irreconcilable
stand" but also by the U.S. initiative on a "so-called interim
settlement" concerning reopening the Suez Canal. TASS does not
go so far as to reject the idea of an interim settlement, but
it does criticize Washington's suggestions as being "drawn up
on terms unacceptable" to Egypt.* The dispatch fails to spell
out any Egyptian objections, nor does it elucidate regarding
the U.S. proposals.
This pattern is consistent with Moscow's failure to acknowledge
the six points advanced by Secretary Rogers in his 4 October
UNGA address in connection with a Suez Canal agreement--
relationship of interim and overall settlements, cease-fire,
zone of withdrawal, supervisory arrangements, Egyptian presence
east of the canal, and use of the canal.** Soviet media in
reporting the speech made no mention of Rogers' discussion of
an interim settlement, merely claiming that he called on the
Arabs to give up their demand for withdrawal. But PRAVDA's
Kolesnichenko, speaking on the 10 October '`)scow domestic
service commentators' roundtable, had disparaged the
secretary's proposal "to concentrate on so-called interim
agreements." At the same time, however, Kolesnichenko conceded
that in principle an interim agreement--"say an agreement on
* Cairo radio on the 28th first reported the TASS dispatch
without mentioning the reference to "unacceptable terms"; a
later Cairo newscast cited TASS as saying the views presented
by Secretary Rogers at the UNGA "include conditions Egypt
cannot accept."
** In reporting Egyptian President as-Sadat's 16 September
speech, Moscow took no note of his discussion of these same
points, which he said had been the center of Assistant
Secretary Sisco's July-August talks in Israel.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 11118 'CRENDS
3 NOVEMBER 1.9 7.1
opening the Suez Canal"--could bG~ "of some advantage." Such
a settlement, he explained, should not freeze settlement of
the "main question, the key problem" of the Middle East--
withdrawal of Israeli troops. Judging from Rogers' remarks,
he said, the United States was banking on precisely this
so that the occupation might continue.
While downgrading U.S. efforts to promote an interim settlement,
Moscow has taken note of Israeli reluctance to commit itself to
discussions on the matter. TASS on 30 October, for example,
reported Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban as declaring that
his government was intent on boycotting talks on reopening
the canal and added that, "resorting to blackmail," Eban said
resumption of U.S. deliveries of Phantom planes would probably
influence Israel's attitude on the canal question. And an
Arabic-language broadcast on the 31st claimed that in radio
statements Golda Meir and Abba Eban had completely rejected
discussion of the problem of opening the canal. Earlier, a
17 October RED STAR article by Vasilyev and Gavrilov had
attributed to Western news agencies a report that the Israeli
cabinet rejected an "American version of the agreement on
opening the Suez Canal" because it even vaguely mentioned
partial withdrawal of Israeli forces. A Volskiy article in
NEW TIMES (No. 44, 29 October) provided a stereotyped
explanation of U.S.-Israeli differences, pointing to the
"allocation of roles"; Washington would like to appear in
Arab eyes as an honest broker , and it was clearly an advantage
when Israel paraded its dissatisfaction with certain U.S.
statements.
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