TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040046-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: November 10, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
10 NOVEMBER 1971
(VOL. JOCII, NO. 145)
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CONFIDENTIAL
C
721
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by MIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United Stat,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
CHINA
Evidence Indicates Purge of Lin, Other Military Chiefs . . . . 1
All Provincial Stations Now Originating Political Material . . 6
OCTOBER REvOLUTION ADDRESS
Grishin Optimistic in Review of Soviet Foreign Policy . . . . 8
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Warns of Motives Behind Chinese Diplomatic Moves . . . 11
Budapest Paper Evinces Concern over Sino-U.S. "Rapprochement". 14
Peking Expresses Hope for Friendly Relations with Soviets . . 15
INDOCHINA
Ministry Spokesman Scores 7, 8 November U.S. Strikes in DRV . 17
Laird Trip Seen as Preparation for "New Military Adventures" . 20
NHAN DAN Calls Rejection of Aid Bill Blow to Nixon Doctrine . 21
October Revolution Keynote Speech Reaffirms Soviet Support . . 22
Cambodian National Day: Chou En-lai, Sihanouk Speak in Peking. 23
Cambodian Government Troops Said To Suffer Heavy Losses . . . 26
Paris: Communists Ignore U.S. Remarks on Dwindling POW Mail . 26
PRC-PAKISTAN
Bhutto Visit Nets Pakistan Limited Peking Commitment 28
USSR-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Soviet Ambassador Calls for Stepped-Up Attack on "Rightists" 32
TOPIC IN BRIEF: Amchitka Nuclear Test 35
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 NOVEMBER 1971
Moscow (2754 items)
October Revolution
Anniversary
[Grishin, Grechko
Speeches
Brezhnev in France
Brezhnev in GDR
Allende Election
Anniversary
Kosygin in Cuba
China
Indochina
(1%) 30%
(--) 770]
Peking (1821 items)
Domestic Issues (29%) 21%
UN Vote on China* (23%) 20%
Asia-Africa Table (6%) 17%
Tennis Matches
9% n PRC
5% Albania (27)
2% Indochina (6%)
[DPRK Delegation (4%)
2% in DRV
2% Peru-PRC Diplomatic (--) 5%
2% Relations
9%
8%
2%]
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
?eking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* The entry "U.S. Vote on China" in the 3 November TRENDS should be
corrected to read "UN Vote on China."
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CHINA
EVIDENCE INDICATES PURGE OF LIN, OTHER MILITARY CHIEFS
Most of the PRC's active top military leaders have been out of
public view for two months, and there is mounting evidence of
a major purge in the armed forces extending up to Lin Piao,
the defense minister and "deputy supreme commander." Lin's name
has not been mentioued in monitored PRC media for over a month.
Though the apparent purge may have been precipitated by Lin's
failing health, recent politically charged comment which may
be interpreted as aimed at Lin suggests that Mao's heir-designate
is politically moribund.
IDEOLOGICAL Lin Piao appears to be the primary target of a
CAMPAIGN recently launched ideological campaign condemning
the "idealist conception of history" for empha-
sizing the role of "heroes" and "theorists of genius." The
current drive has been most notably reflected in an article in
RED FLAG No. 11, first broadcast by the Shanghai radio on
23 October, which added a significant new thrust to the continuing
campaign to deepen the study of Mao's philosophical works in
order to eradicate the influence of "sham Marxists" and "political
swindlers." Directing the new thrust at those who "rezard them-
selves as theorists of genius," the RED FLAG article seems to be
developing a case against Lin based on his "excessive" praise of
Mao, an error deriving from his major role in the cultural revolu-
tion as the most outstanding student and propagator of Mao's
thought. "Excessive" adulation of Mao had previously figured in
charges against Yang Cheng-wu, the PLA acting chief of staff
purged in 1968, and Politburo member Chen Po-ta, the leading
Maoist ideologue who has been missing since the party plenum
last August and September.
The RED FLAG article denied the existence of innate knowledge and
stressed that truth can be determined only by "objective results
in social practice." Striking at the idea that "people can
cultivate themselves into supermen with foresight and vision,"
the article pointedly cited a line from the "Internationale"--
"never there is a savior, nor will we rely on gods or emperors"--
to buttress its argument that "there is no man with congenital
foresight and vision." In the past few weeks a campaign has
been unfolding to promote the "Internationale" and another song,
the military-orientated "The Three Main Rules of Discipline and
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the Eight Points for Attention." A joint article by PEOPLE'S
DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, released by NCNA on 27 October,
urged that the masses "be repeatedly taught to sing the songs
in close connection with the current situation, and tasks."
Lin's vulnerable position on the question of innate wisdom and
genius, a quality he attributed to Mao, was expressed in a
speech he gave at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee
Politburo in May 1966. In that speech, according to Red Guard
publications, Lin claimed that Mao had "inherited, defended, and
developed Marxism-Leninism with genius." Praising Mao for "his
great proletarian natural talent" and declaring that "we should
recognize natural talent," Lin reportedly declared that "Chair-
man Mao is a natural leader" whose Thought "will remain brilliant
forever" and obsequiously claimed that what Mao "says in one
sentence is better than what we say in 10,000 sentences."
One of the first indications in the media of the nature of the at-
tack on Lin came in aNingsia broadcast on 5 November which
recalled that since the death of Marx and Engels, "opportunists
of various kinds have launched rabid attacks against Marxism."
Specifically, the broadcast noted that Mikhail Bakunia, the
19th Century Russian anarchist and writer, once wrote to Marx
saying, "I am your student, and I am proud of this" and later
led a "conspiracy to usurp the leadership of the First Interna-
tional." In tracing the antecedents of unnamed elements in
the CCP who have "inherited the style of the ancestors of
revisionism," the broadcast mentioned that Khrushchev, who
"slandered" Stalin after his death, had previously praised him
as "greatest genius, teacher, and leader of mankind, a great
invincible supreme commander"--terms Lin has used with reference
to Mao. While Chen Po-ta also fits the image of a fawning
political swindler plotting crimes after Mao's death, references
in the broadcast to seizing military power make Lin the more
likely target. The broadcast stated that the faction "in power
within the party" taking the capitalist road "will always try to
seize power over the army," and it observed that in CCP history
Chang Kuo-tao had previously tried to "split the red army and
establish a separate party central committee."
Lin's apparent removal from active control of the PLA was
suggested in the Fingsia broadcast's reference to the PLA
as "a powerful proletarian army personally founded and led
by Chairman Mao," with no mention of Lin's leadership role
in the army. A diminution of Lin's status as the leader in
control of the PLA had first been reflected in another varia-
tion of this formula, appearing in the joint Peking press
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editorial marking Army Day on 1 August. At a time of apparent
moves to depersonalize control of the army, the joint editorial
referred to the PLA as a force "founded and led" by Mao and
"commanded" by Lin--a step back from the usual formula since
1967, which had described the army as "personally founded and
led" by Mao and "directly commanded" by Lin.
An attempt is also being made to bolster the image oi Mao him-
self as an active military leader. An unusual Lanchow broad-
cast on 28 October, for example, recalled Mao's leadership
role "on the old battlefields in northern Shensi" where he
"personally commanded the battles." The broadcast noted that
during the Yenan period Mao "not only took command of the
liberation work throughout the country, but also directly
commanded the fighting in the northwest war theater winning
a great victory there."
While the applicability of many recent attacks to more than
one missing leader makes it difficult to identify the players
without the scorecards which may be available to Chinese
cadres, a 20 October PEOPLE'S DAILY article broadcast by
Radio Peking also seemed pointed particularly against Lin.
The broadcast quoted Lu Hewn, literary figure of the 1920's
and 1930's, as having said that what had hurt him most "was
the sinister arrow fired by my ally and his smiling face
after I was wounded." In an appnrent allusion to betrayal
by close comrades, the article said that in order to "pre-
vent himself from being attacked from behind," Lu was forced
"to sidestep and was unable to launch a frontal attack on
his enemies"--a course which seems akin to Mao's zigzags.
Lu was also said to have constantly reminded the masses to
pay attention not only to the obvious enemy but also to
"secret agents in one's own camp." Perhaps to imply that
there was military support for "sham Marxists," t)e article
stated that "if the struggle against sham Marxism is tanta-
mount to a civil war among warlords, then it is more impor-
tant than ever for leftwing theorists to fight a civil war . ? .
and withdraw the poisonous arrows fired from behind."
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Characteristically, Peking media have
AS AN ISSUE carefully avoicied suggesting discord
over issues that could have produced
a major purge of the military leadership. There were, how-
ever, a few possible allusions to dissension over resource
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allocation priorities in the media during the summer,* and
such differences may have been exacerbated by the major new
development in Chinese foreign affairs in the recent period,
the invitation to President Nixon. Movement toward Sino-
U.S. detente could have served the arguments of elements who
played down a need for weapons expenditures to defend the
country against external threats. There is evidence at
least that the developments in Sino-U.S. relations are involved
in the current maneuvering: A 5 November article broadcast by
the Kiangsu radio stated that
the class struggle in international circles and the
class struggle at home are linking with each other.
Any slight happening in international circles can
incite the desire of a handful of class enemies at
home to evil.
The article went on to note that ideological changes hinge on
changes on the international as well as the domestic scene
and to observe that "the more drastically and rapidly the
situation develops and changes, the stronger will be the
reactions of various classes and strata to the situation."
There had been a few earlier indications that Mao's "revolu-
tionary diplomatic line" was not immediately accepted by all
elements in the leadership. Most notably, there were efforts
in the media to explain the benefits of the new line to local
units, especially military units. Typically, a Sinkiang broad-
cast on 24 October described how a PLA unit had strengthened
its understanding of the new line: "Previously" some members
of the unit's party committee had lacked understanding of the
"sharp and complicated international class struggle," but
after reading from Marx and Mao they realized that while the
reactionary class will struggle ever more frantically, it is
doomed so long as the revolutionary army stays alert and
follows Mao.
PARTY CONTROL Since the 1 August celebration of Army Day,
the first public occasion at which Lin's
status was noticeably diminished, signs of army-party discord
have been manifest in increasingly frequent articles on the
need for PLA units to follow the orders of party committees.
* See the 1 September TRENDS, pages 39-41.
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A complementary theme has been that militia units must be
firmly under party control, with emphasis on the need for
county and lower-level armed forces departments, which handle
militia affairs, to obey the "unified leadership" of the
local party committees. PLA dominance has also been quali-
fied by the campaign to promote collective leadership, a
campaign which has included frequent reminders that the military
figures who occupy most party posts on local levels are not in-
fallible and that the exemplary ones do not act without prior
approval by the full CCP committee. A 21 October Tsinan broad-
cast encompassed all these points in describing how the PLA
head of a commune armed forces department, who was also deputy
secretary of the commune party committee, had reformed his
thought: He had been making decisions affecting the militia
without consultations, and as a result "militia work was not
carried out smoothly"; after study, he came to regard "the
people's armed forces department as a branch of the party
committee," subject to all committee orders.
A Hopei broadcast article on 31 October stated that since the
end of the second plenary session of the Central Committee
in the fall of 1970, and in particular since the beginning
of the year "in the light of the new trends of the current
class struggles at home and abroad, as well as the reality
of the thinking of the troops and militia," the party
committee of the military district had led the troops in mass
study so that they could distinguish between "genuine and sham
Marxism." As part of their study, the PLA cadres were said
to have examined the party's historical record for instances
in which leaders from Chen Tu-hsiu to Liu Shao-chi had tried
"splitting the party and the army."
A Chengtu radio report on 30 October called for the PLA to
"march in step from top to bottom" and "obey the orders of
Chairman Mao, the party Central Committee headed by Chairman
Mao, and Mao Tse-tung Thought in everything." Struggle must
be carried out "against all flaws hindering marching in step"
so that the army's "glorious tradition of obeying orders in
everything" can be carried forward. The broadcast warned against
"everyone going his own way and taking arbitrary action." Re-
flecting the intensity of current disciplinary problems within
the PLA, the broadcast cautioned that "we must oppose doing
one thing to people's faces but doing something else behind
their backs, and pursuing murky things."
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ASCENDANCY OF The only clear gainer so far in the leader-
YEH CHIEN-YING ship crisis is Yeh Chien-ying, one of the
10 "old marshals" and a military leader known
to have close past associations with Chou En-lai. Yeh was a
statf general during most of the civil-war and held important
posts under Lin in the central-south region during the post-1949
period. Although he was the target of some public criticism dur-
ing the cultural revolution, he did not appear to be in serious
trouble; at the same time, he did not appear to be exercising
very much power. During the past two months, however, he has
made numerous publicized appearances as senior military officer
present; and beginning with the celebrations of the Albanian
party's 30th anniversary on 8 November, he has moved up in the
leadership rankings ahead of civilian leaders Chang Chun-chiao
and Yao Wen-yuan into the missing Chief of Staff Huang Yung-
sheng's old position behind Chiang Ching.
While some other leaders have also been notably more active
than before in the recent period, they have for the most part
been appearing as stand-ins for Huang Yung-sheng and the other
missing PLA service chiefs.
One missing prcvincial leader has resurfaced in Peking: Rua
Kuo-feng, Hunan first secretary, unmentioned at some recent
provincial functions he would have been expected to attend,
was reported among those seeing off the PRC's UN delegation
on 9 November and was grouped with leading members of the
central party and government apparatus.
ALL PROVINCIAL STATIONS NOW ORIGINATING POLITICAL MATERIAL
On 5 November the Kweichow provincial radio resumed locally
originated programming after a month-long solid relay of
Radio Peking. Kweichow, with a long history of factional pro-
blems, had previously ended a 20-month solid relay of Peking
Radio on 18 May, the same day its new provincial CCP committee
was announced; it reverted torelayingPeking broadcasts on
8 October. With Kweichow's resumption of original programming,
all 29 provincial-level radio stations are now originating
political material for the first time since January 1967.
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In another broadcasting development, the new winter-spring
schedule for the Peking radio's domestic service, announced
8 November, provides further evidence of a muting of the "cult
of Mao." Effective 15 November, two morning quarter-hour pro-
grams entitled "Selected Readings from Chairman Mao's Works"
will be discontinued. Five-minute programs of news briefs will
be added "during the mid-morning and late evening hours."
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OCTOBER REVOLPTION ADDRESS
GRISHIN OPTIMISTIC IN REVIEW OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
In the 6 November keynote address fin the eve of the 54th
anniversary celebration of the October Revolution, Politburo
member Grishin exuded confidence on the state of the world,
pointing to a "considerable weakening" of imperialism in the
face of an "effective rebuff" from peaceioving forces headed
by the international communist movement. Among other
problem areas, he cited the "financial crisis" in the United
States which has "aggravated the contradictions among the
imperialists." Reaffirming Soviet adherence to the "Leninist
policy of peaceful coexistence and support for the liberation
forces," Grishin emphasized the latter point in noting the
CPSU's support for "the trend toward consolidation of all
revolutionary movements" and asserted the party's conviction
that cooperation between the revolutionary and aemocratic
parties and communists is "the guarantee of the final victory
of the national liberation revolutions, the guarantee of
independent and progressive development of the liberated
states."
Grishin characterized the Soviet "peace program"--outlined by
Brezhnev in the 30 March Central Committee report to the
24th CPS! Congress--as "a realistic and constructive approach
to international problems ripe for resolution by methods of
negotiations and cooperation." At the same time, describing
the spirit of the program as "militantly anti-imperialist,"
he sought to underscore the point that the peace offensive
implies no breach in continuity or erosion of ideological
principle. In what may have been inteaded as an invidious
comparison with the Chinese, he declared that Soviet actions
in the international arena are founded not on "transitory
considerations of a speculative" nature, but on "a principled,
strategic course based on a scientific analysis of the lam,
of world development." At a later point, he asserted that
in the interests of world peace and as a counter to the
"dangerous military adventures" of world Paperialism, the
CPSU is raising the defensive might of the USSR, a theme
repeated by Defense Minister Grechko in his Red Square
address on the 7th.
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In his rundown of outstanding foreign policy issues, Grishin
perfunctorily criticized the United States for its actions in
Indochina and for its support of Israel in the Middle East and
complained of the "splitting, anti-Soviet line" pursued by the
Chinese leadership.* He touched only briefly on disarmament
issues, noting that "positive results" have been achieved at
the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation and
observing that "the world progressive public has welcomed with
satisfaction" the Soviet proposals for convening a conference
of the five nuclear powers and a world disarmament conference,
as well as the Soviet proposals for the reduction of armed
forces and armaments in central Europe, for banning bacterio-
logical weapons, for ending underground nuclear tests,
"and others." Suslov's keynote address last year had not
mentioned disarmament.
Grishin reviewed the recent flurry of trips abroad by the
Soviet leadership, remarking that exchanges, visits, consulta-
tions, and talks between national political figures serve the
intelests of strengthening peace and cooperation. He did not,
however, treat the question of U.S.-Soviet relations or
mention President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the USSR. He
dealt at some length with Brezhnev's October visit to France,
which had been heavily played up in Soviet media, observing
that it has served to ease international tension and to
strengthen world peace and European security. He said the
improvemert in Soviet-West German relations similarly improves
the prospects for world peace and security in Europe.
Grishin lauded the four-power agreement on Berlin of 3 September
but did not mention the FRG's 1970 treaties with the USSR and
Poland, which remain unratified. Repeating the call for a
European security conference, he noted that conditions have
now been created for its convening "as early as 1972." The
30 October Soviet-French declaration following Brezhnev's
visit to France had registered both sides' hope that prepara-
tions will be made to enable a conference to meet in 1972.
* Grishin's remarks on Indochina are discussed at greater
length in the Indochina section of this TRENDS. See the
Sino-Soviet Relations section for a discussion of Moscow's
current stance toward the PRC.
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On the Middle East, Grishin routinely pledged Soviet support
for the Arabs in their struggle against "Israeli aggression
backed by American imperialism." While recalling that this
position was again confirmed during Egyptian President as-Sadat's
talks in Moscow last month, Grishin did not take the occasion
to repeat the pledge in the Soviet-Egyptian communique on
measures to strengthen Cairo'r "military might." But routine
comment has reiterated Podgornyy's statement, at a dinner
for as-Sadat, that the USSR will combine efforts to achieve
a political settlement with measures to help the ARE and
other friendly Arab countries in strengthening their "defense
capability." Grishin did charge Isroel with thwarting a
political settlement, claiming that the "predatory" Israeli
plans fail to take into account the Arabs' "firm will" to
defend their interests as well as the increasingly strong
friendship and cooperation between the Arab and Soviet peoples.
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S I NO-SOV I ET RELATIONS
MOSCCW WARNS OF MOTIVES BEHIND CHINESE DIPLOMATIC MOVES
Moscow has renewed it attack on the Chinese leanership after
a lull of almost a month in anti-China polemics, roughly
spanning the period since the 12 October announcemsnt of the
Soviet invitation to President Nixon. In the October
Revolution anniversary address on 6 November Grishin made
the standard call for normalization of Sino-Soviet state
relations, but in contrast to Suslov last year he coupled
this call with the charge that the Chinese leaders -re
engaging in anti-Sovietism--the allegation that prompted the
walkout of two Chinese diplomats and several journalists.*
On the eve of the anniversary TASS publicized a lengthy,
vitriolic article in INTERNATIONAL LIFE accusing the Chinese
leadership of trying to form an anti-Soviet bloc and of
reaching new heights in "fanatical" efforts to split the
communist movement.
The attack on Peking led off Grishin's remarks on relations
with the socialist countries. While reaffirming Moscow's
desire for normalized relations and claiming that Soviet
initiative in this regard has borne "some fruit," Grishin
observed that "serious progress" requires a desire for
cooperation from both sides and that "unfortunately the
Chinese leadership is continuing its splitting, anti-Soviet
line." Consistent with Soviet practice in recent months,
he did not mention the Sino-Soviet border talks, which Suslov
last year had said "could nor be described as easy." Under-
scoring the unaltered CPSU position toward the PRC as defined
at the 24th congress, Grishin reaffirmed as its basis "a
principled struggle against the ideological and political
platform of the CCP leadership--which is incompatible with
Leninism." He added that the struggle includes "resolute
exposure of Peking's hostile propaganda and defense of the
Soviet Union's national interests."
APALIN ARTICLE Entitled "The Antisocialist Essence of
Peking's Foreign Policy," the lengthy
article by Apalin in the November issue of the monthly
INTERNATIONAL LIFE--signed to the press on 21 October and
* Neither Chinese nor Soviet media acknowledged the walkout.
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publicized by TASS on 4 November--represents the latest Soviet
propaganda broadside designed to discredit the Chinese leadership
and to dissuade communist and other countries from receptivity
to Peking's flexible diplf,matic moves. Apalin's message to
those who would consort aith Peking is that although its methods
and tactics have changed, "sometimes fundamentally," PRC foreign
policy "in essence remains the same--antisocialist, insidious,
and dangerous to the revolutionary movement." In this context
Apalin revives the recurrent theme--present, for example, in
the 25 July I. Aleksandrov article in PRAVDA--that Peking "would
like to provoke a military conflict between socialism and
capitalism and then become the hegemonic force in a world
destroyed by war." He also cites Peking's rejection of the
Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers
as further evidence of the PRG's "adventurist course aimed
at intensifying international tensions."
Although Peking is trying to disguise the real import of its
current diplomatic maneuvers, Apalin declares, the PRC's chief
foreign policy goal is "to form a bloc aimed primarily against
the Soviet Union and world socialism." This bloc, he adds,
would be composed of "individual socialist countries, developing
countries, and even some imperialist states." Concern on this
score had been expressed in less pointed terms at the leadership
level and in authoritative Soviet press comment in the wake of
the announcement of President Nixon's projected visit to Peking.
Gromyko had raised the specter of "combinations" of states
directed against other states in the course of an explicit
discussion of Sino-U.S. relations in his 28 September UN
General Assembly speech. And Brezhnev, at a dinner for
President Pompidou in Paris on 27 October, made a thinly
veiled allusion to possible Sino-U.S. collusion on Indochina
when he warned that the problem cannot be solved "either by
attempts to impose an alien will on Vietnam by means of
force or by way of secret combinations behind the backs of
the Vietnamese people."
In Moscow's first authoritative press reaction to President
Nixon's Peking trip, the 25 July I. Aleksandrov article had
cautioned against the formation of "political combinations
aimed against other states." More pointedly, an article by
D. Volskiy in NEW TIMES No. 35 in September interpreted a
RED FLAG article disseminated widely by Peking in August as
an attempt to justify the invitation to President Nixon on
the grounds of the need for maximum flexibility in order to
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differentiate the "main enemy" from the "secondary enemy."
Recalling that the Japanese had been specified as the rain
enemy during World War II, Volskiy clearly implied--but
stopped short of saying in so many words--that Peking regards
the Soviet Union as the main enemy today: After maintaining
that the President's planned visit to Peking was behind the
publication of the RED FLAG article, he concluded that it
was "obvious" why Peking was advocating alliances with "the
intermediate forces" and a temporary, tactical truce with "the
secondary enemies" in order to concentrate its efforts against
"the main enemy."
Apalin in INTERNATIONAL LIFE now charges that in order to
facilitate their anti-Soviet goals the Chinese leaders are
willing to abandon their previously proclaimed principles
and to "neglect the common tasks of the anti-imperialist
struggle and perform sharp volte-faces in policy when they
see a possibility of reaching some agreement with the
imperialists which benefits solely China's national interests."
Stating that the anti-Soviet orientation of China's foreign
policy "invariably meets with understanding" in the capitalist
world, Apalin adds the allegation that "the diplomatic
recognition of the PRC by Western countries is a form of
payment for the policy of splitting and undermining the
united front of the anti-imperialist forces--a payment for
anti-Sovietism."
Turning specifically to Peking's divisive efforts in the world
communist movement, Apalin says that "the Chinese leaders are
now more fanatical than any time in the past in trying by
every means to raise obstacles to the development of
socialist unity." He alludes to Romania's and Yugoslavia's
cordial relations with Peking in observing that the Chinese
are pursuing a "differentiated" approach to the socialist
countries and are playing on "natimalism" and anti-Sovietism
to encourage "neutralism" among Moscow's allies. Noting that
Peking is using a variety of means to achieve its ends--
ranging from "the restoration of party links with countries
which until recently were among the 'revisionist parties" to
the advancement of "material incentives"--he caps his lecture
with the statement: "Marxist-Leninist parties believe that it
is impossible to reconcile the Peking leaders' splittist policy
and that a position of neutrality and of compromise runs
counter to the fundamental principles of proletarian inter-
nationalism and makes the struggle against imperialism more
difficult."
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BUDAPEST PAPER EVINCES CONCERN OVER SINO-U1S1 "RAPPROCHEMENT"
In keeping with Budapest's role as leading proxy spokesman for
Moscow in the Sino-Soviet polemic, an article in the Hungarian
party organ NEPSZABADSAG by Vernal on 7 November represents the
bluntest attack on President Nixon's projected visit to Peking
yet to appear in Soviet bloc media and notably registers
concern over "the possibilities of an American-Chinese
rapprochement."
Pointing to the past history of Sino-U.S. relations, Vernal
comments that "it is no exaggeration to say that the U.S.
President will be forced to undertake a humilitating pilgrimage
to Canossa in visiting the Chinese capital." He adds that
"Nixon's visit to Peking is tantamount to a fiasco for U.S.
policy based on the nonrecognition of People's China and aimed
at isolating this vast country." Analyzing the President's
motives for visiting Peking, Vernal. says "the U.S. imperialists"
would like to extricate themselves from the Vietnam dilemma in
Peking "under conditions satisfying for the U.S. capitalists,
with the Chinese leaders' aid." He defines as an additional
moti-Yation of "U.S. strategists" the objective of shifting
the balance of power against the Soviets by entertaining the
possibility "that despite the existing disparity of interests,
Peking's nationalist and world-power aspirations coincide with
U.S. notions."
After noting that the Chinese leaders "are willing to receive
the U.S. President," Varnai goes on to claim that "they have
rejected high-level talks with the Soviet leaders"--an
allegation Moscow itself has not made. He adds that the
Sino-Soviet border talks "have been marking time for two
years because various Soviet proposals aimed at a settlement
remain unanswered." Moscow has been leaving it to its East
European proxy spokesmen to bring up the matter of the talks.
Seeking to fan suspicions in the international movement over
Sino-American "collusion," Varnai says that "a flirtation
between Peking and Washington would rightly elicit the mis-
givings and disapproval of the Indochinese, the DPRK, and
many other Asian countries--countries in direct conflict with
U.S. imperialism, whose vital interests are attached to the
unity of the anti-imperialist forces."
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Linking the Peking visit to the President's projected visit to
Moscow, Varnai concludes with the pointed reminder that "what
the President takes with him first to Peking and then to Moscow
will determine in many respects the impression and answers he
will take home with him from both capitals, and particularly
from Moscow, which is doubtless more important for the United
States in the final analysis."
PEKING EXPRESSES HOPE FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS
Peking has used the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary
to indicate that Sino-Soviet relations are not excluded from
Its moves to normalize the PRC's relationships within the inter-
national community. In a message a shade more conciliatory than
last year's, the Chinese said they are "deeply convinced" that
"the friendly and good-neighborly relations" between the two
countries "will eventually be restored and developed." Last
year's message posited the same goal but without the expresaion
of confident hope. An offensive reference to Stalin's tutelage
appearing in the 1970 message, and deleted in PRAVDA's version
of the message, was not present this year.
As in 1970, the Chinese message--again addressed from the NPC
Standing Committee and the State Council to their Soviet
counterparts--urged that "important questions" involving
state relations between the two countries be settled on the
basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Also like
last year, the message affirmed that "controversies of
principle" should not affect the two countries' state relations.
Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov's reception marking the anniversary
wae again attended by PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chaio Kuan-hua,
chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks and newly
appointed head of the PRC delegation to the current UNGA
session. Also attending we.... the Chinese ambassador to the
USSR, Liu Hsin-chuan, and the chief Soviet negotiator at the
border talks, L. F. Ilichev, and his deputy. The expanded
Chinese turnout included the naval commander.
As if to underscore the triangular setting of Peking's diplomatic
moves, NCNA's report on the 9 November departure of Chiao
Kuan-hua for the United Nations noted the presence of Ilichev.
A powerful group of Chinese leaders present at the airport
was headed by Chou En-lai.
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While calling for improved state relations with the Soviets,
Peking has alao reminded the communist movement of the
"controversies of principle" mentioned in the message. On
the same day as the October Revolution anniversary, the
CCP sent a message to the Albanian party on its anniversary
reaffirming a common interest in opposing "Soviet revisioniam."
In a special gesture to the Albanians, on 8 November the
Chinese took the opportunity of a rally celebrating the
Albanian anniversary to put on view the top leaders currently
making appearances: Chou, Chiang Ching, Yeh Chien-ying,
Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Li Haien-nien. In his
speech at the rally Chang praised the Albanians for waging
an uncompromising struggle against "modern revisionism with
the Soviet revisionist leading clique as its center." The
same point was made in an 8 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on the anniversary.
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INDOCHINA
The U.S. air strikes on 7 and 8 November against North Vietnam--
described by IT.S, spokesmen as the heaviest since those of
21 September--prompted only a routine DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement, which does, however, assail them "as
particularly serious." Followup comment on the 9th claims that
bombing '..hroughout Indochina had been intensified oh, the eve
of Defense Secretary Laird's trip to Saigon.
Authoritative criticism was leveled at the Administration and
the Nixon Doctrine in a 2 November NHAN DAN article by Nguyen
Huu Chinh--a frequent commentator on U.S. affairs?pegged to
the Senate rejection of the foreign aid bill. Chinh revived a
line used during the July-August anti-China polemic when he
claimed that the Nixon 'Doctrine is aimed "at sowing dissension
in the socialist camp." At the same time, Hanoi, which has never
mentioned the President's planned trips to Peking and Moscow,
continues to demonstrate its even-handed treatment of its two
big allies. Thus, propaganda on the October Revolution
Anniversary, in a departure from the practice of previous years,
refers to Chinese as well as Soviet aid to the DRV. On the
1 October Chinese National Day Hanoi had also atypically
referred to Soviet as well as Chinese aid.
Soviet restraint toward the United States, particularly in the
wake of the announcement of the President's plan to visit Moscow,
seemed reflected in Soviet Politburo member Grishin's remarks on
Vietnam in his keynote address on the October Revolution
anniversary. Criticizing American "aggression" in cryptic and
general terms, Grishin said nothing about the Vietnamization
policy, although he did assail continued U.S. air strikes against
the DRV.
Communist media marked the 18th anniversary of Cambodinn independ-
ence much as they did last year, with publicity for a reception
in Peking at which Chou En-lai and Sihanouk spoke. But unlike last
year, neither the Chinese leaders' message nor the PEOPLE'S DAILY
edito'7ial repeated the call to "persevere in a protracted people's
war" in Indochina. Such calls dropped out of the propaganda after
Peking, in the wake of Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos, exuded
confidence over the military situation.
MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES 7, 8 NOVEMBER U.S. STRIKES IN DRV
The U.S. air strikes in the North Vietnam provinces of Quang Binh
and Nghe An on 7 and 8 November--described by U.S. spokesmen as
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the deepest this year and the heaviest since 21 September--are
protested in a routine statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman on the 8th. However, it differs from the recent
spokesman's statements when it recalls the "savage bombings"
on 21 September and refers to "repeated" raids in Vinh Linh
and Quang Binh Province as well as to strikes in Lai Chau
and Ha Tinh provinces.
The 21 September raids were denounced at the higher level of
a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 22d and they prompted
the communist delegates at the Paris talks to boycott the
session on the 23d.* The alleged strikes in Ha Tinh ane Lai
Chau were protested in ministry spokesman's statements on
16 October and 3 November, respectively. (Other routine
spokesman's statements since 21 September were issued on
27 September and 5, 9, and 22 October.)
The latest protest calls the strikes on 7 and 8 November
"particularly serious," saying they were against "populated
areas" around Dong Hol, capital of Quang Binh, and "a number
of localities" in Nghe An Province, and "caused damage in
lives and property to the local population." Casualties were
also mentioned in the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry
statement and the spokesman's protest on 3 November. The
spokesman now says that these "grave acts of war proved that
the obdurate and war-seeking U.S. imperialists still are
hatching their schemes of military adventure against the DRV."
And in standard fashion the protest says the United States
"must bear full responsibility for the consequences of its
acts of war against the DRV."
The p-o*est also notes the alleged downing of two U.S. planes
in Nghe An on the 8th, which had been reported earlier that
day 'y Hanoi radio. The earlier broadcasts said that several
other U.S. planes were damaged, and called the downings a
"stern warning" by the DRV armed forces and people who would
punish all U.S. "reckless acts of war" against the DRV. These
latest claims bring Hanoi's total downed planes to 3,401.**
* For a discussion of propaganda following those strikes see the
TRENDS of 22 September, pages 4-6, and 29 September, pages 6-7.
** At the time of the bombings on 21 September, DRV propaganda
similarly claimed two planes, bringing the total at that time to
3,399. That total was incorrectly put at 3,999 on page four of
the 22 September TRENDS.
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The DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 9th and the party
organ NHAN DAN on the 10th echo the foreign ministry spokesman's
claim that the latest air strikes caused "losses in lives and
property." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN calls the strikes "acts that
encroached in a very brazen and gross manner" on DRV sovereignty
and security and says the Nixon Administration had repeatedly
committed "many war crimes" against the North Vietnamese. Both
papers round up alleged U.S. action against the North during
October; they claim, among other things, that strikes were
carried out on 72 occasions while "B-52's on 33 occasions
dropped more than 4,000 tons of bombs on Quang Binh and Vinh
Linh." They also called attention to the alleged attacks on
30 October in Dien Bien district, Lai Chau Province.
NHAN DAN says these U.S. "serious acts of war" prove that the
United States is "planning new military adventures" against
the DRV, and it cites a Cornell University study as saying that
"during Nixon's Administration more bombs have been dropped in
Vietnam than during Johnson's." NHAN DAN, like a Hanoi radio
comment on the 9th, says that the "new crimes . . . are closely
connected" with Secretary Laird's re--nt visit to Saigon. And
both item score Laird' e "arrogant threat that the Unitnd
States will contivue the bombing as long as it deems necessary."
MAN DO 1 NHAN DAN claims to see signs of new U.S. "military
adventures" in the presence of the aircraft carrier
Constfalation in Indochinese waters as will as the intensification
of te bombing throughout Indochina during Laird's visit. The
pape: routinely asserts that no activity will save the U.S.
position, that the United States was "properly punished" by the
downing of the two planes and that the northern armed forces
and people, "constantly vigilant and combat ready, are determined
to appropriately punish all U.S. acts of war." Similarly, NHAN
DAN calls the downings "a serious warning" and an "encouragement
to us to resolutely smash all military adventures" of the United
States. It says that the armed forces, especially those in the
military area just north of the demilitarized zone, "will 'lways
heighten their vigilance and step up their technical and tactical
training and combat readiness along with other air defense
activities so that they may win resounding victories under all
circumstances."
A Liberation Radio commentary on the 9th condemns the strikes
and says that for each "aggression" against the North, the South
Vietnamese "will punish them five or 10 times harder." It adds
that this warning "has been carried out for many years."
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LAIRD TRIP SEEN AS PREPARATION FOR "NEW MILITARY ADVENTURES"
Vietnamese communist propaganda on Defense Secretary Laird's
3-6 November visit in Saigon claims that the purpose of his
stay waE, to prepare for "new military adventures" to expand
and intensify the war. Laird is also said to have been
concerned to paint a "rosy picture" of Vietnamization in
preparation for the President's imminent speech on further
U.S. troop withdrawals, and to assure President Thieu that
U.S. aid will not be cut off. In addition to Hanoi and
Front radio comment on the -Secretary's visit, according to VNA
press reviews there was comment in the Hanoi papers on 6 and
8 November. Hanoi radio on the 10th broadcast a QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN commentary, but it is not yet available in translation,
Castigating Secretary Laird's trip--and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Moorer's visits to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and
Bangkok--propaganda observes that Laird's previous fact-finding
trips to Saigon in early 1970 and 1971 were followed by "new
U.S. acts to step up and expand the war"--the Cambodian
incursion in 1970 and the Laos campaign early this year.
Evidence that allied military activities intensified prior to
Laird's arrival in Saigon was detailed in a 29 October
Liberation Radio commentary which scored U.S. naval reinforcements,
ARVN operations with U.S. support, plans to strengthen the
Cambodian army five-fold, increased aid to Laos, and attacks m
the DRV. The commentary went on typically to charge that the
Secretary's visit was aimed at "concocting adventurous and
reckless schemes to intensify the war and commit more crimes."
TROOP WITHDRAWAL Linking Laird's trip to the President's
upcoming announcement on further U.S.
troop withdrawals, a 9 November LPA commentary typically said
that "as everyone knows, Laird's trip . . . was aimed at
creating an optimistic picture to be used by Nixon in a
forthcoming speech." Declaring that Laird "pretended to be
deaf and blind to the actual situation," the commentary, also
carried by Hanoi radio, said that the "colorful picture" the
Secretary will return with, "as well as Nixon's deceitful
tricks in his coming sp.:tech, by no means help demonstrate 'good
will for peace,' 'successful Vietnamization,' or the 'end of
the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam."
Comment scored Laird's statement at his press conference on the
6th about the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Vietnam
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for the protection of American forces stationed there. A
Liberation Radio broadcast on the 7th, for example, asserted
that this statement "clearly shows to everyone that Nixon's
boast that all U.S. combat troops will be witharawn from
South Vietnam is only designed to fool public opinion."
NHAN DAN CALLS REJECTION OF AID BILL BLOW TO NIXON DOCTRINE
The 29 October Senate vote against the Administration'd foreign
aid authorization bill was used as a peg for a genera] attack
on Nixon's policy in the 2 November NHAN DAN. The article
written by Nguyen Huu Chinh--an author who frequently comments
or U.S. affairs*--was reviewed by VNA on the 2d and broadcast
by Hanoi radio on the 3d. Chinh said that while the President
has described the vote as resulting from a temporary alliance
of dovish senators who oppose the Vietnam war and conservatives
who resented the anti-U.S. vote in the United Nations on the
China issue, in fact the vote "has brought into bold relief
the thoughts, doubts, and worries which are torturing millions
of Americans in the face of the Nixon Administration's foreign
and domestic policies." The author added that the senators
are using their rights with respect to the budget as a tool to
oppose a foreign policy "which is not in accordance with the
actual and lasting interests of the United States. In reality,
the question of whether or not the foreign aid program should
be continued has become a sharp conflict."
The NHAN DAN commentator declared that the "lackeys" whose
survival depends on U.S. aid become a "support for U.S.
imperialism to carry out its expansionist policy and that the
foreign aid program has become more important since the
appearance of the Nixon Doctrine." He went on to comment that
* Most recently, Nguyen Huu Chinh discussed the President's
15 August, 9 September, and 7 October remarks on his new
economic policies in NHAN DOT articles on 13 September and
13 Octo5er. In a 4 June NHAN DAN article, pegged to the
President's 1 June press conference, Chinh also discussed the
U.S. ec,nomy and claimeA that "the American people's crisis of
confidence has become a major threat to Nixon's political life."
Chinh also had articles on the congressional elections in 1970
as well as the Presidential campaign in 1968.
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the Aiministration has not tried to cover up the purpose of the
Nixon Doctrine, which he said is aimed among other things "at
sowing dissension in the socialist camp." (During the height
of the July-August anti-Chinese polemic, the Nixon Doctrine was
repeatedly described as aimed at splitting the socialist
countries, but this claim has appeared only infrequently since
then.)
Chinh called the oenate vote "a quite devastating blow" to the
Nixon Doctrine. And he said that while it is evident that not
all senators shared Fulbright's opinion that the Administration
is using it "as a main weapon in the cold war," it is "obvious"
that U.S. flexibility is now limited. The author observed
that the defeated bill dealt only with a small part of the total
U.S. foreign aid: A large number of programs are camouflaged
under different names and are beyond the control of Congress and
large sums of military aid remain intact, "especially U.S.
military aid funds for the U.S. puppet administrations in
Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane." He said that the
Administration will use every means to restore the rejected
expenditures, but concluded that the vote on 29 October
"reminds Nixon that he is facing strong opposition from Congress."
OCTOBER REVOLUTION KEYNOTE SPEECH REAFFIRMS SOVIET SUPPORT
Soviet determination to continue assistance to the Vietnamese
was routinely reiterated in propaganda on the October Revolution
anniversary. Politburo member Grishin declared in his keynote
address that the Soviet Union has given Vietnam economic and
military aid and will continue to do so. .:he new aid agreements
signed with the DRV during Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi last
month, he said, w.:re "a clear testimony to the consistent
implementation of the great principles of socialist internationalism
by our party and the Soviet people." And in reviewing Soviet
leaders' recent foreign travels as an implementation of the USSR's
"peace program," he called Podgornyy's DRV visit a "new striking
confirmation of our unbreakable friendship and fraternal
cooperation with that heroic country."
Grishin delivered a mild, pro forma attack on U.S. Indochina policy.
Observing that the Soviet Union supports the "heroic" people of
Vietnam and othet Indochina countries in iheir struggle against the
"American aggressors" and backs the PRG's seven-point peace proposal,
he said "facts show that the American ruling circles" do not want
to seek a political solution: "The United States is torpedoing the
Paris talks and is not stopping the barbaric bombing raids over the
DRV."
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Grishin avoided the usual attack on the U.S. Vietnamization
policy, where in last year's October Revolution anniversary
speech Suslov had scored the Vietnamization policy and
American "aggression" in Laos and Cambodia. Grishin's
language also contrasts with Suslov's specific attack on the
U.S. "Government" for "resorting to all sorts of devices" in
trying to Vietnamize the conflict or Americanize the settle-
ment. As might have been expected during his Hanoi visit,
Podgornyy in several speeches denounced U.S. operations in
South Vietnam, the bombings of the DRV, and aggression in Laos
and Cambodia as well as the "Guam doctrine" and the pacification
policy, and asserted that the peoples of Indochina will make
Vietnamization a failure.
CAMBODIAN NATIONAL DAY: CHOU, SIHANOUK SPEAK IN PEKING
PEKING CELEBRATIONS As in 1970, Peking marked the anniversary
of Cambodian independence (9 November)
with a message from Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and
Penn Nouth, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, and speeches by Chou
and Sihanouk. The latter two spoke at a Peking rally last year;
this time they spoke at a reception hosted by Sihanouk. A
Pekiig "report meeting" attended by Li Hsien-nien was held this
year, with Ieng Sary, "special envoy" of the "interior part" of
the RGNU, reporting on the military and political successes of
Sihanouk's front and government.
Consistent with Peking's current political and diplomatic posture,
Chinese statements on the Cambodian anniversary omit former
formulations prescribing protracted war in Indochina and
denouncing U.S. "counterrevolutionary dual tactics." Thus the
PRC leaders' message to the Cambodians, as well as similar
messages on DRV National Day (2 September) and Laotian
Independence Day (12 October), omitted the call for perseverance
in protracted people's war that figured in all three messages
last year. The formula on protracted war disappeared from
Chinese comment in the wake of the Lam Son 719 operation in
southern Laos and the emergence of a notably confident portrayal
of the Indochinese situation as "unprecedentedly fine."
Similarly, Peking in recent months has been accenting the positive
regarding an Indochinese peace settlement, with endorsements of
the peace proposals of its allies and clients replacing its former
attacks on U.S. proposals. Where Chou last year took the occasion
of the Cambodian anniversary to deprecate President Nixon's
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proposals, this year he expressed support for Sihanouk's
five-point declaration, the PRG's seven-point peace proposal,
and the five-point program of the NLHS.
Chou avoided any direct attack on the Nixon Administration,
but he took the opportunity to voice Peking's line on a growing
unity among "medium and small countries" in opposition to the
superpowers. Observing that the world is in the midst of "a
violent upheaval" and taking note of the UN vote for seating the
PRC, Chou intoned that "the superpowers are finding it more
and more difficult to practice power politics and hegemony
and engage in their truculent acts of bullying and butchering
weak and small nations will."
In his reception speech Sihanouk typically expressed concern
over a possible accommodation on Cambodia, rebuking "foreign
governments and circles" for recommending a "so---illed 'political'
solution." He once again rejected the idea of "a 'new Geneva
conference' or a political solution," claiming that President
Nixon alone holds the key to a settlement and must stop his
interference in Cambodian internal affairs. Unlike last year,
Chci! did not echo Sihanouk's denunciation of a conference.
Last year Chou accused the United States and its "collaborator"
of "scheming to carve up Cambodia."
Ieng Sary's report to the Peking meeting contained an allusion
to President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC in the course
of an attack on alleged U.S. schemes for new aggression.
He warned that "though U.S. imperialism is compelled to come
to China with a white flag," it continues its "vicious
intrigues" of denying the rights of weak and small countries
and is resorting to "new trickery" to deceive world public
opinion. This rather surprising passage, which might be read
as an expression of concern--shared by the Vietnamese
communists*--over the effect of the Nixon visit, was included
in NCNA's account of the spee:h. This represents the first
public reference to the President's visit--albeit without
mentioning the President directly--to have been made in Peking.
Sihanouk's remarks on the visit last summer were in a message
released while he was in North Korea. Apart from reports on
the Kissinger missions, the only references to the President's
visit which have appeared in PRC media have been attributed to
foreign sources.
* Peking and Hanoi media have reported that Ieng Sary arrived
in Hanoi on 10 November at the head of a FUNK/RGNU delegation
for a "friendship visit."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-25-
MOSCOW Attention to the Cambodian anniveraary in Soviet media
was confined last year to routine-level radio
commentaries broadcast in Cambodian and in Mandarin to South Asia.
This year Moscow publicized a "day of solidarity," and TASS
reported that a meeting of the "Moscow public" was held on the
9th but failed to mention the sponsors or name any speakers.
TASS said that the Moscow meeting approved a telegram to the
FUNK Central Committee condemning the aggrcssion of "the U.S.
imperialists and their flunkeys" and pledging that the Soviet
people will always "be on the side of peoples fighting for their
freedom and independence, for peace, democracy, and social
progress." A TASS commentary on the 8th also mentioned the FUNK,
saying that it is leading and directing "this truly people's war."
The commentary also said the FUNK has united "the patriots of the
country" aad praised its political program for a "fair and
peaceful settlement" of the Cambodian problem. Moscow's anniversary
propaganda last year did not mention the FUNK, merely noting that
the "Cambodian People's Liberation Armed Forces" were fighting
imperialism. Soviet media, of course, mention neither Sihanouk
nor his government.
In his speech in Peking Sihanouk made one of his recurrent
pointed alluskions to Soviet refusal to recognize the RGNU, noting
that 28 (ountries have recognized his government and calling on
"other countries and governments who are sincerely friendly to
our people and sincerely love justice, democracy, freedom, and peace
to kindly give their official recognition to the RGNU."
VIETNAMESE Greetings messages were sent to Sihanouk and Penn
COMMUNISTS Nouth by DRV President Ton Due Thang and Premier
Pham Van Dong and by PRG leaders Nguyen Huu Tho
and Huynh Tan Phat. This year ai last, a NHAN DAN article praised
the Cambodian people's accomplishments in the struggle against the
"U.S. imperialist aggressors" and their "lackeys" and pledged
continued Vietnamese support in accordance with Ho Chi Minh's
testament and the joint statement of the Indochinese People's
Summit Conference.
Hanoi again marked the anniversary with a "solidarity week," but
there was apparently no Hanoi meeting. Last year a meeting was
sponsored by the DRV Fatherland Front and Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee. A statement by an official of the two organizations
was broadcast this year, praising the victories of the Cambodian
people and pledging Vietnamese solidarity. The NFLSV Central
Committee and the South Vietnamese Committee for the Defense of
World Peace held a meeting similar to one held last year.
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10 NOVEMBER 1971
-26-
CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS SAID TO SUFFER HEAVY LOSSES
Communist comment on the war in Indochina focuses on the
fighting along Cambodian Highway 6, where communist forces urn
credited with inflicting heavy casualties on Phnom Penh troops
taking part in the Chenla It operation. An 8 November report by
Sihanouk's news agency, AKI, on the most recent fighting claims
that in the 10 days from 26 October to 4 November the Cambodian
National People's Liberation Armed Forces (CNPLAF) on Highway 6
killed or wounded 3,100 troops and captured 210. The r?port says
7,800 government troops have been killed since the launching of
Chenla II on 21 August.
The CNPLAF's "frustration" of the Chenla II operation was hailed
in the Hanoi press on 5 November. An editorial in NHAN DAN on
the 5th noted that the announced purpose of Chenla II was to
ease communist pressure on Kompong Thom city,* but it went on to
claim that the operation was in fact aimed "at cutting off the
transportation route of the CNPLAF and at attacking and occupying
the liberated areas."
NHAN DAN's editorial underscored the.massive nature of the
operation--involving, it said, 70 battalions and about 20,000
men, supported by U.S. aircraft. Citing Western news reports
to document its failure, the editorial said AFP reported that
U.S. commanders were "panic-stricken" in the face of government
defeats and not only continued their air support but also sent
officers to the area to study the situation. Other communist
comment, including the LPA commentary on the 5th, has charged
directly that U.S. officers are in command of the operation.
PARIS: COMMUNISTS IGNORE U.S. REMARKS ON DANDLING POW MAIL
Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged Ambassador
Porter's remarks in a preliminary statement at the 4 November
session of the Paris talks on the sharp decrease in the volume
of mail received from American prisoners of war held by the DRV.
* Phnom Penh's announcement in mid-October that Highway 6 had
been opened to Kompong Thom was ridiculed in a 16 October AKI
commentary which maintained that, on the contrary, the road
"has been cut in several places and the CNPLAF have relentlessly
trounoed-the enemy there."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL VMS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-27-
The VNA account of the oession said only that tho U.S.
representative "rehashed the so-called prisoner-of-war problem
with a more provocative and arrogant tone." Conaistent with
its general practice,* Hanoi media did not report the remarks
by DRV press spokesmen Nguyen Thanh Le at his post-aession
briefing in which he called Ambassador Porter's reference to
decreased mail a "fabrication" and insisted that DRV policy
toward U.S. prisoners is "humane and unswerving."
Procedures for mailing Christmas packages to the prisoners this
year have not yet been announced by Hanoi. The announcements
had come progressively earlier for the past three years--on
9 November in 1970, 18 November in 1969, and 13 December in 1968.
GVN RELEASE The VNA account of the Paris session on
OF VC POW'S 28 October also ignored GVN deputy delegate
Nguyen Xuan Phong's announcement that 2,938
caLAunist prisoners would be released to mark President Thieu's
31 October inauguration. The VNA account in fact ignored the
GVN statement completely, as it has been doing for the past
several sesaions.
The GVN's release of prisoners wac denigrated in Front propaganda,
however, including an LPA commentary on the 30th and a Liberation
Radio commentary on the 31st. LPA said that in order "to
beautify the 'national day' farce and the caebration of
Thieu's reelection," the Saigon administration is "making a
ballyhoo about it's release of 3,000 people illegally detained
whom they call 'communist prisoners.'" The LPA commentary
added that the release "cannot whitewash Thieu's crimes" against
the people, and the Liberation Radio broadcast said that Thieu
directed his "psychological warfare agencies" to publicize this
"cheap swindle as a manifestation of his good will."
* VNA's service channel regularly transmits texts of both the
DRV and PRG press briefings to the Hanoi office. Only on rare
occasions have the briefings even been acknowledged in Hanoi
media for domestic consumption. During the past several weeks,
however, Hanoi radio's Mandarin- and English-language broadcasts
to Southeast Asia have briefly mentioned some of the briefings.
Broadcasts in both beams on 7 November referred tersely to the
PRG spokesman's briefing but did not mention the one by the
DRV's Le.
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CONFIDENTIAL EMS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-28-
PRC - PAKISTAN
BHUTTO VISIT NETS PAKISrAN LIMITED PEKING COMMITMENT
Ali Bhutto's apparently hastily arranged 5-8 November "friendly
visit" to Peking "at the invitation of the Chineee Government"
yielded a limited and ,:arefully measured commitment et Chinese
support for Pakistan in its confrontation with India over the
East Bengal problem. The trip by Bhutto, leader of the West
Pakistan-based People's Party, was likely intended as a
counterweight to the recent show of Soviet support for India
and to Indira Gandhi's "information trip" to a number of Western
capitals, including Washington. But while gaining a reaffirma-
tion of Chinese support after a period of silence, the Pakistanis
did not receive pledges going beyond Peking's previous stand.
During the visit the Chinese refrained from abusive anti-
Indian comment beyond pro forma charge.. of interference in
internal Pakistani affairs, glossed over the contentious
issues in East Pakistan, and pledged their support in vague
terms contingent on "foreign aggression" against Pakistan.
Most notably, the Chinese called for a peaceful settlement of
the Indian-Pakistani conflict.
Since the onset of the crisis last March Peking has taken a
notably low posture ou the tense Indian-Pakistani silmation
stemming from the civil war in East Bengal and the resulting
flow of refugees into India. Peking has not discussed the
details of the crisis in East Bengal; it did not publicly
acknowledge messages of support to Pakistani President Yahya
Khan reported by Pakistani and Indian sources to have been
sent by Mao and Chou En-lai in mid-April; it has not
mentioned the flow of refugees to India; and it has not
reported the Soviet-Indian treaty. Moreover, while Chinese.
media earlier had periodically reported Pakistani protests
to India charging hostile military activities, they have not
done so since 20 August.
Peking has been careful to avoid taking an inflammatory line
during a period in which it has continued to make gestures
toward India as part of its broadening diplomatic moves.
Recently, for example, an Indian table tennis team arrived
in the PRC to take part in an Afro-Asian tournament, and
NCNA carried Indira Gandhi's message of congratulations on
the UN vote for seating the PRC.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL VBIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-27-
The VNA account of thu session said ordy that the U.S.
reprenentettve "rehashed the so-called prisoner-of-war problem
with II more provocative and arrogant tone." Consistent with
its general practice,* MAnoi media did n...)t report the remarks
by DRV proms spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le ut his post-session
briefing in which ho called Ambassador Porter's reference to
decreased mail a "fabrication" and insisted that DRV policy
toward U.S. prisoners is "humane and unswerving."
Procedures for mailing Christmas packages to the prisoners this
veer have not yet been announced by Hanoi. The announcements
had come progressively earlier for the past three years--on
9 November in 1970, 18 November in 1969, and 13 December in 1968.
GVN RELEASE The VNA account of the Paris session on
OF VC POW'S 28 October also ignored GVN deputy delegate
Nguyen Xuan Phong's announcement that 2,938
communist prisoners would be released to mark President Thieu's
31 October inauguration. The VNA account in fact ignored the
GVN statement completely, as it has been doing for the past
several sessions.
The GVN's release of prisoners was denigrated in Front propaganda,
however, including an LPA commentary on the 30th and a Liberation
Radio commentary on the 31st. LPA said that in order "to
beautify the 'national day' farce and the celebration of
Thieu's reelection," the Saigon administration is "making a
ballyhoo about it's release of 3,000 people illegally detained
whom they call 'communist prisoners." The LPA commentary
added that the release "cannot whitewash Thieu's crimes" against
the people, and the Liberation Rada.? broadcast said that Thieu
directed his "psychological warfare agencies" to publicize this
"cheap swindle as a manifestation of his good will."
* VNA's service channel regularly transmits texts of both the
DRV and PRG press briefings to the Hanoi office. Only on rare
occasions have the briefings even been acknowledged in Hanoi
media for domestic consumption. During the past several weeks,
however, Hanoi radio's Mandarin- and English-language broadcasts
to Southeast Asia have briefly mentioned some of the briefings.
Broadcasts in both beams on 7 November referred tersely to the
PRG spokesman's briefius but did not mention the one by the
DRV's Le.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFLDENTIAL IH [H MEM
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-28-
PRC - PAKISTAN
BHUTTO VISIT NETS PAKISTAN LIMITED PEKING COMMITMENT
Ali Bhutto's apparently hastily arranged 5-8 November "friendly
visit" to Peking "at the invitation of the Chinese Government"
yielded a Limited and carefully measured commitment of Chinese
support for Pakistan in its confrontation with India over the
East Bengal problem. The trip by Bhutto, leader of the West
Pakistan-based People's Party, was likely intended as a
counterweight to the recent show of Soviet support for India
and to Indira Gandhi's "information trip" to a number of Western
capitals, including Washington. But while gaining a reaffirma-
tion of Chinese support after a period of silence, the Pakistanis
did not receive pledges going beyond Peking's previous stand.
During the visit the Chinese refrained from abusive anti-
Indian comment beyond pro forma charges of interference in
internal Pakistani affairs, glossed over the contentious
issues in East Pakistan, and pledged their support in. vague
terms contingent on "foreign aggression" against Pakistan.
Most notably, the Chinese called for a peaceful settlement of
the Indian-Pakistani conflict.
Since the onset of the crisis last March Peking has taken a
notably low posture on the tense Indian-Pakistani situation
stemming from the civil war in East Bengal and the resulting
flow of refugees into India. Peking has not discussed the
details of the crisis in East Bengal; it did not publicly
acknowledge messages of support to Pakistani President Yahya
Khan reported by Pakistani and Indian sources to have been
sent by Mao and Chou En-lai in mid-April; it has not
mentioned the flow of refugees to India; and it has not
reported the Soviet-Indian treaty. Moreover, while Chinese
media earlier had periodically reported Pakistani protests
to India charging hostile military activities, they have not
done so since 20 August.
Peking has been careful to avoid taking an inflammatory line
during a period in which it has continued to make gestures
toward India as part of its broadening diplomatic moves.
Recently, for example, an Indian table tennis team arrived
in the PRC to take part in an Afro-Asian tournament, and
NCNA carried Indira Gandhi's message of congratulations on
the UN vote for seating the PRC.
CONFIDENTIAL
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J
?
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CONFIDENTIAL ERIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
- 27 -
The VNA account of the session said only that the U.S.
reprementattve "tuhashod the so-called prisoner-or-war problem
with a more provocative and arrogant tone." Consistent with
it) general practice,* Hanoi media did not report the remarks
by DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le at his Po-(ion
briefing in which he called Ambassador Porter's ref,.,rence to
decreased mail a "fabrication" and insisted that DAV policy
toward U.S. prisoners is "humane and unswerving."
Procedures for mailing Christmas packages to the prisoners this
year have not yet been announced by Hanoi. The announcbments
had come progressively oarlier for the past three years--on
9 November in 1970, 18 November in 1969, and 13 December in 1968.
GVN RELEASE The VNA account of the Paris session on
OF VC POW'S 28 October also ignored GVN deputy delegate
Nguyen Xuan Phong's announcement that 2,938
communist prisoners would be released to mark President Thieu's
31 October inauguration. The VNA account in fact ignored the
GVN statement completely, as it has been doing for the past
several sessions.
The GVN's release of prisoners was denigrated in Front propaganda,
however, including an LPA commentary on the 30th and a Liberation
Radio commentary on the 31st. LPA said that in order "to
beautify the 'national day' farce and the celebration of
Thieu's reelection," the Saigon administration is "making a
ballyhoo about it's release of 3,000 people illegally detained
whom they call 'communist prisoners." The LPA commentary
added that the release "cannot whitewash Thieu's crimes" against
the people, and the Liberation Radio broadcast said that Thieu
directed his "psychological warfare agencies" to publicize this
"cheap swindle as a manifestation of his good will."
* VNA's service channel regularly transmits texts of both the
DRV and PRG press briefings to the Hanoi office. Only on rare
occasions have the briefings even been acknowledged in Hanoi
media for domestic consumption. During the past several weeks,
however, Hanoi radio's Mandarin- and English-language broadcasts
to Southeast Asia have briefly mentioned some of the briefings.
Broadcasts in both beams on 7 November referred tersely to the
PRG spokesman's briefing by, did not mention the one by the
DRV's Le.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FB IS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-28-
PRC - PAKISTAN
BHUTTO VISIT NETS PAKISTAN LIMITED PEKIKG COMMITMENT
All. Bhutto's apparently hastily arranged 5-6 November "friendly
visit" to Peking "at the invitation of the Chinese Government"
yielded a limited and carefully measured commitment of Chinese
support for Pakistan in its confrontation with India over the
East Bongo' problem. The trip by Bhutto, leader of the West
Pakistan-based People's Party, was likely intended as a
counterweight to the recent show of Soviet support for India
and to Indira Gandhi's "information trip" to a number of Western
capitals, including Washington. But while gaining a reaffirma-
tion of Chinese support after a period of silence, the Pakistanis
did not receive pledges going beyond Peking's previous stand.
During the visit the Chinese refrained from abusive anti-
Indian comment beyond pro forma charges of interierence in
internal Pakistani affairs, ^lossed over the contentious
issues in East Pakistan, a__ pledged their support in vague
terms contingent on "foreign aggression" against Pakistan.
Most notably, the Chinese called for a peaceful settlement of
the Indian-Pakistani conflict.
Since the onset of the crisis last March Peking has taken a
notably low posture on tile tense Indian-Pakistani situation
stemming from the civil war in East Bengal and the resulting
flow of refugees into India. Peking has not discussed the
details of the crisis in East Bengal; it did not publicly
acknowledge messages of support to Pakistani President Yahya
Khan reported by Pakistani and Iudian sources to have been
sent by Mao and Chou En-lai in mid-April; it has not
mentioned the flow of refugees to India; and it has not
reported the Soviet-Indian treaty. Moreover, while Chinese
media earlier had periodically reported Pakistani protests
to India charging hostile military activities, they have not
done so since 20 August.
Peking has been careful to avoid taking an inflammatory line
during a period in which it has continued to make gestures
toward India as part of its broadening diplomatic moves.
Recently, for example, an Indian table tennis team arrived
in the PRC to take part in an Afro-Asian tournament, and
NCNA carried Indira Gandhi's message of congratulations on
the UN vote for seating the PRC.
CONFIDENTIAL
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4%1
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CONFIDENTIAL FBTS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
- 27 -
The VNA account of the session said only that the U.S.
representative "rehashed the so-called prisoner-of-war problem
with n more provocative and arrogant tone." Consistent with
its general practice,* Hanoi media did not report the remarks
by DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le at his post-session
briofing in which he called Ambassador Porter's reference to
decreased mail a "fabrication" and insisted that DRV policy
toward U.S. prisoners is "humane and unswerving."
Procedures for mailing Christmas packages to the prisoners this
year have not yet been announced by Hanoi. The announcements
had come progressively earlier for the past three years--on
9 November in 1970, 18 November in 1969, and 13 December in 1968.
GVN RELEASE The VNA account of the Paris session on
OF VC POW's 28 October also ignored GVN deputy delegate
Nguyen Xuan Phong's announcement that 2,938
communist prisoners would be released to mark President Thieu's
31 October inauguration. The VNA account in fact ignored the
GVN statement completely, as it has been doing for the past
several sessions.
The GVN's release of prisoners was denigrated in Front propaganda,
however, including an LPA commentary on the 30th and a Liberation
Radio commentary on the 31st. LPA said that in order "to
beautify the 'national day' farce and the celebration of
Thieu's reelection," the Saigon administration is "making a
ballyhoo about it's release of 3,000 people illegally detained
whom they call 'communist prisoners." The LPA commentary
added that the release "cannot whitewash Thieu's crimes" against
the people, and the Liberation Radio broadcast said that Thiela
directed his "psychological warfare agencies" to publicize this
"cheap swindle as a manifestation of his good will."
* VNA's service channel regularly transmits texts of both the
DRV and PRG press briefings to the Hanoi office. Only on rare
occasions have the briefings even been acknowledged in Hanoi
media for domestic consumption. During the past several weeks,
however, Hanoi radio's Mandarin- and English-language broadcasts
to Southeast Asia have briefly mentioned some of the briefings.
Broadcasts in both beams on 7 November referred tersely to the
PRG spokesman's briefing but did not mention the one by the
DRV's Le.
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uuNFINNTiAL FBIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-28-
PRC - PAKISTAN
BHUTTO VISIT NETS PAKISTAN LIMITED PEKING COMMITMENT
Ali Bhutto's apparently hastily arranged 5-8 November "friendly
visit" to Peking "at the invitation of the Chinese Government"
yielded a limited and carefully measured commitment of Chinese
support for Pakistan in its confrontation with India over the
East Bengal problem. The trip by Bhutto, leader of the West
Pakistan-based People's Party, was likely intended as a
counterweight to the recent show of Soviet support for India
and to Indira Gandhi's "information trip" to a number of Western
capitals, including Washington. But while gaining a reaffirma-
tion of Chinese support after a period of silence, the Pakistanis
did not receive pledges going beyond Peking's previous stand.
During the visit the Chinese refrained from abusive anti-
Indian comment beyond pro forma charges of interference in
internal Pakistani affairs, glossed over the contentious
issues in East Pakistan, and pledged their support in vague
terms contingent on "foreign aggression" against Pakistan.
Most notably, the Chinese called for a peaceful settlement of
the Indian-Pakistani conflict.
Since the onset of the crisis last March Peking has taken a
notably low posture on the tense Indian-Pakistani situation
stemming from the civil war in East Bengal and the resulting
flow of refugees into India. Peking has not d'scussed the
details of the crisis in East Bengal; it did not ?ublicly
acknowledge messages of support to Pakistani President Yahya
Khan reported by Pakistani and Indian sources to have been
sent by Mao and Chou En-lai in mid-April; it has not
mentioned the flow of refugees to India; and it has not
reported the Soviet-Indian treaty. Moreover, while Chinese
media earlier had periodically reported Pakistani protests
to India charging hostile military activities, they have not
done so since 20 August.
Peking has been careful to avoid taking an inflammatory line
during a period in which it has continued to make gestures
toward India as part of its broadening diplomatic moves.
Recently, for example, an Indian table tennis team arrived
in the PRC to take part in an Afro-Asian tournament, and
NCNA carried Indira Gandhi's message of congratulations on
the UN vote for seating the PRC.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-29-
The Pakistan delegation, which was heavily militaTy in composition,
held talks with Chou and Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei in
what NCNA termed "a friendly atmosphere." According to an NCNA
account of a banquet given by Bhutto on the 7th, Chou said in a
toast that the talks "on questions of common interest have
achieved satisfactory results"; and Bhutto was quoted as
expressing "satisfaction with the current visit," adding that
"we had extremely fruitful discussions and are returning to
Pakistan with complete satisfaction." However, no communique
was issued, no military or economic agreement was announced,
and there was no across-the-board Chinese endorsement of the
Pakistani position. Peking carried no editorial comment on the
visit.
INDIAN ROLE Peking's carefully measured commitment to
Pakistan was reflected in the relatively
temperate remarks by Chi Peng-fei. According to NCNA's
account of a banquet he hosted on the 7th for the Pakistani
delegation, Chi dwelt only briefly on India, observing that
the Indian Government "has crudely interfered in Pakistan's
internal affairs" and has "carried out subversive activities
and military threats against Pakistan by continuing to exploit
the East Pakistan question."
This contrasted with Bhutto's anti-Indian tirade when, in his
speech, he condemned the Indian Government's "activities to
disintegrate and subvert Pakistan"--specifying that it was
persisting in "training, arming, and launching infiltrators
and saboteurs" against Pakistan--and charged that India "has
encouraged, incited, and financed a secessionist movement to
strike at the roots of our country." Describing "feverish"
Indian military activities, such as the deployment of its armed
forces "including heavy armor and artillery and aircraft"
along both borders with Pakistan in an effort "to intimidate
us," BhuLto concluded that "India is planning to achieve its
objective against Pakistan through armed conflict."
EAST PAKISTAN Chi maintained that "the East Pakistan question"
QUESTION is the "internal affair" of Pakistan and called
for a "reasonable settlement" by "the Pakistani
people themselves." In a platitudinous tone, he asserted that
"the broad masses of the Pakistani people are patriotic and
they want to safeguard national unity and unification of the
country, and they oppose internal split and outside interference."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 NOVEMBER 1971
-30-
During the course of developing tensions Peking has largely
avoided addressing the East Pakistan problem as such, referring
only occasionally to "secessionist Elements" while focusing on
alleged Indian and great-powar inter2erence in Pakistan's
internal affairs. Regarding the lat:er, Chi declared that "it
is absolutely impermissible for any foreign country to carry
out interference and subversioa under any pretext," adding--
in an apparent allusion to the Soviets--that "certain persons
are truculently exerting pressure on Pakistan by exploiting
tension in the subcontinent in a wild attempt to realize
their ulterior motives." Similarly, Bhutto expressed regret
that "some countries" have "succumbed to Indian propaganda
and pressure" and noted that India "openly asserts that she
has acquired massive arms and boasts that she would not be
alone in conflict against Pakistan." Neither speaker
specifically mentioned the Soviet Union and neither referred
to the Soviet-Indian treaty.
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT While maintaining that the East
Pakistan problem is an internal
Pakistani matter, Chi expressed Peking's concern over the
possibility of major hostilities erupting. The Chinese
government and people "are greatly concerned over the present
tension in the subcontinent," according to Chi, wt) said the
Chinese position is that "disputes between states should be
settled by the two sides concerned through consultations and
not by resorting to force." The reference to "consultations"--
rather than to negotiations--suggests Chinese care to avoid
overstepping the line that it is up to the Pakistanis
themselves to settle the basic question. Offering further
support to Pakistan, Chi urged compliance with "the reasonable
proposal" by President Yahya Khan for mutual Indian-Pakistani
troop withdrawal from the border as a means of "easing tension
in the subcontinent."
Regarding possible hostilities, the Chinese were careful in
pledging continued support for Pakistan. Chi assured his
guests that "should Pakistan be subjected to foteign aggression,
the Chinese Government and people will, as always, resolutely
support the Pakistani Government and people in their just
struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national
independence." This reflected no movement on Peking's side
from the position stated in the 11 April PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article that the Chinese Government and people
"will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government
and people in their just struggle for safeguarding national
independence and state sovereignty and against foreign
aggression and interference."
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The absence of stronger Chinese pledges of support seemed
reflected in Bhutto's remarks that Pakistan was prepared to
defend itself. Declaring that if Pakistan is attacked "we
shall not be found wanting in defending our honor and our
homes," Bhutto simply expressed "appreciation and gratitude
for the understanding and support which the government and
people of China have shown" and noted that Chinese "friendship
and support will continue to be a source of inspiration and
strength to all of us." Bhutto did not echo his host's
appeal for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
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USSR-CZECHOSLOVAKI Pi
SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLS FOR STEPPED-UP ATTACK ON "RIGHTISTS"
Addressing a rally held in Prague on 4 November to mark the October
Revolution anniversary, Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko seemed to go
out of his way to. suggest that the Czechoslovak communists were not
moving with sufficient vigor to quell persisting "rightist"
opposition. In his speech on the same occasion a year ago,
Chervonenko had been more sanguine on the CPCZ's prospects for
successfully overcoming the influence of the ousted liberal
forces.
The ascendant position of the conservatives in the CSSR is
underscored by the fact that the October Revolution keynote
address has been delivered for two successive years by a major
conservative figure in the party leadership--Vasil Bilak in
1970 and Alois Indra this time. Indra, elevated to full membership
in the Politburo in February, heads the Central Election Commission
which is in charge of the long-delayed elections to the country's
governmental bodies, to be held this month. Faced with public
apathy and hostility, the regima has emphasized in its propaganda
a need to combat the still not fully vanquished right wing. The
propaganda has for the most part been couched in general terms,
with the inimical forces unspecified, although the party organ
RUDE PRAVO reacted directly on 25 September to the publication of
an antiregime interview by the liberal Josef Smrkovsky--still
living in Czechoslovakia--in the Milan weekly GIORNI-VIE NUOVE
on the 16th.
At the 4 November rally, broadcast live in the Prague domestic
service, Chervonenko registered a pro forma observation that the
Czechoslovak communists "have withstood the tests" and "foiled
the counterrevolutionary plots," then procceded to discourse at
length on the urgency of a more intensive ideological struggle.
He reminded his hosts of the stand taken by the 14th CPCZ Congress
in May to the effect that "there remain not a few problems and
difficulties which must be overcome in order to completely
eliminate the consequences of the activity of rightwing revisionists
and antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia in various spheres of
party, state, and economic construction, as well as in the sphere
of ideology." In his speech a year ago, the ambassador had merely
expressed "understanding" of the difficulties facing the
Czechoslovaks in the antirightist struggle and a "conviction" that
they would succeed.
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Chervonenko went on to lecture this time that the "lessons"
drawn by the Czechoslovak communists "make it imperative to
understand that Lenin's warning--that the struggle against
opportunism requires utmost revolutionary firmness and that
no compromise is admissible--has enormous fundamental
significance today even more than ever before." Pressing the
point, he recalled Lenin's warning to a Czechoslovak communist,
Smeral, that "nobody should be forgiven anything," that
"I . . . cannot forgive your moderation, consideration for
your political opponents. Change your attitude, fight, and
reject?ruthlessly reject--any policy of compromise," which
"undermines the workers' movement and leads it toward social
democracy."
Underscoring the CSSR's reintegration into the Soviet bloc,
Chervonenko noted "the consistent consolidation and constantly
growing friendship between Czechoslovakia and its socialist
allies, Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact--all this
is a worthy response to the enemies of socialism." Protection
of the CSSR against its "opponents," he added, is also provided
by the Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship treaty of May 1970. He
recalled, in this connection, that "at a time of trials and a
crisis-ridden development of Czechoslovakia, the aktivists of
Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship were in the front ranks of the
struggle against rightist revisionism, anti-Soviet elements, and
the counterrevolution."
Neither Chervonenko nor Indra explicitly recalled the "fraternal
assistance" provided Czechoslovakia in August 1968; both
Chervonenko and Bilak had used the term at last year's October
Revolution meeting in Prague.* Chervonenko this year cited the
"truly acute political crisis in 1968 and 1969," and Indra
employed a generalized formulation to the effect that revisionist
reformers of 1968 had "failed precisely because the Soviet Union
and the other fraternal socialist countries and the loyal
Czechoslovak communists and other patriots are guided by the
behest of the Great October and with honor and in practice
implement the principles of Leninist teachings." In the same
vein, Indra added that "the more time separates us from August
* The October Revolution anniversary message from the
Czechoslovak leaders to their Soviet counterparts this year, as
last year, recalls the CzechoEdovak "crisis" but does not
directly mention the August 1968 intervention.
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1968, the more clearly its Importance emerges, the more visible
to Its poaitive influence on the development of mankind." And
in Laviah remarks on the theme of solidarity with the USSR,
said that "the Soviet people . . . never betrayed or deserted
their close brothere In moments Of Nev0f0 tot, whether it Wdel
In Hungary in 1956 or three yea ago here in Czechoslovakia."
He thanked "Comrade Brezhnev personally for the enormous work
carried out in the interest of all mankind" in the current
Soviet peace offeneive.
Indra and Chervonenko both regiatered correct tributes to the
stewardship of Gustav Husak ea CPCZ First Secretary since
April 1969, and both pointedly quoted the CPCZ leader on the
score of relations with the USSR. Indra said "we agreed from
the bottom of our hearts with Comrade Husak, who stated on
returning from the 24th CPSU Congress: 'Whoever does not have
good relations with the Soviet Union does not have good relations
with our socialist syetem or with his own people." The Soviet
ambassador prefaced his call for a stepped-up CPCZ ideological
struggle with the remark that "rightw.ing opporLuniam and
reisionism, as our recent ellperience has convincingly confirmed,
said Comrade Gustav Husak at rhe 14th CPCZ Congress, inevitably
culminates in overt betrayal of socialism and the revolutionary
workers movement and in overt adoption of anticommunist, anti-Soviet
positions."
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TOPIC IN BRIEF
AMCHITKA NUCLEAR TEST
TASS predictably highlighted continuing worldwide protests,
notably from Jnpnn and Canada, in reporting the 6 November
detonation of a U.S. nuclear device on Amchitka istend in the
Aleutians. In its first ....eport on the detonation, noting U.S.
Government efforts to "play down" the dangers, TAS 'd citcd the
New York TIMES to point to "the great risk not only for the
environment but also for world peace"; on the 9th it pointed
to "confirmation" of U.S. scientists' apprehensions about
damage to the environment. Soviet reportage in the preceding
weeks had been featuring Japanese and Canadian protests as well
as efforts in Congress and the U.S. scientific community to
get the test called off. But Soviet comment anticipating the
teal was negligible and routine. The official Soviet attitude
was publicized in a TASS report of UN delegate Malik's remarks
In the UNGA's First Committee on 28 October reiterating the
call for an underground nuclear test ban and stating that the
Soviet Government "fully shared the concern and alarm" of the
Canadian Government.
There has been no Moscow comment on the subject since 6 November.
By contrast, the last U.S. nuclear test in the Aleutians, on
2 October 1969, occasioned an IZVESTIYA article the same day
charging that the test was linked to the development of warheads
for ABM's and MIRV's and was another step toward accelerating
the arms race.
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