TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040049-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
Illlllll~~iiiuiii~~llllllli~~l~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICEI
~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~ I~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
1 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 48)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the natioral defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
6POU- 1
Iudeded Lew euIewelie
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Communique on Pham Van Dong V.:.sit to PRC Sees Closer Ties . .
I
Communi^ts Denounce New South Vietnamese Move Into Cambodia .
8
Laos: Souphanouvong Letter Reverts to Call for Bombing Halt .
9
Joint Editorial Condemns "Swindlers," Calls for Party Unity .
11
"Swindlers" Are Attacked for Errors in Agricultural Line . . .
12
PRC-PAKISTAN
Peking Reaffirms Measured Support for Pakistan . . . . . . . .
13
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Pictures Israel as Increasingly Militaristic . . . . .
17
2ormer Mideast Con.mentator Maksimov Authors Series in Arabic .
18
Soscow Notes Jordanian Premier "Killed" in Cairo . . . . . . .
19
ROMANIA-YUGOSLAVIA
Tito-Ceausescu Communique Stresses Indepe-.uence, Affinity . .
20
GERMAN CP
Illegal KPD Treated as Still Extant, Though Inoperative . . .
24
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prague Comment During Bilateral Talks Anticipatea Progress . .
28
CZECHOSLOVAK ELECTIONS
Prague, Moiocow Defensive on Mandate of *,ong-Delayed Vote . . .
30
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Central Committee, Soviet Meetings Approve Five-year Plan . .
33
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 NOVEMBER 1971
Moscow (2817 items)
Peking (1344 items)
Supreme Soviet Session
(1%)
21%
Indochina
(20%)
40%
[Kosygin Speeches
(--)
7%]
[Pham Van Dong
(11%)
32%]
CPSU Central Committee
(--)
13%
in PRC
Plenum
Domestic Issues
(18%)
13%
Indochina
(5%)
4%
United Nations
(28%)
11%
Middle East
(3%)
3%
[Disarmament Debate
(--)
3%]
China
(5%)
3%
[PRC Seat on
(--)
3%]
Somali President
(3%)
2%
Security Council
Barre in USSR
Guinea Invasion
(--)
5%
West German CP (DKP) (0.1%)
2%
Anniversary
Congress
Albanian National Day
(--)
3%
Indian-Pakistani
Conflict
(1%)
3%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow end
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
I N D 0 C H I N A
COt4MUN I OUE ON PHAM VAN DONG VISIT TO PRC. SEES CLOSER TIES
Both the Chinese and North Vietnamese used the 20-27 November
visit to the PRC by Pham Jan Dong's party-government delegation
as an occasion for effusive testimony to Sino-Vietnamese
solidarity while skirting areas of possible discord. The
Chinese were at pains to impress upon their guests "ad the
world at large that President Nixon's forthcoming visit and
the recent PRC leadership reshuffle will not divert Peking
from continuing unstinting support to the Vietnamese. Having
received reassurances on this score, the Vietnamese joined
with their hosts in a communique registering satisfaction
that relations of "intimate and solid friendship and unity"
are binding the two sides "ever more closely."
After signing the joint communique on the 25th, the DRV
delegation toured Shanghai and Canton accompanied by Chou
En-lai before returning to Hanoi on the 27th. As in the
communique on Chou's visit to Hanoi last March, th3 current
document says the talks between the two sides were held in
"a most cordial and friendly atmosphere, which fully manifested
the fraternal friendship and militant unity" between the two
peoples. Also like the March communique, the current one
lists the situation in Indochina and "questions of common
interest" as subjects of the talks. But in adding another
subject--"the strengthening of the friendly relations and
cooperation" between the two countries--the current communique
may reflect concern by the two sides to overcome strains in
their relations resulting from Peking's invitation to
President Nixon.
The communique cites the "excellent" situation in Indochina
resulting from the "victories of strategic significance" won
in the past year. That the Chinese may have favored a
stronger statement is suggested by the fact that Chou En-lai
in a major speech on the 23d described the situation in
Indochina as"unprecedentedly fine"--an appraisal that began
to appear in Chinese comment following the Lam Soa 719
operation. The communique last March--issued during Lam
Son 719--was replete with warnings about the "extremely grave
war escalation" in Indochira and directly linked China's
security with that of the DRV. That communique also said the
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1 DECEMBER 1971
two sides "reached completely identical views" in discussions
on how to deal with possible further military actions by the
United States. In the only reference to unanimity in the
current communique, the two sides "unaAmously point out"
that the Indochina war "was caused by U.S. aggression and it
will end only with the United States' stopping its aggression
and all its interference."* Consistent with the emphasis in
Hanoi's recent statements, notably Dong's speeches during the
visit, the communique focuses on Washington's Vietn.imization
policy and support for the Thieu regime as the central concern
in the present circumstances.
CHINE;. SUPPORT In the communique the Chinese reaffirm
their "unshirkable internationalist duty"
to support the Vietnamese war effort "to the end," repeating
the assurance that the Chinese "will not flinch even from the
greatest national sacrifices." This formulation dramatizing
Peking's commitment, which dates back to 1965, was revived by
Chou during his Hanoi visit in March and appeared in the
communique on that visit; it was also repeated by Li Hsien-nien
when he headed a Chinese aid delegation to Hanoi in September.
Some of the Chinese comment on assistance during the Dong
visit was couched in unusual. terms that may reflect some of
the issues in the recent PRC leadership crisis and disputes
over economic priorities. On the 24th, Chou repeated Mao's
"instruction"--first voiced by Chou during his Marcn visit
to Hanoi--that "if anyone among us should say that we should
not help the Vietnamese" that would be "betrayal of the
revolution." This formula, with its overtones of discord
over the nature and extent of aid to the DRV, had been
paraphrased by Li in Hanoi in September and then by Chou in
his 23 November Peking rally speech, in effect reassuring the
Vietnamese that Sino-U.S. developments will not affect
Peking's commitments to its allies. In his speech on the 24th
* In contrast, the joint communique on the recent visits to
the DRV by Soviet President Podgornyy, the DPRK's Pak Song-chol,
and Ieng Sary, "special envoy" of Sihanouk's governmer., said
tl-:e talks registered unanimity of views on the sub j.--.: is
discussed. These more comprehensive assessments seem to have
been included at the visitors' behest. DRV spokesmen during
the visits avoided referring to unanimity of views even s.?
the guests so characterized the talks.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
in which he revived the full instruction, Chou added other
remarks suggest_ng that the Chinese are now in a better
positior to assist the Vietnamese. Noting that Long was
going to tour southern parts of China, Chou said that "you
will see that the mental outlook of our people, through
tempering in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, has
deeply chanL,_d," adding that in the future "it will be possible
for our people to perform our internationalist duty better than
beige and give more support and assistance to the Vietnamese
and Indochinese peoples."
Chinese speeches during Dong's tour of Shanbnai and Canton
were even more explicit in acknowledging that the PRC had
fallen short in aiding the Vietnamese. Both Chang Chun-chiao,
Politburo member and Shanghai party chief, and Kwangtung
party head Liu Hsing-yuan admitted that what their respective
areas have done to support the Vietnamese "falls far short
of the expectations" of the Vietnamese comrades and that the
Chinese "still have many shortcomings" in their work. Both
speakers solicited the guests' "criticisms and suggestions"
to help the Chinese improve their assistance.
During the provincial tour Dong, for his part, was unusually
specific in thanking the Chinese for their assistance. In
Shanghai he thanked the people for having provided "complete
sets of equipment for many important factories in the North,
many transportation facilities, farm machinery, materials
and equipment as well as large quantities of consumer goods.
You have trained and brought up for us thousands of workers
and technicians, and sent to Vietnam many enthusiastic and
experienced experts." In Canton Dong similarly noted that
"you have provided us with large quantities of equipment,
materials, and consumer goods, trained many technical personnel
and workers for us, and taken meticulous care of the
Vietnamese cadres re.eiving medical treatment here."
INTERNATIONALISM The two sides registered a meeting of
minds on the key issue of proletarian
internationalism, which had emerged as a touchstone of
divergent Chinese and Vietnamese positions in recent months in
the wake of the announcement of President Nixon's visit to
Peking. In the joint coranunique the two sides "note with
satisfaction" that their relations "have continuously been
consolidated and developed on the basis of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism." This "intimate and solid
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 friendship and unity of 'both comrades and brothers,"' credited
to the nurture of Ho Chi Minh and Mao, "are binding ever more
closely the parties and peoples of China and Vietnam."
At the same time, however, Dong continued the DRV's practice of
singling out the USSR as well as the PRC in expressing gratitude
for aid. Although he had not mentioned Moscow in his rally
speech on the 23d, he did include references to the Soviet Union
in his speeches on the 20th and 24th. A 27 October QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN editorial on the joint communique thanked the USSR as
well as the PRC for assistance, pointedly noting that assistance
from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has been
valuable in the struggle against U.S. imperialism, "the enemy
number one of progressive mankind."
* The divergence between Chinw?se and Vietnamese positions on
this issue in recent months, including that reflected at the
beginning of Dong's visit, is discussed in the TRENDS of
24 November, pages 4-5.
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In the course of the visit, Dong's formulations on proletarian
internationalism converged with those of the Chinese after an
initial reluctance to match the Chinese claims.* By the time
of Dong's 23 November Peking rally speech, in which he
effusively praised Sino-Vietnamese unity, the DRV leader was
prepared to acknowledge that "our relations based on Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism have developed daily
and become all the more unbreakable;" he further added an
expression of gratitude for Chinese support "filled with noble
proletarian internationalist sentiments."** At the Peking
banquet his delegation gave on the 24th, Dong noted that the
Chinese speeches during his visit had been "full of proletarian
internationalist spirit," and he forcefully reaffirmed that
Siao-Vietnamese friendship "is based on Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism and no force on eart% can shake it."
** One of the first authoritative indicators of the degree of
Hanoi's disquiet over Peking's invitation to President Nixon
was Defense Minister Giap's failure for the first time in his
annual congratulatory message on the 1. August anniversary of
the Chinese PTA to characterize Chinese assistance as being in
the spirit of "proletarian internationalism."
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1 DECEMBER 1971
C"UNIST Dong's speech on the 24th included, for the first
UNITY time during the visit, a renewal of the plea
contained in Ho's will that "our party will do its
best to contribute effectively to the restoration of unity among
the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism." The appeal in Ho's will, issued
in September 1969 at a time when Sino-Soviet tensions were at
a peak, had been recalled by DRV leaders three times previously
in the past two months. Le Duan's invocation of the appeal fcr
communist unity at a 4 October rally welcoming Podgornyy
represented the first such high-level DRV pledge to work for the
restoration of unity since last June--that is, since before
Peking's invitation to President Nixon and Hanoi's July-August
polemics charging that the Nixon Doctrine is aimed at splitting
the communist countries. Ho's "teachings" on the restoration
of 4olidarity of the socialist camp were mentioned in an
article on DRV diplomacy by Foreign Minister Trinh in the
October issue of the party journal HOC TAP. In a 14 October
interview with the Italian CP organ L'UNITA, as carried by
VNA English on the 18th, Dong responded to a question on the
DRV's policy of unity within the communist world by pledging
to carry out Ho's will. (Strangely, however, the 29 October
joint communique on the visit to the DRV of North Korea's
Pak Song-chol said nothing about efforts to divide the communist
countries or about the need to work for restoration of communist
solidarity.)
Apart from Dong's invocation of Ho's will, the subject of Sino-
Soviet discord was largely avoided in the mutual effort of the
Chinese and Vietnamese to project a sense of harmony. The
sole anti-Soviet barb was contained in Chou's speech on the
23d when he voiced Peking's line on the medium and small
countries uniting against the superpowers. On the same
occasion Dong in effect rebutted Peking's line by linking
China and Vietnam with "the entire powerful socialist camp."
During the visit Dong did not, however, repeat North Vietnamese
statements at the time of Chou's visit last March that the DRV
stands at the southeastern outpost of the socialist camp.
U.S. POLICY In another area of likely divergence, policy
toward the United States, the two sides sought
to reach an accommodation by expressing mutual concern over the
application of the Nixon Doctrine in the form of Vietnamization.
In a reference to the American role in Asia generally, the
joint communique points out that Washington is applying the
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Nixon Doctrine in Indochina by "talking about 'reducing U.S.
commitments' in Asia; this in essence is to prolong, intensify,
and expand its war of aggression against Indochina." The
Chinese took the occasion of the visit to ascribe priority
to the Vietnam conflict among current international problems,
in effect seeking to reassure the North Vietnamese that
Sino-U.S. relations will not take precedence over their
cause. This point, which was made by Chou in his welcoming
remarks on the 20th, was repeated in a 28 November PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial on the visit.
Perhaps in a gesture to Hanoi's apprehension over the meaning
of the Nixon visit, the Chinese joined the Vietnamese in
asserting in the communique that "U.S. imrerialism," though
"constantly altering its tactics and methods," has "not in
the least changed its aggressive amibition." However, while
reciting standard views of the two sides on Korea, Japan, and
other subjects, the communique does not directly address
itself to the Nixon Administration's policies or the role of
the Nixon Doctrine outside the Indochina context.
VIETNAM In noting that the two sides affirm that the
SETTLEMENT PRG seven-point proposal provides the correct
basis for a Vietnam settlement, the joint
communique repeats Pham Van Dong's 20 November hardened
elaboration of points one and two on U.S. withdrawal and
support for President Thieu: Thus, it specifies that U.S.
withdrawal and ceasing aggression as outlined in point
one must include putting "an end to all activities of U.S.
air and naval forces and all other military acts against the
people in both the southern and northern parts of Vietnam";
and it explains that the provision under point two for an
end to U.,S. interference and support for President Thieu
means that the United States must "relinquish all its
commitments to the fascist Nguyen Van Thieu clique."
Editorials in the 27 November DRV party organ NHAN DAN and
the army paper QVAN DOI KHAN DAN reviewing the joint communique
quote these passages verbatim. However, a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial on the 28th refers more generally to the two "most
important points" of the PRG proposal: "U.S. i.nperialism
must speedily, totally and unconditionally withdraw its troops
from South Vietnam and stop supporting the Nguyen Van Thieu
clique.'
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
SOVIET TASS and Moscow radio broadcasts carried brief,
COVERAGE factual reports of Phnm Van Dong's activities in
China. The reports predictably singled out his
expressions of gratitude for Soviet aid, his toasts to the
solidarity of the communist countries, and his recollection
of the call in Ho's will for a restoration of communist unity.
A commentary broadcast in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress
on 27 November cited Dong's thanks to the Soviet Union for
assistance and said that these remarks reflect "a close,
genuine internationalist relationship" between the Vietnamese
people and the peoples of the USSR and other socialist
countries. The commentary went on to cite examples of Soviet
aid, including shipments of weapons, military equipment, and
ammunition, the assistance of Soviet military specialists in
setting up a DRV antiaircraft system, and economic aid. It
concluded with the assertion that these facts contradict
"Chinese propaganda machinery's fabrications" that the Soviet
Union "has betrayed the interests of the friends in Indochina."
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COMMUNISTS DENOUNCE NEW SOUTH VIETNAMESE MOVE INTO CAMBODIA
The 22 November launching of a new ARVN operation into Cambodia
prompted official protests from the PRG's spokesman in Paris on
the 23d, from a spokesman of Sihanouk's foreign ministry on the
25th, and by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 30th.
Peking endorsed the Sihanouk government's protest in a
28 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which denounced
"U.S. imperialism" for "this new crime of aggression" and
expressed confidence that the operation would "certainly end
in ignominious defeat."
All three Indochinese statements claimed that the United States
is behind the new military move. The PRG and DRV spokesmen,
charging that the operation is commanded by U.S. officers and
supported by U.S. aircraft, maintained that the new "aggression"
demonstrates the "deceitful character" of President Nixon's
"allegation" about the cessation of the U.S. combat role and
refraining from direct interference in Cambodia.
z
The ARVN incursion was also condemned in articles published'in
the DRV party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN on 27 November. The papers also stressed U.S. responsibility
for the operation, with NHAN DAN asserting that the ARVN troops
"were sent into Cambodia on U.S. orders, with direct support
of the U.S. Air Force, and with the participation of U.S. troops."
To document the latter charge, NHAN DAN cited a Western news
report that an American captain had been seen with South
Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. In addition to denouncing the
Cambodian operation, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN scored "fierce U.S. air
strikes," the "scheme" to send ARVN troops into southern Laos,
and "recent repeated" air strikes against the DRV. The army
paper routinely claimed that these actions demonstrate that
"Nixon is very stubborn and still persists in scheming to
prolong and expand the war of aggression" in Indochina.
APPEAL TO CITIZENS Shortly after the launching of the ARVN
OF PHNOM PENH operation an unusual broadcast on the 23d
over Sihanouk's clandestine radio sought
to play upon Cambodian concern about fighting near the capital
and hostility toward the Saigon forces. It charged that the Lon
.Vol government had "decided that before they are completely
defeated and before they take flight abroad they will allow the
U.S. imperialists and Saigon running dogs to destroy Phnom Penh."
The broadcast alleged that "according to the U.S. imperialist
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CONPIDETL 1 DECEe1BER 1971
radio, on 19 November 1971 the U.S. imperialists sent planes to
bomb the outskirts of Phnom Penh and dispatched Thieu-Ky troops
to destroy Phnom Penh and quell the people." It called upon
the Cambodian people to "prevent the Thieu-Ky gang from
entering Phnom Penh, the U.S. pirates from annihilating Phnom
Penh," and the "wounded" Lon Not regime from "escaping." The
broadcast also urged the people to take up arms against the
govern:aent and to "evacuate" to the "liberated zone" to avoid
U.S. bombing and strafing.
LAOS: SOUPHANOUVONG LET.?ER REVERTS TO CALL FOR BCt4BING HALT
Prince Souphanouvong resumes the nearly two-year-old correspondence
with Prince Souvanna Phouma on the issue of a settlement in Laos
with a hard-line letter dated 20 November and delivered on the
23d by the NLHS permanent representative ii. Vientiane, Soth
Pethrasi. This reopens the correspondence which had been
interrupted last August when Tiao Souk Vongsak, Souphanouvong's
"special envoy," left Vientiane for Sam Neua after delivering
a letter denouncing Souvanna Phouma for refusing to accept the
22 June NLHS proposal for a simultaneous bombing halt and
cease-fire throughout the whole territory of Laos.*
The current message reverts to the NLHS stand prior to the
22 June proposal in demanding that the United States "stop its
war of aggression in Laos," and that "first of all it must stop
immediately and unconditionally the bombardment of the whole
territory of Laos so that contacts may be created for the Lao
people to sit down together and settle their own affairs
without foreign interference." In apportioning the blame, the
message, like previous letters, places "full responsibility''
for the consequences of new military adventures on the Nixon
Administration and warns Souvanna Phouma that he will also have
to bear his "share" of the responsibility. While Souphanouvong's
sharpest attack is against President Nixon, he also assails
Souvanna Phouma. He claims that the situation in Laos is
worsening due to the "sinister schemes of the Nixon Administration"
and calls the President "the most barbarous murderer of our times."
But Souphanouvong also accuses Souvanna Phouma of having discussed
* For a discussion of the Souvanna Ph :a-Souphanouvong exchange
of letters following the 22 June NLHS proposal see the TRENDS of
14 July 1971, pages 8-9 and 11 August 1971, pages 7-8.
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intensification of the U.S. bombing and an increase of Thai
troops in Laos with the President during his Washington visit
in September. And he warns the Prince that "unless you
resume without delay the line which conforms to the aspirations
of the nation and which you adopted in the 1961-62 period, the
Lao people will not tolerate these misdeeds of yours."
Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow media have all reported the
Souphanouvong message as usual, but thus far there has been
no comment. There has as yet been no communist acknowledgment
of Souvanna Phouma's 27 November reply to Souphanouvong which
complains that the latter once again was silent about North
Vietnamese aggression in Laos, and which repeats suggestions
that Tiao Souk Vongsak be given authority to negotiate and
that the Plain of Jars be neutralized.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971.
CHINA
JOINT EDITORIAL CONDEMNS "SWINDLERS," CALLS FOR PARTY UNITY
A joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial,
released on 30 November, calls for strengthening party leader-
ship to overcome "the great harm to the unity and unification
of the party" caused by Liu Shao-chi and "other swindlers." The
use of a joint editorial, the most authoritative form of media
comment, raises the propaganda campaign against Lin P::ao to a
higher stage and underscores the need to step up efforts to
strengthen party authority over all aspects of society. All
other joint editorials issued since August 1969 have been pegged
to specific anniversaries; with none released for National' Day
this year, the last such joint editorial came on Army Day, 1 August.
Utilizing a lengthy quotation from a speech by Mao in 1964, the
current editorial recalls the past "conspiracies and intrigues"
that "emerged on the Central Committee." Mao is quoted as
saying (in 1964) that "even now . . . persons plotting is an
objective fact." The editorial then pointedly observes on its
own that throughout the party's history "bourgeois careerists,
conspirators and persons having illicit relations with foreign
countries" have only brought "disgrace and destruction upon
themselves in the end."
While it is clearly indicated that plotters threaten party unity
today, the editorial says there are only a handful of "hidden
antiparty, antisocialist counterrevolutionaries" within the
party. All party members, "particularly the party's high-
ranking cadres," are instructed to "be frank and forthright
politically." In order to improve the work style of the party
as well as party spirit, party members are encouraged to state
their "political views openly" and to express agreement or
opposition "on every important political issue, adhering to
what is right and correcting what is wrong."
The necessity for party committees to exercise unified
leadership "over all kinds of work" including "industry,
agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army and
the government" is given specific stress. Members of party
committees "at all levels" must work to strengthen their
concept of the party "and place themselves within the party
committee and not outside it, still less above it." Deeper
study of the works of Marx, Lenin and Mao is prescribed for
all party members to help them distinguish between the "Marxist
line and the opportunist line."
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FI3IS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1.971
"SWINDLERS" ARE ATTACKED FOR ERRORS IN AGRICULTURAL LINE
Peking propagandists are clearly making a major effort to smear
the targets of the current purge with the same accusations
brought earlier against Liu Shao-chi. The incessant coupling
of Liu with current "political swindlers" seems ' + answer the
same purpose as the portrayal of Liu, early in the cultural
revolution, as "China's Khrushchev." The latest items in this
campaign charge the "political swindlers" with having undermined
Mao's agricultural. policies by fomenting deviations on both the
left and the right-; the charges now dredged up differ little
from those earlier aimed at Liu alone.
An article in RED FLAG No. 12, broadcast by Radio Peking on
27 November, is aimed primarily at the leftist errors of the
swindlers. It indicates that they first tried to undermine
the commune system in the late 50's by immediately putting
the communes under state control and by ignoring the need to
retain private plots during the current stage of socialist
development. The article, by a county first secretary, notes
that the masses' enthusiasm had been "dampened" by the leftist
policies as well as by the overtly rightist attacks which
followed. Moderate current policies outlined by the article
clearly show that leaders pushing a leftist line during the
cultural revolution have lost out, but it seems unlikely that
Lin and the military leaders were actually guilty of this
particular deviation; most of the experiments in leftist
agricultural policy were dropped after 1967 when the army
became dominant.
An article by the writing group of the Anhwei Provincial CCP
Committee, broadcast by Peking on 30 November, focuses its
attack on agricultural mechanization, with a lengthy
theoretical discussion on the need for collectivization
to precede mechanization. The article adds little of
substance to the voluminous file of charges already aimed
at Liu for crimes in this field, but it does state that Liu's
errors will still be a threat as long as any vestige of
private ownership exists. Without calling for an immediate
end to private ownership, the article notes that ideas of
the old society still influence not only exploiters, "but
also exert an influence in varying degrees on the masses of
people." Because of this lingering influence of the old
society, it, remains possible for agents of the bourgeoisie
to sneak into the party "in order to usurp-leadership of the
party and state."
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1 DECEMBER 1971
PRC - PAKISTAN
PEKING REAFFIRIV1S MEASURED SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN
In the wake of Pakistan's charge of 22 November that India has
launched an "all-out offensive against East Pakistan," Peking
has become more vocal in its declarations of support for Pakistan
and in its denunciation of Indian "subversive activities and
military provocations." However, Peking's stand on the crisis
surrounding events in East Pakistan has not shifted substantively
from previous Chinese statements of policy--notably Acting Foreign
Minister Chi. Peng-fei's comments on 7 November during All Bhutto's
visit to the PRC.* In particular, Peking has been careful not to
characterize current Indian actions as "foreign aggression,"
against which the Chinese have pledged support to Pakistan in
vague terms. Peking has reiterated its call for "peaceful
consultations" to settle the dispute and for "serious considera-
tion" to be given to President Yahya Khan's "reasonable proposal"
fur a mutual withdrawal and disengagement of armed forces from
the border areas.
INDIAN ACTIONS Reflecting Peking's anxiety over ..he increased
tension in the Indian subcontinent, Chou En-lai,
at a meeting with the Pakistani ambassador on the 24th at which
he received a letter from Yahya Khan, "expressed concern over
the military provocations carried out by India along the East
Pakistan border in the past few days." From that date Peking
has given limited coverage to press reports--principally
Pakistani--detailing alleged Indian military activities
against Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Since 20 August
Chinese media had discontinued publicizing Pakistani charges
of Indian military activities. An NCNA dispatch on the 24th
and Peking radio broadcasts in Bengali on the 25th cited
Associated Press of Pakistan reports of the 22d that "India,
without a formal declaration of war, launched an all-o:'t
offensive against East Pakistan" and that Yahya Khan had
declared a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. On the
28th an NCNA report focused on Indian press articles and
Western press agency dispatches citing Indian admissions
that Indian forces had been given the "authority to invade
East Pakistan by crossing over, the border under the pretext
of 'self-defense."'
* Peking's carefully measured treatment of Bhutto's 5-8
November "friendly visit" is discussed in the TRENDS of
10 November, pages 28-31.
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0
A wide-ranging NCNA article on the 29th charged that in the
past week the Indian Government, "supported and encouraged
by social imperialism, has been carrying out repeated
subversive activities and military provocations against East
Pakistan," sending large numbers of armed forces across the
border and occupying Pakistani territory. Quoting Pakistani
news sources for detailed reports of Indian military activities
in East Pakistan, NCNA noted that the Indian troops were using
many Soviet-made weapons and charged that the USSR "was
speeding up its supply of large amounts of arms and military
material for the Indian Government." Accusing the Soviets of
exerting diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, the report recalled
Podgornyy's 3 April letter to Yahya Khan and noted a more
recent letter "generally on the same line as the previous
one." NCNA also took note of a number of recent PRAVDA
articles which, "turning white into black, blamed Pakistan
for creating tension in the Hindustan subcontinent and tried
to intimidate Pakistan into accepting a 'political solution'
beneficial to India."
CHINESE SUPPORT Though Chou on the 24th was quoted only
as having expressed concern at Indian
"military provocations," Peking's support for Pakistan was
reaffirmed by Li Shui-ching, Minister of the First Ministry
of Machine Building and head of a PRC delegation attending
two ceremonies in Pakistan in connection with 'PRC-aided
projects, and by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien at a reception
given by the Albanian ambassador on the 29th. At a banquet
in Islamabad on the 24th, Li Shiu-ching assured his hosts
that "should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression,
the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly
support the Pakistan Government and people in their just
struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national
independence." This commitment is identical to that pledged
by Chi Peng-fei on 7 November at a Peking banquet for the
visiting Pakistani delegation headed by Ali Bhutto. On
25 November, following a similar pledge, Li Shiu-ching
added vaguely that "we are firmly convinced that a just
cause is bound to be victorious and that the friendship
between the peoples of China and Pakistan will be consolidated
and developed continuously."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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Pledging Chinese support for Pakistan "in their just struggle
against foreign aggression and in defense of their state
sovereignty and national independence," Li 1 Isi.en-nien on the
29th declared that the tension on the subcontinent had been
"aggravated" by the "subversive activities and military
provocations" of the Indian Government, "supported and
encouraged by social imperialism." Expressing the PRC's
"nceat concern" and pressing for "peaceful consultations"
by "the two parties concerned," Li Haim-nien urged that
"serious consideration" be given to Yahya Khan's mutual
withdrawal proposal.
Though Chinese comment specifically devoted to the Indian-
Pakistani dispute has remained silent about the Soviet-Indian
treaty, this subject was broached for the firct time in Chinese
media in the text of Chiao Kuan-hva'-. address to the UN
General Assembly on 26 November rebutting a Soviet attack
on Peking's disarmament policy. Released by NCNA on the 27th,
Chiao's speech included an attack oa the Soviet Union for
having concluded what "in essence" is "a treaty of military
alliance" with "a neighbor of China." Chiao charged that
with "the encouragement and support of this treaty" the
unnamed neighbor "launched bare-faced armed aggression
against Pakistan, another neighbor of China, thus aggravating
tension in Asia." Apart from this speech, Peking has not
drawn implications for Asian security general'y in discussing
the Indian-Pakistani crisis.
Peking has also been careful--in view of the Chinese commitment
to "support" Pakistan in the event of "foreign aggression"
against that country--to avoid using that term in its own
name when describing current Indian actions. Apart from Chiao's
reference to "armed aggression," the Chinese have instead
referred to "subversive activities and military provocations."
REFUGEE PROBLEM Peking has used the United Nations as a
forum for airing its views on another
issue--the East Pakistan refugee problem--that it had avoided
in commenting on the Indian-Pakistani conflict. While Peking
has shied away from dealing with the events in East Pakistan
prompting the crisis, it set forth its stand "on the so-called
'question of refugees from East Pakistan"' in a statement on
19 November by one of its delegates addressing the UNGA Third
Committee. The only previous reference in PRC media to the
refugee issue was contained in a 26 June NCNA dispatch quoting
a Pakistani spokesman as saying that India was "trying to
prevent the displaced people from returning to their homes in
East Pakistan."
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The speech by the Chinese delegate at the United Nations,
transmitted by NCNA, contended that the refugee problem arose
"due to a certain country's intervention in Pakistan's
internal affairs." The delegate, Fu Han, declared that
"the country concerned" has repeatedly rejected all of
Pakistan's proposals "to relax the tension on the subcontinent
and settle the question of refugees." Fu Hao compared these
"tactics of interference in the internal affairs of other
countries" with those of "a certain neighboring country"*
which "plotted a rebellion in the Tibetan region of our
country and carried out subversive activities." Stressing
that the refugee problem is purely an internal matter and
that the first step to its solution is cessation of "the
interference in Pakistan's internal affairs," Fu distinguished
the refugee problem from "disputes between states." The
latter, he explained "should be settled through consultation
between the countries concerned."
* The Chinese delegates' consistent failure to refer to India
by name--in contrast to direct attacks on the Soviet Union and
the United States--suggests an effort by Peking to softpedal its
censure of another member of "the third world." In his maiden
speech to the UNGA, Chiao Kuan-hua had declared that the PRC
was a member of the third world and had voiced Peking's line of
opposition by small and medium countries against the two super-
powers.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW PICTURES ISRAEL AS INCREASINGLY MILiTARISTIC
As the UNGA debate on the Middle East approaches, Moscow propaganda--
including signed articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA--builds up a
picture of an increasingly militant Israel creating an atmosphere
reminiscent of that prior to the June 1967 war and again threaten-
ing the Arabs. Orekhov in PRAVDA on the 28th, for example,
accused Abba Eban of declaring in the Knesset that Israel is
ready to renew war, and Shimon Peres of "threatening Egypt that
after the new war it 'would have to hold talks not about the
frontiers existing before the 1967 six-day war but about the
frontiers which will arise as a result of the conflict in 1971
or 1972.1 "
At the same time, Moscow dismisses Israeli "inventio.ts" about
"alleged belligerency among the Arabs," charging that Israeli
propaganda falsifies the statements of Egyptian leaders and
"screams about Cairo's inflexible position." Propagandists
continue to portray Egypt as seeking a political settlement and
planning co present "substantial constructive proposals" in the
UNGA discussion, and they characterize the Arab countries as
"maintaining self-control and keeping cool." The United States
is routinely described as not only failing to try to restrain
the Israeli leaders, but encouraging Tel Aviv's "extremist
demands."
As evidence of the "militarist campaign" conducted by Israel
and its U.S. supporters, commentators point to Tel Aviv's demands
for further Phantom deliveries, Senate approval of half a billion
dollars to finance "new offensive weapons deliveries" to Israel,
press reports of U.S. "intention" to supply Israel with
surface-to-surface Lance missiles, reports of a "secret Pentagon-
Israeli agreement" on assir,tance in production of military
equipment in Israel, and the announcement of Golda Meir's forth-
coming talks in Washington. A domestic service broadcast on the
26th briefly noted that UN cease-fire observers reported an
overflight of Egyptian positions on the canal by two Israeli
military aircraft--date unspecifie%'-.--and that Egyptian anti-
aircraft batteries were forced to open fire. TRUD correspondent
Repin, according to TASS on the 26th, acknowledged that the
Arab countries, taking into consideration the "military psychosis
being whipped up" in Israel, are taking steps to increase combat
preparedness "of their troops and rear" to frustrate Israeli
designs.
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FORMER MIDEAST CONMENTATOK MAKSIMOV AUTHORS SERIES IN ARABIC
A series of talky broadcast in Mosrow's Arabic-language service
22-25 November marks the reappearance of Yevgeniy Maksimov as a
radio commentator on Middle East affairs. His commentaries had
from time to time been featured on Arabic-language broadcasts
from 1955 through 1959. His only known--and noteworthy--comment
on the area since then was his discussion, in the 27 January
1970 PRAVDA, of the Soviet proposals for a Middle East settlement.
This major article marked the first time in Soviet mass propaganda
that elements of the proposals had been specifically identified
as those advanced by the USSR.* A PRAVDA article.by Vasilyev in
January 1969 had first outlined the December 1968 Soviet proposals
but without identifying them as such.
The current Maksimov series has dealt with Moscow's understanding
of a political settlement; a shift in international public
opinion since 1967 more sympathetic to the Arabs; Soviet military
assistance to the Arabs while supporting a political settlement;
and Moscow's position vis-a-vis the Palestinian question.**
In the talk on the 24th, Maksimov argued that there is no
inconsistency in the Soviet position of supporting a political
settlement while enhancing the combat capability of the Arab
armies. The USSR believes, according to Maksimov, that as long
as the "consequences of Israeli aggression" have not been
eliminated, "the Arab countries could struggle with greater
success for a political settlement when they are strong and
capable of curbing Israeli aggression." Maksimov recalled that
during President as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow, agreement
was reached "by which the Soviet Union would make a new
contribution toward strengthening Egypt's mils.+:ary power."
But he went on to stress that this "has been and is still being
done" by the USSR "while insisting on a Middle East political
settlement."
In the last broadcast, Maksimov rejected two "erroneous, harmful,
and extremely dangerous" views: any attempt to reach a
political settlement which disregards the Palestinian question,
* See the 28 January 1970 TRENDS, pages 16-19.
** The first two commentaries are discussed in the 24 November
1971 TRENDS, pages 20-21.
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1 DrrEMBER 1971
and any attempt to make the Palestinian question preeminent
over all other issues of a political settlement. Maksimov
advocated a middle ground. The Palestinians' struggle for
their "national rights" could only succeed, he said, if they
are a part of the joint front struggling for "liquidation of
the consequences of the Israeli aggression." Noting that the
Palestinians "practice the right to carry out both armed acts
and political activity," he in effect advised them to use "all
forms of struggle and not just one form to the exclusion of
all others."
MOSCOW NOTES JORDANIAN PREMIER "KILLED" IN CAIRO
The 28 November assassination of Jordanian Premier and Defense
Minister Wasfi at-Tall in Cairo is acknowledged by Moscow in
a one-r,entence TASS report that day datelined Cairo. Citing
the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, TASS says only that at-Tall, who
was in Cairo for a session of the Arab Joint Defense Council,
"was killed today" at the entrance to the Sheraton Hotel. In
keeping with past Soviet disapproval of Palestinian extremist
actions, such as aircraft hijackings, TASS fails to explain
how he wes killed and makes no mention of the assailants,
members of an organization called Black September.
Promptly reporting the formation of the new Jordanian cabinet,
TASS reports from Amman on the 29th that it is headed by
Ahmad al-Lawzi, who also holds the defense ministry post, and
that the transport minister has also been given the finance
portfolio (formerly al-Lawzi's). TASS adds that there are
no other changes "as compared to the cabinet headed by the
last prime minister, Wasfi at-Tall." The item concludes by
noting, without comment, that a government declaration broadcast
by Radio Amman stresses that the new cabinet will continue the
former political course.
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ROMANIA - YUGOSLAVIA
TITO-CEAUSESCU CCNMIUNIQUE STRESSES INDEPENDENCE. AFFINITY
Yugoslav and Romanian media played up the Tito-Ceausescu meeting
in Timisoara on 23-24 November as confirmation of the excellent
state of relations and solidarity between the two countries and
parties. The Romanians in particular gave the meeting extensive
coverage, with an article in the party organ SCINTEIA on the 27th
hailing it as "a brilliant expression of Romanian-Yugoslav friend-
ship and r, remarkable contribution to the general cause of peace
and socialism." The lengthy joint communique issued on the 25th
says the talks took place in an atmosphere of "friendship,
cordiality, and full mutual esteem and understanding," adding
that the two side's reached "an identity or great closeness of
views" on the questions discussed.
The emphasis on close Romanian-Yugoslav collaboration and general
identity of views was apparently designed for domestic as well
as international consumption, to offset any notion that Ceausescu's
independent policies have resulted in Romania's isolation or that
Brezhnev's 22-26 September visit tc Belgrade has in any way
adversely affected Belgrade's special relationship with Bucharest.*
In an apparent gesture of reassurance to Ceausescu on this score,
Tito used the occasion of a toast on the 24th to suggest that the
two leaders "could meet not only once*but even twice" a year or
"at any time there is an opportunity for it." The strong emphasis
on bilateral ties is underlined in a section of the communique
dealing with economic cooperation between the two countries.
Noting that "untapped possibilities" still exist for further
cooperation, the document calls for broadening economic, scientific,
* Although the Romanians predictably welcomed the Brezhnev-Tito
talks, Bucharest's highly selective coverage of Brezhnev's
Yugoslav visit and its pointed failure to report the Soviet
leader's subsequent visits to Budapest and Sofia seemed
suggestive of disquiet over Soviet motives. Reflecting apparent
concern to avoid portraying a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement for
Romanian domestic consumption, the AGERPRES account of the
25 September Soviet-Yugoslav joint statement, carried in the
Bucharest press, omitted passages referring to the existence of
a good basis for further development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations,
the planned increase in interparty contacts and state-level
consultations, and the agreement on mass media exchanges. The
AGERPRES account also left out a concluding passage dealing with
mutual friendship.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
and technical cooperation, as well as for broadened contacts and
cooperation between scientific and cultural institutions and
between press organs and other media.
In the wake of Brezhnev's public reaffirmation of the principles
of the 1955 Belgrade statement and the 1956 Moscow declaration,
the communique reasserts both sides' resolve to promote relations
with "all" communist parties on the basis of "equality, mutual
respect, and noninterference in internal affairs" and upholds the
right of every party to build its internal and foreign policy
platforms "in line with conditions in its country."
Capping talks which presumably encompassed the Yugoslav leader's
discussions with President Nixon in Washington in late October
as well as his earlier talks with Brezhnev, the communique
reiterates the two sides' shared policy of developing relations
of friendship and cooperation with all countries, regardless of
social systems, on the basis of principles of independence,
sovereignty, equality, mutual benefit, and noninterference, in
the interests of international detente. There is no specific
mention of the Soviet Union anywhere in the document, or of
China except in an approving reference to Peking's entry into
the United Nations. But Belgrade's and Bucharest's already
manifest approval for the Chinese and Soviet invitat'ons to
President Nixon is reflected in a passage welcoming the
"intensified direct contacts and exchanges of views between
heads of state and governments of different countries,"
accompanied by a replay of the theme that the solving of
world problems requires the participation of all countries--
"big, medium, and small."
EUROPEAN SECURITY Both sides reaffirm their support for a
AND DISARMAMENT European security conference without
preconditions and with U.S. and Canadian
participation. Underscoring what Belgrade and Bucharest
evidently both hope to gain from such a conclave, the document
expresses hope that it "will contribute to the building of a
system of European security that would effectively guarantee
peace, independence, and sovereignty for all European states
as well as cooperation based on equality"--a formulation that
in effect defines an antidote to the Brezhnev doctrine.
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With much the same thrust, the communique follows up a plea for
general and complete disarmament* with a call for partial
measures including the renunciation of military maneuvers on
xoreign territories and the banning of new military bases or
emplacement of nuclear weapon! on other countries' territoric .
It also calls for liquidating foreign military bases, withdrawal
of troops to within national boundaries, and the elimination of
military blocs.
In the European context, and with the Macedonian question
possibly in mind, the communique makes a noteworthy call for
the "inviolability" of borders and declares that "respect for
the territorial integrity of all European countries represents
an essential prerequisite" for relaxing European tensions and
promoting cooperation.
THE bALKANS The only direct reference to the Balkans in the
communique is a brief call for multilateral and
bilateral cooperation and for turning the Balkans into a zone
of peace without nuclear weapons--an objective long pressed by
Romania. An indication that the two sides may differ in their
approaches to Balkan security was reflected in. the toasts
exchanged between the two leaders on the 23d. Where Ceausescu
made a pitch for the Romanian proposal to convert the Balkans
into a zone of peace and multilateral cooperation, Tito. in
reply stressed the need for readiness to defend independence
and sovereignty and commented vaguely that "our two countries
will contribute to a broader and faster stabilization of the
situation in the Balkans, contributing in this way to world
peace."
Reflecting Belgrade's general preference for bilateral over
multilateral cooperation and its aversion to blocs, Tito's
apparent lack of enthusiasm for multilateral Balkan cooperation
may also mirror a Yugoslav belief that chances of cooperation
with Sofia are negligible because of the perennial Macedonian
question. As if to offaet_ any impression of negativism on
Belgrade's part, however, Tito remarked defensively in a final
toast on the 24th that Yugo'lavia was willing to work toward
solving "dissonant" problen. in the Balkans.
* Against the background of the acrimonious Sino-Soviet
exchange in the United Nations over the rival Soviet and PRC
proposals for a world disarmament conference, the communique
calls in a one-sentence paragraph for "the convening of a
general disarmament conference with the participation of all
states."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
INTERNAL The two leaders acquainted each other with "the
AFFAIRS achievements, success, and further development of
the two countries," according to the communique,
and "exchanged views on experiences gained" in socialist
building. The document is predictably devoid of any hint at
internal, problems facing either country, but Tito remarked
in his toast on the 24th that "we have to focus our attention.
fir!t of all on solving our domestic problems, as we still
have much to do so as to meet the requirements of our
socialist society."
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GERMAN CP
ILLEGAL KPD TREATED AS STILL EXTANT. THOUGH INOPERATIVE
The second congress of the l6$al German Communist Party (DKP),
held in Duesseldorf "i-28 November, repeated the long-standing
demand that the F14 . ernment annul the 1956 Federal Constitu-
tional Court decis.'ori .,claring the Communist Party of Germany
(KPD) illegal, despit.? ,ndications in the media that the KPD
exists in name only if at all and that its legality has become
an academic question. The KPD has been without a titular head
since late September, when its leader, Max Reimann, publicly
announced his decision to join the DKP and stated that he now
belonged to that party alone. Within days of Reimann's
announcement, the KPD's clandestine radio went off the air
after broadcasting for 15 years from East Germany. And there
has been no mention since, from Moscow or East Berlin, of KPD
statements or activities.
BACKGROUND The DKP was founded on 25 September 1968 in
ON THE DKP Frankfurt. The statement announcing its forma-
tion declared the new party's respect for the
West German constitution and resolve to defend "the basic
democratic rights and principles" set forth in that document.
While the formation of the new party seemed clearly designed
to circumvent the West German ban on the KPD, the announcement
sought to get across the idea that the new party was not to
displace the KPD, reiterating the demand that the ban on the
illegal party be lifted.
The DKP held its first congress in Essen in April 1969. Its
draft theses for the recent second congress, published in the
DKP organ UNSERE ZEIT on 7 August of this year, was at pains to
conform to the pledge of allegiance to the FRG constitution by
avoiding the Marxist-Leninist positions espoused by the KPD;
rather than calling for a "dictatorship of the proletariat,"
for example, it appealed to West German "anti-monopolist
forces" to gain "a decisive influence on the government and
society" and called for development of a socialist society
in West Germany "on the basis of the democratic principles
and rights proclaimed in the constitution."
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CONFIDI;NT.IAL I'ISIS 'T'RENDS
I. DECEMBER .1, 971
A recent article in the Zagreb daily VJESNIK by the paper's
Rome correspondent, published in installments on 4 and 6 October,
discussed the efforts to legalize the German communist party in
the context of a review of Italian Communist Party (PCI) efforts
as a go-between to help improve East European communist countries'
relations with the FRG. The paper mentioned a meeting between
PCI Secretary General Luigi Longo and the then Chancellor
Kiesinger when the latter, along with the then Foreign Minister
Brandt, was in Rome on an official visit in February 1968.
Kiesinger and Longo, the paper said, discussed the question
of legalizing the KPD. VJESNIK noted that shortly thereafter
the legal DKP came into existence, "having accepted Kissinger's
suggestion" that the KDP's party statutes "be harmonized with
the West German constitution."*
The Yugoslav paper's portrayal of the DKP as designed from the
outset to supplant the KPD squares with evidence in the propa-
ganda of a well-orchestrated scenario--with the CPSU a key
participant--to ease the KPD out of the picture and bring a
respectable party to the forefront. The termination of the
virulently anti-FRG broadcasts of the KPD's clandestine radio
in particular serves as a tangible response to Brandt's
Ostpolitik. In the year since the signing of the Moscow and
Warsaw treaties with Bonn, Brandt has been quoted repeatedly
in the Western press as stating that one of the gains for
West Germrny accruing from his Ostpolitik has been the reduction
of anti-FRG invective issuing from the media of Moscow and its
bloc allies. But the full scenario has yet to be played out,
with the KPD, apparently in limbo, still treated as an entity
seeking legal recognition.
REIMANN'S SWITCH & The 72-year-old KPD Central Committee
FADEOUT OF THE KPD First Secretary Max Reimann, who has
campaigned for years to get the ban on
the KPD annulled, was formally elected to DKP membership on
27 September 1971 by the local party organization in Rheinhausen,
in the Ruhr-Westphalia area of West Germany, according to a
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND report two days later. On 25 September
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND had published an ADN account of an interview
* In October 1968, shortly after the announcement of the new
party's formation, the Federal Government withdrew the
standing 1954 arrest warrent for Reimann, who arrived back
in West Germany on 14 November 1968.
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CONP I DIONTIAL F1014 H TRIENDS
I DI,CEM131~R 171
grantud by Ruimann to the DKP preso sorvicu on the 23d, with a
prefatory conunont noting that "Ruimann had expressed the desire
to join the DKP" and that the local DKP leadership was reconunend-
ing that he be elected "honorary chairman" of the DKP. lie was
duly elected to the honorary post at the DKP congress on
26 November, according to ADN and PRAVDA.
Reimann explained in the interview that his motives for joining
the DKP, whose establishment he had "welcomed from the very
beginning," were "simple" in that the DKP, as the legal Marxist-
Leninist party of the West German workers class, strives for
all the proper goals of "freedom, democracy, and socialism" in
the FRG Pointing out that he had devoted all his strength in
recent years to the struggle for lifting the ban on the KPD,
Reimann asserted that this struggle "is and remains an urgent
political necessity." But he added that it was only natural
that he should join the DKP. As if to forestall any idea that
this decision was not entirely his own, Ruimann said that he
had publicly declared many times his intention to "set the date"
for his entry into the DKP and that "now is the time." He
stated that he now belonged to "one party, the DPK; thus I am
exercising no party functions outside the DKP." But he hastened
to add that his DPK membership had "nothing to do with a 'merger'
of the DKP and the KPD"; he was merely exercising the constitu-
tional right of every West German citizen to join a legal
political party.
Reimaun's purportedly spontaneous decision to join the DKP was
made known a month after he visited the USSR: On 27 August?
TASS reported that "KPD Central Committee First Secretary
Reimann" was "on rest" there "at the invitation" of the CPSU
Central Committee and was received by Politburo member Kirilenko
and Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev, head of the inter-
national section. A formal statement had been issued in the
name of the KPD as recently as 12 August--a central committee
statement marking the 15th anniversary of the West German ban
on the party. The KPD had been issuing its customary pronounce-
mea.ts and Ruimann had been performing his customary functions
through the spring and early summer, attending and addressing
the CPSU congress in March and the SED congress in June in his
capacity as head of the KPD; the party had sent a greetings
message to the CPSU congress.
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1 DIaCE;MIIISR 3.971.
No K1'D message was publicized in early November during the
observance of the October Revolution anniversary. Noting
Rolmann's unanimous election by the DKP congress as honorary
chairman of the legal party, PRAVDA on 26 November simply
identified him as "eminent figure of the German workers move-
ment. Addressing the congress on the 25th Reimann perfunctorily
repeated the demand that the ban on the KPD be lifted; ADN
reported Reimann's speech, but the CPSU and SED delegates at
the congress, politburo members Pelehe and Norden, respectively,
did not mention the KPD.
The KPD'a clandestine radio, "German Freedom Station 904," which
purported to broadcast clandestinely from within the FRG but
in fact used a transmitter at Magdeburg, East Germany, has not
been heard since 1 October--four days after Reimann was admitted
into the DPK. It had been on the air since 20 August 1956, three
days after the KPD was declared illegal.
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1. DECEMBER 1971
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FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PRAGUE COWENT DURING BILATERAL TALKS ANTICIPATES PROGRESS
Czechoslovak media have yet to comment on the outcome of the
most recent round of FRG-Czechoslovak "exploratory talks," held
in the Bavarian town of Rothenburg ob der Tauber on 18 and
14 November, but two Czechoslovak press commentaries appearing
while the talks were in session seemed to buttress prior
propaganda indications of expected progress. Western press
reports say the talks were viewed in Prague government circles
with satisfaction, and West German sources have noted that
FRG representative State Secretary Frank presented to his
counterpart, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign lelinister Gotz, a
"draft formulation" which went to the "utmost limit" that
Bonn can "Justify" on the pivotal issue of the Czechoslovak
demand that West Germany declare the Munich agreement
invalid ab initio; Gotz in turn reportedly made a counteroffer
in the form of a "suggestion."
Against the background of publicly acknowledged progress toward
a solution in the inner-German phase of the Berlin negotiations
and of the developing momentum for convening of a conference on
European secul.ty and cooperation, the Slovak youth paper SMENA
on the 18th, the first day of the recent two-day round of talks,
offered what seems the most optimistic public assessment in
Czechoslovak media to date on the prospects for the bilateral
talks since they started in March 1971. Citing "West German
information," SMENA said the fourth round of the talks "should
take place in a more favorable spirit;" since at the third
round in Prague in September "both sides agreed on the procedure
which should be followed." After routinely taking the Brandt
government to task for not adopting a "realistic and constructive
attitude" on the Munich agreement similar to that shown I.i
concluding the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and in cooperating to
solve the "West Berlin question," SMENA made a notable effort--
for the first time in Czechoslovak media--to dispel West
German concern that if the Munich agreement is declared invalid
ab initio, as Prague insists, former Sudeten Germans could be
affected by Czechoslovak laws regarding such crimes as high
treason in 1938 and by other legal issues.
Arguing along lines first broached in a Moscow radio talk by
"historian" Aleksandr Galkin in September, SMENA also discounted
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1 DECEMBER 1971
West German apprehensions over the consequences of meeting
Prague's demand on the Munich agreement: "It is surely obvious
that thm CSSR did not implement such an attitude toward the
Germans who had remained in our country after the war, and it
does not do so toward the Sudeten Germans who are now FRG
citizens and who have come to our country as tourists."
Possibly anticipating the Bonn "draft" and Prague "suggestion"
which FRG sources say were advanced in the bilateral talks,
SMENA said questions concerning state citizenship "should,
in fact, be codified by the agreement on the normalization
of relations." It added that "no specific work" on this
has been started "as yet."
Another Czechoslovak commentary, in the Prague daily SVOBODNE
SLOVO on the 19th, argued that the Prague position on the
Munich agreement is based on the "legal continuity" of the
Czechoslovak state as extant prior to September 1938--a view
which, the article noted, has been ado;ted subsequent to the
Munich agreement by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy
as signatory powers, leaving only the FLAG as one of the
German successor states to repudiate the agreement. But the
paper went on, in an abrupt change of tone, to declare that
"partial problems still exist today which must be solved and
which concern that entire [World War II] period," and
"certainly it is possirle to arrive at a solution."
Neither the authoritative party daily RUDE PRAVO nor CTK has
commented on the fourth round of the talks, and the talks
have been unmentioned by Czechoslovak leaders in their many
speeches in the past two weeks connected with the local and
national elections. Only Pavel Auersperg, Central Committee
member in charge of the party's international affairs
department, in a speech at the German Communist Party (DKP)
congress in Duesseldorf on 25 November, ,as discussed
Prague-Bonn relations since the fourth round. Repeating
the standard Czechoslovak demand for recognition of the
nonvalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio, Auersperg
used language almost identical to that of CPCZ Presidium
member Bilak on 11 November in stating that "no Czechoslovak
government" can ever recognize the temporary validity of the
Munich accord.*
* See the TRENDS of 17 November 1971, pages 34-36, for a
discussion of this new twist introduced by Bilak.
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CONFIDENTIAL P13IS 'T 'RENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
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CZECHOSLOVAK ELECTIONS
PRAGUE,IIOSCCJ DEFENSIVE ON MANDATE OF LONG-DELAYED VOTE
Czechoslovak media, seconded by Moscow, insist that the outcome
of the 26-27 November elections to the country's local and
national governing bodies amounts to a massive defeat for the
"rightists" and proof that the post-1968 "consolidation" has been
successfully completed. The vote was the first nationwide
election held in the CSSR since 1964; scheduled for 1968, it was
postponed, as the conservatives desired, until after the consolida-
tion process permitted a controlled 14th CPCZ Congress--finally
convened last May after a five-year interval. CTK on 28 November
publicized a figure of 99.45-percent participation in the election
by eligible voters, compared with publicized totals of 98-plus
percent in similar elections held in the GDR "u 14 November and
in Hungary on 25 April. Prague's announced results dispensed
with the usual formality--observed in the GDR and Hungary--of a
small total of "invalid" ba?lots. There was no publicity for
any contests in the CSSR elections, as had been the case in
the Hungarian vote.
TASS on the 28th, reporting the results of the election, carried
a commentary by PRAVDA's Prague correspondent Grinyuk proclaiming
the outcome proof that "the hopes of the enemies of Czechoslovakia
that the party of Czechoslovak communists will fail in regaining
the people's trust, in overcoming the difficulties and in
directing the republic along the road of further socialist
development, have dismally collapsed." The voters, Grinyuk
said, "voted 'yes' for the socialist system, for the policy
of their communist party, for friendship with'-:the peoples of
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."
DISRUPTIVE Prague media acknowledged the existence, if not
ACTIVITIES the scope, of disruptive activities during the
balloting despite the carefully prepared scenario.
Thus the Prague domestic service on the 27th, ambiguously noting
that the elections "were largely carried out in. a spirited
fashion," added that "isolated negative phenomena during the
first day of the elections did not influence the voters and were
condemned by the peopia themselves." The party organ RUDE PRAVO
on the same 'ay, hailing in advance the defeat of the "right-
wing," declared that "the enemies of our socialist set-up have
failed to disturb the dignified course of the elections, to
trouble the peaceful, optimistic atmosphere" and that "they have
not managed to launch any organized campaign, and all isolated
attempts to do so had no response."
CONFI NT
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
After the results were in, RUDE PRAVO on the 29th, in a
commentary entitled "Maturity," included low-keyed observations
to the effect that the election results were "more positive than
many expected" and demonstrated a "further switch of public
opinion." The commentary cited "the fiasco of the policy of
boycotting the elections which foreign reaction sought to
propagate hand-in-hand with the orphan renegades in the
country, opportunists and revisionists, who were anxious to
undermine confidence in the CPCZ." The paper's main target
was clearly the arch-liberal Josef Smrkovsky, who had publicly
deprecated the 14th CPCZ Congress and, indirectly, the
impending November national elections in an interview
published in the Milan weekly GIORNI-VIE NUOVE in mid-
September. RUDE PRAVO's 29 November commentary was notably
candid in describing the pre-election period as one of
"struggle" and of resolute efforts for "the liquidation of
disruption" and for "a sincere relationship with the USSR."
It claimed that the populace "gradually" came around to
the side of "truth."
The prominent role played by the unpopular leading party
conservatives in the conduct of the elections was recognized,
approti ngly, in a Grinyuk dispatch on the election preparations
published in PRAVDA on 24-November. Grinyuk reported "big
public meetings" at which "the country's prominert party and
state figures V. Bilak, K. Hoffman, A,, Indra, J. Lenart,
L. Strougal, and others" spoke. The dispatch reported Gustav
Husak as pledging, in a pre-election meeting, "consistent
adherence" to the May 1970 Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship
treaty--"the treaty which we rightly consider the guarantee
of the free life of our people and a pledge of the independence
of our state . . . ."
In a major speech in Prague on the 24th, Husak declared: "We
are able to say today that Czechoslovakia is an economically
and politically consolidated state." The main preoccupation
of the speech, however, was a defensive deprecation of enemies
of Husak's regime at home and abroad. The Czechoslovak leader
assailers economic reformist Ota Sik, now teaching at the
University of Basel, and took a further swipe at Smrkovsky:
"A man >'io has in recent years had a certain important position
in politics made himself heard by way of bourgeois channels,
alleging that only about 10 percent of the people are behind
this communist regime."
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CONFIDENTIAL FIIIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
The regime's sensitivity to such statements was exemplified
further in a harsh commentary by Rohacek in the Prague domestic
service on the 29th which leveled new direct attaeks on
Smrkovsky, who "dared to assert" that only 10 percent of the
populace backed the leadership, as well as on Dubcek and
Frantisek Kriegel. The commentary scored alleged Western newrr
reports that Smrkovsky "abstained" from the elections and
alleged Western efforts to exploit the recent birthday of "a
man who is hardly remembered by anyone in this country today,
the bankrupt politician Alexander Dubcek." It appeared to
revive the spectre of prosecution of Dubcek in adding thak:
a wavering opportunist has become a patron of the counter-
revolution." The talk concluded that "the mandate" of both
parts of the CSSR "is firmly in the hands of our leadership,
and it will never be otherwise."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL CONNIITTEE. SOVIET MEETINGS APPROVE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
Final formal ratification of the USSR's ninth five-year plan
occurred at the Central Committee plenum on 22-23 November and
the Supreme Soviet session on 24-26 November. At the plenum,
Baybakov delivered the main address on the five-year plan and
the 1972 plan, while Garbuzov reported on the budget. Brezhnev
delivered a major address on the party's conduct of foreign
policy since the 24th Party Congress as well as a summing-up
speech on the economic issues. These speeches have not been
released, but a plenum resolution routinely approving the
Politburo's handling of foreign policy is given w.:de publicity.
At the Supreme Soviet session, Kosygin delivered the report on
the five-year plan as well as a further closing statement
following the debate, while Garbuzov again reported on the
budget. Excerpts of Kosygin's speeches have been very widely
publicized, and text of his and Garbuzov's speeches are carried
in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. Most of the summaries of Kosygin's
report, as well as editorials in IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA on
27-28 November, reiterate the relatively restrained prediction
of the plan documents that total Soviet industrial and
agricultural output in 1975 will exceed the current U.S.
level of output.
The most dramatic development of the meetings was a negative
one--Voronov was not removed from the Politburo. Last July,
almost certainly at Brezhnev's instigation, Voronov had been
demoted from RSFSR Premier to the relatively insignificant
post of chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee. It
was widely thought that he would soon be removed from the
Politburo--in what would have been the first such ouster since
late 1964 apart from the retirement of overage members Mikoyan
and Shvernik in 1966. But the plenum did no more than elevate
Mikhail Solomentsev, Voronov's successor as RSFSR Premier,
from the secretariat to candidate membership of the Politburo.
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1 DECEMBER 1971
CONSUMER GOODS Kosygin's report displays continued high-level
sensitiv':-ry over the changed relationship
between the two sectors of industry--producer goods (Group A)
and consumer goods (Group B)--in the new five-year plan. Unlike
Brezhnev, who had candidly discussed the relationship between
the two branches of industry in his report to the 24th CPSU
Congress last March and had justified "a certain preferential
growth rate for Group B," Kosygin skirted the subject entirely.
Instead of disclosing the planned growth rates for the two
sectors of industry, as he had at the congress, Kosygin merely
reported the planned growth rate for industry as a whole
(47 percent) without any breakdown by sectors. In the body
of his report, however, he gave a rounded-off growth rate for
consumer goods production in the new plan (49 percent).
Kosygin's omission was corrected in the official version of the
five-year plan published on 27 November, which reported the
growth rates for Groups A and B at 46.3 percent and 48.6 percent,
respectively. Commenting on these rates, a I December PRAVDA
editorial reassures its readers that the higher growth rate for
consumer goods production "does not mean, of course, any
lessening of attention alven to heavy industry, which is the
foundation of the country's economic and defensive strength."
Although Kosygin gave similar reassurances, his deliberately
vague treatment of the problem highlights its sensitivity both
as a political issue and, more recently, a public relations
problem.
CONFIDENTIAL
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