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February 24, 1972
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Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008 Confidential IIIIIIIII~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIII OREIGN111 BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~ TRENDS in Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential 24 FEBRUARY 1972 (VOL. XXIII, NO. 8) Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00871 Approved For Release 2005/(1619p1W1 5T00875R000300050008-2 This propaganda analysis report is based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national d- :nse of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro- hibited by law. GROUP 1 Estlud.d (rain auiemelic downpredlnp and d!tle~tirtelien Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 CONTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention PRESIDENT'S CH:ZNA TRIP Peking Gives Visit Ample Coverage Without Commentary . . . . . 1 PRC Assesses U.S. China Policy Before President's Arrival . . 6 Moscow Exhibits Restraint, Uses Proxies to Stress Concerns . . 10 PRAVDA Defends CPSU's China Policy on Eve of Nixon Trip . . . 13 Radio Moscow Seeks to Fan Albanian Anxieties over Visit . . . 13 East European Allies Stress "Anti-Soviet" Aspect of Trip . . . 14 DRV, PRG Attach. President, Maintain Silence on Peking Visit . 18 Moscow Links Bombing with Nixon Trip, Scores Eight Points . . 21 PRC Offers Pro Forma Support to DRV on U.S. Air Strikes . . . 23 DRV Claims Seven U.S. Planes Downed, Displays Captured Pilots. 24 DRV, PRG Protest U.S. Postponement, Walk Out of Paris Session. 28 Le Duc Tho Meets U.S. Visitor; Other Leaders' Moves Reported . 29 Hanoi Army Paper Reviews Indochinese Military Situation . . . 30 PRC FOREIGN AFYAIRS New Approach Shown in One of Two New Recognition Agreements. . 31 USSR-ARAB RELATIONS Iraqi-Soviet Communique Suggests Future Treaty Relationship . 34 Visit of Libya's Jallud Given Minimal Publicity by Moscow . . 37 Grechko, Egyptians "Exchange Views" on Military Cooperation . 38 MEDITERRANEAN Moscow Sees Peace Threat in Greek Home-Port, Cyprus Issues . . 41 ECUADOR Cuba Adopts Wait-and-See Stance Toward New Military Regime . . 44 CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS Second Liaoning Party Plenum Denounces "Swindlers" . . . . . . 46 USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS Crackdown on Cultural Figures in Ukraine Continues . . . . . . 48 Approved For Release 209MNRDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FB I S TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 FEBRUARY Moscow (3118 items) Peking (1595 items) China (8%) 12% Domestic Issues (46%) 36% [Nixon Visit (1%) 5%] Indochina (26%) 25% Indochina (21%) 11% [U.S. Bombing (---) 7%] [World Assembly (13%) 7%] of DRV Meeting, Edgar Snow Death (--) 11% Versailles PRC-Mexico Diplomatic (--) 5% Greece, Cyprus (--) 7% Relations [Soviet Go,, arnraent (--) 5%] PRC-Argentina Diplomatic (--) 3% Statement on Greek Home Ports Relations Nixon Foreign Policy (--) 3% Iraqi Delegation in (1%) 6% Report USSR Hungarian Leader Kadar (--) 4% in USSR These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been 'overed in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 - 1 - PRESIDENT'S CHIN A TRIP PEKING GIVES VISIT AMPLE COVERAGE WITHOUT COMIENTARY Peking has provided extensive coverage tA President Nixon's visit while observing a virtual standdown In polemical propaganda on U.S. policies and act.ton .generally since the P.resident's arrival on 21 February. With Mao's extraordinary meeting with the President on the very fj.tst day signaling the major attention to be accorded the visit, 's coverage seems designed to set the stage for what Chou En-lai on the 21st said could be "a new start" in Sino-Amer.icari relations. While providing this coverage, highlighted by a generous spread in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 22d, Peking has latgalyavoided anti-U.S. polemics. It has originated no comment on U.S. activities since the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 200 supporting the DRV protest against the U.S. bombings,* and i.` has mentioned the United States only in passing or indirectly in news items on Indochina. Reflecting the anomaly of a visit by the }rief of state of a country with which the PRC does not have diplomatic relations, Peking reported that the visit was at the invitation of the PRC Government but offered no other characterizativn.** Nor was there any explicit characterization of the atmosphere at the Peking airport, the banquet .on the first day, or the various meetings. Peking did, however, note that the fl&gs of the two countries were flown and .their national anthems played at the * See the Indochina section of this TRENDS. ** Haile Selassie paid "a state visit" last October. Chinese reports on the arrival and subsequent ceremonies explicitly depicted a "warm" atmosphere. In other types of recent visits, Burmese Premier Ne Win--a target during the Chinese cultural revolution of virulent .propaganda attacks--made a "friendly and informal" visit last August; Paki.atan's Bhutto arrived for a "fr.i.endly visit" at the invitation of the PRC Government last November, when he represented a political party rather than the Pakistani Government; and .DRV Premier Pham Van Dong made an "official friendly visit" at the invitation of the Chinese party and government, also in November. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 C014FIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 airport and the banquet. Taken together with the fact that Mao's meeting with the President took place on the first day, the characterization of their conversation as "serious and frank" would seem to indicate,. frum Peking's standpoint, that the visit should be viewed by the world as a serious attempt to address the differences dividing the two countries and to seek areas of common interest. PRC MEDIA COVERAGE Reportage on the activities of the President's group has been disseminated broadly in PRC domestic and international media, giving Chinese and foreign audiences factual accounts of the arrival, the banquet on the 21st, the various meetings, and sightseeing and other activities. The mast extensive coverage appeared in the press and broadcasts on the 22d reporting the meeting with Mao and other events of the .ftrst day. Thus, for example, the main evening newscast in Radio Peking's domestic service on the 22d opened by reporting that PEOPLE'S DAILY devoted extensive space to the meeting with Mao and followed with reports on the banquet of the 21st, including the toasts, and on the talks between the President and Chou and between Secretary Rogers and the Chinese foreign minister. The photographic display in the 22 February PEOPLE'S DAILY was more generous than the coverage given other visiting noncommunist chiefs of state since the cultural revolution. Previous visitors, including two Pakistani presidents, Die Win, and Emperor Haile Selassie, were each accorded two trunt-page pictures in PEOPLE'S DAILY and one or two pictures an inside pages after they had met Mao. President Nixon was pictured three times on the front page and four times on inside pages. This is comparable to the treatment accorded .Romanian Pretn.dent Ceausescu after meeting Mao, when there were also three front-page photographs plus six additional ones on inside pages. But the President was not granted an honor given to Ceausescu and other communist leaders--a front- page photograph of the leader alone, with no one else, on the day of his arrival. Like other chiefs of state, Ceausescu did not meet Mao until later in the visit rather than on the first day, and met Mao only once. first filmed reports came on the evening ui the 22d, leading off the transmission for that day and being repeated at the close. The' a official film ''f the meeting with Mao came Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 first, followed by 10-minute films of the arrival in Peking and the banquet, including portions of both the President's and Chou's toasts, and finally a two-minute film of the afternoon meeting with Chou. On the 23d, the initial 17 minutes of the transmission were devoted to filmed reports of the preceding day's activities, including the second meeting with Chou and the ballet performance. So far the TV coverage parallels that given to Haile Selassie's visit last October. The emperor arrived on the morning of 6 October, and there was no TV reportage that evening; on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, filmed reports of his activities lasting 28, 9, and 22 minutes respectively led off the TV transmissions. A five-minute film of Mao's meeting with the emperor was shown on the 9th. Peking made a point of providing the "compatriots" on Taiwan with coverage of the President's visit. A broadcast by the PLA Fukien Front radio to Taiwan on the 22d was wholly devoted to the events of the first day of the visit. A broadcast on the same day by Radio Peking to Taiwan devoted the first seven of eight items to the visit. As part of its worldwide dissemination of reportage on the visit, Peking has beamed reports to Southeast Asia in various languages, including Vietnamese. Radio Peking has also kept its Russian listeners informed on the visit. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE Peking's coverage has consisted solely of of reportage without. commentary, but the five principles of peaceful coexistence"--capping the front- page of the 22 February PEOPLE'S DAILY and enunciated by Chou at the banquet he gave on the 21st--have provided a leitmotif. Chou :.alled the President's visit "a positive move" affording the leaders of the two countries an opportunity of meeting in person to seek the normalization of relations and to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides. Noting that contacts between the two countries were suspended for more than 20 years for "reasons known fully to all," Chou said "the gate to friendly contacts has finally been opened,'` and he expressed confidence that the day "will surely come" when the common desire of the two peoples to promote the normalization of relations and to work for the relaxation of tensions "will be realized." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 -4- Acknowledging that the twc countries' social systems are "fundamentally different" and. that "great differences" exist between their governments, Chou declared that these differences should not hinder China and the United States from establishing "normal state relations". on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and "still less should they lead to war."* Though Chou claimed that Peking had "consistently" pursued a policy of seeking, negotiations with the United States since 1955, his invocation of the principles of coexistence on the day of the President's arrival represents another milestone in a development that dates back to late 1968. At that time, when Peking was taking a notably more flexible ideological and political stance in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, a PRC Foreign Ministry statement in 26 November had called for a resumption of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks in Warsaw after the President took office and revived the proposal for a Sino-U.S. agreement based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Peking's revival of this approach marked a striking shift in its strategy of pursuing the rivalry with the Soviets by attacking their policy of detente. (At the time of the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary in February 1965, for example, Foreign Minister Chen I said peaceful coexistence with the United States was "out of the question.") The November 1968 statement claimed that Peking had "consistently" followed the line of coexistence in Sino-U.S. relations for the past 13 years--thus dating this policy back to the same point Chou did in his toast. In the passage in his toast calling for peaceful coexistence, Chou said that as early as 1955 the PRC Government publicly stated that "the Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States and that the Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government." This wording appeared in .a statement issued by Chou at the Bandung conference in 1955--where Chou became prominently associated with espousal of a negotiated approach to Sino-U.S. tension--and in formal reports that -year to the National People's Congress. Chou'a toast contained no reference to a specific issue, but the 1955 statement he recalled had expressed a readiness for negotiations on relaxing tension in the Far East and specifically * The 7 October 1969 PRC Government statement agreeing to open border negotiations with the USSR said that "irreconcilable differences of principle" should not prevent them from "maintaining normal state relations" on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The statement said there was "no reason whatsoever for China and the Soviet Union to fight a war" over the border issue. Approved For Release 2005 1DIlDECb AP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 in the Taiwan area. At that time Peking had explicitly expressed an interest in the "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan and professed a willingness to enter into negotiations with "the responsible local authorities of Taiwan" to prepare this resolution of the problem. "A NEW START" Chou concluded his toast with an expression of hope that through "a frank exchange of views" to gain "a clearer notion of our differences and make efforts to find common ground," a "new start" can be made in relations between the two countries. He took not of the President's remark before dan,"t, Washington 25X1 at "what we must o Is tind a way La see Lnar we can Ave aranraa .vi Y1,.,...- U-4-- .....-t __ a _ In a reflection of Peking's evident sensitivity to charges that its invitation to the President may enhance his electoral prospects, the NCNA account of the 17 November departure cited reports that the visit has the support of "a number" of U.S. senators--quoting Senator Humphrey by name--and that both houses of Congress had approved a resolution supporting the trip. In contrast to other communist sources, Peking's recent comment on the President's Vietnam peace initiative avoided citing the U.S. election in denigrating his move. LEADERSHIP So far the leadership turnouts for the President TURNOUT have been mostly confined to those active leaders thought to be close associates of Chou En-lai, and none of the older, semiretired leaders has made an appearance. Except for Chiang Ching's appearance at the ballet performance on 22 February, the Politburo members generally regarded as "leftist" in orientation, such as Shanghai leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, have not met the President. The President has not yet-seen Tung Pi-wu or Soong Ching-ling, one of whom usually functions as chief of state. Tung, who sometimes acts as a host during formal state visits when diplomatic relations exist, had appeared for the visits of Yahya Khan, Ceausescu, and Haile Selassie. In a departure from the usual practice, Tung was formally designated "acting" PRC chairman in a 24 February message to Kuwait on its national day. He had previously been identified as acting chairman in October 1969, in a message to the DRV, but he is normally termed deputy chairman. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBURARY 1972 In a similar departure-from normal practice, Wu Te was identified as "acting" chairman of the Peking revolutionary committee in the first NCNA English transmission reporting the President's arrival. In a subsequent, fuller account of the arrival and in reports of other events, however, he has been identified by his usual title of vice chairman. Wu has served as Peking chief since Hsieh Fu-chih dropped from an active public role in 1969, but he has not previously been identified as "acting." The Chinese do not normally use the "acting" designator unless the absent holder of an office is not return. (Chi Peng-fei was designated acting foreign minister while Chen I was still alive but presumably not expected to be able to resume office.) PEKING ASSESSES U.S. CHINA-POLICY BEFORE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL Coinciding with the President's departure for the trip, Peking offered an appraisal of U.S. China policy in a polemical account of the President's foreign policy report to Congress. Peking's assessment, an 18 February NCNA account providing the first direct Chinese comment on the message, included the first substantive discussion.of.the.President's China visit since the invitation was announced last July. The NONA account also discussed Secretary Laird's 15 February defense report, observing that the two reports complement each other as evidence that U.S. foreign policy remains "one of global aggression and power politics backed by strength.' In addressing sensitive issues of Sino-U.S. relations and the President's visit, NCNA.took a firm but balanced approach centering on the Taiwan.problemwhile implicitly leaving the door open for improving-relations-between the PRC and the United States. NCNA cited the President's observation that China is a "dedicated opponent".of.the United States as indicating that "U.S. imperialism has no wish to change its hostile policy" toward China. As if to document-this claim, the account quoted the President's statements that the dialog with the PRC would not be at the expense of friends and..that diplomatic and defense ties with the ROC would be maintained.. This showed, according to NCNA, that the Nixon Administration has "not yet relinquished" its idea of "one China, two governments." The formula cited in the.NCNA.acco.unt as objectionable is one that was added last year to Peking's list of offensive formulas. Attacks on it, reflecting Peking's. sensitivity over any tendency within the Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 international community to accept an accommodation that would confer legitimacy on the Chiang regime, prominent after the seating of the P.RC in the United Nations, figuring particularly in reaction to Japanese efforts to straddle the Taiwan question. The statement quoted-by NCNA on Washington's commitments to the ROC is followed immediately in the President's foreign policy report by the assertion thatthe.ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the United States to decide and that a peaceful resolution of this problem by the parties would help reduce tension. NCNA's failure to cite this assertion is consistent with Peking's virtual silence on U.S. suggestions that the Taiwan question might be resolved between the contending Chinese parties. Last spring, in reaction to a State Department spokesman's effect along with his assertion that the status of Taiwan remains to be determined and is subject to future international resolution, Peki-:g did no more than acknowledge and subsequently ignored the former suggestion while directing its fire at the notion of Taiwan's status remaining undetermined. Further elaborating on the Taiwan issue, the NCNA account claimed that the President is in the "grip of insuperable self- contradiction" in talking about relations with the PRC while saying that the United States would not turn -;:s back on its old friend in Taiwan. It added, however, that the PRC "Government and people"have "always been friendly toward the American people" while opposing the "policies of war and aggression of U.S. imperialism." This carefully balanced formulation, while failing to strike the hopeful note of a new opening that marked last spring's ping-pong diplomacy, was notable for associating both the government and people of China in. expressing friendship, and it avoided an invidiov_ 4istinction between the U.S. Government and the American people. Rounding out its comment on Taiwan, NCNA reiterated the demand-- termed an "unswerving position"--that the United States withdraw its forces from the island as well as from Indochina, Korea, and elsewhere. When voicing a similar. demand in the context of an authoritative discussion of Sino-U.S. relations in mid-1970, a Chinese leader had declared that a relaxation of relations was "oi'. of the question" .so long as. the United States refused to withdraw from Taiwan.. The NCNA account of the foreign policy report avoided any such categorical statement. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 Underlining Peking's, more flexible approach with an implicit justification for receiving the President despite the differences recounted by NCNA, the account concluded by stating that affairs between countries must be settled-by the countries concerned through consultation--a dictum. attributed to Mao in the authoritative New Year's Day editordal. In contrast, Peking's assessment of the President's foreign policy report last year ended with the forecast.that "a storm of real people's revolution will arise" in the United States and sweep him into "the garbage heap of history." OTHER ISSUES Apart from the notable discussion of Sino-U.S. issues, the NCNA account followed routine lines in commenting on other.issues covered in the President's report. As part of Peking's effort to reassure its Indochinese allies of support, NCNA endorsed the PRG's seven-point peace plan and its elaboration of "two key problems," said the questions of the Indochinese countries can be settled only by their peoples themselves, and claimed that the recent step-up in U.S. air activity gave the Lie to the peace talks "fraud" propounded by the President on 25 January. On other Asian issues, NCNA registered special concern over alleged U.S. encouragement of Japanese military expansion, drawing implications for Chinese security interests. Citing the Laird report as supporting the modernization of Japan's forces, NCNA said Washington's policy would arouse "high vigilance and firm opposition" by the Chinese and other Asian peoples. Dwelling on plans in the foreign and defense reports calling for an expansion of U.S. arms. expenditures, NCNA echoed earlier assessments of the same issue in comment on the State of the Union message last month, viewing tha military buildup as directed chiefly against the USSR -while making no direct reference to China's security. In contrast to Peking's treatment of the 1971 foreign policy report as an indication of alleged Soviet-American collusion to divide up the world, this year's account concentrated mainly on Washington's increased competition with Moscow,.parricularly in regard to Europe, the Middle East, -and arms development. NCNA made only passing mention of the President's discussion of negotiations with the USSR on Berlin, SALT, and other issues and avoided altogether his comments on the trip to Moscow this spring. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 In line with last year's treatment, Peking's own assessment of the President's report was preceded by pickups of hostile foreign reaction, including authoritative comment from Hanoi, Tirana, and Pyongyang. But in using this proxy comment Peking took care to avoid spoiling the atmosphere surrounding the President's China trip, muting the sharp personal invective against the President contained in the foreign comment and omitting passages that could be read as criticism of the visit. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 MOSCOW EXHIBITS RESTRAINT, USES PROXIES TO STRESS CONCERNS Soviet media have handled President Nixon's arrival and activities in Peking with the same restraint that marked their anticipatory comment, reflecting concern not to jeopardize ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations or spoil. the atmosphere for the Presider 's impending visit to the USSR. Registering concern over the implications of a Sino-U.S. rapproachement, they have continued to impugn Peking's motives in particular and to avoid direct censure of the President by picturing him as under pressure from "circles" in Washington. Scant, slanted cov3rage of the trip in dcmestic media betrays Moscow's sensitivity about publicizing the President's summitry in Peking to Soviet audiences. The official attitude was spelled out by Yuriy Zhukov in PRAVDA on the eve of President Nixon's departure, in a 17 February article belatedly conveying Moscow's first authoritative reaction to the President's 9 February report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy: Zhukov wrote that a judgment of the trip must await its concrtAo results, while pointing with foreboding to signs that the Peking ',adership and "certain circles" in the United States harbor motives detrimental to Soviet bloc interests. Broadcasts chiefly for foreign consumption have drawn heavily on proxy comment from friendly sources and from the Western press to sharpen the portrayal of the U.S.-Chinese contacts as anti-Soviet in essence and prejudicial to the national liberation movement. In broadcasts in Mandarin, Moscow has intensified its efforts to fan domestic opposition to the trip. A broadcast in Mandarin on the 22d, not mentioning the trip directly, aired a strong attack on the PRC leadership by Polish First Secretary Gierck, including an expression of hope that "the Chinese people and the Chinese ccrninunists will manage to reject Mao's dangerous line and restore socialist principles in China's policy." NEWS COVERAGE TASS' initial report of the President's arrival on the 21st read in full: "U.S. President Richard Nixon arrived in Peking for an official visit* today at the invitation of the PRC." This single-sentence report was published on the inside pages of the central dailies, where routine foreign news items normally appear. Radio Moscow's announcer, after * As noted above, Peking itself did not attach any such label to the visit. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 reading the brief report in the domestic service, went on to cite an AFP report that "on the eve of the President's arrival in Peking, U.S. B-52's stepped up bombing the entire tf!rritory of Indochina." Moscow's only comment so far on the reception accorded the President came in a domestic service newscast on the 21st, when the announcer observed that the "reserved" welcome at the airport was only "a sham" staged for Chinese domestic consumption and that "the real action takes place in the wings, . . . where the Chinese leaders offered words of welcome to the White House boss." TASS reported later on the 21st that the President met with Mao Tse-tung and that "according to R. Ziegler, they had a serious and frank talk." On the 22d, briefly reporting the preceding day's banquet, TASS said the speeches delivered by the President and Chou indicated that "not only Sino-American relations but also international problems are being discussed at the talks." TASS noted that the President "stressed that the sides had common interests that outweighed all the differences," and it singled out from Chou's toast the statement that bilateral differences "should not prevent China and the United States from establishing normal state relations." TASS concluded by quoting the New York TIMES to the effect that at the banquet the Chinese leadership extended "a heartfelt reception to the President, whose traops are still staying in ."aiwan and whose armed forces are continuing military operations in Vietnam." On the 23d, reporting that the President had his third round of talks with Chou and that Secretary Rogers met with Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, TASS said newsmen in Peking had noted "a sharp step-up in the Chinese press coverage of R. Nixon's visit," with pictures of the President, Chou, and Chiang Ching attending the ballet. TASS got in a dig at the end: "Local observers," it said, noticed that Peking media were making no references to "American imperialism" and that the Peking press has also "sharply reduced reports about American air raids on the DRV and the bombings of South Vietnam." TASS added that two articles on Vietnam in that day's issue of PEOPLE'S DAILY "speak about the struggle of the Vietnamese patriots against nameless enemies." SOVIET COMMENT Zhukov's PRAVDA article on the 17th, examining the President's foreign policy report, reiterated the now standard Soviet position keynoted by Gromyko in the UN General Assembly on 28 September: The USSR regards steps to normalize relations between Washington and Peking as "natural" so long as "this is not done at the expense of other states' interests." Zhukov added suspiciously that "the President considered it necessary Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 to point out that while certain U.S. political circles are exert- ing pressure in favor of utilizing the new U.S. approach to Peking to exploit Sino-Soviet tension, U.S. policy is not directed against Moscow." On the matter of U.S.-Soviet rela- tions, the widely broadcast Zhukov article deplored the President's "unjustified accusations" against the USSR but concluded by citing Brezhnev on the importance of improving relations between the two countries.* Reasserting the official wait-and-see line on the President's China visit, Zhukov went on to state that "the perfectly logical thing will be to determine the political essence of this visit by its real content and result." But again the caveat: "It is impossible to ignore the evidence of the desire of both the Peking l6ddership and of certain circles in Washington to utilize the process of development of Sino-U.S. contacts to the detriment of international detente and against the interests of the socialist community." While Zhukov's article raid not spell out Moscow's specific con- cerns, a panelist in Radio Moscow's weetcly roundtable discussion on the 20th said that from a close reading of the views of "American political. observers" one could infer that the aim of U.S.-Chinese contacts, "though it is not discussed openly, is to try to divide Asia into spheres of influence--a Chinese and an American one." More pervasively, in some domestic comment as well as in propaganda for foreign audiences, Moscow has continued to air suggestions that a deal on Indochina, behind the backs of the Indochinese, may be in the making in Peking. Kondrashov in IZVESTIYA on 19 February attributed the charge to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.** There has been wide play in this context for U.S. Communist Party leader Gus Hall's remark, at the CPUSA congress, that "if the Peking leaders make a deal with the ruling circles of the United States, this will be a serious threat to peace and the interests of the peoples." * Soviet propaganda on the 54th anniversary of the Soviet army and navy, 23 February, treats the United States routinely. In pro forma language which has characterized propaganda on this occasion in recent years, Moscow has repledged the USSR to a policy of peace, warned against the threat of "imperialism" headed by the United States, and affirmed the USSR's intent to maintain an adequate defense posture. ** See the Indochina section of this TRENDS for documentation of this propaganda line. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 3.977 PRAVDA DEFENDS CPSU'S CHINA POLICY ON EVE OF NIXON TRIP Concern to offset the notion that Soviet intransigence toward the PRC had exacerbated Sino-Soviet tensions and thereby spurred Peking to turn toward the United States seemed reflected in a PRAVDA article by 0. Borisov on 18 February, expounding a gratuitous defense of the CPSU's China policy on the day after the President began his journey to Poking. Widely broadcast to communist audiences in particular, the article, entitled "The CPSU's Foreign Policy and the Further Consolidation of the World Socialist System," sought to absolve the Soviet leadership of blame for the current low estate of relations with Peking and to put the onus for current tension squarely on the Chinese leaders. Elaborating the stock Soviet argument on this score, Borisov maintained that while the Soviet party and government have been pursuing "a principled, con- sistent" course toward normalization of relations with the PRC, "this course has encountered stubborn resistance from the Peking leaders, who stand on positions of anti-Sovietism, great-power chauvinism, and nationalism." Moreover, Borisov charged, Peking's policy of "anti-Sovietism" has "intensified" in connection with the President's trip to the PRC. Setting out to document a portrayal of failures in Chinese foreign policy, Borisov cited the PRC's support for Pakistan in the conflict with India and added that in general Peking's leaders have been "unmasked as supporters of the aggravation of international tension." In the same vein, he said the Chinese leadership's efforts to make Peking the center of the world movement have failed, as have their attempts to create a pro-Peking bloc among the socialist countries and to "torpedo CEMA and the Warsaw Pact." In sharp contrast, Borisov main- tained, communist unity has been enhanced by the "tireless efforts" of the CPSU and the Soviet state, and "the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union has borne fruit." RADIO MOSCOW SEEKS TO FAN ALBANIAN ANXIETIES OVER VISIT In a blatant effort to play on Tirana's suspicions about the President's talks with its principal ally, a Radio Moscow broadcast to Albania on 20 February observed that "Peking's turn toward Washington has created a very dangerous situation for Albania." The broadcast explained that since Albania is Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 20( IN /i ~fqAALRDP85T0087 Rig0,aFOO50008-2 NDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 depundent on the PRC politically, economically, and militarily, it cannot openly criticize the President's trip to Peking; but neither can it decrease its criticism of Washington, because"this would have a negative influence on the prestige of Albanian leaders." The broadcast went on to say that Washington is interested in improving relations only with Peking--"a policy based on anti-Sovietism"--and "has no intention of recogni.-ing the Albanian People's Republic," against which it has been pursuing a hostile policy since the end of World War It. Another Moscow broadcast to Albania on the 22d, bemoaning Tirana's estrangement from the Warsaw Pact, concluded that "historical experience shows that Albania, as a poor socialist state, can develop comprehensively only under conditions of equal coopera- tion with all the socialist countries." So far, Tirana's coverage of the President's visit to Peking has been limited to very brief reports, attributed to NCNA, of the President's arrival, his talks with Chou, and his attendance at the banquet. EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES STRESS "ANTI-SOVIET" ASPECT OF TRIP Moscow's hardlining allies in Eastern Europe have followed its thematic lead but not--with the notable exceptions of Budapest and East Berlin--its restraint. There have been pro forma echoes of the official Soviet position that normalization of Peking-Washington relations is a "natural" development which can only be welcomed if it contributes to peace and does not adversely affect other countries. The Czechoslovak party organ RUDE PRAVO, reasserting this line on 21 February, noted that it was shared by "our allies." But the dominant line is that the two conditions are not likely to be met. Czechoslovak, Polish, and Bulgarian comment is pervaded by charges that anti- Soviet motives underlie the Siro-U.S. contacts, as well as by suggestions that the Chinese leaders are prepared to sell out Hanoi in a deal with Washington. Prague's comment has been notable for recollections of the Sino-Soviet border clashes in an effort to dramatize the portrayal of a U.S. exploitation of a bellicose Chinese stance toward the Soviet Union. East Germany, by contrast, has refrained so far from any original comment, although the party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and the East Berlin radio have aired a few commentaries on the trip from Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 other Soviet bloc sources stressing the alleged anti-Soviet aspect. Hungarian comment has been measured in tone and so far devoid of charges of anti-Sovietism. Romania gave the President's trip predictably ample news coverage from the outset, prudently holding off until the 23d before welcoming the visit in an authoritative article in SCINTEIA. Yugoslav media have registered enthusiastic applause for the trip, calling the Mao-Nixon meeting an augury of "serious possi- bilities for a rapprochement." PRAGUE ON PRC Czechoslovak comment prior to and during the MILITARY STANCE trip has been unique in elaborating on U.S. use of the Chinese military stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Thus RUDE PRAVO commented in an article on the 12th that "the murderous volleys" fired by Chinese soldiers at the Ussuri River in 1969 "awakened Nixon and his 'China' policy" to the opportunity to secure Chinese "cooperation" against the Soviet Union. On the 17th the paper seized on a statement by Secretary Laird to the effect "that Chinese guided missilesare threatening the majority of cities and other targets" in south and east Asia "and a substantial part of the Soviet Union." In thus "setting one socialist country against another," it added, the Secretary was spurred by the policy of the PRC leadership "with its anti-Soviet orientation." On the 22d, RUDE PRAVO reported an "extensive campaign" by Chinese authori- ties to "explain" the President's visit to the Chinese people, in which Chinese soldiers were "reminded of the recent clashes on the Sino-Soviet borders" and told that "the Russians were worse than the Americans." GIEREK ON MAO PZPR First Secretary Gierek, rumored to be at odds with the Soviets over some aspects of his domestic reforms, delivered one of the most vigorous attacks against Mao's leadership by any East European party leader to date, in a Katowice election speech on the 21st. Without mention- ing the President's visit directly, Gierek said China "is now turning against its natural and infallible allies, the socialist countries," adding that the course of "the Maoist Chinese leader- ship is aimed against the interests of the entire socialist community, including the vital interests of Poland." He came close to calling for the overthrow of Mao in voicing a "hope that the Chinese people and the Chinese communists will find enough strength to discard the dangerous Maoist course . . . ." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/ Rpr& -ATP85T00875F"p~Q1%0 DS 08-2 24 FEBRUARY 1972 A fairly heavy volume of Polish comment on the President's trip has emphasized the alleged anti-Soviet aspects. An article in the 24-:.lJFebruary issue of the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY, entitled "Nixon's Chinese Gambit." argued that despite alleged assurances by the President and his aides that "their Chinese gambit is not directed against the Soviet Union at all," other statements in U.S. media "leave no doubt" that the move is designed as "a trump card in the anti-Soviet game." BUDAPEST A relatively small volume of comment in Budapest media so far has treated the visit with some detach- ment and in language largely free of invective. Thus the Hungarian Government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 21st "approved" the resumed U.S.-Chinese contacts and added only that it was "diffi- cult" to say whether eased tensions would result. In low-keyed terms, it commented that "the press of the socialist countries considers the escalation of the U.S. air war in Indochina the most regrettable prelude to Nixon's Peking visit." 25X1 Starting on the of the 21st, the Bucharest radio carried factuat reports on the President's arrival in Peking and subsequent activities, including his "serious and frank" talks with Mao and summaries of the toasts exchanged by the President and Chou En-lai. All the reports cited NCNA as the source. The first original commentary in Bucharest media appeared on the 23d--a SCINTEIA article by one of the paper's leading inter- national commentators, V. Iliescu, summarized at length by AGERPRES. Entitled "A Positive Event in International Life," the article welcomed the U.S. break with a long-standing policy of "ignoring the existence of the People's Republic of China" and hailed the trip as "proof of a realistic stand." Predictably, SCINTEIA took the occasion to press Romania's advocacy of "negotiations and direct contacts" among all states, declaring that the President's China visit and his planned journey to the Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 Soviet Union "are fresh proofs of the universal validity of this method." Reiterating Bucharest's line on the need for "active participation of. R11" states in the solution of international problems, Iliepcu concluded that "public opinion" in Romania is following the Sino-American dialog "with interest" and believes it will "stimulate the positive course of events towards detente" and world peace. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 INDOCHINA Vietnamese communist media have continued to ignore President Nixon's trip to Peking while pressing their vitriolic attack on the Fresident and his policies. The recent series of articles by NHAN LAN's Commentator included one on the 19th which observed pointedly that the Vietnamese are victoriously fighting against U.S. "aggressive imperialism, the number one enemy of all nations." On 22 February, the day after the President arrived in Peking, VNA announced that the People's Army Publishing House has put out a took entitled "Nixon's Criminal Records" which documents "crimes" perpetrated under the Vietnamization policy. The U.S. air strikes against the North on the 16th and 17th, during which Hanoi claimed seven planes were downed, prompted a DRV Foreign Ministry statement--the first issued at that level rather than by the ministry spokesman since the flurry of statements during the sustained strikes at the end of December. The air strikes and other U.S. "escalation" moves are called further proof of the "hypocrisy" of the President's eight points. Propagandists continue to demand a positive response to the PRG's seven-point proposal, particularly to the "two key points" elaborated on 2 February. On the eve of President Nixon's arrival in Peking, the PRC went on record as officially supporting the DRV's protest against the 16-17 February U.S. bombings with a 19 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement followed by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article the next day. Peking normally supports DRV Foreign Ministry statements in this manner, and had done so during the December strikes. Thus far Moscow has failed to react officially to the recent U.S. bombings of the DRV, although TASS as usual promptly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement. The strikes at the end of last yea- had occasioned a 30 December Soviet Government statement. Moscow comment has pointed out that the recent escalated bombings took place on the eve of the President's trip to Peking and has continued to warp of a backstage Sino-U.S. deal on Indochina. DRV. PRG ATTACK PRESIDENT. MAINTAIN SILENCE ON PEKING VISIT On the eve of the President's trip to Peking, Hanoi and Front media sustained their sharp attacks on U.S. policy. Particularly noteworthy is a 19 February NRAN DAN Commentator article which discusses the unchanging nature of imperialism in orthodox terms, saying President Nixon "has revealed" that Vietnam is to be used as "a major springboard for attacks on the world socialist system." The article also continues CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00$75R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 Hanoi's personal abuse of the President when it says he "speaks of peace tirelessly, but the more he does so, the more affirmatively the world public, thinking of his acts, brands him a loathsome, bloodthirsty hawk. He fervently calls for an end to the war while actually prolonging and expanding it. He publicizes his readiness for negotiations, E'tt keeps blocking all progress at the Paris conference." While the Commentator article, like other Vietnamese communist propaganda, avoids any explicit mention of the President's visit to Peking,* it is presumably with the visit in mind that the article says that "while trotting around the globe to peddle his peace philter," the President continues to escalate the war. The article was initially carried only by VNA in English and in Vietnamese, but Hanoi radio broadcast it belatedly in the domestic service on 24 February--at a time when P#.king was giving ample publicity to the President's visit. The Commentator article does not repeat Hanoi's charge that a prime aim of U.S. policy is to split the socialist countries, but this charge recurs in a Liberation Radio commentary broadcast in Vietamese on the 22d, the day after the President arrived in Peking. The commentary echoes earlier Hanoi propaganda when it says that at the beginning of his career the President "revealed his frenzied opposition to communism, to the sccialist countries, and to the world national liberation movement." It adds: "After the Chinese revolution triumphed in 1949 Nixon was deeply embi~tered and nurtured an unabated grudge . . . . He sought by all means to capitalize on the internal disagreements of the socialist camp in order to further his interests, split countries in the socialist camp and the world communist movement, and perform the trick of 'peaceful evolution' through economic cooperation and other Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/0Wa~g q 85T00875F %q%3( g08-2 24 FEB^UARY 1972 maneuvers." The commentary concludes that no matter how frequently the President may today insist "that he is eaber for peace and is opening an era of negotiations, ho can in no way conceal his crimes and his extremely reactionary nature." Hanoi had most recently repeated the charge of U.S. attempts to divide the socialist countries in the NHAN DAN Commentator article of 13 February which accused the President of professing a "readiness to negotiate" in order to divide the gocialist camp. Similar charges had appeared in the 10 February NHAN DAN Commentator article and in broadcasts early this month of Truong Chinh's speech delivered at the Vietnam Fatherland Front congress in December. The alleged maneuvers of the President to divide the socialist countries had also been cited in an article by Thanh Tin in the January issue of the DRV party journal HOC TAP. Thanh Tin has analyzed U.S. policy in articles in HOC TAP in January or February of each year since 1969. This year's article, labeling the President an "archimperialist," echoed the tone of Tin's January 1971 article, which said the President had "achieved records for his stubbornness, brazenness, and brutality." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 MOSCOW! LINKS BOMBINGS WITH NIXON TRIP, SCORES EIGHT POINTS Thus far Moscow has failed to react officially to the 16-17 February U.S. bombings of the DRV,* although TASS as usual promptly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry and Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements as well as the 19 February Hanoi press conference at which five captured American pilots were presented. ATTACKS Moscow's comment has pointed out repeatedly that the ON PEKING escalated bombings took place on the eve of President Nixon's trip to Peking, continuing at the same time to play on Vietnamese fears of a backstage Sino-U.S. deal on Indochina. Commentators say the timing of the bombings is designed to show Peking that the United States intends to maintain its influence in Asia, and they again say that Washington has been gratified at Peking's restrained reaction to the bombings of the past few months. A Kuznetsov domestic service commentary on the 21st described as a "stage play" both "certain pronouncements in Peking propaganda" criticizing U.S. Vietnam policy on the eve of President Nixon's arrival and Peking's "reserved" airport reception of the President. TASS and Moscow radio reports on the 23d, citing "local observers" on the absence of references to "U.S. imperialism" in the Peking press while the President is in China, noted that two PEOPLE'S DAILY articles that day referred to the Vietnamese patriots' struggle against "nameless enemies." A Kondrashov article in IZVESTIYA on the 19th typified Moscow's comment raising the spectre of a backstage deal on Indochina, generally using the proxy of Western press observers or East European communist media. Kondrashov quoted U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT as saying the President evidently hopes that "as signs of agreement with the United States grow, Peking will make use of its influence in Hanoi to arrange an acceptable settlement of the conflict in Indochina." Ukraintsev picked up the same quotation in a domestic service commentary on the same day and claimed that "U.S. Administration spokesmen have repeatedly said they hope to reach some kind of agreement with Peking on matters linked to the Indochina war." The Americans are relieved at Peking's "restrained reaction" to the U.S. bombing, Ukraintsev said, repeating the * Moscow had waited until the end of the sustained 26-30 December bombings of the DRV to react officially, but it reacted then at a higher level than either Hanoi or Peking--with a 30 December statement at the government rather than the foreign ministry level. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 frequent charge that the bombings are aimed at inducing an Indochina settlement advantageous to the United States. The charge of a Sino-U.S. deal on Indochina was elaborated in a broadcast in Mandarin on the 18th over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, which called the "premeditated" bombing a prelude to the talks in Peking--a demonstration that the U.S. stand on the Vietnam issue is "still stiff." The broadc::st cited "American observers" as saying President Nixon will try to make the Chinese leaders agree to a "compromising settlement" behind the backs of the Vietnamese. It went on to charge that Washington has hinted that U.S. economic aid to China and Sino-U.S. trade will depend on "China's patticipation in the collusion behind the Vietnamese people's backs." U.S. EIGHT POINTS Some commentators say President Nixon's peace plan is merely a "smokescreen of peace rhetoric" to cover up intensified aggression. Alexey Leontyev said i.n a 21 February English-language talk, for example, that by making proposals which the other side cannot accept, Washington is "trying to justify continued military operations ratb^r than promote negotiations." While Moscow has followed Hanoi's lead in focusing on the U.S. proposals for U.S. troop withdrawal and elections in South Vietnam, an IZVESTIYA article by Mikheyev on the 16th also brought up a cease-fire and prisoner exchange. Mikheyev complained that the U.S. plan makes withdrawal conditional n't only on the release of captured U.S. pilots but also on a cease-fire throughout Indochina, calling this a demand that the communists lay down their arms and reconcile themselves to "U.S.-supported regimes." The commentator also observed that the eight points speak only of the withdrawal of U.S. "troops," not of U.S. "advisers," nor of the cessation of U.S. military aid to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane or the liquidation of U.S. bases in Indochina and Thailand. He commented that the proposal on the South Vietnamese elections is merely an effort to preserve the Saigon army, police, and administrative apparatus and that Thieu's "retirement" would thus be meaningless and the election a "farce" like his election in October 1971. Mikheyev concluded with an expression of support for the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of its seven points, citing the substance of the proposals including the new demands for a deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal and Thieu's resignation. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 PRC OFFERS PRO FORMA SUPPORT TO DRV ON U.S, AIR STRIKES On the eve of President Nixon's arrival in Peking, the PRC went on record as officially supporting the DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting the 16-17 February U.S. bombings in the usual manner, with a PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 19th and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 20th. While the state- ment assails Secretary Laird by name for making "truculent war threats" in asserting that such "so-called 'protective reaction' raids" will continue, it does not mention President Nixon or the "Nixon Administration." The most recent previous PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the bombing, on 29 December, made a passing reference to the Nixor_ Administration. The current statement complains that "the 'eight-point proposal' recently dished up by the U.S. Government was camouflaged with the cloak of 'ending the war"' and says that the current actions "shed the disguise of sham peace and laid bare the aggressive features of the U.S. aggressors," but unlike the December state- ment it does not take the United States to task for failing to respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal or for having "obstructed" the Paris talks. It does, however, conclude with the demand that the "U.S. Government" stop its war of aggression in Indochina, "cease to support the puppet regimes in the Indochinese countries," and withdraw U.S. and "vassal" troops totally, unconditionally, and by a set date. The statement scores "U.S. imperialism" for attempting to bolster its "Vietnamization" plan by air war in order to perpetuate its "forcible occupation" of South Vietnam, but it does not mention "Laoization" or "Khmerization" as the December statement did. The statement concludes with the affirmation that the Chinese Government and people "firmly support" the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in their war against "U.S. aggression" but does not add the warning, contained in the December statement, that the Chinese Government and people are "closely watching" U.S. moves in Indochina. It says that U.S. imperialism "cannot shake the Vietnamese people's determination to fight their war of resistance to the end," but it avoids expressions of gratification, which appeared in the December statement, over U.S. "disastrous defeats" in Indochina and the "exciting victories" of the people in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article similarly avoided mentioning the President by name while scoring Secretary Laird's warning of the Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL. FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1.972 possibility of continued "protective reaction" raids. The article complained that while the "U.S. Government" professes a desire to "end the war" in Vietnam, "its acts are contrary to its professions." Commentator went on to assail the "war provocations and blackmail" of "U.S. imperialism." Expressing the "full support" of the Chinese Government and people for the DRV stand in the 17 February DRV statement, the article added--unlike the PRC Foreign Ministry statement--that the U.S. Government "must accept" the PRG's seven-point proposal but dio not mention the PRG's 2 February "elaboration." PEOPLE'S DAILY expressed the conviction that the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peopl-se, "fighting in unity," will win final victory. DRV CLAIMS SEVEN PLANES DOWNED, DISPLAYS CAPTURED PILOTS The heavy U.S. air strikes on 16-17 February just above the demilitarized zone in Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province were first protested in a routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 16 February. A DRV Foreign Ministry statement appeared the next day--the first at that level since the 26 and 29 December 1971 foreign ministry statements issued during the intensive 26-30 December raids against North Vietnam.* In its initial report on the 16th, Hanoi mentioned strikr'q "at a number of populated areas in Quang Binh Province and Vinh "inh zone" and claimed that two ilanes were downed and "a number of aggressor pilots annihilated or captured." The foreign ministry spokesman's statement issued later in the day repeated the claim of downed planes and charged that the United States had sent "many fighter aircraft to repeatedly strike at many areas" in Vinh Linh and Le Thug district, Quang Binh Province. On the 17th a radio report said that U.S. planes had "attacked a number of populated areas in Quang Binh" that day and that four planes were downed and "many aggressor pilots wiped out or captured." It claimed that in addition to the two planes downed the preceding day, "the Vinh Linh armed forces and people downed one more planethat was not previously reported," making a total of seven for the two days and bringing Hanoi's grand total to 3,440. * See the TRENDS of 29 December 1971, pages 1-7, and 5 January 1972, pages 6-8. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONl I DINT IAI, FII I H TRENDS 24 F'I;IIIMAItY 1972 On the 24th, Ilanoa. lasued another 1)IWV NI.n1.str.y spokesman's statement condemning U.S. "will- acts" from 1.8 to 23 February. During that period, the spokesman charged, U.S. planes including B-52's bombed 1' )ng Lap village and U.S. artillery "from south of the demi.l.itLiilzed zone" and U.S. ships shelled the villages of Vinh Son, Vinh Gl.ang, Vinh 0, -ivid Vinh Quang, located "north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ." He also charged that U.S. aircraft "daily strafed a number of positions" in Quang B.Lnh Province from 18 to 22 February. The foreign ministry statement of the 17th charged that the United States on the .,6th and 17th had "repeatedly" sent many aircraft against heavily populated areas in the Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province, and it "strongly condemned this new extremely serious U.S. military adventure" against the DRV. The spokesman's statement the day before had called the strikes on the 16th "extremely serious acts of war"--a more usual description. The foreign ministry statement paralleled earlier ones in calling the strikes a challenge to U.S. and world public opinion and a "gross encroachment upon the sovereignty and security of the DRV." But it stopped short of the harsh 29 December statement, which had called on the governments and peoples of the "fraternal and peace- and justice-loving nations" to struggle to stay the hands of the "U.S. aggressors" and had pointedly noted that the DRV is a "socialist country and a sovereign and independent nation." The 17 February foreign ministry statement inexplicably did not include the charge that the strikes violate the U.S. pledge to cease bombing of the North--a charge contained in all seven of the previous DRJ Foreign Ministry statements on U.S. actions against the North issued during the Nixon Administration. But U.S. statements on continued bombing so long as the U.S. prisoners are held are again scored in a 24 February DRV War Crimes Commission memorandum on the Nixon Administration's three years of "crimes" against he DRV.* The memorandum says that the President, in announcing his eight-point peace plan on * Earlier this month, alleged allied crimes in South Vietnam in the past three years were documented in a "white book" released on 12 February by the PRG at a Hanoi press conference. The white boot:, which sought to demonstrate that the Administration's Vietnamization policies are prolonging and expanding the war and causing more "crimes," was reportedly sent to the antiwar assembly held in Versailles from 11 to 13 February. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 20pAMgRp~pl4i*2-RDP85TO0PKf, 0ORq, Rff008-2 24 I-'l:BRIIARY 1.972 25 January, 'rcynically declared that 'the United ;states reserves the right to resume bombing North Vietnam us long as our men are detained."' Thu document cites the periods of bombings in 1.970 and 1971 which had prompted DRV Foreign Ministry statements. It does not mention the 1.6-1.7 February itrikem specifically, but 4, seems to allude to them when it arns that as long as the United States persists In its Vietnamization policy and bombing of the North, captured U.3. military men will continue to be detained "and the list will be made still longer, as was shown by the outcome of the U.S. air strikes .aunched against North Vietnam in late 1971 and early 1972." The spokesman's protest on the 1.6th said that the U.S. "seriouj acts of war" had unmasked "the fraudulent peace allegations of the Nixon Administration." The foreign ministry statement similarly said that the Administration's "deceitful protestation of peace" had been exposed. In cataloging alleged U.S. provocations, the statement assailed the dispatch of additional aircraft carriers and B-52's to the area and U.S. "threats" to use air power against the DRV. And it noted that the United States had "arbitrarily postponed for an indefinite period of time the 145th session of the Paris conference." While neither of the protests mentioned the U.S. eight-point proposal, it has been brought up in other comment on the air strikes. For example, a NHAN DAN editorial on the 19th said that the air strikes, coming on the heels of the "brazen undermining" of the Paris talks, show that the eight points "are obviously for deceitful purposes." Hanoi did not reveal the exact number of pilots captured until they were presented at a press conference on the 19th by Ngo Dien, chief of the Information and Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry. Dien recalled two similar press conferences last December* as he introduced the five captured pilots and charged that they afforded further evidence of the Nixon Administration's "crimes." The pilots, according to Ha-'oi's radio report, were photographed and allowed to speak briefly. They were identified as Ralph W. Galati, William R. Schwertfeger, Kenneth J. Fraser, James D. Cutter, and Edwin A. Hawley. Dien asserted at the press conference that the U.S. bombings in the latter part of 1971 had been "severely condemned" by public opinion * For background on the earlier press conferences, on 20 and 31 December, see the TRENDS of 5 January, pages 6-8 and 22 December, pages 3-4. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONI?LDI:NTIAL, F'B1.4 TRENDS 24 F'EBIIUARY 1972 . and that the now strikes "clearly prove that the Nixon Administration is a warlike and stubborn administration," lie derided the Administration for "boasting about peace" and its eight-point plan while engaging in actions that contradict irs words. Dien also charged that contrary to U.S. statements announcing the end of the bombing of the North, on the 18th "many aircraft" were again sent to bomb many regions in Quang Binh and "warships close to the shore opened fire on the Vinh Linh zone." Dien referred disparagingly to the Administration's concern about U.S. prisoners of war, ztating that the only way to secure their release is to end the war and respect the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people as set forth by the PRG in its seven-point proposal and the two-point clarification of 2 February. VIGILANCE The claimed downing of the seven planes and the capture of the pilots prompted immediate praise from the VPA High Command and the press as evidence of heightened vigilance in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh. On the 17th a VPA High Command congratulatory message* applauded the downings, as did NHAN DAN and Hanoi radio ;ommentakies. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial followed on the 18th, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 19th. The VPA High Command message commended the armed forces and people of Quang Binh and Vinh Linh for "scoring outstanding early-spring feats of arms" in "heightening vigilance and fighting well." Asserting that the United States "will resort to many more reckless schemes and moves to intensify the war in order to avert their inevitable failure," it warned that the people and armed forces "must therefore be very vigilant and stand combat-ready." There are routine calls for heightened vigilance and combat readiness, particularly in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's editorial of the 18th. The editorial registers confidence, claiming that throughout the North he people and armed forces "were prepared to spot, intercept, and destroy the U.S. aggressors if they dared attack us." But it urges further efforts to emulate Quang Binh and Vinh Linh and notes that those exemplary areas are not "subjective" or complacent over their achievements. The 19 February NHAN DAN editorial says that "for nearly two months, implementing the High Command's combat order," Quang Binh and Vinh Linh "have made every effort to enhance combat-readiness and increase their fighting strength." It points to the preparedness * The VPA High Command had also issued congratulations on 20 and 30 December 1971. Approved For Release 2005/dbg~D69- P85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 20QSU06A08sNCIAI.RDP85TOOa OQQPQDQ50008-2 24 FEBRUARY .1.972 of soldiers and compatriots in Quang Binh and Vinh Llnh, even while celebrating Tot, and calla the downings proof of the "new progress" of the armed forces in these areas and "a stern reply . . . to the bellicose, stubborn Nixon clique's military adventures and insolent threats." DRV, PRG PROTEST U,S, POSTPONEMENT, WALK OUT OF PARIS SESSION The U.S. postponement of the 145th Paris session scheduled for 17 February was protested by the DRV and PRG delegations in statements issued in Paris on the 16th and carried in Vietnamese communist media the following day. On the 17th both delegations sent messages to the allied delegations--publicized by VNA on the 18th and by LPA on the 19th--again protesting the unilateral decision to cancel the session and proposing that the 145th session be held on the 24th. On 24 February LPA and VNA, within an hour of each other, reported the developments at the 145th session that day--with the DRV and the PRG reading separate statements on suspension of the meeting and proposing that the 146th session be held on 2 March. VNA, but not LPA, reported that the two communist delegations walked out after reading their statements. The DRV statement, read by Xuan Thuy, said the decision to suspend the 145th session was a manifestation of the DRV Foreign Ministry's "vigorous protest" over the 16-17 February U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. Thuy did not mention the Versailles gathering explicitly when he accused "the U.S. delegate" of using "gross" language with z-.gard to"peace-loving people of the world, including the American people." And he said that in its 23 February message to the DRV, the U.S. delegation "implied that it would continue to sabotage the Paris conference." Thuy's statement repeated the claim that the U.S. "escalation" of the air war further exposed the "fallacious" character of the Nixon Administration's words about peace. The PRG's statement on the 16th, protesting the U.S. postponement of the session, had specifically mentioned the eight-point plan in saying its nature was exposed by the stepped-up military action and the increase in B-52 sorties. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENT I Al, Ffl:r.S TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY .1.972 LE DUC TWO MEETS U.S. VISITOR; OTHER LEADERS' MOVES REPORTED VNA announced on 22 February that the American scientist George Wald had recently visited the DRV and, while there, had met a number of captured U.S. pilots and talked with Le Duc Tho. The report identified Tho in his position as special advisor to the DRV delegation to the Paris conference and said that the meeting, on 21 February, was "cordial." VNA said that Tho "further explained" to Wald the "serious stand and well-wishing attitude of Vietrsm" and stressed that the Vietnamese would fight "until complete victory." Le Duc Tho has not normally met with Americans visiting the DRV, although he--along with Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Duy Trinh--received Cyrus Eaton and his wife in December 1969. Dung is the leader who most frequently meets visiting Americansi when they are received at a high-level; Hanoi reported his meetings with at least three U.S. antiwar delegations last year. It is possible that Dong did not meet with Wald during his week-long stay in Hanoi because the Premier has been occupied with activities surrounding the visit of Sihanouk, who arri?.~ed in Hanoi on 12 February. On the 23d VNA announced that Dong had accompanied Sihanouk on a trip to Haiphong and the Quang Ninh coal mining area from 19 to 21 February. Hanoi's reports on Sihanouk's public activities have also noted that on 14 February, on the eve of the lunar new year (Tet), he was received by Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. Hanoi media reported that Dong accompanied Sihanouk during his activities on the 15th, but there have been no reports on what Sihanouk did from 16 through 18 February. Consistent with past practice, Hanoi media during the week since Tet have been publicizing various holiday activities by the DRV leadership, but without providing precise dates. For example, as late as 23 February VNA noted that "on the occasion of the lunar new year" Le Duc Tho had visited medical facilities trevting "cadres back from the front." Similarly, a 21 February domestic broadcast noted that Truong Chinh had "recently" visited a foreign trade branch exhibit, and a broadcast on the 20th said Le Duan had paid a Tet visit to a publishing house.* Other low-level activities of Le Duc Tho in Hanoi were noted on 24 February in a VNA report that on the 22d he had visited an art museum. * For a report on earlier Tet activities by the DRV leaders, see the 16 February TRENDS, page 19. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/4.hl9fMDP85T0087PROP008-2 24 FEBRUARY 1972 HANOI ARMY PAPER REVIEWS INDOCHINESE MILITARY SITUATION Hanoi comment on the military situation includes an article in the 17 February QUAN DOI NUAN DAN, broadcast to the domestic audience, which offers some new analysis of allied military Strategy while reflecting the standard optimism that the Indochinese "peoples" are in an advantageous war situation. Reviewing the fighting throughout Indochina, the article turns first to Laos where, it routinely claims, the "enemy" in late 1971 was "dealt a staggering blow on the Plain of Jars." In a seeming allusion to allied speculation about the likelihood of an offensive in South Vietnam this winter, the article notes that the action on the Plain of Jars took place "while the Nixon clique was fearfully making preparations to cope with the eventual attacks by the PLAF on various battlefields in South Vietnam." The allies' "strategic" defeat, according to QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, not only worsened their military position in Laos but also "had a strong effect on the general situation" in Indochina and undermined "the Americans' big scheme to attract and disperse their adversary's forces on the northern Laos front in order to shield their lackeys' troops in South Vietnam." Also surveying the fighting in Cambodia, the article maintains that the balance of forces in that country is "very unfavorable for the Americans and their lackeys." Arguing that South Vietnamese troops can no longer assist the Phnom Penh forces, the article notes the recent pullback of ARVN forces from Cambodia, adding that their "defens.Lve position in northeastern Saigon, in the high plateau, and in the Mekong Delta has obviously worsened." It cites action in various parts of South Vietnam, asserting among other things, that Saigon troops have been "strongly attacked" in the highlands and that "the Kontum and Pleiku provincial capitals have been under pressure and on permanent alert." QTTAN DOI NHAN DAN maintains that the allies have failed in their effort to "attract and disperse their adversary's forces" and that "the Americans' setbacks in Laos and Cambodia have affected their war situation on the South Vietnamese battlefield, causing the Saigon puppet troops to become more passive." It concludes, routinely, with the prediction that the Indochinese peoples will continue to deal "new painful blows on all battlefields." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL - 31 - PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 NEW APPROAC;i SHOWN IN ONE OF TWO NEW RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS Peking has sustained its diplomatic momentum with announcements on 15 and 19 February on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Mexico and Argentina, representing the 21st and 22d such accords in the series of agreements beginning with the one with Canada in October 1970. In addressing the Taiwan issue, the agreement with Argentina followed the Canadian formula-- Argentina recognized the PRC Government as the "sole legal government of China" and added noncommittally that it "takes note" of Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. In line with the recognition agreement with Peru late last year,,the Chinese expressed support for Argentina's claim to jurisdictio< over adjacent waters to a limit of 200 miles. The communique also recorded agreement to adopt "active measures for the development of trade." In contrast to this unexceptional treatment of the Taiwan and other issues in a recognition agreement, the agreement with Mexico and the followup PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 17 February notably departed from Peking's practice since October 197n by passing up all prior formulas for dealing with the PRC's claim to be the sole government of China. The Sino-Mexican communique made no mention of this claim or of Taiwan, stating simply that the two sides had decided to establish relations on the basis of what amounts to four of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.* In Peking's only allusion to the Taiwan problem in connection with this recognition agreement, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial cited Mexican President Echeverria's speech in support of seating the PRC in the United Nations last fall for the statement that "the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the PRC are "juridically indivisible"; PEOPLE'S DAILY noted that Mexico had subsequently undertaken the "courageous" step of breaking its relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government. * The fifth of the principles, the one specifically dealing with "peaceful coexistence," was omitted. The use of the five principles of coexistence in the series of recognition agreements has followed no regular pattern. The principles of "nonaggression" and "peaceful coexistence" were omitted in the agreements with Canada, Italy, Chile, Austria, Turkey, Belgium, Lebanon, and Iceland. The principle of "nonaggression" was omitted in the agreements with Cyprus and Cameroon. None of the five principles were cited in communiques with Kuwait, San Marino Iran and Rwanda. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0003b0050068-2 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/6OWPOiAIADP85T00875F fZMG 'biM8-2 24 FEBRUARY 1972 In addition to the Canadian formula now repeated again in the case of Argentina, Peking has accepted two other formulas for acknowledging its claim to be the sole legal government of China. In Peking's preferred formula, the other side rerogr,izes thn PRC as "the sole legal government of the entire Chinese people," thus implicitly recognizing Peking's claim to Taiwan. The most accommodating tormula used prior to the Mexican agree- ment provides recognition of the PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China" without any reference to the Taiwan question. Peking's approach in the Mexican case suggests a more confident attitude now that the PRC has been seated in .he United Nations and Sino-U.S. and other developments have greatly enhanced its international standing. Thus, provided the other country will take the initiative shown by Mexico--acknowledging on its own that China is "Juridically indivisible" and breaking off diplo- matic relations with the ROC-Peking may be even more flexible in the recognition negotiations than it showed in the series of agreements dating back to the compromise with Canada.* Apart from tougher cases in which the Taiwan question has acquired special importance, as with the United States, Japan, and possibly Britain, Peking may wish to appear less defensive and more accommodating on this issue while broadening its diplo- matic standing across as wide a front as possible. * Before this series of agreements, Peking had not always demanded a formal statement on its legitimacy as the sole government of China. Thus, the Sino-French recognition agree- ment of 27 January 1964 contained only a declaration of intent to establish relations and ignored the question of representa- tio< of China. A Chinese statement on the following day, however, defensively and vigorously reiterated Peking's claim to Taiwan. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES The Chinese followed past practice by extending support to the recognizing government on an issue important to that government, in the Mexican case going on record in the communique in support of the Mexican-backed proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. PEOPLE'S DAILY widened this endorsement by noting that the PRC gives "active support" to the "Just stand of all peace-loving countries for the establishment of nuclear- free zones or peace zones." Notwithstanding this expression of support, Peking has not formally signed the protocol on a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. In the last Chinese pronouncement on this subject, the PRC's UN delegate Chen Chu addressed a First Committee session on 10 December discussing a protocol to be added to an earlier treaty on such a zone. Annommcing that the PRC would not take part in the vote, Chen pointed out that the PRC has no soldiers stationed abroad, has no military bases on foreign soil, and has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Fe declared that this "p.lncipled" stand, which he contrasted with that of the two superpowers, is "the best support to the good wishes of many countries fo: the establishment of nuclear-free zones and peace zones." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS USSR -ARAB RELATIONS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 On the heels of Egyptian President as-Sadat's 2-4 February talks in Moscow, Soviet-Arab contacts have stepped up with the 10-17 February "official friendly" visit to the USSR of an Iraqi party-government delegation led by Revolution Command Council Deputy Chairman and Ba'th Party Regional Command Deputy Secretary Saddam Husayn. On the 23d, a Libyan Government delegation led by Economy and Industry Minister 'Abd as-Salam Jallud arrived in Moscow on what Cairo media described as the first visit of an official high-level Libyan delegation to the USSR. In the Middle East, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was in Cairo for talks 18-21 February after visiting Somalia. And a Soviet party-government delegation led by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kirill Mazurov arrived in Damascus on the 21st for a six-day visit to Syria. IRAQI-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE SUGGESTS FUTURE TREATY RELATIONSHIP The communique on Saddam Husayn's visit is marked by a much more cordial tone than that on his previous Moscow talks, in August 1970. Most significantly, it seems to foreshadow another Soviet-Arab treaty in recording the sides' agreement to study the question of "what supplementary measures can be taken in the near futuri to appropriately consolidate and embody in treaties" the two states' relations and "raise them to a new and higher level." Saddam Husayn, in his 11 February luncheon speech as reported by Baghdad radio, spoke of the need for "developing relations between cur countries to the level of a firm strategic alliance." The version in the 12 February PRAVDA reduced this to "strengthening the ties between our countries," although it did record his further statement that "we look toward the day when qualitative progress is effected in the character of relations between us," as well as his remark that the "firm strategic alliance" between "our peoples, parties, and governments" is the foundation on which relations are and will be based. The communique notes that Saddam Husayn was received by Brezhnev and by Podgornyy and held talks with Kosygin. Moscow had notably failed to report Brezhnev's meeting with Egypt's as-Sadat, but, in contrast, gave wide publicity to the Brezhnev-Saddam Husayn Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 meeting: Broadcast reports of the latter meeting, beamed world-wide, accounted for over half the total publicity on the Iraqi visit, and exceeded the attention given to as-Sadat's stay in Moscow. The report on the 15 February meeting, held in a "frank and friendly atmosphere," noted that the sides "exchanged views"on the Middle East and condemned "Israeli aggression." Questions of the further development of bilateral relations were discussed, the report added, as well as "examina- tion of the question of strengthening friendly ties" between the CPSU and the Iraqi Ba'th. The communique expresses satisfac- tion with the state of "friendly links" between the parties and a "mutual desire" to develop them further. The 1970 communique had mentioned only that "useful meetings" were held between party representatives. The current communique records the sides' desire to further develop political, economic, and "military" cooperation--the 1970 document expressed Iraq's appreciation of Soviet assistance in strengthening Iraq's "defense power"--as well as cooperation in creation of an Iraqi national oil industry. According to the communique, the Soviets support Iraq's oil policy, while the Iraqis express appreciation for Soviet aid in developing and exploiting oil resources. The communique--like that in 1970--notes Soviet acceptance of an invitation to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to visit Iraq. While the Middle East crisis was dismissed in the 1970 communique with the observation that the sides "exchanged views" on the subject, the problem is currently addressed in routine language blaming the tense situation on "Israeli imperialist aggression" supported by assistance from U.S. "imperialist circles and international Zionism." The sides state that a just and durable peace cannot be established without "liberation of all" occupied Arab territories and.securing the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people. The communique includes stress on the need for '..,ity of action of the Arab states. Howe'er, Baghdad radio in reporting Kosygin's 11 February luncheon speech omitted or altered all his specific references to other Arab countries, and in the communique substituted "Iraq" for "the Arab countries" in a reference to "the Arab countries' anti-imperialist course" in foreign policy and successes in "progressive social-economic changes." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 Along the lines of the Soviet-Egyptian communique on as-Sadat's Moscow visit last October, the Iraqi and Soviet sides "resolutely condemned" attempts by international imperialism to spread "anticommunist and anti-Soviet feelings" aimed at breaking up Arab solidarity and Arab cooperation with the socialist countries. PRAVDA carefully edited out Saddam Husayn's accusations against Iran in his luncheon speech, merely noting that he "touched on the question of Iraq-Iran relations, setting out his government's position." The communique strikes a compromise in condemning "imperialist" intrigues in the gulf and calling, as did the 1970 communique, for liquidation of "imperialist domination" in the area and abolition of foreign military bases. INTERNAL Propa`?rnda surrounding the visit -seems to suggest AFFAIRS the Soviets are hopeful that the Iraqi. regime intends to im?ilement its "Nationrl Action Charter" of last November and open the door to political activity in Iraq by other "progressive, anti-imperialist forces"--specifically, the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurds. Thus Brezhnev, in his 15 February meeting with Saddam Husayn, was reported by Moscow's domestic service to have welcomed the Ba'th Party leadership's desire to "unitq all anti-imperialist and progressive forces" in he country to strengthen the country's national independence. And Kosygin in his 11 February luncheon speech pointed to "important changes" in Iraq, citing efforts by the Ba'th and "other progressive parties and oi.ganizations" to set up a national front of all progressive forces in the country, which he said would undoubtedly facilitate Iraqi advancement "along the path of progressive socio-economic reforms." And he expressed confidence that this would be furthered by steps by the Ba'th Party and the government such as nationwide discussion of the N tional Action Charter and "further implementation" of the 11 March 1970 statement on a "peaceful democratic settlement" of the Kurdish problem. Koryavin, in the 10 February IZVESTIYA, assessed the charter as ranking "among the most important political events" occurring in Iraq. He pointed out that there had been no "nationwide action program of any sort" in Iraq in the last few years, and no cooperation between the country's main progressive forces-- the Ba'th, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Iraqi CP. Explaining the "transitional period" in Baghdad, Koryavin pointed to Iraqi CP support for the dratt charter and the charter's provision for Kurdish participation in state affairs, remarking that peace in Iraq has opened up broad prospects for the Kurds. Approved For Release 2009/IRE IDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CON, IDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 A more dubious assessment of the state of affairs had appeared in a NEW TIMES article (No. 49, December 1971) by R. Petrov. While regarding the charter as a "major positive step," he noted a struggle within the Ba'th between progressive 'ices and elements "tied to moribund social relationships" c to the foreign oil monopolies, and concluded that only the future wot:ld show to what extent the proclaimed progressive aims could actually be achieved. In the course of analyzing the "two key political problems" facing Iraq--the Kurdish question and the problem of establishing a "national democratic front of progressive forces"--Petrov not only ticked off the former fr-:Zings of the Iraqi Ba'th, but noted that the Iraqi CP and the Kurdish Democratic Party had also engaged in self- criticism of past faults--"leftist' deviations" in past CPI activity and "extremist elements' activities" in the Kurdish movement. VISIT OF LIBYA'S JALLUD GIVEN MINIMAL PUBLICITY BY MOSCOW Thus far Moscow has only briefly acknowledged the arrival of a Libyan Government delegation headed by Economy and Industry Minister Jallud on the 23d "at the invitation of the Soviet Government." TASS the same day carried a two-sentence announcement that Novikov, vice chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, had received the deleg.--tion. On the 24th TASS reported that Novikov and the Libyans began talks that day "in a friendly atmosphere" and "exchanged views" on questions of mutual interest. The only monitored Libyan report has been a 21 February LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY item that Jallud had left for Cairo en route to Moscow at the head of ~-n official delegation for talks with Soviet officials. But Libya takes the occasion Lo warn Iraq of the dangers of concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union. Bayda radio on the 23d cited an "authoritative source" at the foreign ministry as saying "it is almost confirmed" that Iraq is about to conclude a treaty with the USSR, and expressing Libya's "extreme concern" over this trend "which the fraternal Arab countries have begun to follow." Declaring that this trend takes the Arabs back to the days of the Baghdad Pact and "Western imperialist countries' treaties," the statement adds that Libya views this attitude as a "serious violation" of the Arab League Charter. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CON I?IDENTI.AL 1'111.S '1'I4I:NDS 2/e FEBRUARY .1.972 Moscow's limited propaganda attention to Libya In the past two months has included commentaries in Arabic, one in late January and one in early February, hailing the termination of Libyan agreements with Britain and the United States. The second commentary praised Libya's struggle to eradicate imperialist influence and to establish cooperation with "progressive states" sucii as Egypt and Syria. It pointed noted that the latter countries' successes along the roar of independent national development have "depended more and more on the support and help" of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. In December, Moscow had indirectly responded to Libyan criticism of the Soviet role in the Indian-Pakistani conflict with a TASS pickup of an article in the Lebanese CP daily AN-NIDA' condemning "the anti-Soviet campaign in the Libyan press." GRECHKO, EGYPTIANS "EXCHANGE VIEWS" ON MILITARY COOPERATION In line with Moscow's propaganda treatment of recent Grechko visits to Iraq and Somalia, the Soviet defense minister's 18-21 February "friendly official" visit to Cairo was given limited publicity.* (Grechko's Somali visit, originally scheduled for December, was postponed due to his reported illness in Baghdad.. Iraq.was the first leg of that trip which, according to Moscow in early December, was also to have included Syria.) Soviet and Egyptian media briefly reported his activities, TASS noting on the 19th that Grechko, accompanied by the Soviet ambassador and "the chief military adviser," Col. Gen. V. Okunev, was received by President as-Sadat on the 19th. Another TASS dispatch on the 19th reported that Grechko that day inspected troops of the Third Field Army. And it added-that at a luncheon given by the army commander, Grechko affirmed that the USSR "will be giving all kinds of assistance" to the Egyptian people, and charged the United States and Israel with trying to "sow seeds of mistrust" between the Soviet and Egyptian peoples and between the armed forces of the two states. A one-sentence TASS item on the 20th said that Grechko and War Minister Sadiq "continued talks" that day.. * There was little monitored Moscow or Cairo Leportage on a previoLs Grechko visit to Egypt, from 30 March to 3 April 1968. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONIC' I 0E NT I A1, l"1118' 'I'IZI;NI);I 24 I-'I1:l luIAltY 1972 According to ii short commt.nt lque I8NUed on the 2.I.14t, the sides "exchanged views" on f.ur.ther Soviet-Egypt military cooperation in the :Interests of enhancing the "defense capacity" of Egypt. (Cairo's version said "enhancing the fighting capabl.l..l.tles.") And the Egyptians expressed gratitude for the Soviet Union's "great support and assistance" In strengthening the armed forces and the country's "defense capacity"--or what the Cairo version called Egypt's "combat ability." (Similarly,a "Joint statement" on Grechko's official friendly visit to Iraq last December, according to TASS, said the sides "exchanged views" on strengthening and further developing military cooperation, and the Iraqi side expressed appreciation for the "big help and assistance in strengthening the defense capacity" of Iraq. The IRAQI NEWS AGENCY's version additionally said the two sides "reached agreement on further developing military cooperation.") A Moscow commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 18th, heralding the Grechko visit, asserted that Article 8 of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, on military cooperation, "has gravely perturbed" Tel Aviv and Washington. It added that this military cooperation "serves the cause of establishing peace and security" in the Arab East as well as the consolidation of Egypt's ability to repel the "Israeli invaders." The commentary went on routinely to recall that in the communique on as-Sadat's recent Moscow visit the sides confirmed their determination to seek a "Just settlement" in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. An Arabic-language commentary on the 22d, noting the "exchange of views" on military cooperation during Grechko's visit, assailed "dirty attempts" by the Arabs' enemies to distort the nature of this cooperation and isolate the Arab peoples from the support and help of the socialist cowltries. ZHUKOV IN Discussing President Nixon's foreign policy report PRAVDA in a 17 February PRAVDA article, Yuriy Zhukov claimed that the "slanderous inventions" in the report with regard to Soviet intentions in the Middle East were aimed at sowing anti-Soviet feelings in the Arab countries, but that the Arab peoples know their friends. Zhukov took issue with the statement in the report "that allegedly 'the Soviet Union's attempts to consolidate and expand its own military position in Egypt are a subject of alarm in the United States."' He complained that the Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDE M! LAh PB LF; TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 report presumes to advise the USSR "'to show restraint in its arms deliveries' to the Arab countries" at a tim8 when U.S. arms are pouring into Israel. Zhukov expressed astonishment at the U.S. politicians' "impudence" in believing that the aggressor is allowed to do anything while his victims do not even have the right to acquire defensive weapons to protect their own homes. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONF I.1)EN'C I1 A1, F11.1 1S '11ZENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1.972 MEDITERRANEAN MOSCOW SEES PEACE THREAT IN GREEK HOME-PORT, C')7JRUS ISSUES Moscow comment echoes the 15 February Soviet Government statement on the U.S.-Greek home-port arrangements, charging that the U.S. naval presence constitutes a threat to peace in the Mediterranean. And propagandists claim that Greece, at American behest, is pressuring Cyprus in fulfillment of a NATO plan to turn the island into "a major NATO base." Focusing on the bruader as''ct of the U.S. naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, Moscow repeatedly points out that the Greek "bases" are located in direct proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA review on the 20th by i'onomarev and Malyshkin summed up the propaganda charges in declaring that the Pentagon leaders intend to switch a proportion of U.S. ships to Greece from bases in Spain and Italy to control the entire eastern Mediterranean, "threaten the southern borders" of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, support Israel's "aggressive aspirations," and pressure the Arab states. Moscow also rebuts the "old grating arguments" of "an allegedly 'growing Soviet threat' in the Mediterranean," a PRAVDA article by Ivanov on the 18th calling this Greek "ballyhoo" which was used in the past to Justify implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. A Volskiy article in IZVESTIYA on the 17th/, protested that Soviet intentions in the Mediterranean are only peaceful. In `r.. is connection Volskiy recalled Brezhnev's statement, in his 30 March CPSU Congress report, that after a political settlement in the Middle East it would be possible to consider further steps aimed at a military detente in the region, particularly at turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace. Volskiy insisted that normalization of the situation in the Mediterranean is "linked primarily" with a Middle East settlement. Citing Soviet foreign policy actions representing "Lhe USSR's 'peace offensive' in the Mediterranean," he listed Brezhnev's visits to France and Yugoslavia, Kosygin's Algerian and Moroccan visits, and Egyptian President as-Sadat's recent talks in Moscow. Volskiy recalled that Brezhnev in his 11 June election speech last year had stated that the USSR die' not consider it an ideal situation when navies of the great powers cruise for long periods miles away from their own shor.:s, and "we are prepared to solve Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONF1.01!'WI W11'. AL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1.972 this problem, but . . . on an equal basis." Since early fall., Moscow media have largely ignored the issue of naval talks. Among other items, the KOMMUNIST editorial for January, reviewing the Soviet peace program, noted without comment that the USSR "has advanced a proposal on solving on an equal basis the problem of naval forces operating far from their native -l;.,res." A Dobrov commentary in Italian on the 23ri, deploring the silence in official circles in Rome over developments in the Mediterranean, is notable for the observation that "in Spain there is talk about a plan for a Mediterranean security system based on agreements between the countries concerned." Moscow has rarely, if ever, addressed itself publicly to Spanish initiatives, promoted from time to time, on Mediterranean security. TREATMENT Highlighting Soviet propaganda attention to OF CYPRUS Cyprus in the wake of the 11 February Greek Government "ultimatum" to Nicosia, a PRAVDA article by Yuriy Yasnev on the 17th entitled "Hands Off Cyprus!" asserted that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries "cannot remain indifferent" tJ developments around Cyprus. PRAVDA routinely added that the Soviet Union supports Cyprus' independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, the dismantling of "war bases" on the island, and a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question without any outside interference. Propagandists note support in Cyprus for the government's policy and cite President Makarios as declaring at a rally that various plans for imposing a solution on the Cypriot people against their will cannot succeed. Moscow has publicized statements by some Soviet public organizations in support of Cyprus, as well as statements by Cypriot, Greek, and Lebanese communist parties on the situation. But it apparently has not replayed a Turkish Cr appal, broadcast on the 18th by the Turkish-language clandestine "Our Radio," which charged both the Greek and Turkish "juntas" with delivering ultimatums to Cyprus and preparing to invade the island and noted that the Makarios government has the support of the socialist countries. CYPRUS The propaganda furor over tl'z Greek "ultimatum" and TALKS the ensuing Greek-NATO "threat" to Cyprus' independence has contained re'atively few references to the fate of the intercommunal talks. A Mirkov article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 15th alleged that "NATO agents" broke up the talks to create a pretext for foreign interferen~?e. Taking up the standard theme that a plot against Cyprus was concocted at the NATO Council session in Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFT.1)EN7'TAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 Lisbon on 3-4 June 1971, Markov claimed that the wrecking of the intercommunal talks was part of Lice plan formulated in Lisbon. And a Chirkov commentary in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 16th accused NATO agents of spreading the "provocative story" that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together in the same state. He went on to charge that NATO, taking advantage of "the disagreements that have arisen in the process of official negotiations" between representatives of the "Greek and Turkish communities," was trying to tie the island to NATO. The fullest discussion c;f the status of the talks appeared in an unattributed article in NEW TIMES (No. 7, 11 February 1972) which claimed again that frustration of the dialog between the communities was part of the Lisbon plan, and that the interruption of the negotiations last September was "primarily the handiwork of NATO agents." Soviet propaganda on Cyprus in the past several months focused on the usual allegations of NATO plots with only a few passing references to the discussions on widening the intercommunal talks to include UN, Greek, and Turkish representatives. Now NEW TIMES has explained that President Makarios, countering "this NATO maneuver," asked the United Nations to appoint a representative of the UN secretary general as an observer at the negotiations. Greece and Turkey in turn, the article went on, proposed increasing the number of participants by adding their own representatives acting as legal advisers on constitutional matters. NEW TIMES noted that in October the UN secretary general sent Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey a memorandum proposing, an increase in the number of participants in the negotiations, which was accepted by the Cyprus Government. And in late January UN official Guyer held discussions in ''costa with the government "and community leaders" about negotiations with the participation of the United Nations and representatives of Athens and Ankara. NEW TIMES added that "even this decision, which is to some extent a compromise," was not to NATO's liking, and charged "NATO agents" in Cyprus with stepping up subversive actions to frustrate the new phase of negotiations. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/0YBR; %-F RP85T00875RO SQO 'NOS-2 24 FEBRUARY 1972 ECUADOR CUBA ADOPTS WAIT-!X,-SEE STANCE TOWARD NEW MILITARY REGIME Attentive but noncommittal Cuban reportage of events surrounding the successful 15 February military coup in Ecuador reflects an inclination to defer a judgment of the new regime until its policies and intentions become clearer, The coup thus shelves, at least for the time being, the warming trend in Cuban-Ecuadorean relations--highlighted by Castro's 4 December talks in Guayaquil with now-ousted President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra on the return leg of his extended visit to Chile. But Havana's ample publicity for the new leaders' promises of reform and its citation of a Chilean comment on their apparently "progressive" leanings suggest an initial judgment that the new military regime is likely to carry forward the trend Castro had viewed favor in Velasco Ibarra's. NEWS COVERAGE The Cuban Communist Party organ GRANMA has carried daily without comment "the latest news reports on EcuadoL," including pronouncements of the new military leaders, recognition of the new government by various countries, and appointments of high-ranking government officials, with many of the reports credited to news agency dispatches. Havana radio and PRENSA LATINA reportage of developments touched off by the "quick, bloodless coup" F--trayed the new military government headed by Brig. Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lara as an independent, nationalist-oriented regime. PRENSA LATINA reported Velasco ibarra's arrival in Panama and quoted him as saying he as not sad about the military coup but was "through with politics." Quoting Santiago's PURO CHILE on 17 February, PRENSA LATINA said that "something about this coup makes us feel that this has not been 'Just another coup"' and that, considered as a whole, the first decisions taken by the military government in Ecuador " how a progressive mentality." PRENSA LATINA dispatches on the 19th and 20th reported announce- ments by the new government that it "will carry out wide reforms in the country's education system," that its road construction policy "will not be guided by private interests but will be based on technical criteria," and that it will "carry out a complete revision of its oil agreements." PRENSA LATINA also reported that the co'xpists had cancelled the elections scheduled for 4 June and had ar-ounced "a plan of structural changes which will benefit the maj _ity." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 In contrast to its coverage of the Bolivian coup last August, Cuban media conveyed no suggestion that outside elements had been involved either in the planning or the execution of the coup. PRENSA LATINA duly carried Rodriguez' denial that the military leaders "had used other revolutions as an example and model" and his claim that the revolution "is strictly Ecuadorean in spirit--an Ecuadorean intention, an Ecuadorean yearning." It quoted his comment that "our movement" is neither fascist nor socialist and that "we speak of a nationalist revolution . . . because someone had to change the structures that were outdated for the life of a modern state," BACKGROUND Recent Cuban comment on Ecuador has stressed the Velasco Ibarra government's stand in the "tuna war" with the United States and its resistance to various acts of U.S. "economic aggression" against Latin American nations. In early December Castro indicated a favorable view of the Ecuadorean Government, associating it for the first time with the governments of Peru and Chile, particularly in view of its voting record in the United Nations on the China representation question. In his 3 December farewell press conference in Santiago, Chile, Castro defended the Ecuadorean Government against a reporter's allegation that it was "fascist": Although the Ecuadorean Government was "not a revolutionary government," Castro declared, it had nevertheless demonstrated its "absolute independence" of the United States by voting with Cuba, Chile, and Peru for the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations. Reiterating the line that Cuba's reestab- lishment of diplomatic relations with other Latin American nations hinges on their demonstration of independence from the United States, Castro asserted that "there are no contradictions" in his visit to Ecuador and that "there would be no contradiction if the Ecuadorean Government were to wish to establish diplo- matic relations with Cuba," In a 4 December interview in Guayaquil, replying to a question on his talks with the Ecuadorean president, Castro described Velasco Ibarra as "a vigorous, likable person" who had made "some thought-provoking statements in regard to Cuba." Stating that his brief visit to Guayaquil was "merely to greet" the Ecuadorean president and to "make his acquaintance and excharge views," the Cuban prime minister expressed Cuba's appreciatii,n for the "gestures" represented by Ecuador's votes on the UN China representation question. Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/gjdAf}MP85T00875g8-2 24 FEBRUARY 1972 CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS SECOND LIAONING PARTY PLENUM DENOUNCES "SWINDLERS" On 20 February Shenyang radio reported that the second "enlarged" plenary session of the Liaoning provincial party committee was held from 1 to 13 February. Nearly 300 persons attended the session, including an unspecified number of the full and alternate member9 of the provincial party committee and "responsible comrades" of party committees at the municipal, regional and county level. The session was presided over by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, Liaoning's first secretary, and Tseng Shao-shan, second secretary. Although no other members of the provincial party committee were mentioned in the report, all but one have made relatively recent public appearances; Deputy Secretary Mao Yuan-'sin, nephew of Mao and a former Red Guard leader, has not appeared publicly since April 1971. Although the need to strengthen party unity to overcome the harm done by "swin"'lers"--a term that has become identified with Lin and his followers--has been a common theme in all other recently reported provincial party plenums, the reportage on the Liaoning plenum is more explicit in indicating that the Lin Piao affair has hindered the rebuilding of party units within the province. The radio report, for example, linked the failure to complete the total rebuilding of the provincial party apparatus with the negative influence of "swindlers who had illicit relations with foreign countries and attempted to change the line and policies of the party." Indicating that gaps still exist within the provincial party apparatus, more than one year after the formation ofitthe provincial party committee, the report was able to claim only that "party committees at various levels have mainly been established." Calling for speeding up the work of "party building, criticism of revisionism, and rectification of work styles," the session stressed the need to strengthen party building as well as the party's centralized leadership, and concluded that "all party members, in particular the members of party committees at various levels, should strengthen their party concept and place themselves under the party's absolute leadership." Party members were told to "improve the party committee system" and to "conscientiously implement democratic centralism and strengthen the party's collective Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 leadership." New party members are to be accepted "actively and prudently," and it was reiterated that party committees should strengthen their leadership over revolutionary committees and mass organizations and "grasp firmly and well the work of improving and building the Young Communist League, particularly the strengthening of YCL work in schools." A 20 February LIAONING DAILY editorial greeting the conclusion of the plenary session revealed that in the past year "the work in some areas was not done well" and stressed that "it is necessary to further expose and criticize the criminal activities of Liu Shao-chi and other swindlers." Asserting that this task is a "question concerning not only a certain single individual," the editorial stated that it is "imperative" to make "full use of these people as teachers by negative examples and mobilize the masses in depth to criticize them and wipe out their pernicious influence." The editorial argued that "this is a task of prime importance at the present time and it should be grasped firmly, meticulously, and successfully." The concern for increasing party control over all social organs expressed in the reports on the Liaoning plenum--an intensified theme in PRC propaganda since the purge of Lin Piao and several other top military leaders last fall-- was echoed in an unusually frank HOPEI DAILY editorial broadcast by the Hopei radio on 21 February. Declaring that the of "whetcier to consolidate and strengthen the party leadership or weaken and destroy it" is an "important criterion for distinguishing between genuine and sham Marxism," the editorial condemned those "swindlers" who "opposed the leadership of the party w-thout restraint" and "deliberately destroyed the organizational principles of the party." Without centralized party leadership, it was asserted, "there will inevitably appear a state of either dual leadership or plural leadership--a state of anarchy." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS CRACKDOWN ON CULTURAL FIGURES IN UKRAINE CONTINUES The Ukrainian cultural crackdown begun in early January has continued to gain momentum. At a 1/ January meeting of the Kiev writers organization chairman Yuriy Zbanatskiy denounced "poisonous weeds" like Anatoliy Kuznetsov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vyacheslav Chornovil for providing "spiritual food for Munich radio stations" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 8 February). He declared that such facts must not be overlooked and that youth and "our inexperienced comrades" must be more actively protected from harmful influences. He complained that the writers union had been too lax in admitting young writers and evaluating their work. Among those criticized by Zbanatskiy was former writers union secretary Vitaliy Korotych, whose latest work was alleged to contain "non-class" poems. The 21 January CPSU Central Committee decree prompted editorials in the two leading party papers (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 29 January, and PRAVDA UKRAINY, 1 February) criticizing a variety of authors, literary journals, publishing houses, film studios and institutes. Similar editorials appeared in the Komsomol papers (MOLOD UKRAINY, 8 February, and KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, 11 February) criticizing ideological defects in the literary work of the Komsomol press. The writers union paper LITERATURNA UKRAINA ran two editorials on the decree (28 January and 8 February); in the second editorial the editors conceded that they had committed errors similar to those condemned by the decree. On 10 February the writers union presidium met to discuss the decree (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 15 February), and on 11 February the Ukrainian Central Committee convened a conference of leaders of creative unions, literary institutes, newspapers, journals and publishing houses to hear a still unpublished speech by Ukrainian culture secretary F. D. Ovcharenko (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 12 February). Interestingly, among those participating in the discussion at the 10 February presidium meeting was the notable dissenter B. D. Antonenko-Davidovich, who along with the recently arrested dissidents Ivan Dzyuba and Vyacheslav Chornovil, refused to testify at the November 1970 Moroz trial and co-authored an open protest against the court's Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 24 FEBRUARY 1972 lawlessness. He was singled out for attack in the 8 February MOLOD UKRAINY editorial on literary criticism which censured Dnepropetrovsk's youth paper for printing an enthusiastic review of his recent book "even though the literary critics and public had greeted the book's appearance negatively." Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2