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April 12, 1972
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...~. _. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Confidential FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE II,IIIIII~~~~~~~~u~~umllllll b'R~I~1g3S an Commtc~a.+t 1'r~ pa~an~:~c~ STATSPEC Confidential 12 APRIL 1972 (VOL. XXIII, N0. 15) 00300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONfI'IDI'sN'l'IAI~ This propaganda analysts report 18 based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIB without coordination with other U.B. Government components. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United Btatea, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the UB Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of Its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person to pro- hibited by law. cpouv 1 [ulud~d Ism au~sw,atlt dOWOOIOd100 OOd bdsulRaUa, Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS 12 APRIL 1972 CONTENTS Tupice and Events Given Mayor ACtention A i INDOCHIN Hanoi, Front Acclaim "Victories" in South Vietnam Offensive 1 DRV Government Statement Assails Unli~:iited U.S. Air Strikes 5 DRV Claims 22 U.S. Planes Downed in April, Urges Vigilance 9 DRV Military Comment, Plenum Developed Rationale for Offensive. 13 PRC Condemns U.S. Bombing, Acclaims Communist Offensive 16 Moscow Reacts Cautiously to Communist Offensive, U..S. Actions . 20 Cambodia: Communists Claim Their Forces Threaten Phnom Penh 24 SING-SOVIET RELATIONS Peking Maintains Firm Line on Soviet "Hegemonistic" Aime 26 USSR-IRAQ Kosygin Visit Produces Second Soviet-Arab Friendship Pact 32 DISARMAMENT Moscow Hails BW Accord, Urges Ban on Chemical Weapons 39 GERMANY AND BERLIN Gromyko: Treaty Refection Wi11 "Undermine" Berlin Accord 41 USSR-BOLIVIA IZVESTIYA Comments Belatedly on Expulsion of Soviet Diplomats 46 USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS Ukraine Plenum Rebukes Two Obkom Leaders, Removes Sobol 48 CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS Shake-up in Kwangtung Leadership Revealed in NCNA Reports 50 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 FOR OP'P'IC'tAL U8E OivLY rBIS 'I'RIsNDS 12 APRIL 1.972 -:L- 'TOPICS AND CVCNTS GIVCN MAJOR ATTCNTION 3 - 9 APRIL .L972 Moscow (2971 items) Peking (1303 items) Indochina (3%) 11% Domestic Issues (34%) 32% [Communist Offensive (--) 2%] Indochina (30%) 28% in South Vietnam [Communist Offensive (--) 12%] [Strikes on DRV (--1 2%] in South Vietnam [Le DUan'A Birthday (--) 2%] [Sihanouk in DPRK (--) 8?0] CPSU 24th Congress (J2%j g~ [Strikes on DRV (--) 4%] Anniversary ligltese Prime Minister (4%) 11% Hungarian Liberation (U.3%) SX in PRC Anniversary Palestinian People's (--) 5% China (5X) 4X Congress AUCCTU 15th Congress (13%) 4X Senegal National Day (--) 3% Kosygin in Iraq (--) GX ' These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Mobc:ow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, ar diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Toples and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed !n the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor slgniflcance. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONI~'IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 12 APRIL 1972 INDOCHINA Vietnamese communist media Dave claimed military "victories" and civilian "uprisings" in many parts of South Vietnam, and an order from the command of the South Vietnamese liberation army (PLAF) on 11 April. called for further offensive action to achieve "complete victor~~." Following the initial thrust of the offensive in Quang Tri, the focus of the propaganda shifted to Binh Long Province northwest of Saigon--an area which some comment noted could be used ae a staging ground for further important offensives. The first substantive report--carried on 10 April by Hanoi radio-- on the North Vietnamese party (VWP) Central Committee's "recent" 20th plenum suggests that the meeting endorsed the launching of the current offensive in South Vietnam. According to the report, the plenum held that "victories" since the 1968 Tet offensive "have opened up the realistic possibility of defeating the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine." High-level Hanoi condemnation of U.S. air and naval action against the DRV came in an 11 April government statement protesting the "continuous" attacks since 6 April "at President Nixon's orders." The statement contained the first direct acknowledgment of U.S. charges Chat North Vietnamese forces have invaded the South. The charges had been referred to obliquely, however, in a 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry protest against air strikes that day which ridiculed the "illusion" that the United States could deter the North from supporting the South. In a foreign ministry statement on 10 April seconding Hanoi's protest of the 6th against the U.S. bombing, Peking acclaimed the "magnificent victories" won in the communist offensive while going to considerable lengths to rebut Washington's argtunent that the offensive represents an invar~ion from the North. The statement showed signs of restraint, containing no direct attack on the Nixon Admin:~stration by name and failing to reaffirm Peking's support for the war effort. Moscow has to dare issued no official endorsement of Hanoi's protests, although solidarity with the DRV was reaffirmed in a Soviet-GDR communique at the conclusion of SED party chief Honecker's 4-10 April visit. Moscow's cautious approach is also evidenced by its avoidance of any personal criticism of the President. HANOI. FRONT ACCIJ~IM "VICTORIES" IN SOUTH VIETNAM OFFENSIVE Typical of the broad communist claims regarding the current offensive, the 11 April order from the South Gietnam liberation army command CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 200~1~p,~~-RDP85T0~7~5,~~i~~300050015-4 12 APRIL 1972 maintains Chat PLAF troops are "winning great victories on all fronts" and that "our people throughout the South are arising vigorously, smashing the U.S.-Thieu clique's yoke of domination, and gaining control.." Calling for further attacks, uprisings, and proselyting, the order pledges to "develop tY~e offensive impetus to gain great victories, smash Vietnamization, and bring our people's resistance to complete ?:ictory." The PLAF order was welcomed on the 12t1~ in .lanoi press editorials which acclaimed the "vigorous" development of the offensive. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's editorial, likQ other comment, reflected Hanoi's apparent calculation that the South Vietnamese army, without the support of U.S. ground forces, would b: vulneraule to the communists' main-force attacks. Appraising the situation in the South, it observed Chat the U.S. army--the "main" of the war--had been disengaged from the fighting, and it cl~~imed that the ARVN is "obviously exhausted following its heavy, repeated defeats" in 1971. The editorial called upon the communist "regular units" to "deal the enemy vigorous blows," to attack liim "continuously and very strongly," and to "fight to break the backbone of the puppet regular units" and "make him panicked ar.d confused as soon as he catches sigh of our troops." The paper maintained: "We are now stronger than before and the enemy is weaker than before. Nothing can check our advance." BINH LONG The importance of the attacks northwest of Saigon, FIGHTING in Binh Long Province, was underscored in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 8th which praised the PLAF there for "destroying a big chunk" of the defense network "established to block the way and protect" Saigon. Suggesting that the way has been opened for further attacks, the editorial maintained that the area of ea8tern Nam Bo, which includes Binh Long, is a position from which to "stage offensives that exert a strong effect on the southern cities and rural areas, from Saigon to the P4ekong Delta." It added that "the glorious Binh Long victo;.y" had not only "rocked the enemy's important defense line" but also "directly created conditions for the revolutionary forces to develop their offensive position in this strategic area." In a review of the situation throughout the Soutl-,, a NHAN DAN editorial on the 8th claimed that the PLAF in Binh bong, in fighting from the 5th to the 7th, had "seriously damaged" the ARVN 5th Division, "forced all of the 9th Battle Group to surrender," and "annihilated" several other ARVtd unite, Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIL`rNTIAL FBIS TRIrNDS 12 APRIL 1972 "completel;~ liberating Loc Ninh district" and seizing control. of Flighwny 13 north of Chon Thanh--the southernmost district capital in the province. A Liberation Radio broadcast on the same day pressed similar claims and asserted that the people of Loc Ninh district "rose up" in coordination with the military attacks and were "eagerly constructing a revolutionary administration." This broadcast, like other commentaries, stressed that the Binh Long attacks came at a time when ARVN forces were dispersed to meet other assaults. It Cook note of reports that the Thieu government has had to use the airborne battalion that guards the presidential palace to defend the outskirts of Saigon and has had to assign military cadets to `~~ard duty. Details of alleged communist military achievements in Binh Long Province were supplied in a Front radio broadcast on the 9th which claimed that 3,500 allied troops were put out of action from 5 to i April; it alleged that almost 1,000 of them were captured, including high-ranking officers and U.S. advisers. The radio said that 400 military vehicles were seized, including nearly 50 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and that l0 aircraft were shot down. It went on Co claim Chat the PLAF wiped out two multibattalion units, one regiment, and numerous battalions. Another Front broadcast, also on the 9th, claimed that a third multibattalion unit--the 52d Battle Group--was "annihilated" on 7 April north of the Binh Long provincial capital of An Loc (designated Hon Quan by the communists). This feat, according to the broadcast, "completely isolated" the allied troops in An Loc. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th, which highlighted this "large-scale annihilating battle," again stressed the importance of the eastern Nam Bo battlefield. And an article in the army paper on the 11th, hailing alleged communist victories in the neighboring province of Tay Ninh, claimed that the PLAF is taking control of Highway 22 in that province as well as of Highway 13 in Binh Long. The article said that the fighting in the two provinces had forced U.S. Commander Abrams to move part of the ARVN 21st Division into the area from the southern part of the country. IMPACT ON ARVN Hams i ,and Front propaganda continues to place considerable stress on the need to carry on proselyting among South Vietnamese Government forces, and comment on the fighting claims significant success in such efforts. The Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000~g~~g~Etu~l~-RDP85T0~~7S5~~300050015-4 12 APRIL 1972 proselyting duties of the PLAF were officially reviewed in an instruction from the army's political departmer-t, publicized by the Front on 6 April, which recalled the PRG's 25 January l0-point statement of policy toward people "forced by the U.S.-Thieu clique to serve as mercenaries."* The LO points have been recalled in other propaganda, including the 8 April NHAN DAN editorial; NNAN DAN typically held that they have been "exerting an increasingly strong influence on the ranks of the puppet army, showing the puppet troops the path to follow ." The NHAN DAN editorial, in dwelling on the alleged failure of Saigon's armed forces to deal with the current offensive, suggested that the communists may be counting on a breakdown of these forces in order to accomplish their ob~ecti~-es in the offensive. The editorial claimed broadly that "in the atmosphere of seething attacks and uprisings by our armed forces and people on the vast frontline, Saigon puppet units have begun to continuously stage antiwar acts and to surrender and desert en masse." IC singled out the alleged defection under fire of the 3d Division's Stith Regiment in Quang Tri and the "collective surrender" of the 5th Division's 9th Battle Group it Binh Long; and it went on to observe Chat such actions clearly show that the "puppet forces" are declining in the face of the "liberation troops' offensive strength" and that the communists' strength and the a111es' "weak and defeated position" are "having a strong effect on all troop categories of the puppet Saigon .forces." As has been the case during previous mayor engagements, including Lam Son 719, communist media have quickly exploited the claimed capture or defection of ARVN officers, describing the circumstances in detail and publicizing purported statements by the officers. For example, VNA on the 7th announced that the officers and men of the 56th regiment had been brought to a "specified place" where they Caere "received" and were given an explanation of the PRG's 10-point policy. VNA cited the commander and deputy commander of the regiment-- both lieutenant colonels--as stating that their opposition to the "brutal" implementation of Vietnamization had caused them to refuse to obey orders from the division command; they were also quoted as saying they had "seen clearly" that the ARVN "could not resist the revolutionary forces as Che U.S. *The 10-point statement is discussed in the 2 February TRENDS, pages 21-23, and in the 5 April TRENDS, page 4. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL F$IS TRENDS 12 APRIL 1972 troops continued to be pulled out and t-~~ men in the Saigon army, fed up with the war, no longer wanted to fight." On the 9th VNA described Che surrender of the 56th Reg.iment's headquarters at Camp Carroll, indicating that the camp's defenders had contacted the "liberation" forces by radio to inform Chem they did not wish to fight and to arrange their surrender. The 8 April NHAN DAN editorial had ridiculed the reported announcement by the ARVN that the 56th regiment's commander committed suicide. DRV GOVERf~'IENT STATEMENT ASSAILS UNLIMITED U.S. STRIKES The U.S. decision to step up air and naval attacks against the North in the face of the communist offensive in South Vietnam prompted A DRV Government statement* on 11 April which called the action "an extremely serious new step in escalating the war." It specifically protested the "continuous" attacks since 6 April "at President Nixon's orders" against the Vi.nh Linh region,. Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces, and Vinh city. The statement cited Secretary Laird for the remark that the United States would intensify and prolong its attacks on the DRV,, and it went on to claim that "the White House spokesman" not only said there would be no limit to the use of air power against the North but "t:treatened to strike at Haiphong har'uor." A NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th cited UPI in specifying that this "threat" was voiced on 8 April, along with the Press SecretF.ty's additional "hint" that the United States might even bring infantrymen back to South Vietnam. 'The government statement contained Hanoi's first direct acknowledgment of U.S. charges that the DRV toad invaded the South. As carried by VNA in English, it said: "To conceal their criminal acts of war escalation, the U.S. ruling circles have put forward deceitful contentions, calling black white. * Hanoi has issued a number of government statements on Indochina developments during the Nixon Administration, but this is the first one pegged to air strikes against the DRV. It apparently was issued at the government rather than the foreign ministry level because it was reRponsive to a new U.S. policy derision--to extend the scope of the air strikes. Earlier government statements included those of 12 June 1969 on U.S. decisions on troop withdrawal, 6 November 1969 on the President's speech outlining his Vietnamization policy, 30 April 1970 on the incursion into Cambodia, and, most recently, 10 February 1971 on Lam Son 719. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ~~~i~D1~~5T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 12 APRIL 1972 They have rehashed shopworn contentions about 'North Vietnam aggression against South Vietnam,' ." (The Vietnamese word which VNA translated as "aggression" ie "xam luoc," but in this context it also could be translated as "invasion.") The KHAN DAN editorial on the 12th was even more precise in~ ref erring to U.S. statements when it said that "frenzied" acts against the North, including B-52 bombings deeper into North Vietnam territory, were being justified by such "vile arguments" as the claim that "the bombings were 'retaliation against the communist troops' offensive across the DMZ' . The 6 April. DRV Foreign. Ministry statement, protesting air. strikes that day and claiming the downl*g of l0 planes, had contained a passage which seemed clear~.~- to have been prompted by the U.S. charges of a DRV invasion. The statement said: In carrying out their new military adventures against the DRV, the U.S. imperialists continue Co nurture the illusion that Chey can oppress the Vietnamese people and force them to give . up their legitimate right to self-defense against U.S. imperialism and izs henchmen, . that they can force the North Vietnamese people to .give up their sacred duties regarding the freedom and independence of their fatherland and regarding their kith-and-kin compatriots in South Vietnam. Hanoi's pledge to fulfill its duty as the great rear for the frontline in the South and its support for its southern compatriots is standard fare in the propaganda, but this point had not been made in any of the previous nine foreign ministry statements on air strikes during the Nixon Administration. It was left to the government statement to revive Hanoi's formulation that justifies a Northern military presence in the South which it does not directly admit. Thus, the statement said that "wherever there are U.S. aggressors on Vietnamese territory, all Vietnamese have the right and duty to fight against them to defend the independence and freedom of their fatherland." This formulation appeared frequently in the propaganda after the beginning of the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 12 APRIL 1972 U. S.-DRV Paris talks in May 1968,* but prior to its use in the government statement its last known appearance in the propaganda was in December 1970--in the wake of large-scale U.S. air strikes against the North in November and the abortive prisoner- rescue attempt. Defense Minister Giap, speaking at a meeting marking army day, expressed the DRV's "right to track and shoot down all U.S. planes, regardless of type if they violate our airspace." He went on to eay that "we have the' right Co concentrate troops in whatever zone in order to protect our fatherland." After declaring that the Vietnamese have a "right" to fight wherever there are U.S. aggressors, the government statement cryptically said "the U.S. Administration also fabricated the myth about the so-called 'understanding'** between the United States and the DRV.:'. It did not directly indicate that the "understanding" concerned DRV military restraint as a quid pro quo for the U.S. bombing halt. But it reaffirmed Vietnamese determination to "fight until not a single~U.S. aggressor remains on their territory," and it added that the United States had invented the story of "North Vietnamese violating the understanding" as a pretext for stepping up'Che war against the DRV "in defiance" of the October 1968 U.S. pledge "to completely and unconditionally end the bombing of the DRV." * For example, Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking at a National Assembly session, was reported on 24 May 1968 to have said: "A11 our people, 31 million as one, are determined to fight and defeat the enemy. Wherever there are enemies, every Vietnamese has a right to go there to fighC them." Earlier in the war,. Hanoi had periodically explicitly denied the presence of VPA troops in the South. On six occasions between January 1966 and February 1967, VNA issued "authorized" denials of Western reports on the VPA presence. ** The matter of the "understanding" has come up only infrequently in official statements. It did appear in the 29 December 1971 foreign ministry statement on the sustained air strikes--which said that Secretary Laird even put out the ''fantastic allegation" that the DRV had violated an "understanding"--and in foreign ministry statements of 21 and 27 November 1970. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 12 APRIL 1972 The government statement declared that the Administration has embarked on "new military adventures against the DRV in the hope of salvaging" the Vietnamization plait. It added that this further demonstrates that Vietnamization is aimed not at ending the war but at prolonging and expanding it. The foreign ministry statement on the 6th had atypical]y included in its list of appeals to fraternal socialist and other peace- and justice-loving nations the plea that they demand an end to the Administration's Vietnamization policy. The ministry statement, in addition to calling for an end to "encroachments" on the ARV, appealed for help in persuading the Administration to respond to the PRG's seven-point peace plan. In an earlier passage it observed that U.S. and world opinion is demanding that the Administration. end its "sabotage" of the Paris talks.* The government statement's concluding appeal to the fraternal socialist and other countries included a call for them "to extend even stronger support and assts:ance to the dust patriotic fight of the Vietnamese people, and of the peoples of Laos and Cambodia as well, until total victory." Similar references to increased aid had appeared in the foreign ministry statements of 29 December 1971 and of 6 March. 'At the same time, the government statement said that U.S. bombs and shells have been unable and will never be able to subdue the heroic Vietnamese people. It added that "no brute force and no insolent threats can shake the Vietnamese people's determination to fight for the independence and freedom of their fatherland." It "hailed" both the feats of the North, which it claimed had "shot down many aircraft and sunk or damaged many U.S. warships " and the "extremely glorious victories of the heroic compatriots." PRG SUPPORT The PRG issued a Foreign Ministry statement on 8 April, supporting the DRV statement of the 6th, but as yet there has been no endorsement of the DRV Government statement. And on the 9th Front media publicized a PLAF Command congratulatory message, dated the 7th, Co the * VNA's Paris-to-Hanoi service transmission on 12 April carried statements from the DRV and PRG delegations to the Paris conference "demanding" that the 148th session be held on 13 April. The delegations had issued similar statements last week. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/~~, ~I~~,P85T0087~~0+~50015-4 l2 APRIL 1972 VPA Filgh Commund on the claimed downing of l5 planes beCween I and 6 April.* Tho PRG Foreign MinisCry statemenC, ae usual, followed the g?neral formaC of the DRV eCatemenC. Thus iC said thus the "nsw militacy adventure" of Che Administration was uimad ut "" the Vietnamese people to give up Chair lugiCimate right to~self-defense. The PLAF Command matched Ilunoi'e pleclgo to :Lte kith-and-kin in Che South when it , "solemnly warned" Che United StaCee Chat "Vietnam ie indivisible and Che Vietnamese people are indivisible" and that if Che United Scales continues to aCta:k the North, "tha southern troops and people will deal them punitive blows that will be 10 or 100 rimes stronger." It expressed Che determinntion of "all southern cadres, combatants, and compatriots to frustrate Che new Aggressive ploC of Che U.S. imperialists, to liberate the South and to defend Che North." Both the LPA and Liberation Radio commentarieo on the 5th warned of more U. S. actions against the North, but while LPA predicted heavier defeats for the United States, Liberation Radio pointed to the indivisibility of Vietnam and said thaC "with the 'when the South calls, the North will answer; when the North ca11e, the South ie present on time' spirit, . the southern armed forces and people are ready Co perform steel-like acts to knock out Che enemy if he dares Co recklessly lay a hand on our beloved North." DRV CLAIMS 22 U.S. PLANES DOWNED IN APRIL. URGES VIGILANCE The 12 April NHAN DAN editorial rounds up Hanoi's alleged victories against U.o. air and naval strikes against the DRV. Noting that the northern armed forces and people are launching an emulation movement to accelerate production, t~ be ready to fight, and to give due punishment to the U.S. "aggressors ,for their new escalation," NHAN DAN claims that since l April, * 7'he PRG has endorsed seven of Che l0 DRV foreign ministry statements protesting U.S. air strikes during the Nixon Administration; it most recently failed Co issue a foreigq ministry statement following the 17 February 1A72 DRV statement. However, on 18 February 1972 the PLAF Command issued congratulations on the alleged downing of seven planes. The PLAF Command had also sent congratulations on 22 November 1970 on the downing of six planes. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 200~i1~$4~'~'IQl~4-RDP85T~?~l~~f~-~~300050015-4 I'l AI'ItIL 1972 22 U.S. p.l.anes including throe b-52'e hav? boon downed in the Fourth Military Region, bringing its total. downed over tied DRV to 3,468, and that eight U.S. ships "were hit and w?~; ablaze." A later report ors the 12t{~ brings the number of ships reportedly hit to nine. The editorial, in addition to citing such "threats" against the DRV as the possible bombing of Haiphong, details the U.S. buildup. It observes that the United States ie increasing the number of aircraft carriers in the area to six, that many phantom fete have been sent from Japan to Da Nang, and that additional B-52's brought in raised the total of those aircraft to 100. It also charges that the U.S. Seventh Fleet has easel cruisers and destroyers to strike daily at coastal areas of southern DRV as well as to provide fire support to ARVN troops. A LO April Hanoi radio domestic commentary had cited AP in claiming Chat the Seventh Fleet had "more Chan doubled its force last week." The commentary said Chat in addition to more aircraft carriers, the Administration had mobilized nine cruisers and destroyers. Zt noted that two additional squadrons of F-4 bets had been brought from Japan, raising the total number of fete involved in air attacks against both the North and South to "more than 500." And it, too, said 100 B-52's were now operating in the area. Hanoi report on 6 April that 10 U.S. planes were downed that day, seven in Quang Binh and three in Vinh Linh. Three additional planes were reportedly downed on the 7th in the same areau. On the yth, Hanoi said that a B-52 had been downed that day in Vinh Linh--thp third since 2 April.* Ard on the 10th, Hanoi claimed three planes, two over Vinh city (Nghe Are Province) and one over Con Co Lsland. Although the propaganda has said that a number of U.S. pilots have been "annihilated," there have been no reports of captured U.S. pilots. The alleged downing of the 10 planes or. 6 April prompted a congratulatory m~.eage from President Ton Duc Thang--dated the 6th and carried in DRV media the following Say. Thang * See the 5 April TRENDS, pages 4-6. U.S. spokesmen have denied that any B-52's have ever been downed, but. on the 9th the U.S. command reported Chat one had been "slightly damag~^ b~ a surface-to-air missile" that day but returned to base . ~?fely. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/p~~t~ ~~~,~,~P85T0087~~r~Op1~~~~50015-4 12 AI'it I I, 1 ~JlJ had rlmllarly cang,ratulatad the people and arrnad furc~ar in the Ilam Rung brlilada araa tart Dar.amhar Cur the allnl{ad duwnlna uY the IUOtIi ll.ll. plane in thnt gran. Ar to that marraga~ 'I'hung now ~~allad un the people to "~luraly unita~ Curt.har hclg,hean thd~lr vlgtlnnc~a~ and rtand toady to C1Kht ," 'Cho VNA prarr review on the Gth noted that cummanddtiunr ware Lesuad by thn VPA Illgh Command Cur action during the wnak but. rerangaly~ thorn her bann no mention of any VI'A congratulatur.y mearagnr alnca thr,~. Such marrag,ar era common; they had bean iarued in p'a-~ruary of shit year and in December 1971 as wall rr dr .ng earlier pari~,dr of marriva bombing in March 1971. and May and November 1970. VPA ORDER, PREMIER'S ~Nano.i'e continuing attention to DIRECTIVE ON VIGILANCE heightening vigilance and combat-readineae hoe included a 6 April VPA High Command order to the North Vietnamese armed forcer and a "recent" DRV Premier's Office diroctiva on combat-readiness and air defense taeke~ publicised on the 7th. A QUAN DOI NIU1N DAN editorial on the 7th called for implementation of the VPA order, as did a 6 April ilanoi radio commentary. Tl~e VPA high Command order--only the third to have been issued during the period of th? Nixon Administration-- ir similar to she previous two in its basic appeals. An Order was issued on 28 December 1971 ae the time of sustained U.S. bombinge~ and one on 10 December 1970 urged implementation of the unprecedented point VWP-Government appeal for vigilance that followed tl~e massive November 1970 U.~. air strikes and abortive pr:eoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay.* The current order calls for the protection of property and lives, the ensuring of public order and eecurity~ close coordination. and the downing of many U.S: planes and "capture of many aggressor pilots." It also urges the military to "completely and quickly annihilate the enemy's coasnando and surprise assault units if they venture to come ~" an element preLent in tho 19)0 order but not in the one of 1971. The current order includes a new element when it ref ere to the "firing at and sinking of many U.S. warships" and to "taking timely steps to suppress all * See the TRENDS of 29 December 1911. pages S-5. and of 16 December 1970. pages 1-4. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 20x00u10~8uft18't~lA-RDP85Tm1018'P~BP~U~0300050015-4 17 AI'Nt1, Ib>! rahc.,taga." 'I'hla t ima the order is apaclCic~al ly addressed In the "mtaalta~ radars artlllary~ and naval forcer" ar wall as to the canal antlalrr..raft~ alt f~+rrac raqular army. aarurity~ and rnl I 1 t la fc+rrea. Y'ha drroc lava from the 1'ramiar'a t)ffica "on atrangthaning r~+mhat-raadirtasa and the people's air defence" calla nn "all luraltttaa" to "realty heighten vigilance" and o:;laniKa combat-raadinarr ratlrtactorily.~ AmonK other thingr~ 1t orders m111tic~ and self-defense forces to conrolidate and carry out patrol and guard ciutier~ and It says "stela organs moat rna i nt a Irr round-the-r lock duty during :~f f hourr rnd holldayr." it calla for the building o[ sufficient ahalterr~ the Improvement o[ watch and alarm-sounding syrtemr enc. facet old unitr~ and the rertetction and reduction of meetings and activities of largo crowds. Like the VI'A Nigh Commend order, it also calls for satir[actory implementation of communicationr and tranrportat:ion talks. A ~ April NiIAN bAN editorlal~ praising the Quang Binh and Vtnh Ltnlr forcot f.or theft "outstanding feat of army in shooting down" 1D planet the praviout day. tierilarly exhortr all locatitiet to heighten combat-readiness and combat abilities. t..ike the directive of the rams date, it urges the ronrolidation of the milttia and self-detente forcer. And it stater char "party committee echelons and the administration" at baste levels in particular are required to "load the incraara to air defense. including the digging of pity and trenches and the or?ganiz.~tion of the alaemc evacuation, dieperrion~ first air and other systems, and must control these oc~ivities permanently and closely." a The Premter~s Oft ice to not known to have issued a previous dlroctive devoted solely to combat-readiness and air defense tasks !n the part three and a half years. Hoveverc in January 1971--after the unprecedented point party-go?~ernment appeal--an instruction was issued on stepping up "the emulaelon movement for production and combat preparedness among the North Vietnamese people ana armed forces in 1971." It included a brief call for greater efforts in strengthening national defense and increasing combat-readiness against "all saLotage and provocative acts of the United States." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/0~;~iN~~~~1~~85T00875R~~1~~,~~~15~0015-4 I! AI~Nit, lv1J I>NV M 1 ~ I fiN2Y crNfi , f~L,CNl~1 I~VI~ L,O~iaU i~lllT 1 UNAI~ Fl~`t f>t~ ~t;N51 VL Ilanni anal Mrunt propaKanda fur more than a year has 'wyaQrt remarkably neon ahcrut the rommuniata' intantton to launch a maJor otternaive+ In N~-uth Vlotnam after U.ti, Krnund troops cuulrl no 1onKrrr play a rrlgnlticant r.ombat ro1t5. Authoritaliva military c~rmmantatura have rpppata+lly maintained that t.lta. ANVN?~-unsupported by 1f.N. trumps--could not fond off lam p-rrcala attacMs by communist main-tnrco rtntta~ Un 2~i Narch, only six dayrr bpf.ora the -~urrQnt ~~ftonalvp warn initlatpd, Nanui papQrs published an articla by the military cornmantator "Chien Thang" ('1'ha Victor) which reitpratpd thQ view that thQ A1tVN ass "unable to stand on its own" and QxprQSrrpd the apparQnt thinking of Nanoi.'s military plannQres "tlnly with 'big punches' of. the regular Corc'Qa can a party launch maJor annihilating battler and bring about a clear changQ in the balance of forcer on the battlefield," The Chien Thang article, with its optimistic appraisal of the "upgrading" trend o[ the cotwnttnirt military position, took on added significance with the release beginning on 27 March of maJor speeches at the UItV National Assembly cession, held 20-75 March.* The language o[ the leaders' speeches ear strikingly similar to C}tiQn Thartg's. Morrovar, the speeches rQVealFd that the party Central Committee's 20th plenum had been held "early this yrar," thus strongly suggesting that Chien Thang was reflecting the viaw4 0[ the Central Committee. Tlt1s was confirmed on 10 April when Nano! released its first substantive report of the plenum proceedings. Ths report, like tlrQ C,hipn Tltang article, held that "fundamental changes" had occurrQd in fife military situation: "We era holding the initiative and era in a victorious. advantagaour, and upgrading position. whereas the enemy is in a losing, passive, difficult, and downgrading posture." The report on the plenum also recorded its view tinat communist "victories" sin^e the 1968 Tet offensive "have opened the realistic possibility of defeating the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon bvctrine in Indochina." That the plenum envisaged a military defeat of Vietnamization was spelled out in an ll April NNAN DAN editorial on the Central Committee's meeting which declared in even stronger terms: "We have the proper conditions to take the initiative in attacking the enemy. to smash the Vietnamization See the 29 March 'TRENDS. pages 8-11. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000d-AQ~Q~'?r~lA-RDP85TQp~~7~~QQ,Q300050015-4 1J AI'1111. I'lIJ plan and the NIlr-,n trurlrlna, and to advan-~a (,,ward wlnning Kraal new vtrt,-rlaa and laadlnk the ant t-It,tl, net lone( aalvat i--n tpalatanrv t? ti-tal vi-'tory." Ac,'?rding lu ll-a rapnrt -,n the plenum, 'ha Central t;ummittaa bald that paraQVrranra In and arralaratl-,n of Una "war of raalrtanra" la the "urKant teak" of the Viatnamaaa at the praaant stage. LIACItC,R(RXVb Aa large-acala fighting dlminiahrd 1n the wake of the 19GN '1'at offrnalva, llancsi propaganda generally av,rldad dlaruaring the lmportanca of Ihp rota of thQ male-force unlta, Nut thr North VLatnamec~~Q ,1 id not auggaat that they could auccred withnut flit urn of there units. Thr naraartty for attnckr by targp units at toms point to the war war at least implicitly reaffirmed during thtr prrtod--in a Uecrmber 19G9 article by URV Uefenre Minister Vo Nguyen Ciap which pointed out that in ehr course of a protracted "people's war" thrrr wll.l by n transition from "progresrivr e;-oluelon" to "developments by ]raps and bounds." The implicatlon? of Glap'r remarks ware sharpened in an ur~,yigned article in the January-February 1971 issue of the URV journal TUYEN NUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING) which stressed that protracted warfare strategy "is not protracted guerrilla fighting" and that than mutt also be "sudden trap-like developments." Llrrtwhare~ the article arrested even more pot.ntedly that "the total. defeat of the 'Vietnamtzation' of tFre war inure be a (continuous process and also will take },lace to large leaps wlriclr change th? balance o[ forcer to the point where the enemy does not have the cepaciey to continue ehr war." Prior to the publication of the TUYfN 11UAN article, an authoritative argument for decisive main-force attnckr war presented in a December 1970 erticlp attributed to PRG Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung. publicized in both Hanoi and Front media. In stark contrast to Vietnamese communist propaganda over the previous two years, Trung stated baldly that. the stepping up of big-unit actions is "required in the development of the ail-people and comprehensive people's war in order eo smash the U.S. imperialists' stubborn plots and to crush their aggressive will." It is possible that the 19th plenum--which Hanoi media first me-tioned rn 1 February 1971--endorsed Tram Nam Trung's apparent view that Hanoi's regular army units had to be committed to a decisive engagement with the allies. Hanoi's report on that plenum. like its report on the 20th plenum, noted thAt the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 (;rlNlrll)I~N'1'lAl. I~iIIN 'I'111SN1)N 11 A1~1111, 191 t,antral l;~~rmnli i.aa dlwc~uwwad the war, but it rnvnalnd I ittla alas. t;~~nanant un the l ytlr pl scrum d lct, irowavar, raC l nct Chn priority North Vlatnam waw Klving to the wart 'i'hn 2 Mabrunr.y 191 NIiAN 1)AN adltnrlal, for nxnmpla, arrwarcad that. "to uppoara the Amaricanar t~rr national walvaCinn Lrr nn urKnnt, aaerecl, and moat Lmportant duty of our paopla~" 'I'ha laawlbllity and doslrabili.ty of cunCront.tng thn n111ds with c~c~rmnuniwt main-f~rrca unitw war pressed in nrticl.onby ilanol military r~rrnmarrtntors In the spring of 1.911. in the wake of c)parntton Lnm 4on 119, which Ilnnoi main tnlnsd had bnon a mn~or wtratagi~~ dafQat for thQ ARVN. Moot notable among those artic?lew was one written by tha commentator "Chian 91nh" and publ ishad in the 2 April. QUAN I)DI NiiAN i)AN. Chia? Binh held that "only by annihilating the enemy's military Eorceo by big drunks can wo gradually knock out thr enemy, gradually crush Iris wf ll, and gradually change thta ~,aar ::'?~.~tion in c~rdar en advance towaed completely militarily d~efoating him." Ile mnintained that Lnm Son 719 had demonotrateu that the allied forces "cannot cope" with "large-ocale blows of annihilation." The role of main-force attacks was again raised in July and eaely August Ln a spate of commentaries on rho military sttua(ion during the first six months of the year. A 2 Auguot article by Chien Thang ~aao particularly outspoken in its etreoo on the impact of offensives by mein-force units and thtir unique role in "definitely weakening" the adversary with "big battles of annihilation." In October an article by the military commentator "Cuu Long,'' publicized by bath 1lanoi and Front media, again prasoed the case for large-scale attacks. In one of the boldest rationalizations for such action, he stated flatly that "our main-force army can now completely defeat the southern puppet army." He likened the current situation to that in 1965 when, he claimed, the ARVN was nearly put out of action prior to the intervention of U.S. troops. The notion that the ARVN could be defeated was again raised at the beg inning of this year in propaganda pegged to a 24 December PLAF command communique on the fighting in 1971. The communique, released on 3 January, maintained that with L.S. troops withdrawing and the ARVN "seriously disintegrating," the PLAF was "fully capable of defeating the Saigon puppet army even if it received more U.S. dollars, weapons, and air support." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000(G~l~~l~~jl~; RDP85TOQ~~~~,1 X00050015-4 12 AI'll I L l 912 PRC COI~EMNS U~S~ BdM81NG~ ACCLAIMS CONr11JNlST OFFENSIVE A IU April 1'k(: F~~rolgn Ministry rtutomont 0oconds Ilunol's wt~~tu~uont un file G~.h donauncing U.S, bombing o[ tho D:tV and "warmly" uc.~ ~ulmti "thu magnlClcont virturlo0" won during tho curront conununlse ut lun~ivo In South Vlutnnm, '1'ho Chin00o 0eutomont l0 not~~blre f~~r gulag to ronrldnr0blo length to JuOtify eho URV'0 war role In thu Buuth~ rovlving a thomo that wa? ln0t prominent in Chinosu etutu- mrant0 !n the mid-1960'0. At Cho Demo eim0, Itiowovor, tho 0tutemunt uvold0 attacking th? Nixon Admin Utration by name and fail0 to reaffirm Poking'0 commltmont of rapport to the war effort in Induchlnu. L~aking'r nw st. recent proviou? official 0tatement on lndorhtnn, n 31 Marr.h foreign mini0try 0catamone wpporting Vietname0e cummuni0t protest0 agaln0t ?uspen0lon of the Paris tulkr, had bean the first. ruch rtotemant in year0 to fall eo express Chlnere suppers for the war effort. Apart from the foreign mini0tty statement, which followed Peking's invariable pattern of 0econding an official DRV statement, there ha0 been no official or elite comment by Peking on the communist offensive. Politburo alternate member Chi Teng-kuei, speaking at an 8 April banquet for a visiting Albanian delegation, referred only in pa00ing to Indochina in prai0ing Albania for, among other thing0, 0upporting "the three peoples of Indochina in their war against U.S, aggres0lon." At the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, Peking had weighed in with high-level expressions of support backed by mass rallies. Thus, during the first week, Chou En-tai had Bent. a message to the head of the NFLSV acclaiming its "exceedingly brilliant victories" and pledging the PRC's "powerful backing," and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial combined praise for the offensive with mocking jabs at President Johnson for being "genic-stricken." Although expressing "utmost indignation" over the U.S. bombing of the DRV, the 10 April Chinese statement shows restraint in reacting to Vietnamese developments. Unlike the 31 March PRC statement, it does not attack the Nixon Administration by name, and it fails to respond to the 6 April DRV statement's call for the fraternal countries to "act resolutely" and to "struggle more powerfully" in demanding that the United States end Its attacks on the DRV, end the Vietnamization policy, and respond to the PRG's seven-point peace plan. The Chin~Oe statement, in fact, is devoid or the demands on the United States that have been included in all other recent statements. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CUNU I U14N'I' I Al, I~(s I S 'I'lli.NUS a2 AI'R1L ,1972 'I'liu mnl.n throat of tiro rtatmmont, uccount4ng Cr,r almost half of ler length, is d.iroctad wt the argument--attributed to "the U.S. Govarnmant"--that thu U.5. attacks on North Vietnam era !n rusponso to an invasion of the South. ReJecting thi? argument as "r.idlculous and absurd to the extreme," rho stntement all: but acknowledges rile North Vietnamese role in the offenAivo !n the cause of justifying Ilanoi'? actions. Asserting flatly that "South and North Vietnam i? ens country," the statement insists that since the "Vietnamese nation is a whole" it is "fully legitimate and a matter of course for the Vietnamese compatri-its in the nor~the.rn and southern parts of the country to support each ether and jointly combat the aggressors." U.S, military threats, the statement declare,, cnnnot prevent "the people 1n North Vietnam from fulfilling their sacred duty of supporting their blood-sealed compatriots in the South." The issue of North Vietnamese involvement in the war in the South I~ad figured prominently in Chinese pronouncements in the mid- 1960's reacting to the escalating hoetilitiee. The Chinese argued et that time that U.S. actions had erased the demarcation line dividing Vietnam that had been established in the 1954 Geneva settlement. According to this argur,rent, the DRV, China, and other countries w?er.e thereby free of any restrictions in offering support and aid to the war effort. In stressing this issue now,* but without reaffirming its commitment of support for the war, Peking may be particularly concerned to portray developments in Vietnam as an internal matter and to play down the interests of outside powers. One motive for this approach might be to Limit the impact of these developments on Sino- U.S. relations.** Another consideration might relate to the * Peking made a passing reference to this issue in a party- government statement of 13 December 1970 supporting a DRV party-government appeal to carry on the war. The Chinese statement said the "Vietnamese nation ie an integral whole, and it is the sacred duty of the people in the northern part of Vietnam to support and assist their kinsmen in the South." The current Chinese statement's assertion Chat "South and North Vietnam is one country" represents the sharpest formulation of this line yet made by Peking. ** In the S1no-U.S. point communique of 28 February, Peking had softened its standard formulation of support for the Indochinese "war Pgainet U.S. a,;gression and for national salvation" to one of support for the Indochinese "efforts for the attainment of their goal." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/~ ~L,~~tDP85T00~~~t~~~~0050015-4 l2 Afltl.L 1972 c~nCral role played by soviet waaponry in Cho comtnuniss of fonslve, a role which pule Peking al a dis~.idv~~ntage `.n iCs composition wish the Soviets for influence in Vielnam~ It may bu reveuling in t.hie connection that NCNA's nccouns of the recent VWP plenum, based on VNA's report, omitted the claim Chat Ilanol had eucceesfuliy won "Che ever greaser sympathy, support, and assistance of Che fraCerna.l eocialieC countries." OFFENSIVE IN In acclaiming the "magnificent victories" won SOUTH VIETNAh1 by the Vietnamese comrades, the foreign minlsCry statement assesses the "vehemen~,: offensive on various battlefields" i.n South Vietnam as dealing "a heavy blow" at the Vi.etnamization programs The statement mentions no other objective of the offensive and alludoe Co political issues only in expressing confidence that the Vietnamese will frustrate all "political schemes of U.S. imperialism." Apart from the foreign minietry statement, the only authoritative Chinese comment on the offensive has b~:en a 6 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which also hailed the offensive as a heavy blow to Vietnamizalion. Mentioning only the Quang Tri-Thus Th1en area, Commentator expressed approval of the offensive as demonstrating "the mighty power of people's war" and contributing "to the three Lndochinese peoples' ~oinC struggle." In contrast to the 31 March and LO April foreign ministry etatemente, the Commentator article reaffirmed Peking's backing fur the war as "the bounden proletarian internationalist duty" of the Chinese people. "So long ae the Vietnamese people fight to the end," Commentator declared, "the Chinese people will support Chem to the end." Since a 4 April NCNA report based on Western news accounts, all of Peking's coverage of the military situation in South Vietnam has consisted of pickups of Vietnamese communist sources. Typical of these reports was one carried by NCNA on the 10th and attributed to LPA which praised the attacks in Binh Long Province from 5 to 7 April. NCNA ended its account by citing a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary as portraying "a large-scale battle of annihilation" in B1nh Long Chat demonstrated "the strength of a closely coordinated offensive" and an "ability to fight large-scale battles of annihilation." In addition to these battle reports, Peking has also been carrying the texts of official etatemente by the DRV and the PRG. But Chinese reservations about the offensive, evident in Peking's failure to initiate high-level expressions of support (the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONCZDENTZAL )!BZS TRCNDS 12 APRIL 1972 foreign ministry statement being a routine seconding vtatement), also seem reflected in a reluctance to endorse the objectives of the offensive beyond that of dealing a blow to Vietnamization. NCNe1'e account of the VWP plenum report noted the claim that victories since 1968 have inflicted "an important failure" on the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Docr,rine, but it omitted the more ambitious claim that thesE victories have "opened the realistic possibility of defeating" Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine. NCNA's own reports on Vietnam developments have been devoted to U.S. actions and statements. NCNA reports on 7 and 10 April took note of military moves and statements made by the United States, including Secretary Laird's news conference on the 7th, in connection with the expanded deployment of U.S. air and naval forces in Vietnam. Like the foreign ministry statement, NCNA took issue with U.S. assertions that the communist offensive represents an invasion by the DRV and violates the 1954 agreements. The report on the 7th cited three U.S. presidential candidates-- Humphrey, Jackson, and Wallace--as w~:11 as Senator Goldwater as supporting the use of U.S. air power in Vietnam, thus giving the impression of bipartisan support for the Administration's moves. Another NCNA report, on the 11th, rook particular note of what it described as "indiscriminate bombing" of Vinh and referred to the use of B-52's over the DRV. Peking has not referred to U.S. domestic oppasitio-~to American actions in Vietnam. In a gesture of solidarity with thN DRV, Peking announced on the 9th Chat a documentary fil~a on Pham Van Dong's visit to the PC.C last November would be shown beginning on the 10th. Observing that the film is "permeated with warm feelings of great friendel;ip ac;.d militant unity" between the DRV and China, NCNA said that the 700 million Chinese people provide "a powerful backing" for the Vietnamese and that China's territory is "their reliable rear area." These pledges have not yet appeared in's comment on current developments in Vietnam. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS a.2 APRIL 1972 MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE. U.S. ACTIONS Moscow has sustained its cautious approach to the latest developments in Vietnam. Limiting itself chiefly to reportorial coverage, it has studiously avoided any mention of the USSR's role in providing military support to the ARV while evincing sensitivity to the possible impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, with President Nixon's Moscow visit ~n the offing. The Soviet Union has yet to issue an official statement on the recent U.S. military actions. But the first elite reference to Soviet aid in the context of the current offensive and the first demand at thy. leadership level for an end to the U.S. bombing of the North came in remarks by Brezhnev when, according to Radio Moscow, he received the DRV Ambassador and had "an exchange of opinions" with him in an atmosphere. of "friendship. and cordiality."* Reporting the meeting the day it took place, Moscow said Brezhnev extended wishes for "further success in defense of the freedom and independence of the. motherland and. the construction or socialism." Declaring that. the Soviet. party, government, and people "unswervingly follow the course of solidarity witY~ Vietnam and with the patriots of Indochina," he added that Chey will "continue to give them assistance and support." Notably, the report of Brezhnev's remarks made no mention of the war in the South. It quoted the Soviet. leader only as condemning "U.S. aggression in Indochina" and. as demanding "at- immediate end to the bombing of the DRV." Kosygin had used the occasion of a 7 April speech in Iraq to express "warm, fraternal solidarity" with the Vietnamese people but mrde no reference to recent developments. More explicitly, a Soviet-GDR crmmunique on SED party chief Honecker's 4-10 April * By contrast, reporting on 11 February that Kosygin had received the DRV ambassador at the litter's request, TASS said their talk on "questions of mutual interest" passed in .an atmosphere of friendship and "comradely frankness"--a euphemism for substantive differences. That meeting was reported some two hours before the Soviet Government belatedly came out with a statement assailing the eight-point U.S. peace plan disclosed by the President on 25 January and backing the 2 February PRG statement that rejected the U.S. plan and "elaborated" on the PRG's own seven points. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09..: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 COI~FZD~NTZAL FBZS TRCNDS 12 APRIL 2972 visit to Moscow, as reported by Radio Moscow, expressed "fraternal solidarity" with the DRV as well as "concern in connection with the expansion of U.S. aggression in I.ndochi-~a that has taken p1a~~ recently." Noting that the United States. had renewed its bombing of the DRV after the boycott of the Paris talks, the communique registered both eidee' "decisive condemnation of these aggressive acts" but rendered no pledge of support for the DRV. Soviet sensitivity over the repercussions Hanoi's new offensive could have on Soviet-American relations was evident in TASS' account of Defense Secretary Laird's 7 April press. conference: The account contained no reflection of Laird'e.charge that .the Soviet Union has been a mayor contributor to the. war by virtue of its failure to restrain Hanoi Soviet media. also .ignored State Department press spokesman McCloskey's 4 April press conference, which included the remark that the North Vietnamese are largely supported by heavy Soviet mil:~tary equipment. Acid Moscow's account of the Washington ceremony for.signing..of the convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons suppressed the fact that President Nixon spoke, thereby avoiding. the. problem of how to treat h1s implied criticism of the Soviet support for Hanoi. TASS' report of Secretary Laird's press conference characterized. his remarks as an attempt to "blackmail" the DRV by threatening a continuation of the bombing "until it displays readiness to conduct talks in Paris ser~.ously, on terms set forth by Washington." But TASS obscured the thrust of the secretary's remarks by neglecting to mention his charge. that Che.North Vietnamese actions constitute an invasion azd a. violation of the DMZ that sets aside the 1968 understanding under. which bombing of the North was halted, nor did it report his. warning that the bombing of the North will continue until the North Vietnamese pull back their forces. TREATMENT OF Moscow's cautious treatment. of .the Vietnam DRV STATEMENTS developments and of President. Nixon.... personally was underscored in its handling of the 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement and of the DRV ;overnment statement ~f the 11th. TASS versions of both s*_~tervents deleted all personal references to President Nixon and obscured Hanoi's definition of the goals of th~a war. Where the DRV Foreign Ministry statement says "world public opinion demands that the Nixon Administration immediately end Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDIrNTIAL FBIS TRENDS 1l APRIL 1972 the war of aggression," the TASS version reads: "World public opinion demands the immediate end of the war of aggression." And where the DRV statement specifically affirms the Vietnamese people's resolve to "struggle tenaciously, to step up their war of resistance and *_o strugglle.until the collapse of the puppet regime and armed forces in order to liberate the South, bt;ild socialism in the North and thus advance Coward peaceful reunification of the fatherland," the TASS version reads: "The Vietnamese people. are. determined.. to fight tenaciously, to step up their war. of resistants.". In the same pattern of restraint, the 11 Apri1.TASS account of tha DRV Government statement deletes four personal references to President Nixon and similarly obscures the goals of the war as enunciated by Hanoi. Where the DRV Foreign Ministry statement calls on the..fraternal socialist countries to "act resolutely and timely to check the new" U.S. actions, the TASS account waters this down to a plea for the fraternal countries "to condemn the U.S. imperialists' new military ventures." ~~ASS' account of the DRV_Government statement entirely omits its call for tie socialist count to take "timely action" and its added appeal for :'even st.onger support and assistance." The a~count.of the government statement also sanitizes that document's allegat{.on that Secretary Laird "said there was no limitation on. the bombing. of the North and threatened to attack ilaiphong. harbor.:'..--TASS' version reads: "The United States Defense Secretary. Laird, the statement says, has cynically announced that. the United S~:ates will intensify blows at North Vietnam." SOVIET COMN~NT Moscow's first comment on the. use .of B-52's and U.S. naval shellings of the .North. came on 11 April shortly after the release of the DRV. Government statement. On his own authority, TASS commentator Vastly Kharkov described the U.S. military moves as "an extremely grave step" designed to "save Vietnamization." But he. cited. the DRV Government statement for the specific charge. that. the U.S. acts constitute "a violation of international. law, a cynical trampling on the 1968 ~ommitm~nt~ about the uncondi- tional cessation of the bombings and ahellings of the. DRV.. . Asserting that the world public supports the DRV, Kharkov concluded with a general:tzed reaffirmation of Soviet support: "The Soviet people, who regard help to arabattled Vietnam as their internationalist deity, will fulfi].sit to. the end. The American aggressors ought to know better, for reckless adventures will inevitably be avenged." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 G(JNFI.ULIJ'1'LAL L~IIIS `CR1:N1)N 12 nI~RIL 1972 I~ur11?r 5lovir~t commcsnt :Lncluded a I'RA1~'DA article by Skvortsov on tha 8th which said that "the Pentagon's".expansion of the f.tighti~sg and the American withdrawal from the Paris talks were twin actions representing an effort by the United Staten to "impose its will on the Vietnamese people." Skvortsov added that "the people in Washington should a t long last rid themselves of the illusion that it is possible to intimidate the Vietnamese people." An article in RED STAR by Leontyev on the 9th portrayed "the broad advance of the patriots in South Vietnam" as another "blow struck at the policy of Vietnamization," but Leontyev stopped short of claiming that victory could be achieved on the battlefields "Today it has been proved again that it is not the notorious. Vietnamization, but only negotiations that can bring peace to Vietnam." DRV EMBASSY MEETING The USSR's reticence about .its military support role in Vietnam at this delicate puncture in U.S.-Soviet relations was pointed its failure to publicize a meeting at the DRV Embassy in Moscow. on S April which Hanoi said was attended by Soviet Deputy Defense.Minister Batitskiy. The Hanoi domestic service, Hanoi. broadcasts .to South Vietnam, and Hanoi's Mandarin service made use of an LPA . Moscow corY~espondent's account of the underscore Soviet support for the DRV. Noting that Batitskiy.had headed. the Soviet military delegation which recently visited North Vietnam, the account quoted him as stating Chat "the new victories scored by the armymen and civilians of Quang.Tri.. and Thua Thien as well as in Cambodia and Laos indicate the might of the Liberation Armed Forces and are a heavy blow. to. the U.S. imperialists' Vietnamization policy." Batit~;kiy added, the account said, that "the Soviet armymen and..civilians wi11 do their beat to fu1fi11 their international obligation of supporting the Vietnamese people and rendering support for the PRG's seven-point proposal." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 pp l;l)NI~' l l)I;N'I' I AID hpti ll1~~l~. I~~ A roved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85TO 8 0 0050015-4 CAMBODIA! COMMUNISTS CLAIM TWEIR FORCES TI~REATEN PWN~'I PENI~~ Ln thu wr-kc of thu swuru cunununist wlcul..l lnkw and r-ltr-clcu In rued arounl l'I-nom l'unl- on the night ul' 20-21 Murcl-, thu mc~cllu of S.Lhanuuk's Frunt (FU-JK) hrivu I'ocusud uttuntLc,n un tho nc~ucl to '' l:Lber.ate" maJor Cambodian ci,tius--lac lud LnK I'h-tum I'nul--~-rn-ci have sought to .Lund substance to this with thc~ announcement of l?he appoantmunt of rt "1~'U~JK Cc-mmittc~u crf Phnom Penh." Onl~~ March AK:[, the agency of S.lhannuk'd Front, publicized a communique from the FUNK's pu.liticnl. bureau and the Royal Government of National Un.l.on oL Camhudin (kGNU), dated the 23d, which announced the composition of the I'hnnm Penh committe~4, headed by Norodom Phurlssara, a cousin ol.' Sihanouk, Phurissara was reported in January to have coma to the "liberated zone." The decision on the composition of: the seven-man committee was said to have been made at a Joint session of the FUNK and RGNU, in with a pr.opusal by Khieu Samphan, a FUNK political bureau member, RGNU vice premier and defense minister, and the army (CPNLAF) commander in chief . Also on the 24th, a FUNK radio broadcast highlighting the 20-21 1`larch attacks on Phnom Penh called upon residents of tl-e capital to "rise up and seize power." Maintaining that the CPNLAF had been "launching powerful offensives w~rhout letup on many other fronts" and that "in the future the CPNLAF will intensify their activities on all battlefields, especially Phnom Penh," the broadcast urged: "Therefore, the population of Phnom Penh should rise up unitedly Co strike and demonstrate to overthrow the Phnom Penh traitorous clique and recapture power." Khieu Samphan in his role as CPNLAF Commander in Chief echoed the radio's claims about the war situation in an appeal to his soldiers--dated 24 March and broadcast by the FUNK radio on the 28th--in which he praised the attacks on Phnom Penh and said that they had "dealt stunning blows to the shaky enemy leadership apparatus." Holding that "at present the whole country is launching offensives agai:-st the enemy in all fields-- military, political, economic, and psychological," he asserted: "We should ceASe]_assly intensify attacks against the enemy everywhere, around and inside Phnom Penh ." In listing actions to b, taken, he noted that "people's power" should be established in and around the capital. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85TOO875ROOO3OOO5OO15-4 - tqJ~ l;-1 NI IAI r 1 nl'HI-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T008~,~F,~IQ3QQ~50015-4 r11~.1 no I April rattlni) annlltat ajrlrPal, ~latn~l thn J41h~ a Itu-la nttlirtt Inarlnt, N~unti i.ttq, whn waa cs-~r+n~ tir,~av aj.j~nlt-twit f n I hn Irlli~k t o flaw - nmm 1 1 t nn f nt 1'htinm 1'n-tl- , I h I a alrpna 1 a l l v-) npr-n f Itv war W nt a "nppnr l o l l y I n I'Irnnm 1'nith" - t n a t al;P pltlkop and in cnnpataly a{ih nlltot ~tnttpa (n nt~+aniva -innun-atrat Inns and "rlan up 1n fnanrrpr I Imt t.. nvntlhtna Ihn traitors' arhnfnlatrat Inn an-I taws I-naPt In y~rur nat- Itanrla." In rnn-?lurlink his apl-va1, Ny,uon I:n~ at atoll "'fhn 1lmv has cninn. 1110 CI'NLAN ltavn unlvaahn-1 tl-nlt ~onnta) nffnnplvn." nn 7 Apr I I , Ak 1 Carr t or) an alrpoa 1 f rrrm t by i'tINK' a 1'hnnm 1'anh cnminlt inP- adrirvaancl in thn - Ii idpna of tltn c appal, able h nchnwl lhp vlnw that thv army waa attackir-~ vvorywharo and nnc I rc I Ink tho capital . l t_ urKnd I'hr+nm 1'nnh roa i~lpttf a t n rnordfnate lhetr pffnrta wish thn i:i'NLAN in nvnrt.hrna Utn government and "lthpratn" tha capital. Also oft the lcl, tha IrtIWK radio broaclcaa- a commentary wltlrh labeled recent fightinK "a nat.tonwirle weneral nffenaive" and claimed that the CI'NLA1~ waa dirt+cllnq its attacks al "a number of bIK c:ltiva. inrludinK Phnom Penh." tittering inatrnctinna for reMlrlentp of the capital wlu- chose not to 1envF, the brondrnpt urged them to atnyawny from lnrntinna whir.h might be subJect to nttarka. in conc:luaion, it warned that the capital war c:ompl~tely enrtrcled nn-1 the reKime'p "cionmaday" waa drawing nrar. (While the concentration of attention nn the fittest to l?Imum Penh in recent propaganda is unusual, equally frenzted warninKa itnve been volcerl in thr peat. 'Chun, Cor example, n 10 December broadcast by tl-e NLINK tad to predlrted in rimllttr t~~rmr th.,t the "doornaday" of tho Lon Not reKimc war drnwink near and maintained that "our fortes hava~ arrtved nt the Rnteta of Phnom Penh" and have aurroundecl several other rider.*) 'Chc 3 April radio commentary echoed earlier propaganda in referrtnr to the CPNLAF's Determination to "liberate" Siem Renp, Kompong 'Thom, and Prey Veng. The intention to "liberate" Kompong 'Thom was voiced in nn appeal Erom the CPNLAF command in the area, publicized by AKI on 29 February. A similar appeal pertaining to Siem Reap was publicized by Che news agency on 14 Ptnrc{t.** And on 2 April, AKI carried a 25 March app~~nl from the CPNL/~F command on the Prey Veng front which pledged to "liberate" the province and city of Prey Veng. * The 10 December broadcast was discussed in the 15 December TRENDS. page 15. ** The appeals on Kompong Thom and Siem Reap were discussed, respectively, in the 8 March TR);NDS, page 23, and the 15 March TRENDS, page 11. Approved For Release 2000/6~'I'~D.~TI~RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/(~B~Oar:r~~~1-RDP85TOq$~~SF~yQq~00050015-4 1~ AI?Irrl ta~.~ 511rt~l=~tlVltt aE.LA11ctN5 tlI:KINc~ h1AIN'TAIN~ ~1t~'1 LINT: aJ "iOV~Lt "I~tl~l~l1'~fi1C" A1h+~, lihilp 11-n (/liPl/qP filnrr-f~uvlPt pnlolnicgl oarhangPa frl?eata~l by iI1P lnillAll?I'AMiai Alll runfllr'i IIAVP a1lha ldPd (I/ PAr11Pt 1OWO14~ 1'v41n~ hqa indirA(Pd Thal Il 1q in nl- mood fn toapund fgvutghly 1n ihP rl~nl {llgtllry gesture tul.Ard 1I1P C1lihvaP sleds by !(torhnnv In il-P i;{'tat chlof'a mA~ur furPl{fn pnllry al atPpiont Iln ?tl Nar~h + IItO/,hr1PV'a apOO111/ Irl which hP PaprPaaPd Ac1VIPi rPAdiilOgq f n 1/ggv rP1Ai 11-11a wish II1P {'iii. 11-1 tIIP prihf fp1O? 11f pQpRpfUl 1 uP\ i Ai Otll P Anli i (1 1 OnC 11IdP A n11t1q~~rPtlpiun ai1,rPP_~Ollt ~ roinrldod with the return to I'Pking of the chief t3uvlPt tIPIj1/t 1Atur at lhP border tallca after A thteP~auntli abaonc a. Lint 1kP Moaclw~ 1'Pkinq hAa nut mPnt icmed 11 ichov/a tpturn. 5ixni[icantlyc Peking chnae to puhllcinP proalptly un the rlaxi day the fact ihAt the aeaafnn nt the N1no-Soviet border river navi{iatirln commission held from h flecQlaber to 21 March had failed to rPACh an aRtePment. 1~Ioacow hao remal-1Pd silent un [hie development. ConalatQnt with (ta ovoldancP of commentary on 1'rPSidont Nlxc/n'o vtait~ {'eking hes nut reactQd directly to Moarow'a criticism of r:he titno-1t.5. commit. but PQking'~ attacko on tiovfet pc/lfcy and its mouse via-a-via tho two cup~rpoworM reflect its poaltion within the triangular relationohip. 1'ekinR'o Dense of the global power real itieo wao moot vividly demon at rated during the tiouth Asian crioi^ whQn the Chinanr~ sharply nccuaed the Soviets of expanalonist ambitions, Including h rhgrge made by the Chinese repreoQntative at the Security Council that one of the Soviet aimo was to encircle China. 1'ektng's responses to other develapmente-- such as Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko'o vioit to Japan a month before the i'resident's trip [o the PRC~ and a oeemingly innocuous recent Soviet news report on the Taiwan elections-- hnve evidently been shaped by the triangular context. During the YtCesident's visit. which produced a communique in wlllch the two sides pledged not to seek hegemony 1n file Aein- Pacific region and to oppose efforts by others to do soy Peking * Brezhnev s remarks on China are d~acussed in the TRENDS of 22 March, pages 8-11. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/0~,;,~1~,-r-~~85T00875F~~Q,03rQQQr50015-4 I1 Heusi fall fiArlrr A ~eert rlt u 1 u Itrrar nw Iry i vl-rrt t I-tg fnt t I-a (t t ?t f Imo 111 ru. otrt gout a 1lrat t hlnoaa self lr lala 11r flans but ian - 1t ias hart plgr arl vtoatl-a In hnnr-t +.f i~r-vlal Atmor) vnrcaa Itay al mcmrrtlalo fr-t S:r-vlot ar-Iriiara wl-rr fail In (,bins during Wprlrl Wat 11 Mnarnw rl-I-qP fn Ignnrv t111a g,oafura, rnMplaltrlnyl 1Wtlrot rlrgi '~nvivf rllpinmalq nn thiq rrrraalnt-, as In te+rrnttt yoara, woto tofnaorl Irvtmlaalnn tr- lay wroatha at tho thoftrr-rlala In f~rrtlhPagt t.hina~ (,U~N?t1'Vt1 Ifs ,Ihl'NI (:rr-mykrl'a vtail to Japan fr--M ?7 tc- 1N January pr~~nlpferl a (;hittoav rpapunaA whfr-h In offer t agaopaori the vtalt as roar l lVo to the new fluldlly In Aafart affalra imparted by 1'pkln~l'a Invitatlun to 1'rvrldpnt 1:Ixrm. Ar cr-rr1111g tr- a lengthy N(;;aA account on ~ hobruary, Grr-mykr-'a trip was "an important atop" taken by the Ilovieta to gtep np cr-llualr-tt with Tokyo attd "ln cllntattd with Impprialiam fns spheres of iniluQnce to AriA." After taking, nr-tp of the central place held by the Ching quertlnn in the tioviet-Japanese taller, I~CNA raid hat Grnmyko had "scurried to Japan tc, wnr- 1t at this Juncture" In order "to expand the pr-altir-na r-f tiovlet revialnnlsm In Arta." NCNA Alro noted In this context that U.5.-JApanere relatlona became strninnd in the second half of 1971, but 1t ment'funed only Wnshington'a nAw ecr-nr-mic policy na n factor whf le leaving 1'eking'r invttatiun to }'resident Nixon implicit between the liner. NCNA probed a seise point in 5ovtet-Japanese relations by tii-1CllNaint; the northern territories gltsation, in the grocers inVII11 {tIVAl1~V A1-art Sri+m (hva.~ pnlatiilc'p) ralllar 11agKa~l t f/ p1/a/~ I C I r phrvurat Iona, 1'ak I nor Ilea hYaaaall Its ant la4nviat I Itta larknly In Lha Hama of uppllr1111nr1 1-y tlla tblrll w~trlll and "tnwlllnn att~l small ttat.Inna" tll tlta "plludr a+;~l ha?arnnny pram Iced by the auparllnwnra." 'I'hlla/ 1?athar tllillt tll ;Iirlura Mitarnw'a Innvny as ~Ilrprtoll al!alnpl. China In partll~ulur~ III11M1 11f Pukitlv'a l'llflgllatll haM Itppll IIPaI~,{t1a11 tU Itt111araCllrO its r~nnnnnll Intoraata wllh other rountr}aa rprtQntfu} of Muparpl/war rlutnlnanl?a. 41Ynlflcantlyl 1'ak1nK'tr variatillnn an rho !hams of aullarpowar "cotttlattt Ion attd col lualon" Nava heart heavily walgittad to rtrraaaing I~ontentloua alpmanta In '3ovlpt-U.!+, ralatllma. thereby Jurtlfytng flexible mancuverLnN by i'akinq within the trtangulnr rel.ationahlp. Peking's approach haw been ll}urtrat,ed recently on the occerlon o[ virlitr by drlagationr coming f.rnm arear of ruperpower rivalry. At the tJme of. the viMle in March of t;gyptian foreign affalrr advisor kiyad. VicF Premier L1 IlAien-Wien on 23 March declared thnt one of the rearons why the Middle Last quertion~ "a ma,lor question cinacly linked with the anti-imparialirt etruggl.e" throughout the world, remains unsettled is that "one or two superpowers al~~~k hegemony and contend for rp}terea of influence." [expressing Chinese euppor': toe the Aeab etrugglelagainre Israel, Li concicmnecl tiro superpowers for "subverting Aeab I:ountriar to t}reir aggression. subversion. control, and interference" and for "their conspiracy to divide spheres of influence." 'Phree days lnter~ Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei Lectured the Egypt inns on not becoming dependent on the Soviets. insisting that every country should pursue a policy of "maintaining .independence an-1 of relying mainly on ire own strength and regarding foreign assistance as supplementary." These themes were also aired by the Chinese during the visit of Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff shortly after the signing of anew agreement continuing the British bases on Malta. Choir En-lair speaking at a 2 April banquet for the vieltore~ pledged support for Malta's effort to "consolidate national independence" and "develop a self-contained economy devoted to peace." Declaring that the superpowers are "contending for spheres of influence everywhere in the worlds from land to the seas and the oceans," Chou expressed sympathy for the "many" Mediterranean countries that !rave evinced "grave concern over the increasing tension created by the superpowers contending fur hegemony" in that area. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 r;I1NirII11'.IJI'IAI. VIIIt! 'f111~,111R~ 1;1 AI'llll. IV11 stir N April, lira day of (Ira Mallaaa ~talaka(1un'a dapattura fr~~m Iha I'111;, I'I~.I11'I,i~,'!J 11AlI~Y rarHad atr arl Irla artt II lad "111-{ingv Ih~~ ,irramlrly fnr Ilat{amuny In Iha Mwlltarranaan Ilatwapn Iha 'iupvrlruwara" whl~ lr alahuraled un tha lharrra ui' liuvlal-11.4. rlvnlry In tha Haditarranaan. 'I'Ird article ~~h:rryad Lhat Lha "Ins racra lnl, l y scuts rani and Inn" batwaarr Llta Iltt l tad 41 at ra anal Ihv 4uvlal Unlnn In lira Maditarranaan "Iran anrlnualy Impairad thv indapandanca and ruverplgrrty of tha cnutttriau alum, It a c~~art, agKravatar.l thn tenrlun In tha Hiddln Hart and tha Mediterranean araa, and aruurad krava cuncnrn and atrunk o{rpuMJtlun Crum tlrc~ Mediterranean courttrleM." 1'LUI''ij UATT.Y cluaad by dxpraual.nq ChinaMCr rup~rorC Cur the rtrug{tle ag,alnat the rrupc~rpuwr+r "urrambla fur haaemuny' in the area. Peking Isar had rocourre to the proxy of ltr alllear to talus mare Menuitive irquep lnvolvtng Morcow'n relations witlrln lire cunununlrt world. An IvCi1A diupatch datellnrd 'Plrana on 1 April rummarized nn art lc la in the Albanian party on I April Jenouncing the "!lrezhnevlah" docerlne of limited uuverelgnty of communist cuuntrles. NCNA quoted the article au saying the SovleCd for years have been manipulating the German yueetcion, "unscrupulously sacrificing" the GDR's nntlonal interests for the sake of their "hargainings with WrWt German imperialism." In this cnnne~tlon the article w:ru ~luoted ae citlrrg the Berlin agreement ae "flagrantly" ululating GUR sovereignty. NCiJA also quoted the as charging that the "Soviet eoc.ial imperialists, besides openly uccupying Czechoslnvalcia, have sent their troops into and eil~ntiy occupied" the GUI(, Poland, llungnry, Bulgaria. and-- cuming clo[acr home to the Chinese--Mongolia. Touching another senpiCive matter, the ~iCNA account cited the article's conclusiun that "the relations of limited sovereignty cannot fail to arouse the indignation and revolt" of the pdoples sub,~ugated by the Soviets. ATTACKS CrV BREZHNEV Though Peking continues to show restraint in not pursuing the strident ideological vendetta against iloacow that embittered Sino-Soviet relations in the 1.960'x, recent articles in the theoretical journal RED FLAG have contained personal baba at Brezhnev as a representative deviatlonist !n tltie history of the communist movement. An article in RED FLAG i1o. 3, whose title-~-"Be Open and Aboveboard, and Do Not Intrigue and Conspire"--clearly relates it to the Lin Piao affair, cited Brezhnev and Khrushchev an examples of leaders who engaged in intrigues and conspiracies. According to the article, Brezhnev used these methods to expel. his predecessor, "carry out Khrushchevism without Khrushchev, and become the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : C~~ ~RDP85T00875R0(~r03~00050015-4 12 Ai'1111~ ly/7 aml-1lluua rtaw liar uC lira pruaanl nrcr." 'l'hu urtlr~la dLd nut., lu-wrvur, rc~l'e~r t-- Nuvle,l clualknw auulnal t;lrlna. ~ilynll'Ic~anlly, In runnlnl, tlrruu~,h lhv ru?ur~a' gcrllary ul' "awlndlurr+" In Clr (Haar rununrur 1 Ml li Lwlury, klru err ~ lc~ 1 u d Id nut lnr ludo lhu chnr?a of "Illlc~ll rul.nllunw with Carulgn c:c,untrl.urt." 'I'Irlr+ chnrgu hnM I'rstluuntly apl-uurucl Ln cc-rnmant rulalucl tc, lh~~ l,ln Pine purg,u, mUMt nutnbLy in lira nucherrltatlvu l Uucmmbur Jc-Lne crdl.turiul. cm party .Lundur.ahlp.* I)ruzhnuv war alto nnmc~d In u lldt oC r.anc+gadoe in tho communist nwvumunt dlncudrrud .ln un artLclu .ln RLU IrLAG Nc. 4 calling for thr. study of world history, Thu artlc.le ca.l.lad fur study of what It earmed lire close re.laCionshlp between modern world history, conr:amporary world history, and the h.idtory of the world communist mnv?ment, on the one hand, and the current class struggle on the othor. Striking a note that became prominunt after the announcement of Peking's invitation to 1'r.esident Nixon, t}ie article characterized lire present situation as one of "global upheaval," a "crucial turning point" !n which the Chinese "must be prepared to wage a great struggle differont from the struggles in the past." Ln short, the article's ipJunctions represent still another effort to orient the Chinese along the lines of flexible, Chouist policy directions in the world arena. * A Szechwan broadcast on l5 March recited a charge against Mao's former rival Chang Kuo-tap--an appropriate surrogate for attacks on Lin Piao--that could be read ae linking Lin's purge to disputes over Peking's stance toward the Soviet Union and the United States. Reca111ng a dispute that was resolved at the pivotal Taunyi conference in 1935, the broadcast said Chang opposed Mao's line of "marching north to resist Japan." Read in the current context, this might be interpreted as a charge that Lin opposed the unremitting confrontation with .the SoviQt Union at a time of improved Sino-U.S. relations. On the ether hand, the charge against Chang is an important part .of the communist historical record that could be expected to appear in a detailed denunciation such as the Szechwan broadcast contained. The broadcast did not include the charge of ill:~it foreign connections. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000~~$ufQ9~it-~IRi;RDP85T0(~~itSF~Qk~QQt00050015-4 12 AI'a1L I:y~2 USS?-IRAQ KOSYG t rJ VISIT t'RODIJCCS SECONb SOV I ET-ARAB, FR I E~JI)SW I P PACT '1'ha treaty of f riandrhlp and cooperut lun ol.gnad ~.n Baghdad un 9 April., during the 6-10 April "official. friendly vier," of u Soviet party-govornnent delegation .led by Koeygin, ie modeled 1ar.gely on the Soviet-Lgypt:lan treaty rigned last Muy but clivergee from it on some counts--notably including a weaker article ~n military cooperation. The conclusion of the trenty was foreshadowed in the communique on the February US5R visit of an Iraqi delegation led by Bath Regional Command Deputy Secretary and Revolution Command Council Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn. The stated occasion for Kosygin'e trip was the inauguration of the Northern ar-Rumaylah oilfield; hie delegation included the Soviet minister for the oil industry. The Soviet deputy minister for the gas industry, also in Iraq for the ceremony, was reported by Baghdad as announcing Chat the first Soviet tanker would begin loading ar-Rumaylah oil for transport to the Soviet Union. Moscow propaganda surrounding the visit has played up what is termed an Iraqi victory over the "monopoly of the Western oil kings" with the establishment of a national petroleum industry and commissioning of the first mayor national oilfield, developed with Soviet techdical and economic aid.* Speaking at the commissioning ceremony, Kosygin rejected "fairy tales" spread by the "capitalist oil companies" to the effect that the Arabs are unable to manage their own economies. If Iraq and other Arab countries do not now possess enough experts and technicians, he added, they soon will have them with the help of the socialist countries. * Peking has indirectly attacked Moscow on the oil question, NCNA on the 11th citing a Kuwai~i paper as declaring that the Soviet leaders are opposed to the idea of the Arab countries using their oil as a weapon against Israel and "imperialism." The paper chimed that an "Arab leader" recently visiting Moscow wr~s told. that Arab oil is actually "international property." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 C(11Jh1UI~~N'I'1AI, 1'14I~i 'I'ItI~;NIIlJ 12 AI'It I I, 19y2 Thu c.nuuulwalunlnk ul' Chu ul.ll'Luld culttcldtad with culuhraClciny ail' Chc~lSCh unnl.vurNnry ~)f' Clue Ba'tit I'rirty--nn uvunC nwdLu Kanura~ l.y s~n~ght to divnecu f:rrtm KoNygin'H vLdit, pr.uHUmubly eo aN nc)t to nppunr to bu giv.Lng it gruaCur. atC~+ntiun Clout CI-u Syrlnn Bath Pnrty'N eulubrat?,:Lon of the sumo event.'u CI'SU delegations were aunt to Damnaeus and liaghditd uxpresNiy :`or the respeet.Lve lia'tlt anniversary festivitios.* Where liay,hdad accounts oC Kosygin's visit stroesod the double celebration of the panty's ,jubilee anniversary cnd the start of ntttic)na:L nil producl?ion, Moscow's focueecl on the latter avant. c)n 9 April, however, reviewing Kosygin's visit, TASS did note various activitie:t commemorating the Da'th anniversary, including a reception attended by Kosygin; and both the communique on the visit and Koeygin's departure cable to the Iraqi leaders took due note of the anniversary. 1'Itere were no reports of speeches at a dinner given by President al-Bakr for KosyKin on 6 April or at a luncheon given by Saddam l~lusayn and a reception hosted by Kosygin on the 9th. But speeches were made by Kosygin and Saddam 1?lusayn at the oilfield inauguration on 7 April and by Kosygin and al-Bakr at the treaty signing ceremony on the 9th. Kosygir had preliminary separate meetings with Saddam llueayn and al-Bakr on the day of his arrival, and Formal talks were held on the 8th--preceded, according to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, by a 90-minute private session between Kosygin and Saddam 1?lusayn. SOVIET-IRAQI The 15-year friendship and cooperation treaty TREATY generally parallels the one concluded between Egypt and the USSR last May, with some additions and omissions. Two elements in the Iraqi treaty that are not present in the Egyptian one have precedents in the Soviet treaty signed with India last August--the phr~sP in Article 10 pledging that neither party will allow its territory to be used for any action that might cause military harm to the other, and the stipulation in Article 13 that any differences in interpretation of provisions of the treaty shall be resolved between the two sides in a spirit of "friendship, understanding, and mutual respect."** * Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, Yugoslavia, and the DPRK also reportedly sent delegations to both Baghdad and Damascus for the anniversary. ** Th~: Soviet treaties with Egypt and India are discussed, respectively, in the 3 June 19'1 TRENDS, pages 11-14, and the 11 August 1971 TRF,i~lDS, pages 26-30. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 (;UNfLI)ItiN'I'LAL I~'IICw 'I'ItI~;NU~I 1.2 AI'R LI. 1972 Artlclu 7 on rugular cnn~eultatiune adds to thu I~gyptian vrar.dlon a roforoncu ec.~ dovelopanq Iraqi-~!3oviot "po.litical coaporat.l.un." And whore Clio U~tSlt and t'sgypt agr.oed to consult onJ.y on Lnternat.lonal :issu?e, the USSR and Iraq agree to consult a18o "on questions of further developing r.e.lct:lans." A provision for contacts in the event of n threat to peach-- part of Arl?iclo 7 in the Egyptian treaty--becomes a separate article in the Iraqi document. 'i'bis, along with Article .13, accounts for the total of 14 articles in the Iraqi treaty as compared with 12 in the Egyptian. Article 9 on military cooperation, much briefer Chan the one in tie Egyptian treaty, says merely that the two countries, for the sake of their mutual security, will "continue to develop cooperation in the field of strengthening the defense capabilities of each." What contribution Iraq might make to Soviet defense and security is unclear, but the article could co-~ceivably relate to naval facilities for the Soviet fleet in the );ereian Gulf. (TABS announced on the 9th a forthcoming "official friendly visit" by a Soviet naval squadron to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr under "an understanding reached earlier.") The Egyptian treaty;, in contrast, provides for continuing cooperation in the "military field" on the basis of appropriate agreements to strengthen Egypt's "defense capacity," and spells out some elements of this cooperation. Ln line with Iraq's refection of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, Article 3 omits a paragraph contained in the counterpart article of the Egyptian treaty on mutual efforts to achieve a lasting an~~ fair peace in the Middle East in harmony with the aims and principles of the UN Charter. Although Iraq is drawing an Soviet expertise in developing its oil resources, Article 2 goes beyond the Egyptian version in adding that the signatories will respect "each other's sovereignty over all natural resources." The same article fails to describe Iraq as trying to "reconstruct socdety along socialist lines," a phrase applied to Egypt in the Cairo treaty. The preamble registers bioscow's concern over Arab unity in a new passage, not present in the earlier treaty, expressing the two sides' conviction that "further cohesion of all forces of peace and progress, inc0.uding the consolidation of the unity of the Arab states" on an anti-imperialist basis, is l.mportant in the struggle for world peace and security. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS TRENnS 12 APRIL 1972 It was presumably also at Moscow's behest that another new paragraph in the preamble expresses the conviction Chat international problems "must be solved through cooperation and by seeking solutions acceptable to the parties concerned." References to "Zionism" in the preamble and in Article 4, on the other hand, appear to be at Iraq's behest: The Egyptian treaty nowhere mentions Zionism and alludes to Israel only indirectly in a passage on Egypt's "eliminating the consequences of aggression." Extolling the treaty in a speech at the signing ceremony, Kosygin emphasized that it "is not directed against any other country" and "does not infringe on anybody's ?.egitimate interests." These remarks may have been intended in part as assurance to Iran, bur Kosygin clearly also had other Arab countries in mina: He went on to assert "our deep conviction" that the treaty is compatible with the interests of wide international cooperation, "including the cooperation of the .Soviet Union and Iraq with other Arab countries." Moscow broadcasts in Arabic have sought to persu~:de other Arab countries that they will themselves benefit from strengthened Soviet-Iraqi relations. A commentary on the 7th said Kosygin's visit "should find" an "extensive, positive reaction" on the part of all friends of Iraq. And a broadcast on the 11th, praising the Iraqi treaty and the "companion" Egyptian one, argued that Iraq could now contribute even more to the general Arab struggle. Arab reaction to the treaty has been less than enthus~.astic. Rounding up w~r1d press approbatiol of the treaty on the 11th, TASS found only two Arab papers to cite, and one of them--Cairo's AL-AHRAM--dealt with the communique on Kosygin's visit, not the treaty. Egypt's reaction had teen conveyed in terse reportorial coverage; and a brief Cairo radio item on the 9th, one of only four on the subject, pointedly represented the treaty as banning the use of either country's territory for "provocation or ideological sabotage" against the other. Monitored Damascus media have not mentioned the Kosygin visit at a11, although Damascus radio did report the Bulgarian defense minister's earlier visit to Baghdad and Podgornyy's current visit to Turkey. Libya's cool reaction was conveyed officially in a prompt Foreign and Unity Ministry statement on the 9th expressing "strong an.xiety." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS ' 12 APRIL 1972 JOINT COMMUNIQUE The 1G April communique on Kosygin's visit sums ~!p the talks held "in an atmosphere of friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding." The two sides are said to have discussed questions of bilateral relations and to have "exchanged opinions" on international problems, on which their positions were "identical or similar." Where international issues were covered in the 17 February communique on Saddam Husayn's Moscow visit, this one deals specifi.rally only with the Middle Eaet, repeating from the February communique a paragraph asserting a shared belief that a dust and durable peace cannot be established without the "liberari~a of all" occupied territories and protection of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs. The communique touches on party relations in a single sentence, no!:ng agreement that successful development of such relations is an important mesns of strengthening Iraqi friendship and cooperation. It was to further strengthen these relations, the communique notes, that the two sides concluded the treaty which among other things contributes to the point struggle against "imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism." Expressing "complete satisfaction" with the .revel of relations achieved, both sides reaffirm a resolve to continue developing ties in the "political, economic, defense" and other fields. The communique also records Iraq's gratitude for Soviet assistance in developing the Iraqi economy, particularly with regard to the national oil industry. UNITY PROJECT In taking note of Iraq's unity project with Egypt and Syria, the communique broaches a subject Moscow media had all but ignored since Baghdad's 15 February proposal in the wake of King Husayn's announced plan for a federated Jordan. Soviet acknowledgment of the concept in the communique still falls far short of an endors~!ment: In light of Saddam Husayn's recent visits to "the friendly fraternal countries" of Egypt and Syria, the communique says, "the Iraqi side set out its recent steps toward Arab unity in the interests of countering the intrigues of imperialism and its agents in the area."* The Soviet side * In what is apparently the only acknowledgment of the Iraqi delegation's late March talks in Damascus and Cairo, a Kudryavtsev article in NOVOYE VREMYA (No. l4, 1 April) noted that in mid- March the Iraqi Government had submitted a proposal on the forma- tion "of an alliance in some form" among Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and that "this scheme was discussed in Damascus, to which an Iraqi dele- gation came; it then went to Cairo." An Aleksandrov domestic service commentary on 9 April remarked in passing that the Iraqi Appr?~e~~q~i~~~~~~~~~0~~'~t ~~ ~~~8v~0~~~v'~t~$~0~'v~0~~~v y4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFZDI:NTIAL flDIS '.CRIB;NpS l2 APRIL 1972 Ln turn simply "highly assesses the efforts to strengthen un:LCy of the Arab countries on the progressive, anti-imperialist, and anti-Zionist basis" and welcomes "the steps of the leaders of Iraq and other progressive Arab countries in this direction." A shade more positively but still cautiously, Kosygin in his ar-Rumaylah speech "warmly welcomed" the "important political moves by a num'~er of Arab go~.iernments, including the Iraqi Government--mcres aimed at strengthening solidatity among the Arab countries" and at consolidating their cooperation in the struggle against "imperialism and Israeli aggression." In the same speech, Kosygin warned against anticommunist and anti-Soviet slogans spread by "enemies of the Arabs" bent on sowing seeds of mistrust toward the Arabs' friends and creating a rift in Soviet-Arab relations. The communique does not repeat the February Moscow communique's indictment of. imperialist efforts to spread anticommunist and anti- Soviet feelings. TALKS WITH KURDS, Moscow's intereaC in unity of the CONWIUNISTS "progressive forces" in Iraq was under- scored by Kosygin's remarks in his ar-Rumaylah speech on the 7th, as well as by hie separate meetings on the 8th with an Iraqi Communist Party (CPI) delegation and with members of the Political Bureau of Che Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK). Zn ar-Rumaylah, he hailed Iraq's social and economic reforms, the implementation of measures under the 11 March 1970 manifesto on a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem, and the draft National Action Charter of last IJovember. The charter, he noted, provides for the formation of a "front of progressive forces" in the country. In his speech at the treaty ceremony on the 9th, the Soviet leader concluded by wishing Iraq further success in achieving unity of all "national and progressive forces" in the country for the realization of progressive economic and social changes and an anti-imperialist foreign policy. Soviet propaganda, welcoming the establishment last month of Syria's National Progressive Front, has encouraged the Iraqis to form their own such organization, wh:!ch would include the DPK and the CPI. While TASS on the 9th only briefly reported Kosygin's meetings with the CPI and DPK representatives, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic that day noted that all Baghdad papers reported the CPI talks and that the DPK organ AT-TA'AICHZ reported the meeting with tY~e Kurds. The broadcast said that in the former meeting Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 1'UiJlrll)I~,i1T,lAl, hI)I;i 'I'111StJIJH I ~ AI'ill 1, I ~/~ Kc.-Wygl,n uxl+rusMUCI eut.l.?i'ucCfun wLCI- Chu cluvuluhmnnl c+l' r~+lal Lcm++ buCwuun 1.rttcl and "oCl-ur Llburutud Arctb Nc.nt.uN" +ta wull ~tw ++I' "nuCionul. re.lationN .lndidu Lracl" ttnd ChuC hu wulcc+mud discuaalcma an Cho Cf)UntCy concarning tha Nutlona.l. AcClcm Ch+trCur. Accurding to a Baghdad radio account of thu Cwo-hour. +uc+uC ng~ CI'l l~lrbC Secrotary 'Aziz Muhammad asserted 'tu purty'd Cu Cry Co overcomo the obetaclus to aor c eoopuraClun~ pnr.tlcul.nrly among tho Bu'th~ the DPK~ and t"rcc CP:[. 't'ASy cnt Chu Ilth reported a CPL official as welcoming the trusty and I~fucl~;ink efforts to implement it "in clove cooporrCion wl.t?.h other progressive national forces" in Lrr~. Baghdad's account of the Kosygin-DPK talks said "mutual tatress" was placed among other thii~gs~ on implementation of the 11 March 1970 manifesto and on the formation of a national front. Ac^ording o Baghdad, the Kurds present were chiefly cabineC ministers. Kurdish leader al-Barzani complained in a LC FLGARO interview reported by AFP on the loth. that "these happy encounters are being performed behind our backs" and asserted Chat the Soviet arms obtained by Baghdad would be used against the Kurds rather than against Lran or Lerael. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 r,irw~ll-t;N1tA1, dalr~ ~Igl~,wrrp 1 7 AI'q 11. 1'a 1 J U 1 5111tM~1M~N t h1OSCUW 1~U11L5 ITV ACC()ItIJ, UFZG~S lilW ON CI-IL~MICA1. V~C:AWON~ i'I-p 4uvfat publicity tot tha 10 April algninp, of ilia runvpnti~m un bannlnK the dpvalupmpnl, pruduct.lun, and rtockpilina of bartpriolugiral and toxin wnapunr har fQatured 1'rQridant 1'udgurnyy'~ remarks at thQ MoNCaw cararruny. Morcuw har duly reported that similar carpmonipr wpra bald the rams day in Lur-~lun and Warhington, with T'AN'S nn the i.Oth noting that 1'reridant Nin~~n "attended" the Warhington ceremony, 'fhp fart that thr I're~ident delivered a appach ear unmentioned, presumably because his remacka were implicitly critical. of Morcoa's military aid to Ilanoi.< Ibdgornyy cited the accord ar attesting to the possibility oC progress, step by step, [award canrolidation of international peace "given a desire to reach agreement on international issuer." Ile recalled that the convention had bear. approved at the 26th session of the UN Ganaral Araembly in Uacambar and called it a result of. "faint ef[ortr by a largo number of countries." Koutine Soviet commentary, however, har continued to depict the accord a? an initiative of th? U55tt and its allies. A broadcast to North America on the 8th, Eor example, pointedly reminded lirtanar? that the agreement "war initiaeed by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries"; and a foreign-language commentary on 29 March. tracing the efforts of the rocialirt elates to ban bacteriological and chemical weapons simultaneously, said they had agreed to proceed with a ben on bacteriological weapons in the face of the West's "negative attitude." CI-EMICAI_ WEAPONS Podgornyy used the occasion to reaffirm Sov.let determination to continue working toward "limiting the arms race, including strategic arms." He viewed the ban on bacteriological weapons as opening "new favorable prospects" for slackening the arms race and as a good example to be followed in the approach to other pressing disarmament problems. In line with Soviet comment since the opening of the latest round * In reporting the ceremonies in Moscow, Washington, and London for signing of the seabed treaty on 11 February 1971, TASS noted that President Nixon and Secretary Rogers "made speeches" at the '.Jashington ceremony. And it quoted some of President Johnson's remarks in recounting the U.S. ceremony for signing of the nonproliferation agreement on 1 July 1968. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 r,IrNptIr1~N't IAi, Vht-+ ~lill~,Ntrtl 17 AI'q 11, 1'a 11 ~~( rha rinnava dinarnrarnant tatkn ttn !V pahruaryt 1'ttdgnrnyy callwl t~~r ilto tlr~tllihlt ittn tl( f1lPrait'gi waapllnN ar !lra rtatrt pt alt ant) t itara/ t of in,ad as "a raw latpttrtant lnlt ial Iva" iha draft t seat y nnhmitrad Iry tho atrc-tallat daloKat inns at lhrr (lanava ta1kM c-rr 7N Mart h, N~~ur Ina ~ t,rtrmontary t-vor the part two warka hNr alnn hai lad lira draft troaty an an important tnitia U va and haw taken thta Waat r? tank (ttr allaKad lack of anthurtiArrm. '1'hur a panalirrt in the 7 April dttmartic narvira conunantatorr' roundtable chided thtr U.ti. dalogatlcrn in Canava tot atKulnK that it it too Qaely to begin drawintl up a troaty; hp Alro rQ_~acttrd obrrrvatlonr in the London pram that a cottvetttion cannot bQ roncludrd now "because nu([tciently affactivta means of control. are lacking." 'i'he ramp rcttronentator ctbratvQd that "certain powers" do nht want to ralinquialr t{re c?Irtsmical weapons which Ara "being urtad by t}ra U. ti. tntervvr~t tonirtr in LndoclrinA~ tlra Uritirh punitive (areas in Ulrter~ the 1'ortuguere colonialirtr in Afeir.A~ and by all o[ them roller_tively agalnrt the Antiwar And progrerrive movements in their respective c:ounlrlero." V. Uvchinnikovt !n An international roview Article in 1'RAVbA on 1 April, called A ban on chemical weapons a{re "next urgent lark" after the Accord on bacteeiologicul agants~ assailing Che United Stattas in routine faslfion for use of tear gao and defoliants in Indochina And [or continued failure to ratify the 1925 Geneva protocol barring the use of chemical and bacteriological wenponr. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 ~,uNlr 1 UIrN'I' 1 A1, Itll I !l 'I'ItltNl)!1 17 AI'1111, I'1 J7 . i~ ~_i~i,n~~Y nwu ~~ rii~ t ~r C,I~tlf?1YKU ~ T1tE/ilY IZfrJECT 10N WILL r+U~IDt:RM I NErr i3lrltLl N ACCt~RD !~uvlel. I?urc?Ign tllni.atar Gr~miyko hnw mnJa tlrr. 1'irat uf.Cacinl yovits'~ t;uvurnmvnt Nt6rtGhlPnt pub.llcly .ll.nking elrn Lmplumn:~Cr.rtlon of Chu Blg I?~~ur ilur.l.ln ncc:ur~l wlth IrItG rnel.Cicatl.on of tlrr. Mr~rcow and War.snw tre+rtles--thcr au-cnllracl "ruvurnn li.nkagn" concnpC. Address.Lng n ~ulnt ucnslun of the CorcriKn nCi'nirw committocs of thn USSR Supr.?mn ~ovlct un l'Z April, Gromyko clacl.arad thnt if tho 1rRC fnile to r?arr.ify lhn twu tr,c~r+tins, "this would rtleo undermine tho known nKrearnunta on Wort Ilcrlin"--n point Brezhnev had not mnde in hie 20 tlarch Sovlet trado union congress speech in passages rebutting West Garmnn opponents o[ ratification. Ccomyko's speech wound up an intensive woek of activity involving Soviet relations with both Germanys: SCD party chief llonecker was in t4oacow 4-10 April for talks with Brezhnev, to which Moscow gave minimnl publicity; a long-term Soviet-FRG trade agreement, incluri- ing a clause providing for FRG competence for West Merlin once the B1g Four Berlin accord ie implemented, was initialed on the 7th; Bundoerat Chairman Kuehn was in the USSR 3-12 April for Calks with Gromyko and Brezhnev on tt+e treaties; and it was announced o:c the 12th that the ~o1nt Soviet-FRG commission for development of economic cooperation will hold its first meeting in Bonn on 19 April. These moves have come dust prior to the 23 April Baden-Wuerttemberg state elections and the subsequent scheduled readings of the ratification bills in the West German parliament, thus providing substance to the Brandt-Scheel coalition's argument that the treaties, though Y+ot ratified, have already given a visible thrust to developing Soviet-FRG relations. GROMYKO SPEECH In his speech as reported at length by TASS on the 12th, Gromyko discussed the Soviet Govern- ment's views on the treaty and Cook note of several of the sensi- tive issues raised by the Bonn opposition. Observing that the "main meaning" of the treaty is that it provides "the necessary political foundation for a radical turn in Soviet-West German relations," Gromyko again stated--like Brezhnev at the trade union congress--that the signing of the treaty was not "a simple matter for the Soviet Union" because of the consequences of World War II and the postwar policies of West German "revanchism." Crediting the Brandt government with "realism," Gromyko stressed the notion that the present treaty is the only Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 c;IINh I bl;N~l' I AL 1~ II I'r ~t'Itt~.NIJ;1 I;! AI'Itll. 1'!)7 h~~au l b lc~ una Ln "thn prnnettt cued I t IuttM uf" bn lattra" ltt I;urupa and r~.~l l.urtr Chct "prlttclpla ul' ayuullty uC ~t?+ttaa." Nutlnp, thr-I. nulcl+ur utdn hod bnan ubllgad to ranuunc:u nnythlnu car I++ul tuculvud nnytlJing, ut tho uxpanwu ul' thn uthnr, ha quid Chut "thu ruin dtutu ul' nffnirv, which nxlwtud without thu tru++ty and which duuc+ nut dupund un 1tn rucugnll.lun ur nunrocu?nltlon by uny~~nu, is tnkon un tbn bunlw." Gr.umyku expc+ndad un thn notion Hutt bock didnu uccnpt rnnunciution of [orcn ne thn mnane to suttlo dldputnw and thnt both regard the pr?snnt 14u+:opuan bordcrp nH "lnviolublu," citing tho texC of the treaty urticloe on thnsc~ two pulntt+~ c:rumyko'e r.emarke included Moscow's first public rofernnce to tits "Unclerstrtnding on the Intentions of Cite Sides," which fire Soviet foroign minister said was "u soparate document" dletinet from the treaty toxt. It applied, he added, to the development of GDR-FRG relations "on the basis of full equality and the absence of dieerimination," to the process of admitting the two German stateB to the United Nations, and to "Che settlement of issues between the FRG and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic connected with the invalidity ~f the Munich agreement." Gromyko also "informed" the foreign affairs committees about the Scheel "letter" received by the USSR at the time of Cho signing on 12 August 1970, which TASS said "outlined" the views of the FRG "on questions of self-determination." TP.SS noted that the committee membet.s "were familiarized with the text of the letter." The reverse linkage issue was broached by Gromyko toward the end of his speech, after hie enumeration of advances made in Soviet- Weat German relations since the signing of the treaty Strongly denouncing the opponents of the two treaties, Gromyko complainrJ that "they are again trying to impose are their country concep tc+ of revanche, of hostility to neighboring peoples and states." But Gromyko did not denounce the Bonn opposition as a whole, stating rather that the opponents of the treaties are concentrated around the "right wing" of the CDU/CSU and thus implicitly recognizing that the entire CDU/CSU faction is not totally committed to non- ratification of the treaties--a thetre that has appeared repeatedly in recent Moscow propaganda. Gromyko insisted that the USSR had no "intention of intimidating anyone," adding that it was for the FRG to decide to choose between "friendship and hostility" with the Soviet Union. He continued with minatory overtones: There will be no friendly and good-neighborly relations if the necessary understanding of the Soviet Union's interests, the minimum of which are reflected in the Moscow treaty, ie not displayed in the FRG. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 t,11Nh 1 IttrN'I' 1 A1, hN 1 !i 'I'lll!NUlt t~ nl~ull. I~~i~ 1 [ 1 t turns out that. tl~n i~a~lnrn 1 Ilalrub l l c: hay nu dnw i rr to c.uupnratn ua, naturally wn wtl.l. huvn to mnkn Hula of tl~lw and draw thn appruprlato cunc:luMlonr. 'I'lin lu?l.c uC pul.itLcnl dnvnlupmnnt ahuwr that a [ailurn of thn tr.nntlna to nntnr lntu furcn would ru].l 4uvlot-What Cnrnurn rnlutlona Cnr brrek. Morn thnn thnt, th].r would nleo undnrml.nn thn known ugrnomnnta un,Wnrrt Nnrlin, nrnct now ubrtnclnr on thn rasa of tho normnllzntion of relutlonr bntwnnn tho hKG and tho GUR, And cross out rr11 that hua nlrondy boon a :tuinod betwoon tlrom. A11 thin could not but cnuBO a profound crleis uf. confidoncn In thn policy of th? F'ndoral Ilnpublic of Germany, with all lire rneultunt connequences. TAS5 roported that 3romyko entertained questions on the treaty from the deputise, including one to which he responded: "The Soviet. Union will not accopt any fresh talks on the treaty." GromyKO said this had been made clear by 13rezhnev at the trade union congress, although the CPSU leader had seemingly limited his refusal to c~~nduct new talks to the treaty's provisions on borders. REVERSE LINKAGE Prior to Gromyko's speech, the only explicit ^oviet references to the reverse linkage ques- tion had appeared in Moscow radio commentaries. For example. IZV)rSTIYA's senior political observer Matveyev remarked in the domestic radio roundtable on 12 March that the "West Berlin" agreement was directly dependent on the fate of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, although he stopped short of stating that the Soviet Union would not sign the final quadripartite protocol if the accords were not ratif ied. More recently, in a commentary on the 7 April initia111ng of the Soviet-FRG trade agreement, Moscow radio's Yakovlev said that the trade agreement "takes the quad- ripartite agreement on West Berlin into consideration; the latter will become effective after the ratification" of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Gromyko likewise said on the 12th that the trade agreement would take effect after the ratification of the Moscow treaty. Refraining from direct commentary on reverse linkage, the Moscow central press has instead publicized explicit ref erences Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CtlNlrll)hN'I'lAl, ir141li '1'111{NUlI 1 ~ AI'111[, 1'1 !! t~- rout+ruu IlnknKu Iry uucl+ 1'urulg,n epuknnnun uw Itr+urdt and (;Ult I~urc~ly,n Mlnlaecrr Winxur.* tiuvlr;t cununuutury un thn rnt:Ll'lcutton ul' tl+n trnutinrr wul'tunud nppruc.lrrhly fulluwlug Ilruxhnuv'+r epraach ~t tlr? tr.adn un.l.un cun?ruee. Muacuw wont tcu I'+.rr ata to publialzu two taignificunt et++tumunte by Wuet eiurman i{~adOCe nn thn r.uunif.iention of. the two Curnurn etnturi during Ilnnnckar'e visit to tha Soviet Union. Ll,V1.51'LYA un ehu Gth publldhud un lntnrvlew with Drandt by lte Gunn curruepundunC '1'uaunyun In which Che Chancellor. a11ud?d to Urc+zhnuv'e tradr union congress speech, Baying that the "hostility and mutual mlet-?uet" rusulting from Wurlcl War 1L were felt on both eldue. lirundt woe further quoted as saying that the "suffer- inge of the war are not, of course, forgotten !.n the Soviet Union," but he uddod that "we have additional problems linked to the division of the Gorman nation." In an even more explicit state- ment on the reunification of the two Germanys, Bundesrat Chairman Kuehn Commented in a Moscow radio interview, broadcast on the 11th to German lidtenera, that the Moscow and Warsaw treaties "were formulated by the government from Che German position and with all rerQrvations for a peace treaty; reunif ication, for which all ~: ~s are striving, was not abandoned." HONECKER VISIT Moscow's public restraint on the ratification issue was also reflected in its report on GDR leader tIonecker's "unofficial friendly" visit to Che Soviet Union 3-10 April. Avoiding any appearance of interference in West German affairs, the report simply stated that the impending ratification of the two treaties, "the subsequent coming into force of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin," and the agreements between the GDR and the FRG and West Berlin Senat should promote further cooperation and normalization of relations between the FRG and the socialist countries. Notably, the rep~~rt contained no polemical reference ~,o the CDU/CSU opposition to the treaties or to the ccnventional GDR demand that the FRG recognize the independence and sovereignty of the GDR. The report stated that the meetings between Brezhnev and Honecker were held in an "atmosphere of unanimity, sincerity, and fraternal friendship." * TASS on 13 March quoted Mikhaylov as commenting in IZVESTIYA that if the treaties were not ratified the Berlin agreement would not be implemented. Whether inadvertently or by design, however, TASS' report; did not make it clear that Mikhaylov was paraphrasing a statement made by Brandt. See the TRENDS of 15 March, pages 30-33. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 GllNl~' 1.UI;N'I' lAL IrBI ti 'I'ItI~;NUB 1.2 AI'ItI,L ~9yl I'rudumnbly bucuuvu of its "unofficial" nuturo, 3aviot modiu's covurugu oC Ilonockur.'s visit was minimal. Central media on tho 4tli and 5th carried u briof 'fAS;i roport on thc~ GllR loader's arrival but said nothing further about tl~e visit until tho 10th, whop Moscow radio curried the final report--not described ue a communique. Moscow and Lust Berlin radios reported Ilonecker'8 return home on tl~e lOtli. An IsusC Berlin radio conunentary by a Moscow correspondent on the loth noted pointedly that "the week spent by Erich llonecker with Leonid Brezhnev did not meet with great publicity in the press." The first followup Moscow comment on the visit, a radio eommen- tary by Zholkver broadcast to German listeners on the 11th, largely paraphrased the Soviet report on the visit but Cook a slap at the "reactionary imperialist circles [whoJ doggedly ob;Ject" to the developing detente in Europe. A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the 12th, ae summarized by ADN, refrained from any polemical attacks on West Germany, at the same time pointing out such GDR contributions to the lessening of tension in Europe as the rece_~t arrangements for Easter visits Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 (.;ONIrT.Ub;tJ'L'IAL, l~lil.~i ',I'RI;NI)S l2 APItiG 1,972 USSR-BOLIVIA IZVESTIYA CONr1ENTS IIEI.ATEDLY ON EXPULS l ON OF SOVIET DI PI_OMATS An lZVES'1'IYA article on ll Al~ri1 ended a l3-day silence In Soviet mecliu on the Lolivian Government's 29 March order expelling 119 members of the Soviet P;mbaesy for reasons which remain unspecified, but which by impl:l.cctti.on involve alleged interference in llo.livian interna'L affairs: ...'The tYming' ' of the article seems related to Western press publicity for the departure of 30 Soviet diplomatic offlcinle from La Paz on l0 April, wiL?h additional departures imminent. ivtoscow had not publicized earlier statements made to newsmen by the Soviet ambassador in La Paz, reported in Bolivian media. The IZVESTIYA article, as reviewed at some length by TASS, now mentions a "statement" issued by the Soviet Embassy which "rPiected the attempts to accuse Soviet diplomats of some 'impermissible activity' as absolutely groundless." b[oscow had waited six days before acknowledging the P4exican Government's order on 1f3 rlarch 1971 expelling five high- ranicing Soviet L;mbassy officers. Its reaction then was at a higher official level--in the form of a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement to the Mexican Embassy in Moscow, terming the charges against the diplomats "totally ground- less" and calling the expulsion "an unfriendly act against the Soviet Union." TASS carried a brief report of the 24 tiarch statement, and Radio Moscow gave the same brief report worldwide publicity. But there was no accompanying commentary, where the IZVESTIYA article now indulges in rhetoric ab~~ut "anti-Soviet actions" multiplying in Latin America--replete with vague charges of behind-the-scenes manipul.:~tion by U.S. interests bent on disrupting hemisphere countr-~es' relations with socialist states. Alleginz; that in the wake of the August 1971 coup in Bolivia U.S. "monopolies" used "a11 the levers to disrupt S~~viet-Bolivian relations" in a drive to "bolster their shaken positions in the key branches of the Bolivian economy," IZVESTIYA says propagation of the timeworn "myth" about "communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere" and about "Soviet interference" reached a peak with the expulsion order. While thus in effect acknowledging the evident basis for the order, the article--to fudge from TASS' summary---nowhere directly imputes charges of Soviet Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 GONFIUI~N'1'I:AL. 1.~'1i1.5 'L'RP;tJI)S :1.2 APRLI. .1972 interference to the Boiiv:lan Government and is at pains to obscure the Large number of diplomats involved, referring to the expulsion order as the Bolivian Gover:~ment'e "invitation to a number of staff members of the USSR Embassy and other Soviet institutions in La Paz to leave the country." IZVESTIYA countercharges that the Bolivian Foreign Ministry "diel.orts even the data about the number of people in the Soviet colony in La Paz." The Bolivian Government's action, IZVESTIYA declares, "fan only play into the hands of those who are ready to sacrifice the interests of Soviet-Bolivian rela tione to please the external forces that wish to bring the world back to the worst times of the cold war." Bolivian media had earlier quoted the Soviet ambassador in La Paz as making a stronger and more direct reference to the consequences for Soviet- Bolivian relations in the comment that "measures such as this do not contribute in any way to maintenance of cordial relations between the two governments:" IZVESTIYA, portraying the Bolivian action ae a link in a chain of anti-Soviet machinations in Latin America, observes that the "short- sighted" decir~ion has caused "perplexity and disapproval in a number of Latin American countries." IZVESTIYA's lane had been foreshadowed on 2 April in a commentary in Spanish to Latin America over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, without direct reference to the Bolivian episode but in apparent allusion to it. The commentary noted a "recent step-up of slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union" in "some" Latin American countries, adding that "the poison of this wretched campaign is aimed against the Soviet diplomatic and trade representations, with the clear objective of worsening the relations with the Soviet Union and prevent:;ng the development of recently established economic and cultural relations." Charging that this effort "is led by the United States" and employs "the wornout scarecrow of anti- Sovietism," Radio Peace and Progress cited Costa Rica and Chile as focal points of current U.S. attempts to disrupt developing relations with the Soviet Union. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CUNir1:DLN'1'T.AL l~'I1.LS 'I'1t1~N1)S 1.2 AI'RT.1., :1972 - 48 - USSP IP~ITERNAL AFFAIPS UKRAINE PLENUM REBUKES Tl~n OBKOM (.FADERS. REMOVES SOBOL A 3.1 March Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on the organizational work of the Voroshilovgrad and Cherkassy oblaet party organizations has rebuked the leaders of these two oblasts and removed first deputy premier N.A. Sobol--a close protege of Poclgornyy in the Ukraine--from the Ukrainian Politburo. Although the two oblaet leaders have no obvious ties with any prominent Ukrainian factions, the criticism of them, like the recent ouster of the Khmelnitskiy obkom leader, appears to be linked to initiatives by Shelest begun at the June 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on improving leadership of primary party organizations. Shelest's current relations with Sobol are unclear, but the removal of the patron of the Kharkov faction, once the strongest faction in the Ukraine~is bound to affect factional alinements in the Ukraine. The plenum opened with reports by Voroshilovgrad first secretary V.V. Shevchenko and Cherkassy first secretary A.N. Andreyev on their oblasts' organizational work, followed: by speeches by two deputy heads of Che Ukrainian Central Committee cadres section P. Ye. Didkovskiy and P.K. Klimenko, who presumably presented their respective assessments of conditions in the ?wo oblasts. After the remaining speeches, SheJ.est delivered a speech and the plenum adopted a decree criticizing the two oblasts for a wide variety of shortcomings, including poor organizational work and failures in agricultural and consumer goods production. Since the speeches were not published, the decree provides the only substantive information on the transactions of the plenum. Shelest laid the groundwork for the recent attack in his speech at the 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum. lie then criticized the Voroshilovgrad obkom and a local gorko~n for not taking effective measures to correct conditions at a Voroshilovgrad mine and for not improving the work of party organizations. He concluded that "the only explanation for this is that leaders of the obkom and gorkom still are not devoting enough attention to primary party organizations of enterprises which lag" (RADYANSKA UKSAINA, 25 June 1971). Inasmuch as Shelest played the leading role at the.June 1971 plenum and in exposing and condemning similar organizational shortcomings in Khmelnitskiy, Yiev.and.TernopoJ. earlier this year, he appears to be the prime mover in this campaign of criticism. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDI~.N7'IAL IBIS TRENDS 12 APRIL 1972 The March plenum a.iso announced the retirement on pension of first deputy premier. 5obol and his removal from the Ukrainian Politburo. lie was removed ae first deputy premier on the same day. Although tl~e state of Sobol's health is unknown, his age, 62, is not excessive (in fact, he is younger than Shelest)--suggesting that he is a victim of political intrigue. Sobo1's retirement may be related to shortcomings in industry, especially Che lag in the production of consumer goods at Kharkov's heavy industrial enterprises. 5helest in his June 1971 plenum speech was especially critical of Kharkov, remarking that the Ukrainian Politburo recently had examined production of consumer goods at the ma~or.Kharkov enterprises and had msde "severe criticism" of the leaders of several mayor enterprises for cutting back or not increasing consumer goods production. Sobol may have been doubly guilty here--as first deputy premier in charge of industry and a? senior patron of the Kharkov leaders. Indeed, one of the Shelest--the big Malyshev transport.machine.building plant--ls currently headed by O.V. Soich, an associate of Sobo1, and was .formerly directed by Sob61 himself, who spent most of his career (1929-58) at this plant. If Sobol's removal from the Politburo was motivated by political reasons, then it represents a setback far Podgornyy. After Podgornyy left Kharkov to become Ukrainian first secretary, Sobol rose in.rapid succession from plant director to Kharkov sovnarkhoz.chief,.Ukrainian sovnarkhoz chief, and Kharkov first secretary..-When.Podgornyy.left.the Ukraine in mid-1963, Sobol was placed in.charge-of.cadre work as Ukrainian second secretary. When. the_CPSU.Central Committee adopted a decree in 1965 ceasuring.Kharkov and marking Podgornyy's de.`.eat by Brezhnev, Sobol the Ukraine, being demoted from irst deputy premier. Since then the Kharkov faction.has.never.regained its predominance in the Ukrainian leadership.. Its.sole representative in the Politburo new is Kharkov.first.secretary G.I. Vashchenko, who was party secretary at the.Malyshev.plant when Sobol was director in 1958 and was later Kharkov first secretary Sobol's top deputy. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS l~ APRIL 1972 CH I IVA I IVTERIVAL AFFAIRS SHAKE-UP IN KWANGTUNG LEADERSWIP REVEALED IN NCNA RETORTS Ting Sheng, commander of the Canton Military Region and a Kwangtung provincial party secretary, has replaced Liu Hsing-yuan as chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee-- the first ouch replacement at the top provincial level to be announced since Lin Piao's fall. Ting Sheng's appointment was revealed inter alia ir. NCNA accounts of the Canton reception for Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff. Party identifications were not provided for the Kwangtung officials in attendance, b~,t if the national pattern is followed Ting Sheng will also replace Liu '?sing-yuan as first secretary of the Kwangtunn party organization. Liu last appeared publicly on 8 March; his background is that of a PLA commissar closely associated with Huang Yung-sheng, PLA Chief of Staff and former leader in Kwangtung, who was purged along with Lin Piao last fall. Liu's downfall, if it proves to be such, may be assumed to be an outgrowth of the Lin Piao affair and possibly the forerunner of additional shifts at top provincial levels. Further shifting of the Kwangtung leadership wa8 also revealed in the NCNA identification of Chao Tzu-yang, a recent Cransfer from Inner Mongolia where he had served as a secretary on the provincial party committee, as a vice-chairman on the Kwangtung revolutionary committee. Chao, who was first secretary of the old Kwangtung party committee and also a secretary of the former Central-South Bureau headed by purged Tao Chu prior to the cultural revolution, may also fill a vacancy on the provincial party committee created b; Ting's probable elevation to first secretary. 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