TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 21, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
S ERYICE
~IIIIIII IIIIII-~ullllllllllll~
T&B~IVDS
in Com>nunirt l~ro~a~anda
STATSPEC
Confidential
21 JUNE 1972
(VOL. XXIII, N0. 25)
8000300050025-3
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CONKIll~N'I'IA~,
This propaganda analyals report U based ex-
clualvely on mat~irlal carried in communUt
broadcast and press media. It la publfahed
by FBIB without coordination with ether U.B.
dovernment components.
WARNING
Thfa document contains informakion alYecting
the national d~:fenae of the United Elates,
within the moaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, ui the UB Code, as amended. Its
tranamiasfon or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorised person >a pro-
hibited by law.
o~our i
Gebd~d Ire ~u~w1k
d~wn~r~dlq end
bel~aMurlM
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CONFIDEN~r,IAL FBIS 7:RE~NDS
21 JUNE 1972
CON~'~NTS
Topics and Events Givers Mayor Attention i
INDOCHINA
Podgornyy Visit to tisnoi Reflects Soviet-DRV Strains 1
Le Duc Tho Rerizrns to Hanol Via Moscow and Peking 7
Hanoi Urges l;on~auniet Unity,.Assails U.S..Divisivc.Schemes 8
Sour.h Vietnamese C~mmuniet Journal Scores?Defenoive Attitudes 11
DRV Ministries Protest U.S. Bombing, Attacks on.Dikes . ?.~
Hanoi Laude, Exhorts Co~nunications and Tt~ansport Workers '.7
PRAVDA Defends Detente.Palicy.Against-Uanamed.Cri~ics.. 19
Brezhnev Given Special Praise for Summit Diplomacy 21
POLAND-YUGOSLAVIA
Tito Arrives in Warsaw on "Offi.cial Friendly" Visit 22
MIDDLE EAST
Selective Moscow Publi~:ity for Egyptian War Minister's Visit 25
CHINA
PEOPLE'S DAILY Explains That No Leader Irreplaceable 27
Militia Instruction Anniversary Used to Attack Lin Views 28
Campaign Against Lin Buttresses Moderate Educational i:ine 29
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FOR ?FFICZAL U8E ONLY OBIS '1'RCNI)S
21 JUiVI, 19?2
- i -
TOPJ.US AND GVEN'i'S GIVEN MAJOR AT'TLN7.'LON l2 - 18 JUNG 197.
Moscow (28%2 items)
Pekirt~ (1221 itemA)
Gron~yko in trance (--)
1%
Domestic Issues
(39%)
49%
Soviet-Iraqi Treaty (1%)
5%
Indochina
(25%)
14%
Ratification
[PRC ):~relgn Ministry
(--)
4%]
Nixon USSR Visit (6I)
5%
State~.ent on U.S.
Indochina (10%)
4~
Bombing of DRV
OAU Summit Conference, (L%)
4%
[PRG 3d Anniversary
(19%)
3%
Rabat
Ui4 i;nvironment Conference,
(6%)
12%
Tito in USSR (10%)
3 o
Stc,ckholn~
90th Birth Anniversary (--)
3%
OAU Sumr~iit Conference,
(--)
10%
of Bulgaria's
Dimitroc
Rt~oat
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
l~'igurea in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given maJor Pctention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Tre:~ds. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda c~~ntent may be routine or of minor significance.
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CCNFIDCNTIAL FI31S TRENDS
21 JUNE 1972
I (VDOCW I I'dA
Soviet President Podgorayy's 15-1~i_.June."unofficial frig:ndly" visit
to Hanoi~.reflected.l~ereisting.Soviet.-DRV.strains while apparently
falling short of .meeting. Hanoi's need for reassurance following the
Moscow summa t. tlavin~~ remaincd.._s.ilent on the visit ~~nti1 after it
was over,.Moscow ~nd.Hsnoi.on.the..-19.th.released..an,announcement
discl.oeing-that-"friendly" talks took .p1F~.ce in an atmosphere of
"frankness, friendship, and.comradeship'.'?--a formulation highlight?ng.
the divergence. of. interests .and..contr.~:ating with the.:'unanimit}~"
registered.in the point communique on P.oclgornyy's.highly publicized
visit to Flanoi.last.October.. The Soviets promised continuing
support for the .war .effort in rou.*~.ne terms and ~~tned with their.
hosts in calling.for a resumption of. "constructive talks in Paris.
Le Duan, Tru.yng Chinh,. and .other URV leaders participated in the
talks, with >;re-nier Pham Van Dong notably absent.
On the day of Podgornyy!s dPparture.fbom Hanoi,..Le_Duc.Tho arrived
home from the Dimitrov celebration.. in.Bulgaria.v.ta..M~~.acow.and ..
Peking. Tho was greeted..only by ..low-level.Soviet.officials
during his.Moacow stopover., but in.Peking.he met with Chou
En-1xi and was feted.by.Politburo member.Chang_Chun-chiao._ Tho
left Peking the day before Dr. Kissinger's arrival there.
Hanoi used the occasion of .the Dimitrov commemoration to.underscore.
the importance. of.international. comm~io.ist._unity..and_to__press its
polemic. against...the..Nixoa..Adminiatraci.on'.s .summitry... _Speakiug_..
at the.So#ia conference on the.l3th,.Le Duc_Thu..implicitly took.
issue with. Moscow .by ..insisting that .peaceful ..coexis.tence .should .
not obstruct .communist.unity in-the_face of.U.S. "schemes." In
an editorial marking the anniversary on the.l8th and coinciding.
with Podgornyy's.departure, the.DRV_.srmy paper-sharply expressed
Hanoi's-disqulet_by portraying_the.President's.travels.as.aimed.
at using.."the..venom of.bourgeois nat:[onalism to divtde the
revolutionary forces."
PODGORNW VISIT TO HANOI REFLECTS SOVIET-DRV STRAINS
Pndgorayy's 15-18 June "unoff -vial friendly.'.' visit..to Hanna .reflected .
persisting Soviet-DRV strains while-.occasioning..routine.reaffirma-
tions of Soviet support for the w.:r effort and a call for the Paris
talks to resume. The visit .was not acknowledged by .Moscow and Hanoi
until after Podgornyy's departure, when both sides released an
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
71 JUNE 1972
announcement on the .l9th saying "friendly" talks had covered
bilateral rel,ati.ona and the situation in Vi.~:tnam in connection
with "the intensified U.S. aggressive actions." CPuU Secretary
Katushev's "unofficial" visit in.late Apr'.1, in the wake of
Kieainge:'s visit to Moscow to prepare for President Nixon's
visit, was given similar treatment. In ccntrast, Podgorttyy's
official ~.i.sit to Hanoi .last .October had been highly publicized
and produ~:ed a ~nint communique as well as the signing of aid
agreements.
Po~lgornyy was accompanied this .time by Katuahev and Deputy Foreign
Minister Fi.ryubin, who ac.ompani.ed Katushev in April. Talks were
rield with Le Duan, .Tr.uong Chinh,.Foreign Minister Trinh, Pais
negotiator Xuan Thuy, and others, with .Premier Phaa~ Van Doug.
notably abset-t. No military or aid officials were said to have
taken part in the talks.
If the purpose was to brief the North Vietnamese on the Soviet-
U.S. su mnit and--as auggested.by Xuan Thuy's presence and Le Duc
Tho's imminent retuxn--to sound. .them .out on the prospects for a
Vietnam settlement,. .the visit.aeems to have .underlined the two
allies' divergent.interesta and concerns. According. to the
announcement, the tali;.s.took place in an atmosphere of "Lrsnkness,
friendship, and .comradeship," a formulation serving to highl~g:~t
the airing of issues marked by. .discord. Tiie point cc~uaunique ort
Podgornyy's visir last .October had also referred .to "frankness,"
but a markedly different emphasis .at .that time was registered in
the formulation .that the exchange .took place in an atmosphere of
"fraternal friendship, cordiality,_and comradely. frankness."*
Moreover, that communique.regiatered "unanimity on all the
questions discussed,." a claim misair~g from the current announcement.
Katuahev's talks in April were characterised as having .taken place
* In each case the Russian word for "frankness" was "otkr~vennost,"
although the TASS internationEl.service translated it variously as
"frankness" and."openness" in October and .as "sincerity" and
"frankness" this time. Hanoi.uaed.a different .term in October than
i~Z the current statement.. In .the .October .communique, ..the Vietnamese
term was "coi mo," which.connotea.a.relaxed.openness and which VNA
had rendered in English as .'!open-he$rtedness." .The .Vietnamese term
in the current .statement .was .'!thang than,'! .which .carries the
connatation.of "straightforwardness"; VNA's English version used
"frank."
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CJNFIDENTIAL FBIS T;CNDS
21 .TUN}: 19'12
in an atmoapt:ere of "cordiality, fraternal friendship, and mutual
understan~Iing," a.formulat~.on conveying greater harmony than that
marking Podgornyy'8 visit after the Moscow summit.*
According to the anc-ouncement on Pod$ornyy's visit, the Soviet
side routinely pledged .that "true to the principles of proletariAn
internatiunalism" it will .continue to provide the Vietnamese "all
the necessary assistance .and .support." There was no expression of
Vietnamese gratitude for .Soviet aid. Both aides. expressed
"satisfaction" that the.communiat.forces-in South Vietnam are
dealing "serious blows".at the Saigon troops and the Americana
but Soviet reserve may be reflected i.n.the absence of any more
specific ~rpntion of the .communist offensive. .Divergence between
the two aides on .the sensitive matter of the i1.S. mining was
evidenced in i pa~.sage decrying the interdiction measures.
According to the Soviet version, the .two aides .demanded that
the United States "immediately.snd uncondit.iorally stop bombing,
shelling, and mining-of DRV.ports," while the DRV.versiun
aided a reference to the.."blockade".of the ports. "a'he Soviets
thus went a step beyond .their demand in last month's Soviet-U.S.
communique---for an end to the bombing but with no mention of
the mining -while stopping .short of IIanoi'c stronger
characterization of a blockade.
The two sides also .demanded .that the United .States .end the
Vietnamization~program.and."resume .constructive talks"-in .Paris ..
The communist peace proposals, specifically the PRG's seven
points and "elaboration," were cited-as "a const:u.ctive.
foundation for an.aarly solution." of.tre Vietnam question,
but no particular iasues_or..demands-were raised...(Moscow has
not reported Podgorny~y's remarks in .Calcutta-on.the 18th on
his way home. According to noncommunist media, :~e.said that
the Paris talks "would be resumed .soon".and that t;te USSR "would
do everything-possible .for the .de-escalation..of the Vietnam
conflict." IIe said he was .'berg satisfied" with .the ..talks in
Hanoi and that "everything went as we desired.")
~' The role of Soviet-U.S.. relations in .complicating Moscow's
relations with Hanoi ..had .also been is evidence last February in
the wake of the release of the U.S. and Vietnamese comc~~nist
negotiating.posit.iona.. T.ASS reported a "Frank" talk between
Premier Kosygin and the DRV amba.seador.on.11 February.some t?~ao
hours before disseminating a belated .Soviet Government statE:ment
that carefully balanced Moscow's relations with Hanoi and Washington.
CONFIDENI'ZAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JUNE 1972
SOVIET COI~M~ENT Hanoi has .not .commeated..directly on the
Podgornyy visit beyoad the announceoent
itself, but Moscow has followed up.wlth routine radio commen-
taries stressing Soviet pledges of continued aeeiatance to the
Vietnamese and support for a political settlement of the war.
Comment has stressed that the Soviets.remaln loyal to the
principles of proletarian intsrnattonaliem, and a commentary
in Mandarin ove~.Radio.Peace..and.Progreaa on.the.20th recalled
that the USSB.haa given-the DaV vilitaryr aid including misaiies
and beta as well.as..training by Soviet military instructors Rt
"combat positions."
A foreign-language commentary .widely broadcast by-.Radio Moscow
on the 20th elaborated at .some .length on ..the.call..for a resumr~tion
o.f the Paris talks coatained.ia the .:nnouncewent on she Podgoxnyy
visit. After clting.7Cuan Thuy as having recently st:eased the
need for a negotiated.aettJ.ement and aa.having..expresaed.rsadinesa
to pursue.this approach, the.commantary explained "the moat
important .points" of _the..PRG peace plan. The first point of the
plan, the commentary aaid~ provides fora returr..of.POW's if the
United Statea.aeta a final date-for.the.withdrawat.of its troops.
According. to the.como~ntary, the cease-fire that then could take
place would create the basis for a political aettlemenr.~ provided
that the South Vietnamese.could exercise self-determination without
outside preesure...Ia this connection the commentary. described the
Saigcn regime aa.a.-tool. of .such pressure and cited the PRG's demand
fir the removal of Thieu.
A 19 June Moscow commentary .broadcaat.to..Chiues.e audiences most
directly related.the Podgornyy visit to.the ongoing Soviet campaign
to defend the detente_p~liay against.hardline-critics. After
stressing that .the ..visit ahowed..Moacow'-a "Lenia:et interne*.ionalist
foreign policy" to be "firm and unahakab].e," the.commeatary invoked
an Implicitly anti-Peking charge that bas figured in tt~e Soviet
campaign.when it claimed that Moscow'-a stand bad undercut "the
epportuaiat.political actiona..of others. including such slanders
as the one .alleging. that the Soviet..Uaion..is.colluding with
imperialiats.to divide up apheres.o#.influence.:' idithout directly
mentioning the Moscow summit, the.commeatary concluded by observing
that the Soviet Union .haa .held _negotiationa..with..capitalist
countries and hae.beea "consistently faithful to its interna-
tionalist duty."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
ll JUNE 197;0
The Vietnam .question was .apacifically..citad. in .a .mayor PRAVDA
article .hy .Yu..Cher-tov on l5 .June .defending .th.e Moscow summit
against .those who ".like .to .deri~ce._henefit from artificially
fomenting hostility ..and.tensioa.':. The .article .claimed that. the
Soviet stand oa.Vietnam registered..in.the.summit communique is
"devoid of any.ambiguity or.miaundex:atandinga,.thus making
groundless any speculation.about.".a 'conapixacy' or a 'division
of spheres of influence.'.". An earlier PRAVDA article, by
Inozemtsev on 9 June, .had dsnounced..Bpeculation about.a
coneni~:acy between .the auperpower~s to ..the detriment.of "some
third ~:ountries" but had not explicitly mentioned Vietnam in
this context.*
HUNGARIAN ARTICLE In keeping ..with.Budapest!s.role.as a
leading..proxy-spokesman.on..contLOVersial
issues, an article in .the .Hun.garian..party_.da.ily__NEPSZABADSAG...by.
Varnai an 17 June -was ..notably .more..outapoken..than..Scviet
commentators .have..been iii seeking -to reconcile..the summit and
Moscow's .Loyalty to _an .al.:.y.** ..Gibers-.Mnacow .has..limited..itaelf
to implicit polemical _thrust_s .at..the...Chiaese, Varnai made ..the .
f irsC direct .charge _monitored_in __Soviet . bloc..media.. Ghat "the
Chinese re,j ected .point .action _ia .helping _.Vietnam. even after . the
announcement .of .the .U..S. blockade.10 .He .also .charged. that. after
the summit_Peking_revived its line on collusion between the
superpowers. ...
* The Chernov article .is discusaed.further in tr.s U.S.-Soviet
Summit section of phis TRENDS. .The Inozemtsev article was
diACUSSed in the TRENDS of 14 June,. page.il.
** During periods of relative restr.aiat in.Sino-Soviet polemics,
Varnai has aired sensitive.isaues that Moscow has muted_or side-
stepped when speaking in its-own name.._Lroaically,. it was Varnai
who previously had sought. to score.points at the expense of Sino-
U.S. detente by invoking._the.interasts.of the international
communist movement. In a 7 November 1971 articLe,..Varnai said
that "a flirtation between Peking and-.'~Iashingtoa would rightly
elicit the misgivinga_and_disapproval..of .~he..Indochines.e, the
DPRK, and many other .Asian .countries--couatriea..in direct .conflict
with U.S..imperialism,..whose-vitP.l interests are attart,ed to the
unity of the anti-imperialist.forcea.."
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CONFID!:NT~.AI. F1iIS 'GRENDS
21 JUNE 19~~1
Varnai's article, entitled "Pea.ceful Coexistence a,id the Class
Struggle," clearly posed the issue underlying Moscow's defensive
res~onae to critics:
Some people fail Co understand how onA could sit dawn at
the negotiating table rind come to an agreement with the
same U.S. imperialists who are committing a barbarous
aggression against one of the socialist countries--the
DRV. They feel that this procedure is in contradiction
to the policy of solidarity with the Vietnamese people.
Clewing to the stock Soviet line, Varnai insisted that the policy
of coexistence is not at variance with anti-imperialist struggle,
"for both lines constitute an integral part of. the homogeneous
class struggle." Shifting to pragmatic grounds, he .argued Chat
the summit was ~u~stified by the "mayor" agreements reached, that
Hauoi's national interests were not adversely affected, and that
the Chinese are to blame for the lack of a united response to
the miring of DRV ports. Noting that the war was going on before
the Summit and when there was no missile agreement, Varnai added
that "following the talks--unfortunately--the war continues, bur
there is now an agreement on limiting missiles, and several other
important agreements Nava >;aen concluded also."
Emphasizing that Hanoi will prevail in its struggle "with Che
military and economic aid of the socialist countries, and
primarily of the Soviet Unicn," Varnai observed thaC "the
m~3rderous and destructive bombing" is calculated "to give the
impression that it compels the enemy to come to an agreement."
In this context he outlined the following scenario for the
outcome of the war:
The United States cannot change the situation through its
military operations. There is no other way: il? will have
to end the bombings and the blockade policy, withdraw all
its troops from South Vietnam, and acknowledge thaC this
country will be independent and neutral and will be
administered, without any outside interference, by a
government of national concord.
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CONFLDrsP~'.CIAL rDZS TRENDS
21 JUNE 1972
I.E DIJC THO RETURNS Td HAI:~I `/IA MOSCOW AND REKING
Ise Duc Tho arrived in Hanoi on the 18th via Moscow and PekinlS
after attending the Dimitrov anniversary celebrations in Bvl~;aria.
rlis attendance at the '3ulgarian celebrations had been annuur.ced
bEforehand but not the continuation of hie trip. His depar.'cure
from Peking on the 18th preceded.Kissiilger's arrival by ~~ne day,
and he returned to Hanoi on the day of Pcdgornyy's departure.
Hanoi acknowledged Tho's ,stopovers in Moscow and Z?eking in a
VNA dispatch on the lEth reporting hid arrival home that day.
VNA noted that he was welcomed and seen off in Moscow by two
deputy chiefs of a CPSU department and a deputy foreign minister,
and that in Peking he saw Chou En~1ai and was honored at a
banquet given by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao. A VNA
service message from Moscow to Hanoi on the 17th said that the
Chinese ambassador was present when Tho departed :rom Moscow
on the 16th, but this was not noted in an;r of the reports
released publicly.
MOSCOW Tho's 15-16 June stopover in Moscow was reported in
PRAVDA on the 17th. Like the 18 June VNA dispatch,
the Moscow report noted that he was .welcomed and seen off at
the airport by Rakhmanin and Chukanov, deputy chiefs of the
Central Committee's department for relations with communist
countries, and Deputy. Foreign "' aster Smirn~v. There is no
indication that he saw any higher-level Soviet officials.
Tho has received varying treatment on his .stopovers in Moscow.
When he arrived in Moscow on 28 April en route to Paris he was
met by Rakhmanin and Deputy Foreign Minister Kosyrev, and he
was seen off two days later by Katushev, who had dust returned
from Hanoi. As in the June stopover,. there was no report that
he had talks with Soviet .leaders in April, but in each casa
his Moscow stopover coincided with Soviet-llRV talks t,~king
place iri Hanoi. When Tho stopped .in..Moscow .last. July en route
home from Paris he had."warm and cordial" Calks with Politburo
member Kiri.lenko, and in June 1971 en route to Paris .he met
with Kirilenko and Katushev. There were no reports that he
met any Soviet leaders during a.stopover in Ja[~ciary 1970.
During earJ.ier trips he met with Kosygia aid once with Mazurov.
PEKING Although Tho received higher-level attentio~.i in Peking
than .in Moscow, his stopover in Peking this time
occasioned more restrained expressions .of Sino-Vietnamese
solidarity than in .the .recent past. To some degree this may
be attributable to the overshadowing ceremonies attending
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
21 JUNE X972
Prince Sihanouk's departure .far a .trip .abroPd, .but it .may ..also
be due to strains between .Hanoi and Peking .involving the
V+_ptnam war and relations with the United States. Hanoi may
have ha3 the Kisainger.vieit to P.ekiag in-.mind when it
observed--in a 21 June QUAN DOI NHAN.DAN commentary citing
the activities of Adminiatrs,t~.on representatives--that
"Nixon and Kissinger.personally have also engaged in
diplomatic activities."
During Tho's stopover .this time .the .Chineae..muted..rheir
expressions of support for.the war effort.and criticism of
the United States. In the onLy.reference to .the war, Chang
Chun-chiao and Tho were_reported by NCNA.to have toasted
"the great victories': of .the Vietnamese at the banquet on
the 17th. .They also .toasted "the constant.consolidation and
growth of .the revolutionary friendship and .militant unit~-"
of the two countries, but .there .was .no .reference to PRC
backing of the .Vietnamese.. Dur.inR Tho's i7-29 April stopover,
Chou En-lai, who hosted a banquet for Tho then. but .was giving
one for Sihanouk. this time, .pledged.Chineae.support."no matter.
in what form the..war.-is-carried-out".while denouncing U.S.
"war escalation:' and ..charging that Washington. had. long .violated
the Geneva ,agreements . In the only .reported- contact between
Chou and Tho during this month's atopover,..the premier paid _a.
courtesy call at the ;nest house on the 18th for."a very cordial
conversatior.~' (according to NCNA; the VNA report called it "a
cordial conversation").
Attenbing both the banquet and.the.Chou-Tho..meeting..was DRV._
Vice Foreign Trade Minis ter_.Ly.Ban, whose..extended stay.to
discuss Chinese supplementary aid dates back to his arrival in
Peking on 3 May.
FIAlVOI URGES COM"UNIST UNITY. ASSAILS DIVISIVE U:S~ SCHEMES
Hanoi's concern about ..the development of .Soviet and Chinese
relations with the United States was registered .in NorCil
Vietnamese ccmment on the 90th .anniversary of the. bit :b..of..
the Bulgarian communist .and .Comintern leader...Georgi L.~~aitrav...
'1 he anni~~ersary comment .uniformly.underacored the. importance
of a unifi`d communist .movement, _and -an.-18..June. QUAN DOI .NHAN
DAN editorial contained .a..sharp.warning..about _U