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June 28, 1972
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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00800 t~360050026-2 Confidential T FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE Illllllui~u~~~~u~mllllllll H ENDS in Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential 28 JUNE 1972 (VOL. XXIII, NO. 26) Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL This propaganda analysis report es based ex- clusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FHIS without coordination with other U.B. Covernreent components. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro- hibited by law. [eeluded I,.. euemalk down ,edin0 and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 CONTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i U.S. 25, 26 June Strikes Prompt DRV Foreign Ministry Protest . . 1 DRV Stresses Importance or Transportation, Use of "New Forces" . 6 Brezhnev Pledges Continued Aid to Vietnam, Assails "Blockade" . . 7 Peking Signs New Supplementary Aid Agreement with DRV . . . . . . 11 Hanoi Issues Instructions for Armed Forces Party Committees . . . 15 KOREA Korean War Anniversary Receives Muted Treatment . . . . . . . . . 17 U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS Moscow Again Ueiends Summit, Affirms Ideological Purity . . . . 21 DIMITROV ANNIVERSARY International Meeting in Sofia Stresses Soviet Leading Role . . 26 POLAND-YUGOSLAVIA Cordial Communique Cape Tito's Five-Day Visit to Warsaw . . . . 30 MIDDLE EAST Brezhnev Asks Israeli With4rawal; USSR Scores Raids on Lebanon. 33 CUBA-PERU Cuba Welcomes Peruvian Move to Restore Relations . . . . . . . 35 USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS Goaplan Official Urges Reorganization of Agricultural Organs . 33 PRAVDA Article Justifies Unequal Investments in Republics . . . 41 PRC AND ENVIRONMENT Peking ;Elaboro tea Views on Environment at UN Conference . . . . 43 CHINA RED FLAG Strei'ees.Attention to Agriculture, Light Industry . ? 46 Approved For Release 2000/&WfE RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 NTIn Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE 0' !T,Y FBIS TRENDs 28 JUNE 1972 - i - TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 JUNE Moscow (2694 items) Peking 1254 items) Indochina (4%) 9% Domestic Issues (49%) 37% (Podgorn,y in DRV (--) 5%] Indochina (14%) 30% 31st Anniversary of Nazi invasion of (--) 6% (Sihanouk in Romania, Albania (0.3') 23X] USSR Rwanda Government (--) 4% Nixon USSR Visit (5X) 5% Delegation in PRC Israeli Attacks on Lebanon (--) 3% Sri Lanka Prime Minister in PRC (--) 3% China (2%) 2% These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The to-m "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press art icle or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items ox extens: ie reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor aigniScan, e. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FB IS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 INDOCHINA In addition to the continuing daily protests over U.S. air strikes from the spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry, a more authoritative foreign ministry statement on 26 June--the second such high-level protest this month--assailed strikes at Hanoi and Haiphong. The statement and a flurry of press comment singled out alleged strikes at the dike system and irrigation works for special condemnation. At the same time, Hanoi's continuing concern with transportation problems was reflected in an article on the 26th which discussed problems in connection with the incorporation of "now forces" into the regular transportation and communications branch. . Moscow has continued to press the line that its detente policy is not inconsistent with its support .'or Vietnam. And Brezhnev, speaking at a 27 June banquet for Castro, was unusually forceful in promising support to the Vietnamese until "victory" and in condemning the U.S. "blockade" of DRV ports--an issue which had been avoided in the Soviet-U.S. joint communique on the President's visit. Soviet propaganctlsts have continued to assail the United States for refusing to return to the Paris talks, insisting that peace can be achieved only at the conference table. The PRC and the DRV on 28 June signed another supplementary aid agreement, providing for the supply of "ordinary materlals" and a grant of "military equipment and material" to the Vietnamese. There are indications, however, that `Le Chinese offered the aid less enthusiastically than on a comparable occasion at the time of the Lam Son 719 operation last year. Also on the 28th, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article reaffirmed Chinese support for the war effort in seconding a series of foreign minis~ry statements by its Vietnamese allies. U,S, 25, 26 JUNE STRIKES PROMPT DRV 70REIGN MINISTRY PROTEST Following the 10 June DRV Foreign Ministry protest over U.S. air striker, Hanoi had reverted to the daily lower-level protests by the ministry spokesuan. But on 26 June another foreign ministry statement protested action against Hanoi on that day and against Haiphong, among other targets, on the 25th. The statement again underlined Hanoi's determ!.nation to continue the struggle, hat it differed from other high-level statements since the early-April escalation of the air war in its failure to mention support and Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 assistance from the socialist countries. Where the earlier protests had expressed gratitude and appealed to the socialist and other countries to continue efforts to stay the hand of the U.S. "aggressors,"* the current statement said: "Despite the strong protest of the public opinion in the world and the United Sc,,tes, the Nixon Administration obdurately continues its frenzied and adventurous war escalation against the DRV. This is an extremely gross encroachment upon the sovereignty and security of the DRV and an insolent challenge to the whole of progressive mankind." By contrast, the foreign ministry protest of 10 June had expressed "sincere and deep gratitude" for the socialist countries' condemnation of the U.S. escalation and appealed to "brother;. and friends" to etr:'ggle evon more vigorously to stay the U.S. hand and continue to support and assist the Vietnamese. It is unclear whether the foreign ministry statement's failure to mention socialist support and assistance was calculated to suggest dissatisfaction with Moscow's and Peking's current stands. Despite the absence of any reference `o the socialist countries in the statement, condemnations of air sl:rikec by. Soviet and Chinese spokesmen continue to be cited in other current DRV1 comment. A PRG Foreign Ministry statement of 24 June protesting the air strikes in both North and South Vietnam echoed earlier high-level DRV statements in expressing thanks for support "from brothers and friends" and in asserting 'confidence that the peoples and governmet-ts of various countries "will take active and timely measures to stay the bloody hands of the Nixon Administration." DOWNING OF PLANES Propaganda fanfare celebrating the claimed downing of the 3,700th U.S. aircraft on 27 June underscored Hanoi's determination to "direct staggering counterblows at the U.S.'air pirates and properly punish them for all their criminal war escalation steps." Hanoi radio claimed on the 27th that a total of 10 U.S. jets, "including the 3,700th U.S. aircraft downed over the North," had fallen victim to DRV antiaircraft'and air force units that day, and it put the total of U.S. planes downed at 3,704. Identifying a captured pilot for the first time since the April escalation, VNA reported on 20 June that a plane piloted by Richard Logan Francis "was among the five U.S. aircraft shot down by the Hanoi aimed forces yesterday." The VNA account said Francis' wounds were bandaged before his captors took him to prison. For backgr'und see the TRENDS of 14 June 1972, pages 3-4. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 On 26 June the VPA High Command sent commendations to the Hanoi people and armed forces and the Vietnam people's air forces "for their brilliant feat of shooting down 10 U.S. jet planes within a few hours yesterday."* Exhorting the armed forces in Hanoi and the people's air force to "steel their determination to fight and win," the commendation noted that the 39700th plane was downed during the action and that "a number" of U.S. pilots had been "wiped out or captured." A NHAN DAN editorial on the 28th portrayed the downing of the 3,700th u.S. aircraft as having "the force of a triumphal song praising the glorious journey North Vietnam has made in the past eight years, bath:Lng in fire but fighting unflinchingly and gaining strength all the time." CHARGES OF STRIKES The foreign ministry statement on the 26th AT DIKE SYSTEM highlighted alleged U.S. bombing of dikes, claiming that "violent strikes on the dike system and irrigation works" expose "the utterly brutal aggressive nature of the U.S. imperialists and the fallacy of their propaganda about peace and goodwill." The statement said that dike segments were among the many areas bombed in Hanoi, Haiphong, Viet Tri, and "many other populous areas." A statement issued by the DRV Watar Conservancy Ministry on 16 June had scored alleged strikes at the dike system from 10 April to 10 .June,** and propaganda has since been giving the issue increasing Tattention. .1 23 June NHAN DAN editorial, for example, attacked "the Nixou clique" for "moving further :-long the criminal path" and sending "aircraft and vessels to bomb and shell many important dikes on large river networks and many water conservancy projects." It asserted that "the Nixon clique" hopes to break the dikes and thereby cause floods and droughts. A NHL,-,' DAN article on the same day claimed that recent U.S. attacks on coastal dikes and dike sections neat the river mouths were timed just "before the flash flood season with the aim of weakening the bodies and bases of the dikes so that when the water level rises the dikes can easily be damaged." * The VPA High Command has sent several messages of commendation since the escalatirn of the air war in early April. For example, on 11 May the armed forces and people of Hanoi and Haiphong were commended for downing numerous plane3. ** See the TRENDS of 21 June 1972, pages 12-14. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 A NHAN DAN article on the 26th also warned of futu,'e flooding when it charged that President Nixon "has ordered" air and naval attacks on many dikes and sluices along the major rivers-- the Red, Thai, Binh, Day, Ma, and tam--as well as the Nam Dinh canal and many sea dikes in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, and Ninh Binh provinces. The paper charged that the strikes at this time of year had considerably weakened the dikes and "destroyed the structure of the soil in the embankments." Observing that the recent attacks have not caused immediate floods, the article said that breaks in the dikes would be "unavoidable" if bombing were stepped up during the flood season. An editorial in the party paper on the same day urged that careful. preparations be made to cope with floods when they occur, saying that each family is expected to be prepared to move provisions and domestic animals "to high and dry places" during the forthcoming rainy season. The 28 June NHAN DAN editorial laudi'g the claimed downing of the 3,700th plane the day before charged the President with genocide, claiming that he "is launching attacks in a most provocative manner on dike systems with the intent to carry out mass murders through floods and famine." A 27 June LPA commentary denouncing U.S. bombing in North and South Vietnam focused on recent strikes at portions of dikes and irrigation works along the Ma river and cited an article published in THE GUARDIAN on 22 June for the claim that the United Stbtes has resorted to ",.rti#icial rains" as a means of causing "widespread floods." FOREIGN MINISTRY In addition to the 26 Jude foreign ministry SPOKESMAN PROTESTS statement, daily foreign ministry spokesman protests ir. the past week have included the following specific charges : + The 21 June statement alleged that on the previous day "U.S. aircraft indiscriminately poured bombs and shells on many urban wards, schools, hospitals, and factcries" within Nam Dinh municipality. It also charged that on the same day B-52's hit "many populous areas" in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Nat, Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe Pn, Ha Ti:', .and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. + The statement on 22 June charged that "in addition to continuing the dropping of mines to seal off various; ports of the DRV," U.S. aircraft had bombed and shelled the outskirts of Haiphong city and several other populated areas in Bac Thai., Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thc.i Binh, Nun Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, and Ha Tinh provinces. The statement also claima4 that B-;,2's had struck a number of villages and hamlets in Quang, Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area. CONFIDENTI :.L Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CON^IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 + "Sternly" protesting the "killing and woundit.g of many civilians," the statement on the 23d claimed "continued barbarous strikes" withir. Lang Son, Ha Bac, Ha Tay, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh as well as at several villages "on the outskirts of Hanoi." + Air strikes on 23 June were condemned in the statement on the 24th, which charged that rockets fell "in the center of Hanoi and on its outskirts," destroying the Nam Dan dam and a portion of the sea dike in Nhan Ly hamlet. Ridiculing U.S. denials that "it is not U.S. policy to bomb dikes," the statement asserted that "U.S. imperialism cannot cover up the obvious fact that for more than two months, U.S. aircraft and warships have relentlessly struck at DRV dikes and hydraulic works and even at the people who have been engaging in repairing the damaged sections." The protest also claimed that many populous areas in Yen Bai, Lang Son, Quang Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces had been hit. Additional details concerning the effects of the.-rockets directed at Hanoi on the 23d were provided in an article broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 24th. Citing several examples of civilian deaths caused by the raids, the broadcast claimed tnat the attacks had served culy to spur the Hanoi populace to "exert greater efforts to Ft 3p up production and to satisfactorily carry out antiaircraft and ewscuation tasks." + The 25 June statement condemned air strikes at populous areas in Vinh Phu, Bac Thai, Hoa Binh, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. Echoing the statement of the 24th, the protest specifically denounced the Nixon Administration for "continuously attacking the DRV's dikes and water conservancy projects." + Strikes against Hanoi on 26 and 27 June, as well as continuing bombing shelling of "many municipalities, townships, and villages in other provinces," drew a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on the 27th protesting the "mad bombing and shelling" of the capital which "killed and wounded many innocent people and destroyed a large number of people's houses." Unlike the other foreign ministry spokesman's statements issued during the past week, the protest of the 27th invoked a lesson learned from "our beloved President Ho Chi Minh," t,;kio "taught us that nothing is Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 more precious than freedom and it:dependence," to buttress its claim that the Vietnamese people "ire determined to, smash to pieces all the U.S. mad steps o` war escalation to protect their fatherland." In further contrast with the previous protests issued during the past week, the statement of the 27th called upon the United States to "enter into serious negotiations at the Paris conference on Vietnam and positively respond to the seven-point solutian of the PRGRSV, the two key problems of which were recently further clarified." DRV STRESSES IMPORTMICE OF TRANSPORTATION. USE OF "NEW FORCES" Hanoi's continuing concern with transportation problems was und.r scored in a 26 June broadcast of an article by Communications and Transportation Minister Phan Trong Tue pegged to awards recently given to outstanding units and individuals in communications and transportation work.* The article echoed earlier Hanoi comment when it said that the Central Committee "regards communications and transportation as the key and central task of all the party, people, and armed forces" and that the maintenance of communications and transportation is "one of the decisive conditions" in obtaining victory. While devoted mainly to outlining actions to be taken in the present situ'tion, the article also reflected current problems. In observing that the communications and transportation combatants have met "innumerable difficulties and hardships," it said, for example, that "if food supplies are not brought in time the combatants eat jungle plants so that they have sufficient energy to continue working." Urging transportation forces to preserve their cargoee; and vehicles, the article also noted the importance of being careful with fuel--"considering gas as one's blood." The strain of transportation tasks on manpower resources was pointed up by the article's injunction to conserve manpower and its acknowledgment that transportation work requires mobilization of a "great number" of the masses and "the organization of people along communications lines" to carry out such tasks as road repair, the camouflage of supplies, and loading and unloading. Problems in organizing the mast:, involvement in transportation tasks seemed reflected in instructions the article offered for dealing with "new forces" now supplementing the regular transportation forces. "Cadres, workers, and assault youths in the communications and transportation branch" were told to "provide utmost assistance for * Earlier propaganda on the awards is discussed in the 21 June TRENDS, pages 17-18. Approved For Release 2000/VgTdWENEik=RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 and closely cooperate with these new forces." The article called for the "rapid readjustment and arrangement of the forces in the branch and the new supplementary forces," and it seemed to indicate the formula for such reorganization when it noted a need to set up "many assault teams" to carry out such tasks as the repair of roads and bridges and air defense. BRED1NEV PLEDGES CONTINUED AID TO VIETNAM, ASSAILS "BLOCKADE" In the wake of the Soviet-U.S. summit, Moscow has continued to stress the constancy of its assistance and support for the Vietnamese and to score the Chinese "splittist" stand on Indochina. Brezhnev's 27 June remarks or. Vietnam, at a banquet for the visiting Castro, were more forceful than most recent Moscow comment. Brezhnev's assertion that Soviet "support and all-round aid to the Vietnamese people will continue until the victory of its just cause" goes beyond his 5 June speech during Tito's visit as well as the 19 June Soviet-DRV announcement on Podgorny3y's visit to Hanoi. Brezhnev had pledged cn 5 June that Soviet support and assistance is "immutable," and the statement on the Podgornyy visit merely promised "necessary assistance and su,pport." Brezhnev's criticism of U.S. actions in the DRV was also stronger than that in recent authoritative Soviet comment, Thus, he said "we resolutely condemn the measures undertaken lately by the United States to blockade DRV ports and to intensify bombings of economic objectives, Transport routes, and populated localities." In the Joint communique on President Nixon's visit, Moscow had demanded an end to the bombing but had notably failed to mention the mining. The Soviet version of the announcement on the Podgornyy visit reported that the two sides demanded an end to the mining, while the Hanoi version additionally imputed to the two sides a description of the mining as a "blockade." In his speech on the 27th, Brezhnev also routinely called for a withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops and repeated the view that "a basis for constructive talks and for attaining a political settlement" is provided by the DRV and PRG proposals and the proposals of the FUNK and the NLHS. Moscow's defense of its Vietnam stand included a 21 June domestic service commentary which said the passage on Vietnam in the joint communique ;n President Nixon's visit was couched "in the clearest possible terms and gives absolutely no justification for any speculation regarding the position of the Soviet Union." A Radio CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREIJDS 28 JUNE 1972 Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin on the 24th said that the PRG's message responding to Soviet congratulations on the 6 June anniversary of the PRG's establishment again proved the USSR's "genuine internationalist policy" when it expressed gratitude for "very valuable" support and "huge and effecs.ive" aid. The broadcast went on to score Peking's failure to join in united action and its attempts "to sow discord between the Vietnamese and Soviet peoples" with talk of "two superpowers." The commentary also charged Peking with obstructing the transport of Soviet aid to Vietnam but left it unclear whether the reference wao to current or past obstruction. Moscow has not specifically complained of Chinese aid obstruction since the mining, but a 17 June article by Varnai in the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG alluded to the Chinese refusal to allow Soviet ships to use Chinese ports when it charged that China "rejected joint action in helping Vietnam even after the announcement of the U.S. blockade."* A 25 June !ASS report of Kissinger's press conference upon his return from Peking noted that he acknowledged that Vietnam had been discussed in detail. TASS, of course, did not acknowledge his speculation on a "policy review" that may now be going on in Hanoi, or the exchanges with reporters on Moscow's and Peking's attitudes toward a settlement and on Peking's reported refusal to let Soviet ships unload cargoes destined for Vietnam at Chinese ports. TASS noted Kissinger's remarks regarding U.S. support for direct negotiations with the DRV, but it observed that he "refused" to say when the United States would return to the Paris conference. A brief report attributed to TASS in the 26 June PRAVDA on Secretary Rogers' press conference before his departure on his foreign tour noted without comment his assertion that the United States continues to give preference to the Paris conference as a forum for settling the Vietnam conflict and is hopeful that "the other side is interested in talks." Moscow comment criticizing the U.S. refusal to resume the Paris talks has included a 21 June RED STAR article by Leontyev and Gavrilov which said that "the Vietnam question cannot be resolved by the force of weapons. It must and can be resolved only through talks on the basis of respect for the national rights and expectations of the Vietnamese people." The article praised the PRG proposal as "a sensible and constructive basis" for restoring peace in Vietnam and recalled that the 10 June DRV Foreign Ministry statement again called upon the United States to hold "serious talks" in Paris and give a "positive reply" to the PRG's seven- point proposal. ApproJMc? i 3P g ase 1 01~~T09pg i tP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 AIR STRIKES Moscow has been duly reporting Hanoi's continuing official protests over U.S. bombing, but there has been minimal Soviet comment. For example, a Serbin dispatch from Hanoi, published in PRAVDA on 16 June, cited a worker as referring to difficulties because so many of the men were in the amy or working on road construction and transport and as saying that the rice harvest will be a "frontline" harvest because of the bombing. According to VNA on the 25th, condemnation of alleged U.S. attacks on DRV dikes and other hydraulic works had been voiced by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Unions, A. P. Shitikov, when he received a visiting DRV war crimes commission delegation on the 22d. A Soviet report of the meeting, broadcast by Moscow radio on the 22d and published in IZVESTIYA on the 24th, reported only that Shitikov condemned U.S. "aggressive actions" against the DRV. VNA also cited him as promising greater economic and military assistance, but Moscow said he recalled that Podgornyy's visit reaffirmed Soviet "solidarity" with the Vietnamese people. The alleged U.S. bombing of dikes and dams was brought up in a Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 27th which cast doubt on White House Spokesman Ziegler's denial of such bombing. The broadcast pointedly recalled that General Lavelle had gone beyond his authority in bombing North Vietnamese targets. Another broadcast on the same day described U S. actions in both North and South Vietnam as genocide. EAST EUROPEAN Following the appearance of the 17 June Varnai CONWf:NTARIES article in the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG, which had sought to reconcile the Soviet-U.S. summit with Moscow's loyalty to its Vietnamese ally, other members at the Soviet bloc have chimed in with defenses of Soviet policy and attacks on Peking in terms more outspoken than Moscow itself has used. A 21 June article in the Polish Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY took issue with U.S. "Kremlinologists" who see differences between Hanoi and Moscow and who claim that the Soviet Union criticized the Vietnamese leaders, urging them to adopt a more conciliatory position toward American peace proposals. The article said the communique on Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi shows that such speculations are inaccurate. It went on to assert that the Vietnamese need help from all the socialist countries and have succeeded in the difficult task of maintaining friendly relations with both the Soviet Union and China despite the anti-Soviet overtones of Peking's policy, "with whir:h Hanoi cannot, of course, be in solidarity." Casting doubt on Peking's Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL OBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 motives, the article observed pointedly that China must be concerned with the bombings, "especially those near her borders," but still is not ready to coordinate aid with the other socialist countries. Rather, the article speculated, Vietnam would probably be a topic of discussion during Kissinger's visit to Peking.. A 21 June article in the Czechoslovak party daily RUDE PRAVO emphasized the firmness of the USSR's Vietnam stand, pointing to the Soviet Union's "powerful military, economic, and political assistance" to the Vietnamese and recalling that during President Nixon's visit the Soviet leaders "clearly and uncompromisingly repeated" the point that a U.S. withdrawal and acceptance of the Vietnamese peace proposals constituted the "only" road to a political solution. The article emphasized that Vietnam is the question on which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries "know of no compromise and cannot compromise." Also on 21 June, an article in Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG stressed the determination of the Vietnamese to hold out until final victory despite U.S. "genocide" and Washington's apparent effort to impose a "peas-- of the graveyard" in Vietnam. The article asserted that "never before have the Vietnamese people been in greater need of a consolidation of international solidarity," which is needed all the more because he Chinese refusal to cooperate with the USSR "seriousl; harms those struggling for their just cause." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 PEKING SIGNS NEW SUPPLE'M'ENTARY AID AGREEMENT WITH DRV Peking has reaffirmed its backing for the Vietnamese war effort by signing another supplementary aid agreement with the DRV and issuing a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 28 June ia support of a series of statements by its Vietnamese allies condemning U.S. military actions. NCNA announced that an agreement was signed in Peking on the 28th providing Chinese "supplementary economic and military material aid" to the Vietnamese for 1972. The agreement, which consists of a protocol on the supply of "ordinary materials" and another one on the "gracIitous supply of military equipment and material," is the product of the protracted stay of DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, who arrived in Peking on 3 May with the announced purpose of discussing aid. A protocol on supplementary military aid to Vietnam for 1972 had been signed in Peking on 22 January, and a similar supplementary protocol for 1971 was signed last July. A more comparable occasion was the "agreement" on "supplementary economic and military aid" signed in Peking on 15 February 1971 during the Lam Son 719 operation in southern Laos. However, on that occasion the NCNA announcement was prefaced by a statement of purpose saying the agreement was concluded in order "to completely defeat the U.S, aggressors and all their running dogs in Indochina." There was no such statement in the current announcement. Chou En-tai and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng attended the signing ceremony in February 1971. This time the ranking Chinese officials present were Yeh Chien-ying, who has been performing functions formerly carried out by the purged Huang, and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. There may have been a hint of Sino-Vietnamese strain in NCNA's statement that Yeh and Li had "a cordial and friendly talk" with the Vietnamese comrades. Peking's standard formulation for relations with its close allies is "very cordial and friendly"-- the formulation used to characterize Chou'? tal'. with Ly Ban three days after his arrival as well as the meetings between the DRV delegation and the Chinese in February 1971. CHINESE COMMENT The 28 June PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, pegged to foreign ministry statements issued by the PRG and the DRV on 24, 25, and 26 June, criticized the U.S. mining of DRV ports and intensified bombing as well as the redeployment of American forces from Vietnam to Thailand. Commentator declared that no matter "how desperately" the United States escalates the war, the Chinese "will, as always, resolutely support" their Vietnamese and other Indochinese allies. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIh TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 The Commentator article represented Pekiteg'a first reaffirmation of support for the Vietnamese since the 12 June PRC Foreign Ministry statement protesting air strikes near the Chinese border. Unlike the 12 June statement, however, Commentator made no reference to Chinese security interests or provocations against the PRC. Like the foreign ministry protest, Commentator avoided mentioning the Nixon Administration or raising issues concerning a political settlement in Vietnam--elements present in the PRG and DRV statements. Peking's choice on this occasion of a Commentator article-- rather thsn an official statement as ii: the cage of the protest injecting Chinese security interests--reflects its carefully calibrated expression of involvement in Vietnamese developments. The Chinese may have felt constrained to reaffirm their support for the Vietnamese after Kissinger's latest visit to Peking and in view of the successive PRG and DRV statements, particularly the one protesting air strikes on Hanoi proper.* Commentator somewhat softened the 12 June statement's assurances to the Vietnamese, making no reference to an "unshirkable inter- nationalist duty" and saying that the Chinese and Vietnamese people are "closely related like the lips and the teeth" without noting also that they are neighbors. Similarly, where the foreign ministry statement warned that the Vietnamese "are by no means alone" in their struggle, Commentator less emphatically pointed out that the Vietnamese "are not alone" in the struggle. The U.S. mining and bombing measures in Vietnam were also condemned in the customary 25 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war. There was no mention of Chinese security interests or support for the war effort in Vietnam, the editorial simply claiming that a U.S. defeat was a certainty. In a reflection of Peking's guarded assessment of the communist offensive in Vietnam, the editorial did not repeat last year's obser??,tion that the "raging flames" of Vietnamese resistance were leaping "higher and higher," forcing Washington into an "unprecedented dilessnn," and that the United States had been defeated in Vietnam on a scale not duplicated since the Korean war. More generally, the editorial reflected the change over the past year in the Sino-U.S. * There has been no regular pattern in recent weeks in Peking's response to official DRV statements. On occasion Peking has seconded these statements on the same official level, at times it has made use of an editorial or Commentator article, and at other times it has offered no supporting comment at all. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/000N jqbjN@ff 0026-2 28 JUNE 1972 relationship by significantly muting the harsh attack in the 1971 editorial on the United States as the "most ferocious enemy of the people of Asia" and as threatening "a new war of aggression in Asia." The day after the Korean war anniversary, NCNA announced the arrival in Peking of U.S. Congressional leaders Boggs and Ford. NCNA reported that they were feted at a banquet on the 26th attended by NPC Vice Chairman Kuo. Mo-jo after having a "friendly" talk with Kuo and other Chinese officials--marking the first time Peking has offered an explicitly favorable characterization of a meeting with U.S. officials. The Kissinger delegation, which had arrived in Peking one day after the stopover of DRV negotiator Le Duc Tho on his way home, had held "extensive, earnest, and frank" discussions with Chou En-lai and other officials during the previous week. The delegation was given a banquet on the 20th attended by Chou, Yeh Chien-ying, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, and PRC ambassador to Paris Huang Chen. PRC COVERAGE OF The evolving Sino-U.S. relationship has been FOF.EIGN COMMENT reflected in PRC media's selective coverage of foreign comment on Vietnamese developments. Thus, NCwA's account of the 24 June PRG statement on U.S. air strikes deleted vitriolic references to President Nixon and an attack on the Administration's 'deceitful" diplomatic efforts. Similarly, NCNA omitted an attack on the U.S. "allegations about peace and good will" contained in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 21st. Peking's cautious approach to the Vietnamese communist offensive has also been reflected in accounts of a North Korean pronouncement and a PRG-Mauritanian communique that deleted references to "brilliant victories" won in the offensive. N"NA's account of the 24 June PRG statement deleted a passage attacking the "perfidious maneuver" of the United States to "weaken the united front" of world support for the Vietnamese-- a passage suggestive of delicate issues involving outside powers and U.S. political moves. However, an NCNA report on a 22 June Albanian editorial retained a passage accusing the "Moscow social imperialists" of coping to the assistance of the United States in Vietnam in an effort to strengthen the "holy Soviet- U.S. alliance" and undermine the Indochinese struggle. NCNA also carried harsh attacks on the -United States and the Soviet Union in covering Prince Sihanouk's trip to Albania, but this was in conformity with Peking's practice of putting its Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL 78IS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 media at Sihanouk's disposal without editorir1l intervention. Speaking at a banquet in Tirana on 23 June, ;.'ihanouk described President Nixon as "more perfidious, more cruel, and more obstinate" than his predecessor and denounced the "deceitful peace maneuvers of the Machiavellian Richard Nixon." On the same occasion the Albanian president excoriated the "modern revisionists" as "sham friends" of the Indochinese people and denounced Moscow's stand on the U.S. mining as well as its failure to recognize Sihanouk's government as a policy of "anti- imperialism in words but pro-imperialism in deeds." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CCNFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 I HANOI ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS FOR ARID FORCES PARTY COMMITTEES On 20 June Hanoi radio and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN began publicizing in installments a "document" issued by the VPA General Political Department which amounts to a lengthy handbook of instructions on the functioning of party committees in the army. The five-part document spells out in meticulous detail 1) the organization and position of army party committees; 2) rules on the makeup and ta6ks of the committees, including the specific responsibilities of standing committees, party secretaries, committee members, and control committees; 3) principles of the committees' leadership and relations with other elements; 4) work methods, including rules on the convening of meetings and implementation of resolutions; and 5) basic guidelines for building the committees' leadership. The release of these instructions at this time may have been prompted, at least in part., by the need to strengthen party organization in order to deal with strains created by the new military demands and personnel losses resulting from this spring's offensive in South Vietnam. However, the detailed, basic nature of the document suggests that it is aimed at the long-range, ongoing tac'.: of guiding and strengthening the party organization in the VPA. similarly, with this apparent purpose, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 24 to 26 February had published a lengthy set of instructions for party chapters in agencies (co quan) which it said was an excerpt from a book on the subject "edited by the VPA Department of Organization under the direction of the General Political Department as a document of study and guidance in building the party in various army agencies." The March issue of the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN journal carried an article attributed to Le Tat Thang which discussed the same problem. The document currently being publicized was anticipated in another article by Thang in the April issue of the army journal which pointed out the importance of strong, well-run party committees in combat. Thang maintained that party committees play "a more important role in large-scale battles and in combat with coordination of various armed services." The author may have been alluding to the current offensive in a passage in which he declared that "in view of the requirements of the present combat task," the "strengthening of the leadership of party committees becomes more important 'nd urgent." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 The importance of the role of the party committee in the army was also noted in a 20 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, on building the army and in an editorial in the army paper on the 25th which discussed the duties of political commissars. The latter editorial argued that "the strengthening of the party's leadership in every field and under all circumstances, especially in the present violent struggle, is a decisive factor for victory." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 KOREA KOREAN W,^R ANNIVERSARY RECEIVES MUTED TREATMENT The 22d anniversar:' of the outbreak of the Korean War (25 June) and the attendant "solidarity month" have been marked in a lower key by Pyongyang as well as by Pelting and Moscow than has been customary in past years. Pyongyang's treatment of the anniversary has been bland and more notable for its omis:rions than for any new developments in issues discussed. The downplaying of the anniversary, traditionally an occasion for vituperative attacks on the alleged aggressive intent of the United States and its South Korean "puppet," is consistent with the DPRK's evolving line of moderation and flexibility in dealing with the ROK and the United States. This line was first manifested last summer and reflects the changing relationships in Asia stemming from the Siro- U.S. rapprochement.* Pyongyang rarked the anniversary with the customary rally in thn capital, a joint statement by public organizations, and editorial comment. This year's rally, however, was given somewhat less prominence than has been customary even for nondecennial anniversaries.** The ranking official present was KPA Chief of General Staff 0 Chin-u and the address was made by the trade unions chief. Normally, the nondecennial rallies have been attended by First Vice Premier Kim I1, and last year's was addressed by Second Vice Premier Pak Song-chol, a higher-level official than usual. This year's rally was reportedly attended by some 20,000 people; last year's was said to have been attended by 100,000 and previous nondecennial rallies reportedly drew 200,000. * The "preliminary" talks between the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations, begun last August to discuss the fate of families separated by the Korean War, arrived at an agenda for the "fuV.i-dress" talks on 16 June after some 20 meetings and a number of "working-level" sessions. Since the beginning of the year, Kim Il-song has elaborated on various proposals for the reduction of North-South tensions in a series of interviews with foreign newsmen, most recently in a 21 June interview with Selig Harrison of the Washington POST. ** The major 20th anniversary in 1970 was attended by Kim Il-song and special foreign delegations and was addressed by Kim I1. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/0&(QAD&Ijh RDP85TOO IV%J 50050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 Anniversary comment routinely attacked "U.S. imperialism" and "Japanese militarism" in stock terms, but otherwise few issues were raised. The unification issue was not developed beyond expressions of support for the eight-point program for peaceful unification adopted at the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly in April 1970 and for Kim I1-song's 10 January YOMIURI interview and hie 26 May interview with the New York TIMES in which he elaborated proposals for a North-South peace agreement and political contacts. Standard demands for U.S. withdrawal from South Korea and the dissolution of UNCURK were repeated, and the public organizations' joint statement added that the U1:!tdd Nations should no longer be "abused" by the United States as a tool for aggression and "must annul all the previous illegal 'resolutions' on Korea." The joint statement alluded to President Nixon's detente diplomacy to the course of calling upon the United States to withdraw its troops from the South. Recalling that in the past the United States argued that it had to retain its military bases in South Korea to prevent communist expansion, the statement said that now that the Americans "are going to have good relations with big socialist countries there will be no ground for them to keep their military bases in South Korea." Pyongyang used the occasion to call upon the ROK rulers to discard their "reliance upon outside forces" and to accept the DPRK's "fair and aboveboard proposals" on unification through North-South negotiations. The "appeal to the South Korean peoples" adopted at the rally was notable for its failure to F,ttack Pak Chong-hui or to call for the overthrow of his "clique" as was standard in previous years. Although Pak was si4bjected to scathing criticism in a low-level KCNA commentary on his own speech on the anniversary, even this commentary did not demand his ouster, merely calling upon his "clique" to "atone for its crimes" and heed the DPRK's proposals on peaceful negotiations. The theme of Asian unity and the emphasis on Sino-Korean solidarity, which dominated the proceedings last year, '7ere all but absent this year. There was no particular effurt to link Chinese and Korean security interests, and Asian unity received only a passing reference in the rally speech. The speaker called upon "all revolutionary peoples of the world" to unite and deal joint blows against U.S. imperialism, appealing for such unity "particularly" among the "revolutionary peoples of Asia." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FfIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 PEKING The effect of Sino-U. S. developments in the part year was also evident in Peking's muted treatmer-t of the anniversary. Where last year the occasion was marked by a Peking rally addressed by NPC Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo as well as the customary PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, this year the rally was omitted and the editorldl pulled its punches against U.S. Asian policy. The 1971 editorial, depicting a U.S. "policy of aggression and war in Asia," called the DPRK "an impregnable fortress standing rock-firm at the anti-U.S.- imperialist front in East Asia." This year's editorial more blandly Described the DPRK as "a powerful socialist state standing firm at the eastern outpost of the anti-imperialist struggle." It did not repeat last year's references to the Pueblo, the downing of U.S. planes, or alleged provocations against North Korea. The editorial referred to the "blood- sealed friendship and unity" of the Chinese and Koreans as "a reliable guarantee" for defeating common enemies, but it did not invoke the possibility of a new war with the United States and did not repeat last year's characteriza- tion of the two allies as being as close as "lips and teeth." The editorial demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the peaceful unification of the country, endorsing the eight-point program and the "major proposals" advanced by Kim I1-song in his press interviews on a peace agreement between North and South, political negotiations, and the establishment of a confederation. It reiterated that "U.S. troops under the signboard of the 'UN forces"' should pull out from South Korea and that UNCURK be dissolved. The editorial's passages on other subjects, such as Taiwan, "Japanese militarism," and Vietnam are largely pro forma and devoid of harsh attacks on the United States. MOSCOW Moscow gave the anniversary minimal attention this year, with routine press and radio comment and brief reports of greetings messages from Soviet public organiza- tions on the occasion of the "month of solidarity." The customary Moscow rally was addressed by a Soviet friendship society official and the DPRK Ambassador. In the usual manner, Moscow comment stressed the peaceful unification issue, expressing appr:val of the DPRK's proposals on contacts with South Korea and calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops, and emphasized the DPRK's peaceful economic development--with Soviet assistance. A RED STAR article mentioned the Soviet- DPRK treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in the usual manner on this occasion, asserting that it Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/%&~ -,WfADP85T008l,5R00~0 N00050026-2 r Is 28 JUNE 1972 aerves the cause of "peace and security in the Par East" but avoiding a depiction of U.S. aggressiveness in this connection. This year's treatment of the United States in general was even milder than usual. An IZVESTIYA article merely noted that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is "a source of tension is the Korean peninsula." A RED W:t article denounced the South Korean "puppet regime" for transforming the country into "a military-strategic bridgehead for the Pentagon," but it did not further attack he United States in this context. Last year Moscow had pointed out that "one of the biggest contingents of U.S. troops in Asia" was stationed in South Korea, had elaborated on U.S. military assistance to "eoul, and had charged that the United States was trying to involve Japan in aggressive plans. A PRAVDA article had gone so far as to link U.S. modernization of ROK forces and the moving of "fresh U.S. troops into the South" with a planned "march on the North" to "do away with" the DPRK. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 U.S. -SOV I ET RELATIONS MOSCOW AGAIN DEFENDS SUMMIT. AFFIRMS IDEOLOGICAL PURL TV Moscow has sustained its effort to Justify the results of the summit to domestic and foreign communist audiences. Authoritative comment extolling the summit, more measured and less euphoric than earlier assessments, is balanced by more pointed affirmations of the continuation of the class struggle in the international arena and the undiminished need for Soviet ideological vigilance and military preparedness. Concurrently, Soviet media are devoting increasing attention to the evolving arms debate in the United States, with particular reference to Secretary Laird's requests for new strategic weapons. In keeping with this more militant stance, Brezhnev, in his 27 June speech at a dinner honoring Fidel Castro, applauded the "successes" achieved at the summit but cautioned that they "in no way signify a possibility of weakening the ideological struggle." He even allowed for an "intensification" of the latter and the possibility of its becoming "an increasingly acute" form of struggle in the future. As if to affirm his ideological credentials before his Soviet and Cuban audience, Brezhnev declared: "Marxist-Leninists have no illusions about the antipopular essence of imperialism and its aggressive intentions."* An article by USA Institute Director Arbatov in IZVESTIYA on 21 June, largely devoted to hailing the strategic arms limitation agreements, expressed concern over the possibility that "right extremist circles" in the United States might try to "emasculate" the new arms accords by attempting to "compensate" for their restrictions by calling for a new arms race in areas not covered in the agreements. While TASS had ignored Secretary Laird's testimony before the congressional appropriations committees on 5 and 6 June, a prompt TASS report on his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 21st asserted that his emphasis on "poe tions of strength" contradicted the Basic Principles document signed by Brezhnev and the President in Moscow. And an article on SALT in PRAVDA on the 22d, signed by * The formula disclaiming "illusions" about "imperialism" has been used by other members of the leadership--for example, by Andropov at a Murmansk awards ceremony last December and by Suslov in a 20 June Moscow speech to propagandists. Approved For Release 2000/08/OFN gE*85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1?72 0. Grinev and V. Pavlov, conveyed assurances that the USSR "has taken and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its own security and that of its allies." While summaries of the Arbatov article were broadcast mainly to audiences outside the Soviet bloc, including North America, the Grinev- Pavlov article was publicized chiefly in broadcasts to Moscow's East European allies. Both articles were summarized in Mandarin, and neither was carried in Radio Moscow's domestic service. ARBAfOV IN Entitled "The Power of a Realistic Policy," the IZVESTIYA Arbatov article, while playing the stock theme that the United States was forced to alter its "cold war" policy under the pressure of "new realities," credited the United States with having taken "a positive and realistic stand on many of the questions discussed" at the summit. After hailing the SALT agreements, along familiar lines, Arbatov notably took to task those unnamed "skeptics" who say that the new accords do not yet signify disarmament. In rebuttal he emphasized that not long ago such negotiations "concerning the very essence of national security" would have seemed "inconceivable." Granting that the new accor.:s are only a first step, he added they s& a "an extremely important first step." What the summit amounted to, he insisted, "is a considerable achievement in limiting arms, normalizing Soviet- U.S. relations, and strengthening peace and international security." At the same time, Arbatov's positive appraisal was tempered by reminders that the class struggla would continue and that current world tensions could adversely affect U.S.-Soviet relations. In a passage apparently designed mainly for domestic consumption, Arbatov said that the USSR and the United States "are going to -be involved in a principled ideological struggle" and warned the Soviet people to beware of "subversive propaganda, ideological subversion, and psychological warfare"--"forme not compatible with peaceful coexistence, which the United Statec has used as part of its armory for a long time now." Shifting to a broader perspective, Arbatov commented ou t'ie different forms in which the class struggle could evolve, "Will it be the form of armed clashes,, the arms race, acute and dangerous political crisis? Or will it be in the form of peaceful coexistence in which ideological differences between Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FDZ8 TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 the two systems and their rivalry in various spheres are combined with joint efforts in the sphere of peace and security?" This difference in form, he emphasized, "can mean the difference between war and peace." In passages outlining how the "positive changes" in Soviet- U.S. relations could be altered by events, Arbatov registered concern about conflicting pressures in the United States that could "emasculate" the essence of the SALT agreements. Noting that "right extremist groupings" have launched a campaign against the SALT agreements, he said that although they have failed to prevent the new accords, the debate over the U.S. military budget "demonstrates the path which could be explored-- the path of 'compensating' for the restrictions imposed by the treaties by urging on the arms race in other spheres without actually expressing direct opposition to the treaties and agreements." (On 25 June, a participant in Radio Moscow's weekly commentators' roundtable program pointed out that the debate on strategic arms is developing "essentially over whether ratification of the agreements should be accompanied by the adoption of new armament programs in certain fields.") Pointing to other issues that could affect U.S.-Soviet relations, Arbatov cited continuing tensions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He declared in summation: "In brief, the struggle to improve the international situation, including to normalize Soviet-U.S. relations, is by no means at an end; it will continue, demanding a great deal of effort, persistence, and vigilance." GRINEV, PAVLOV The Grinev-Pavlov article is the second since IN PRAVDA the summit to appear under an apparent pseudonym.* While Pavlov's identity is not known, "0. Grinev" was identified in 1966 as the apparent pen-name of Foreign Ministry disarmament expert Grinevskiy. Among other articles signed by Grinev in 1966 was one in IZVESTIYA in August of that year commemorating the third anniversary of the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty. Clearly designed to reassure the Soviet defense establishment as well the USSR's communist allies that the strategic arms limitation accords will not compromise Soviet military strength, * See the TRENDS of 21 June 1972, pages 19-20, for a discussion of the 15 June PRAVDA article by "Yu. Chernov." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONVIDEN'CIAL P018 'T'RENDS 28 JUNE 1972 the Grinev-Pavlov article developed a lengthy defense of the agreements along the lines of the 29 May PRAVDA editorial that offered Moscow's first authoritative appraisal of the summit results: "The SALT agreements will undoubtedly go down in history as a major achievement along the path to curbing the arms race and reducing the threat of nuclear war, and as an important measure facilitating progress toward general and complete disarmament." The commentators went on to discuss the ABM treaty and the interim agreement in standard fashion, still suppressing the details of the protocol which outlined the allotment of ballistic missiles for each side. The article was notable, however, for a more pointed reassurance that the Soviet Union will continue to take unspecified measures to insure its security: Of course, the limitation of strategic weapons does not yet eliminate the danger of nuclear war, although it does move in this direction. Until such time as this danger is liquidated, the Soviet Union has taken and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its own security and that of its allies. This circumstance is taken into consideration by the Moscow agreements. They in no way weaken the defense capability of the Soviet Union and its allies. TASS ON U.S. In the same issue of PkAVDA that carried the STATEMENTS Grinev-Pavlov article, a Washington-datelined TASS dispatch cited Secretary Laird's ~:& timony on 21 June before the Senate Armed Services Committee in which Laird linked his support for the new accords with congressional approval of funding for new weapons systems. Quoting the Secretary as stating that the United States should negotiate with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength," the dispatch added: "This contradicts the Basic Principles of relations between the USSR and the United States that was signed in Moscow--a document that proceeds from a recognition of the security interests of the sides based on the principle of equality and renunciation of the use of force or the threat to use it." TASS' account of President Nixon's 23 June press conference was markedly more cautious. It played up the President's call for congressional approval of the SALT accords but obscured his remarks on the need for a continuing offensive nuclear weapons program. TASS said the President "strongly urged" Congress to approve the accords "on their merits." Noting that Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FlIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 reporters drew the President's attention to Secretary Laird's linkage of the SALT accords to the financing of new strategic arms, the Soviet news agency cited the President's comment to the effect that they are "different matters." It added: "but referring to the fact that the programs were recommended by the government prior to the signing of the arms limitation agreements, the President went on record for solving the question of their financing after the congress completes discussing the ARM treaty and the interim agreement." 'rASS did not mention the President's statement that Secretary Laird's position is "a sound one," or his remark that "without a continuing offensive program, we can be sure that the security interests of the United States would be jeopardized and the chances for a permanent offensive agreement will be totally destroyed." Soviet media likewise obscured Secretary Rogers' support foe funding of new strategic weapons. A PRAVDA account of his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 19th merely noted his support for the Moscow agreements and his request for early ratification. The report ignored the Secretary's assertions that the new arms programs would strengthen U.S. security and provide "bargaining chips" for the next round of arms talks. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 DIMITROV ANNIVERSARY INTERNATIONAL MEETING IN SOFIA STRESSES SOVIET LEADING ROLE The 90th anniversary of the birth of Georgi Dimitrov on 18 June was used by the USSR and its hardcore East European allies to hold up the Bulgarian communist and Comintern leader as the prototype of a leader correctly blending national patriotism and socialist internationalism with awareness of the CPSU's key role in the world communist movement. The event was played up in a sizeable three percent of Radio Moscow's commentary output in the week ending on the 18th. The occasion was observed at commemorative meetings in Moscow, Prague., and Leipzig, addressed by Pelehe, Bilak, and Verner, respectively, and at a 13-17 June international conference in Sofia attended by 48 ruling and nonruling communist party delegates--including CPSU Secretary Ponomarev--and representatives of some 66 -1ther parties and organizations. The Sofia conference heard a letter of greeting to the Bulgarian party Central Committee from Tito, who had just returned from the USSR and was preparing to leave for Warsaw. Conference speakers from the Yugoslav League of Communists and from such other independently oriented parties as the Romanian and Italian CP's focused selectively on such aspects as Dimitrov's "creative" approach and his promotion of the united front strategy of class struggle. The Chinese took minimal notice of the Dimitrov anniversary and ignored the Sofia ceremonies, which afforded a platform for direct and indirect attacks on the Peking leadership by Soviet bloc speakers. NCNA reported on 17 June that an exhibition of books and photographs marking the anniversary was opened in Peking that day under the sponsorship of Chinese friendship societies. The day before, NCNA reported that the Bulgarian ambassador had given a film show on the 16th to mark the occasion, with a vice foreign minister leading the Chinese officials in attendance. Reflecting Peking's sensitivity regarding the Comintern as symbolizing Moscow's hegemony in the international communist movement, NCNA referred to "the Bulgarian people's leader Georgi Dimitrov" and made no mention of his Comintern association. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL EBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 PONOMAREV'S SPE(fCH In his speech to the Sofia conclave as reported in the Bulgarian party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 14 Jura, Ponomarev characterized Dimitrov as "a great internationalist and great patriot, profoundly aware of the tremendous significance of the correct combination of international and national aspects" in the activity of both ruling and nonruling communist parties. Underscoring Dimitrov's devotion to the unity of the international working class and the united front strategy, Ponomarev noted the late leader's striving for "the alinement and rallying of all progressive revolutionary forces: the international workers class, the Soviet Union, the people's democracies, the peoples of colonial and independent countries, and the antifascist democratic movements throughout the world." He observed that Moscow's strategy of a unified anti-imperialist struggle, spelled out at the 1969 Moscow international party conference and at the 24th CPSU Congress, had borne fruit in, among other things, President Nixon's visit to the USSR. Ponomarev repeatedly held up Dimitrov's irreconcilability toward ideological "deviations" as a model for communist parties today in opposing "all kinds of rightist and 'leftist' opportunism and revisionism and all manifestations of nationalism and national restrictiveness." He denounced the Chinesa by name in a historical context: Recalling that Dimitrov and the Comintern had contributed to the creation of "a united national anti-Japanese front in China" in the 1930's, Ponomarev added that "even at that time he declared himself against the erroneous trends which, as became clear later on, expressed the nationalistic positions of Mao Tse-tung's group." VELCHEV The keynote address by Bulgarian Politburo member and Secretary Velchev, which preceded Ponomarev's relatively moderate speech on the 13th, prefaced a strong denunciation of the Chinese with the assertion that "anti-Sovietism is the poisonous bait with which imperialist propaganda strives to tempt some circles of the communist, socialist, trade union, and national liberation movements." Such anti-Sovietism, Velchev said, "is particularly obviously manifested by the policy of the present Chinese leadership, which has taken the road of dissidence, setting the CCP in opposition to the CPSU" and the world communist movement and the PRC at odds with the socialist community. He added that this line is "used by international imperialism to weaken the positions of socialism and peace." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 COWFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 Scoring nationalism, Velchev stressed that the Bulgarian party and state "sacredly observe Dimitrov's behest: always and in everything to combine patriotism with internationalism." Avowals of loyalty to the CPSU and the Soviet Union pervaded the speech. "Dimttrov's stipulations on the Soviet Union as the mainstay 3f the working people all over the world," Velchev declared, "have acquired renewed strength today." He also underscored the present-day validity of "Dimitrov's conclusion on the attitude toward the USSR and the CPSU as the 'touchstone' for proletarian internationalism," OTHER EAST EUROPE Speakers representing the parties of PARTY SPOKESMEN Moscow's other orthodox East European allies generally emulated Ponomarev's moderate tone and refrained from combining their protestations of loyalty to the USSR with direct attacks on Peking. Dimitrov's correct combining of patriotism and internationalism was stressed by Czechoslovakia's Svestka and Poland's Lukaszewicz, though not in so many words by Hungary's Nemes. The latter, however, quoted Dimitrov to the effect that "any deviation" from the principle of alliance with the Soviet Union "is intolerable and harmful." Similarly, the GDR's Norden declared that fulfillment of Dimitrov's legacy demands "irreconcilably struggling against bourgeois ideology, anticommunism, and anti- Sovietism in all its forms." ROMANIA'S RAUTU Romanian Communist Party Executive Committee member Rautu avoided any mention of the Soviet Union, judging by the lengthy report of his conference speech in RABOTNICHESKO DELO on the 15th. Focusing instead on Dimitrov's contribution to good relations between Bulgaria and Romania, he called relations between Sofia and Bucharest "a valuable model of permanent comradely and fraternal relations between two socialist countries." In this context, Rautu reiterated the standard Bucharest line on observar.ce of "fully equal rights, sovereignty, and the principle of comradely mutual assistance" in :socialist inter- state relations. He explicitly recalled Dimi.trov's call for a united front at the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935, but stuck to generalities in the present-day context. Thus he observe? that the communist parties "have a reliable guiding star in Marxism-Leninism" and--alluding to the May 1972 Moscow summit--noted that "the recent developments are evidence of growing positive processes and realistic trends in international life toward detente." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL PHIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 TITO'S LETTER The letter from Tito to the Bulgarian Ceatral Committee on the occasion of the Dimitrov conference, like the conference speeches of the Yugoslav and Romanian delegates, did not mention the USSR. As carried by TANJUG on the 14th, the letter dwelt on Dimitrov's promotion of friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Tito praised Dimitrov's "breadth of political understanding of the complex international trends and concrete conditions in different countries." He also recalled the late leader's "affirmation of people's national identity and self-determination," as well as his opposition to "all forms of nationalism and chauvinism. Tito recalled "with great pleasure" his meeting with Dimitrov at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 and "the last meetings in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in 1947"--the year before iselgrade's break with the Cominform. In 1'49, the year of Dimitrov's death in Moscow, Bulgarian Politburo member Kostov was purged and executed for, among other sins, "Titoism." He was posthumously rehabilitated at the Bulgarian plenum of April 1956, and the Sofia dailies of 17 June 1972 carried commemorative articles on his 75th birth anniversary. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000WYa9ANRDP85TOQIIIiR UWS00050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 - 30 - P0 LAI4D- VU G Os LAV IA CORDIAL COM4JN I (JE CAF TIM ' S FIVE-DAY VISIT TO WARSAW The communique issued at the end of President Tito's 3.9-23 June visit to Poland registers anmewhat closer agreement in the talks between the Yugoslav leader and Gierek than had emerged from Tito's talks with Brezhnev in Moscow earlier this month. While both communiques described the atmosphere of the respective talks as one of "friendship, cordiality, and ft?.nk- ness," the Warsaw document added "full mutual understanding '1 trust" where the 10 June Moscow communique added only "mutual respect and equality." And where the Moscow document failed to record any overall meeting of minds, the Warsaw communique said the two sides "noted with satisfaction the identity or similarity of their views" on topical international questions,and on relations between the communist parties and "progressive and liberation movements." The Warsaw communique also reported the signing of a bilateral supplementary trade agreement for 1971-75, while the document on Tito's Moscow visit merely referred to previously agreed measures for long-term economic cooperation. Tito's visit to Warsaw broke new ground in bilateral relations. The last Polish-Yugoslav summit meeting had taken place when Tito visited Warsaw in 1964, while Tito's recent Moscow talks amounted to a followup of Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade last September. The latest Warsaw communique, like the 10 Jr-e communique on Tito's talks n Moscow, recorded an "exchang, of views" and "mutual informing" by the two leaders from still disparate ideological vantage points. Thus in asserting that ;ielgrade- Warsaw relations "are becoming more and more comprehensive, stable, and long-term," it noted that the two leaders do not consider "the differences in the ways of building socialism in the two countries" to be an obstacle to successful development of -elations. Accompanying comment in Warsaw media was franker than Moscow's had been on the basic difference between Poland as a Warsaw Pact member and Yugoslavia as a nonalined country. Like the Moscow communique, the Warsaw communique recorded both sides' renunciation of "the use or threat of force" in solving international disputes. It also noted the "significance" of President Nixon's visits to Moscow and Warsaw and of Tito's visit to the USSR. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 FOLLOWUP CONNIENT Warmer interstate relations with residual differences on the party level were reflected in comment in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU and in a more enthusiastic appraisal on the visit in the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY. The party paper observed on the 25th that the results of the talks "should be assessed as a positive contribu- tion of our two countries to the cause of security, peace, and socialist progress." It focused heavily on the improvement of economic relations between the two states, highlighting the supplemental trade agreement signed during Tito's visit. ZYCIE WARSZAWY commented more effusively on the same day that "never before have the two countries been so close to one another as at present, and never did cooperation between our governments, our parties, and our nations have such optimistic prospects for development." It added that "the final communique leaves no doubts that convergence or identity of views encompasses today more domains than ever before." Predicting that bilateral cooperation "will now become still more dynamic," the government paper observed that "for us, it is very important that-the circle of our friends and allies in our common struggle is gettirg stronger and wider." Comment in Yugoslav media has been more restrained. A Belgrade domestic service commentator remarked on the 24th that "no exceptional efforts" in Warsaw were required "to find a common language on all problems of common interest and to leave aside the differences which exist and are natural." Noting that "some circles, West as well as East," are speculating "whether Yugoslavia is crossing over to the East," the commentator emphasized that "nonalined socialist Yugoslavia goes along its well-known internal and international paths." The Belgrade radio's program in Russian to the USSR on the 23d, in positively appraising the Tito-Gierek talks, noted at same time that "there were some subtle differences in their views." The broadcast snidely remarked that "it is obviously not as clear to Poland as it is to Yugoslavia that the situation in the Mediterranean region has an effect on the state of relations in Europe," based on the Yugoslav view of the "indivisibility of peace." MOSCOW COVERAGE TASS on the 23d carried a terse account of the Tito-Gierek communique, touching on its main points and citing its praise for President Nixon's Moscow and Warsaw visits while omitting all the passages indicating the degree of agreement reached in the Polish-Yugoslav talks. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 200(Q,fl -RDP85T07S500050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 IZVESTIYA on the 25th carried a TASS correspondent's dispatch from Belgr'de on Yugoslavia's relations with CEMA--a subject absent from both the Moscow and Warsaw communiques. Entitled "TANJUG on Yugoslavia's Cooperation with the CEMA countries," the dispatch quoted the Yugoslav news agency on Belgrade's "interest" in intensifying its relations with the Soviet bloc economic organization "in accordance with its national nd economic interests, sociopolitical system, and nonalinement policy." The dispatch was evidently occasioned by Belgrade's announcement on 19 June that Yugoslavia would send Premier Bijedic--its highest ranking delegate to a CEMA parley to date--to the 26th CEMA Council session slated to open in Moscow on 29 June. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09cM - - 5T00875R BOs3T0000550026-2 S 28 JUNE 1972 MIDDLE EAST BREZFNEV ASKS ISRAELI WITFORAWAL; USSkk bCURES RAIDS ON LEBANON Brezhnev touched on the "couplex end dangerous" Middle East situation in a scant three sentences in his 27 June speech at the dinner for Fidel Castro. The problem, he said, "can and must be" dealt with on the basis of Arab demands for withdrawal of the "aggressor's troops"--he did not specify withdrawal frog. "all" occupied territory--and fulfillment of Security Council Resolution 242. Brezhnev made ao mention of the Jarring mission, supported in the Soviet-American communique on the Moscow summit. Nor did he offer the customary assurance of Moscow's "invariable assistance and support" to the Arabs, as he had done in his 5 June dinner speech during Tito's visit. .He routinely accused Israel of persisting in its "policy of conquest" but did not refer to the Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon beginning on the 21st. Soviet propaganda has denounced Israel's military operations, charging Tel Aviv with trying to sow discord between the Lebanese and the Palestinian fedayeen and with seeking to thwart any efforts leading toward a peaceful solution. Noting reports of future U.S. military deliveries to Israel, Moscow claimed that Israel marks new arms deliveries by "increasing its anti-Arab action." Speaking in the Security Council debate, Soviet representative Malik, according to TASS on the 24th, complained of Israel's new "acts of aggression at a time when in '?'ie international situation as a whole, positive phenomena" conducive to relaxation of international tensions have begun to appear. Malik added that this atmosphere might contribute to resumption of the Jarring mission aimed at a peaceful political settlement of the Middle East dispute. Explaining the Soviet vote on the Security Council resolution adopted on the 26th, Malik said the USSR would have liked a "tougher" resolution but voted for the draft "despite its shortcomings" in view of the urgency of the question. PEKING'S POSITION NCNA on 28 June reported PRC representative Huang Hua's explanation in the Security Council of Chinese reservations regarding "unsatisfactory" phrases in the resolution adopted on the 26th, as well an his assertion that Israel's "premeditated act of aggression" should "logically" be condemned whereas "it is perfectly just" for the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to take up arms to resist Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 200MOWORNIlA&-RDP85T0 5FMf@00050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 aggression and defend their national rights. Noting that the resolution was adopted with two abstentions, by the United States and Panama, NCNA observed that U.S. delegate Bush had tabled a draft resolution which was "seemingly fair" but in fact favored Israel. TABS described the U.S. draft as reflecting a fish, "if not to exonerate Israel," at least to equate the aggressor with its victims. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 CUBA-PERU CUBA WELCOMES PERUVIAN MOVE TO RESTORE RELATIONS An official statement declaring that the Cuban Government is "most gratified and receptive to the noble and worthy initiative of the Peruvian Government and its president, General Velasco Alvarado," keynoted Havana's prompt and enthusiastic welcome of President Velasco's 20 June announcement that Peru "will soon initiate direct negotiations with the Cuban Government leading to the prompt reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries." The Peruvian initiative came in the wake of the adverse vote on 8 June in the Organization of American States (OAS) on Peru's proposal to repeal the 1964 anti-Cuban OAS resolution and allow each member nation to establish the kind of relationship it desires with Cuba. Both Cuba and Peru have interpreted the U.S. failure to obtain a two-thirds vote against the Peruvian resolution as an indication that the 1964 resolution--which required a two-thirds vote for adoption--no longer has sufficient support within the OAS to be sustained. GOVERNMENT STATEMENT Following initial publicity for Velasco's 20 June announcement, frontpaged in the party organ GRANMA and further publicized in reports of Latin American reaction, Havana radio on the 23d broadcast the text of the government statement praising the Peruvian decision and emphasizing that Cuban receptivity to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Peru was fully in keeping with the stated Cuban position on "normalization" of relations with individual hemisphere governments. Castro has repeatedly declared that the nature of Cuba's relationships with other Latin American governments is a function of their demonstration of independence from the United States. Accordingly, the Cuban Government statement expressed Cuba's "deservedly high esteem" of the Peruvian initiative, "particularly inasmuch as it is in keeping with that country's sovereignty and thus constitutes a conduct of total national independence, removed from any foreign pressure." The statement went on to recall Peruvian actions aimed at asserting control over the country's natural resources and at achieving economic independence; it singled out for special praise Velasco's contention that "the struggle for sovereignty is equivalent to the struggle against foreign economic domination." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREN!S 28 JUNE 1972 While noting that Cuba's support for measures designed to enhance Peru's national independence 'has not been conditioned by the existence of formal diplomatic relations," the Cuban statement asserted that "the development of fraternal relations of solidarity" among the Latin American people and nations never- theless "can take place more closely and fully within the framework of official diplomatic relations." It declared that "we shall respect Peru's position as Peru has respected ours" and that "the Cuban people extend their hand to shake Peru's extended fraternal hand." In a restatement of Cuban policy that can be construed as an invita..ion to other "revolutionary" and "independent" Latin American governments to follow Peru's lead, the statement affirmed that Cuba will "be consistent with our policy of absolute respect for those Latin American governments that have maintained toward Cuba a position of mutual respect for the development of the Cuban revolution without complicity with the policy of imperialism." GRANMA on 12 June, in an editorial on the OAS vote on the Peruvian resolution, had recalled the Cuban Government's "clearcut policy" of readiness "to establish relations with those governments which are independent and ready to express and demonstrate their conduct in accordance with authentic expressions of national sovereignty and independence." For 'dell over a year, Cuban spokesmen have pictured the Peruvian Government as one in which positive revolutionary processes were occurring. In his 10th Bay of Pigs anniversary speech on 19 April 1971, Castro cited specific nationalistic actions of the Peruvian Government and declared that "a real change in that country's structures" was taking place; although "one cannot speak about a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Peru," he said, "from the viewpoint of revolutionary theory one can speak objectively about a revolutionary process in Peru." He characterized the Peruvian process in virtually identical terms in his 26 July 1971 speech marking the 18th anniversary of the assault on the Moncada barracks, adding that "the Peruvian revolutionary movement is in full swing." And at a press conference on 4 December during his brief stopover in Lima on his return trip from Chile, Castro asserted--as reported by Lima's EXPRESO--that "we esteem our relations with Peru, because we realize that it has a truly sovereign, independent government." On the question of formal relations, he said "we shall await the time when the Peruvian Government deems it feasible and useful to the interests of the nation to establish relations with Cuba." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 OAS VOTE Reacting to the 8 June OAS vote on the Peruvian resolution to allow member states to reestablish relations with Cuba at the level they desire, Havana's reportage and comment combined continued denunciations of the "U.S.- controlled" OAS and further disclaimers of Cuban interest in rejoining the organization with applause for the "independence" shown by the seven nations which voted for the resolution. Cuban media interpreted the 7-13-3 vote as a victory for the pro-Cuban forces, constituting in affect a renunciation of the 1964 resolution applying sanctions to Cuba. Thus a 12 June GRANMA editorial noted that "from a judicial point of view . . . it is proper to point out that the stability of the two-thirds of the votes--essentially required in order to ratify the sanctions adopted against Cuba in 1964--has ceased to exist in the OAS, because 23 governments now constitute its membership." While denouncing the OAS, the editorial declared that the Cuban Government "nevertheless respects the initiative of the Peruvian Government because it finds this to be an act of good faith, taken independently"; it added that "the same thing can be said" of the other governments voting for the Peruvian proposal. The same interpretation of the OAS vote was suggested in PRENSA LATINA's reports of reaction to the ballotting. Quoting the Communist Party of Argentina's organ NUESTRA PALABRA, PRENSA LATINA on the 13th reported that the vote "did not result in the ratification of the diplomatic and commercial isolation of Cuba ordered by the inter-American organization in 1964 under U.S. pressure." And a PRENSA LATINA disratch from Caracas on the same day cited the Venezuelan Communist Party organ TRIBUNA POPULAR for the conclusion that as a result of the vote "any country that wishes to maintain full ties with the socialist island may do so," since "currently the OAS does not have a two-thirds majority--16 votes--to sustain the diplomatic boycott applied against Cuba in 1964." In a similar vein, domestic service commentator Guido Garcia Inclan declared on the 13th that the United States "did not realize that as a result of that vote, the most honorable nations would be free to do as they please with their independence." He added: "All this means that our sister nations will begin to reestablish relations with Cuba . . of their own free will." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 202841 ?12RT:~IA-RDP85TQYP7,A%0300050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 -38- USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS GOSPLAN OFFICIAL URGES REORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL ORGANS In the June issue of PLANNED ECONOMY, Gosplan first deputy chair- man for agriculture T.Z. Sokolov criticizes the agriculture ministry as incapable of leading farms and proposes a reorganiza- tion based on specialized associations, a national system of sovkhozes, and kolkhoz councils equipped with administrative powers. Though somewhat vague, Sokolov's proposals are the most explicit indication of current official thinking on agriculture, and they are notably in accord with PRAVDA's 5 June editorial praise of sovkhoz ministries, kolkhoz councils, and specialized trusts and associations. Sokolov's proposals are in many respects reminiscent of Khrushchev's controversial initiatives. They appear to threaten the powers of the agriculture ministry which were reduced by Khrushchev and partially restored after his fall. Although Sokolov points out that the agriculture ministry is currently incapable of effective leadership, his solution is not to strengthen the ministry but to further reduce its power by transferring all sovkhozes to a national system of sovkhozes. He also favors granting kolkhoz councils some of the executive powers currently exercized by the agriculture ministry and once envisaged for the abortive kolkhoz unions advocti~.ed by Khrushchev and his proteges. Sokolov was appointed first deputy chairman of Gosplan in the spring of 1970 when Brezhnev was pressing for increased allocations to agriculture. He entered his new job with a notable warning against attempts to divert money from agriculture (PLANNED ECONOMY, September 1970). Since his appointment, as his current article indicates, Gosplan has altered its planning procedures to improve rural construction and give preference to manufanture of agricul- tural equipment and fertilizer. CENSURE OF MINISTRY Sokolov states that "it is quite difficult for the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and its local organs in their present form to concretely lead the complicated, multibranch kolkhoz-sovkhoz production and the huge network of various kinds of organizations, establishments and enterprises." While calling the rayon agriculture administration the "main link in agricultural leadership," Sokolov criticizes its handling of the planning and organization of production, use of Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 new equipment, material-technical supply, and financing. And he goes on to assert that the oblas. agriculture administration as well "does not have the necessary rights and opportunities for proper leadership of production activities of sovkhozes and kolkhozes." As one remedy Sokolov proposes the establishment of a national system of sovkhozes. Noting that sovkhozes are administered by republic sovkhoz ministries in five republics, Sokolov writes that "apparently, one should attentively study their experience in order to more correctly decide the question of administering sovkhoz production from bottom to top." Sokolov's proposal reinforces earlier indications of effo-ts to weaken the agricul- ture ministry through the creation of union-republic ministries of sovkhozes. In August 1970 an Azerbaydzhan Ministry of Sovkhozes was established, and Azerbaydzhan First Secretary G.A. Aliyev said that it would be "subordinated to the Azerbaydzhan Council of Ministers and USSR Ministry of Agriculture" (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 13 August 1970). However, on 23 December 1970 the ministry was changed to a union-republic ministry (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 25 December 1970), suggesting that .t would eventually be subordinated to a similar USSR ministry rather than to the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. Similar union-republic sovkhoz ministries were subsequently established in Georgia in December 1970, Uzbekistan in January 1971, and the RSFSR in February 1972. A 17 February 1972 Moscow radio broadcast revealed that the 9,700 sovkhozes in the RSFSR, then mostly under the jurisdiction of the agriculture ministry and its local organs, would be transferred to the new sovkhoz ministry. KOLKHOZ COUNCILS As another remedy Sokolov favors empowering the kolkhoz councils formed in 1969 with administrative powers similar to those envisaged by advocates of the abortive kolkhoz unions. He notes that the kolkhoz councils now have only a "consultative character and do not possess the rights of administration" and observes that "competent kolkhoz organs could more efficiently plan production, dispose of material- technical and financial resources, ensure observance of the Kolkhoz Charter, and decide all questions of organization of production." Although Sokolov has never publicly endorsed kolkhoz unions, he was a member of the USSR Council on Kolkhoz Affairs, which administered kolkhozes independently of the agriculture ministry from 1946 until Stalin's death. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 USSR Minister of Agriculture V.V. Matekevich "as o-ienly opposed the creation of kolkhoz unions with administrative powers--a move that would weaken the power, of his ministry. His opposition prevailed during the debates of the 1950's and 1960'a, and when a system of kolkhoz councils was eventually established in 1969, it was stipulated that the new organs would have no administrative or even coordinating powers. Moreover, Matekevich was made chairman of the All-Union Council of Kolkhozes and the councils were placed under the control of the agriculture ministry and its local organs. Since the formation of the kolkhoz councils, grass-roots complaints about their limited powers have appeared from time to time--by I. Vinnichenko in LITERARY RUSSIA, 10 July and 18 September 1970; M. Kovalenko in KOMMUNIST, March 1971; kolk!:oz chairmen in IZVESTIYA, 23 January 1971; aid Yu. I. Krasnopoyas in the ECONOMIC SERIES OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, No. 1, 1971. On the other hand, the councils have been criticized by officials in the agri- culture ministry for "issuing orders to kolkhozes"--by V. Filimonov in AGRICULTURE OF RUSSIA, March 1971, and L. Zaytsev and A. Ivanov in ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, June 1971. The agriculture ministry tightened its control over the council in March 1971 by the adoption of a new statute even more specifically defining the consultative functions of the councils (ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, June 1971). SPECIALIZED Sokolov has high praise for "specialized adminis- ASSOCIATIONS tration of agricultural enterprises" and in this connection cites the work of the USSR Main Administration for the Poultry Industry (Ptitseprom), the RSFSR Main Administration for Meat Sovkhozes and Livestock Production (Skotoprom), and intersovkhoz and interkolkhoz production associa- tions. He states that the experience of such associations should be studied with an eye toward "a transition in the future to administration through specialized organs operating on principles of cost accounting." The 5 June PRAVDA editorial on "New Forms of Agricultural Administration" also praised sovkhoz ministries, kolkhoz councils, and specialized trusts and singled out Ptitseprom in particular. The status of the latter may have been enhanced by the recent appointment of RSFSR deputy agriculture minister I.A. Bakhtin to head it (identified in the 16 June PRAVDA). This proposal, like the others, represents a revival of a Khrushchev initiative. Khrushchev's last proposed reform involved the reorganization of agriculture into specialized Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 nationill administrations. Despite objections that this would split agriculture up into narrow incoordinated branches, Khrushchev publicly stated that his proposal would be discussed at a plenum in November 1964 (PRAVDA, 10 August 1964). Ptitseprom, which now is winning high praise, is the only specialized associa- tion Khrushchev managed to create before his overthrow. Skotoprom is the creation of former RSFSR Premier Voronov, who established it in late 1969 to administer his meat cattle program. PRAVDA ARTICLE JUSTIFIES UNEQUAL INVESTMENTS IN REPUBLICS An unusually defensive article on nationality policy in PRAVDA on 22 June arg:ces that union republics must not insist on obtaining equal shape;: of investment funds and must allow Moscow to develop some areas Aister than others, thus implying that there have been complaints of this matter. The author of the article, E. Bagramov, explains that while "all republics possess equal rights," some have varying natural resources and opportunities and produce unequal national income, and that "such differences are unavoidable." Under present conditions, Bagramov writes, no republic can use the "advantages of its geographical position or more significant economic potential" for itself; by means of central planning and the all-union budget, the national income is distributed to ensure development in the interests of "the entire Soviet people." "This feature of nationality policy," Bagramov points out, is reflected in the 1972 budget, which returns to Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Tadzhikistan, Armenia, and Turkmenia almost the full share of tax revenue produced by their repubics, while Kazakhstan is the most favored, receiving its entire tax revenue plus an additional 456-millicn-ruble subsidy from the national government. Eagramov does not mention the more advanced republics which presumably are less favored by the budget. At the same time, however, he declares that allocation of investments is no longer determined by the need to "overcome the economic backwardness of particular republics or regions because this problem is already resolved" and that state interests may dictate preferential investment in the formerly backward nationality areas or other regions. The most notable recent complaint about regional investment distribution came from the Ukrainian leaders in 1971. At the 24th Congress, then Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest complained that the Donets Basin coal industry was being developed at Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 200&$&TfA-RDP85TP79S9300050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 "extremely low rates," with only two new mines opened in the last five years; he also attacked those who had reduced coal industry development in favor of gas and oil (PRAVDA, I April 1971). Donetsk First Secretary V.I. Degtyarev eagerly backed Shalest's demand for accelerated development (PRAVDA, 6 April 1971). Subsequc tly, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Minis, ru adopted a decree "On Measures to Further Develop the Coal Industry of the Donets Basin" providing for doubling of investments in order to rebuild present mines and open new mines (Degtyarev in the 18 April 1972 PRAVDA UKRAINY and Ukrainian Coal Minister M.M. Khudosovtsev in the 18 September RADYANSKA UKRAINA). Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 - 43 - PRC AND ENVIRONMENT PEKING ELABORATES VIEWS ON ENVIRONMENT AT LIV CONFERENCE Peking used the occasion of the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm on 5-16 June to make its most com?re- hensive. statement on world environment problems. As elaborated by chief PRC delegate Tang Ke in a major address on 10 June, Peking's approach demonstrated an intention to tailor its environment policy to meet its political needs as a leading spokesman of the third world and its pressing economic needs as an underdeveloped nation for relatively unrestricted industrial development. At the same time Peking sought to place the onus for damage to the world environment on the developed nations, particularly adapting this line to its campaign against tie two ouperpowers. The Stockholm conference also served as a forum for Peking to defend its nuclear weapons program in an attempt to neutralize criticism of China's continued atmospheric tests. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES The PRC delegation at Stockholm placed the major responsibility for the "increasingly serious pollution and damage of the human environ- ment" on the superpowers while defending the interests of underdeveloped countries in rapid industrial development. Stating that countries damaged by big-power policies of "plunder, aggression, and war" have the right to apply sanctions and demand compensation, Tang cited in particular the "barbarous atrocities" .ommitted by the United States in Indochina, including its bombing, the alleged use of "toxic chemicals and poisonous gas," the mining of DRV ports, and the alleged bombing of Red River dikes "to make a man-made flood catastrophe." Moving to the broader question of how international environmental safeguards should be formulated, the Chinese delegate made a pitch to the large third-world group at the conference by defending the right of all developing nations--including China--to relatively unrestricted industrial and economic development and by opposing any international environmental restraints that would limit these states' national sovereignty. Thus, emphasizing that "only by building an independent national industry" can a country become strong and prosperous, he acknowledged that a certain amount of environmental damage will result but that the problem can be solved as stays advance in wealth and technology. Attacking what he called the pessimistic view of the world environment situation, Tang stated that developing nations must not refrain Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 200&(PI S&LA-RDP85TPM7~EgR9300050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 -44= from developing industry for fear of ecological damage; so long as states are independent of the interference of "imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism" and their governments "genuinely service the people," he asserted, problems arising from industrial development can be solved because mankind's ability to transform the environment will "grow continuously" as nations progress. Tang strongly warned against any efforts by the superpowers to subject other countries to their control under the guise of protecting the environment. While not ruling out all inter- national restrictions, he emphasized that world environment measures should "respect the sovereignty and economic interests" of all countries, adling that each country has the right to determine its own standards in light of its own conditions. Turning to China's population problem, Tang attempted to justify the rapid growth since the communist takeover while explaining Peking's present approach to this vexing question. Citing the improvement in Chinese living standards over the past two decades as proof for the Marxist thesis that mankind will create "ever greater quantities of wealth" to meet its needs, Tang also struck a pragmatic note by cautioning that the Chinese by no means approve of unch.:e_,'ad population growth but have advocated and implemented family planning measures that have produced "some effects." NUCLEAR WEAPONS The consensus among participating nations in favor of a halt to nuclear testing posed the major problem for the Chinese at the conference. The Chinese defensively and at length reaffirmed Peking's line on the need to develop nuclear weapons to counter the "nuclear blackmail" of the two superpowers. Repeating Peking's call for a world summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, "to reach agreement on the nonuse of nuclear weapons," Tang stressed Peking's pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons and called attention to the superpowers' refusal to undertake such a commitment. Showing irritation over criticism of PRC atmospheric tests, he expressed regret that "some people" oppose all nuclear tests while ignoring the fact that the superpowers have stockpiled large quantities of nuclear weapons and "threaten the small and medium countries." NCNA reported on 14 June that the conference on that day adopted a resolution on the prohibition and condemnation of nuclear tests but that the PRC voted against the resolution. A Chinese Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CnNFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 delegate reiterated Peking's line at the meeting that day. Chief delegate Tang returned to the subject yet again on 16 June in connection with the discussion of the "declaration on the human environment." Tang deplored the fact that the Chinese proposal on a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was not written into the declaration "owing to the stubborn opposition and obstruction on the part of the superpowers and their extremely few followers." He singled out Japan and New Zealand for harboring "ulterior motives" in directing "the spearhead against China under the pre- text of preventing nuclear pollution," thereby "confusing public opinion and shielding the superpowers." The PRC delegation announced that it would not take part in the voting on the declaration. In addition to parrying criticism of Chinese nuclear testing, the approach taken by the PRC at the conference had the effect of updating Peking's refusal to participate in the Soviet-proposed world disarmament conference or five-power nuclear conference as well as the Geneva disa'-iament talks. The Chinese speakers made no reference to the agreements on limiting strategic arms reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit, a subject which Peking has mentioned directly only in a factual NCNA report on 2 June covering President Nixon's trip. In rejecting calls for an end to nuclear tests and demanding a non-first-use agreement, Peking has sought to justify its continuing nuclear development program as well as its refusal to accede to partial disarmament measures which in its view leave the superpowers' nuclear strength intact vis-a-vis the PRC.* * Peking's attitude toward the Moscow summit seems reflected in a recent article in RED FLAG (No. 6), the third of a series of articles discussing world history as a means of understanding the current international situation. The article discussed efforts to limit the British-German naval arms race earlier this century and drew the conclusion that a temporary detent:z today will bring about an even greater rivalry tomorrow. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000R&MENYIk,RDP85T0OAIP59 100050026-2 28 JUNE 1972 CHINA RED FLAG STRESSES ATTENTION TO AGRICULTURE. LIGHT INDUSTRY An article in RED FLAG No. 6, broadcast by Radio Peking on 22 June, firmly and unequivocally criticizes the view that most economic efforts and resources should be fed into heavy industry. With reference perhaps to the views of the purged military leadership, the article gets in a dig at the military- industrial complex in criticiving "imperialist and social imperialist" countries where "industry, especially military industry, has developed abnormally" while agriculture has lagged behind. Carrying forward a line formulated by Mao in his "Contradictions" speech in 1957 but only recently revived in the wake of the purge of Lin Piao, the article stresses the interdependence of the three economic sectors of agriculture, light and heavy industry: each supplies essential outputs to the others and one should not be developed at the expense of the others. In an at.ampt to explain current policy to cadres who "view this situa- tion from a certain isolated case" and feel that more efforts to develop agriculture and light industry would adversely affect heavy industry, the article notes that in the short term in a particular instance the diversion of "manpower, funds, equipment, and materials" may cause apparent slowdowns in heavy industry but argues that in fact "this is not the case." The article claims that once agriculture and light industry have developed, heavy industry can "develop better and at a quicker pace." That problems are being encountered in getting full compliance with the new line is evident in a warning to local industries that "funds, steel products, and other materials, which are to be used on agriculture according to plans, must be guaranteed and must not be misused or reduced." The article states that "contrary to one's subjective wishes," shifting funds to heavy industry will not cause it to develop more quickly. On the contrary, according to the article, "the development of agricul- ture and light industry will slow down, which in turn will result in a slower development of heavy industry." Thus the slogan "give first priority to developing heavy industry" is now interpreted as giving "adequate" attention to agriculture and light industry. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 28 JUNE 1972 The f3undation role of agriculture is repeatedly stressed, to the extc^t that the article states that "only after agriculture develops in a comprehensive way can industry, especially light industry, develop in a comprehensive way." Calling the labor force the "most important productive `nrce," the article justifies a continuation of the movement of sending people to the countryside, arguing that production will be affected "if the increase in the industrial labor force and among the urban population has surpassed the limit permissible for the development of agriculture." Therefore, population distribution planning must "consider first the needs of agricultural develop- ment, and then the needs of industrial development." The future path apparently envisaged by the article calls for increasing industrial development primarily through enhancing the quality, not quantity, of labor and equipment, thereby "supplying more industrial products to the state while not increasing investments or increasing investments to a lesser extent and not increasing the burden on agriculture." The article concedes that in the long run production cannot be expanded without capital construction, and it seems to admit that some of the "contradictions" of resource allocation are real. It states that "for a certain period, the scale of capital construction cannot . . . go beyond the permissible level of the development of agricultural production because of certain limits on manpower, materials, and funds." Criticizing "some comrades" who "invariably go after bigger projects," the article indicates that big projects which do not bear quick rewards must be discouraged, for they "inevitably consume manpower, funds, equipment, and materials" which are needed for developing agriculture. This injunction may well not apply, however, to large state projects but onl:,,7 to local endeavors. In support of the theory that heavy industry-must not be allowed to crowd out agriculture and light industry, a SZECHW..N DAILY Commintator's article broadcast on 18 June revealed some details of the province's industrial development. Criticizing the view of "some comrades" that "if heavy industry is not done well, then the whole situation will be affected," the article advocates more attention to light industry, which "not only meets the ,;:.;" irements of the people's daily life, but also ? provides more accumulation more quickly." According to the broadcast, past policies have resulted in light industrial Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TrENDS 28 JUNE 1972 development lagging "considerably behind" that of heavy industry even though funds accumulated by light industry over the past 20 years have been 550 percent of the state investment in light industry and the surplus has supported heavy industry. The article also provides a further rationale for Szechwan to produce its own light industrial products in noting that since +echwan's population is great it has a "vast consumption." Sup~lying consumer products from otheb provinces places a burden not only on them but on the transportation system, "affecting the transport and supply of materials for heavy industrial con- struction and materials for agricultural production." In addition, the article points out, long distance transport causes losses in quality and increases in cost. And for any further doubters the article notes that self-sufficiency is an integral part of obeying Mao's dictum to "be prepared against war and famine." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2