TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 23, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Relea' e ` r ?
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Confidential
rB's
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
23 AUGUST 1972
T00875R6M MW()3I3 34)
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COIFTJIDENTJAI,
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
01~ E '"'
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
23 AUGUST 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Hanoi Criticizes Communist Allies, Pledges Not to Compromise . I.
Le Duc Tho Sees Kirilenko, Chou on Way Home from Paris . . . . 7
DRV Scores Administration for Optimistic Statements on Talks . 9
Paris Talks: U.S. Blamed for Loss of Peace Opportunities . . . 10
DRV Ministry Assails Strikev at Hanoi, Claims Dikes Bombed . . 12
SALT AND DISARMAMENT
Suslov Decries "Positions of Strength" Stance for SALT II . . . 1E
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Replies to Arab Critics with Jabs at "Some Arab Leaders" .
21
KOREA-USSR
Mosco-4 Mutes Unification Issue, Marks Korean Liberation . . . .
25
AFRICA
Moscow Reacts Cautiously to Uganda Ouster of Asians . . . . . .
26.
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Party/Governrtnt Decree Tightens Control Over Scientists . . .
30
Scandal B-.posed in Matskevich's Agriculture Ministry . . . . .
31
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 AUGUST 1972
Moscow (3258 items)
Peking (1304 items)
Vietnam
(8%)
8%
Domestic Issues
(39%)
39%
[U.S. Air Strikes
(3%)
2%]
Indochina
(19%)
10%
DPRK Liberation Anniversary
(--)
5%
[Vietnam
(8%)
5%j
Asian-African Women's
(--)
5%
[Sihanouk PRC Tour
(4%)
1%]
Conference, Ulan Bator
Nonalined Conference in
(12%)
13%
Venus 8 Launch
(--;
4%
Guyana
Indian Independence
Anniversary
(--)
4%
Canarlian External Affairs
Minister in PRC
(--)
5%
Crimea Meeting of Soviet
Bloc Party Leaders
(13%)
4%
Cameroon Government
Delegation in PRC
(--)
4%
Conference of Solidarity
with Iraq, Baghdad
(--)
4%
Congo (Brazzaville)
National Day
(--)
3%
China
(5%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi registered acute displeasure with its big communist allies in
NHAN DAN editorials on 17 and 19 August which bitterly assailed
policies of "reconciliation" and "compromise" with the United Sr;ttes.
Subsequent Vietnamese communist comment also emphasizing Hanoi's
resolve to pursue the struggle and itE, firm refusal to compromise
reinforced the impression that the editorials reflected DRV
resistance to new pressures to accept a settlement. r.eports of
optimistic statem:nts by Administration officials on prospects for
success in the negotiations have been denounced by Hanoi as
"tricks" to help the President's campaign for reelection, and
Presidential adviser Kissinger's trip to Saigon has been pictured
in the same light.
Hanoi's expression of concern over counsels of compromise coincided
with the return home from Paris on the 19th of Le Duc Tho, special
adviser to the DRV delegation at the Paris talks, who made the
customary stopovers in Moccow and Peking. Moscow took the
opportunity to reassure the North Vietnamese of its support, giving
Tho the highest-level treatment and strongest pledge of Soviet
aid and political support since his stopovers in mid-1971. As
usual, Chou En-lai received Tho in Peking, but the Chinese again
failed to go beyond the minimum in their treatment of his stopover.
Typifying Peking's cautious approach, the Chinese foreign
minister made no mention of Vietnam in a speech on the 20th
welcoming his Tanzanian counterpart, who himself used the occa31on
to condemn American intervention in Vietnam and to demand a total
U.S. withdrawal.
Resumption of full-scale bombing of the North on 16 August following
the clearing of a week of bad weather was reflected in increased
DRV protests against alleged attacks on civilian targets, including
water conservancy projects. Hanoi has continued, however, to
evince optimism regarding the repair of dikes and dams allegedly hit
in U.S. .bombing raids. In addition to continuing, virtually daily
protests over U.S. strikes by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
during the past week, a protest at the authoritative level of a
foreign ministry statement was triggered by U.S. strikes at Hanoi
on the 16th.
HANOI CRITICIZES COMMUNIST ALLIES. PLEDGES NOT TO COMPROMISE
The 17 August IJHAN DAN editorial, coming after new talks between
Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger and coinciding with Tho's return 'tome
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after stopovers in Moscow and Peking, reads like a strident lecture
to Hanoi's big allies against pressuring the North Vietnamese to
compromise their basic goals. Taking sharp exception to its
allies' policies of detente toward the United States, the editorial
warned in effect that these policies might jeopardize the big
communist powers' support for the DRV and implied that Hanoi is
under pressure from its allies to reduce its military offensive in
South Vietnam or perhaps to accept a cease-fire.
The suggestion that support for Hanoi could be jeopardized appeared
in a passage describing circumstances in which a communist country
might abandon its "internationalist duty"--a term regularly used
to characterise aid to Vietnam. NHAN DAN warned that if a socialist
country's efforts to carry out peaceful coexistence are aimed only
at its own narrow, immediate interests, then "it will not only harm
the revolutionary movements of various countries, but in the end
will bring to itself incalculable losses and give up its lofty
internationalist duty." In what ma!- have been a show of displeasure
at the kind of support that has been forthcoming in recent weeks,
the editorial also observed pointedly that "the vitality of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism manifests itself
first of all in revolutionary deeds, not in empt: words."
NHAN DAN concluded its lecture on the perils of "reconciliation"
with a passage hinting that Hanoi has been pressured to accept a
cease-fire or some other form of military accommodation. Thus
the editorial declared that it may be acceptable to make some
reconciliation to help "impel" revolutionary forces but thet "if
out of the narrow interests of one's nation one tries to help the
most reactionary forces avert the dangerous blows, just like
throwing a lifebuoy to a drowning pirate, that is a cruel
reconciliation beneficial to the enemy and not beneficial to the
revolution."
The editorial also assessed the effect of triangular big-power
relations in enhancing Washington's freedom of maneuver in Vietnam.
It charged that the United States is hoping to use "reconciliation
toward a number of big powers" to gain a free hand in its
actions; and it noted that the Nixon Doctrine canceives of an
equilibrium among the big powers and the "division of the main
components of the socialist System" as a "shield" to gain freedom
of action in checking the national liberation movement, "first of
all hurling back the patriotic struggle of the nations of the
Indochinese peninsula."
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The NHAN DAN editorial was pegged to the 8-12 August conference
of nonalined nations in Guyana, citing in particular the seating
? at the conference of the PRG's and Sihanouk's representatives as
demonstrating solilarity among third-world countries. Hanoi's
demonstrative use of this occasion, which the editorial called
an "important international political event of profound
significance," served to accentuate a contrast between its
satisfaction over third-world support and disillusionment over
the policies of its communist allies. Tice editorial framed the
message in stark terms by delivering "a serious warning" to those
who are inclined to compromise. Welcoming the independent
policies of the nonalined nations, it asserted that the Guyana
conclave "clearly embodied a new trend of the time: the struggle
of small nations to shape their own destinies in defiance of all
sinister schemes of imperialism and regardless of all rightist
tendencies and unprincipled compromises." The "victory of the
national liberation movement" and of the Guyana conference, accord-
ing to the editorial, represents a failure of the Nixon Doctrine
and "should serve as a serious warning to those who are departing
from the great, all-conquering revolutionary thoughts of the time,
and who are pitifully bogf ing down on tie dark muddy road of
compromise."
Hanoi evinced its anxiety about the policies of other communist
nations in a series of rhetorical questions in the 17 August
editorial. In a sharp departure from the DRV's ubual proclamations
on the inevitability of success for the world revolution, the
editorial asked whether the revolutionary forces were indeed
triumphing over "imperialism," what force is deciding the course
of history, who is the chief enemy of the revolution, and "where
lies revolution and where counterrevolution." These questions,
the editorial observed, "were easy to answer in the past" but
have "become today puzzling questions because of unhealthy
tendencies," It lamented that "to make things worse, the perfidious
imperialists capitalize on the general confusion to confound wrong
and right, black and white." Later the editorial reaffirmed that
the world socialist system is the factor deciding the trend of
history, but it went on to underline the importance of mutual
support among countries to promote the world revolution and
sharply etched the alternatives in a?'claring that
the road of revolution is full of fragrant grass
and flowers. Opportunism is a stinking swamp.
We communists must persist in revolution, and
should not compromise.
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The presence of these sharply polemical injunctions raises the
question of whether NHAN DAN's intended audience may include
elements in the Hanoi leadership who lean toward heading
counsels of compromise evidently coming from Hanoi's allies.
But the context and thrust of the injunctions point at Moscow
and Peking as the basic sources of concern. The theme of
refusal to compromise, pervasive in Hanoi's comment in the wake
of the 17 August editorial, was given special emphasis in NHAN
DAN's 1.9 August editorial--marking the 27th anniversary of the
August Revolution--in which the counsels of compromise were
clearly traced to external sources. The editorial noted that the
Vietnamese revolution is "pushing back terrible pressure" not
only of U.S. attacks and the blockade and mining, but of "all
kinds of none-too-agreeable actions in one way or another
exerted by tendencies of compromise from the outside." It
affirmed that "to compromise and to behave as a coward will only
lead to capitulation, flinching, and accepting a life in slavery,
a useless life." And it went on to note that the army and people
have "reorganized the fight" in the face of the war escalation
and "many-sided pressure from the enemy," adding:
Our posture is very firm and can be reversed by
nobody. We are ready to cope with all trials
and will only advance, never retreat.
While pledging to pursue the struggle, the 19 August editorial
injected an unusually somber note in a lengthy passage stressing
the importance of maintaining the "revolutionary offensive spirit"
in "adverse conditions or temporary regressions." In this context
it again raised the problem of outside pressures:
Opportunism often appears in time of regression and
at turning points due to the lack of rev,.)lutionary
dynamism. The disastrous opportunist tendencies
of all shades from outside have not been able to
harm this land.
It is not usual for Hanoi's August Revolution anniversary propaganda
to dwell upon past reverses, although analyses of the low points in
the Vietnamese communists' struggle are standard fare in party
discourse. For example, Truong Chinh pointed out in his August
1968 Marx anniversary article that under certain circumstances it
had been necessary to shift to the defensive in order to prepare
for a new offensive, and this view was echoed by Vo Nguyen Giap in
his December 1969 article on the party's military line. The same
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point was made by Le Duan in his lengthy article in February 1970
which, like tha current anniversary editorial, dwelt on the
significant contributions of unsuccessful uprisings in the 1930's.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 19 August anniversary did
not match NHAN DAN's polemical tone but echoed the party paper in
its expression of determination. The army paper declared that
"only by struggling resolutely and perseveringly, by reaching no
unprincipled agreements, and by fearing no sacrifices or hardships
can the revolutionary peoples achieve their legitimate interests."
The editorial warned that the United States is stepping up air
and naval attacks "in coordination with extremel;, cunning political,
diplc,'natic, and psywar schemes," and it charged Washington with
"boasting about its eagerness for peace and its dec.ire to solve
the war through negotiations while stepping up the bombings and
shelling with a view to forcing our people to accept the
conditions they have set forth." At the same time, the army
paper struck an optimistic note with the claim that "never before
have we had such a sound battle position and such great strength
as we now have."
A Liberation Radio editorial. on the August Revolution, broadcast
on 18 August, also emphasize, that victory will come only through
struggle. It claimed that Fast experience demonstrated that
"genuine peace in independence and freedom cannot be obtained by
begging" and added that "a genuine peace can be achieved only
through our people's strength and tenacious, unsubmissive, fighting
spirit."
President Nixon's detente diplomacy came under fire in a 21 August
NHAN i)AN article by Nguyen Huu Chinh, a commentator who frequently
discusses the U.S. domestic scene. Chinh derided the President
for "bragging" about his "foreign trips" and for suggesting that
"he alone" deserved credit for "the detente that is taking place
among a number of countries." Expressing Hanoi's view that the
Administration's "diplomatic moves" reflect the weakening of
"U.S. imperialism," the article added that "in the final analysis
the international agreements he has achieved do not have any major
practical effect and can in no way change the balance of forces
in the world.".
In the vein of the polemics aginst "reconciliation," Chinh also
reiterated the charge that U.S. efforts to achieve detente "with
some big powers" are aimed at gaining a free hard to-cope with
the world revolutionary movements and to "bully the small nations."
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And he cautioned, with respect to the President's policy toward
relations with communist countries, that
while he walks lightly, he carries a big stick.
How can one forget that the Nixon Administration
has always been the intimate friend of the
dictatorial fascist regimes in Greece, Spain,
and Portugal?
Chinh went beyond earlier Hanoi reaction to the U.S.-Soviet
summit when he recalled the President "shedding crocodile tears"
over the diary of a "Soviet" girl. He did not indicate the
occasion of the President's remarks, but earlier Hanoi comment
citing those remarks--as well as other statements the President
had made during his USSR visit--had carefully avoided any
specific mention of the Soviet Union.
ABSENCE OF SLOGANS Hanoi's concern over the effect of big-power
relations on its policies at this Juncture
may be reflected in the absence thus far of the set of slogans it
normally issues to mark the 19 August anniversary and the 2 September
DRV National Day. The slogan'- were publicized during the first
week of August in 1970 and 1971 and have customarily appeared no
later than 19 August. In addition to routine-level Hanoi and PRG
comment on the 19 August event, the NFLSV and PRG have issued a
joint appeal marking the two anniversaries this year, and the usual
NFLSV/PRG congratulatory message to the DRV leaders has been
publicized.
The absence of the slogans may indicate disarray or uncertainty over
how to treat the sensitive issue of Hanoi's relations with Moscow
and Peking. Last year's slogans included the standard expression
of thanks for support from the socialist countries, but perhaps
as a result of Hanoi-Peking discord over the Sino-U.S. rapprochement,
a passage was inserted calling on the Vietnamese to "uphold the
spirit of independence and sovereignty, rely mainly on ourselves."
A dramatic change in the slogans three years ago may be relevant
background for conjectures as to the reasons for the ai,sence of
the slogans this year: They were reduced from a total of 20 or
30 to only eight in August 1969, at a time--two weeks before Ho
Chi Mlnh's death--when there may well have been disarray in Hanoi.
That strained international communist relations may have been a
factor at that time was suggested by subsequent developments, such
as Hanoi's effort to promote a Sino-Soviet accommodation and the
meeting in Peking of Premiers Kosygin and Chou as the former was
returning from Ho's funeral.
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LE DUC TWO SEES KIRILENKK. CHOU ON WAY HOME FROM PARIS
Making his third trip between Hanoi and Paris in as many months,
DRV negotiator Le Duc Tho was accorded high-level treatment by
both Moscow and Peking during his customary stopovers at those
capitals on his way back to Hanoi on 19 August. This trip,
which coincided with Hanoi's blistering denunciation of the
detente policies being practiced toward the United States by its
two big allies, was given greater play by Moscow than any since
a year ago. As in the summer of 1971, Tho was received by
Brezhnev's deputy, Politburo member Kirilenko, and the substance
of their talks was given unusual publicity by Moscow. The
Chinese followed their recent practice during his stopover in
Peking, where he was again hosted by Politburo member Chang
Chun-chiao and had a meeting with Chou En-tai.
In the customary pattern, a representative of the country at
which Tho was to make the second stopover-was mentioned as
present in the host country's announcement on his departure from
the first stopover. Thus TASS on the 17th reported that the
Chinese charge d'affaires was among those seeing Tho off in
Moscow that day. An exception to this pattern occurred in June
when no Chinese representative was officially announced as present
at Tho's departure from Moscow for. Peking, though a VNA service
message from Moscow to Hanoi noted that the Chinese ambassador
had been present on that occasion.
Following recent practice, Hanoi's coverage of Tho's trip consisted
of a single report on the 20th taking note of his stopovers in
Moscow and Peking. VNA reported that he had "cordial" talks
with both the Soviets and the Chinese, giving no account of the
substance. In July 1971 VNA had carried a fuller account, similar
to Moscow's then and on the latest occasion.
MOSCOW Moscow reported that during his 16-17 August stopover in
the Soviet capital Tho met with Kirilenko and CPSU
Secretary Katushev for "friendly and cordial" talks on "the further
strengthening of friendship i d cooperation" between the USSR and
the DRV as well as on "the development of the struggle of the
Vietnamese people." According to Moscow's.account, Tho said that
the Vietnamese people would continue their "military, political,
and diplomatic" struggle for "genuine peace" and independence, and
he thanked the Soviet Union for its "constant and effective aid."
The Soviet side was quoted as expressing support for the Vietnamese
people's struggle and for the DRV and PRG proposals for a peaceful
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settlement, and as condemning the U.S. bombing and the "mining
and blockade" of DRV ports. The Soviet side pledged to continue
providing "economic and military aid and moral and political
support" to the Vietnamese people until "the complete victory
of their Just cause." According to a foreign-language Moscow
radio report on 18 August, both Tho and the Soviets made similar
remarks at a rally that day marking the conclusion of the USSR's
solidarity month which opened on the 20 July anniversar" of the
1954 Geneva agreements.
This is the first time Tho has met with a Soviet official as
high ranking as Kirilenko since the July. 1971 stopover. During
several subsequent visits he was received by no official higher
than Katushev. (Tho had also met with Kirilenko during a June
1971 stopover. There were no reports that he met any Soviet leaders
during a stop in January 1970. During earlier trips he met with
Kosygin and once with Maxurov.) The only precedent for Moscow's
account giving the substance of Tho's talks with Soviet leaders
was at the time of his July 1971 talk with Kirilenko, which
was described in terms very similar to the latest report. All
the other talks, including those with Kosygin, were described in
terms no more specific than that they covered "questions of
mutual interests."
PEKING As in his two previous visits, Tho was met at the
airport on 18 August by Chang Chun-chiao, who gave a
banquet in his honor that evening and saw him off on the 19ty.
He again met with Chou for what NCNA called "e very cordial and
friendly conversation." As at the time of his July stopover en
route to Paris, Peking did not characterize the atmosphere of the
banquet or indicate what was said at the banquet or during the
talk. During his June visit the Chinese quoted Chang and Tho
as having toasted "the great victories" of the Vietnamese and
the growth in Sino-Vietnamese unity, but even that represented a
marked reduction in Peking's expression of support for its ally.
During Tho's 27-29 April stopover Chou, who on that occasion hosted
the banquet far the visitor, pledged Chinese support "no matter
in what form the war is rarrted out" and denounced U.S. "war
escalation." The change in Peking's approach has.been consistent
with its low posture on the Vietnam question in recent weeks.
Peking's reports. on Tho's latest stopover again mentioned the presence
of DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who sigce' the
supplementary aid agreement with the Chinese on 28 June. His protracted
stay in China, dating back to his arrival on 3 May, suggests that he may
be coordinating aid shipments to Vietnam coming from or through China.
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DRV SCORES ADMINISTRATION FOR OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS ON TALKS
Hanoi's view that the Administration is escalating U.S. Involve-
ment in the Vietnam war and falsely claiming it seeks a negotiated
settlement was pressed at length in an article by the military
commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor), published in both NHAN DAN
and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 18 August.* The article leunched its
attack by criticizing the Administration for "giving full blast
to its propaganda machines" on the occasion of the departure
of the last U.S. Infantry combat battalion from Vietnam. Chien
Thang maintained that the President had no choice but to withdraw
U.S. troops after the "bankruptcy" of U.S. strategy in 1968 but
that he used U.S. ground forces intensively during the withdrawal
period and has now ordered the massive commitment of U.S. air
and naval forces. In view of the increased U.S. air and naval
involvement, Chien Thang commented, "Nixon's claim about 'ending
U.S. involvement' is but a blatant deception."
Chien Thang also accused the President of trying to "fool public
opinion" into believing he is following a course of negotiations.
The article cited as evidence "rumors" allegedly spread by the
White House to the effect that the situation in the talks has
never been so good, that the war may end before 20 January 1973,
and that the war is likely to be over before the end of September
1972. These statements have been attacked in other Hanoi commentaries,
which attributed t-,e one about the war ending in September to
Dr. Kissinger.** At another point, Chien Thang also deprecated
"Nixon's successive diplomatic moves and the hasty trips of
Kissinger, Connally, Rogers, and Agnew to Asia, Europe, and Latin
America" which he claimed "have failed to lessen the isolation of
the United States and to drum up any more support." In addition
to noting continued opposition to the war in such countries as
Sweden, India, Mexico, and Uganda, Chien Thang echoed the 17 August
NHAN DAN editorial's praise for the nonalined conference's stand
on Indochina and said the conclave had proved that the United
States cannot "isolate the Vietnamese revolution."
* Chien Thang s last article, analyzing the course of the communisL
offensive in South Vietnam, was published in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN on 3 May and is discussed in the 3 May 1972 TRENDS, pages 4-6.
** An article in the 16 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cited a French
newspaper for the report that Kissinger had gold a friend the war
would be over before the end of September. See the 16 August 1972
TRENDS, pages 12-13.
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k. 19 August Hanoi domestic ssrvAo,ce commentary, pursuing the attack
on "rumors" about negotiations, also decried Kissinger's 16-18
August visit to Saigon. The commentary charged that "at a time
when the Nixon Administration is preventing the Parts conference
from moving forward through its stubborn stand, it is resor'.:ing
to all kinds of tricks to make it appear as if there will I.
important changes at the conference." According to the radio,
"Kissinger's recent trip to Saigon constituted one of these
perfidious tricks."
The 21 August Nguyen Huu Chinh article also charged the
Administration with "trying to sow the illusion that some progress
hes been made at the Parr conference," and it further asserted
that "Nixon and his associates are trying to make home people
believe that the U.S. position concerning Vietnam has changed."
The Chinh article, like several other commentaries, took note
of remarks by Secretary Rogers in ar interview published on
20 August. For example, a 21 August article by QUAN DOI KHAN DA1','s
Commentator quoted Rogers as "decla,ri.,; shamelessly that
negotiation measures to end the war would be worked out with+.n
the year" and charged that
Nixon has repeatedly released many false themes of
peace. Recently he also ordered his followers to
spread the news that there was something new in the
contacts with the communists and that the United
States was trying to settle the war by September.
PARIS TALKS: U.S. BLNIED FOR LOSS OF PEACE OPPORTUNITIES
VNA's typical summary treatment of the, 17 August Paris session
brushed lightly over -Ae. Binh's discourse on opportunities for
peace allegedly missed in the past. The account duly reflex :ed
her major points--that the United States should cease the
Vietnamization policy, end its support of the Thieu regime, and
respect the aims aa%'. 'La%;ure of the PRG. Without mentioning
Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Shriver's charge that
President Nixon has passed up opportunities for peace during his
term in office,* she declared, according to VNA, that January 1969
* Initial Hanoi treatment of Shriver's remarks is 3iscussed in the
16 August 1972 TRENDS, page 13. The reference on that page to
VNA's pickup of his charge on 15 August should have read: "Hanoi
radio picked up the charge . . . ."
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23 AUGUST 1972
"was a very good opportunity to and the war, but President Nixon
has chosen to 'Vistnamize' the war land] block and sabotage the
Paris conference on Vietnam." The VNA account omitted her
rectal of of at alleged lost opportunities--all occasions when
new proposals were offered by the communists: the 10-point
solution of May 1969, the eight-point initiative of September
1970, and the seven-point peace plan of July 1971, together with
the two-point "clarification" of February 1972. Other
Vietnamese communist propaganda, like Mme. Binh, has predictably
ignored statements that the opportunity for a settlea ent in
1968-1969 was signalled by Hanoi's withdrawal of tron}s from
South Vietnam's northern provinces.
VNA was even more cryptic in reporting DRV representative Xuan
Thuy's remarks, which were largely a restatement of last week's
stt+rament by Nguyen Minh Vy. It omitted completely his lengthy
charges of U.S. escalation of the war, which he used to counter
U.S. criticism of DRV activities in the South, as well as his
list of alleged U.S. attacks o,i the North during the preceding
week. It did report Thuy's brief mention of the lost
"opportunities for peace" in the course of his charges of U.S.
escalation, which he said surpasses that of "the 1965-1968 period."
It also noted the DRV delegate's remarks scorning the President's
proposals of 8 May, as well as his criticism of Secretary Rogers'
14 August remark that the United States is withdrawing its
troops gradually in order to provide the Thieu regime with evcry
possibility for survival.
In closing, the VNA report as usual dismissed Ambassador Porter's
remarks in one sentence, followed by the claim that he "also
disclosed the U.S. intention to sabotage the negotiations"--
presumably a reference to an exchange at the clone of the session
over the setting of the date for resumption of the talks. The
next meeting was finally scheduled for 24 August.
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DRV MINISTRY ASSAILS STRIKES AT WANOI1 CLAIMS DIKES BOMBED
Massive U.S. attacks of 14 and 16 August o" Hanoi and Thanh Hoa
city, respectively, as well as recent attacks on other cities in
the DRV prompted a foreign ministry statement of the 17th.
Somewhat more muted in tone than the last previous statement at
that level, on the 8th, it charged that such attacks on populous
areas, together with bombing of the dike system and water
c "..servancy projects, constitute "a towering crime that the
Johnson Administration dared not commit."
Asserting that by such "savage tricks" the Nixon Administration
is only revealing its "extremely cruel, aggressive nature" and
staining U.S. tonor, the statement claimed that U.S. strikes are
failing to shake the Vietnamese people's "iron-like determination."
The foreign ministry then warned that the Nixon Administration
will be held responsible if it continues bombing cities, dame,
and dikes and demanded that it honor "the U.S. Government's
commitment of October 1968" and stop its bombing and mining
activities and "all other acts that encroach on DRV sovereignty
and security." The statement concluded with a standard appeal
by the government and people of the DRV for support from
fraternal socialist countries and "all conscientious people in
the United States and in other parts of the world" to help "stay
the bloody hands of the U.S. aggressord'and prevent "the
recurrence of the Guernica, Coventry, Dresden, Hamburg, and
Essen cases."
This theme was further developed in a strongly worded NHAN DAN
editorial of 21 August, carried by both Hanoi radio and VNA.
Entitled "Let Us Stay Nixon's Bloody Hands," the editorial
repeated the reference to the World War II bombing of
Coventry, charging that the President has gone further than
Hitler by creating "tens of Coventrys" in the North, bombing
seaside resorts, and using antipersonnel bombs and poison gas.
The editorial "severely warned" the Nixon Administration that
"our retaliatory strength is unlimited" and that the United
States will never be able to gain the "position of strength it
so desires." Claiming that "perpetrators of crimes must be
and are being punished appropriately"--through the downing of
U.S. planes and the capture of pilots--the editorial said that
continued bombings "have torn to pieces the tricky and
deceitful screen that they (the U.S. imperialists) recently set
up to mislead public opinion by saying that they were trying to
settle the war through negotiations and that the negotiating
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23 AUGUST 1972
situation has never been so good as now." Finally, claiming that
the people of America are organizing to oppose "Nixon the war
criminal" despite his forthcoming nomination by the Republican
convention, the editorial concluded with standard assertions that
the U.S. bombing will never stop the Vietnamese people from
fighting for independence and freedom.
The 16 August bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong also prompted Hanoi
to broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen on the 20th a
"Joint statement" attributed to eight captured pilots. Describing
themselves as the detained Americans "in Hanoi," the pilots
reportedly stressed the futility of such bombing, claiming that
it will not serve to break the Vietnamese people's spirit but
will only make U.S. withdrawal more difficult. In addition,
the broadcast quoted them as says'-g that the bombing will only
risk "the death or capture of many more Americans" and endanger
the lives of those already held captive. The statement concluded
with an appeal to Congress to end the war and bring the prisoners
home, as a first step resuming "serious negotiations" at the
Paris conference.
CHARGES OF STRIKES VNA on the 20th reported as a "sample" of
AT DIKES AND DAMS U.S. strikes at dikes the dropping of six
2,000-pound bombs on the dike in He Son
village, Ha Trung district of Thanh Hoa Province. Describing
this alleged attack of the 17th as "the 38th U.S. air raid on
the dikes and other hydraulic works" in the province, the
report said that a 40-meter stretch of the dike's surface was
destroyed and that hits on its sloping side erased the collapse
of another section. In coverage of earlier strikes, VNA on
17 August claimed attacks of the 15th and 16th on dikes and
water conservancy works in Thanh Hoa, highlighting a strike of
the 16th on a dike associated with the Trung Luong lock in
Ha Tinh Province--reportedly the fourth attack on this lock.
And the foreign ministry spokesman's statement of the 22d claimed
strikes at dike portions within Hai Hung Province.
Despite these claims of continuing U.S. strikes at water
conservancy projects, Hanoi maintained last week's tone of
optimism regarding the dike situation. Hanoi rr...o on
20 August reported the awarding of the Ho Chi Minh medal to
nine individuals for their "many outstanding achievements in
water conservancy worn," while a Mandarin-language broadcast on
the 21st cited the repair of a number of portions of the dike
system damaged by U.S. attacks in Hai Hung, Nam Ha, and Thanh Hoa
provinces and other areas. Describing the work accomplished in
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23 AUGUST 1972
Hai Hung, the latter article claimed that workers and cadres,
together with the engineering departments, have "widened and
increased the height of the dikes and dams destroyed by U.S.
planes . . . to three times their original width and height."
And a NHAN DAN editorial on the 22d, entitled "The Entire World
I. Struggling To Protect Our Country's Dikes," hailed the
"creative ideas and enthusiastic acts" of various individuals
and countries in supporting the DRV position. It directed
special praise at Cuba's recent proposal to celebrate "Dike Day"
on 28 August, ane? it lauded the resolution recently issued by
"several hundred well-known intellectuals and artists in France
and other countries" which allegedly asserted that, should the
dikes break this summer, President Nixon "will be held as
responsible for this destruction as if he had bombed these
dikes."
In an apparent effort to demonstrate support for the DRV from
foreign countries in the face of alleged attacks on the dikes,
VNA reported on the 23d that the Cuban ambassador to the DRV
and visiting Cu'~nn of.fi.ci.al,s--including the captains of two
Cuban ships "unloading goods at Haiphong port"--aided residents
of Hanoi in reinforcing a section of the Red River dike near
the city. At this writing, VNA has not, however, picked up an
NCNA report of-18 August to the effect that the PRC's ambassador
to the DRV, Wang Yu-ping, as well as other embassy staff members
had joined Hanoi residents in repairing dikes allegedly damaged
in recent U.S. bombing raids. Wang was quoted by NCNA as saying
that the staff members were helping repair the dikes "to show
their great indignation at and strong condemnation of U.S.
imperialism's strikes against dikes, dams, and other water
conservancy projects in North Vietnam."
SPOKESMAN'S Emphasis on alleged deliberate U.S. bombing of
STATEMENTS civilian targets characterized the DRV foreign
ministry spokesman's statements of the past
+ Attacks of 17 August on the Thai Binh provincial capital, the
suburbs of Hanoi, and Cat Be Island off Haiphong were highlighted
in the statement of the 18th. Opecific targets reported hit in
Thai Binh's capital included a hospital, part of the university
of medicine, and a senior high school. In addition, the
statement charged that B-52's "carpet-bombed" areas in Quang
Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone, and U.S. warships
"wantonly shelled" coastal areas in He Tinh and Quang Binh.
Calling the alleged strikes "new proofs of Nixon's obstinacy,"
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the statement claimed that they "further exposed the utter
bellicosity and cruelty of the Nixon Administration and its lie
that the U.S. does not bomb civilian targets."
+ The "bellicose," "deceitful" nature of the Nixon Administra-
tion was further revealed, according to the spokesman's
statement of the 19th, in its dispatch of aircraft and warships
"to savagely bomb by day and by night population centers, cities,
provincial capitals, and district towns while continuing to
attack dikes and irrigation works of the DRV." The statement
condemned the 19 August bombing of Hai Duong, capital of Hai Hung
Province, as well as attacks of the 18th on populated areas in
Hoa Binh, Ha Bac, Ha Tay, Hai King, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An,
Ha Tinh, and Q*..ing Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It
further claimed that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh and
that U.S. ships shelled coastal areas in Thanh Hoa and Ha Tinh
provinces.
+ In a relatively lengthy statement issued on 21 August, the
foreign ministry spokesman condemned U.S. "extermination raids"
of the 19th and 20th and listed all provinces and cities
allegedly hit since 30 July. It claimed that such raids reveal
"the U.S. imperialists' extremely cruel and perfidious plot of
massacring civilians and razing to the ground every residential
quarter and every provincial capital in an attempt to subdue
the Vietnamese people." Repeating standard charges that the
Nixon Administration is thereby violating its pledge of
October 1968 and challenging world public opinion, the statement
concluded by declaring that it "must bear full responsibility
for its barbarous crimes." The specific strikes which prompted
this protest, according to the statement, included those of the
19th at the capital cities of Thai Binh and Hai Hung provinces
and of the 20th r- Haiphong. Wards in the latter city were
said to have been hit by demolition bombs, perforating bombs,
and steel-pellet bombs.
+ A statement on the 22d charged the United States with dropping
"dozens of perforating bombs" on dike portions in two villages
in Thanh Ha district of Hai Hung Province, an area it described
as part of the Thai Binh River system. it also claimed that
U.S. aircraft bombed and strafed Vinh city and populated areas
in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa,
Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh
zone and that B-52's bombed localities in Quapg Binh and Vinh
Linh. "Many schools" were cited among the economic and cultural
establishm..nts damaged, and numerous civilian casualties were
reported.
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23 AUGUST 1972
+ A statement on the 23d protested alleged U.S. bombings of
populated areas in Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and
Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It further charged
that B-52's bombed localitieo in Quang Binh and that U.S.
warships "indiscriminately launched arti.,.lery attacks" against
coastal areas in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces.
PLANE DOWIINGS As of 23 August, the total number of planes
allegedly downed over the Norch reached
3,845, as Hanoi during the past week reported the downing of 20
planes and the capture of an unspecified number of "aggressor
pilots." One ship was reportedly "set ablaze" on 18 August off
the coast of Ha Tinh Province.
The alleged downing of a B-52 over the Vinh Linh area o?i
21 August marked the 1,700th plane downing claimed for the 4th
Military Region, which also includes Quang Binh, He Tinh, and
Nghe An provinces. The alleged downing appeared to respond to
an earlier appeal by the military region command, described to
a broadcast by Hanoi radio on 18 August, for local units to
launch an emulation movement to achieve a total of 1,700 downed
planes "to score achievements to commemorate the August revolution
and National Day."
A 22 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial in praise of this
"brilliant victory," as broadcast by Hanoi radio and VNA on the
same day, lauded the people and armed forces serving in the
"direct rear of the vast heroic frontline," stressing their
coordination, maintenance of vital communications lines, and
simultaneous achievements in both economic and defense activities.
Citing one means of accomplishing these tasks, the editorial
noted that "combatants and compatriots" in the military region
have been "allowing youths to serve voluntarily as civilian
laborers on the battlefields." It attributed this and other
successful policies to the correct leadership of the party's
political and military line and of the local party committee.
As an illustration of the military region's successes, the
editorial claimed that since the April escalation of the war
113 other U.S. aircraft, including six B-52's, have been downed
in the region and 45 warships set afire. A NHAN DAN editorial
of the 23d in praise of the downing, carried by Hanoi radio,
praised the "steel land of Vinh Linh" in similar terms. The
editorial stressed the people's ingenuity and skill in fighting
against the ever newer weapons and tactics used by the United
States and claimed that the region's communications and
transportation network continues to function smoothly despite
U.S. attacks.
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23 AUGUST 1972
The occasion of the 27th anniversary of the August revolution
and the claimed increase in the number of recent plans downings
appear to have prompted a 19 August Hanoi radio commentary
hailing the "August armed exploits that are blossoming red
throughout both parts of our country." Praising specifically
the alleged downing of 23 planes in five days,* including six
on the night of 18-19 August, the commentary used the occasion
to laud recent achievements of the northern armed forces and
to blast the "war-maniac Nixon clique" for escalating attacks
on the North. The commentary claimed that,. although "the Nixon
and Kissinger butchers" may try to force the people of the
North to yield by bombing civilian targets, including dikes and
wrcer conservancy projects, the people will never renounce the
,chievements of the August revolution or lose their revolutionary
spirit. "The Nixon sadists," said the commentary, "are very
stupid." Then, viewing Dien Bien Phu and the "complete defeat"
of "Johnson's war of dsstructionl" as, steps toward "total victory
in the anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking," the article
concluded that the United.States can never shake the people's
determination to fight and, win and that the'people of "our
entire nation" share "the same absolute revolutionary ideology
and the same revolutionary offensive spirit."'
Acclaim was also given this week to Vinh Phu. Province for having
downed its 100th plane last week;. Hanoi radio on the 17th
broadcast President Ton.Duc Thang's..16.August letter of
commendation to the "compatriots,. combatants,, and cadres" of
the province.
* This achievement was also lauded: in a. QUAN DOI NHAN?DAN,
commentary of 20 August, aired, by Hanoi radio on the same. day,
which praised the exploits of the northern armed forces and
people in opposing "the U.S. skyraiders' perfidious schemes."
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SALT AND DISARMAMENT
SUSLOV DECRIES "POSITIONS OF STRENGTH" STANCE FOR SALT II
The first authoritative public Soviet reaction to the Senate
debate on the U.S.-Soviet Interim Agreement on limiting strategic
offensive weapons came from CPSU Politburo member Suslov on
23 August, in an address to a joint session of the two Supreme
Soviet foreign affairs commissions which unanimously approved
the treaties for ratification by the Supreme Soviet Presidium.
According to TASS, Suslov complained that "some representatives
of the forces of the 'military-industrial complex' continue to
entertain illusions about the possibility of trying to speak
with the Soviet Union at the forthcoming strategic arms limita-
tion talks 'from positions of strength."'
Moscow had refrained for almost three weeks from direct comment
at any level on the Senate debate sparked on 3 August by Senator
Jackson's introduction of his original amendment to the Senate
resolution approving the Interim Agreement. Routine news items
reported in general terms that "opponents" of the agreement,
including Jackson, were trying to block it, and Moscow alluded
without detail and without comment to the Defense Department's
proposal on a new rounterforce/first-strike nuclear warhead.
Routine-level comment on these questions, raising the issue of
Administration support for the Jackson amendment, first appeared
in the central media three days before the Supreme Soviet
commissions convened.
JACKSON AMENDMENT The first Soviet comment on the Jackson
amendment appeared in an international review
in the weekly LIFE ABROAD on the 18th This was followed by a
lengthy discussion of the Senate debate in the Moscow domestic
service commentators' roundtable on the 20th. The review in
LIFE ABROAD labeled Jackson's original amendment "a virtual ultimatum
to the Soviet Union" in view of its demand that the USSR "refrain
from modernizing its arms, even those not subject to the limitations,
under the threat of a U.S. renunciation of the Interim Agreement
and of the treaty to limit ABM systems, which has already been
approved by the Senate." Where both the weekly and the roundtable
discussions noted that Republicrn Senate leader Scott was a
co-sponsor of the Jackson amendment, one of the roundtable com-
mentators, PRAVDA deputy chief editor Nekrasov, singled out Jackson
for criticism. He charged that Jackson was attempting "to sabotage
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23 AUGUST 1972
the spirit of the agreement" and went on to cite Jackson's state-
ment that "my amendment has the approval of the White House."
Both the paper and the discussion program noted that Jackson
then altered his amendment, the former citing White House approval
for the "compromise amendment" and the latter stating that "the
very spirit, the spirit of the demand that the U.S. Government
continue the arms race, was lcept in the amendment.
On the 22d IZVESTIYA broke its abstinence from comment on the
Jackson amendment, saying, according to a TASS summary, that
the Interim Agreement "must become law withcut delay" and that
"any procrastination--and this should be clear to anyone--thwarts
further practical steps to curtail the nuclear arms race which is
hardly in the interests of the United States."
DOD PROPOSAL Commenting on the Defense Department's proposal
to develop a new, more accurate and more powerful
nuclear warhead, one of the roundtable commentators charged that
the "ballyhoo" surrounding the Jackst~a amendments was in fact
related to the Pentagon's intention "to design a new warhead, the
so-called second-generation warhead for intercontinental strategic
missiles--a warhead which is more accurate and far more powerful
than that which it now possesses." LIFE ABROAD, citing U.S. press
reports, stated flatly that the "new type of-multiple warhead"
would have the capability "of destroying missiles based in silo-
type launch pads." It went on to assert that Senator Brooke had
tried to amend the Senate's resolution approving the Interim
Agreement by urging astipulation prohibiting both sides from
"creating a first-strike capability." The paper noted that the
Foreign Relations Committee had approved the resolution without
any amendments.
SUSLOV SPEECH Suslov praised the SALT accords in standard
terms, treating them as a positive consequence
of the "consistent" Soviet "peace program" endorsed by the 24th
CPSU Congress. He went on to assert that the USSR "did not have
to change the nature" of its foreign policy in order to reach
? the accords. Prefacing his remarks on the U.S. "military-
industrial complex," Suslov observed that the "broad" American
public welcomed the SALT accords "positively" and,that "on
the whole" the American political leaders reacted "favorably"
to them. However, in a blunt statement directed at the
Administration, he declared:
It should be clear to all that proceeding from the
interests of its security, the Soviet Union will
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23 AUGUST 1972
attentively follow the attempts of certain forces in
the United States to distort the spirit and letter of
the concluded treaty and Interim Agreement and will
take into account in its policy the changes that may
appear in the position of the American side.
Also addressing the joint session of the foreign affairs commis-
sions, according to TASS, were First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov and First Deputy Defonsu Minister Kulikov. TASS
reported that Kuznetsov, speaking "on behalf of the Soviet
Government," saw reason to hope that because of the "positive"
experience of SALT I the further limitation of strategic offen-
sive weapons "will be continued in a constructive spirit and
yield concrete results." TASS reported that Kulikov also
endorsed the SALT accords but that he "at the same time stressed
that the party and government were showing concern for raising
the Soviet Union's defense capability."
VENUE FOR SALT II Acknowledging for the first time in Soviet
media that Geneva would be the venue for
the second round of SALT, the LIFE ABROAD article noted that the
Swiss Government had 'nnounced its agreement to the site "at the
request of the [two] sides."
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR REPLIES TO ARAB CRITICS WITH JABS AT "SOME ARAB LEADERS"
After more than a week of virtual silence, Moscow has begun to
respond to outspoken Arab criticism, particularly from the Cairo
press, of Soviet policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and
attitudes toward the Arabs, in what Belgrade's TANJUG on the 19th
called "a kind of public polemic" about certain questions being
raised in the Arab world. In a sharper tone, Moscow continued
to reject the idea that the Soviet Union is interested in seeing
the "no war, no peace" situation prevail in the Middle East. It
lectured the Arabs on their need for friendship and cooperation
with the USSR, suggesting that Israeli and "imperialist" pressures
on the Arabs for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations result from
Western and Tel Aviv assessments that Egypt "has now seriously
weakened itself." 14--1 Arab countries were further warned of the
dangers of disunity and of intrigues to disrupt Soviet-Arab
friendship.
Along with routine attacks on Arab "reactionaries," Moscow has
begun to take swipes at "leading sections" in the Arab countries
and at the illusions of "some Arab political leaders." Moscow
has not acknowledged, much less responded to, several recent
press interviews by Egyptian President as-Sadat expressing hope
that the USSR understands Egypt's attitude as that of a sincere
friend, but also complaining that Moscow failed to take into
account the "psychological factor" in its dealings with the
Arabs and that it imposed a "certain embargo" on arms, which it
supplied only "up to a certain point."
PRESS COMMENT An article in the Soviet weekly NOVOYE VREMYA,
not yet available in translation, was viewed
by TANJUG on the 18th as Moscow's first reply to Arab criticism
addressed to Moscow. According to TANJUG, the weekly rejected
assertions about insufficient Soviet military aid to the Arabs
and took to task the chief editor of Cairo's AKHBAR AL-YAWM,
al-Quddus, and "some of his colleagues" for forgetting the
? identities of their friends and their enemies. NOVOYE VREMYA's
attack was apparently prompted by al-Que'dus' 12 August article
complaining of Soviet silence on the issue of arms supplies and
on the improvement of Moscow-Washington relations. In an article
on the 19th, al-Quddus questioned Soviet sincerity with regard
to its treaty obligations to Egypt. Moscow frequently cited the
treaty the basis of developing Soviet-Egyptian relations in
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its defensive propaganda immediately following the ouster of
its military personnel from Egypt, but more recent comment,
proffering advice to the Arabia generally, has made no mention
of the treaty.*
A Medvedko article in PRAVDA on the 19th set the stage for
further comment by %.xpressing concern over imperialist efforts
to split the Arabs, cut them off from their "sincerest allies,"
and weaken the progressive Arab regimes "from the inside" by
helping "the forces of reaction there to take power." Medvadko
assailed "re..tionary quarters and certr.in nationalist slem'3nts"
in the Arab world for trying to "blacken" Soviet-Arab friendship
and promote the idea of a single Arab front "relying entirely
on Arab forces." Citing.the Beirut ASH-SHA'B, Medvedko warned
that Arab unity cannot be achieved "by anythin3 that harms Arab-
Soviet friendship."
Taking up the theme, a Kudryavtsev article in the 21 August
IZVESTIYA, as reported by TASS, acknowledged that "some or
other difference.." among the Arab states were unavoidable, given
the "differing shndec Jf their sociopolitical systems and
political aspirations.' But he advised the Arabs that their
common interests "ought to be above" these differences.
Kudryavtsev warned that the United States tried to make use
of what it assessed as "the most vulnerable moments" in the
activities and sentiments of "leading sections" in the Arab
countries to depict the Soviet Un:on's sincere and friendly
aid as "well-nigh 'Soviet expansion' and 'abuse of national
sovereignty,"' in hopes of arousing nationalistic sentiments
among the Arabs.
Continuing the attack, a PRAVDA article by Bolshakov on the
23d warned, acccrding to TASS, that the U.S. Republican and
Democratic election platforms' support for Israel showed "how
illusory are the hopes of some Arab olitical leaders for
'mutual understanding' with the United States." Bolshakov also
warned of the danger of insufficient unity of the Arabs in the
face of a common enemy and cautioned against underestimation
* Kosygin called the Soviet-Iraqi treaty a guarantee of the
continued development of friendly relations in a message on the
17th to an international conference of solidarity with Iraq held
in Baghdad to nunrort Iraq's oil nationalization decision.
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"by individual Arab leaders" of the gravity of the situation
"as well as the reactionary nature of soma of the monarchist
regimes." Bolshakov insisted on the importance of the USSR's
friendly assistance, along the lines of Madvedko's assertion
that friendship with the Soviet Union is the "guarantee of
success" for the Arab peoples' struggle for social and economic
progress and a just peace in the Middle East.
PUBLICITY FOR Moscow also played up Arab expressions of
ARAB REMARKS appreciation for this USSR's friendship and
support. Thus TASS on the 22d cited the head
of a visiting Syrian People's Assembly delegation as saying
Syria could overcome the "intrigues of reactionaries" only with
the cooperation and friendship-of the Soviet Union. A similar
assertion was attributed to the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH by TRUD on
the 22d, and Moscow's domestic service on the 19th cited AL-AHRAM
as calling Soviet friendship "a vitally important question" for
the Arabs.
Syrian President Hafiz al-As&d was quoted by TASS on the 10th as
saying, in an interview with the Beirut AL-ANWAR, that the interests
of the Syrian people demanded continuation of the Soviet military
experts' mission in Syria, and there was no call for a discussion
of whether they should continue their mission. However, Damascus
radio's account of the interview reported al-Asad as saying the
question of Soviet experts in Syria was not a subject of discussion
"at present." He also twice expressed the hope of Syria--and Egypt--
that "the Soviet Union will meet our demands in a better and more
effective way." Asked about CPSU efforts to reconcile factions of
the Syrian Communist Party, al-Asad in effect warned Moscow that it
had no connection with Syrian domestic affairs; professing to know
nothing about Soviet conciliation efforts, he added that it was not
Moscow's business to interfere in he affairs of a Syrian party
and that "such an interference, if it happens, would not be in
harmony with our friendship with the Soviet Union."
HUNGARIAN While Moscow has confined itself to oblique
CRITICISM references to unidentified "individual Arab
leaders," press comment from Budapest has been
openly critical of aL-Sadat. A 9 August article by Ervin Reti in
ESTI HIRLAP, in an obvious reference to the Egyptian president's
past proclamations that 1971 would be the year of decision,
complained of "some Arab propagandists and organizations" which
arouse exaggerated expectations and nourish illusions of a swift
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solution. The author added that "setting various dates and
making statements not adequately thought through" may serve as
shock therapy in the short term, but can also "affect matters
negatively."* ESTI HIRLAP called it "simply not true" that
the socialist countries could approve of the "no peace, no
war" situatiin, but asked if that were worse than "a war which
appears dangerous, uncertain, and senseless." If the Av%b world
were really prepared for a war which promised success, the paper
added, then it would have enough strength to achieve all this
without war, "with the tools of a political settlement."
The Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG took a skeptical view of
plans for an Egyptian-Libyan marger in an article on the 15th by
Sandor Bocz which also professed alarm that "anti-Soviet
tendencies" would receive a boost from the "unexpected with-
drawal" of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt. Bocz noted
that the Egyptian rightwing and Arab reaction in general had
their hopes aroused by this development, while leftist
university students openly opposed the withdrawal. The author
expressed the belief that as-Sadat last spring dealt a blow,
"whether he wanted to or not," to the Nasirite left in taking
a position on "certain fractional struggles at that time";
now, "after tipping the political balance," he was trying to
maintain national unity with his personal power and prestige.
* The Polish paper SLOWS POWSZECHVE had criticized as-Sadat in a
24 July article for repeatedly proclaiming final deadlines for an
armed showdown, although "he lacked the objective data for it."
Adding that "sterile breaches" of these deadlines caused successive
tensions among the students and to some extent in the army, the
paper said the decision to withdraw the Soviet experts should be
viewed against this psychological background. If the withdrawal
decision were to strengthen the government in the face of impatient
elements, the paper said, then what was needed was a military feat;
but the problem was that the results of such a feat might be the
reverse of what was intended.
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KOREA-USSR
MOSCOW MUTES UNIFICATION ISSUE. MARKS KOREAN LIBERATION
Moscow has continued to show reluctance to publicize the 4 July
North-South Korean joint statement on reunification, with thn
first available Soviet comment coming belatedly in a 10 August
IZVESTIYA article.* Moscow media had duly carried the text of
the 4 July statement itself, but there hove been only brief
Soviet reports on subpequent Korean comment and publicity,
including the 19 August statement by North Zciean political
parties and public or"anizations proposing a joint conference
with their counterparts in the So,:th to implement the 4 July
statement. Moscow's treatment has contrasted with that of
Peking, which acclaimed the Korean joint statement authoritatively
in a 9 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a major speech by
Chou En-lai on the same day.
While Moscow has long been on record as supporting the goal of
"peaceful unification" of Korea, its reserve toward the most
dramatic development on this issue may be related to the
implications for the German question, a case in which the USSR
supports the maintenance of two separate states rather than
their reunification. It may also be that Moscow was taken by
surprise by the Korean announcement and that it sees Peking
as taking over its role as Pyongyang's patron in the United
Nations.
The 10 August IZVESTIYA article was pegged to support of the
UiJGA agenda item sponsored by a number of third-world countries,
"The Creation of conditions Promoting the Speediest Independence
Pnd Peaceful Reunification of Korea." The article brushed
quickly over the content of the 4 July joint statement, noting
only that the statement set forth "the basic principles of the
country's unification by peaceful means and with no foreign
interference" and that the North and South agreed in particular
"not to allow armed conflict, to develop all-round relations,
and to form a committee for a settlement between North and South."
* The joint statement and followup propaganda are discussed in
the TRENDS of 6 July, pages 16-19, and of 12 July, pages 34-35.
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IZVESTIYA commented merely that this has created "new opportunities"
for ;saceful unification and that "the United Nations cannot remain
to one side of such a favorable development of events on the Korean
peninsula." The article explained, however, that the UN role in
facilitating North-South contacts and negotiations for reunification
is merely to "rescind the U.S. troops' right to use the UN flag,"
dissolve UNCURK, and withdraw foreign troops from South Korea.
LIBERATION ANNIVERSARY rioscow failed to mention the 4 July
statement in conwent on the 27th
anniversary on 15 August of the liberation of Korea from Japanese
rule, which was marked in low-key fashion, as in 1971, with the
usual exchange of leaders' messages, wreath-laying ceremonies in
Pyongyang, receptions hosted by the respective ambassadors, and
a film show in Pyongyang. The current climate of detente in Asia
and within Korea, as well as the current state of relations
between Pyongyang and Moscow, seemed to be reflected in the
anniversary comment. The Soviet leaders' message, saying the
"fraternal friendship" of the two peoples will be developed and
consolidated, expressed confidence in the growth of Soviet-Korean
relations based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism. Last year's message, perhaps
reflecting Soviet displeasure with Kim I1-song's endorsement
of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, did not make the customary
reference to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
Unlike past years, routine anniversary comment this year did
not use the occasion to attack Peking's "splittist" policies.
The Soviet message this year inexplicably omitted the customary
reference to the Soviet army's contribution to the liberation of
Korea, although that fact was recalled in routine-level Moscow
comment. The routine comment also recalled in the usual way
that the USSR continued to give North Korea economi' and technical
assistance after the war, and a RED STAR article once again
observed that the Soviet-DPRK treaty of friendship, cooperation,
and mutual assistance "protects the peaceful labor of our
peoples" and helps to "insure peace and security in the Far East."
The Soviet leaders' message praised the Korean people's struggle
to end the "occupation" of South Korea by U.S. troops, but Soviet
comment, reflecting Moscow's detente policies as well as developments
in Asia, played down the theme of alleged U.S. aggressive intent in
Korea. The leaders' message failed to repeat a reference to "the
aggressive, wild ambition of imperialism" which had appeared last
year. Routine comment generally avoided references to U.S.
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"provocations" in Korea, although RED STAR dLd criticize the
U.S. "militarist preparations" if maintaining troops in South
Korea and modernizing the South Korean army.
Although there was no mentio.t of the North-South Korean joint
statement on reunification, Soviet comment did focus on support
for the goal of "peaceful unification." Like Pyongyang, Moscow
avoided the denigration of "puppet Pak Chong-hui" which had
been standard fare in anniversary comment in previous years.
The greetings message from the North Korean leaderv also reflected
the Asian climate of detente. It failed to specify "U.S.
imperialism and Japanese militarism," as it had done in previous
years, when praising the friendship and co:peration of the two
countries in the struggle against the "common enemy." It
similarly failed to repeat last year's charge of "daily
intensifying new provocative war maneuvers of U.S. imperialism
and its stooges." The message praised the Soviet army in
customary terms for rendering help in liberating Korea, and
it reiterated the hope that the traditional friendly relations
will further develop on the basis of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
In contrast to Moscow's silence on the 4 July joint statement in
its anniversary comment, a NODONG SINMUN editorial on the 15 August
anniversary hailed the joint statement as a "historic stage" on
the road to unification. The editorial called on the "South
Korean rulers" to implement the agreement and stressed a need
for vigilance against U.S. "splitting maneuvers" and "the
reinvasion moves of the Japanese militarists."
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AFRICA
MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO UGANDA OUSTER OF ASIANS
Soviet coverage of Uganda's order expelling Asians from the country
within three months has remained circumspect, apparently out of
concern on Moscow's part to steer clear of any complications
affecting its developing relations with the Am-',n regime or its
close ties with India and Bangladesh. Thus Moscow media's
belated reporting of President Amin's 5 August expulsion order
portrayed it as an offer of an opportunity to Asians holding
British passports to leave the country. And Moscow's first
comment on the episode, an article by Lesnov in IZVESTIYA on the
16th strongly supporting the Ugandan action against "British
passport-holders," did not even mention the fact that Asians
were involved.
Moscow's reporting did not mention that Amin on 9 August added
citizens of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to his original
expulsion order and that, in the same 9 August statement, he
in effect invalidated the claim of some 23,000 Asians to Ugandan
citizenship, thus swelling the ranks of those facing expulsion
to some 83,000. An 8 August: Moscow domestic service commentary
on alleged Israeli and Western transgressions against Uganda
cited only the brief passage of Amin's 5 August speech in which
he assailed the activities of the British-American Tobacco
Company in Uganda.
The first Soviet mention of Amin's original expulsion order was
in a TAS:',? report on the 15th which said Amin received that day
the British Government's special representative, Geoffrey Rippon,
"who arrived in Kampala to discuss with local authorities the
question of persons of Asian origin who reside in Uganda but
have British citizenship." The report went on to note offhandedly
that "the Ugandan Government the other day offered those persons,
of whom there are more than 50,000 in Uganda, to leave the country
within three months," adding that "most of them are engaged in
trade and other spheres of economic activities." The report
ignored Amin's main charge that the Asians in Uganda were engaged
in "economic sabotage" and "corruption."
LESNOV ARTICLE The Lesnov article in the 16 Auguet IZVESTIYA,
entitled "Threats of Colonizers," was broadcast
by Radio Moscow only in English to the United Kingdom on the 16th
and 17th. It observed at the outset that "Uganda has lately been
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the target of undisguised imperialist intimidation and pressure"
and that "the pretext for the anti-Ugandan hysteria that has
gripped Britain's ruling circles was President Idi Amin's
decision to expel British passport-holders who are not citizens
of the Republic from the country within three months." It
added that the announced purpose of Amin's decision was "to
place the economy of the country under national control and
to protect it from foreign domination."
Lesnov characterized what he described as threatened "reprisals"
by Foreign Secretar Douglas-Home as "surprisingly like those
used by Tel Aviv's propaganda machine a few months ago, when
the Israeli Embassy was asked to leave Uganda because it had
engaged in subversive activities." Now as then, he continued,
the West is trying to foment tribal conflicts, discredit
President Aniin, "and cast aspersions on the countries with
which Uganda has established truly friendly relations." The
article concluded that Uganda's expulsion of the Israelis, its
recent warning about the activities of United States nationals,
and its current "strong stand against British intimidation" show
that "this newly independent country is determined to follow
the road it has chosen and to conduct its internal affairs
without any imperialist interference."
UGANDAN MILITARY Soviet. media gave correct though not
DELEGATION IN USSR red-carpet treatment to the visit of a
high-level Ugandan military delegation
to the USSR between 30 July and 10 August. TASS on the 31st
said the delegation, headed by acting commander of the Ugandan
Army Colonel Nyangweso, had a "friendly, businesslike" talk
that day with USSR Ground Forces Chief of Staff General Nikitin,
who gave a luncheon for the visitors attended also by Ugandan
Ambassador Ondoga.
Following an 8 August PRAVDA UKRAINY report of the delegation's
visits to Odessa and Volgograd, TASS on the 11th said Colonel
Nyangweso's delegation had returned home and reported to
President Amin that the visit had been "very useful." The
Kampala radio additionally reported enthusiastic statements
by both Nyangweso and Amin on the state of preparedness of the
Soviet armed forces, as well as a remark by Amin to the effect
that he would not reconsider his expulsion order despite what
he described as an intent by Britain to ask "soira countries"
to exert pressure on him to do so.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PARTY/GOVERMENT DECREE TIGHTENS CONTROL OVER SCIENTISTS
Measures have been adopted to tighten contr%.'- over Soviet, higher
educational institutions, punish dissident scientists, and intensify
indoctrination of students. PRAVDA on 30 July published a joint
decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers "On
Measures to Further Improve the Country's Higher Education," which
established centralized control over hiring and firing of
university rectors and ordered university party organizations and
social science departments to inculcate a "class approach" among
students and an ability to combat anti-Marxist views. A 16 August
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview with the chief of the office for
awarding diplomas further disclosed that the Higher Attestation
Commission has adopted a new procedure to strip academic degrees
and titles from persons committing "amoral, antipatriotic, and
other acts incompatible with the title of scholar." This punitive
innovation seems clearly aimed at scholars seeking to emigrate to
Israel.
In the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview, Nina Lanevich, chief of the
department handling registration and awarding of diplomas and
certificates of the Higher Attestation Commission under the Ministry
for Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, commented on the
new instructions for awarding academic titles and degrees. Noting
the rapidly growing number of scientists, Lanevich explained that
the July decree and the new instructions were designed to tighten
the procedure for awarding degrees and indicated that the
provision for stripping scientists of their titles and degrees
for "amoral and antipatriotic" acts was one of only a few changes
contained in the instructions. Questioning Lanevich on that
point, the interviewer asked: "But were titles not taken away
before for such acts?" She replied that this had occurred
"extremely rarely" and explained that scholarly councils of
universities followed the instructions of the Higher Attestation
Commission in such cases but that these instructions did not
provide for such punishment. As a result, she went on, the
stripping of titles and degrees has "depended on.the initiative of
the scholarly councils and the administration" of each institution.
The new provision will obviously encourage such action and make it
more common.
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The July decree also provided for stricter controls over personnel
policy. Rectors of all higher educational institutions will
henceforth be appointed and removed with "consideration of the
recommendation of the collegium of the USSR Higher and Secondary
Specialized Education Ministry," rather than only by the ministry
to which the institution is subordinated. A Council for Higher
Schools under the ministry was created to work out
recommendations for improving education and research and the
training and use of specialists. The decree also ordered
creation of local councils of rectors of higher educational
institutions in educational centers.
The council established in Moscow, the most important educational
center, clearly reflected the political impact of the July decree.
Although the 27-member-council was headed by the rector of an
institute, the roster of deputy heads notably included the head
of the city party committee's science section and the deputy
chairman of the city executive committee (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA,
3 August).
SCANDAL EXPOSED IN MATSKEVICH'S AGRICULTURE MINISTRY
The position of USSR Agriculture Minister V.V. Matskevich may have
been weakened by the recent arrest and public exposure of one of
his top assistants. In the 2 July PRAVDA, satirist A. Sukontsev
exposed V.P. Semin, deputy chief of the secretariat of the agriculture
ministry, for accepting bribes--a free television set, dacha, and
other items--from a Moldavian sovkhoz director, and on 16 August
PRAVDA reported his arrest and expulsion from the party. Sukontsev
implicated the ministry's leadership by pointing out that the lax
atmosphere in the ministry had permitted the flagrant abuses by
Semin. Sukontsev complained that Semin had frequently asked the
heads of the ministry's various administrations to perform special
favors for the Moldavian sovkhoz and that these officials always
complied without questioning. The 16 August PRAVDA report noted
Matskevich's acknowledgment of the correctness of the PRAVDA
criticism and the formation of a special inspection unit within
the ministry to prevent such abuses.
The scandal in Matskevich's ministry was preceded by other signs of
displeasure with his leadership. Although the top command of his
ministry remained virtually intact from 1966 to 3.970, it has
experienced extensive changes in the past two yee.rs; four new deputy
ministers have been appointed since 1970, including two this spring.
Moreover, the press has recently begun to urge changes in the
administration of agriculture which have, by implication at least,
called into question the effectiveness of Matskevich's leadership.
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