TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050038-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: September 20, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
F ~IS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
20 SEPTEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 38)
300050038-9
 Approved For Release 2000($ /?r?I)L 4~iAPf P85T00875R000300050038-9
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 SEPTEMBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
PRG 11 September Proposal on Settlement Pressed at Paris . . .
1
Peking Shows Reserve in Supporting PRG Peace Proposal . . . . .
5
Moscow Gives Minimal Attention to PRG Peace Plan . . . . . . .
6
Hanoi Reports U.S. Delegation'z Arrival, POW Release . . . . .
9
DRV Protests Alleged Air Strikes Against Schools, Dikes . . . .
10
Heavy Allied Casualties in Quang Tri Called Major Achievement .
16
DRV Propaganda Journal Stresses Correctness of Party Policies .
17
Soviet Government Statement Assails Israeli Attack on Lebancn .
21
Moscow Uses Iraqi President's Visit to Counter Arab Critics . .
26
New Soviet Arm3 Control Initiative at 27th UNGA Session . . . .
30
MosL:ow Develops Indictment of PRC's Disarmament Posture . . . .
32
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Kisssinger's Moscow Visit Hailed as Contribution to Detente . .
36
WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS
Publicity for "Shield 72" Shows Restraint Toward West . . . . .
38
CHINA
Peking Uses Ping-pong Diplomacy to Expand International Ties .
41
AFRICA
Moscow Deplores, Peking Ignores Fighting in Southern Uganda . .
44
CZECHOSLOVAK TRIALS
Moscow Tries to Portray Western Communist Support for Trials .
46
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
20 SEPTEMBER 1972
Moscow (2905 items)
Peking (1284 items)
Israeli Attacks on
(1%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(34%)
36%
Lebanon & Syria
Table Tennis Meetings,
(18%)
20%
Vietnam
(9%)
7%
Games
(PRG 11 September
(--)
2%]
Vietnam
(11%)
10%
Proposals
[PRG 11 September
(--)
7%]
[Le Disc Tho in USSR (0.2%)
2%)
Proposals
Iraqi President al-Bakr (--)
4%
Israeli Attacks on
(--)
6%
in USSR
Kissinger in USSR
(--)
3%
Lebanon & Syria
DPRK National Day
(9%)
4%
China
(8%)
3%
9th East & Central
(29)
3%
Tsedenbal-Brezhnev
(--)
3%
African Summit
Talks in USSR
Conference
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention In terms of voluma are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prier issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
20 SEPTEMBER 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1972
Moscow (2905 items)
Peking (1284 items)
Israeli Attacks on
(1%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(34%)
36%
Lebanon &
Syria
Table Tennis Meetings,
(18%)
20%
Vietnam
(9%)
7%
Games
[PRG 11
September (--)
2%]
Vietnam
(11%)
109
Proposals
[PRG 11 September
(--)
7%]
[Le Duc Tho in USSR (0.2%)
2%)
Proposals
Iraqi President al-Bakr (--)
4%
Israeli Attacks on
(--)
6%
in USSR
Lebanon & Syria
Kissinger in USSR
(--)
3%
DPRK National Day
(9%)
4%
China
(8%)
3%
9th East & Central
(2X)
3%
Tsedenbal-Brezhnev
(--)
3%
African Summit
Talks in USSR
Conference
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. So-ne may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 SEPTEMBER 1972
INDOCHINA
In line with the Vietnamese corinunists' usual careful orchestration,
the 11 September PRG statement on a settlement was presented by
Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris session on the
14th and given pro forma endorsements by DRV delegate Nguyen Minh
Vy and in a DRV Government statement, also issued on the 14th.
Predictably, followup propaganda, including an editorial in Hanoi's
party paper NHAN DAN on the 16th, has hewed closely to the
language of the PRG statement in expressing readiness to reach
agreement with the United States that neither side will impose a
government on South Vietnam and in stressing that the three
components of the provisional government would be "of equal
strength and on an equal footing." Hanoi's account of the Paris
session totally ignored Ambassador Porter's statement, in which he
criticized and asked for clarification of some aspects of the
PRG proposals. Hanoi has also failed to mention the 15 September
meeting between Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger.
Moscow has given the PRG statement minimal attention, although
Podgornyy expressed support for it in general terms in a speech
on the 14th. Moscow's effort to balance support for its Vietnamese
ally with considerations of U.S.-Soviet relations was pointed up
by the fact that TASS reported on the 15th--the day after Kissinger
left Moscow--that the DRV ambassador had been received by Katushev.
TASS' report of Kissinger's press conference upon his return home
noted that on the issue of Vietnam he remarked only that the two
sides "outlined their positions" and that the Soviet Union's
"views on Vietnam differ from those of the United States."
In a departure from past practice, Peking has failed to issue any
formal or editorial endorsement of the PRG's latest peace proposal,
limiting its authoritative backing to Li Hsien-nien's remarks when
he received a copy of the statement on the 13th. Chinese spokesmen
have generally been avoiding the Vietnam question in their
pronouncements on international issues.
PRG 11 SEPTEMBER PROPOSAL ON SETTLEMENT PRESSED AT PARIS
The PRG's latest amplification of its position on a Vietnam settle-
ment as outlined in the 11 September statement was formally
presented by Foreign Minister Mme. Binh, as expected, at the Paris
session on the 14th. She repeated verbatim the portion of the PRG
statement which spelled out the "two requirements" which the
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20 SEPTEMBER 1972
United States must meet regarding withdrawal and a provisional
government in South Vietnam, as well as the passages expressing
readiness to reach agreement that neither side would impose a
government and touching on the selection of the tripartite
provisional government. She also echoed the statement when she
said that the PRG is "recognized as the authentic representative
of the South Vietnamese" by the socialist countries, the
nonalined nations, and peace- and justice-loving nations
worldwide.*
Mme. Binh's presentation differed from the PRG statement in
explicitly repeating the demand--introduced in the PRG's
2 February elaboration--that "Nguyen Van Thieu must resign and
the Saigon administration must give up its policy of terrorizing
and repressing the people." The 11 September statement had
broached this issue only indirectly when it described the Saigon
component of the three-sided provisional government as being
"without Thieu." It would appear that the statement's failure
to call explicitly for Thieu's resignation resulted from the
decision not to repeat any of the detailed political demands
which had been spelled out in point two of the February:
elaboration**--although the September statement did reiterate
the specific demands on U.S. withdrawal outlined in point one
of the February elaboration. The second "requirement" in the
September statement dealt in broad, general principles, stating
that "a solution must proceed from the actual situation that
there exist in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies,
and other political forces," that "it is necessary to achieve
* While the PRG's presentations at the Paris talks consistently
contrast the PRG with the Saigon "administration," they do not
always repeat the assertion that the PRG is the "authentic"
representative. Since the resumption of the talks on 13 July,
this has been said only once--at the 17 August session.
** Point two of the February elaboration stipulated that "Thieu
must resign immediately, the Saigon administration must end its
warlike policy, disband at once its machine of oppression and
constraint, stop its pacification policy, disband the concentration
camps, set free political prisoners, and guarantee democratic
liberties as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements. Then the
PRG will immediately discuss with the Saigon administration the
formation of a three-component national concord government in order
to organize general elections, elect a constituent assembly, work
out a constitution, and set up an official government."
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national concord," and that "the sides must unite on the basis
of equality, mutual respect, and mutual nonelimination."
Democratic freedoms must be guaranteed, it said, and "to this
end, it is necessary to form a provisional government of
national concord with three equal segments to take charge of
the affairs in the period of transition and to organize truly
free and democratic general elections." It was in an earlier
passage that the statement had said that the PRG and the
Saigon administration "without Thieu" will each appoint its
people for the provisional government and that the appointment
of representatives for the third component "will be made
through consultation."
DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, again sitting in for :iuan Thuy,
declared that the PRG statement puts forth "a correct and fair
way to settle the Vietnam issue, insuring a lasting peace in
Vietnam." He also said that "the DRV delegation fully approves
of and supports the requirements with respect to the United
States," and he concluded that "peace can be restored
immediately, the Americans can withdraw in honor, and U.S.
servicemen can rapidly be repatriated if the Nixon Administration
will . . . positively respond to the two correct and reasonable
demands of the PRG." Like mime. Binh, Vy quoted verbatim both the
first requirement on U.S. withdrawal--including the new call for
the withdrawal of technical personnel--and the second requirement
regarding a provisional government. He did not, however, quote
the passage on PRG readiness to reach agreement with the United
States on nonimposition of a government in South Vietnam or the
one on the selection of the three components of a provisional
government.
The VNA account of the Paris session often fails to mention the
GVN delegate's presentation, but on this occasion .t also
ignored Ambassador Porter's statement completely. There was,
characteristically, no reflection of the give-and-take following
the delivery of the prepared statements, and Hanoi media did not
report the post-session press briefings.
The DRV Government statement, carried by both Hanoi radio and VNA
on the 14th, declared that the DRV "sees eye to eye with the PRG
in its profound evaluation of the situation and in its correct
stand on the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue as expounded
in this important statement." Like the PRG statement, it prefaced
a recapitulation of specific proposals with an attack on the
Vietnamization policy and U.S. "escalation" and declared that the
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Vietnamese will not be intimidated by "bombs and threats." And
unlike DPV Paris delegate Vy, the statement quoted the PRG's
expression of readiness to reach agreement that neither aide
will impose a government in South Vietnam, as well as the
"two requirements."
The statement concluded with a standard appeal for support,
explicitly citing the "socialist" as well as other "peace- and
justice-loving countries." It called on them "to struggle even
more vigorously to force the Nixon Administration to put an
immediate end to its criminal war of aggression, negotiate
seriously, and meet in a positive manner the PRG's two
requirements . . . ." The PRG statement, oddly, did not specify
socialist countries when it referred to world support, although
the February elaboration had done so. The Front as well as Hanoi
has been claiming worldwide support for the latest proposal.
And Hanoi radio on the 20th cited LPA correspondents in Paris
for the report that Nine. Binh had sent letters and copies of the
PRG statement "to foreign ministers of the socialist countries,
other countries having diplomatic relations with the PRG, and
many nonalined countries." It added that she had also sent letters
to "many antiwar politicians and personalities in the United States"
and had sent the PRG statement to UN Secretary General Waldheim.
The NHAN DAN editorial on the 16th contrasted the PRO's "reasonable
and sensible" proposal; with the U.S. stand. It stated that ag DRV
Premier Pham Van Dong had observed in his National Day speech,
a solution based on a provisional government of national concord is
a just and honorable one. On the other hand, it said, the Nixon
Acministration's stand--as reflected in the eight-point proposal
of last January and in the President's 8 May statement--is aimed at
forcing the South Vietnamese to accept the Saigon "puppet"
administration as legal and constitutional and at eliminating the
PRG and the PLAF.
Without explicitly referring to the U.S. call for a cease-fire, the
editorial said the United States proposed that "the revolutionary
administration and the revolutionary armed forces give up their
struggle for independence and freedom and lay down their weapons. . . ."
It added that to negotiate "with a plot to maintain the lackeys and
to eliminate the revolutionary administration means to negotiate with
fists banging on the table to force the adversary to surrender, while
seeking every means to use the Paris conference as a screen to hide
and intensify the war of aggression."
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20 SEPTEMBER 1972
PEKING SFU!S RESERVE IN SUPPORTING PRG PEACE PROPOSAL
Peking has been aonspicuously reserved in its support for recent
Vietnamese communist pronouncements on a peace settlement,
reflecting persisting divergences between Peking and Hanoi in
their dealings with the United States. The Chinese failed to
follov their usual pattern in endorsing the 11-September PRG
statement, limiting their support to Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's
remarks on receiving a copy of the statement from the PRG
ambassador on the 13th.* Marking the first time the Chinese have
failed to issue a formal or editorial endorsement of a major
Vietnamese pronouncement since the seven-point plan was released
last year, Peking's cautious response stands in contrast to its
strong endorsement of the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" with a
PRC Government statement and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial two days
later. Moreover, in receiving the PRG ambassador for delivery
of the 11 September statement Li substituted for Chou En-lai, who
heretofore had lent his authority to Peking's expression of
support for its allies on such occasions. Chou appeared on the
evening of the 13th, however, at a reception for visiting
ping-pong teams.
Peking's reticence in associating its interests with the
Vietnamese conflict was again evidenced by Chou's failure to
raise the question of Vietnam during a 17 September speech welcoming
the Zambian vice president, who in his speech expounded at length
on this issue and praised the Chinese record of backing the
Vietnamese. In recent weeks Chinese spokesmen have generally
skirted the Vietnam question while addressing themselves to other
international issues.
SINO-VIETNAMESE Although NCNA duly carried the text of the
DIFFERENCES 11 September PRG statement as well as the
seconding DRV statement on the 14th, Peking's
accounts of Vietnamese commentaries have reflected careful
editorial discretion in treating sensitive issues of a political
settlement and have muffled criticism of the Nixon Administration
and the current U.S. negotiating approach. Taken together with
Peking's reserve in supporting the 11 September statement, thic
cautious treatment accords with the carefully balanced Chinese
* Li's remarks are discussed in the 13 September 1972 TRENDS,
page 7.
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approach to the settlement question that has stressed the need
for an accommodation ani has evidently been a factor in Hanoi's
recent outcries against outside pressures for a compromise
settlement.*
Ccnsistent with Peking's own comment in recent months, NCNA's
accounts of the 11 September LPA commentary and the 16 September
NHt,N DAN editorial muted demands centering on Thieu's removal
wh?Lle taking note of the call for a coalition based on an
acknowledgment of the existence of two administrations and
armies. Though the accounts repeated criticism of President
N..xon's 25 January and 8 May peace proposals, NCNA omitted
Vietnamese charges that the Nixon Administration is engaging in
deceitful maneuvers during the current negotiations and is not
seriously interested in a settlement. Characteristically, NCNA's
account of the NHAN DAN editorial omitted a passage arguing that
the "very bellicose, obdurate, and cunning" Nixon Administration
is using the negotiations to help it in the Presidential election
but intends to "cling stubbornly to the lackey puppet
administration" in Saigon.
MOSCOW GIVES MINIMAL ATTENTION TO PRG PEACE PLAN
Moscow has thus far given minimal attention to the 11 September
PRG statement on a settlement, although Podgornyy on the 14th did
endorse it in general terms in the course of a speech at a dinner
for the visiting Iraqi president. Podgornyy failed to mention
the specific content of the PRG statement when he expressed
support, for "the constructive proposals of our Vietnamese friends"
including the 11 September PRG statement, "which contained a
demand for the halting of the aggressive U.S. war and the
establishment of peace in Vietnam and the solving of the internal
problem of South Vietnam while taking into consideration the
current situation." Podgornyy also routinely reiterated support
for the Vietnamese people's struggle for the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Vietnam and for their right to solve their internal
problems without outside interference.
* Chou En-lai authoritatively voiced Peking's approach in a major
foreign policy address on 9 July in which he cited the Vietnam
war as marring a favorable trend toward peaceful settlement of
"mutual disputes" in Asia. See the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages
15-17.
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Thus far, there has been no further authoritative Soviet comment.
Moscow had belatedly supported the 2 February PRG statement
"elaborating" on the seven points with a USSR Government
statement on the 11th. That had been the first such official
Soviet statement to be issued following a Vietnamese communist
peace initiative.* Moscow had endorsed the PRG's 1 July 1971
seven-point proposal with a PRAVDA editorial on the 5th--the
day after Peking extended editorial support.
Routine Soviet comment, which has called the current PRG
statement "a new important initiative" for peace, has focused
on the point calling for formation of a provisional government
of national concord. Kozyakov, in a 13 September commentary
broadcast in English to North America, commented that the PRG
statement has "answered many of the questions that are being
asked in Washington and in the American press" and has made it
"perfectly clear" that when it speaks of the right of the South
Vietnamese to self-determination it "does not mean that there
should be the communist domination that the U.s. leaders talk
about."
Soviet commentators have generalized on the rest of the statement,
giving little substance and failing to cite the new demand for
withdrawal of U.S. "technical personnel." The initial TASS
account of the PRG statement carried the two main points verbatim
except for omitting site reference to technical personnel.
Kozyakov's commentary contains the only reference in available
Moscow propaganda to the PRG statement's treatment of the POW
issue. Asserting that Washington has been using the prisoner
issue to "Justify" Vietnamization and support for the Saigon
regime, Kozyakov said that the PRG statement makes it clear
that the release of the POW's "depends on an end to the U.S.
interference in Vietnam's affairs." He went on. to quote the
statement's assertion that the prisoners will be "speedily
released" if the United States "ends the war of aggression,
removes all U.S. troops, terminates all military interference in
Vietnam, withdraws support from the Saigon puppet government,
and lets the South Vietnamese set up a tripartite government of
national accord."
KISSINGER VISIT Moscow characteristically gave only the
barest coverage to Presidential adviser
Kissinger's visit to Moscow and did not acknowledge that the
issue of Vietnam was discussed until TASS on 17 September
* The USSR Government statement is discussed in the TRENDS of
16 February 1972, pages 8-10.
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"lNF!DENTI41, PHIS TRIPNDS
20 SEPTEMBER 1972
reported hie press conference upon him return Loris, 'FADS
attributed to Kissinger the assertion that ir. Moe,:.)w the two
sides "outlined their positions on the Vietnam prcb.kem" and
that "the Soviet Union stands for definite principles iii its
international affairs and that its vi'wa on Vietnam cfffor
from those of the United States." TASS did uat report him
comment that the private talks with Le Duc Thu indicatce n
"certain seriousness" on North Vietnam's pact, nor h1a criticism
of the PRG statement and hire rerrurks on the Imposition of a
"particular form" of government in South Vietnam. Earlier brief
TASS reports had noted that Vietnam was a tople Kissinger
discussed wilt Britis'a 1?aders during hits stop in London and that
in Paris he met with T'u and Xuan Thuy.
KATUSHEV AND DRV Reflecting Moscow's effort to balance its
AMBASSADOR interests in the relationship with the
United States and its stake in Vi,:tnam,
TASS reported that CPSU Secretary Katushev-who is in charge of
relations with ruling parties--saw the DRV ambassador on
15 September, the day after Kissinger's departure from Moscow.
According to the brief TASS announcement, Katushev and the
ambassador had "a warm and friendly talk which covered
questions of mutual interest," but there was no indication of
the topics. There also was no indication that the ambassador
handed over a copy of the 14 September DRV Government statement;
TASS on the '15th duly reported the DRV statement. Although some
East European leaders have been reported to have received PRG
envoys for delivery of the 11 September statement, there has
been no announcement that a Soviet leader met with a PRG
represen',itive for that purpose. Two days after the PRG had
1 -ued its 2 February elaboration TASS had reported that Ko6ygin
received the DRV and PRG ambassadors, who informed him of the
PRG statement and the DRV's "stand" (Hanoi's own statement not
yet having been released).
BACKGROUND: Since then there has been no consistent pattern of
reports on whether Soviet leaders have met with DRV and FRG
envoys to receive copies of statements. There were no reports
that any Soviet leaders received a PRG envoy following the release
of the 15 April NFLSV-PRG appeal in connection with intensified
U.S. military actions. The timing of meetings the DRV.ambassador
had with Brezhnev. Kosygin, Grechko, and Katuahev in April
suggested that the envoy presented an 11 April DNV Government
statement and a 16 April party-government appra] pro':esting U.S.
actions, but ne.. ner Hanoi nor Moscow spet.i:C,_-.a ;his. VNA, but
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not TASS, had reported that during Xuan Thuy's meeting with
ICosygin during a May stopover in Moscow, the DRV ambassador
handed Kosygin a copy of Hanoi's 10 May government statement
denouncing the U.S. niniig of DRV ports. On 18 July TASS
briefly reported that Gromyko 'ce:ceived the DRV ambassador and
was give, a copy of President Ton Duc Thang's appeal on the
occasion of the Geneva agreements anniversary.
HANOI REPORTS U.S. DELEGATIONS ARRIVAL. M' RELEASE
Hanoi gave limited coverage to the 16 September arrival of the
American delegation which plans to escort home the three
American POW's--Lieutenants Markham L. Gartley and Norris A.
Charles, and Major Edward K. Elias--whose planned release had
been announced in a VPA General Political Department order on
2 September.* In brief reports, VNA on the 16th and Hanoi
radio the next day announced the arrival of the American
delegation and its reception by the Vietnam Committee for
Solidarity W2.th the American People.
A Hanoi bro dr9gt in English on the 17th carried a lengthy
account of the relta.se ceremony, interspersed with recordings
of statements by various participants. Summaries of this event
carried by VNA and in the domestic service on the same day did
not inclcie the texts of prepared statements attributed to the
three pilots or the text of the VPA order, read in full in the
English-language broadcast. All the -.Crsions emphasized the
good treatment given the pilots during their detention and the
DRV's "humane policy" toward the prisoners. Remarks attributed
in this connection to Mrs. Bui Thi Cam; secretary of the
Vietnam Committee for Solidarity Wit,: the American People,
stressed the responsibility of the escort delegatio, for assurin,s
that the released pilots "will not be used by the U.S.
Administration for military purposes and for misleading
propaganda." This responsibility was said to have been affirmed
by Mrs. Cora Weiss, co-leader of the delegation. The dual themes
underscoring Hanoi's humanitarian treatment of the prisoners and
its professed fear of possible U.S. mistreatment of them or their
testimony once they arrive home had been stressed in propaganda
accompanying the initial announcement of their release.
* For a report of the release order, see the TRENDS of 7 September
1972, pages 15-18.
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Hanoi's broadcasts in English have given considerable attention
to remarks imputed to Lieutenant aartley's mother and
Lieutenant Charles' wife during a tour of bombed areas in
Hanoi on the morning of 17 September. A domestic service
version of their alleged remarks, broadcast on the 18th,
reported their shock at the eight of such "terrible destruction"
and their hope that the American people will be made aware of
the extent of it, attributing to Mrs. Gartley the conviction
that "this war is meaningless."
DRV PROTESTS ALLEGED AIR STRIKES AGAINST SCHOOLS. DIKES
For the first time in several weeks, Hanoi has issued protests
over U.S. air stri'xes at a ministerial level as well as in the
continuing statements by the foreign ministry spokesman. The
DRV Ministry of Higher Education and Vocational Middle Schools
denounced the alleged destruction of a college in Vinh Phu
Province on 10 September, and the DRV Minister of Water
Conaervancy assailed alleged damage to the dike system in August.
The former statement, broadcast in full by Hanoi radio on
14 September, charged that the United States had attacked "in
the recent past" nearly 20 vocational middle schools as well as
general education schools and various colleges.* Referring in
particular to the alleged attack on the college on 10 September,
the statement charged that the U.S. imperialists attacked it
"with the purpose of not only killing its teachers, students,
cadres, employees and workers . but also destroying the
research and experimentation bases."
The DRV Water Conservancy Minictry's communique, reported by VNA
on 13 September and Hanoi radio on the 14th, claimed that U.S.
planes had made 78 attacks on dikes and other hydraulic systems
in August, damaging 50 dike sections, 17 hydraulic works, two
hydrological stations, and "a factory for the repair and production
of equipment for the prevention and combat of floods and for
hydraulic projects." After detailing several of these attacks,
which it charged the United States had deliberately made during the
high-water and storm season, the cc mnunique focused on the
* This statement is the first one condemning alleged bombing of
schools to be issued by a ministry since 27 July, when the
spokesman of the Ministry of Education issued- a protest against
alleged strikes since April.
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long-term effects of U.S. bombing. Attributing these both
to the dropping of "delayed-action bombs" and to the inherent
instability of recently repaired earthworks, the communique
warned that the "U.S. imperialists must bear full responsibility
for the consequences of their crimes and perfidious schemes."
Other comment on alleged bombing of the dikes and dams came in
a wide-ranging Hanoi radio commentary of 16 September and in
undated speeches by the directors of the water conservancy
departments of Thai Binh and Ha Tinh provinces, reported by Hanoi
radio on the 13th and 20th, respectively. The commentary,
entitled "Nixon Is Frenziedly Attacking and Destroying Dikes
and Dams," began by condemning the 28 July State Department
report on the condition of the dike.i in North Vietnam. Consistent
with earlier comment on the report acid on the President's 27 July
press conference, Hanoi claimed that .he Nixon Administration is
trying to "avoid its responsibility for floods that may happen
during the season of torrential rains." Listing alleged attacks
on major targets during July and August, the commentary argued
that the attacks were "deliberate." Acclaiming "dike day"
(August 28), the commentary asserted that, deb ite this
expression of world support for the DRV, the "Nixon clique" is
continuing "its genocidal crimes against our people in both
zones of Vietnam."
The Thai Binh water conservancy director's speech made only a
passing reference to air strikes. He asserted that the province
had overfulfilled its plan for earthwork connected with the dike
and dam system and that people had been "urgently mobilized" to
repair damaged dikes and build new ones in preparation for the
late-rice season, while fighting against enemy planes "all the
time." In more strident tones, the Ha Tinh water conservancy chief
charged that "from 3 March to 23 August 1972 the U.S. aggressors
attacked all the water conservancy projects in Ha Tinh 150 times,"
striking not only at dikes and dams but also at hydroelectric
stations, motor vehicles, and dike builders and menders.
Following a lengthy list of specific alleged attacks on dams,
dikes, and sluices in Ha Tinh, the official claimed that the
province's people "have made and are making all-out efforts"
despite all hardships "to resolutely mend the damage inflicted by
the U.S. aggressors."
A NHAN DAN editorial of 20 September, carried by Hanoi radio,
condemned the United States for "dropping bombs to destroy cities,
towns, and villages and to massacre countless civilians." Citing
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specific damage in various cities, the editorial claimed that
such damage was intentional, as proven by the types of bombs
used and the timing of the attacks. It called on "peace- and
justice-loving governments and peoples" to protest and "take
realistic actions to check" such attacks, and claimed that
people in both South and North Vietnam are resolutely continuing
to oppose the enemy. As evidence of the effort of the armed
forces and people in the North, it stated that they have downed
422 planes in the past five months and killed or captured many
pilots, as well as participating in "combat and combat-support
activities" and persevering in production.
SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS; Alleged U.S. actions of the past week were
REPORTS OF BOMBING protested in the following routine
statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman:
4 The statement of 13 September protested U.S. air strikes of the
12th on the capital of Ninh Binh Province and on populated areas
in Yen Bai, Bac Thai, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai
Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, He Tinh and Quang
Binh provinces. In addition, it charge' that B-52's had bombed a
number of localities in Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships
had shelled coastal hamlets in He Tinh. The statement claimed
that such bombing, carried out by the United States "with a view
to massacring civilians and destroying economic and cultural
establishments in the DRV," only reveals its "utterly brutal and
blood-thirsty aggressive nature."
? U.S. actions of 13 and 14 September were condemned in a statement
of the 14th, which termed them "rabid, criminal war acts" and
demanded in standard fashion that they be stopped without delay,
along with other acts encroaching on the sovereignty and security
of the DRV. The statement charged that targets of the 14th
included Kien An township near Haiphong, the suburban districts of
Gia Lam and Thanh Tri in Hanoi, and a number of populated areas in
Ha Tay and Hoa Binh provinces. On the 13th, it claimed, U.S. planes
"launched savage air raids" on the towns of Phu Ly and Hon Gai,
the township of Ninh Giang, and many places in the provinces of
Lang Son, Bac Thai, He Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha,
Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, He Tinh and Quang Binh. Without
specifying the date, it also charged that B-52's "carpet-bombed"
localities in Quang Binh Province, and claimed that U.S. warships
shelled a commune in the Vinh Linh zone.
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+ The statement of the 15th repeated the charges in the preceding
day's statement of U.S. raids on Kien An and the suburbs of Hanoi
and added other targets allegedly hit in actions of the 14th: the
capital of Thanh Hoa Province and "many densely populated areas"
in Son Lr., Bac Thai, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Ha Tay, Thai Binh, Nam
Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the
Vinh Linh zone. It further claimed that B-52's bombed a number
of localities in Quang Binh. Specific targets listed were a senior
middle school in Dong Hung district of Thai Binh Province and a
section of the Red River dikes in a village in Thuong Tin district
of Ha Tay Province.
+ Condemning U.S. actions of 15 September, the spokesman's statement
of the 16th charged that the capital cities of Ha Bac and Vinh Phu
provinces were bombed, together with Ha Tu township in Quang Ninh
Province and "many other populous areas" in Vinh Phil, Ha Bac, Quang
Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh
provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. The statement further claimed
that B-52's had raided localities in Quang Binh Province and that U.S.
warships had shelled coastal areas in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Among
targets reported hit were "many houses and public inst'.tutions and
utilities, including a secondary school, a dike, and a sluice."
+ The statement of the 17th, claiming further attacks of the 16th on
the suburbs of Hanoi, charged that "the continued attacks on Hanoi
capital and intensified strikes by aircraft including B-52's on populous
areas aimed at massacring civilians have further exposed the utterly
brutal aggressive nature of the Nixon Administration." In addition to
the alleged attacks on the Hanoi area, the statement cited U.S. bombing
of populated areas in the province of Yen Bai, Tuyen Quang, Vinh Phu,
Ha Tay, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoag Nghe An,
Ha Tinh and Quang Binh and in the Vinh L inh zone; B-52 attacks on
localities in Quang Binh Province; and shelling by U.S. warships of
coastal villages and hamlets in Thai Binh, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh.
Many homes and economic and cultural establishments were reported
destroyed.
+ Cat Ba Island and the Do Son area of Haiphong were highlighted in
the spokesman's statement of 18 September, which protested raids of
the 17th. It further charged that U.S. planes bombed densely
populated areas in Lang'Son, Bac Thai, Quang Ninh, Ha Hung, Nam Ha,
Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and
the Vinh Linh areas, and that U.S. warships bombarded coastal areas
in Thai Binh, Nam Ha and Thanh Hoa.
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4 The United States' "mad war acts" of 18 September were
protested in the spokesman's statement of the 19th, which cited
as specific examples the alleged bombing of an elementary
school in Hai Hau district of Nam Ha Province and of a dike
along the Red River in & village in Xuan Thuy district of the
same province. In more general terms, the statement charged
that U.S. planes bombed and strafed the capital cities of Ha
Tinh and Quang Binh provinces as well as populated areas in Nam
Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh
provinces and in the Vinh Linh zone. It further charged that
B-52's had bombed "a number of localities" in Quang Binh Province.
In several reports issued during the week VNA detailed the
following U.S. air raids, with special emphasis given to those
of 14 September:
The town of Kien An near Haiphong was reportedly struck on the
14th for the fifth time since 26 August. In this, the latest
attack, U.S. planes were charged with dropping "more than 100
demolition and blast bombs," which allegedly damaged several
streets, two schools, assorted restaurants, food stores and homes,
and one church, as well as "exacting heavy tolls" on the civilian
population. In other action of the 14th, U.S. planes reportedly
carried out "massive bombing" of the capital of Thanh Hoa Province,
dropping antipersonnel, demolition and perforating bombs and
damaging homes, various enterprises and a pagoda, as well as class-
rooms, kindergartens and living quarters itt one sector of the city;
and struck at populated areas in Ha Tay Province, allegedly for the
fifth day in a row, causing damage to a cooperative in a village in
Chuong My district and to a 200-meter section of the Red River dike
in Thoung Tin district.
Phu Tho, the capital of Vinh Phu Provinces was reportedly hit in
raids of the 15th, as well as many villages in Thanh Ba district of
that province; alleged targets included a T4B. sanitorium, a creche,
a cooperative, and a school. Bombing on the 15th of Bac Giang, the
capital of Ha Bac Province, reportedly resulted in heavy damage to
all quarters of the city, with several stores and cooperatives cited
as major targets; it also allegedly caused extensive damage to two
dikes and two sluices located on both banks of the Thuong River.
And on the 16th, Ha Tay Province was again the scene of attacks on
villages and hamlets in a number of districts in which houses,
cooperatives and several dike sections were hit. Of the dikes,
only that in Thuong Tin district was specified, with reference to
the previous bombing on 14 September; according to VI' , this dike
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protects an area of 60,000 hectares spread over six districts in
the province. A further report of bomb damage sustained on
16 September charged that U.S. planes, in two separate attacks,
bombed the La River dike in Duc Tho district of Ha Tinh Province,
damaging a 150-meter stretch of the dike and causing many
casualties among people working on or near it.
PLANE DOWNINGS As of 19 September, Hanoi claimed to have downed
3,924 U.S. planes, with downings during the
week reported over 10 provinces and the city of Haiphong. Hanoi
radio on 18 September reported that one of the alleged downings,
over Quang Binh Province on 15 September, was of a B-52; the same
broadcast also said that three U.S. warships had been set afire by
coastal artillery during the week. Figures on plane downings for
the first half of September were provided in the Hanoi radio account
on 15 September of downings on the 14th and 15th. According to this
broadcast, 46 aircraft had been downed and "many air pirates"
captured as of 15 September; receiving special praise were the
multiple downings of 2, 6, 11 and 12 September, which allegedly
included a B-52 on the 6th and the 3,900th plane on the 12th.
Further reaction to the downing of the 3,900th plane, initially
discussed in last weeks TRENDS, included the VPA High Command's
commendation of the 12th, broadcast by Hadoi radio on the 13th.
Other figures on plane downings, together with an assessment of the
air defense situation in the Fourth Military Region (including Nghe
An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone)
appeared in a Hanoi radio broadcast of 13 September. Reporting on a
recent conference of "leading cadres of the anti-aircraft defense
force" of the region, the broadcast lauded the region's initiative
and coordination in successfully opposing increasingly frequent
and more sophisticated U.S. raids. According to the report, the
region had downed "about 150" U.S. planes since 1 April, "including
nine B-52's,"and "all three cetegories of troops" had fought well.
The conference concluded by calling for an emulation campaign .for
achieving outstanding exploits and "'contributing to quickly bringing
the total number of U.S. aircraft downed over the North to 4,000
aircraft."
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HEAVY ALLIED CASUALTIES IN QUANG TRI CALLED MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT
In the wake of the Saigon forces' capture of the citadel in Quang
Tri city on 15 September, Hanoi and Front media have set out to
picture the communists as the real victors since they allegedly
have successfully fulfilled their primary responsibility of
destroying the adversary's forces. This point was made in a
NHAN DAN editorial on the 18th which, in listing "excellent"
features on the Quang Tri battlefield, claimed that liberation
troops have "annihilated" more than 24,000 allied troops in the
province since the GVN's counteroffensive was launched on
28 June. The editorial observed that "destroying the enemy's
strength is always a primary, essential task in war." It lauded
the "firm, brave, and flexible commands at all echelons" whit'-
were said to have maintained the initiative and considered the
annihilation of the enemy potential as the objective of their
military action. The paper observed that the fighting in Quang
Tri is continuing and predicted that the liberation forces would
"certainly annihilate much more of the enemy potential, surround
him, and advance toward completely dooming his operation."
This approach was also taken in an 18 September LIBERATION PRESS
AGENCY (LPA) report on the fighting in Quang Tri. It said: "In
a war the annihilation of enemy forces is the first objective;
the liberation fighters in Quang Tri have fulfilled with great
merit their main task." An LPA report on 17 September, in addition
to claiming that Quang Tri liberation forces had put out of action
24,000 troops since the GVN counteroffensive, also alleged that
180 planes had been downed or destroyed and 240 military vehicles
wrecked, including 90 tanks and armored personnel carriers.
Hanoi has attempted to portray previous ARVN achievements as
defeats by stressing the losses inflicted on the allied forces.
For example, the military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant),
in a 4 August article, rejected allied claims of having scored a
victory by holding the provincial capital of An Loc and argued
that the fighting there was really a "big disaster" since it
pinned down and depleted three divisions.* On the other hand,
some propaganda has appeared to question this line of reasoning.
One atypical commentary from the South Vietnamese communist party
journal TIEN PRONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 3 June, had
appeared to criticize communist failure to take such objectives as
An Loc: It urged more resolute attacks at the provincial level
and added that it is not enough to annihilate manpower but "we must
also liberate" areas. ,
* See the TRENDS of 9 August 1972, page 17.
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DRV PROPAGANDA JOURNAL STRESSES CORRECTNESS OF PARTY POLICIES
Articles in the July-August issue of the journal TUYEN HUAN
(PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), now available in translation, contained
further evidence of the North Vietnamese party's concern to defend
its policies in the face of disagreements with its communist
allies and to justify these policies to its people. While the
articles may well have been aimed at countering doubts at lower
levels of the party about the wisdom of the current offensive,
they contain the unmistakable message that Hanoi intends to stick
to its course, even in the face of strong opposition from abroad.
The existence of incorrect attitudes among party members in the
wake of Hanoi's disputes with its allies had been implied when an
article in the January-February issue of TUYEN HUAN had noted that
"most cadres and party members" have demonstrated "steadfast
political standards" and confidence in the party's line in the
face of persistent differences in the socialist camp over view-
points and lines on "fundamental problems of the era."*
In line with the 24 August NHAN DAN editorial which called for a
program to "explain the basic situation of the resistance" during
the current offensive,** the lead article in TUYEN HUAN held that
"it is necessary to insure that our party and all our armed forces
and people thoroughly understand the party Central Committee's
assessment and guideline" concerning such things as "the present
basic situation and the immediate tasks," "our victorious position"
and the enemy's "defeated" position, and the "prospects for winning
great victories." Suggesting'that there is a need to counteract
disappointmcint with the offensive, the article noted that the
"value" of "victories in the current offensive" will be "greatly
enhanced if we enable everyone to clearly see the background of
the struggle and fully understand the difficulties that our armed
forces and people have overcome on the battlefield." Adopting a
nationalistic tone which is repeated elsewhere in the journal, the
article claimed that these "victories" are a result of the
determination of the Vietnamese people and the party's "correct,
* The January-February 1972 TUYEN HUAN article is discussed in the
22 March 1972 TRENDS, pages 20-22.
** The 24 August editorial is discussed in the 30 August 1972 TRENDS,
pages 6-7.
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independent, and sovereign line." It weer on to affirm that the
Vietnamese can deal with further difficulties and challenges,
and pointedly noted that at the time of the August revolution
the DRV coped with "a horde of wicked imperialists in a situation
in which the USSR was far away" and "the Chinese revolution had
not yet triumphed."
The second article in TUYEN HUAN by Thanh Son--a signature which
has appeared over other articles in the propaganda journal as
well as in the party journal HOC TAP--opened with praise for the
4,000-year-old history of Vietnam, and for the creativity of the
Vietnamese people and nation and their successful battles against
aggressors, "including great countries." While such praise for
Vietnam's past is not uncommon in the DRV's theoretical writings,
Thanh Son's article was unusual in its direct reassurance of
Vietnamese who lack confidence in the party and its policies.
Thanh Son argued with nationalistic fervor against undervaluing
the contribution of the Vietnamese party in formulating the policies
guiding the nation's struggle. He berated "many people" who believe
the party, like any other party, is only applying Marxism-Leninism
and who "do not understand our national creativity and our
creativity in party leadership guidelines." He maintained that
Marxism-Leninism is a "guide" but not a "dogma" and that foreign
experience cannot be strictly applied to Vietnam without taking
the concrete conditions of the country into consideration. And
he asserted that "every success of the Vietnamese revolution is
the result of a correct and creative application by our party
of Marxist-Leninist principles and the experiences of the world
revolutionary movement to the concrete situation and conditions
in Vietnam." The article also rejected the point of.view of
people who, because of their,"idolizing of foreign experiences,
are 'modest' to such a degree that they have an inferiority
complex; they see great things only in foreign countries and
fail to recognize great, creative thinge in their own country."
And it dismissed the notion that great and creative achievements
are unlikely in Vietnam because it is a small country.
In illustrating the Vietnamese party's past:, formulation of policy,
Thanh Son chose to recall developments in the 1965-1966 period--a
time when Hanoi appeared to have differences with its allies over
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the courses it adopted.* Thanh Son even took note of those
differences when he recalled that at that time "even people who
sympathized with and had good will toward our resistance were
filled with misgivings and consternation" and were "afraid that
the Vietnamese nation, small in size and with its economy still
underdeveloped, was unable to confront the United States."
Attributing successes since that time to the party's "revolu-
tionary stand and correct, creative lines," as well as to the
"sympathy, support, and aid from brothers and friends" and the
"fighting spirit" of the Vietnamese, Thanh Son seemed to be
directing a gratuitous slap at the policies of Moscow and Peking
when he added:
If the world situation were not facing such complex changes
as it is now, our succese would certainly have been even
greater.
Reaffirming Hanoi's determination to achieve its goals despite
outside developments, Thanh Son added that the trend of the war
is favorable and that: "Wherever Nixon goes--to the East or the
West--and no matter what expedients and tricks he may resort to,
he absolutely cannot reverse this trend of the war nor save the
'Vietnamization' strategy from complete defeat."
The "creativity and independence" of the Vietnamese party's line
were also discussed in another article in TUYEN HUAN, authored by
Hong Nam who, like Thanh Son, has published articles previously
in both TUYEN HUAN and HOC TAP. Hong Nam also strongly reaffirmed
Hanoi's commitment to the war, asserting that the national,
democratic revolution and the unification of Vietnam require that
"U.S. neocolonialism" be defeated. According to Hong Nam, "there
is no other choice. This is not accidental but is a historical
necessity." The article attributed differences among communists
about policy toward the United States to their different
* A suggestion of these differences was contained in Pham Van Dong's
31 August 1965 national day speech when he addressed himself to
"some people abroad" who feared that the Vietnam war might spread.
Dong argued that this possibility would best be prevented through
struggle and that any compromise with the United States would
constitute "dangerous encouragement" to aggressive U.S. policies
and spell greater dangers to peace and security. He also reassured
"some people" who feared that a prolonged war would cause the
Vietnamese heavy sacrifices and losses.
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interpretations of the strength of the United States, maintaining
that "an inaccurate assessment of the U.S. imperialists has been
a factor leading to different strategic stands in the struggle"
against the United States. The Vietnamese party, according to
Hong Nam, has arrived at "an accurate assessment" of U.S.
strengths and weaknesses, thus demonstrating the party's
"creative spirit and independent thinking" and allowing it to
"determine the correct revolutionary lines, guidelines, and
methods for defeating the U.S. imperialist aggressors." He
went on, in discussion of different policies, to quote
extensively from Le Duan. Among remarks by Le Duan he cited
was a statement in his speech to the Vietnamese party Central
Committee's 19th Plenum that
while applying Marxism-Leninism and Marxist military
science and learning from the revolutionary experiences
and revolutionary ware in our brotherly countries, we
should be creative in implementing our lines, policies,
aims, and methods, should think independently to discover
revolutionary rules and war rules for our country and
should not and cannot use certain formulas as unchangeable
models and principles in conducting the revolution and
war.*
* Le Duan's speech at '.,:he 19th Plenum, held sometime early in 1971,
has been quoted in previous articles but never released in full.
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MIDDLE EAST
SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ASSAILS ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON
A Soviet Government statement condemning the 16-17 September
Israeli incursions into southern Lebanon, released promptly on
the 17th, contained what seems the minimal response Moscow would
feel itself constrained to make=. The prime purpose seemed
registered in a passage putting the USSR on record as "remaining
on the side of the Arab peoples" at a time when Soviet policies
in the Middle East have been under Arab attack. The statement's
"strong" denunciation of the latest Israeli raids, and belatedly
of the 8 September attacks oiz Lebanon and Syria as well, was
in fact notably restrained and typically cautious on several
counts:
+ Again insisting that there was no connection between the
Israeli raids and the 5-6 September events at the Olympics in
Munich, it followed past Soviet practice in ignoring the question
of fedayeen activities in Lebanon. There was only one mention
even of the presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
+ It complained about alleged Western encouragement of Israel
but referred only indirectly to the American veto in the Security
Council debate on the 8 September Israeli raids. It nowhere
mentioned the United States by name.
+ And while it routinely denounced Israel's "criminal actions"
against the Arabs, it fell far short of the indictment of Israel
in the last comparable Soviet Government statement, on 22 March 1968,
which was also responsive to Israeli "provocations" against the
Arabs. That statement had accused Israel of "following in the
footsteps of the Hitlerite criminals."
The March 1968 government statement, issued the day after an
Israeli strike at guerrilla centers in Jordan, had used that
raid as a point: of departure for a broadside against Israeli
policy and behavior in general. Moscow's more normal practice
has been to issue TASS statements on "military provocations" by
Israel against its Arab neighbors, as well as on such incidents
as the Israeli bombing of Abu Za'bal in Egypt in February 1970.
The choice of the higher-level format of a government statement
this time seems traceable to a defensive concern about appearances
at a time of continuing worldwide outcry over the Munich events
and resulting pressures for international action to combat terrorism.
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Thu higher-level format in a uense compensates for the relatively
feeble content of the statement's reassertion of support for
the Arabs, indictment of Israel, and treatment of the United
States.
Moscow's sensitivity showed through clearly in a commentary
broadcast in Arabic on the 19th, claiming that broad secttons
of Arab public opinion received the Soviet Government s.atement
with "deep satisfaction" as another "categorical proof" of the
USSR's principled policy of combatting imperialist aggression.
The commentary went on to berate unnamed "people In the Arab
world" who at this very time "crudely deride" the Soviet Union,
alleging that it is "not committed to any moral standards."
The broadcast scornfully rejoined that there could be nothing
more immoral than "standing among Arabs holding Soviet wraapons"
and at the same time criticizing the USSR; the weapons, it said,
were "not Soviet charity," and it added that the Soviet people had
worked with "complete self-denial" and "greatest sacrifices"
to help the Arabs.
EVENTS IN MUNICH, Along the lines of recent Moscow comment,
PALESTINIAN ROLE the government statement was at particular
pains to disavow any connection between the
"tragic incident" in Munich and the Israeli attacks and to dissociate
the Arab states--specifically Syria and Lebanon--from "any responsi-
bility for these events." The statement stopped short of any
expression of disapproval of the terrorist actions in Munich. Cautious
criticism, howsve