TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050043-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: October 26, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
26 OCTOBER 1972
75R0000050043,3NO. 43)
 Approved For Release 2000f@( LI #rWP85T00875R000300050043-3
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 OCTOBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV Government Statement Reveals Text of Draft Peace Agreement.
1
Hanoi Routinely Protests Continued U.S. Air Strikes in DRV . .
6
Hanoi Paper Reiterates Confidence in Military Situation . . . .
7
Moscow Reaffirms Support for Vietnamese Communists' Position .
9
Peking Vilifies Thieu Regime, Avoids Negotiations Issue . . . .
10
Pathet Lao Presents Detailed Peace Proposal in Vientiane . . .
11
Sihanouk's Government Reiterates Rejdction of Cease-Fire . . .
17
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Exhibits Concern Over Military Buildup Allegations . . .
19
KOREA
North-South Contacts Continue Despito Martial Law in ROK . . .
21
CHILE
Moscow, Havana See Failure of Anti-Regime Conspiracy . . . .
24
HUNGARY-USSR
Publicity for "Successfully Developing" Economic Cooperation .
27
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Collection of Suslov's Speeches and Articles Is Published . . .
30
Consumer Goods Output Lags Despite Government Measures . . . .
30
Historical Play on Writer-Regime Relations Attacked . . . . .
32
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FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
26 OCTOBEt 1972
Moscow (2758 items)
Peking 1366 items
Indochina
(10%)
12%
Domestic Issues
(36%)
41%
[International
(1%)
8%]
Indochina
(20%)
28%
Solidarity Week
[Vietnam
(6%)
16%]
Tashkent International
(--)
9%
[Cambodia
(2%)
7%]
Conference on Socialist
[Laos
(2%)
5%]
Transformation
UNGA Session
(8%)
9%
Egyptian Premier
Sidgi in USSR
(0.1%)
5%
PRC-Maldives
Diplomatic Relations
(--)
4%
October Revolution
Anniversary
(3%)
5%
Somali Revolution
Anniversary
(--)
3%
China
(4%)
4%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week..
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 OCTOBER 1972
INDOCHINA
Hanoi radio's release of the 26 October DRV Government statement
revealing the draft agreement on a Vietnam settlement negotiated
by North Vietnam and the United States came some 11 hours after
a VNA commentary, ~agged to President Thieu's TV speech of the
24th, had made HE.loi'J first explicit mention of the recent
private talks in Paris and Kissinger's nurrous meetings with
Thieu in Saigon. Hanoi's comment on Thieu's speech, along with
other recent propaganda, held the United States responsible for
his intransigence and thus laid the groundwork for the charge in
the government statement that the United States is using
"so-called difficulties in Saigon" as a pretext to delay
implementation of the agreement. The statement said that the
DRV "strongly denounces the Nixon Administration's lack of
goodwill and seriousness" and "firmly demands" that the United
States fulfill its commitments and sign the peace agreement on
31 October.
The bulk of recent Hanoi and Front propaganda has routinely
pictured the Vietnamese as desiring a peaceful settlement but
determined to continue the struggle against "intensified aggression"
in both the North and the South. Continuing attacks on alleged acts
of repression by the Thieu regime include Front comment pegged to a
14 October statement by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman accusing
the Saigon administration of massacring prisoners.
Peking has continued to refrain from discussing a Vietnam settlement
and, consistent with its usual reaction time, has yet to respond to
the DRV Government statement. However, Peking appeared concerned to
show its support for Vietnamese communist efforts to discredit the
Thieu government when a 24 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article belatedly endorsed the PRG statement on Saigon's alleged
massacre of prisoners.
TASS promptly carried a brief report of the DRV Government statement
on a peace agreement, noting Hanoi's insistence that it be signed
on 31 October. Unlike Hanoi media, Moscow had carried several
brief reports on Kissinger's talks to Saigon, citing Western press
speculation linking his travels with the Paris .iegotiations ant
reporting Thieu's opposition to a coalition government. Moscow,
however, had avoided comment on rumors regarding a peace breakthrough.
DRV GOVERMENT STATEMENT REVEALS TEXT OF DRAFT PEACE AGREEMENT
In revealing the scenario of the private U.S.-DRV negotiations since
8 October and the text of a draft agreement, the DRV Government
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 OCTOBER 1972
statement said that this information "is in the interest of
peace and will in no way affect the negotiations, the two
parties having agreed upon the text of the agreement and the
schedule for its signing." It added that the DRV "strictly
holds" to the understanding that there will be no changes'in
the agreed text of the agreement and that it should be signed
on 31 nctober. The statement divulged that the first timetable
had bean set on 9 October when it was agreed that U.S. bombing
and mining of North Vietnam would cease on the 18th, with
initialing of the text of the peace agreement in Hanoi on the
19th and thy: signing in Paris on the 26th. It said the United
States had on two occasions proposed new schedules, having
finally suggested on 20 October that the formal signing should
be on the 31st. But on the 23d, the statement added, the United
States again referred to "diff icult'as in Saigon" and "demanded
that the negotiations be continued !or resolving new problems and
did not say anything about the im'?leuusntation of its commitments
under the agreed schedule."
The government statement termed the "so-called difficulties in
Saigon" merely a pretext to delay implementation of the U.S.
commitments since, it cla:[med, "everyone knows that the Saigon
administration was set up and fostered by the United States."
The statement charged that the latest developments show that the
Nixon Administration is not negotiating with a serious attitude
and goodwill, and that in fact it is dragging out the talks in
an effort to deceive public opinion and cover up its scheme of
maintaining the Saigon puppet administration "in order to prolong
its war of aggression in Vietnam and Indochina."
Such charges regarding U.S. support of Thieu have been a
continuing staple of Hanoi propaganda and were repeated
vehemently in comment on President Thieu's TV sp'sech dQlivared
on 24 October following Kissinger's five-day stay in Saigoi,i.
The first brief mention of Thieu's speech, in a Hanoi radii)
broadcast in Mandarin on the 25th, posed the question: "It Nixon,
while express4.ng sincerity about peace and about pursuing the
path of finding a solution through negotiations, trying his utmost
to protect Thieu, an obstacle to finding a settlement to the
Vietnam problem?" The broadcast concluded that given its support
for Thieu, the U.S. Government must be held responsible for the
obstacles to the negotiations and for the prolongation of the war.
A similar line had been taken in c 14 October QUAN DOI MAN DAN
article pegged to a 12 October speech in which Thieu had also
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 OCTOBER 1972
opposed the idea of a coalition government.* The army paper
charged that President Nixon was trying to create the false
impression that the Administration wanted to reach a solution
but had met opposition from Thieu. The timing of this article
was notable, appearing on the heels of the intensive four-day
talks in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho during which,
the government statement now makes clear, U.S.-DRV agreement
was reached on the draft peace accord. In addition, as the
government statement has now revealed, the article in the
army paper came three days after the first U.S. proposal--on the
1lth-??of a revised schedule regarding the initialing and signing
of the agreement.
The pattern of Hanoi media'& behavior during the past few days
has provided a classic example of careful orchestration. It
has been clear that Hanoi was unwilling to give any hint to its
domestic audience about the private negotiations in advance of
the presentation of its official record. Thus, Hanoi's first
clear allusion to recent private talks appeared in the 25 October
Mandarin-language broadcast on Thieu's TV speech. The broadcast
preceded its rhetorical question on President Nixon's behavior
regarding Thieu with the statement that "public opinion feels
that at a time when people are closely following the diplomatic
activities aimed at peacefully settling the Vietnam question,
Thieu's obstinate attitude and bellicose clamorings raise many
doubts."* This passage iecurred verbatim in a broadcast in
English to S)utheast Asia but was not repeated in a commentary
broadcast to Vietnamese audiences the same day. Hanoi's
explicit mention of the private talks in Paris and Kissinger's
meetings in Saigon came in a VNA commentary on Thieu's speech
transmitted in the news agency's international service in English.
The VNA commentary said that Thieu, in coming out vituperatively
against the restoration of peace and against national concord,
* See the TRENDS of 18 October 1972, pages 1-2.
** Somewhat surprisingly, a Liberation Radio broadcast on the
21st had alluded to Kissinger's visit. It cited AFP for the
report that Thieu on the 19th--in addition to meetings with
legislative, Judicial, and political representatives--had conducted
"a very important meeting, unprecedented in the history of the
second republic, with a very important U.S. delegation at
Independence Palace."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 OCTOBER 1972
showed first of all that he is frightened by worldwide public
comments on "the recent negotiations in Paris between the
representatives or the DRV and the American side, which point
to the Vietnamese people's goodwill and seriousness."
Observing that many people have asked of Thieu's behavior
"how can the tail wag the dog?", VNA said his "powder-smelling
statements at a time when both Nixon and Kissinger remained
muted after six meetings between the President's special envoy
and Thieu . . . can only reveal the real intention of Thieu's
boss." VNA went on to say that Thiau's "arrogant" attitude
can only mean that Mr. Nixon has not actually made up his mind
to abandon Thieu, and instead is "still trying to use him in
his political game now that the election is drawing near."
There is other evidence that while Hanoi was willing to allude
to some speculation about private negotiations in comment for
audiences abroad, it was reluctant to broach the matter to its
domestic audience. Thus, VNA'a international transmissions
on 24 October reported cryptically that the press bureau of the
DRV Embassy in Peking had issued an authorized statement on
the 23d describing as "sheer fabrication" REUTER's report that
North Vietnamese diplomats in Peking said on the 21st that "a
major development was possible in the next two or three days"
about such questions as "the lot of Nguyen Van Thieu." Hanoi
media have also remained silent on Pharr Van Dong's recent
interviews with NEWSWEEK and other Western publications.
While generally avoiding acknowledgment of specific speculation
about the status of negotiations in its domestic propaganda,
Hanoi had sustained the practice--initiated in August--of
challenging U.S. expressions of optimism.* Thus, a 25 October
NHAN DAN editorial on U.S. air strikes, transmitted by VNA some
two hours after the first reaction to Thieu's TV speech,
declared: "Certain people in Washington have for some time now
tried to make believe that the war is coming to an end. The
fact, however, is that the forces of aggression there are
continuing the intensification of the war, perpetrating more
crimes every day in both zones of Vietnam." As an example, the
* This propaganda included the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator
article which presented a comprehensive review of the communists'
negotiating position, but Started out by attacking U.S.
expressions of optimism under the heading "Tricks That Can
Deceive No One." See the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 3-6.
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26 OCTOBER 1972
0
0
editorial added that on 11 October when the U.S. side was
speaking of progress, U.S. aircraft had struck Hanoi, killing
many civilians and damaging foreign diplomatic missions. It
werut on to detail strikes in both the North and the South and
concluded with the routine pledge that the struggle would be
continued no matter how difficult the road. A Hanoi radio
commentary on the 24th, pegged to alleged U.S. intensification
of the bombing of civilians in the North, had also spoken of
the Nixon "clique" resorting to "all sorts of tricks to create
a fraudulent peace smokescreen." It charged further that the
"clique" has .lso adopted the trick of "letting its lackey
Nguyen Van Thie't voice its warlike and stubborn position on its
behalf" but added that "this shrewd maneuver certainly will not
deceive the public."
Earlier propaganda castigating U.S. support for Thieu included
a 21 October commentary broadcast in English to Southeast Asia
which again ass!.led Thieu for declaring in his 12 October speech
that all those w'Ao supported a national concovd government and
all communists should be killed. The commentary charged that
Thieu's "fire eating" simply reflects U.S. scheming to prolong the
war through Vietnamization--which, it noted, means brother
fighting brother. After lauding the PRG's proposal for a three-
segment government, it said that "Thieu has turnei out to be the
main obstacle to national concord and peace. Yet Nixon has tried
to retain him as a tool of U.S. colonialism."
The "repressive" policies of the Thieu regime have continued to
be the target of communist criticism, and Front media have also
sought to undercut Saigon contentions that the communists plan to
carry out reprisals against the population. Thus, an authorized
LPA statement or :he 25th "resolutely rejected" the "completely
fabricated story" that the GVN had seized a Viet Cong plan for
sentencing to death some 23 categories of people. The matter of
"so-called Viet Cong death lists" had been ridiculed as early as
last 24 June in a QUAN DOI KHAN DAN article.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 OCTOBER 1972
HANG! ROUTINELY PROTESTS CONTINUED U.S. AIR STRIKES IN DRV
In addition to the NHAN DAN editorial of the 25th and the 9a:noi
radio commentary of the 24th, cited above, which attacked the
Nixon Administration for spreading rumors of progress in
negotiations, the daily statements by th3 DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman protesting U.S. strikes during the past week have
said that the Nixon Administration ir revealing its "false
allegations about peace and goodwill" by continuing the bombing
of the North. The spokesman's statement of the 26th, for
example, forcefully asserted that the Administration is
attempting to deceive world public opinion by "ballyhooing
incessantly that it will end the war and that it is negotiating
seriously to solve the Vietnam problem" while actually
continuing to send U.S. planes to bomb and strafe "many
municipalities, cities, towns, and population centers of the
DRV." The statement called the continuing U.S. raids "criminal
war acts" which "prove that the United States does not have a
serious attitude and goodwill for negotiation aimed at ending
the war and restoring peace in Vietnam." A NHAN DAN editorial
of 22 October also lashed out at the United States for "saying
it wants peace" while "stepping up its war efforts and
intensifying the bombing and strafing of North Vietnam." After
detailing alleged U.S. attacks from 18 to 21 October on 15 DRV
provinces, the editorial assailed the "U.S. Imperialists" for
"continuing to intensify the war in defiance of the American
people and world public opinion."
In an editorial the previous day, NHAN DAN had claimed that
world public opinion "demands that the United States immediately
end all bombings and strafirgs of Hanoi, Haiphong, and other
cities and towns." NHAN DAN then singled out recent gestures
of support from officials of several cities within the USSR
and the PRC--in response to the 3 October appeal by 37 DRV
mayors--to bolster its claim of worldwide public demand for the
United States to stop its bombing of the Ncrth. The paper
delivered a scathing attack on the Nixon Administration for
allegedly attempting to save its "Vietnamization strategy" by
putting Hanoi, Haiphong, economic installations, schools,
hospitals, churches, and crowded city wards, "including the
diplomatic corps district in Hanoi," on the list of "strategic
.targets" of the U.S. air force. It went on to call for increased
vigilance and improved air defense work in order to meet the
threat of "aggressive U.S. imperialists," who were pictured as
remaining "very bellicose and stubborn, unwilling to give up their
aggressive design."
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26 OCTOBER 1972
The Administration came under, additional fire in an appeal
issued by the minister of education, the minister of higher
and secondary professional education, and the education workers
trade union at a 19 October Hanoi press conference. The appeal
called on teachers and students throughout the world to help
"stay the bloody hands of Nixon, prevent. him from killing
teachers and pupils and destroying schools in the DRV."
Claiming that more than 200 schools have been demolished and
that "hundreds of teachers and pupils have been massacred"
since the April escalation, the appeal condemned the
Administration for "grossly trampling on all international law
and on all norms of morality and civilization, as well as on
the dignity and conscience of all mankind."
In a similar appeal, publicized by VNA. on the 20th, the rectors
of 37 universities and colleges and the directors of 200
secondary schools in the DRV developed the charge that the
President, by making use of the latest achievements of science
and technology "to kill and maim Vietnamese teachers and students,"
had "outstripped the war crimes of his predecessor Hitler."
The claimed downing of the 4,000th U.S. plane over the North on
the 17th received editorial acclaim in NHAN DAN on the 19th and
22d as well as in .JUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 19th. The QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN editorial argued that the downing of the 4,000th
plane demonstrated that the "myths about the 'incredible' U.S.
air power" have been destroyed and that "we are winning, whereas
the Americans are defeated." As of 26 October, Hanoi claimed
to have downed a total of 4,017 U.S. aircraft over the North.
0
HANOI PAPER REITERATES CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY SITUATION
Amid Western speculation about diplomatic moves to end the
Vietnam war, an article published in installments in NHAN DAN
from 21 to 23 October served to reinforce Hanoi's previous
expressions of confidence that the communists can pursue a
military course to victory. The article, attributed to Tran Kien*
and entitled "Four Years of Maneuvers and Failures," was also
* NHAN DAN published a similar series of articles on the war in
South Vietnam by Tran Kien in June 1968, and on 10 November 1970
the paper identified a Tran Kien as a member of NHAN DAN's
editorial board.
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26 OCTOBER 1972
publicized by Hanoi radio. It reviewed the fighting over the
past four years and labeled as "strategic failures" the allied
incursion into Cambodia in 1970, the ARVN operations in Laos and
Cambodia In 1971, efforts to halt support for the communists
in the South, Vietamization, and the recent "re-Americanization"
of the war.
Tran Kien repeated standard DRV evaluations of the military
situation which had been developed previously--for example, in
the reports on the 20th VWP plenum earlier this year.* Thus he
maintained that the fighting in 1971 demonstrated the ability
of the communists' regular forces to "launch large-scale
annihilating battles" and made it clear that "our people's armed
forces in the South were definitely able to annihilate the
puppet regular forces and to defeat the Vietnamization strategy
militarily." He also repeated the evaluation, stressed by Hanoi
prior to this year's offensive, that the communist forces were
in a "victorious, active, advantageous, ascending position."
The launching of the offensive, he said, reflected the favorable
balance of forces on the battlefield.
The article concludes with the affirmation that "the resistance
has scored successes of very important strategic significance,
is in a situation more excellent than ever before, and is facing
extremely brilliant prospects. Persisting in and stepping up
the fighting, we will certainly score complete success."
* For background on.the plenum and on previous Hanoi discussions
of the military situation, see the 12 April 1972 TRENDS, pages 13-15.
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CONFTfENTIAL FBLS TRENDS
26 OCTOBER 1972
MOSCOW REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE CONr1UNISTS' POSITION
Moscow has originated no substantial comment on a Vietnam settlement.
It has continued, however, to report Vietnamese communist statements,
with TASS' prompt, brief report of the DRV Government statement
on a peace agreement taking note of Hanoi's insistence that the
agreement be signed on 31 October. Earlier statements picked up by
Moscow had i