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November 22, 1972
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0 ~,~..- e- 1Z Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R al ~ P;BIS TRENDS In Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential 22 NOVEMBER 1972 (VOL. XXIII, NO. 47) 875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/C N ,.Dgl4; ~P85T00875R000300050047-9 This propaganda analysis report is hosed exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government component. STATSPEC NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 20008,W9 ENR1!4-RDP85T0.875TR0E000s300050047-9 22 NOVEMBER 1972 4.1 CONTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i DRV Claims Good Will, Assails U.S.-Thieu Blocking of Accord. . . .i Cautious Chinese Comment Marks Visit of DRV Aid Delegation . . . 6 Moscow Urges Prompt Agreement, Notes Le Duc Tho Stopover . . . . 8 Hanoi Sustains Routine Protee is Against U.S. Air Strikes . . . . 9 Sihanouk's Government Emphasizes Rejection of Cease-Fire . . . . 11 DRV, PRG Support NLHS Charge That U.S. "Obstructs" Lao Talks . 15 SALT USSR Notes SALT II Complexity, Stresses Equality Principle . . . 18 MIDDLE EAST Soviet Propaganda Marks Time on Arab-Israeli Conflict. . . . . . 21 Cairo Announces Egyptian Military Delegation in Moscow . . . . . 23 CUBA-U. S. Havana Urges Rapid U.S.-Cuban Accord on Hijacking. . . . . . . . 26 WEST GERMANY USSR, GDR Welcome Victory of Brandt and Ostpolitik . . . . . . . 29 Soviet Bloc Pressures Prague to Reach Accord with Bonn . . . . . 30 Zhivkov Eulogizes Brezhr.-ev, Reaffirms Dependence on USSR . . . . 32 Soviet Media Prepare Ground for Brezhnev Visit to Hungary. . . . 33 Ukraine Ranks Shelest Last Among Politburo Members . . . . . . . 35 Leadership Failings Under Mzhavanadze Exposed in Georgia . . . . 35 Masherov Article in KOMMUNIST Stresses Russification . . . . . . 37 SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Peking and the Clandestine Radios Beamed to Southeast Asia . . . Si Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/0 9O J61EPPIJJ W5Rqgp~Q gR9p47-9 22 NOVEMBER 1972 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 NOVEMBER 1972 Moscow (2358 iteris) Peking (1366 items) Bulgarian President (2%) 19% Domestic Issues (30%) 34% Zhivkov in USSR UN Session (6%) 21% [Brezhnev 12 Nov. (--) 12%] [Disarmament (6%) 10%] Speech 50th Anniversary [LA Nuclear-Free Zone (--) 7%] of USSR, 30 Dec. (6%) 10% Indochina (33%) 18% Indochina (5%) 6% [Vietnam (14%) 11%] [Vietnam (4%) 5%] [Cambodia (18%) 4%] International Working Youth Conference in (13%) 6% Nepalese Prime Minister in PRC (--) 9% Moscow PRC-Luxembourg (--) 5% China (2%) 4% Diplomatic Rocket Troops & (--) 3% Relations Artillery Day Albanian Military (6%) 5% European Security (1%) 2% Delegation in PRC These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output 11 the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have bean covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBI^u TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 INDOCHINA Following the 14 November announcement that Le Duc Tho had left for Paris, Hanoi media said nothing about private talks on the peace agreement until the 18th, when VNA reported tersely that the talks with Kissinger would resume on the 20th. Following the private sessions on the 20th and 21st, VNA noted that Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy held consultations with the PRG delegations; however, current commentaries do not mention the talks in insisting that there is no plausible reason for the U.S. delay in signing the accord. In arguing that no changes in the accord should be necessary, propagandists for the most part have not specified issues over which Saigon has shown concern. In exceptions to this pattern, however, Hanoi press articles on the. 19th and 20th atypicnlly raised the question of both sides withdrawing troops from South Vietnam. The articles accused Indonesian officials of commenting on this issue as well as supporting U.S. calls for "clarification" of some points, charges that take on added interest in light of U.S. reports that Indonesia is one of four countries slated to supervise a cease- fire. Persistent complaints that the United States has delayed signing of the peace agreement in order to continue supporting Thieu and negotiate from a position of strength were repeated officially in DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements on the 16th and 18th, respectively, which assailed stepped-up U.S. shipments of war materiel to Saigon. During the DRV economic delegation's current stay in the PRC on the first leg of the annual tour to negotiate aid agreements, Peking has sought to keep the atmosphere propitious for a Vietnam settlement while offering minimal pledges of support to Hanoi. North Vietnamese comment surrounding the visit, on the other hand, has sharply denounced Washington's delay in agreeing to a settlement and has sought to associate the Chinese with Hanoi's cause. Routine Moscow comment has praised the DRV's good will in agreeing to the U.S. request for further private meetings and reiterated that an end to the war depends on the U.S. attitude. Commentacuia have repeatedly cited Brezhnev's 13 November call for the removal of American "obstacles" to signing of the accord. DRV CLAIMS GOOD WILL. ASSAILS U,S.-THIEU BLOCKING OF ACCORD Hanoi media on 18 and 19 November carried Le Duc Tho's statement upon arriving in aria on the 17th in which he typically stressed Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 DRV seriousness and good will regarding a peace settlement and said that the Vietnam problem can be settled promptly if the United States shows a similar attitude. However, like earlier propaganda his statement was ambiguous regarding the DRV's position on modifications in the accord. He said he Lad come to Paris at the suggestion of the United States "to hold once again negotiations with the U.S. side in order to rapidly settle the conclusion of the agreement." But he added that for the negotiations to be successful the United States should "abide by the provisions agreed on tarween the two parties." In addition to decrying the United States' failure to sign the accord on 31 October as it had allegedly agreed to do, Tho deplored the "massive " dispatch of U.S. military supplies to South Vietnam and Cai,ibodia and the continued U.S. air strikes in both North and South Vietnam. On the eve of his arrival in Paris, a DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting the U.S. supplying of arms to Thieu as well as the continued air strikes sniped at the President and Kissinger by quoting some of their statements without attribution. It said these acts "shed more light on the deceitful character of the allegations of the U.S. Government to the effect that it is 'ending its military involvement,' that it 'wants peace--peace with honor--a peace fair to all,' and that 'peace is at hand."' The foreign ministry statement said the record exposes the U.S. aim "of negotiating from a position of strength and maintaining the Thieu puppet administration." A supporting PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the 18th said the U.S. delivery of arms "proves that the Nixon Administ?ation not only refused to sign the agreement already reached but also violated and is preparing t:, sabotage its commitments still more seriously." A Hanoi radio commentary on the 18th referred to the DRV Foreign Ministry protest and said that another "boast of peace objectives" contradicted by U.S. actions was Ambassador Porter's assertion, at the 16 November plenary session of the Paris talks, that "the restoration of peace in Vietnam is drawing near."* The broadcast echoed earlier comment in ridiculing the notion * 'The VNA account of the Paris session on the 16th had dismissed Ambassador Porter's statement with the terse remark that "the U.S. delegate repeated his old contentions." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 that the arms buildup was in preparation for a cease-fire; it said the dispatch of the weapons shows that the Nixon Administration is still using the Thieu regime as a tool to proceed with the war anti maintain i.eocolonialism. The broadcast concluded by warning that this is a "ver' subjective calculation and a critical error" by the Nixon Administration, which should be "realistic and wise" and proceed along the path opened by the peace agreement and withdraw in honor. Another Hanoi radio commentary on the 16th had said that along with delivering equipment to Thieu, the United States has allowed "this war-rabid lackey to shout for war and to put forward insolent demands asking for a modification of the accord which has been agreed upon between the United States a?.td the DRV." The broadcast did not broach any specific terms of the agreement to which Thieu has objected; however, a 19 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the allegedly increasing urban opposition to Thieu did so obliquely. The army paper's commentary, as carried by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi radio, said that various opposition factions have rejected Thieu's arguments "for continuation of the war and partition of the nation" and have demanded that "Thieu resign in order to establish a new administration in Saigon which advocates peace, democracy, and national concord." (A NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th had been more specific when it said that Thieu opposes unificat-&.on because he "b;razenly" considers the South and North as two separate countries and that he opposes an end to U.S. military invol?-3metit: and national concord, "specifically the formation of a three-segment administrative structure in South Vietnam.") The articles in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN, on the 19th and 20th, respectively, in the course of their sharp attack on Indonesian officials went beyond the NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th and other propaganda when they broached for the first time Thieu's objection to the omission in the peace accord of a call for withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary cited AFP for the report that Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik had echoed the allegation that "the Vietnamese people are invading Vietnam" and "tried to explain the arrogant demand by the Thieu clique which the leader of his administration repeated on 9 November: Any force located in areas below the 17th parallel which does not consist of natives of those areas must withdraw." The NHAN DAN commentary on the 20th attributed this statement to "another Indonesian leader of even higher rank than Malik" and specified that the forces not natives of the area included "both the North Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 0 Vietnamese and Americans." The army paper observed that the "worn-out demand" for mutual troop withdrawal "has even been set aside" by the Americans. Bct.h papers also took issue with Foreign Minister Malik for supporting U.S, calls for some of the points in the peace accord to be clarified. And as further evidence of Indonesian bias, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said Malik himself had expressed sympathy with the United States "when the entire world indignantly condemned the Nixon Administration's horrible crimes of bombing and attacking dikes" in the DRV. The commentary also observed that Malik had opposed recognition of the PRG, ae well as the RGNUC, at the nonalined conference in Georgetown last summer. It has been long-standing Hanoi practice to periodically criticize the Indonesians for being biased in favor of the United States, but the current attacks take on added significance in the light of U.S. reports that Indonesia is slated to be one of the members of an international control commission--along with Canada, Hungary, and Poland--that will supervise the Vietnam cease-fire. The timing seems curious since, in quoting Malik and other leaders, the papers cited AFP reports of 9 and 10 ?lovember. It would appear that the articles were calculated to coincide with the ret'irn of Le Duc Tho and Kissinger to Paris. Hanoi media, characteristically, have to date said nothing about Si: singer's trip to Brussels on 22 November to meet with Malik any Suharto.* BACKGROUND ON DRV ATTACKS ON INDONESIA: The walkout of the Indonesian, Malayan, and Lao representatives at the Coorgetown nonalined conference last August in protest over tt.e admission of the PRG delegation had been assailed in a NHAN DAN editorial on 12 August. It said that the "deplorable attitude" of the representatives of these three countries showed "the seamy side of the so-called ASEAN solution to the Vietnam problem which was recently rejected by our government and people." On 10 August VNA had reported that & DRV Foreign Ministry official called in the Indonesian charge d'affaires and rejected "the absurd proposal of the ASELN regarding the settlement of the Vietnam issue," but VNA did not disclose the substance of the proposal. * A Djakarta broadcast on the 22d said it was believed that Kissinger's talks concerned the possibility of Indonesia's participation in a Vietnam cease-fire supervisory commission. It went on to quote Indonesian Deputy Commander Gen. Paggabean as telling the press in Djakarta on the 22d that no requests had been received for such a force as yet. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 Kuala Lumpur radio on 16 July quoted the Malaysian deputy premier as reporting that the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Manila had agreed to contribute all it could toward an Indochina settlement. The Malaysian was quoted further as saying the conference had agreed upon a definition of a Southeast Asian "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality." THE FRONT Front propaganda has continued to claim that the draft peace agreement has met with broad support in South Vietnam and that the southern people are uniting in opposition to Thieu. An LPA commentator article, broadcast by both the Front radio on the 17th and Hanoi on the 19th, scored Thieu as the "main obstacle" to peace and alleged that a "broad united action front" was developing in the South made up of people who "are struggling to topple Thieu and open the way for signing the agreement." Some commentaries have gone on to urge that attacks and uprisings be accelerated to force the United States to sign the agreement. The media continue to focus on the Thieu government's alleged persecution of opposition forces. A particularly strident Liberation Radio commentary on the 16th charged, in this regard, that Thieu "has not only refused to release patriotic prisoners but . . . has also allowed puppet authorities to kill the present detainees secretly Lefore peace is restored." This commentary said that Thieu was "panic-stricken by the idea that these patriots, after returning to their hamlets and wards, would become forces struggling for peace, democracy, and freedom and would become judges who would severely condemn him." Among other things, the commentary cited "recent acts" by the government in Hau Nghai to ducument its charges of persecution. LPA on the 8th had cited "investigations by the Giai Phong [Liberation) Security Department" of government actions in Hau Nghia Province in a report which charged that the allies are pretaring a campaign "aimed at destroying political prisoners and other detained patriots who would--as feared by the United States and Thieu--serve as able cadres for the revolution after a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBI3 TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 CAUTIOUS CHINESE COMMENT MARKS VISIT OF rRV AID DELEGATION During the first week of the visit by the DRV economic delegation now in China to negotiate the annual aid agreement f'r 1973, tr: Chinese have sought t,-, keep the atmosphere propitious for a Vietnam settlement while awaiting results from the new round of negotiation: in Paris. The Chinese have uffered minimal pledges elf support for Hanoi but have avoided strong anti-U.S. polemics. The Forth Viet,,imese, on the other hand, have pointedly sought to associate their Peking ally with their cause, including the war effort, and have gone well beyond the Chinese in criticizing the Nixon Administration's current moves uo the Vietnam front. The DRV delegation was honored by the usual welcoming banquet on 16 November hosted by 'vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and held "very cordial and friendly" talks with a delegation headed by Li on the 16th and with Chou ,n-lai on the 17th. The Chinese side included a vice foreign trade minister, a vice minister in charge of aid, a deputy chief of staff, and the head of the PLA armament department. The DRV group departed on the 19th for a visit to Yunnan along the Sino-Vietnamese border, accompanied by the aid vice minister. On the 21st the delegation proceeded to Chungking. Peking reported none of the substance of Chou's meeting with the DRV delegation, but VNA quoted both Chou and the head of the delegation, Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, as referring to the Vietnam draft agreement and Chinese aid to the Vietnamese comrades. Nghi was quoted by VNA as having denounces; "the ' harzzs and acts of the Nixon Administration" in delaying the sign!.n;; of the agreement and its "present efforts to push ahesi" t~te Vietnamization program. He also expressed gratitude for Peking's "great and precious support and assistance." According to VNA, Chou demanded that the United States "stop delaying", ti.q signing of the agreement and declared that the Chinese will continue aiding the Vietnamese in "whatever eventualities." The divergent approaches taken by Hanoi and Peking were also evident in the 16 November banquet. speeches. Li Hsien-nien made a point of noting that Le Duc Tho had agreed to meet again wit:: the United States and called on the U.S. Government to "keep its word and sign the already reached agreement as quickly as possible." Most notably, Li offered no criticism of the United States. He acknowleded that the DRV delegation Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 had come for talks on 1973 aid, and he made the standard pledge of continuing support and assistance to the Vietnamese as a "glorious proletarian internationalist duty." These low-key remarks stand in contrast to the conspicuous efforts to reassure the North Vietnamese made by Li when he headed a Chinese aid delegation to Hanoi in September 1971. That visit, coming in the aftermath of Sino-Vietnamese strains occasioned by Peking's invitation to President Nixon, was marked by especially strong Chinese pledges of support, including readiness to risk the greatest national sacrifices in behalf of the Vietnamese against the United States as "the most ferocious imperialism of our time." If militant language was absent from Li's remarks last week, Ngh_-'ade a vigorous effort to make up for it. He denounced the United %.,.ates as being "stubborn, bellicose, and unwilling to abandon its ambition of aggression," and he claimed that the Nixon Administration has "perfidiously gone back on its word" by delaying the signing of the draft agreement. He also castigated Washington for stepping up supplies to the Saigon "lackeys" while the latter "are unscrupulously persecuting the patriots they have unlawfully arrested and imprisoned." Nghi expatiated on the importance of aid to the Vietnamese. As the North Vietnamese had done during Li's visit to Hanoi last year, Nghi mentioned the Soviets as well as the Chinese in expressing gratitude for aid from throughout the world. He made repeated references to Chinese assistance, including a passage noting the "enormous supplementary aid" in 1972 and the "many effective measures" undertaken to help the Vietnamese overcome difficulties created by the United States. Where Li had simply noted that the ARV delegation had arrived for "talks on assistance for 1973," Nghi specified that this was to be "economic and military aid." In another pointed effort to identify the Chinese with the Vietnamese cause, the Hanoi domestic radio on 21 November carried a recorded statement by a political commissar of a Chinese ship that had allegedly been hit by U.S. bombs in early May while anchored off the DRV. The Hanoi broadcast said the recording had "recently" been sent by Radio Peking, but no occasion was specified. In the recording, which the introductory announcement said had been translated into Vietnamese and read by a Radio Peking announcer, the Chinese pledged to continue to support the Vietnamese struggle as long as the war persists. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 U.S. MILITARY Recent statements by Peking's Indochinese allies SUPPLIES denouncing U.S. military supplies to Saigon and Phno!n Penh were seconded by a 22 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, the lowest level of authoritative Chinese comment. The article was pegged to statements by the DRV and the PRG on the foreign ministry level and by the foreign ministry spokesman of Sihanouk's government. Commentator complained that the United States had rushed large amounts of arms to its allies after "putting off" the signing of the dr:%ft accord and at a time when the world is "hoping eagerly for peace in Vietnam." The article questioned whether the United States really wants to cease fire in South Vietnam or to let the war flamer spread. It addressed the question of a settlement in only vague terms, calling on the United States to let the peoples of Indochina stttle their own questions without foreign interference. MOSCOW URGES PROMPT AGRE6v1ENT, NOTES LE DUC THO STOPOVER Routine Moscow comment has a time-marking quality, praising the DRV's "good will" in agreeing to the American request for another meeting and stating repeatedly that an end to the war depends on the U.S. attitude. Commentators continue to claim that the United States' actions in Vietnam--pursuit of the bombing and of "aggression"-.-do not square with its words about peace. Soviet commentators have again taken the United States to task for procrastinating on signing the draft peace agreement and have repeatedly quoted Brezhnev's 13 November call for the removal of American "obstacles" to signing of the accord. Charging the United States with using Saigon's obduracy as a pretext for delay, some commentar:ts, including PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles on 16 and 17 November, have accused Thieu of unleashing a "terror campaign" to suppress the growing movement in South Vietnam in favor of signing the peace agreement. Le Duc Tho had talks with Suslov, Katushev, and Gromyko during his 15-17 November stopover in Moscow en route from Hanoi to Paris,* his sixth visit to Moscow in as many months. He had met for the first time with Suslov in addition to Katushev during his stopover last month, but this is the first time he has ever been reported to have met with Gromyko. TASS described the atmosphere of the talks as "friendly and cordial," the characterization used in * Le Duc Tho's stopover in Peking is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 November 1972, page 7. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/ #Ig;friiQP85T0087 g0 gRp50047-9 22 NOVEMBER 1972 August when he saw Kirilenko, Le Duc Tho's talks with Mazurov in September and with Suslov in October had been characterized as "fraternal and cordial." As usual, Hanoi media covered Le Duc Tho's Peking and Moscow stopovers only in their reports of his arrival in Paris. Hanoi echoed Peking and Moscow in characterizing the atmosphere of the talks in both capitals as "cordial and friendly." As in reports of the August and September visits, Moscow said the talks with Tho covered "questions of further developing Soviet-Vietnamese relations." The August and September discussions had reportedly covered development of the two countries' "cooperation" and "friendship." There had been no such description of the talks in October, however. Moscow also noted that thy: curre"L talks covered "the Vietnamese people's struggle for freedom and independence" and that the Soviet Union reaffirmec its "invariable support for the just cause of the Vietnamese people struggling against the American aggression." In October and August, Moscow had more forcefully reported promises of "all-round assistance" or "economic and military aid" but in September had pledged only "solidarity." Moscow's accounts of the stopover also noted that the Sovlat side praised the DRV and PRG position on a settlement as "serious and imbued with good will," supported the Vietamese demand for the "speediest" U.S. signing of the craft peace agreement, and repeated Brezhnev's c.+ ! 1 for removaY. of "the obstacles created by the American side." TASS duly reported Le Duc Tho's 17 November statement to the effect that his arrival in Paris attested to the DRV's "good will" and that the United States must also take a "serious stand" and briefly noted the Tho-Kissinger meetings on the 20th and 21st. On the 21st Moscow media also reported that Katushev received the DRV Ambassador for a talk in "a warm and comradely atmosphere" but did not indicate Cie substance. HANOI SUSTAINS ROUTINE PROTESTS AGAINST U,S, AIR STRIKES U.S. air activity over the North continued to evoke the standard protests from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, generally including the charge that the Nixon Administration is engaging in deceitful and stubborn behavior by pursuing the air war while claiming that peace is at hand. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FillS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 The statemen,: of the 17th, reacting to heavy U-q. strikes on the three preceding days, opened with a relatively strong denunciation of U.S. bombing activities--especially B-52 raids--which it claimed had causeu damage from Thanh Hoa is the DMZ. Carried textually by bith Hanoi radio and VNA, this statement stressed that there were twice as many sorties as usual on those days and that the strikes were "extremely barbarouc." It calit-1 the B-52 attacks 'especially serious'' and said there was heavy damage both air strikes and naval. bombardment. VNA echoed these claims on 20 November in repotting destruction caused by B-52's on the 16th in 1 remote mountainous area of Thanh Hoa Province. The rest of the daily statements, less strongly worded, routinely condemned air strikes and naval shelling of areea below the 20th parallel. U.S. air and naval action during the first 19 days of November was condemned in a "special communique" of the DRV War Crimes Commission carried by VNA on the 21st. Hanoi media have never directly acknowledged the fact that U.S. air strikes have been confined to the area below the 20th parallel since 24 October, but the communique observed atypically that the Nixon Administration "has frenziedly stepped up its criminal and naval war against one-fourth of DRV territory from the 17th to the 20th parallel." It claimed that "on certain days"--such as 2, 3, 6, 7, and 18 November--the intensity of the bombing exceeded that of strikes "In the period of full war." It also claimed that the United States had committed "even helicopters" to its arsenal of air power on those days. Citing the raids of 15 November as among the heaviest, the communique said there had been 410 tactical sorties and "nearly 30" B-52 sorties that day; the record naval shelling was said to have taken place on 17 November when 1,450 artillery shells were allegedly fired at coastal villages in Quang Binh. Like routine comment on the air strikes, the communique called upon the United States to end the attacks immediately and "sign with equal speed the peace agreement it had arrived at with the DRV." Vows of DRV determination to continue the struggle in the absence of a peace accord included a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 16th which hailed successes of the artillery forces and pledged that these for:- s would continue to train ind fight both "on the front" and in the "great rear" area. The editorial paid particular attention to cadre training and to organization of combat and supply, and a brief report in Hanoi's English- language service on 20 November said officers and pilots of the DRV air force were participating in a short course on improving combat and command techniques. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 COMMENDATIONS FOR As of 18 November Hanoi claimed to have CAPTURE OF PILOTS downed 11 more planes, for a total of 4,053, and to have set ablaze four more U.S. warships. No pilots were said to have been captured during the week, but on the 21st Hanoi radio reported a "recent" circular issued by the Premier's Office on the proper procedures for commending units and individuals who capture "aggressor pilots." Stressing that the task of capturing pilots alive is of "special military and political significance," the circular directs that commendations be based on the promptness and thoroughness of the capture--that is, the seizure of documents, weapons, and other equipment as well as the pilots themselves--and the degree to which the captors adhere to "the conditions regarding the implementation of policies on surrendering aggressors and POV's and policies on booty." The circular also provides for careful assessment of each individual's or unit's participation in the capture; stressing that each capture must be regarded as a battle, it directo higher commendation for those carried out under "complex combat circumstances" than for those carried out under normal ones. It directs that reports on each unit's or individual's achievements be prompt and accurate, both in order that commendations can be properly made and in order that exemplary captures can be studied and emulated. SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZES REJECTION OF CEASE-FIRE Cambodian National Day (9 November) provided an occasion for Sihanouk's government (RGNU) to go on record with an authoritative statement ruling out a cease-fire in Cambodia as a result of the proposed Vietnam settlement. However, in what may reflect divergent interests among the parties involved, the RGNU rejection of a Cambodian cease-fire was not echoed by its allies. Peking expressed generalized support for Sihanouk's cause but avoided the question of a settlement. Hanoi praised Sihanouk's five-point program while maintaining its silence on a Cambodian cease-fire. Moscow, with its even more complicated position in Cambodia, simply ignored the anniversary this time, unlike previous years. Sihanouk took an unusually minor role in the National Day festivities, having been in North Korea since 2 November for what he said is to be a month-long vacation. His leaving his Peking base at a time when negotiations are underway on Vietnam Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 and Laos may seem odd, though in doing so he has further distanced himself from a settlement that he insists has no authority in Cambodia. RGNU Premier Penn Nouth and the special envoy of the interior part," Ieng Sary, have also absented themselves from Peking, departing on 18 November for a visit to Shanghai. These two accompanied Sihanouk on his trip to Hanoi from 26 to 28 October.* RGMJ ON CEASE-FIRE Uamb.dian National Day was observed by the ROYNU with a 9 November government statement reaffirming determination to carry on the struggle "without compromise or retreat." While supporting the Vietnam draft accord publicized by Hanoi on 26 October, the statement stressed that "this agreement is only valid for Vietnam" and recalled that in a 29 October speech Sihanouk said that a Vietnam-U.S. peace agreement would have no authority in Cambodia. It pointedly rejected "the maneuver of cease-fire in Cambodia hatched by U.S. imperialism with President Richard Nixon and Mr. Henry Kissinger as ringleaders," and it notified countries that are to be members of the international control commiAnion monitoring a Vietnam cease-fire that if they violate the territorial integrity of Cambodia they will be considered aggressors. In a polemical referenze with anti-Soviet overtones, the RGNU statement added that the Cambodiar people know from past experience that the ICC only interferes in the internal affairs of the country concerned and engages in activities "in the interests of the superpowers." Also on 9 November, Sihanouk's press agency released a statement rejecting a cease-fire that was issued in `1e names of the "interior part" of the RGNU, the Cambodian liberation armed forces, and mass organizations. The statement, dated 2 November, was said to have been adopted following a "recent" meeting in the liberated none. Though it did not mention the Vietnam draft agremeent, its timing seems responsive to that development. A Cambodian cease-fire wes rejected yet again in a 15 November statement by a spokesman of the RGNU Foreign Ministry denouncing * Sihanouk's visit to Hanoi is discussed in the 1 November 1972 TRENDS, pages 15-17. His current visit to Pyongyang is his fourth to be publicized. The previous ones were in June-July 1970, July-August 1971, and April-May 1972. In the first and last previous cases, as now, his trips to Pyongyang came on the heels of visits to Hanoi. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 stepped-up U.S. arms deliveries to the Lon Nol regime. It charged that the United States talks "deceitfully" of peace in Vietnam while at the same time refusing to sign the agreement with the DRV and enhancing the military potential of its Phnom Penh and Saigon allies. The statement reiterated the line that any eventual peace agreement on Vietnam will have nothing to do with Cambodia. Cambodian intransigence hart been illustrat_d by routine-level commentaries carried by Sihanouk's media on 6 and 18 November warning that the liberation forces "will soon launch a general attack to liberate Phnom Penh." The commentary on the 18th stressed that it will be a major attack aimed at "completely wiping out" the Lon Nol forces and at "totally, definitively, and permanently liberating Phnom Penh. As if to underscore the case for intransigence, the RGNU and its Peking patron used the occasion of Cambodian National Day to expand the claim of territory "liberated" to "nearly 90 percent" of the land and "over" five million of the seven million Cambodian people. The previous claim of 85 percent of the land and over five million people had first been announced in a statement by the RGNU Ministry of Information and Propaganda on 13 July 1972, also a time when Sihanouk was vociferously opposing a cease-fire. The claim prior to July, that 80 percent of the territory and "nearly': five million inhabitants had been liberated, dated back to August 1971 when Ieng Sary first came to Peking. That claim had been an increase from the former one of 70 percent of the territory and four million people. The current claim of 90 percent of the territory appeared in the 9 November RGNU statement and was also made by Penn Nouth at a National Day reception in Peking. Its first appearance, however, had been in Peking comment--in an 8 November NCNA commentary and a 9 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversary. NCNA initially disseminated these two items with the old 85 percent claim but followed up a few hours later with corrections providing the new figure. PEKING Peking marked the Cambodian anniversary with the customary message from Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth and the usual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. This year, with Sihanouk out of the country, Penn Nouth addressed a Peking reception which was attended by PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 Chinese comment on the anniversary did not address itself to the issue of a political settlement and accordingly mentioned neither Sihanouk's five-.point program nor the :ease-fire question. Peking had gone on record against linking a cease-fire in Cambodia and Laos with a Vietnam settlement in the 30 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article accompanying the PRC Government statement on the Vietnam draft agreement. Approval of Sihanouk's five-point program was voiced most 4.ecenriy by Chou at a 29 October banquet marking the prince's birthday. Peking's subsequent avoidance of these issues seems related to its evident desire to see a Vietnam settlement firmed up and its effort to keep the atmosphere as propitious au possible. Although Peking did not mention a Cambodian settlement on its own authority, NCNA's account if the Peking reception cited Penn Nouth's denunciation of the "collusion" of the United States and Lon Nol for a cease-fire to gain time for a counterattack and his insistence that the Cambodian question be settled on the basis of Sihanouk's five points and the FUNK program. The Chinese leaders' message portrayed a fighting unity of the three Indochinese peoples under the banner of the Joint statement of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference, a reference not present last year. Peking seems recently to be concerned to invoke the sense of unity symbolized by the Indochinese summit at a time -when divergent interests among the parties involved may come to the fore. The message concluded with a standard pledge of "all-out support and assistance" to the Cambodians in their struggle "until complete victory." VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS Cambodian National Day occasioned the customary greetings messages from,the DRV and PRG leaders acknowledging that Sihanouk represents the legitimacy of the Cambodian state and that the RGNU is the only legal government. The DRV message expressed "unreserved" support for Sihanouk's five-point program and pledged adherence to the joint declaration of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference. There has been no monitored reference in Vietnamese communist media to any of the rejections of a Cambodian cease-fire voiced by the RGNU. The 18 November DRV Foreign Ministry Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 statement denouncing the increased U.S. military supplies to Lon Nol asserted that the Cambodian question can be settled only on the basis of Sihanouk's five points and the RGNU statements of 24 October and 9 November, but it did not note that those statements rejected a Cambodian cease-fire. The 21 November PRG Foreign Ministry statement on arms deliveries to Lon Nol attacked the United States for delaying the signing of the Vietnam agreement and for obstructing the Laos talks, but it failed to mention a Cambodian settlement. MOSCOW Moscow has apparently ignored the Cambodian anniversary entirely this year, presumably reflecting Soviet reluctance to acknowledge Sihanouk's movement at a time when Indochinese negotiations are at a delicate stage. In 1970 Moscow had marked the occasion with routine-level radio comment praising the fight of the "Cambodian People's Liberation Armed Forces" against imperialism. Last year Moscow publicized a "day of solidarity" and a low-level meeting of the "Moscow public." There was praise for the FUNK's leadership of the Cambodian people's struggle, but consistent with Moscow's failure to recognize Sihanouk's government there was no mention of the prince or the RGNU. DRV, PRG SUPPORT NLHS CHARGE THAT U. S. "OBSTRUCTS" LAO TALKS The DRV and PRG have issued foreign ministry statements in support of an NLHS Central Committee statement charging that intensified military actions by the United States and its "henchmen" in Laos "obstruct" the political talks which have been going on in Vientiane between Royal Laotian Government and NLHS delegations. The NLHS statement, released on 13 November, charged that the United States and its "hirelings" have stepped up attacks against the "liberated areas" in Laos in various areas including the Plain of Jars and have also intensified their bombing and plan to introduce more Thai troops. It alleged that "since the latter part of October" two-thirds of the U.S. warplanes in Southeast Asia had been mobilized to bomb Laos and Cambodia. The statement also scored Souvanna Phouma for "slandering" the NLHS and the DRV during his visits to the United States and the United Nations but did not, of course, acknowledge that he was talking about the presence of DRV troops in Laos. While af`:rm'ng that the NLHS is "determined to continue the talks Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 CONFIt EN'f IAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 with the Vientiane side in good faith on the basis of the NLHS five-point solution," the statement said the Lao people will heighten their solidarity with the people of Vietnam and Cambodia in the spirit of the Joint communique of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference, and it called upon communist and peaceloving countries to "step up support and assistance" to the Lao struggle. The NLHS statement was issued the day before ti:e fifth session of the peace talks being held in Vientiane between delegations of the RLG and the NLhS. At the 14 November session the RLG side presented detailed views on the peace plan put forward by the NLHS at the opening session of the talks on 17 October.* The NLHS' detailed stand was an elaboration of its five-point political solution of 6 March 1970. Subsequent w:ekly sessions of the talks, after the RLG presented its own seven-point pence plan at the second session, had been bogged down in procedural details, the sides apparently marking time until Premier Souvanna Phouma returned from a trip abroad. He returned to Vientiane on 9 November and the next day had a meeting with NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, who had been in Vientiane for two weeks in the capacity of "special adviser" to the NLHS delegation to the talks. On the llth Phoumi Vongvichit returned to Sam Neua to report to NLHS leaders. The DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements supporting the NLHS statement were released somewhat belatedly on 18 November. They accused the United States and its "lackeys" of intensifying military operations and "extermination bombings" in Laos, thereby jeopardizing the talks in Vientiane.. The PRG statement, but not the DRV's, mentioned in passing U.S. postponement of the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement, as well as intensified bombing in Vietnam, military deliveries to Saigon and Phnom Penh, and intensification of the war in Laos,as attesting to the "obdurate, brutal., and perfidious nature of the Nixon Administration." The Vietnamese communist statements complained, without elaboration, about "slanders" of the NLHS and DRV by the * The apening of the talks is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 October 1972, pages 11-1G Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 Americana and their "lackeys," the DRV statement naming Souvanna Phouma in this connection. The statements demanded that the United States cease aggression and intervention in Laos and allow the Lao parties to settle Laotian internal affairs on the basis of the NLHS five-point prograri. The DRV statement concluded with the avowal that the Vietnamese people will "strengthen their solidarity and coordinate actions" with the fraternal peoplAs of Laos and Cambodia for complete defeat of the Nixon Doctrine in Indochina and the Vietnamization policy in South Vietnam. The PRG statement expressed similar sentiments. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 SALT USSR NOTES SALT II COMPLEXITY, STRESSES EQUALITY PRINCIPLE In limited, low-level comment on the opening of SALT II in Geneva on 21 November, Moscow has affirmed that the success of the second round of talks depends on strict adherence to the principle of equal security for both sides, which followup comment on the Moscow summit in May had emphsaized lay at the foundation of the SALT I agreements and the document on Bdsic Principles of Mutual Relations signed by President Nixon and Brezhnev. The comment also serves notice that Moscow does not foresee a quick or trouble-free course for SALT II. Citing unnamed U.S. spokesmen who have suggested that further talks be held "from a position of strength," a Moscow domestic service commentary on 20 November said "realistic American politicians understand that the main condition for success of the second round of the Soviet-American talks is the strict observance of the principle of equal security for both sides." The unattributed commentary cited the "basic optimism" of recent comments on SALT II by U.S. observers but added: "It is clear that they realize here that the Lalks may be long and difficult, as complex questions are being decided in a sphere of vital importance to both states." Discussion of SALT II in Soviet media in the period since the May agreements has been sparse and for the most part nonsubstantive. A notable exception was an article by G. Trofimenko in the 5 September IZVESTIYA, which cited U.S. press speculation that the next round "could center" on converting the Interim Agreement on offensive arms into a permanent agreement as well as on the expansion of the limitA'ions to cover all kinds of offensive weapons and the problem of controlling the technological-- qualitative--aspects of the arms race."* WARSAW COMMENT Commentaries anticipating SALT II have been more frequent in East European than in Soviet media, but only Warsaw comment dealt with substantive issues more extensively than Moscow comment did.** An article in the 5 September issue of the Polish army paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, by * Discussed in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 27-29. ** See the TRENDS of 13 September 1972, pages 29-30. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 Jerzy Rulicz, discussed in the context of S4LT II the "difficult" issue of NATO's nuclear potential and the problem c,F inducing Britain and France to let the United States "represent them" in the next round. A commentary marking the opening of SALT II by A. Wasilewska-Sutkowska, transmitted by Warsaw's PAP on 21 November, noted that according to "general, opinion" the SALT II negotiations will attempt to check the qualitative race, since "the agreements reached during SALT I . . . do not prevent the possibility of rivalry and race in perfecting the quality of missiles, warbaads, and other offensive weapons systems." MIRVing of offensive missiles was cited as an example. CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE An articles by V. S. Anichkina and V. F. Davydov in the current issue of USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY (No. 11, signed to press 13 October) provides the most comprehensive Soviet analysis to date of the amendments offered by Senator Jackson during the debate on ratification of the SALT I agreements and of Administration support for those amer_.nents as well as for the effort to li?.ik approval of the arms limitation agreements with approval of the program for modernization of strategic weapons. Avoiding a direct judgment on the extent of Administration support for Jackson's initiatives, Anichkina and Davydov cited U.S. press sources that claimed the White House had "assumed certain commitments toward the rightists in'exchange for their support" and thet the "White House supports this amendment . . . in order to give the President a new trump in furLaer disarmament talks." At the same time,the authors noted the efforts of Administration spokesmen to refute the most extreme arguments of Jackson amendment supporters that the SALT I accords could put the United States in a strategically inferior position. The optimistic conclusions of the article, however, showed no concern over the long-term impact of the extensive support received by the revised Jackson amendment: "The dist.ussion of the Soviet- U.S. strategic arms limitation agreements anc their subsequent approval in the U.S. Congress by an overwhelming majority reflected the considerable changes which have taken place in the position of the U.S. ruling elite on the question of U.S.-:soviet relations." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 PEKING, TIRANA Chinese media have yet to take note of the start of SALT II. But Albania's ATA, in a 22 November dispatch, noted the resumption of talks by "representatives of the two 'superpowers"' and cited the pledge by U.S. chief delegate Gerard Smith that "the United States will make efforts at this stage of the talks that there should be reached not only the ltt tation of offensive nuclear arms but also an agreement on their reduction." ATA commented that "in fact, this is another maneuver of the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet social-imperialists to further strengthen their relations and to hatch up new plots against the independence, freedom, and sovereignty of peoples under the mask of disarmament and peace." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/0@OyQ PR85T00875fgO g#0047-9 22 NOVEMBER 1972 MIDDLE EAST SOVIET PROPAGANDA MARKS TIME ON ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT Moscow has given only token propaganda attention to the Arab- Israeli conflict in recent weeks, with the Israeli raids against Syria and Lebanon eliciting routine denunciation of Tel Aviv's "provocations." Kosygin, speaking at a 21 November dinner for the visiting South Yemeni delegation, did not even mention the problem; instead, presumably with Arab critics in mind, he defensively outlined Moscow's "definite objectives" in its Middle East policy: strengthening the forces of national independence and progress, repelling imperialist aggression, and cooperating "equally" with the Arab peoples in building a new life and insuring international security. Dispatches from TASS and IZVESTIYA correspondents in Cairo--the only available comment pegged to the fifth anniversary of Security Council Resolution 242--dwell on Israel's "annexationist plans" for the occupied territories. TASS correspondent Trushin on the 21st repeated the assertion that the Arab countries have reaffirmed their readiness for a political settlement of the crisis; he also recalled Egypt's willingness to restore Suez Canal navi- gation provided Israel withdrew from Sinai as a Brat step toward total withdrawal and a peaceful settlement. Trushin reiterated a version of the formula on the Arabs' right to liberate their territories by various means, using the wording of the commu- nique on Prime Minister Sidqi's October visit to Moscow. The original formula, introduced in the communique on President as- Sadat's visit to Moscow last April, was qualified in the October communique with the addition of the pbeaea "in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and the legitimate :,fight of states to defend their freedom." Soviet propaganda has taade virtually no use of the formula since the releaa:: of October commu- nique. Propaganda attacks on Israel's "'new' policy" vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors have cited statements by Israeli leaders to demonstrate that Tel Aviv now casts aside any pretense that its military operations are reprisals and assumes the right to attack the Arabs at times and places of its own choosing. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 19 November leveled the typical charge that the "premeditated brigandage" sought to force ta:e Arab countries to capitulate one by one. Continuing to avoid any concrete suggestions for ending the stalemate, Moscow merely asserts that Israel's actions will Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08180,- CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 not break the Arabs' will and calls on the United Nations an'. peace- loving forces to insure a political settlement. DAYAN VISIT, Minimal comment on Israeli Defense Minister Dayan'a U.S. POLICY recent U.S. visit and his 14 November talks in Washington routinely maintained that the purpose was to seek further military support as well as funds. IZVESTIYA's Kudryavtsev, in a 16 Novembar article, likened Tel Aviv's situation to that of Saigon, arguing that Israel was drawing on South Vietnam's experience in sending Dayan to Washington after having studied the hurried U.S. transfer to Saigon of huge amounts of arms prior to a cease-fire. Kudryavtsev called this a "naked form" of the Guam doctrine and claimed that Israel was calculating on obtaining an "appropriate reserve of weapons" to implement that doctrine in the Middle East. Along the lines of recent comment alleging that the Israeli leaders were displaying "nervousness" in the face of a trend toward inter- national detente, Kudryavtsev remarked toot Tel Aviv and Saigon were holdire talks on the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations out of a need to exchange experience on methods of "keeping in the saddle" in view of the general trend toward detente. Kudryavtsev claimed that Israel feared even "outward changes" in the '_J.S. atti- tude. But in noting that President Nixon did not elaborate Dn the "great deal of attention" he said the Administration would give to the Middle East, Kudryavtsev went on to cite Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban as declaring "not without satisfaction" that "there are no changes" in the U.S. stand. There has been virtually no speculation in Soviet media on what Kudryavtsev called the expected "rcactivat-ion of the U.S. Middle East policy." Moscow continues to insist that the pro-Israeli orientai.ton of Washington's stance will not change. A domestic service commentary on the 13th cited Eban as saying the United States would, as before, apply no pressure on Israel and would continue to press the question of opening the Suez Canal instead of pursuing the problem of a general Middle East settlement. IZVESTIYA'a Cairo correspondent Koryavin, in a 19 November dispatch, reported the Egyptian info.-oration minister as stressing that "at present there are no proposals whatever" from the United States on a Mideast settlembnt. KUWAIT CONFERENCE Moscow comment on the 15-18 November Kuwait meeting of Arab foreign and defense ministers professed to see some useful--if limited-- results but at the same time suggested Soviet irritation over the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/0V1 VE EAWDP85T008'A5R08M0050047-9 22 NOVEMBER 1972 Arabs' inability to resolve their various differences. Moscow domestic service commentator Ryzhikov said on the 20th that the conference agreed that no Arab states would accept a settlement of the crisis to the detriment of the Palestinian Arabs' interest, and that it stressed the important role of the Palestinian resis- tance in the Arab struggle. (The conference in fact recommended, according to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, the "removal of all obstacles in the path of Palestine commando action"; it also recommended the establishment of an Arab arms-producing institution, a point ignored by Moscow.) Ryzhikov conceded that "the attitude toward the Palestinian movement" was one of the "complicated pro- blems in the path of Arab unity," but he optimistically hailed what he called the "unanimous positive solution of this matter" at the Kuwait conference. However, a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 19th noted that the conference was not able to settle "some of the differences, especially those between the Palestinians and Jordan." A broadcast in Arabic on the 20th saw some benefit in the fact that "the question of tangible practical measures is raised, per- haps for the first time," with the decision to hold an Arab Defense Council meeting in January to study a military plan and the possibility also of using "economic factors" in the struggle against Israel. But the broadcast noted the "difficulties and differences" in Arab relations and faulted the Arabs for being "incapable of confronting Israel with a single front of resis- tance and of mobilizing all their huge material and human resources" to protect their rights. Presumably reflecting Soviet exasperation with inter-Arab quarrels, the broadcast added that the Soviets "welcome any initiative from the Arab coun- tries, regardless of their social and political systems, to unite the forces and resources of the Arabs" in the struggle against "Israeli imperialist aggression." CAIRO ANNOUNCES EGYPTIAN MILITARY DELEGATION IN MOSCC* The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY announced on 18 November that it "had learned" that an Egyptian military delegation headed by Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Husni Mubarak had been in Moscow for the past three days and had held a number of meetings with Soviet military commanders. Moscow has not acknowledged the visit, just as it did not acknowledge Prime Minister Sidgi'a disclosure, in his 25 October report, that4uring his talks with Soviet leaders "it had been agreed" that Est would send a military delegation to the Soviet Union "sometime between 10 and 15 November." The only other Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 available Egyptian reference to the delegation's presence in Moscow appeared in a Cairo radio broadcast on the 21st which denounced a BBC report that "there has been disagreement in the higher council of the Egyptian armed forces on the occasion of the departure of the military mission to Moscow and that there has been opposition to the departure of this mission." An indication that there are continuing Soviet-Egyptian differences over military supplies appeared in remarks made to journalists by Egyptian Army Chief of Staff ash-Shadhili while he was in Kuwait to attend the opening of the Arab foreign and defense ministers conference on 15 November.* According to a 16 November report in the Kuwaiti AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM, ash-Shadhili, asked by a TASS corres- pondent if the Sukhoi and MIG-21 planes were not enough to confront Israel, replied that the Sukhoi was a bomber, not a fighter, that it was not as fast as some Israeli planes, and that it required MIG-21 cover. He added that the Arab armies' planes "are nr.t very effective in the face of the American Phantoms which Israel 1tas." Ash- Shadhili pointed out that even with enough money--and Egypt and Syria were in "dire need" of money--delivery of planes after purchase required no less than three years, and than another four.years to train qualified pilots. He added that the West sells weapons but wants money for them, while "the East--meaning the USSR--also gives arms but with limits." In the wake of the ouster of the Soviet military advisors from Egypt, Moscow media have repeatedly and defensively denied "slanderous fabrications" by "imperialist propaganda" that termination of the mission was tantamount to a rupture of Soviet-Egyptian relations. Moscow has avoided airing its differences with the Egyptians over military matters, although a broadcast in Arabic in September did contain an acerbic reference to Arabs who hold Soviet weapons while at the same time criticizing the USSR. However, on 21 November TASS atypically replayed a Polish press agency report of an article in the Warsaw KURIER POLSKI which said that the "recent change * President as-Sadat, in an interview published in the Lebanese AL-HAWADITH on 5 October,. had spelled out the "four principal things" Egypt needed--tracked vehicles for desert war, fighter-bombers, tor- pedo boats and electronic equipment. In the same interview he said that in removing the Soviet military presence he wanted the Kremlin leaders to understand that their strategy in the area could not be fulfilled at Egyptian expense. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/0&ieL,TKP85T0087PEg0PAA~g50047-9 22 NOVEMBER 1972 of the Egyptian war minister is generally considered as a manifes- tation of President an-Sadat's desire to maintain friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states." Moscow had reported without comment the late-October removal of Sadiq as war minister and the appointment of Maj. Gen. Ahmad Ismail 'Ali to that post, a development which had prompted considerable Arab press speculation that Sadiq had been relieved as a conciliatory gesture to the Soviets.* A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 17 November took AKHBAR AL-YAWM chief editor al-Quddus to task for views expressed not in his Cairo press articles but in an interview with the Swedish papor DAGENS NYHETER. The broadcast rebutted an assertion attributed to al-Quddus that strategic considerations underlie Moscow's desire to maintain good relations with Egypt. * AKHBAR AL-YA.WM's al-Quddus, in a 29 October article, in effect denied any Soviet influence in Sadiq's removal from office, insisting that the decision to terminate the Soviet military mission had nothing to do with Sadiq. Al-Quddus did, however, assert that "at one stage" the Soviets did not conceal their "dissatisfaction with and objection to Sadiq and many other" Egyptian personalities. He explained this as a political tactic--"attacking those on the sidelineR instead of the presidency, which was what they meant." Moscow ignored al- Quddus' article. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 CUBA-U, S, HAVANA URGES RAPID CUBAN-U,S, ACCORD ON HIJACKING Spurred by the Southern Airways plane hijacking on 11 r_aember, the Cuban Government issued a statement on the 14th calling for rapid negotiation of an agreement with the United States on measures to cope with the hijacking of planes and ships and with "illegal entries and exits between the territories of the two countries"--language drawn from Cuba's 30 October response to U.S. notes on the Eastern Airlines hijacking that occurred on 29 October. Cuban media have not acknowledged any of the statements by F _te Department spokesman Charles Bray about the imminence of negotiations between Washington and Havana, through the intermediary of the Swiss, on an agreement concerning hijacking; nor has there been any mention i.." the media of Cuba's intention to try the hijackers of the Southern Airways plane, which Bray said had been communicated to the United States. Followup commentaries in Cuban broadcast media on the 14 November government statement have been authored exclusively by Castro confidante Guido Garcia. Inclan and carried only iii the domestic radio service. Like the statement !.tself, Garcia Inclan's commentaries have conveyed a sense of urgency about concluding an accord, reflecting apparent Cubav hopes to capitalize on the curtent furor over hijackings to press for concurrent U.S. consideration of Cuba's demands for curbs on anti-Castro exile acti?ities and for the return of people who flee the island illegally. The government statement included the full text of Cuba's 30 October note on the preceding day's hijacking, which emphasized Havana's readiness to take "serious and immediate steps" looking toward an agreement; the note stated that the hijacking problem could be "solved relatively soon," and the government statement said measures to curb hijacking could be implemented "immediately" if the United States cooperated. Garcia Inclan declared in an 18 November broadcast: We have said talk, not waste time. The problem cannot be solved by holding talks today and next year and then the next year, in Paris or Berlin. The problem can be solved with just a few words and, above all, with great honor, without fears or favors, in the manner that characterizes our revolution. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 On the 16th Garcia Inclan, whose commentaries on past occasions have anticipated regime policy lines, implied that one of the thornier questions that would have to be settled would be that of distinguishing political refugees from common criminals. "The word 'pirate,"' he said, "must be clearly defined and the term 'political refugee' must also be clearly defined." Although the government statement did not directly raise the question of political asylum, it did refer to t--,. ruban law enacted on 16 September 1969 which spelled out the regime's position on hijacking and called for bilateral negotiations to solve the problem. The law stipulated that Cuba "reserves the right to grant the right of asylum in those cases it deems just to those persons who arrive in our country for political reasons because they found themselves in need of using an extreme measure to avoid a real danger of death or serious repression." U.S.-CUBAN DETENTE The government statement and Garcia Inclan's commentaries shed little light on Castro's view of the impact a hijacking agreement might have on the broader question of Cuban-U.S. relations. But there have been hints in recent and past Havana comment that the Cuban leader may envisage a link between the problem of aerial piracy and other issues beyond those of exile activities and political asylum. Most notably in the recent comment, Garcia Inclan touched obliquely in a 17 November broadcast on the notion that negotiations on hijacking could bring a general thaw in Cuban-U.S. relations. Using his standard "Letter from Freddy" format (built around letters from a fictional Cuban expatriate newsman in Miami to his old crony Garcia Inclan), the broadcast noted that after the Southern Airways hijacking "the White House newspaper" the Washington POST had editorially urged that the U.S. Government "normalize relations with Cuba and, above all, try to discuss the problem of aircraft diversions." Castro's last extensive public discussion of hijacking, in reply to a U.S. newsman's question on the subject at a December 1971 press conference in Chile, had been notable for a gratuitous linkage of the issue with general U.S.-Cuban relations. In rambling, sometimes contradictory remarks, Castro was ambiguous on whether the hijacking problem should be discussed in the framework of general negotiations on outstanding bilateral issues or treated in isolation. He was unequivocal only on the point that there would be "no agreement" with the United States on measures against plane hijackings unless ships and illegal departures were also covered in accordance with the Cuban law of lb September 1969, Then he added: Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 Someday, when the time comes to talk about everything, I could say that we are going to include the airplane issue in a general agreement. We have a ricnt to do this, because since the law was drafted three year3 ago we have received no reply [from the United States]. Castro went on to cite two other bilateral issues--the U.S. presence at Guantanamo, "which is more illegal than the hijacking of planes," and the question of Cuba's right to indemnification for the damage it suffered as a result of the U.S. "blockade and aggression." But he proceeded to obfuscate the linkage of hijacking to such matters when he remarked, with respect to hijacking, that "perhaps the solution would be to settle some questions which interest you more than us, because you are the ones who have the [hijacking] problem, not us." Castro has evinced preoccupation with the question of the U.S. "blockade policy" toward Cuba, most recently responding to a question at a 25 September press conference with remarks stressing the need to end this policy if there is to be any improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations.* And Havana spokesman in the past have suggested a direct link between hijacking and U.S. pursuit of a blockade policy. For example, a 28 December 1971 PIENSA LATINA commentary, in the course of a review of the his tor} of aerial hijacking, called U.S. pursuit of such a policy a major cause of the problem. More pointedly, an article on hijacking in the December 1970 issue of the journal CUBA INTERNACIONAL had observed, after noting that only a minority of hijackers have political motives: "In these cases, it is possible to find the remedy--lift the blockade of Cuba." Against the background of the record of public statements by Castro and his spokesmen on uncondit ionpl lifting of the blockade and cessation of U.S. acts of "aggression" as prerequisites to any improvement in bilateral ties, the 14 November government statement was notably defensive on Cuba's current proffer of negotiations with the United States at a time when the latter still pursues a "policy of blockade and aggression" against the island. Cuba's "constructive position," the statement explained, was motivated by "esteem for the people of the United States and the international community." * See the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 26-28, for a discussion of Castro's 25 September remarks. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 WEST GERMANY USSR. GDR WELCOME VICTORY OF BRANDT AND OSTPOLITIK Soviet and East German media have reacted with predictable warmth to the 19 November election victory of the Brandt-Scheel coalition government. The initial comment, at official and routine levels, praised Brandt and Scheel for their leadership in normalizing relations with the socialist countries and the West German electorate for endorsing the "realistic" policies of the Ostpolitik. Emphasizing the progress represented by the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, the four-power "West Berlin" agreement, and the initialing of the East-West German basic treaty, the commentaries have uniformly attributed the CDU/CSU opposition's defeat to its failure to accept the present-day situation in Europe and its adherence to a "negative" policy toward peace and cooperation in Europe. PRAVDA's Bonn correspondent on the 21st, according to TASS, described the election as "tantamount to a plebiscite" and the SPD/FDP victory as a mandate for continuation of the "realistic course" charted by Brandt and Scheel. On the 22d the PRAVDA correspondent observed that the West German electorate had based its vote on hopes for a continuation of goodneighborly relations and cooperation with the USSR and other communist countries. Moscow commentators have taken particular Mote of Brandt's statement that he is now ready to sign the basic treaty with the GDR before the end of the year. They have also poi"tad to the Social Democratic Party's popular appeal demonscrdtad by its achievement of a plurality for the first time in a West German election. East German reaction came within hours after Brandt was declared the winner on the evening of the 19th. East Berlin radio and ADN reported that "circles" of the SED Politburo and the GDR Council of Ministers saw the election results as an endorsement by the "majority" of West German voters of the policy of "businesslike relations with the socialist countries, including the GDR," opening the way to the signing and ratification of the basic treaty between the GDR and FRG. In a similar vein, a 22 No imber NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article, carried in full by ADN, added that "a decisive majority of FRG citizens want, as proved by their vote, to live in peace and tranquility with their neighbors." The paper concluded that the "political effects" of the various agreements between the FRG and the socialist bloc "influenced the election outcome and decidedly Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 contributed to the defeat of the CDU/CSU." After reiterating the GDR's willingness to bring the basic treaty to a quick conclusion, the SED organ emphatically repeated the GDR's line that the treaty, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, in no way alters the incompatibility of the social systems of "the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG." SOVIET BLOC PRESSURES PRAGUE TO REACH ACCORD WITH BONN Public statements by Soviet and East European leaders over the past two weeks suggest that Moscow and its allies are pressuring Pragl,.e to compromise on the divisive Munich agreement issue in the titalemated talks on normalizing relations with Bonn. This pressut:s has been reflected in public statements which omit any explicit support for the Czechoslovak demand that Bonn recognize the 1938 Munich agreement as invalid ab initio--a demand which Prague on some but by no means all recent occasions has seemed to moderate by omitting the "ab initio." In his 6 November anniversary speech,CPSU Politburr, member Mazurov simply called for the settlemett of relations between Prague and Bonn without any reference to the need to invalidate the Munich agreement. Brezhnev, in his speech on the 13th during the visit of Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, made no reference whatever to Bonn- Prague relations. And the 18 November communique on the Zhivkov visit, without explicitly asserting support for Czechoslovakia, "expressed hope for a successful end of negotiations between the CSSR and the FRG and for a full normalization of the relations between those countries on the basis of recognizing the Munich agreement as invalid." Zhivkov and Poland's Gierek,in their public statements during their 9-11 November talks in Sofia and in their joint communique, likewise made no reference to Munich, limiting themselves to generalized expression of support for the Czechoslovak stand. Without mentioning the Munich issue, Zhivkov on the 10th went as far as to declare: "I dare say that we are now on the eve of the normalization of relations between the FRG and the CSSR." Hungarian Politburo member Kallai, in a statement carried by Budapest radio on the 20th conveying Hungary's "satisfaction" with the resctts of the FRG election, was hopeful that Bonn would continue its present path and take additional "concrete steps--primarily with the continued normalization of present relations with the CSSR"--toward Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 the further consolidation of European security. Where this wording suggests that Budapest will not move to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG until Prague reaches agreement with Bonn, the Hungarian CP Central Committee's communique on its 14-15 November meeting said that "conditions are ripening for regulating the interstate relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the FRG, including the resumption of diplomatic relations." The communique made no reference to a Prague-Bonn settlement as a prior condition for Budapest relations with Bonn. Czechoslovak media appear to be marking time on the future course of Prague-Bonn relations. In comment on the results of the West German elections, the party organ RUDE PRAVO as well as other papers on the 20th and 21st made no direct reference to the stalemated talks between Prague and Bonn, which have been adjourned since June because of the two sides' inability to reach agreement on the invalidity ab initio of the Munich agrement. However, in a possible oblique allusion to the bilateral talks, RUDE PRAVO on the 21st said that. the consolidation of the Brandt- Scheel coalition in the Bundestag now gives th,a Bonn leaders "the prerequisites to continue asserting the realistic elements in their policy even more boldly and at a faster rate. This is what not only most of the West German electorate but also the world public expect them to do." The only available direct Prague reference to the Munich issue since the election appeared in an international broadcast in English on the 20th which reasserted the Czechoslovak stand that Bonn must recognize "the Munich diktat as null and void from its inception." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER '972 SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS ZHIVKOV EULOGIZES BREDiNEV. REAFFIRMS DEPENDENCE ON USSR Speaking in Moscow the day before his departure for home, Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov reinforced his country's image as the USSR's most obedient junior partner with effusive personal accolades to Brezhnev. Sofia's dependence on Moscow for material support was further underscored in the joirt communique issued at the wi:rdup of the Bulgarian leader's 13-18 November visit. In the current round of top-level Soviet blo: visits, Zhivkov's trip to Moscow followed a 9-11 November visit to Sofia by Poland's Gierek and Jaroszewicz, and TASS on the 11th announced that Brezhnev would go to Hungary "on an official friendly visit late in November." ZHIVKOV ON BREZHNEV Where he had paid tribute chiefly to the Soviet party in a Kremlin dinner speech on the 13th, Zhivkov declared in his speech at the Lenin Komsomol automobile production plant in Moscow on the 17th that "there have never been such fraternal relations between our leadership and the Soviet party-state leadership, between us and Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, our brother, comrade, and great friend of the Bulgarian people, as there are at present." He continued: "I wish to take this opportunity to express from this rostrum our profound gratitude to the Leninist Central Committee, the Politburo, and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, for all they are doing for the Bulgarian People's Republ+.c." In a possibly oblique reference to Brezhnev's recent illness, Zhivkov ...:?led attention to the "energy" displayed by the Soviet leader in foreign affairs. He remarked that "we cannot, however, fail to note the great personal services of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, because we know very well how much wisdom, patience, and energy" is shown by the Soviet leader in the field of international relations. Zhivkov vound up his speech by underscoring the staunchness of Bulgaria's loyalty to "internationalism" on the orthodox Soviet model: "All Bulgarians consider the borders of the Soviet Union and of the enti, socialist community as sacred and inviolable borders of Bulparia." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 COMMUNIQUE As broadcast by the Moscow and Sofia radios on the 18th, the communique on Zhivkov's visit recorded an atmosphere of unalloyed "cordiality, friendship, and mutual under- standing" in bilateral talks which "once more confirmed the complete unanimity of views" between the two parties and governments "on all questions discussed." The Bulgarian delegation of Zhivkov, Premier Todorov, and Fatherland Front Chairman Traykov "expressed the joy and admiration of the Bulgarian communists and of all Bulgarians for the tremendous Soviet achievements in communist building," as well as "warm gratitude to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Government for the constant fraternal assistance and support" they are giving to Bulgaria. The communique may have hinted at L.e burden felt by the Soviet economy in the heavy support of Bulgaria when it said the two sides agreed on concrete measures for "solving with joint efforts a number of particularly ,3ignificant national-economic problems [problemy]." The more general term "voprosy" was used in the same passage with reference to agreement on measures to solve "problems [or questions] connected with a closer interaction between the national economies" of the two countries under the CEMA integration program. Relatively restrained on the score of international communist relations, the communique affirmed the decisions of the 1969 Moscow international party conference and denounced "any manifestations of nationalism, revisionism, and opportunism," in keeping with Brezhnev's low-keyed treatment of the subject in his 13 November Kremlin dinner speech. Zhivkov did not touch on international communist strains in his factory speech on the 17th, but he denounced "anti-Soviet slanderous fabrications by imperialist reaction and opportunists of all shades" in his dinner speech on the 13th. The 11 November "decli:i:_*'-n" issued at the close of Zhivkov's talks with Gierek in Sofia had "decisively condemned the dissident activity of the present CCP leadership" and called for "consistent and firm" struggle against "the anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet course of the Maoists." SOVIET MEDIA PREPARE GROUND FOR BREZH1EV VISIT TO HUNGARY The TASS announcement on the 3.1th that Rrezhnev would visit Budapest late this month has been accompanied by comment aimed at allaying conjectures about Moscow-Budapest tensions in the economic sphere. Thus a broadcast by Radio Moscow in Hungarian on the 11th, hailing Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 the impending visit as "a new important contribution" to bilateral friendship and cooperation, declared "quite categorically" that the Soviet-Hungarian friendship treaty, renewed in 1967, "has been implemented to the letter" and that "there is no field of economic, scientific, or cultural life where our friendship has not borne marvellous fruit." Also on the 11th, a widely broadcast talk on the coming visit insisted that there is "no division" in the socialist community "into large and small or strong and weak countries" and stressed that "thousands of links join the Hungarian economy to that of the Soviet Union." It recalled Kadar's statement at the 24th CPSU Congress to the effect that Hungary's "main guarantee of national independence" is the "mutual trust" which "monolithically" unites Budapest with Moscow. TASS on the 17th included negative features of the Hungarian scene in its report on a just-concluded Hungarian party plenum. It reported that the MSZMP Central Committee "criticized the weak sides of party work" and called for "overcoming anti-Marxist views through creative use of Marxism-Leninism and by convincingly proving our truth." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09C0WNA925T00875RPB10S3gR0jJ047-9 22 NOVEMBER 1972 - 35 - USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS UKRAINE RANKS SHELEST LAST AMONG POLITBURO MEMBERS The new leadership in the Ukraine has demonstrated its disdain for former Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest by ranking him last among CPSU Politburo members. The 9 November RADYANSKA UKRAINA's phr"to of portraits of Politburo members above th,: tribune at the 7 November Kiev anniversary parade showed Shelest in last place and his rival and successor Shcherbitskiy in sixth place. For many years, including last May Day, Shelest had consistently been ranked seventh; Shcherbitskiy had been ranked tenth since he joined the Politburo at the 24th CPSU Congress. The only other notable change in the Ukrainian rankings'was the elevation of Moscow First Secretary Grishin from last place to eighth--an unusual display of favoritism for someone lacking ties to the Ukraine. MAY 1971, NOV. 1971, MAY 1972 NOV. 1972 1. Brezhnev 1. Brezhnev 2. Kosygin 2. Ko syg in 3. Podgornyy 3. Podgornyy 4. Kirilenko 4. Kirilenko 5. Suslov 5. Suslov 6. Mazurov 6. Shcherbitskiy 7. Shelest 7. Mazurov 8. Pelshe 8. Grishin 9. Polyanskiy 9. Polyanskiy 10. Shcherbitskiy 10. Pelshe 11. Kulakov .1. Kulakov 12. Kunayev 12. Kunayev 13. Voronov 13. Voronov 14. Shelepin 14. S'elepin 15. Grishin 15. Shelest In contrast to the Kiev rankings, Shelest stood llth--ahead of Pelshe and Kulakov--at the 7 November Moscow parade. LEADERSHIP FAILOIGS UNDER MZHAVANADZE EXPOSED IN GEORGIA A 1 November.Goorgian Central Committee plenum on industry presented an extremely negative picture of conditions in Georgia further discrediting the leadership of former First Secretary Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 V.P. Mzhavanadze. In his first major speech since becoming Georgian party boss, E.A. ::hevardnadze flailed rampant corruption, poor leadership, and disastrous economic results, suggesting that Georgia is in :or a prolonged period of housecleaning similar to that ex}erienced in Azerbaydzhan. In addition to these and earlier s'gns of disgrace, Mzhavanadze, undisputed boss of Georgia for almost 20 years, did not even appear on the tribune with other Georgian leaders at the 7 November parade in Tbilisi. In his plenum speech published in the 4 November ZARYA VOSTOKA, Shevardnadze complained of "an atmosphere of liberalism," "dulling of vigilance," and "weakening of party and state discipline and intraparty democracy" which he said permitted the spread of embezzlement and imorality among high-level officials. He declared that the early 1972 CPSU Central Committee decree exposing the shortcomings of the Tbilisi organization "in essence" charbrterized the work of the whole republic. Another speaker, Local Industry Minister M.A. Megrelishvili, inquired why Georgia had dropped from one of the leading republics to a position of backwardness and found it to be the result of "conditions of imaginary prosperity and self-satisfaction created in our republic during the last 10 years or more." Statements at the plenum reveal that the Georgian leadership hab Len coping unsuccessfully with economic problems all year and that the economy was one of its most serious failures. The nine-month industrial growth rate fell from 5.8 percent in 1971 to 2.2 percent in 1.972--as against a target of 6 percent--and the Georgian industrial plan was cut back by 103 million rubles in 1971 and by another 102 million in the first nine months of 1972. Shevardnadze ridiculed the "alchemy with figures" whereby a 30-million-ruble overfulfillment of the plan was accomplished by reducing the plan target by 102 million rubles. Mzhavanadze's young protega N.Sh. Tskhakaya was apparently the first to suffer politically for the industrial failures, being fired as Georgian Central Committee secretary in June for unspecified "errors and shortcomings in work." During his tenure as industry secretary in 1970-72, Georgia fell to last place among Soviet republics in industrial growth. In their plenum speeches Shevardnadze and Tskhakaya's successor, Z.A. Pataridze, explained that the economic lag in the first six months of 1972 had been discussed in detail at a late-July CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER y ;? Georgian aktiv meeting and that in August the Georgian Council of Ministers had ordered lagging ministries and enterprises to tako ndditional measures, but that no improvement had occurred. Shevardnadze also revealed serious shortages of consumer goods and food stuffs and noted that the most recent session of the Georgian bureau had punished the Abkhaz republic's second secretary, trade minister, and consumer cooperative chairman for permitting such shortages. Shevardnadze blamed the critical shortage of fruits and vegetables on profiteering by kolkhozniks who sell their produce privately instead of delivering them to the state. Shevardnadze harshly criticized past cadre policy for permitting embezzlers to achieve prominent positions in industry, and Megrelishirili characterized cadre policy as based on 'nepotism" and "friendship." In line with these charges, the plenum removed R. V. Metreveli--like T skhakaya, a young protege of Mzhavanadze-- as Central Committee cadre section chief and bureau candidate member; Metreveli had been promoted from Komsomol first secretary to republic cadre chief in 1970. Apparently to avoid leaving the new republic first secretary open to similar charges of nepotism, Shevardnadze's brother was transferred from Tbilisi city second secretary to the Georgian Central Committee shortly before Shevardnadze became Tbilisi first secretary in July. With Shevardnadze's promotion to Central Committee first secretary, the November plenum transferred his brother from his position as head of the Central. Committee's trade, financial, and planning organs section to a government post. MASHEROV ARTICLE IN KONMUNIST STRESSES RUSSIFICATION Belorussian First Secretary P. M. Masherov has authored an article on nationality affairs in the October issue of KOMMUNIST that goes well beyond previous pronouncements in stressing national assimilation and russification. The numerous articles on this subject appearing this year in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union have been almost uniformly bland, carefully balancing the contradictory themes of the "drawing together" and the "flourishing" of individual republics. Masherov's one-sided stress on the "drawing together" theme--on economic integration of the republics, mixing of peoples, and spread of the Russian language--and his strong attacks on Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 "fetishization" of national customs, defense of republ:c interests, and even publicizing of republic achievements are consistent with the doctrinaire positions he has taken on other issues, particularly against "consumerism" in economic policy. Masherov asserted that "the tendency to draw together is more and more acquiring the leading significance" and complained that literary works and press articles are overemphasizing the achievements of individual republics. Noting the progress toimrd economic integration of the republics, he declared that "the appearance of nationalistic and localistic tendencies in their, so to speak, pure form is unthinkable" under present conditions, but that they still appear in "veiled" form under the guise of protecting the interests of particular republics--for instance by seeking as much capital investment as possible. Even the presentation of economic data showing a republic's progress was viewed by Masherov as potentially dangerous because it tended to obscure ro;:ognition that all successes in republics are the result of nationwide efforts. On the cultural and linguistic front, Masherov lauded the migration of peoples between republics as "progressive" and the learning of Russian as a necessary vehicle for progress. He condemned any preservation of the national homogeneity of the population of a particular republic of mesas of artificial measures" and advocated the creation in all republics of "conditions maximally facilitating and stimulating" study of the Russian language. "internat4onalization," he argued,'does not occur objectively but requires +;n active drive by all party organizations and society. Notably absent from Masherov's article were the conventional warnings against assimilation found even in articles promoting "international- ization." For instance, E. Bagramov's 22 June PRAVDA article attacked authors who "write off" the national as "archaic" and warned against confusing "drawing together" of republics with assimilation. An editorial in the June issue of ZHURNALIST likewise :omplained that "one of the moo,: vexing errors of a number of propaganda articles is to substitute the concept of merger of nations for their drawing together" and to present the former as a present-day task, a mistake which it said "grossly distorts" nationality policy. The thrust of Masherov's argument contrasted sharply with that of the more nationalistic Kazakh First Secretary D. A. Kunayev, who in the 30 June PRAVDA identified both "flourishing" and "drawing together as "leading" tendencies and assailed the notion that some nations are "chosen" and others "inferior" and therefore "biologically" doomed to spiritual stagnation. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 SUPPLE-IENT ARY ARTICLE PEKING AND THE CLANDESTINE RADIOS BEAMED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA In the increasingly fluid situation in Asia produced by the Sino-U.S. detente and the prospects of a Vietnam settlement, Peking has been positioning itself for further developing relations with Southeast Asian countries* while muting its involvement with the Maoist politics of insurrection that dominated Chinese policy in the area a few years ago. With the shift in foreign policy priorities toward normalizing state relations, Peking evolved a dual-track approach in which naves to cultivate relations with Southeast Asian governments proceeded apace alongside continuing support for communist-led insurgent movements invoking Maoist doctrine. PRC-based clandestine radios serve as.outlets for pro-Peking CPs to air their hardline-ideology at the same time to Peking fosters an atmosphere conducive to normal -state relations. Peking's dual approach was clearly evident in its moves to repair its relations with Burma, establishing a pattern that has been followed in the case of Malaysia and, most recently, in the breakthrough that has been achieved it Sino-Thai relations. Peking has made similar moves toward the Philippines and has also relaxed its hostility toward Indonesia. On the regional level, Peking hv.s evinced a more tolerant attitude toward moves aimed at developing cooperation among the countries in the area. The Chinese expressed support for Malaysian and Indonesian efforts to control passage through the Malacca Straits at:e have muted their former criticism of su^h groupings as ASEAN and the British-backed five-power defense pact. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 14 January referred without comment to the proposal for neutralization of Southeast Asia championed by Malaysia in particular. As for support for the communist movements in the area, Peking has been all but ignoring their representatives in China while largely restricting coverage of these CPs to selective replaying of material broadcast by their clandestine radios to Southeast Asia. There are three such stations: the Thai CP's Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), which was first monitored in 1962; the Malayan CP's Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR), inaugurated 4.n November 1969 and beamed to Malaysia and Singapore; and the Voice of the People of Burma (VOPB) broadcasting in the name of the Burmese * This article discusses Peking's relations with the Southeast Asian countries other than the Indochinese countries. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 0 communists sire March 1971. The VOPT is the most prolific in originating material, each day initiating a new program of some eight items. The other two stations initiate new programs every three days. PRC media have regularly carried items attributed to the VOPT and VOMR, but Peking has never acknowledged the existence of the Burmese station. There have been signs recently that the clandestine stations have been easing their criticism of Southeast Asian regimes in what may be a further effort inspired by Peking to promote a propitious atmosphere for normal relations. Most notably, the VOM-c refrained throughout October from criticizing the Malaysian government, possibly in the hope of improving the prospects for further movement in relations between Peking and Kuala Lumpur. In another change, thr Thai CP's radio offered no critical comment on Bangkok's motivati..n in connection with the establishment, of contacts with Peking when a Thai table tennis team visited the PRC in September. In contrast, when Malaysia and Burma sent delegations to China in 1971, the VOMR and VOPB sharply impugned their motives in dealing with:':Peking. BURMA Peking's moves to repair its relations with Rangoon while providing facilities for a clandestine radio which it has never acknowledged illustrates the dual approach in its purest form. In the wake of the return of the Chinese ambassador to Rangoon and the visit to Peking of Ne Win last year.. PRC media have given ample publicity to official Chinese activities in Burma, including a recent report on Chinese technicians who have been surveying PRC-aided projects. NCNA reported that this year's embassy reception in Rangoon on PRC National Day took place in a "warm and friendly" atmosphere, an; advance over last year's merely "friendly" atmosphere. On 26 September NCNA reported on the progress of Burmese government efforts to eradicate illiteracy, marking Peking's first report on Burmese internal affairs in years that was not critical of the regime. Peking has reduced to a bare minimum its attention to the Burmese CP and its resident delegation in China. PRC media have publicized only four BCP messages in the past two years: on the March 1971 Chinese satellite launching, on the CCP's 50th anniversary that year, and on 19 January and 8 April this year expressing condolences on the deaths of Chen I and Hsieh Fu-chih. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 The January message made no reference to the situation in Burm.1, and the April one did so only in noting that Hsieh's death was a loss to the "oppressed people of Burma." Peking acknowledged the presence of Thakin Ba Thein Tin, identified as head of the resident RCP delegation, at the PRC National Day celebrations this year, but this marked his first reported appearance in a year. He was not reported present on two occasions this year which he had attended in 1971. The VOPB has continued to offer its standard fare of combat reports on the BCP-led insurgent forces, commentaries denouncing policies of the "Ne Win military clique," and lessons in Marxism-Leninism and Mao thought. The VOPB extends support to Peking in international affairs, typically taking a harsher line than PRC media. Thus, while Peking remained silent, the VOPB on 20 January denounced Rangoon's recognition of Bangladesh as an "extremely reactionary act." MALAYSIA AND Following the exchange of trade delegations SINGAPORE with Malaysia in 1971, Peking has played host to a growing stream of Malaysian visitors who have been feted and treated to what are officially described as "friendly" meetings with Chinese officials. Peking has put aside its former challenge to the legitimacy of the Malaysian Federation and now consistently uses the official name "Malaysia." This practice has also been extended to neighboring Singapore. A 15 July NCNA dispatch on the visit of a Chinese ping-pong team to Singapore referred, to Lee Kuan Yew as the prime minister of the "Republic of Singapore"--the first such reference to Lee and Singapore by their official titles. Though Peking has occasionally replayed items from the VOMR critical of Malaysian or Singapore policies, it has for over a year carefully edited out all attacks on the governments by name. Peking has also deleted passages from VOMR commentaries that have implicated the PRC with the communist-led insurgency. Thus, NCNA's 5 October replay of a VOMR editorial on PRC National Day omitted a reference to China as the "base area for world revolution" as well as a recital of Mao dicta that only armed struggle and reliance on the gun can assure liberation. In addition, the CP-led insurgency in North Kalimantan, long a Chinese propaganda favorite, has not been referred to in PRC media since NCNA on 29 March replayed a VOMR account of the insurgents' battle successes. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 The VOMR has also shown some signs of moderation. In addition to its atanddown on criticism of the Kuala Lumpur government during October, the station has devoted leas attention to the sensitive issue of "Malay chauvinism" and alleged oppression of Overseas Chinese. The bulk of its comment nonetheless still consists of criticism of Malaysian and Singapore policies and battle reports on the communist insurgency. On 4 November it sharply attacked Razak's recent trip to the USSR, in contrast to Peking's silence on the visit, and it has directed criticism at the five-power defense pact. The VOMR also continues its function a. the major clearinghouse for commentary by pro-Peking communist partibs throughout Southeast Asia. Most recently, the station on 11 November hailed the PKI for its exploits in the liberation of Indonesia from the Dutch, and on 9 September it carried a statement by the Philippines CP. THAILAND Reflecting the significant breakthrough in Sino-Thai relations represented by the Thai table tennis team's visit to China in September, Peking has pulled back from the abusive attacks on the "Thanom-Praphat clique" that had continued until as late as August. Criticism of Bangkok in PRC media is now restricted to infrequent replays of VOPT commentaries that are carefully sanitized to remove attacks on the government by name. ?n another sign of .'improved relations, a Thai economic delegation visiting in October was accorded a "friendly" talk with Vice Premier Li Hsien-mien, marking an advance over NCNA's neutral characterization of Prasit Kanchanawat's talks with Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials in September. The VOPT duly carried the NCNA reports on both visits and stressed in its own commentaries the desire of the Thai people for closer relations with China. However, the clandestine station's regular fare still consists largely of sharp criticism of the Bangkok government's involvement in the Indochina war, its ties with SEATO, its allegedly oppressive internal policies, and its dealings with American and Japanese big business. The VOPT has skirted the sensitive issue of Bangkok's policy toward Overseas Chinese, though a 22 October broadcast did attack the government for permitting the KMT remnants to remain in North Thailand near the Chinese border. PHILIPPINES Though there is no clandestine station broadcasting to the Philippines in the name of the pro-Peking CP, several of the elements characterizing Peking's relations with the other Southeast Asian countries have been present in its Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 NOVEMBER 1972 approach to the Philippines. Recent PRC coverage of developments in the Philippines has avoided direct comment on the CP-led insurgency and has generally sidestepped attacks on the Marcos government in carrying material attributed to other sources. An exception to this pattern was a low-level NCNA report on the declaration of martial law in the Philippines this September. In Peking's sole reaction to this step by the Marcos government, a 26 September NCNA account replayed foreign press comment that criticized Marcos for using martial law to solidify his political position and called attention to demonstrations against the "Marcos authorities." The report noted Marcos' reference to a subversive threat in justifying martial law, but there was no mention of alleged pro-Chinese sympathies among the subversives. Peking broadcasts to the Philippines in Tagolog carried only this NCNA report in taking note of the imposition of martial law. Peking has muted its support for the Philippine CP in replaying foreign comment. In Peking's last reference to the party, a 27 April pickup of a Philippine CP statement on the third anniversary of the "New People's Army" contained no criticism of the Marcos government by name. Prior to that time, Peking had replayed reports on the insurgency at a rate of one every one or two months. Meanwhile, Peking has been publicizing "friendly" exercises in people's diplomacy, and Poking reported on 24 July that the Chinese Red Cross provided aid worth one million yuan for flood victims in the Philippines. INDONESIA Peking's relations with Indonesia have shown the least movement among the cowitries surveyed, but in this case too the Chinese have retreated from the harsh hostility they formerly directed at Jakarta. Peking has all but abandoned criticism of the Suharto government, the last critical reports being two brief NCNA items noting demonstrations against Suharto when he visited Australia and New Zealand-in February. Peking has also curtailed propaganda support for the PKI and publicity for Adjitorop, the head of the PKI delegation in China. The last reference to the PKI in PRC .edia was a 23 May NCNA replay of a PKI statement on the party's anniversary which included denunciations of the "bloody suppression" and "political swindles" of "the Suharto fascist military clique." Adjitorop's only reported appearance in Peking this year has been on PRC National Day. N Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9