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December 13, 1972
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Approved For Release 2000/OWAIr j Dflp5T00875ROO0300050050-5 This propaganda analysis report is based. exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. STATSPEC NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 CONTENTS Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Hanoi Scores Thieu Speech, Calls for Signing of Agreement . . . . . 1 DRV Journal Explains Legitimacy of Agreements With Enemies . . . . 3 Moscow Signs Aid Accords With DRV, Marks Time on Settlement . . . . 6 DRV Continues to Protest Attacks on North, Urges Vigilance . . . . 8 Pathet Lao Presents Draft Peace Agreement at Vientiane Talks . . . 11 SALT Hungarian Newsman Cites Moscow Views nn SALT, MBPR, Bases . . . . . 14 CHILE-USSR Communique on Allende Visit Implies Limited Soviet Commitment . . . 17 THAILAND Thai CP Anniversary: Thai Stress, Chinese Mute Armed Struggle . . 21 USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS Demographer Views Farm Efficiency as Key to Urbanization . . . . . 25 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 DECEMBER 1972 Moscow (2755 items) Peking (1 320 items) - 50th Anniversary of (11X) 17% - Domestic issues (342) 43% USSR, 30 Dec. Indochina (16X) 232 Allende in USSR (--) 102 (Vietnam (122) 17%) Brezhnev in Hungary (25%) 7% (Cambodia (0) 5%] Vietnam (7%) 6% UNGA Session (6X) 152 China (3%) 4% [Middle East (--) 52] Constitution Day (--) 4% Guinean Prime Minister (--) 42 European Security (2%) 3% in PRC Finnish National Day (--) 3% Albanian Military (--) 32 Delegation in PRC These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and International radio serv,ces. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures In pi rentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed n the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/0%ONgj PL85T00875%PP49 0050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 INDOCHINA A 13 December NHAN DAN editorial scored President Thieu's National Assembly speech of the 12th and discounted optimism about the progress of the private DRV-U.S. talks. The editorial accused Saigon and Washington of "scheming to abolish the fundamental principles" of the accord and called upon the United States to choose between signing the agreement and using Thieu to "sabotage" it. Vietnamese communist propaganda earlier in the week had avoided any discussion of the substance of the negotiations while continuing to censure the United States for dragging its feet. An editorial in the November issue of the DRV party's theoretical journal HOC TAP, broadcast by Hanoi on 10 December, repeated the stock call for the United States to sign the agreement while underscoring communist resolve to continue the fight as long as necessary. The November HOC TAP also carried an article defending the legitimacy of making agreements with enemies thus providing theoretical guidance for party member who had been warned in NHAN DAN editorials in August of the dangers of compromise with "imperialism." Soviet support for Vietnam was reaffirmed with the 9 December announcement of the conclusion of the annual Soviet-DRV aid agreement, signed by Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi in Moscow. Routine Moscow comment continues to give pro fr,:,ba support to the Vietnamese communists on the issue of the draft peace agreement and remains circumspect in criticizing the United States. lanoi announced Le Thanh Nghi's arrival in Paris on 10 December to head the North Vietnamese delegation to the French Communist Party Congress. Hanoi has sent delegations at this level to previous CPF congresses; Le Duc Tho led the Hanoi contingent to the last congress in February 1970. HANOI SCORES THIEU SPEECH. CALLS FOR SIGNING OF AGREEMENT The 13 December NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by Hanoi to botL foreign and domestic audiences, dismissed President.Thieu's 12 December speech to the National Assembly as further evidence that the allies are attempting to "abolish the fundamental principles" of the draft peace agreement. In line with this charge, the editorial seemed to be trying to counter Western press Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 speculation about progress in the private Paris sessions when it opened its attack with the observation that the United States "repeatedly tries to make believe peace is around the corner." The editorial scored, as a contrast to such optimistic words, stepped-up U.S. military assistance to Saigon and the alleged intensification of the war and repressive activities in the South--actions which it said indicate Washington's intention to sabotage the provisions of the agreement. "The present state of the negotiations between Vietnam and the United States," according to the editorial, can be assessed by "Judging the concrete actions of the United States and puppets in South Vietnam and the U.S.-inspired arguments of the Thieu clique." The NHAN DAN editorial focused on the question of the rival administrations in the South, defending the PRG's position and bitterly denouncing the Saigon government as "a creature of U.S. neo-colonialism"; it complained that "the sheer existence of this dirty administration" is a violation of the South Vietnamese people's right to self determination. Laying stress on the communist concession in the accord allowing Thieu's government to continue, the editorial maintained that the South Vietnamese people and the PRG are "fully entitleed" to raise the "legitimate demand" that "this stooge administration" be "abolished now." It added that the PRG's recognition of the Saigon regime as one of the three political forces in South Vietnam has demonstrated the PRG's "realistic views and its good will in the correct settlement of the South Vietnam problem." NHAN DAN declared that the United States must choose either to abide by and sign the agreement or to continue to use Thieu to "sabotage" it. Warning that "nobody can threaten or fool the Vietnamese people" and reiterating Vietnamese determination to fight on, the editorial went further than other Hanoi comment since the end of October in suggesting that the DRV would receive increased assistance for such a fight. It asserted that "the more the U.S. aggressors are perfidious and stubborn, the bigger will be the support and assistance of the fraternal socialist countries" and others. Portions of Thieu's 12 December speech were acknowledged in the NHAN DAN editorial when it censured him for praising U.S. troops, for urging that a clear distinction bit made between North and South Vietnam, and for Advocating the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops "nd the prevention of North Vietnamese interference in the South's internal affairs. The editorial Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/OWO%I ij, ADP85TO08kB?0 ~,3igPO50050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 did not respond to the proposals in President Thieu's speech involving an extended holiday cease-fire and exchange of POW's, but an allusion to these suggestions appeared in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 13th. The article charged that "even though Thieu did speak of a truce, a temporary cease-fire, and POW release in his speech, he couli by no means cover up his real aim of sabotaging the agreement, intensifying the war, and serving his U.S. masters in continuing Vietnamization in new forms and realizing their coloni,sli&t dream." DRV JOURNAL EXPLAINS LEGITIMACY OF AGREEMENTS WITH ENEMIES The November issue of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) theoretical journal HOC TAP, as would be expected, reprinted the DRV Government's 26 October statement on the draft peace agreement along with an editorial routinely scoring.the United States for not signing the accord and reaffirming determination to fight on as long as necessary. Broadcast by Hanoi in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on 10 December, the editorial echoed earlier propaganda in attributing U.S. agreement on the ai:cord to allied "defeats" in Vietnam and in charging that U.S. refusal to sign reflects Washington's adherence to its "evil plan" to make the South a neocolony. The same issue of HOC TAP contained an article by alternate member of the VWP Central Committee Nguyen Khanh Toan* which did not mention the peace agreement but explained at length why agreements with an enemy must sometimes be reached- Pointing out that the form of struggle must be altered according to circumstances and that imperialism cannot be destroyed in a single battle but only "step by step," Toan explained: Sometimes we must accept a certain agreement (thoa hiep) with the enemy which must be essentially based on a revolutionary stand, that is, aimed at weakening his forces and * Nguyen Khanh Toan is the chairman of the Vietnam Social Science Commission, chairman of the Central Commission for Teenagers and Children, and vice president of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association. He has contributed numerous articles to HOC TAP in the past several years. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/0 1b@&EDP85T00YB R gAVR050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 increasing our forces. Such an agreement is a principled one, and It is basically different from the unprincipled agreement of opportunism. Toan's argument stands in sharp contrast to the line taken in NHAN DAN editorials on 17 and 19 August stressing the unacceptability of compromise and warning against the effect of the Nixon Administration's dealings with.the major communist powers.* Where NHAN DAN expressed acute concern that support for Hanoi was being jeopardized by big-power relations, the HOC TAP article seems designed to justify a compromise Vietnam settlement in the broader interests of the international communist movement--in effect making a virtue of what had been so sharply deplored last August. The contrast between the two lines can be seen in their varying treatment of the relation between national and international interests in assessing the acceptability of compromise. The 17 August NHAN DAN, hinting that Hanoi was under severe pressure from its big allies to accept a cease-fire, had argued that it may be acceptable to make some accommodation but that "if out of the narrow interests of one's nation one tries to help the most reactionary forces avert the dangerous blows, that is a cruel reconciliation beneficial to the enemy and not beneficial to the revolution." On the other hand, the HOC TAP article argued that when it is necessary to reach an agreement, communists do not allow "narrow and immediate interests" to blur the awareness of "lasting interests" of the entire movement and "do not allow national selfishness to control and undermine the common interests of the world revolution." Toan did echo the August NHAN DAN editorials when he indicated at another point that the international revolutionary struggle against imperialism must be conducted without compromise, but he went on to note that certain situations allowed for "flexibility." His discussion of this point bears striking resemblance to Le Duan's discourse on revolutionary methods in his lenghty February 1970 article. Le Duan had similarly advocated pushing back the enemy step by step and had explained that knowing how to win step by step--a manifestation of a combination of insistence on ultiuate goals * The NHAN DAN editorials are discussed in the 23 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 1-5. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 and clear-sightedness in viewing concrete movements-- is an art of dialectic combination of faithfulness to principle with flexibility in policies . . . . In the saLne article, Le Duan had recalled the Vietnamese communist tactic during the 1945-46 period of alternately making "temporary compromises" with the Chinese Nati'nalist forces and the French in order to divide enemy ranks. These measures were evaluated by Le Duan as "models of Leninist strategy on the exploitation of enemy contradictions and on principled concessions." While presenting a case for compromise settlements, Toan at the same time underlined Vietnamese independence and determination when he declared that "only our people, the master of their country and civilization, deeply cherish them and stand ready to sacrifice everything to protect them." He added that the Vietnamese people, "when their independence and freedom are at stake, never wait for outsiders to come and liberate them." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 MOSCOW SIGNS AiD ACCORDS WITH DRV. MARKS TIME ON SETTLEMENT The Soviets gave a standard reception to the DRV Government's economic delegation headed by Le Thanh Nghi, which arrived in Moscow on 27 November and departed on 10 December after Nghi and Soviet Vice Premier Novikov signed the agreements on economic and "defense" aid for 1973. Kosygin received the group on 2 December in line with standard protocol; either he or Brezhnev or both have customarily received these delegations. Moscow, which had supplied no details of the aid provided for in the agreements in recent years, this time catalogued some economic reconstruction aid. Soviet media did not report a specific reference to military aid by Novikov which appeared in Hanoi's much feller accounts of the speeches by the two vice premiers at the signing ceremony.* CONTENT OF ACCORDS TASS reported that the agreements signed on 9 December covered "aid without compensation" and trade, noting that the aid will include "large consignments of goods, equipment, and other property" and "necessary assistance" in strengthening the DRV's "defense potential." Neither TASS nor VNA expanded on the nature of the defense aid. But in Soviet media's first elaboration on the nature of the economic aid covered in the aid agreements since 1969, a Moscow rauio report noted that the USSR in 1973 will supply equipment "to build tunnels and restore bridges and roads" and will export "industrial equipment, machines, oil products, consumer goods, and foodstuffs." Announcements in Soviet media in September 1967, November 1968, and October 1969 had listed some of the types of materiel, including military, to be given the DRV as aid. And in the past two years, when Moscow's reports provided no detail, Hanoi's had specified some of the materials to be provided by Moscow or exchanged in trade. This time VNA offered no specifics in reporting, in standard language, that the agreements covered "Soviet non-refund economic and military aid for 1973" and that they also provided for "long-term loans" and trade. But Hanoi's * Kosygin did not, however, attend the signing ceremonies, as he had done when agreements were signed at th~? vice premier level in 1967 and 1970. There was a precedent for his absence from the ceremonies in 1968. He signed the agreements himself as Phaii Van Dong's counterpart in 1969, when the DRV premier headed the delegation that negotiated them. Last year's agreements were signed in Hanot during Podgornyy's visit. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 substantial accounts of the speeches by Novikov and Le Thanh Nghi quoted the former as mentioning "armaments and military equipment" and the latter as stating that Soviet aid "in the present urgent situation" would "strengthen the elan and confidence" of the Vietnamese armed forces and people. Both Moscow's and Hanoi's reports announced the signing of an agreement an establishment of a "standing intergovernmental Soviet-Vietnamese Commission for Economic and Scientific- Technical Cooperation." This apparently :represents the culmina- tion of an agreement reached during Podgornyy's DRV.visit in October of last year: The 7 October 1971 joint communique noted that the two sides had agreed to entrust the appropriate organizations and services with the task of working out "long- term development of economic cooperation and trade, cultural, scientific, technical, and other relations." The communique expressed confidence that the setting up of the joint commission would contribute to the strengthening of Soviet-l::.; economic relations. Novikov and Le Thanh Nghi both lauded the "unshakeable solidarity and fra ;vernal friendship" of the two parties, and Hanoi's accounts quoted Le Thanh Nghi as referring briefly to Chinese aid--just as he had acknowledged Soviet assistance in a banquet speech while in Peking to sign the PRC-DRV a1d agreement last month. Moscow, while giving the speeches brief and scant publicity, seemed defensive in insisting in a foreign-language radio commentary on the constancy of Soviet support for the Vietnamese. Broadcast to the Vietnamese among other audiences on 10 December, the commentary emphasized Soviet adherence to the "principles of proletarian internationalism elaborated by Lenin" and underscored Moscow's view of its aid to peoples fighting imperialist aggression as a "duty." The broadcast called the new aid accords "eloquent proof" that there is no discrepancy between the Soviet Union's words and deeds and evidence that Moscow invariably and steadfastly carries out its "international duty of proletarian solidarity." POLITICAL SETTLEMENT Moscow has continued to give the Vietnamese communists pro forma support on the issue of the draft peace agreement and has sustained its circumspect treatment of the United States. According.to VNA's account of the speeches at the ceremonies for signing the aid accords, Novikov did not mention the peace agreement in expressing full support for DRV efforts to "end the war and Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 restore peace in Vietnam" and to "reach a correct solution conforming to the national aspiration of the Vietnamese people." TASS briefly reported these remark,, but it did not report Le Thanh Nghi's attack on "thA obdurate double-faced and bellicose attitude of he Nixon Administration." Speaking at a 6 December dinner for the visiting Chilean president, however, Podgornyy again reiterated the Soviet call for a "speedy" U.S. signing of the peace agreement, and low-level comment--including statements by numerous Soviet mass organizations--have echoed the demand. Moscaw has given scant attention to the 3 December.PRG statement which accused the Thieu government of a "campaign of terror" and crimes against "patriotic" forces being detained in the South. TASS barely acknowledged the content of the statement when it reported that PRG envoys in Hanoi and Moelcow held press conferences on 4 and 7 December, respectively, to publicize the statement. Similarly, TASS only briefly. summarized a 7 December DRV Government statement supporting the PRG statement. Consistent with Moscow's reluctance to criticize the.United States, the TASS summary omitted the DRV's charge that Saigon's terrorist actions were "on U.S. orders," as well as the DRV's appeal to socialist countries to "severely condemn the U.S. aggressors." Some routine Soviet press and radio commer.c did echo the line in the DRV an. PRG statements, but without specifically citing them. DRY CONTINUES TO PROTEST ATTACKS ON NORTH. URGES VIGILANCE U.S. strikes against North Vietnam continued to draw sta?,uiaro protests in daily statements issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, which sustained the charge that.these "crimes" reveal the Nixon Administration's desire to prolong the war despite its declarations that peace is "at hand." The statement of the 11th atypically included among such "crimes" the direct charge that the United States is continuing to mine and blockade various harbors and to drop magnetic bombs over rivers. The last such direct charge of that kind, as distinct from the standard demand in the spokesman's statement,, that the United States cease its mining and blockade of DRV ports, had appeared in a communique of the DRV War Crimes.Commission, reported by VNA on 4 December, which listed several major waterways that had been mined. Hanoi reported the downing of five more planes during the past week, including a pilotless Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 plane over Nam Ha on 11 December, for a total of 4,075 as of that day; it also said two more U.S. warships had been set afire. Intensification of U.S. strikes against the civilian population of Nghe An Province was alleged by VNA on 9 December in a report on the visit of several foreign newsmen to that province between 29 November and 8 December. Claiming that the Journalists viewed the effects of both B-52 saturation bombing and the combination of "tactical air raids and naval bombardments," VNA said eyewitnesses told them the intensity of such raids had increased "markedly" since 26 October. Nghe An's exploits in the face of U.S. bombing were praised in a NHAN DAN editorial of the 6th, which acclaimed the province's achievements in agriculture as well as its military feats during "the present destructive war." Noting that the people of Nghe An had attained successes in agricultural production despite natural hardships and the intensified bombing, NHAN DAN granted that favorable weather conditions may have helped but stressed that the chief fa,-,tor was correct leadership, which led in turn to improvements in technology, management, and organization. Successes in both combat and production tasks were also claimed for the provinces of the Fourth Military Region as a whole, in an 11 December Hanoi radio report on A recent joint conference of the standing committee of the party committee of the region, the regional command, and the standing committees of the party committees of each of the provinces in the region and the Vinh Linh zone. According to the report, the conference set forth a number of local and general military tasks including downing aircraft, maintaining communications and transportation, stepping up passive air defense, aiding the frontline, increasing vigilance, and "making necessary Preparations for organizing forces and technical and tactical training in order to defeat every war adventure by Nixon, [and] aiding the battlefield with men and material under the slogan 'rice and men exceed requirements."' AIR DEFENSE In an apparent effort to sustain civilian concern MEASURES with air defense tasks during a period of relative calm in the northern part of the country, Hanoi radio has broadcast several items calling for improvement of "passive air defense" measures in areas north of the 20th parallel and thus currently beyond the range of U.S. strikes.. Typically, an English-language broadcast on 7 December reported the "practical Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ; CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 deeds" being implemented: continued evacuation of Hanoi; improvement of the militia, antiaircraft forces, missile units, and "the air force and related services"; and continued enlistment of youths in the armed forces. Other broadcasts reported similar activities underway in Haiphong, in the province of Ha Bac (northeast of Hanoi), and in the Vinh Linh zone. The importance of civilian defense measures was highlighted in statements made by DRV President Ton Duc Thang during a visit to a primary school on the outskirts of Hanoi, reported by Hanoi radio on the 8th and by VNA on the 9th. Declaring that children are "the future masters of the heroic Vietnamese nation," Thang urged continued vigilance and performance of passive air defense tasks as a means of insuring the safety and security of teachers and students. In other brief reports, air force, naval, and antiaircraft forces in Hanoi and several northern provinces were reported to be intensifying and improving training and combat procedures. And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, in an editorial on the 8th, urged youths in tr.: army to improve their scientific and technical knowledge and skills so as to better defeat the enemy. The 7 December English-language broadcast presented the current stress on air defense and related activities in areas north of the 20th parallel as a response to "the United States' deliberate delay in the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement and its step-up of the war in both parts of Viet.nam." Charges of intensification of the bombing both of South Vietnam and of areas of the DRV south of the 20th parallel have been leveled in both of the recent War Crimes Commission communiques, as well as in the 2 December foreign ministry statement that was issued specifically to condemn such actions. The foreign ministry statement, in addition, charged that the intensification is directly related to the U.S. delay in signing the peace agreement and declared that the only course for the Vietnamese people is to continue to maintain vigilance, to combine combat and production, and to continue the struggle to defeat the U.S. "aggressors." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/Okra* DP85T008y 0 ;$LV050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 PATHET LAO PRESENTS DRAFT PEACE AGREEMENT AT VIENTIANE TALKS A draft peace agreement presented by the NLHS on 12 December in Vientiane, at the ninth session of the peace talks with the RLG, appears to bring the NLHS' stand encompassed in its 17 October peace proposal* into line with the draft U.S.-DRV agreement on Vietnam summarized by Hanoi on 26 October. The U.S.- DRV draft agreement on Vietnam includes a call for the withdrawal of "all countries" from Laos and Cambodia in order to let the peoples of those countries settle their own affairs; the NLHS draft agreement provides for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Lpos, rather than specifying U.S. troops as in the October proposal, thereby introducing a formula that could be interpreted to include DRV forces. It also spells out a timetable for steps proposed in October on a cease-fire, troop withdrawal, and formation of a provisional coalition government. The draft agreement was presented following the return of NLHS delegation head Phoune Sipraseuth to Vientiane after consulta- tions with NLHS leaders in Sam Neus and stopovers in Hai L. He had left Vientiane for Sam Neua on 2 December and returned on the 10th, stopping off in Hanoi both times. NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, who had been in Vientiane as "special adviser" to the Pathet Lao delegation, had stopped off in Hanoi en rout, oack to Sam Neua on 11 November; he has not returned to the talks. A prompt, favorable report on the NLHS draft by the Vientiane radio on the 12th said it was viewed by he RLG side as a possible "first step toward further agreements in coming sessions" and noted that the RLG delegate to the talks had delivered a speech expressing "satisfaction with the new attitude of the NLHS delegation," CEASE-FIRE & WITHDRAWAL In the text carried in Pathet Lao media on the 13th, the NLHS draft agreement repeats the October proposal's demand that the United States stop the bombing and other military activity in * The five-point proposal of 17 October was presented by the NLHS at the opening session of the Vientiane talks. For a discussion see the TRENDS of 26 October 1972, pages 11-16. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/@&9ft)gQIKLRDP85T0( jP&J 0050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 Laos, dismantle its bases, and take responsibility for war damages. But it neither refers specifically to a U.S. troop withdrawal nor mentions Thai forces. Its timetable calls for implementation of "a cease-fire on the spot throughout Lao territory" and stipulates that "all advisers, military personnel, and regular and irregular troops of foreign countties must be withdrawn from Laos" within 90 days of the signing of the agreer c: `. Like the 17 October proposal, the draft calls for proscription of the entry into Laos of troops or weapons of "arty foreign country." Echoing language in Hanoi's summary of the DRV draft agreement on Vietnam, it rotates that replacement of damaged weapons and materials will be permitted with the concurrence of both sides and at the request of the "coalition government," which would also handle their distribution. It stipulates that prisoners, "regardless of nationality," will be exchanged after the cease-fire simultaneously with the withdrawal of "foreign" troops, where the 17 October NLHS proposal had specified withdrawal of U.S. and allied military personnel. As in the October proposal, the draft agreement provides for supervision of the cease-fire by a joint committee assisted tiv the ICC. COALITION GOVERNMENT The NLHS draft states that the "political coalition council" and "new provisional coalition government," to be formed within 30 days of the signing, would be charged with implementing the agreement, holding further discussions, and administering the country pending elections for "the National Assembly and the National Coalition Government." Both the council and the provisional government are envisaged as tripartite, composed in equal proportions of representatives of the RLG, theNLHS, and the Patriotic Neutralist Forces plus others of neutralist persuasion. The 17 October program had described the provisional government in similar terms, but it is not clear if the "political coalition council" proposed in the draft agreement is.the same as the "politicat consultative council" called for in the 17 October program. The make-up of the council was not spelled out in the October proposal beyond the statement that.it would consist of "components largely representative-of all parties concerned," including all nationalities, religions, social strata, patriotic personalities, and intellectuals. Neither Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08Vt*ia.",PP85TO08-OROQ 050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 the draft agreement nor the October program spells out the division of power in the permanent "National Coalition Government." The draft agreement says that pending installation of the National Assembly and National Coalition Government, each side would continue to admin4.eter its own territory and Vientiane would be made a neutral zone. The October proposal had merely provided that the parties concerned would "agree upon measures to insure security of the premises" of the coalition government and the council. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000 18t/f19Em -RDP85T 8J5fO 300050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 SALT H NVGARIAN NEWSMAN CITES MOSCOW VIEWS ON SALT, MBFR, BASES A Hungarian Journalist recently returned from Moscow has cited Soviet "American exports" there as indicating that Moscow views negotiations on force reductions in Europe as a "supplement" to SALT 11, Istvan Normandy--a military specialist who has in the past served as a proxy spokesman for Moscow on Sino-Sovist and nuclear issues*--indicated in an article in the 10 December issue of the political weekly MAGYARORSZAG that the issue linking SALT and force reductions is that of U.S. forward based systems in Europe (FBS). Moscow may see in the multilateral talks on force reduction a possib'i vehicle for solving the thorny problem of coping with European PBS in the context of bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks on longer-range strategic weapons. The first Soviet comment on substantive issues in SALT II, in IZVESTIYA on 5 and 7 December, singled out PBS as a problem for the current round just as it was for SALT I. At the same time, Kormendy's discussio. suggests some Soviet flexibility on the issue of "balance" in any future European force reductions. SALT AND MBFR Normandy emphasized the complexity and inter- dependence of the force :eduction talks--"the preparations for which will begin on 31 January"--and SALT II, foreseeing prolonged negotiations extending over several years and "covering the full range from strategic nuclear weapons to the troops stationed in central Europe," (Moscow has not yet officially responded to the NATO propobQl of 16 November that initial talks begin at the end of January.) The linkage may also signal a recognition by Moscow that an eventual accord on force reduction could require--as in the SALT I agreements--some degree of "asymmetry" in the reductions by each side. Moscow has in the past taken strong issue with Western scenarios for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) which have concluded that considerations of geographical proximity would require proportionately greater reductions of Soviet troops in East Europe. * In a 25 July 1971 article in the same journal, Kormendy cited Soviet "Chinese experts" on Moscow's assessment of the Chinese nuclear capability and Sino-Soviet relations in general. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09N + 85T0087SMMU 50050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 ? Kormendy, stating that "reciprocal reduction methods" (the formula used in the joint communique issued at the May U.S.- Soviet summit) -can be worked out, asserted that the result would be a military balance based on the principle of "equal security." Moscow has in the past emphasized that this principle--in its view central to the successful SALT I outcome--requires that simple numerical force correlations be balanced by other mitigating factors such as geography. In the context of SALT, the 5 December IZVESTIYA article, an international review by A. Bovin, took issue with the outward simplicity of the Jackson amendment ("100 missiles for you and the same for us") and argued that the equal security "principle requires that quantitative correlations be weighted with other factors--geographical location, the existence of forward based systems and so forth-- which materially influence the degree of security." The Kormendy article did not mention the "parity principle," which the last extended Soviet comment on MBFR said must characterize European force reductions. That article, by Yuriy Koetko in the September 1972 issue of MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNA'A0TNOSHENIYA, had defined parity as the maintenance at a lower level of the same general balance which had already taken shape.* FORWARD BASES An article in the 7 December IZVESTIYA by M. Sagatelyan--the only full-length commentary on SALT II to appear in the central press to date--ci.ted an article in the GUARDIAN to emphasize that the current talks are confronted by the "same old problem:" the United States would like to classify its weapons on European bases and Mediterranean warships as more tactical than strategic, whereas "the Russians regard missiles capable of hitting their territory as strategic and, consequently, a subject for discussion at the talks." Bovin's 5 December IZVESTIYA article also cited FBS as important in SALT II. Moscow continues to ignore the MIRV problem in comment relating to SALT II, though the East European press has given MIRV equal status with FLS as issues to be discussed thare.** * The article is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 15-19. ** See the TRENDS of 29 November, pages 13-14. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 200QfIfNf-RDP85TOO75J300050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS In an unusual assessment in bloc media of the "political atmosphere in Moscow," Kormendy also reported a new sense of calm prevailing there: "the tons of political discussions has changed in Moscow since the spring." He found a belief among Soviet "American experts" that the U.S. interest in arms limitations is serious and of a long-term nature. "The U.S. inclination to negotiate and come to terms is not merely a current policy but a political trend developed on the basis of realities in Washington," Kormendy said. He concluded that "not even the previously skeptical military experts"--apparently but not explicitly referring to those in Moscow--doubt any longer that SALT II will eventually produce further results. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/0 NFY&-85T00875 9?%28850050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 CHILE - USSR C"UNIQUE ON ALLENDE VISIT IMPLIES LIMITED SOVIET W+II1MENT The relatively bland communique issued at the conclusion of Chilean President Salvador Allende's 6-' December visit to the Soviet Union was notable for its failure to indicate any major new Soviet poli- tical or economic commitment to Chile. Moscow's expression of "under- standing"--but not support--of Allende's efforts to "carry out social and economic reforms, strengthen the country's economy, its national sovereignty and independence, and build socialism" was noteworthy for the recognition of a Chilean effort to build socialism* but was weaker as a statement of Soviet backing than formulations used following previous visits of Chilean leaders to Moscow. For example, the statraaent issued last June following the talks in Moscow between Chilean Socialist Party Secretary General Carlos Altamirano and Brezhnev and other ranking Soviet officials said the Soviet leaders "expressed complete support for the revolutionary changes" effected -by the Allende government The communique failed to characterize the tone of Allende's talks with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, although routine-level reports on the progress of the talks in Moscow media had said they took place "in an atmosphere of friendship and a complete identity of views and positions on all questions discussed." Moscow's evident caution in embracing the Allende regime would appear to stem from wariness about undertaking the kind of costly, open-ended commit- ment the USSR has made to Cuba as well as from a reluctance.to become too closely associated with a regime whose stability has been brought intc question by recurring domestic political and economic crises over the past year. VAGUE ECONOMIC PROMISES The communique noted that the USSR "has been giving and is prepared to.give further politl.cal and a unomic support" to Chile and that both sides expressed a da,sire "to further deepen relations of friendship and improve mutua:~ly beneficial cooperation." But in outlining. the "concrete measures" envisaged to implement these aims, it made no mention of the hard currency credits urgently needed by the.Chileans. ? * Moscow has heretofore scrupulously avoided referring to "building socialism" in connection with Chile. Typically, a 9 December Moscow radio talk on Allende's visit referred merely to Chilean workers embarking on "the construction of a new life" and to the Chilean people's "struggle for independence and progress." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONIVVENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 Instead, it referred to the kinds of long-term aid for capital construction projects that Moscow has already been prcvidin6. The failure of the communique to mention any new Soviet hard currency credits is particularly noteworthy in light of the extension of such credits to Chile early this year. Moscow has givo:: only negli- gible publicity to this credit, probably out of a desire to discourage further requests from Chile and to avoid inviting similar requests from other currency-poor !eveloping nations. A 24 November Radio Moscow commentary on Soviet-Chilean cooperation, however, did acknowledge that the Soviet Union had granted Chile "a credit of nearly 100 million dollars for the purchase of foodstuffs." Reported statements by Chilean officials have been vague on the results of the Moscow talks. AFP on the 8th reported a member of Allende's official party in Moscow as stating that the USSR had agreed to provide Chile with increased economic aid, but the report gave no details. And an AFP dispatch from Paris on the 9th reported the President of the Chilean Central Bank, Alfonso Inostroza, as having denied a report that Allende sold 130,000 tons of copper to the USSR while in Moscow and as having stressed that Chile was interested in selling copper "in the traditional markets, especially Europe." Inostraza was reported to have said that expansion of "certain exports" to the USSR and Soviet involve- ment in Chilean economic development could help "to create an infrastructure for exploiting our petroleum and coal." Reports on 12 December from PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent to his Havana office and by the LATIN news agency quoted Chilean opposition spokesmen as being highly critical of Soviet credit offers to Allende. Allende's opponents reportedly declared that the USSR is not helping Chile to solve its acute foreign exchange. shortage by providing hard currency needed for the purchase of food and spare parts; a leading Christian Democratic legislator was quoted as having observed disparagingly that "money is being loaned only for machinery sold to us by the USSR." INTERNATIONAL ISSUES For the most part, the sections of t:ie Joint communique on international issues followed a predictable pattern: The document condemned the U.S. "blockade" of Cuba, applauded recent moves toward detente in Europe, supported the DRV any the PRG, and endorsed a world disarmament conference. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09CO,,&-85T00875R000300050050-5 FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 - 19 - One area where the communique conspicuously sought to blur Soviet- Chilean differences was on the rights of states to not limits on their territorial waters, which Chile actively supports-- maintaining a 200-mile territorial sea limit--and the USSR opposes.* The communique, hintir.g at the continuing divergence of views, stated that "the two sides exchanged opinions concerning the forthcoming UN conference cau maritime law and expressed readiness to concert their positions and cooperate with each other in achieving the aims of the conference, with due account taken of the interests of all states." The communique predictably condemned "foreign interference" in Chilean internal affairs without specifying that either the U.S. Government or U.S. companies were the culprits. In a veiled reference to the Kennecott Copper Company's recent attempts to embargo Chilean copper shipments to Western Europe, it denounced "foreign monopolies" for trying to deprive Chile of its right to use its natural resources as it sees fit, "specifically the right to sell its copper freely." ALLENDE'S STATEMENTS Allende's remarks in Moscow conveyed strong hints to his Soviet hosts that Chile should be considered as deserving of Soviet generosity as is Vietnam. Speaking at a 6 December Kremlin dinner in his honor, the Chilean leader effusively lauded Soviet aid to Vietnam and went on to cite the description of Chile by Pablo Neruda, Chilean Nobel Prize winning poet and communist party luminary, as "a silent Vietnam"--a country which, while not experiencing "the roar of aircraft and grenade explosions," shared the same feeling of an "overt and concealed encirclement of our country." Allende touched briefly on Chile's current difficulties, noting in the dinner speech that Chile was "implementing a revolutionary process.... within the framework of a bourgeois democracy, and it is * Since 1970 the Chinese have supported those Latin American states claiming a 200-mile territorial sea limit and have used the issue in polemics against Moscow, lambasting "superpower" efforts to deprive smaller countries of their ocean resources. Moscow has avoided publicizing the issue; Soviet, media did not carry remarks by USSR delegate Roshchin in the UNGA Political Committee on S November in which he cited as one of the USSR's objections to the Treaty on a Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone the fact that it permits states to set their own territorial sea limits. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/8Ey;RDP85T0(%lpF00050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 not easy." Here and in other statements, he stressed that Chile was the victim of economic "aggression" by "imperialist mono- polies." In an interview on Moscow Radio and TV, Allende took note of alleged efforts by the ITT to prevent him from taking power and later to overthrow him. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 THAILAND TNAM. CP ANNIVERSARY: THAI STRESS, CHINESE MUTE ARMED STRUGGLE Observances of the Thai Comuaunist Party's 30th anniversary on 1 December have reflected both persisting elements and new directions in Southeast Asia, most notably the relaxation of Sino-U.S. tensions and moves toward new relationships in an area that has been dominated by the Indochina conflict and the specter of "people's war." A statement issued by the Thai CP and echoed by the fraternal parties in the area elaborated a classical Maoist strategy of armed insurgency while reminding the Chinese that the Bangkok regime remains hostile to the common interests of the Asian communist movement. The Thai communists' Peking mentor, however, chose to balance its patronage of loyal client parties with its brcaderinterests in Asian detente. Thus, following its dual-track approach to Southeast Asia, Peking failed to publicize its greetings message to the Thai CP while leaving it to the PRC-baba3 clandestine "Voice of the People of Thailand" (VOPT) to broadcast the message.* In revealing contrast, Hanoi issued not only a greetings message but also an editorial in the party organ stressing the link between the Vietnamese and Thai armed struggles against the United States and its local allies. Messages reflecting their mutual ideological affinities were sent to the Thai CP by the fraternal Burmese and Malayan parties and broadcast by their respective PRC-based radios. From 6 to 12 December the VOPT carried fraternal greetings in the following order (giving pride of place to th CCP and other ruling parties) Chinese, North Vietnamese, Albanian, Korean, Romanian, Burmese, Malayan, and Philippine parties. THAI CP STATEMENT T`+.e Thai party marked its anniversary with a major statement on 1 December by the party's central committee and a VOPT editorial on the 5th high- lighting the key points in the statement, particularly the necessity of armed struggle. The etatewent was three times longer than the comparable pronouncement marking the party's 25th * See the Supplementary Article in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972 entitled "Peking and the Clandestine Radios Beamed to Southeast Asia." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 anniversary in 1967 and seemed to take a harder line concerning the attainment of political power in Thailand while adhering to longstanding positions on international questions. Similar to the one on the 25th anniversary, this year's statement repeatedly excoriated the Bangkok government--"the traitorous Thanom clique"-- and pledged to drive the United States out of Thailand by means of a strategy of armed struggle based on "Marxism-Leninism- Mao Tse-tung Thought." The statement also praised China as a "strong bulwark and a reliable ally of all the world revolutionaries," forcefully reaffirmed Thai CP support for the Indochina war effort, and assailed "Soviet social imperialism." In charting the road to power in Thailand, the statement reflected a shift in policy stemming from the party's 10-point policy statement of 1968. Stressing that armed struggle to seize political power is the "only correct means," it omitted the line contained in the 25th anniversary statement expressing an interest in a coalition government. The current statement elaborated a strategy of rural- based armed struggle aimed ultimately at encircling and seizing the cities. It called for a broad united front from below of all persons and groups who oppose "U.S. Imperialism and the treacherous Thanom clique--our common enemy." Though ritualistically characterizing the present situation in the armed struggle as "excellent," the statement reflected a sober awareness of complications presented by conditions inside and outside the country. Thus, referring to the regime's suppression drives against the insurgents, the statement observed that "the enemy remains strong and our side is rather weak," and it acknowledged that the communists will be confronted with "an even more complicated, canning, and arduous struggle." In a passage that could be read as objecting to Peking's dealings with the Bangkok government, the statement insisted that "the dictatorial and fascist Thanom clique" is pursuing a policy inimical to the revolutionary people in other countries, "including the Chinese people." CHINA The Thai communists could hardly have been reassured by Peking's treatment of their anniversary. Together with Peking's failure to publicize the greetings message, the content of the message itself reflected an evident effort to miniwiza the effect on the recently improved Peking-Bangkok relations of Peking's identification with the Thai insurgency. In contrast to the greetings on the Thai party's previous quinquennial anniversary, in 1967, the CCP message this year discreetly skirted sensitive issues posed by the continuing Thai insurgency. The message used generalized language in praising Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 the Thai party for making "a great contribution to the liberation struggle" in Thailand, and there was a minimal bow to the "militant solidarity" of the two parties. Consistent with Peking's practice since the visit cf a Thai tab14 tennis team in September, the message sidestepped direct attacks on the Thai government, resorting rather to the less provocative formulation of "local reactionaries in Thailand." This year's message conspicuously avoided associating the Chinese with a strategy of people's war in Thailand. There was no pledge of Chinese support for the Thai struggle, no mention of Mao thought as the ideological source of the Thai communist movement, and no discussion of armed struggle as the means to power. Also absent was any linkage of the Thai at-uggle with the Indochina war, an issue that had figured prominently in Peking's treatment of the Thai insurgency since its inception in 1965 but has declined in importance as Peking has taken a more relaxed line on U.S. intentions in the area. In i.s own media Peking marked the Thai CP's anniversary only by carrying a 2 December NCNA account of a lengthy article broadcast by the VOPT on 30 November. While duly citing passages in praise of the achievements of the Thai armed struggle since 1965, the NCNA account was measurably more sanitized than a similar NCNA replay marking the anniversary last year. Most notably, there was no reference to the Thanom government and little emphasis on the role of armed struggle. In fact, the NCNA account, with its statement that the Thai party had "no alternative but to take up arms in self-defense" against "external and internal enemies," could be read as leaving open the possibility of a switch to peaceful political competition from the exclusive reliance on armed struggle insistently propounded in the Thai CP's pronouncements. OTHER PARTIES While Peking has sought to minimize its involvement with the Thai insurgency, the North Vietnamese used their greetings message and a NHAN DAN editorial to portray the Thai armed struggle as an integral part of the broader struggle against the United States in Southeast Asia. The message was replete with expressions of North Vietnamese solidarity with the Thai communists in a fight against "the same enemy--the U.S. imperialist aggressors." Like the message, the editorial underscored mutual assistance and support by the two parties and linked their interests by citing the Thai government's role in the Indochina conflict. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 13 DECEMBER 1972 The messages from the Burmese and Malayan CPs registered the ideological. affinities among the Maoist-lining parties in Southeast Asia--and in the process reflected the ideological lag increasingly separating these parties, with their invocation of a strategy enunciated by Lin Piao in his 1965 tract on people's war, and their Peking patron, now embarked on Chouist policies of accommodation and negotiation. Both the Burmese and Malayan messages invoked Mao thought and the doctrine of people's war, denounced Soviet revisionism, and identified the "Thanom-Praphat clique" as the target of armed struggle. The lengthy Burmese message particularly stressed the identity of interests between the Thai and Burmese communists, noting that "your struggles are our struggles and your victories are our victories." The BCP assured its fraternal neighbors that "despite difficulties" it would persist in the fight against "the reactionary Ne Win-San Yu military government" in the belief that "armed struggle in Burma will assist your struggle, a'i the struggles in Thailand helped the revolution in Bursa." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 Approved For Release 2000/08MRiGiA P85TOO87 @Oj Q 50050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 - 25 - USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEMOGRAPHER VIEWS FARM EFFICIENCY AS KEY TO URBANIZATION A polemical article by demographer Viktor Perevedentsev in the November NASH SOVREMENNIK (OUR CONTEMPORARY) argues for more, not less, migration from rural areas to cities and urges adoption of link-type farm labor organization to make up for the losses in farm manpower. Complaining that all recent writings have approached the subject of migration from the point of view of how to hold young people on farms, Perevedeatsev sets out to defend the interests of urban areas, arguing that the falling birth rate and increasing shortage of urban labor require mea..'.'es to stimulate migration to the cities. Perevedentsev's article reflects a longtime debate not only between proponents of industry and agriculture but also between those advocating the reorganization of agriculture on the basis of material incentive and individual initiative ands those calling for greater agricultural investment within the framework of traditional institutions and practices. Perevedentsev indicates that despite the measures adopted since 1966 to improve rural income and living conditions, migration to cities has accelerated. He cites data showing that from 1950 to 1966 the rural population dropped by only 600,000 while during only six years from 1966 to 1972 it fell by 4,800,000. In 1970 ai'ne, 1,700,00( rural dwellers migrated to cities. But Perevedentsev argues that despite the outcry from those concerned with maintaining agricultural production, the agricultural sector has a general surplus of labor which is obscured by regional maldistribution on the one hand and inefficient organization on the other. The author points out that agricultural areas where labor is scarce--Siberia, north and central Russia--are losing population especially rapidly, while areas with surplus farm labor such as Central Asia, the Caucasus, Moldavia, and the west Ukraine are actually gaining population. The problem, in his view, is to stimulate migration from the surplus areas. To this end, he deriders the use of administrative restraints such as denying interral passports to kolkbozniks in order to prevent their migration, and he urges adoption of measures to ease the adjustment of rural migrants to urban life. At the same time, he emphcsizes that "the basis of regulating rural migration must be sought in labor and its organization." Noting that the productivity of Soviet farm labor is only 20-25 percent that of Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5 1 Approved For Release 20004Q$JQ,A-RDP85Tg7?9300050050-5 13 DECEMBER 1972 U.S. f,xm labor, he maintains that adoption of link-typo farm labor irganization could raise productivity, retain enough skilled young people in the countryside, and also release large numbers of surplus farm laborers. Perevedentsev's approach to agriculture appears to be similar to that of former RSFSR Premier Voronov. While Politburo agricultural supervisor Polyanskiy has pressed for large investments to raise rural living standards and retain farm labor, Voronov in a 24 November 1970 speech rejected the argument that youth was leaving the village mainly because of poor living conditions and instead cited poor labor organization and lack of job opportunity as more important factors. Perevedentsev likewise rejects as "naive" the notion that building good clubs and modt.rn well-equipped villages would stop the outflow from the countryside. Like Voronov, he sees the new forms of "unregulated" farm labor organization as the key to keeping youth interested in farm work and to boosting production. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5