FBIS TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050050-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: December 13, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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This propaganda analysis report is based. exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 DECEMBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Hanoi Scores Thieu Speech, Calls for Signing of Agreement . . . . .
1
DRV Journal Explains Legitimacy of Agreements With Enemies . . . .
3
Moscow Signs Aid Accords With DRV, Marks Time on Settlement . . . .
6
DRV Continues to Protest Attacks on North, Urges Vigilance . . . .
8
Pathet Lao Presents Draft Peace Agreement at Vientiane Talks . . .
11
SALT
Hungarian Newsman Cites Moscow Views nn SALT, MBPR, Bases . . . . .
14
CHILE-USSR
Communique on Allende Visit Implies Limited Soviet Commitment . . .
17
THAILAND
Thai CP Anniversary: Thai Stress, Chinese Mute Armed Struggle . .
21
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Demographer Views Farm Efficiency as Key to Urbanization . . . . .
25
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
13 DECEMBER 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 DECEMBER 1972
Moscow (2755 items)
Peking (1
320
items)
-
50th Anniversary of
(11X)
17%
-
Domestic issues
(342)
43%
USSR, 30 Dec.
Indochina
(16X)
232
Allende in USSR
(--)
102
(Vietnam
(122)
17%)
Brezhnev in Hungary
(25%)
7%
(Cambodia
(0)
5%]
Vietnam
(7%)
6%
UNGA Session
(6X)
152
China
(3%)
4%
[Middle East
(--)
52]
Constitution Day
(--)
4%
Guinean Prime Minister
(--)
42
European Security
(2%)
3%
in PRC
Finnish National Day
(--)
3%
Albanian Military
(--)
32
Delegation in PRC
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio serv,ces. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In pi rentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed n the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INDOCHINA
A 13 December NHAN DAN editorial scored President Thieu's
National Assembly speech of the 12th and discounted optimism
about the progress of the private DRV-U.S. talks. The
editorial accused Saigon and Washington of "scheming to
abolish the fundamental principles" of the accord and called
upon the United States to choose between signing the agreement
and using Thieu to "sabotage" it. Vietnamese communist
propaganda earlier in the week had avoided any discussion of
the substance of the negotiations while continuing to censure
the United States for dragging its feet.
An editorial in the November issue of the DRV party's theoretical
journal HOC TAP, broadcast by Hanoi on 10 December, repeated
the stock call for the United States to sign the agreement while
underscoring communist resolve to continue the fight as long as
necessary. The November HOC TAP also carried an article
defending the legitimacy of making agreements with enemies thus
providing theoretical guidance for party member who had been
warned in NHAN DAN editorials in August of the dangers of
compromise with "imperialism."
Soviet support for Vietnam was reaffirmed with the 9 December
announcement of the conclusion of the annual Soviet-DRV aid
agreement, signed by Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh
Nghi in Moscow. Routine Moscow comment continues to give
pro fr,:,ba support to the Vietnamese communists on the issue of
the draft peace agreement and remains circumspect in criticizing
the United States.
lanoi announced Le Thanh Nghi's arrival in Paris on 10 December
to head the North Vietnamese delegation to the French Communist
Party Congress. Hanoi has sent delegations at this level to
previous CPF congresses; Le Duc Tho led the Hanoi contingent to
the last congress in February 1970.
HANOI SCORES THIEU SPEECH. CALLS FOR SIGNING OF AGREEMENT
The 13 December NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by Hanoi to botL
foreign and domestic audiences, dismissed President.Thieu's
12 December speech to the National Assembly as further evidence
that the allies are attempting to "abolish the fundamental
principles" of the draft peace agreement. In line with this charge,
the editorial seemed to be trying to counter Western press
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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speculation about progress in the private Paris sessions when
it opened its attack with the observation that the United
States "repeatedly tries to make believe peace is around the
corner." The editorial scored, as a contrast to such
optimistic words, stepped-up U.S. military assistance to
Saigon and the alleged intensification of the war and
repressive activities in the South--actions which it said
indicate Washington's intention to sabotage the provisions of
the agreement. "The present state of the negotiations between
Vietnam and the United States," according to the editorial,
can be assessed by "Judging the concrete actions of the United
States and puppets in South Vietnam and the U.S.-inspired
arguments of the Thieu clique."
The NHAN DAN editorial focused on the question of the rival
administrations in the South, defending the PRG's position and
bitterly denouncing the Saigon government as "a creature of U.S.
neo-colonialism"; it complained that "the sheer existence of
this dirty administration" is a violation of the South
Vietnamese people's right to self determination. Laying stress
on the communist concession in the accord allowing Thieu's
government to continue, the editorial maintained that the South
Vietnamese people and the PRG are "fully entitleed" to raise the
"legitimate demand" that "this stooge administration" be "abolished
now." It added that the PRG's recognition of the Saigon regime
as one of the three political forces in South Vietnam has
demonstrated the PRG's "realistic views and its good will in the
correct settlement of the South Vietnam problem."
NHAN DAN declared that the United States must choose either to
abide by and sign the agreement or to continue to use Thieu
to "sabotage" it. Warning that "nobody can threaten or fool
the Vietnamese people" and reiterating Vietnamese determination
to fight on, the editorial went further than other Hanoi comment
since the end of October in suggesting that the DRV would
receive increased assistance for such a fight. It asserted that
"the more the U.S. aggressors are perfidious and stubborn, the
bigger will be the support and assistance of the fraternal
socialist countries" and others.
Portions of Thieu's 12 December speech were acknowledged in the
NHAN DAN editorial when it censured him for praising U.S.
troops, for urging that a clear distinction bit made between
North and South Vietnam, and for Advocating the withdrawal of
North Vietnamese troops "nd the prevention of North Vietnamese
interference in the South's internal affairs. The editorial
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did not respond to the proposals in President Thieu's speech
involving an extended holiday cease-fire and exchange of POW's,
but an allusion to these suggestions appeared in a QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN article on the 13th. The article charged that "even
though Thieu did speak of a truce, a temporary cease-fire, and
POW release in his speech, he couli by no means cover up his
real aim of sabotaging the agreement, intensifying the war,
and serving his U.S. masters in continuing Vietnamization in
new forms and realizing their coloni,sli&t dream."
DRV JOURNAL EXPLAINS LEGITIMACY OF AGREEMENTS WITH ENEMIES
The November issue of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP)
theoretical journal HOC TAP, as would be expected, reprinted
the DRV Government's 26 October statement on the draft peace
agreement along with an editorial routinely scoring.the United
States for not signing the accord and reaffirming determination
to fight on as long as necessary. Broadcast by Hanoi in
Vietnamese to South Vietnam on 10 December, the editorial
echoed earlier propaganda in attributing U.S. agreement on the
ai:cord to allied "defeats" in Vietnam and in charging that
U.S. refusal to sign reflects Washington's adherence to its
"evil plan" to make the South a neocolony.
The same issue of HOC TAP contained an article by alternate
member of the VWP Central Committee Nguyen Khanh Toan* which
did not mention the peace agreement but explained at length
why agreements with an enemy must sometimes be reached-
Pointing out that the form of struggle must be altered according
to circumstances and that imperialism cannot be destroyed in a
single battle but only "step by step," Toan explained:
Sometimes we must accept a certain agreement
(thoa hiep) with the enemy which must be
essentially based on a revolutionary stand,
that is, aimed at weakening his forces and
* Nguyen Khanh Toan is the chairman of the Vietnam Social
Science Commission, chairman of the Central Commission for
Teenagers and Children, and vice president of the Vietnam-Soviet
Friendship Association. He has contributed numerous articles
to HOC TAP in the past several years.
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increasing our forces. Such an agreement is a
principled one, and It is basically different
from the unprincipled agreement of opportunism.
Toan's argument stands in sharp contrast to the line taken
in NHAN DAN editorials on 17 and 19 August stressing the
unacceptability of compromise and warning against the effect
of the Nixon Administration's dealings with.the major
communist powers.* Where NHAN DAN expressed acute concern
that support for Hanoi was being jeopardized by big-power
relations, the HOC TAP article seems designed to justify a
compromise Vietnam settlement in the broader interests of
the international communist movement--in effect making a
virtue of what had been so sharply deplored last August.
The contrast between the two lines can be seen in their varying
treatment of the relation between national and international
interests in assessing the acceptability of compromise. The
17 August NHAN DAN, hinting that Hanoi was under severe pressure
from its big allies to accept a cease-fire, had argued that it
may be acceptable to make some accommodation but that "if out
of the narrow interests of one's nation one tries to help the
most reactionary forces avert the dangerous blows, that is
a cruel reconciliation beneficial to the enemy and not
beneficial to the revolution." On the other hand, the HOC TAP
article argued that when it is necessary to reach an agreement,
communists do not allow "narrow and immediate interests" to
blur the awareness of "lasting interests" of the entire
movement and "do not allow national selfishness to control
and undermine the common interests of the world revolution."
Toan did echo the August NHAN DAN editorials when he indicated
at another point that the international revolutionary struggle
against imperialism must be conducted without compromise, but
he went on to note that certain situations allowed for
"flexibility." His discussion of this point bears striking
resemblance to Le Duan's discourse on revolutionary methods
in his lenghty February 1970 article. Le Duan had similarly
advocated pushing back the enemy step by step and had explained
that
knowing how to win step by step--a manifestation
of a combination of insistence on ultiuate goals
* The NHAN DAN editorials are discussed in the 23 August 1972
TRENDS, pages 1-5.
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and clear-sightedness in viewing concrete movements--
is an art of dialectic combination of faithfulness
to principle with flexibility in policies . . . .
In the saLne article, Le Duan had recalled the Vietnamese
communist tactic during the 1945-46 period of alternately
making "temporary compromises" with the Chinese Nati'nalist
forces and the French in order to divide enemy ranks. These
measures were evaluated by Le Duan as "models of Leninist
strategy on the exploitation of enemy contradictions and on
principled concessions."
While presenting a case for compromise settlements, Toan at
the same time underlined Vietnamese independence and determination
when he declared that "only our people, the master of their
country and civilization, deeply cherish them and stand ready
to sacrifice everything to protect them." He added that the
Vietnamese people, "when their independence and freedom are at
stake, never wait for outsiders to come and liberate them."
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13 DECEMBER 1972
MOSCOW SIGNS AiD ACCORDS WITH DRV. MARKS TIME ON SETTLEMENT
The Soviets gave a standard reception to the DRV Government's
economic delegation headed by Le Thanh Nghi, which arrived in
Moscow on 27 November and departed on 10 December after Nghi
and Soviet Vice Premier Novikov signed the agreements on
economic and "defense" aid for 1973. Kosygin received the group
on 2 December in line with standard protocol; either he or
Brezhnev or both have customarily received these delegations.
Moscow, which had supplied no details of the aid provided for
in the agreements in recent years, this time catalogued some
economic reconstruction aid. Soviet media did not report a
specific reference to military aid by Novikov which appeared in
Hanoi's much feller accounts of the speeches by the two vice
premiers at the signing ceremony.*
CONTENT OF ACCORDS TASS reported that the agreements signed
on 9 December covered "aid without
compensation" and trade, noting that the aid will include "large
consignments of goods, equipment, and other property" and
"necessary assistance" in strengthening the DRV's "defense
potential." Neither TASS nor VNA expanded on the nature of the
defense aid. But in Soviet media's first elaboration on the
nature of the economic aid covered in the aid agreements since
1969, a Moscow rauio report noted that the USSR in 1973 will
supply equipment "to build tunnels and restore bridges and
roads" and will export "industrial equipment, machines, oil
products, consumer goods, and foodstuffs."
Announcements in Soviet media in September 1967, November 1968,
and October 1969 had listed some of the types of materiel,
including military, to be given the DRV as aid. And in the
past two years, when Moscow's reports provided no detail,
Hanoi's had specified some of the materials to be provided by
Moscow or exchanged in trade. This time VNA offered no specifics
in reporting, in standard language, that the agreements covered
"Soviet non-refund economic and military aid for 1973" and that
they also provided for "long-term loans" and trade. But Hanoi's
* Kosygin did not, however, attend the signing ceremonies, as he
had done when agreements were signed at th~? vice premier level in
1967 and 1970. There was a precedent for his absence from the
ceremonies in 1968. He signed the agreements himself as Phaii Van
Dong's counterpart in 1969, when the DRV premier headed the
delegation that negotiated them. Last year's agreements were signed
in Hanot during Podgornyy's visit.
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substantial accounts of the speeches by Novikov and Le Thanh
Nghi quoted the former as mentioning "armaments and military
equipment" and the latter as stating that Soviet aid "in the
present urgent situation" would "strengthen the elan and
confidence" of the Vietnamese armed forces and people.
Both Moscow's and Hanoi's reports announced the signing of an
agreement an establishment of a "standing intergovernmental
Soviet-Vietnamese Commission for Economic and Scientific-
Technical Cooperation." This apparently :represents the culmina-
tion of an agreement reached during Podgornyy's DRV.visit in
October of last year: The 7 October 1971 joint communique
noted that the two sides had agreed to entrust the appropriate
organizations and services with the task of working out "long-
term development of economic cooperation and trade, cultural,
scientific, technical, and other relations." The communique
expressed confidence that the setting up of the joint commission
would contribute to the strengthening of Soviet-l::.; economic
relations.
Novikov and Le Thanh Nghi both lauded the "unshakeable solidarity
and fra ;vernal friendship" of the two parties, and Hanoi's
accounts quoted Le Thanh Nghi as referring briefly to Chinese
aid--just as he had acknowledged Soviet assistance in a banquet
speech while in Peking to sign the PRC-DRV a1d agreement last
month. Moscow, while giving the speeches brief and scant
publicity, seemed defensive in insisting in a foreign-language
radio commentary on the constancy of Soviet support for the
Vietnamese. Broadcast to the Vietnamese among other audiences
on 10 December, the commentary emphasized Soviet adherence to
the "principles of proletarian internationalism elaborated by
Lenin" and underscored Moscow's view of its aid to peoples
fighting imperialist aggression as a "duty." The broadcast
called the new aid accords "eloquent proof" that there is no
discrepancy between the Soviet Union's words and deeds and
evidence that Moscow invariably and steadfastly carries out its
"international duty of proletarian solidarity."
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT Moscow has continued to give the
Vietnamese communists pro forma support
on the issue of the draft peace agreement and has sustained its
circumspect treatment of the United States. According.to VNA's
account of the speeches at the ceremonies for signing the aid
accords, Novikov did not mention the peace agreement in
expressing full support for DRV efforts to "end the war and
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restore peace in Vietnam" and to "reach a correct solution
conforming to the national aspiration of the Vietnamese people."
TASS briefly reported these remark,, but it did not report
Le Thanh Nghi's attack on "thA obdurate double-faced and
bellicose attitude of he Nixon Administration." Speaking at
a 6 December dinner for the visiting Chilean president, however,
Podgornyy again reiterated the Soviet call for a "speedy" U.S.
signing of the peace agreement, and low-level comment--including
statements by numerous Soviet mass organizations--have echoed
the demand.
Moscaw has given scant attention to the 3 December.PRG statement
which accused the Thieu government of a "campaign of terror"
and crimes against "patriotic" forces being detained in the
South. TASS barely acknowledged the content of the statement
when it reported that PRG envoys in Hanoi and Moelcow held press
conferences on 4 and 7 December, respectively, to publicize
the statement. Similarly, TASS only briefly. summarized a
7 December DRV Government statement supporting the PRG statement.
Consistent with Moscow's reluctance to criticize the.United
States, the TASS summary omitted the DRV's charge that Saigon's
terrorist actions were "on U.S. orders," as well as the DRV's
appeal to socialist countries to "severely condemn the U.S.
aggressors." Some routine Soviet press and radio commer.c did
echo the line in the DRV an. PRG statements, but without
specifically citing them.
DRY CONTINUES TO PROTEST ATTACKS ON NORTH. URGES VIGILANCE
U.S. strikes against North Vietnam continued to draw sta?,uiaro
protests in daily statements issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman, which sustained the charge that.these "crimes"
reveal the Nixon Administration's desire to prolong the war
despite its declarations that peace is "at hand." The
statement of the 11th atypically included among such "crimes"
the direct charge that the United States is continuing to mine
and blockade various harbors and to drop magnetic bombs over
rivers. The last such direct charge of that kind, as distinct
from the standard demand in the spokesman's statement,, that
the United States cease its mining and blockade of DRV ports,
had appeared in a communique of the DRV War Crimes.Commission,
reported by VNA on 4 December, which listed several major
waterways that had been mined. Hanoi reported the downing of
five more planes during the past week, including a pilotless
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plane over Nam Ha on 11 December, for a total of 4,075 as
of that day; it also said two more U.S. warships had been set
afire.
Intensification of U.S. strikes against the civilian
population of Nghe An Province was alleged by VNA on 9 December
in a report on the visit of several foreign newsmen to that
province between 29 November and 8 December. Claiming that
the Journalists viewed the effects of both B-52 saturation
bombing and the combination of "tactical air raids and naval
bombardments," VNA said eyewitnesses told them the intensity
of such raids had increased "markedly" since 26 October.
Nghe An's exploits in the face of U.S. bombing were praised
in a NHAN DAN editorial of the 6th, which acclaimed the province's
achievements in agriculture as well as its military feats during
"the present destructive war." Noting that the people of Nghe
An had attained successes in agricultural production despite
natural hardships and the intensified bombing, NHAN DAN granted
that favorable weather conditions may have helped but stressed
that the chief fa,-,tor was correct leadership, which led in turn
to improvements in technology, management, and organization.
Successes in both combat and production tasks were also claimed
for the provinces of the Fourth Military Region as a whole, in
an 11 December Hanoi radio report on A recent joint conference
of the standing committee of the party committee of the region,
the regional command, and the standing committees of the party
committees of each of the provinces in the region and the Vinh
Linh zone. According to the report, the conference set forth
a number of local and general military tasks including downing
aircraft, maintaining communications and transportation, stepping
up passive air defense, aiding the frontline, increasing vigilance,
and "making necessary Preparations for organizing forces and
technical and tactical training in order to defeat every war
adventure by Nixon, [and] aiding the battlefield with men and
material under the slogan 'rice and men exceed requirements."'
AIR DEFENSE In an apparent effort to sustain civilian concern
MEASURES with air defense tasks during a period of
relative calm in the northern part of the country,
Hanoi radio has broadcast several items calling for improvement of
"passive air defense" measures in areas north of the 20th parallel
and thus currently beyond the range of U.S. strikes.. Typically,
an English-language broadcast on 7 December reported the "practical
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deeds" being implemented: continued evacuation of Hanoi;
improvement of the militia, antiaircraft forces, missile units,
and "the air force and related services"; and continued
enlistment of youths in the armed forces. Other broadcasts
reported similar activities underway in Haiphong, in the
province of Ha Bac (northeast of Hanoi), and in the Vinh Linh
zone.
The importance of civilian defense measures was highlighted in
statements made by DRV President Ton Duc Thang during a visit
to a primary school on the outskirts of Hanoi, reported by
Hanoi radio on the 8th and by VNA on the 9th. Declaring that
children are "the future masters of the heroic Vietnamese
nation," Thang urged continued vigilance and performance of
passive air defense tasks as a means of insuring the safety
and security of teachers and students. In other brief reports,
air force, naval, and antiaircraft forces in Hanoi and several
northern provinces were reported to be intensifying and
improving training and combat procedures. And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN,
in an editorial on the 8th, urged youths in tr.: army to improve
their scientific and technical knowledge and skills so as to
better defeat the enemy.
The 7 December English-language broadcast presented the current
stress on air defense and related activities in areas north
of the 20th parallel as a response to "the United States'
deliberate delay in the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement and
its step-up of the war in both parts of Viet.nam." Charges of
intensification of the bombing both of South Vietnam and of areas
of the DRV south of the 20th parallel have been leveled in both
of the recent War Crimes Commission communiques, as well as in
the 2 December foreign ministry statement that was issued
specifically to condemn such actions. The foreign ministry
statement, in addition, charged that the intensification is
directly related to the U.S. delay in signing the peace agreement
and declared that the only course for the Vietnamese people is to
continue to maintain vigilance, to combine combat and
production, and to continue the struggle to defeat the U.S.
"aggressors."
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PATHET LAO PRESENTS DRAFT PEACE AGREEMENT AT VIENTIANE TALKS
A draft peace agreement presented by the NLHS on 12 December
in Vientiane, at the ninth session of the peace talks with the
RLG, appears to bring the NLHS' stand encompassed in its
17 October peace proposal* into line with the draft U.S.-DRV
agreement on Vietnam summarized by Hanoi on 26 October. The U.S.-
DRV draft agreement on Vietnam includes a call for the
withdrawal of "all countries" from Laos and Cambodia in order
to let the peoples of those countries settle their own affairs;
the NLHS draft agreement provides for the withdrawal of
"foreign troops" from Lpos, rather than specifying U.S. troops
as in the October proposal, thereby introducing a formula
that could be interpreted to include DRV forces. It also
spells out a timetable for steps proposed in October on a
cease-fire, troop withdrawal, and formation of a provisional
coalition government.
The draft agreement was presented following the return of NLHS
delegation head Phoune Sipraseuth to Vientiane after consulta-
tions with NLHS leaders in Sam Neus and stopovers in Hai L.
He had left Vientiane for Sam Neua on 2 December and returned
on the 10th, stopping off in Hanoi both times. NLHS Secretary
General Phoumi Vongvichit, who had been in Vientiane as
"special adviser" to the Pathet Lao delegation, had stopped
off in Hanoi en rout, oack to Sam Neua on 11 November; he has
not returned to the talks.
A prompt, favorable report on the NLHS draft by the Vientiane
radio on the 12th said it was viewed by he RLG side as a
possible "first step toward further agreements in coming
sessions" and noted that the RLG delegate to the talks had
delivered a speech expressing "satisfaction with the new
attitude of the NLHS delegation,"
CEASE-FIRE & WITHDRAWAL In the text carried in Pathet Lao
media on the 13th, the NLHS draft
agreement repeats the October proposal's demand that the
United States stop the bombing and other military activity in
* The five-point proposal of 17 October was presented by the
NLHS at the opening session of the Vientiane talks. For a
discussion see the TRENDS of 26 October 1972, pages 11-16.
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Laos, dismantle its bases, and take responsibility for war
damages. But it neither refers specifically to a U.S. troop
withdrawal nor mentions Thai forces. Its timetable calls for
implementation of "a cease-fire on the spot throughout Lao
territory" and stipulates that "all advisers, military
personnel, and regular and irregular troops of foreign countties
must be withdrawn from Laos" within 90 days of the signing
of the agreer c: `.
Like the 17 October proposal, the draft calls for proscription
of the entry into Laos of troops or weapons of "arty foreign
country." Echoing language in Hanoi's summary of the DRV
draft agreement on Vietnam, it rotates that replacement of
damaged weapons and materials will be permitted with the
concurrence of both sides and at the request of the "coalition
government," which would also handle their distribution. It
stipulates that prisoners, "regardless of nationality," will
be exchanged after the cease-fire simultaneously with the
withdrawal of "foreign" troops, where the 17 October NLHS
proposal had specified withdrawal of U.S. and allied military
personnel. As in the October proposal, the draft agreement
provides for supervision of the cease-fire by a joint committee
assisted tiv the ICC.
COALITION GOVERNMENT The NLHS draft states that the
"political coalition council" and "new
provisional coalition government," to be formed within 30 days
of the signing, would be charged with implementing the agreement,
holding further discussions, and administering the country
pending elections for "the National Assembly and the National
Coalition Government." Both the council and the provisional
government are envisaged as tripartite, composed in equal
proportions of representatives of the RLG, theNLHS, and the
Patriotic Neutralist Forces plus others of neutralist
persuasion.
The 17 October program had described the provisional government
in similar terms, but it is not clear if the "political
coalition council" proposed in the draft agreement is.the same
as the "politicat consultative council" called for in the
17 October program. The make-up of the council was not spelled
out in the October proposal beyond the statement that.it would
consist of "components largely representative-of all parties
concerned," including all nationalities, religions, social
strata, patriotic personalities, and intellectuals. Neither
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the draft agreement nor the October program spells out the
division of power in the permanent "National Coalition
Government."
The draft agreement says that pending installation of the
National Assembly and National Coalition Government, each
side would continue to admin4.eter its own territory and
Vientiane would be made a neutral zone. The October proposal
had merely provided that the parties concerned would "agree
upon measures to insure security of the premises" of the
coalition government and the council.
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SALT
H NVGARIAN NEWSMAN CITES MOSCOW VIEWS ON SALT, MBFR, BASES
A Hungarian Journalist recently returned from Moscow has cited
Soviet "American exports" there as indicating that Moscow views
negotiations on force reductions in Europe as a "supplement" to
SALT 11, Istvan Normandy--a military specialist who has in the
past served as a proxy spokesman for Moscow on Sino-Sovist and
nuclear issues*--indicated in an article in the 10 December issue
of the political weekly MAGYARORSZAG that the issue linking SALT
and force reductions is that of U.S. forward based systems in Europe
(FBS). Moscow may see in the multilateral talks on force reduction
a possib'i vehicle for solving the thorny problem of coping with
European PBS in the context of bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks on
longer-range strategic weapons. The first Soviet comment on
substantive issues in SALT II, in IZVESTIYA on 5 and 7 December,
singled out PBS as a problem for the current round just as it
was for SALT I. At the same time, Kormendy's discussio. suggests
some Soviet flexibility on the issue of "balance" in any future
European force reductions.
SALT AND MBFR Normandy emphasized the complexity and inter-
dependence of the force :eduction talks--"the
preparations for which will begin on 31 January"--and SALT II,
foreseeing prolonged negotiations extending over several years
and "covering the full range from strategic nuclear weapons to
the troops stationed in central Europe," (Moscow has not yet
officially responded to the NATO propobQl of 16 November that
initial talks begin at the end of January.) The linkage may
also signal a recognition by Moscow that an eventual accord on
force reduction could require--as in the SALT I agreements--some
degree of "asymmetry" in the reductions by each side. Moscow
has in the past taken strong issue with Western scenarios for
mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) which have concluded
that considerations of geographical proximity would require
proportionately greater reductions of Soviet troops in East
Europe.
* In a 25 July 1971 article in the same journal, Kormendy cited
Soviet "Chinese experts" on Moscow's assessment of the Chinese
nuclear capability and Sino-Soviet relations in general.
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? Kormendy, stating that "reciprocal reduction methods" (the
formula used in the joint communique issued at the May U.S.-
Soviet summit) -can be worked out, asserted that the result would
be a military balance based on the principle of "equal security."
Moscow has in the past emphasized that this principle--in its
view central to the successful SALT I outcome--requires that
simple numerical force correlations be balanced by other mitigating
factors such as geography. In the context of SALT, the 5 December
IZVESTIYA article, an international review by A. Bovin,
took issue with the outward simplicity of the Jackson amendment
("100 missiles for you and the same for us") and argued that
the equal security "principle requires that quantitative
correlations be weighted with other factors--geographical
location, the existence of forward based systems and so forth--
which materially influence the degree of security."
The Kormendy article did not mention the "parity principle,"
which the last extended Soviet comment on MBFR said must
characterize European force reductions. That article, by
Yuriy Koetko in the September 1972 issue of MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA
I MEZHDUNARODNA'A0TNOSHENIYA, had defined parity as the maintenance
at a lower level of the same general balance which had already
taken shape.*
FORWARD BASES An article in the 7 December IZVESTIYA by
M. Sagatelyan--the only full-length commentary
on SALT II to appear in the central press to date--ci.ted an
article in the GUARDIAN to emphasize that the current talks
are confronted by the "same old problem:" the United States
would like to classify its weapons on European bases and
Mediterranean warships as more tactical than strategic, whereas
"the Russians regard missiles capable of hitting their territory
as strategic and, consequently, a subject for discussion at
the talks." Bovin's 5 December IZVESTIYA article also cited
FBS as important in SALT II. Moscow continues to ignore the
MIRV problem in comment relating to SALT II, though the East
European press has given MIRV equal status with FLS as issues to
be discussed thare.**
* The article is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 October 1972,
pages 15-19.
** See the TRENDS of 29 November, pages 13-14.
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U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS In an unusual assessment in bloc media
of the "political atmosphere in Moscow,"
Kormendy also reported a new sense of calm prevailing there: "the
tons of political discussions has changed in Moscow since the spring."
He found a belief among Soviet "American experts" that the U.S.
interest in arms limitations is serious and of a long-term nature.
"The U.S. inclination to negotiate and come to terms is not
merely a current policy but a political trend developed on
the basis of realities in Washington," Kormendy said. He
concluded that "not even the previously skeptical military
experts"--apparently but not explicitly referring to those in
Moscow--doubt any longer that SALT II will eventually produce
further results.
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CHILE - USSR
C"UNIQUE ON ALLENDE VISIT IMPLIES LIMITED SOVIET W+II1MENT
The relatively bland communique issued at the conclusion of Chilean
President Salvador Allende's 6-' December visit to the Soviet Union
was notable for its failure to indicate any major new Soviet poli-
tical or economic commitment to Chile. Moscow's expression of "under-
standing"--but not support--of Allende's efforts to "carry out social and
economic reforms, strengthen the country's economy, its national
sovereignty and independence, and build socialism" was noteworthy for the
recognition of a Chilean effort to build socialism* but was weaker
as a statement of Soviet backing than formulations used following
previous visits of Chilean leaders to Moscow. For example, the
statraaent issued last June following the talks in Moscow between
Chilean Socialist Party Secretary General Carlos Altamirano and
Brezhnev and other ranking Soviet officials said the Soviet leaders
"expressed complete support for the revolutionary changes"
effected -by the Allende government
The communique failed to characterize the tone of Allende's talks with
Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, although routine-level reports on
the progress of the talks in Moscow media had said they took place
"in an atmosphere of friendship and a complete identity of views
and positions on all questions discussed." Moscow's evident
caution in embracing the Allende regime would appear to stem
from wariness about undertaking the kind of costly, open-ended commit-
ment the USSR has made to Cuba as well as from a reluctance.to
become too closely associated with a regime whose stability has been
brought intc question by recurring domestic political and economic
crises over the past year.
VAGUE ECONOMIC PROMISES The communique noted that the USSR
"has been giving and is prepared to.give
further politl.cal and a unomic support" to Chile and that both sides
expressed a da,sire "to further deepen relations of friendship and
improve mutua:~ly beneficial cooperation." But in outlining. the
"concrete measures" envisaged to implement these aims, it made no
mention of the hard currency credits urgently needed by the.Chileans.
? * Moscow has heretofore scrupulously avoided referring to "building
socialism" in connection with Chile. Typically, a 9 December Moscow
radio talk on Allende's visit referred merely to Chilean workers
embarking on "the construction of a new life" and to the Chilean
people's "struggle for independence and progress."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONIVVENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 DECEMBER 1972
Instead, it referred to the kinds of long-term aid for capital
construction projects that Moscow has already been prcvidin6.
The failure of the communique to mention any new Soviet hard
currency credits is particularly noteworthy in light of the extension of
such credits to Chile early this year. Moscow has givo:: only negli-
gible publicity to this credit, probably out of a desire to
discourage further requests from Chile and to avoid inviting similar
requests from other currency-poor !eveloping nations. A 24
November Radio Moscow commentary on Soviet-Chilean cooperation,
however, did acknowledge that the Soviet Union had granted
Chile "a credit of nearly 100 million dollars for the purchase
of foodstuffs."
Reported statements by Chilean officials have been vague on the results
of the Moscow talks. AFP on the 8th reported a member of Allende's
official party in Moscow as stating that the USSR had agreed
to provide Chile with increased economic aid, but the report
gave no details. And an AFP dispatch from Paris on the 9th reported the
President of the Chilean Central Bank, Alfonso Inostroza, as having
denied a report that Allende sold 130,000 tons of copper to the
USSR while in Moscow and as having stressed that Chile was
interested in selling copper "in the traditional markets,
especially Europe." Inostraza was reported to have said that
expansion of "certain exports" to the USSR and Soviet involve-
ment in Chilean economic development could help "to create an
infrastructure for exploiting our petroleum and coal."
Reports on 12 December from PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent
to his Havana office and by the LATIN news agency quoted Chilean
opposition spokesmen as being highly critical of Soviet credit
offers to Allende. Allende's opponents reportedly declared that the
USSR is not helping Chile to solve its acute foreign exchange.
shortage by providing hard currency needed for the purchase of
food and spare parts; a leading Christian Democratic legislator
was quoted as having observed disparagingly that "money is
being loaned only for machinery sold to us by the USSR."
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES For the most part, the sections of t:ie
Joint communique on international issues
followed a predictable pattern: The document condemned the U.S.
"blockade" of Cuba, applauded recent moves toward detente in
Europe, supported the DRV any the PRG, and endorsed a world
disarmament conference.
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One area where the communique conspicuously sought to blur Soviet-
Chilean differences was on the rights of states to not limits
on their territorial waters, which Chile actively supports--
maintaining a 200-mile territorial sea limit--and the USSR opposes.*
The communique, hintir.g at the continuing divergence of views,
stated that "the two sides exchanged opinions concerning the
forthcoming UN conference cau maritime law and expressed readiness
to concert their positions and cooperate with each other in
achieving the aims of the conference, with due account taken
of the interests of all states."
The communique predictably condemned "foreign interference" in
Chilean internal affairs without specifying that either the
U.S. Government or U.S. companies were the culprits. In a veiled
reference to the Kennecott Copper Company's recent attempts to
embargo Chilean copper shipments to Western Europe, it denounced
"foreign monopolies" for trying to deprive Chile of its right
to use its natural resources as it sees fit, "specifically the
right to sell its copper freely."
ALLENDE'S STATEMENTS Allende's remarks in Moscow conveyed
strong hints to his Soviet hosts that
Chile should be considered as deserving of Soviet generosity
as is Vietnam. Speaking at a 6 December Kremlin dinner in his
honor, the Chilean leader effusively lauded Soviet aid to Vietnam
and went on to cite the description of Chile by Pablo Neruda, Chilean
Nobel Prize winning poet and communist party luminary, as "a silent
Vietnam"--a country which, while not experiencing "the roar of
aircraft and grenade explosions," shared the same feeling of an
"overt and concealed encirclement of our country."
Allende touched briefly on Chile's current difficulties, noting
in the dinner speech that Chile was "implementing a revolutionary
process.... within the framework of a bourgeois democracy, and it is
* Since 1970 the Chinese have supported those Latin American states
claiming a 200-mile territorial sea limit and have used the issue
in polemics against Moscow, lambasting "superpower" efforts to
deprive smaller countries of their ocean resources. Moscow
has avoided publicizing the issue; Soviet, media did not carry
remarks by USSR delegate Roshchin in the UNGA Political
Committee on S November in which he cited as one of the USSR's
objections to the Treaty on a Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone the fact
that it permits states to set their own territorial sea limits.
CONFIDENTIAL
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13 DECEMBER 1972
not easy." Here and in other statements, he stressed that Chile
was the victim of economic "aggression" by "imperialist mono-
polies." In an interview on Moscow Radio and TV, Allende
took note of alleged efforts by the ITT to prevent him from
taking power and later to overthrow him.
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THAILAND
TNAM. CP ANNIVERSARY: THAI STRESS, CHINESE MUTE ARMED STRUGGLE
Observances of the Thai Comuaunist Party's 30th anniversary on
1 December have reflected both persisting elements and new
directions in Southeast Asia, most notably the relaxation of
Sino-U.S. tensions and moves toward new relationships in an
area that has been dominated by the Indochina conflict and the
specter of "people's war." A statement issued by the Thai CP
and echoed by the fraternal parties in the area elaborated a
classical Maoist strategy of armed insurgency while reminding
the Chinese that the Bangkok regime remains hostile to the
common interests of the Asian communist movement. The Thai
communists' Peking mentor, however, chose to balance its patronage
of loyal client parties with its brcaderinterests in Asian
detente. Thus, following its dual-track approach to Southeast
Asia, Peking failed to publicize its greetings message to the
Thai CP while leaving it to the PRC-baba3 clandestine "Voice of
the People of Thailand" (VOPT) to broadcast the message.* In
revealing contrast, Hanoi issued not only a greetings message
but also an editorial in the party organ stressing the link
between the Vietnamese and Thai armed struggles against the
United States and its local allies.
Messages reflecting their mutual ideological affinities were
sent to the Thai CP by the fraternal Burmese and Malayan parties
and broadcast by their respective PRC-based radios. From 6 to 12
December the VOPT carried fraternal greetings in the following
order (giving pride of place to th CCP and other ruling parties)
Chinese, North Vietnamese, Albanian, Korean, Romanian, Burmese,
Malayan, and Philippine parties.
THAI CP STATEMENT T`+.e Thai party marked its anniversary with
a major statement on 1 December by the
party's central committee and a VOPT editorial on the 5th high-
lighting the key points in the statement, particularly the
necessity of armed struggle. The etatewent was three times
longer than the comparable pronouncement marking the party's 25th
* See the Supplementary Article in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972
entitled "Peking and the Clandestine Radios Beamed to Southeast
Asia."
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anniversary in 1967 and seemed to take a harder line concerning
the attainment of political power in Thailand while adhering to
longstanding positions on international questions. Similar to
the one on the 25th anniversary, this year's statement repeatedly
excoriated the Bangkok government--"the traitorous Thanom clique"--
and pledged to drive the United States out of Thailand by means
of a strategy of armed struggle based on "Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Tse-tung Thought." The statement also praised China as a
"strong bulwark and a reliable ally of all the world revolutionaries,"
forcefully reaffirmed Thai CP support for the Indochina war effort,
and assailed "Soviet social imperialism."
In charting the road to power in Thailand, the statement reflected
a shift in policy stemming from the party's 10-point policy
statement of 1968. Stressing that armed struggle to seize political
power is the "only correct means," it omitted the line contained in
the 25th anniversary statement expressing an interest in a coalition
government. The current statement elaborated a strategy of rural-
based armed struggle aimed ultimately at encircling and seizing the
cities. It called for a broad united front from below of all
persons and groups who oppose "U.S. Imperialism and the treacherous
Thanom clique--our common enemy." Though ritualistically
characterizing the present situation in the armed struggle as
"excellent," the statement reflected a sober awareness of
complications presented by conditions inside and outside the
country. Thus, referring to the regime's suppression drives
against the insurgents, the statement observed that "the enemy
remains strong and our side is rather weak," and it acknowledged that
the communists will be confronted with "an even more complicated,
canning, and arduous struggle." In a passage that could be read
as objecting to Peking's dealings with the Bangkok government,
the statement insisted that "the dictatorial and fascist Thanom
clique" is pursuing a policy inimical to the revolutionary
people in other countries, "including the Chinese people."
CHINA The Thai communists could hardly have been reassured
by Peking's treatment of their anniversary. Together
with Peking's failure to publicize the greetings message, the
content of the message itself reflected an evident effort to
miniwiza the effect on the recently improved Peking-Bangkok
relations of Peking's identification with the Thai insurgency.
In contrast to the greetings on the Thai party's previous
quinquennial anniversary, in 1967, the CCP message this year
discreetly skirted sensitive issues posed by the continuing Thai
insurgency. The message used generalized language in praising
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the Thai party for making "a great contribution to the liberation
struggle" in Thailand, and there was a minimal bow to the "militant
solidarity" of the two parties. Consistent with Peking's practice
since the visit cf a Thai tab14 tennis team in September, the
message sidestepped direct attacks on the Thai government,
resorting rather to the less provocative formulation of "local
reactionaries in Thailand."
This year's message conspicuously avoided associating the Chinese
with a strategy of people's war in Thailand. There was no pledge
of Chinese support for the Thai struggle, no mention of Mao
thought as the ideological source of the Thai communist movement,
and no discussion of armed struggle as the means to power. Also
absent was any linkage of the Thai at-uggle with the Indochina war,
an issue that had figured prominently in Peking's treatment of the
Thai insurgency since its inception in 1965 but has declined in
importance as Peking has taken a more relaxed line on U.S. intentions
in the area.
In i.s own media Peking marked the Thai CP's anniversary only by
carrying a 2 December NCNA account of a lengthy article broadcast
by the VOPT on 30 November. While duly citing passages in praise
of the achievements of the Thai armed struggle since 1965, the
NCNA account was measurably more sanitized than a similar NCNA
replay marking the anniversary last year. Most notably, there
was no reference to the Thanom government and little emphasis on
the role of armed struggle. In fact, the NCNA account, with its
statement that the Thai party had "no alternative but to take up
arms in self-defense" against "external and internal enemies,"
could be read as leaving open the possibility of a switch to
peaceful political competition from the exclusive reliance on
armed struggle insistently propounded in the Thai CP's pronouncements.
OTHER PARTIES While Peking has sought to minimize its involvement
with the Thai insurgency, the North Vietnamese used
their greetings message and a NHAN DAN editorial to portray the Thai
armed struggle as an integral part of the broader struggle against
the United States in Southeast Asia. The message was replete with
expressions of North Vietnamese solidarity with the Thai communists
in a fight against "the same enemy--the U.S. imperialist aggressors."
Like the message, the editorial underscored mutual assistance and
support by the two parties and linked their interests by citing
the Thai government's role in the Indochina conflict.
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The messages from the Burmese and Malayan CPs registered the
ideological. affinities among the Maoist-lining parties in
Southeast Asia--and in the process reflected the ideological
lag increasingly separating these parties, with their invocation
of a strategy enunciated by Lin Piao in his 1965 tract on
people's war, and their Peking patron, now embarked on Chouist
policies of accommodation and negotiation. Both the Burmese
and Malayan messages invoked Mao thought and the doctrine of
people's war, denounced Soviet revisionism, and identified the
"Thanom-Praphat clique" as the target of armed struggle. The
lengthy Burmese message particularly stressed the identity of
interests between the Thai and Burmese communists, noting that
"your struggles are our struggles and your victories are our
victories." The BCP assured its fraternal neighbors that
"despite difficulties" it would persist in the fight against
"the reactionary Ne Win-San Yu military government" in the
belief that "armed struggle in Burma will assist your struggle,
a'i the struggles in Thailand helped the revolution in Bursa."
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
DEMOGRAPHER VIEWS FARM EFFICIENCY AS KEY TO URBANIZATION
A polemical article by demographer Viktor Perevedentsev in the
November NASH SOVREMENNIK (OUR CONTEMPORARY) argues for more, not
less, migration from rural areas to cities and urges adoption of
link-type farm labor organization to make up for the losses in
farm manpower. Complaining that all recent writings have approached
the subject of migration from the point of view of how to hold
young people on farms, Perevedeatsev sets out to defend the interests
of urban areas, arguing that the falling birth rate and increasing
shortage of urban labor require mea..'.'es to stimulate migration to
the cities. Perevedentsev's article reflects a longtime debate not
only between proponents of industry and agriculture but also between
those advocating the reorganization of agriculture on the basis of
material incentive and individual initiative ands those calling for
greater agricultural investment within the framework of traditional
institutions and practices.
Perevedentsev indicates that despite the measures adopted since
1966 to improve rural income and living conditions, migration to
cities has accelerated. He cites data showing that from 1950
to 1966 the rural population dropped by only 600,000 while during
only six years from 1966 to 1972 it fell by 4,800,000. In 1970
ai'ne, 1,700,00( rural dwellers migrated to cities. But Perevedentsev
argues that despite the outcry from those concerned with maintaining
agricultural production, the agricultural sector has a general
surplus of labor which is obscured by regional maldistribution on
the one hand and inefficient organization on the other.
The author points out that agricultural areas where labor is
scarce--Siberia, north and central Russia--are losing population
especially rapidly, while areas with surplus farm labor such as
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Moldavia, and the west Ukraine are
actually gaining population. The problem, in his view, is to
stimulate migration from the surplus areas. To this end, he
deriders the use of administrative restraints such as denying
interral passports to kolkbozniks in order to prevent their
migration, and he urges adoption of measures to ease the
adjustment of rural migrants to urban life. At the same time,
he emphcsizes that "the basis of regulating rural migration
must be sought in labor and its organization." Noting that the
productivity of Soviet farm labor is only 20-25 percent that of
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U.S. f,xm labor, he maintains that adoption of link-typo farm
labor irganization could raise productivity, retain enough
skilled young people in the countryside, and also release large
numbers of surplus farm laborers.
Perevedentsev's approach to agriculture appears to be similar
to that of former RSFSR Premier Voronov. While Politburo
agricultural supervisor Polyanskiy has pressed for large
investments to raise rural living standards and retain farm
labor, Voronov in a 24 November 1970 speech rejected the
argument that youth was leaving the village mainly because of
poor living conditions and instead cited poor labor organization
and lack of job opportunity as more important factors.
Perevedentsev likewise rejects as "naive" the notion that
building good clubs and modt.rn well-equipped villages would
stop the outflow from the countryside. Like Voronov, he sees
the new forms of "unregulated" farm labor organization as the
key to keeping youth interested in farm work and to boosting
production.
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