TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 25, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
Confidential
[B'S
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
25 APRIL. 1973
(VOL. XXIV NO 17)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
(X)NFI I)Ir;N'1'IAI.
'Ili. tn,rtuig iii hr arcrh .is it ytort is b,1.tYl r1.r?tu.i%(-IV un rn,rtu rial
uricrl in It it rign In.lrllr,t ,111( 1 tnr.s mrrli,r. It i Imlrli.hcrl
h~ I'll IS %%ithnnt (rarhn,rtnni with othrr IT.S. (:(Vrrtnnrni
conqunuents.
STATSPEC
\A'I'IUN. I, SI?:(:1'It II')' ! l'O t\. I fl(-\
t'il{rrltllrrf l/,.AI (list tn.nre .ubir ( t to
t rintin,,t '.iii, tiun.
Approved For Release I 964/b/?P~, 1A tDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CON! I UI',NT EA1. FBIS TRENDS
25 APRIL 1973
C 0 TLNTS
TopLcs and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV Protests U.S. Pressure Moves but Limits Scope of Reaction .
1
Poking Offers Cautious Support for Cambodian Allics
5
Sihanoux Trip Hailed on Indochina Summit Anniversary. . . . . . .
6
NL1IS Returns Chief Negotiator to Vientiane, Issues Statement. .
7
Xuan Thuy Meets Suslov, Tours Several Communist Capitals.
8
DRV Elects Delegates to Lower-Level People's Councils . . . . . .
CHINA
10
Shanghai, ['eking Hold Simultaneous Trade Union Congresses . . . .
USSR
11
Ustinov Lenin Anniversary Address Low-Keyed, Optimistic . . . . .
13
Gorshkov Cites Survivability of Sea-Based Deterrent . . . . . . .
CHINA - MEXICO
14
Peking Ready to Adhere to Latin Americsn Nuclear Pact . . . . . .
NOTES: Moscow on Mideast, Crina-USSR-UImalayas,
15
U.S.-East Europe Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
li
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 199p&P/I?l,;I11A; F1Qp87PPQQp~,9I9p60017-1
25 APRIL 1973
'L'UPICS Atli) EVEN'T'S GIVEN MAJUI( A'I"I'EN'I'LON 1.6 ... 22 APRIL 1,973
Moscow (2541 Items
Pek(1075 hells)
Lenin Birth Anniversary
(--)
13%
Domestic Issues
(37%
6%
China
(5%)
7Y
Indochina
)
(25%)
3
257
May Day Slogans
(2%)
6%
[Sihanouk 's 'I'rave 1 s
(18%)
971
Syrian National. Day
(--)
5%
[Lao Patriotic. Front
(--)
3%]
Vietnam
(6 )
47,
Delegation In PR(
Mexican President
(4%)
3%
[DRV/PRG Note., to
(--)
37]
Echnverrla in USSR
Internat iou&, 1 Coni-
Isroelt Attack on Lebanon
(5%)
'-
er'ence Participants
Mexican President
(--)
11%
Echeverr. ire In PRC
I'RC Friendship Delegation
(--)
7%
In ,Japan
Israeli Attack on Lebanon
(3%)
5%
,CAFE' Meeting in 'T'okyo
(.1%)
4%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow sued
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "cocnnientary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention In terns of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior Issues;
In other ewes the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONE 11)I?N'1'IAL F131 S '1.'kE'N1)S
25 APRIL 1.973
INDOCHINA
The U.S. moves calculated to induce communist compliance with the
peace accord have thus far e.Iici.ted from Hanoi about the least
reaction that could have been expected. Tnus the DRV has used
routine, relatively low-level formats for its official protests
against the major U.S. moves--tote halt to mine-clearing operations,
the resumption of reconnaissance flights nver North Vietnam, and
Lhe suspension of the U.S.-l)RV economic t+ilks. And accompanying
comment has not exceeded the ! eve.t of NHAII DAN and QUAN DOI NIIAN
DAN articles. Such articles nave contained Hanoi's only reaction
so far to the publicized statements by U.S. officials calling
the American moves justified in light of communist violations of
the peace accord. Hanoi has nowhere acknowledged the State
Department notes to participants in the 12-power international
conference on Vietnam--released 24 April--which detailed such
violations.
The DRV may escalate Its response on 27 April, when the 90-day
period stipulated In the Paris accord for resolution of outstanding
political issues runs out; the DRV and PRG have issued government
statements marking the end of the two monthly anniversaries of
the accord and may be holding some of their fire for similar
statements at the conclusion of the third, critical. month.
The DRV Foreign Ministry note of 16 April and the PRG memorandum
of the 14th to the 12-power conference participants, detailing
alleged U.S. and CVN violations of the accord, have yet to be
answered by Peking or Moscow. Soviet media summarized the two
cc,munications with negligible supporting comment in routine-level
foreign-language broadcasts, and Peking publicized the texts with
no comment. Both may be holding off until the key 27 April date
to draw maximum capital. from publictty for their replies.
DRV PROTESTS U.S. PRESSURE MOVES BUT LIMITS SCOPE OF REACTION
The halt to U.S. mine-clearing operations in DRV waters on 17 April
and the widespread U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV on the
19th were denounced in standard statements by the foreign ministry
spokesman on the 19th and 20th, respectively, and the suspension
of the U.S.-DRV economic talks in Paris on the 19th was formally
protested on the same day In a press coamunique issued by the DRV
delegation to the talks. The DRV spokesman's protests were endorsed
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 APRIL 1.973
by the PRC In a 21 April foreign ministry spokesman's statement
which demanded that the United States quickly carry out the
mine: clearing, stop encroaching on DRV sovereignty and security,
and "fully accomplish Its duty of healing the wounds of war
that it had caused the Vietnamese people."
MINE-CLEARING HALT The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement castigated the suspension of
U.S. mine.-clearing operations as a "blatant violation" of the
Paris agreement and charged the United States with attempting
to prolong the removal of the mines in order to "drag on the
de facto blockade" of DRV waters. The level and content of
the protest confo:-med to Hanoi's previous response to such a
suspension: The 28 February U.S. halt in minesweeping operations
had similarly prompted a spokesmen's statement which, like the
present one, demanded an immediate resumption of the clearing and
warned in stock terms that the United States must "bear full
responsibility." The 19 April protest, like the one in February,
did not address itself to the =reasons for the U.S. actions. Thus
it did not acknowledge that the stated aim of the suspension was
to force an end to communist violations of the accord, just as the
29 February statement ignored the stated U.S. position that the
halt to clearing operations was responsive to Hanoi's delays to
releastng American POW's.
RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS The spokesman's statement the next day
on U.S. aerial reconnaissance was at
the same level as two prior official protests on the same subject
since the signing of the Paris accord, although the a;r intrusions
cited this time were far more serious than r:hose alleged in the
previous protests--on 1.5 and 31 March.* The earlier statement
referred to intrusions only over the two southernmost provinces
of the DRV and the Vinh Linn Zone, just north of the DNZ; the
current statement accused the United States of much more wide-
spread reconnaissance over the DRV heartland, listing flights
over Hanoi and Haiphong as well as over the provinces of Nghe An,
Thanh hoa, Iloa Binh, Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, and Ila Bac.
Seeming to reflect the more serious nature of the current charges
and the more critical situation throughout Indochina, however, the
* The earlier spokesman's protests, charging overflights on 12,
13, 29, and 31 March, are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 April 1973,
page 5, and 21 March 1973, page 2.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONFIDIsNTI:AL FBIL TRENDS
:> APRIL 1973
statement did escalate the decibel level of Hanoi's protests.
It not only repeated the earlier statements' assertions
that the United States had "grossly encroached" on DRV
sovereignty and security and violated Article 2 of the Paris
agreement, but it also decried the overflights as "a cynical
provocation to the Vietnamese people and an insra eat
challenge to the world public which is sternly condemning the
United States for escalating its war in Laos and Cambodia
and increasing its military involvement in Indochina."
ECONOMIC CONSULTATIONS The press communique issued by the
DRV delegation to the joint economic
commission in Paris, released in Hanoi media on the 20th,
denounced the U.S. suspension of the talks as "a deliberate act
of sabotage" and urged that the United States end the suspension
and enable the commission to continue its work.
Apparently reflecting unpublicized U.S.-DRV guidelines adopted at
the time the economic commission was being established, the
communique claimed for the first time that "by common agreement"
it was to complete its work on 30 April 1973--"60 days after the
commission was set up." The economic commission was first
mentioned in the 1.4 February U.S.-DRV communique on I(issinger's
visit to Hanoi; its establishment was announced in a communique
on 8 March, although Hanoi's current reference to a 60-day
period ending on 30 April implies that it was formed abGuit a
week earlier.
PRESS COMMENT A 21 April NHAN DAN article set the level and
tone for Hanoi's initial comment following
the official protests over the U.S. actions. There has been no
reaction to date at the more authoritative level of an editorial.
Like the 20 April statement on reconnaissance, the article placed
the actions in a broader Indochina context, claiming that U.S.
and GVN military moves throughout Indochina were linked in a
"dark and premeditated plan" with the subsequent U.S. actions
against the DRV specifically. Developing a theme that has
recurred elsewhere in Hanoi comment, NHAN DAN charged the United
States with attempting to cause "tension" in the DRV. It
rejected as a "fantastic claim" and an "absurd slander"
Secretary Rogers' suggestion that the U.S. actions were responsive
to Hanoi's refusal to honor the cease-fire. A Libe-ation Radio
broadcast on the 20t:i had been more specific in noting that
Rogers had told a group of U.S. businessmen the Administration
might cancel its economic plans for North Vietnam.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 APRIL 1973
A 22 April NHAN DAN article scored statements by U.S. Government
officials that communist violations of the peace agreement had
relieved the United States of responsibility to ot~serve the
accord in i', entirety. Rejecting this notion as "absurd,"
NHAN DAN complained that U.S. violations of the Vietnam and Laos
agreements had "increased visibly" since GVN President Thieu's
visit to the United States and General H,3ig's tour of Southeast
Asia..
In an evident response to these U.S. statements, a 23 April
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article charged that the United States had
"brazenly" said it would carry out air reconnaissance as a warning
measure and that it had thus "publicly acknowledged its violations
of the Paris agreement." The army paper accused the United States
of issuing its statements in order to "intimidate the Indochinese
people" and to "prepare public opinion for intensified acts of war
against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." The article
appeared to be responding to U.S. pressure on the DRV to end its
role in Cambodia when it went on to charge that the "immediate
objective" of the anticipated "acts of war" was to "salvage the
Lon Nol regime and continue implementation of the Nixon Doctrine
so as to maintain neocolonialist regimes" in Indochina. Hanoi has
taken no cognizance of U.S. press reports that State Department
spokesman Bray on the 20th had indicated that the United States
told the DRV the United States would respond positively if North
Vietnam damped down the war in Cambodia and withdrew its troops.
Kissinger's remarks on Vietnam at a 23 April luncheon for newsmen
were assailed routinely in a 25 April NHAN DAN article which
scored him for "falsely accusing North Vietnam of systematically
and brazenly violating all the main provisions of the peace agree-
ment."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONFIDE NTIAL FI3IS TRENDS
25 APRIL 1973
PEKING OFFERS CAUTIOUS SUPPORT FOR CAMBODIAN ALLIES
Following a pattern that marked Peking's relati'ls with its
Vietnamese allies last year, the Chinese have been balancing
their broader interests in Sino-U.S. detente with their commit-
ment to Sihanouk's forces at a time when the latter are under
U.S. military pressure. On 20 April Peking used the vehicle of
a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--the lowest level of
authoritative Chinese comment--to second protests against U.S.
bombing in Cambodia and Laos issued on the 17th by Sihanouk's
Royal Government of National Union and the NLHS Central. Committee.
In keeping with Peking's interest in removing big-power involve-
ment in Indochina, Commentator demanded that the United States
strictly observe the Paris and Vientiane agreements, but criticism
of Washington was narrowly fo,;used and there was no pledge of
Chinese support and assistance to the communist forces. In
another sign of Peking s desire to see an American withdrawal,
NCNA on the 18th cited recent statements by several Congressmen
from both parties voicing opposition to the U.S. a{.r strikes.
Though divergent interests between Peking and its allies are
again evident, there has been no strong indication of Chinese
pressure on Sihanouk's front to seek an accommodation, as there
had been in the Vietnam case. Peking's approach has been to
stress the futility of U.S. support for the Lon Nol regime while
rendering political support to its own client. Following up its
triumphant reception of Sihanouk after his trip to "the liberated
zone of Cambodia," Peking publicized the arrival on 20 April
of So Photra, the Sihancuk son-in-law who attempted to bomb the
presidential palace in Phnom Penh last mont;-. NCNA reported his
press conference on the 20th and "a cordial and friendly" meeting
he had on the 22d with Yeh Chien-ying, the ranking Chinese
military leader.
The Commentator article, markedly milder than the RGNU statement
it seconded, accused the "U.S. Government" of having "repeatedly
violated" the Paris and Vientiane agreements but directed its
more sweeping charge at Saigon for hating "never paid the
slightest attention" to the Vietnam agreement. While echoing the
charge of an ARVN incursion into Cambodia, Commentator did not
implicate the United States. In contrast, the RGNU statement
assigned major blame to the United States, portraying the alleged
ARVN operation as the product of planning by President Nixon and
the National Security Council following General Haig's recent
tour and as a part of the !resident's "diabolical design" to
reactivate the Indochina war.
Approved For Release 1999/6Wf8DEdI IRDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 APRIL 1973
Peking's cautious approach was also reflected in NCNA's treatment
of RGNU Defense Minister Khieu Samphan's 18 April statement
protesting against U.S. actions and appealing for world support.
The NCNA account ignored his reference to the question of
Vietnamese communist troops in Cambodia, omitted his charge that
the United States is continuing "deceitful activities on the
diplomatic front" while stepping tip air strikes, and dropped his
criticism of President Nixon and the Phnom Penh leaders by name.
Like the 17 April ;;GNU statement, Khieu Samp`L-.. c'z nounced Lon Nol,
Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam as traitors, The PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article limited itself to references to Lon Nol
and his unnamed "sworn confederates."
SIHANOUK TRIP HAILED ON INDOCHINA SUMMIT ANNIVERSARY
Peking and Hanoi used the occasion of the third anniversary of
the Indochinese summit conference to hail Sihanouk's recent trip
to Cambodia and to take critical note of U.S. actions in
Indochina. Following past practice, Peking marked the anniversary
with a message from Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to the FUNK,
Pathet Lao, DRV, and PRG leaders and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on the 25th. The message said "great changes" had taken place in
Indochina with the signing of the Paris and Vientiane agreements
and with the "resounding victories" being scored against "the
traitorous Lon Nol clique." The editorial balanced these positive
developments with more gloomy observations regarding the "unstable"
Vietnam and Laos cease-fires and the U.S. bombings in Cambodia and
support for Lon Nol. According to the editorial, Sihanouk's
"successful inspection tour of the Cambodian liberated zone not
long ago has vigorously irspired" the resistance movement. The
Chinese referred only in general terms to a settlement, with no
mention of Sihanouk's five-point declaration.
The Peking message promised that the Chinese will "resolutely support
and assist" the Indochinese struggle, but the Chinese stopped well
short of last year's strong avowals of support. Last year the
Chinese called it the-1.r "bounden internationalist duty" to support
any assist the Indochinese and said China provided a "reliable
rear area" for the struggle.
As in the past, Hanoi sent a message to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth
from President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong. According
to the massage, the North Lietnamese "highly appreciate" Sihanouk's
tour of Cambodia and "unswervingly and wholeheartedl?; support" the
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONFI.1)ENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 APRIL 1973
Cambodian struggle to realize Sihanouk'4 five-point program.
After accusing the United States of continuing military
involvement in Indochina, including air strikes in Cambodia,
the message observed that the struggle "is still vary hard
and complex" but that the Indochinese peoples are redoubling
their efforts and enha*icing their solidarity.
NLHS RETURNS CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TO VIENTIANE, ISSUES STATEMENT
The departure for Vientiane of Ph"ulmi Vongvichir, the NLHS secretary
general, may signal a significant NLHS move to break the deadlock
in the talks on implementation of the cease-fire agreement in Laos.
Phoumi Vongvichit's arrival in Vientiane last February had been
followed by an acceleration in the negotiations leading to the
signing of the cease-fire accord on 21 February.* He left
Vientiane on 24 February after signing the agreement and did not
participate in the subsequent negotiations to formulate political
and military protocols on how it is to be implemented. The
announcement of his current return to Vientiane noted that he had
been "appointed" special advisor to the NLHS delegation and
plenipotentiary representative of NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong--
the positions he held in the earlier talks.
The day before Phoumi left for Vientiane (and 60 days after the
agreement was signed), the NLHS Central Committee issued its first
statement on the status of the talks. It accused the United
States--in conjunction with "the ultrareactionaries" in Laos--of
instigating the Souvanna Phouma government to procrastinate at
t`ie talks in an effort "to play for time" so that intcasified
attacks could be launched against areas controlled by the NLHS.
It censured "the ultrareactionaries" for exerting pressure on
Souvanna to submit the agreement for discussion at the "so-called"
National Assembly "in an attempt to carry out their scheme of
sabotaging the judicial and political basis of the agreement."
And it denounced the Vientiane government for making "preposterous
political demands" in an effort to delay the formation of the new
provisional government and the "National Political Union Council,"
a body the NLHS apparently hopes to use as a co'interpoise to the
provisional government expected to be dominated by Souvanna. In
a speech on 14 April, Phoumi Vongvichit asserted that the government
and the council would "administer the country"; the agreement,
* Phoumi Vongvichit's role in the negotiations is discussed in the
TRENDS of 22 February 1973, page 12.
Approved For Release 1999/OG 251r1ARDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 APRIL 1913
however, stipulates only that the council will "discuss with"
and "present its views" to the government on "major questions
relating to domestic and foreign policies."
Hanoi's NHAN DAN published the NI,HS Central Committee statement:
on 24 April, endorsing it in an accompanying article. Authoritative
DRV support for the NLHS negotiating position had recently been
expressed in a 16 April joint communique on the conclusion of
an NLHS delegation's visit to Hanoi. Moscow and Peking have been
more reticent: Chinese medi', have carried no original comment on
the talks, and Moscow has restricted itself to a few radio
commentaries blandly maintaining that conditions for a settlement
exist. Both Moscow and Peking reported the NL11S Central Committee
statement, however--TASS summarizing it and NCNA carrying the text.
XUAN THUY MEETS SUSL.OV, TOURS SEVERAL COMMUNIST CAPITALS
DRV Minister and Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat member
XuL:n Thuy arrived in Peking from Ulan Bator on 24 April, on his
way home after a circuitous trip from Paris which included a trip
to Moscow and visits to several other communist ;apitals.
High-level East European delegations have visited Hanoi since
the peace agreement was signed,* and Xuan Thity's recent travels
seem to be part of the DRV's ongoing effort to increase contacts
with its communist allies. Not long after Xuan Thuy's 8-12 April
Moscow visit, another high-level DRV figure turned up in the
Soviet capital, with PRAVDA reporting on the 20th that Nguyen Van
Tran, VWP Secretariat member and first secretary of the Hanoi
party committee, had met on the preceding day with V.V. Grishin,
CPSU Politburo member and Moscow city party first secretary.
XUAN THUY IN MOSCOW Aspects of Xuan Thuy's 8-12 April sojourn
in Moscow suggest that he may have engaged
in important talks there: He went out of his way to visit Moscow
first, flying there from Paris and then backtracking to East Europe;
the visit was the first he had made at the invitation of the CPSU
Central Committee, and it included a meeting with Politburo member
Suslov. Xuan Thuy had never previously been received by Suslov
on his many stopovers in Mcscow, although CPSU Central Committee
Secretary Katushev, who was also present at the 11 April talks, has
* An East German delegation was in Hanoi from 15 to 19 March and a
Czechoslovak delegation from 4 to 11 April. See the 11 April 1973
TRENDS, pages 10-11.
Approved For Release 19990 ~ }RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
(:ONVIUl'.NTIAL FBIS 'KENDS
25 APRIL 1973
seen Ili", .in the past.* l'RAVDA reported on the I2th that at the
nweL.ing on the prevI.ous clay, Xuan 1huy expressed "profound
gratitude" for 'soviet assistance and the 'Soviets stressed their
intent Ion Lo continue gLving necessary r,i.d to the DRV. In
addition, the Soviet side said :It supported the 31. March DRV
statement and the 1. Apr L1 PltG statement, and both sides called
for strict .I.mp1einenLiL1^n of the Paris agreement while condemning
Saigon for continued violations.
EAST EUROPE: TOUR 1'rom Moscow, Xuan 'Phuy went to Bucharest for
a visit fr.oy.t 12 to 16 April at the Invitation
of the Romanian party Central C.mmittee. lie was received on the
loth by General Secretary Ceausescu, who assured him, according
to Bucharest media, of Romania's "full support" and expressed a
desire to further expand the relations and areas of cooperation
between the two c-)entries. Xuan Thuy arrived in Tirana on the
16th for a visit at the invitation of the Albanian government.
In addition to his talks with Foreign Minister Nase, who iosted
a dinner for him, he was received by First Secretary Enver Hoxha
on the 18th. After a subsequent two-day stopover in Hungary,
Xuan Thu; departed for Mongolia for a visit at the invitation
of the party Central Committee.
Before attending the 12-power international Paris conference on
Vietn n, Xuan Thuy had visited Poland from 6 to 9 bruary and
Hungary from 17 to 21 February for talks presum~,b)7 related to
the two countries' roles as ICCS members. Their respective ICCS
contingents departed for Vietnam immediately after Xuan Thuy's
trip. He had talks with -olish Foreign Minister Olszowski and
Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter and was received by Polish
party leader Gierek. Although there were no reports that Kadar
received Thuy, an account of a 19 February friendship rally
indicated that he had conversed with the Hungarian party leader
on that occasion. During both visits, the media duly reported
various meetings and speeches in which the DRV expressed its
gratitude for support and aid and the Poles and Hungarians pledged
continued assistance and solidarity.
* Suslov did receive DRV Politburo member Le Duc Tho for the first
time on his Moscow stopover on 14 October 1972 and again on
16 November. In addition, Truong Chinh was received by Suslov on
29 December while he was in Moscow leading a party-state delegation
to the Soviet Union's 50th anniversary.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
CONK I DENT I Al, FIi I S TIZI;NI)S
25 APRIL 1973
DRV ELECTS DELEGATES TO LOWER-LEVEL PEOPLES COUNCILS
['he biennial elections to people's councils below the provincial
level were held in .1.'i of the 1)1:V's provinces on 22 April, according
to VNA accounts and 11anoi broadcasts on the 22d and 23d. kccorf!ing
to VNA cn The 21st, elections in 1.0 other provinces will be held
on 29 Apr'.1 anc', in the Vi.n,i Linh area on 20 May. No explanation
was offe-ed1 for the lengthy delay in calling Vinh Linh elections,
but the ai-!a was hit hard by U.S. bombers before the cease-fire.
A NIIAN DAN -rlitoria.l. on 10 March had announced that the elections
would be held between 1 and 30 April, and as recently as 11 April
VNA had referred without qualification to "the forthcoming
elections of the people's councils at all levels scheduled for
22 April 1973." The last people's council elections, which
included elections to the provincial-level councils, were held
from 25 to 30 April 1:'71.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
t:~;rl1 I I;t;l 'I' I AI, V ItI :; 'I I( I.;111 1)S
;'r APR 11. I')'I
Cit IIi A
Sr \NGtiAl. PLKING HOLD SIMULTANEOUS TR DL UNION CONGRESSES
The 23 April. NCNA announcc:nc~rt:; nn ?.rack union con};r~r;r+rr; held fit
I'uking and ShangitaI Crum l.(, t? 11 AI) r I I ra?gIs tcr new norivit um Iii
the drive to re I) uIld mass organ Izntb,nr; I;crit Ide d In the New Yv:ir'rs
Day .Joint edlLurta.l and undurs;cure t.!rc Sh,;ngl:ai 1cr-dt,rrshI )'r;
special rule hi the recons;trucLlon of these auxiliary bodies O. thes
party 't'I r! coordination of ttles; 1r; highly unuswal, and Shanghai's
role is r.c41ccted In Lite Lo,idt?r turnuuLH at the two c.angressssc'ss:
Shanghai leaders and l'oi- thuru members (:hr'ng (.hun-ClrIao and Yao
Wen-yuan appeared at Lite Pei, In}; congr es,,; to extend Lhe lvadersh Ip'rs
"warm greeIi.ngs," and thIrd-rankln}; Shanghai leader Wring 11ung-wen,
back flume t rum one of h i ; Lays; aniong the upper reaches I n !'eking,
was in chari;e of the Shanghai congress. Shanghai hat: been the
bellwether in reorganizing L!tc Communist Youth League (CY1,),
having been Lite t1rst province-level unit to establish it new CYI,
contmttteu. In it IurLher ref le,:tioil of Shru'ghaI':; leadership rule
In c,verse,.1ng tnas8 organ i zaI I nns, Chang and Wang appeared at the
Peking municipal CYL congress early this month.
While Shanghai had announced a preparatory trade union meting on
28 March, Peking had not previously Indicated that Its municipal
congress was Inuninent. Shan:;I, In a 15 April l'rov.nulal broad-
cast, is Lite only other )rovi.nce? thus far to announce a preparatory
trade u'ion meeting. A 24 April DAILY editorial marking
the Peking an;+ Shanghai congresses asserted that other congresses
will be held "when the conditions aro? ripe."
The new Sh.:,:ghai Trade Union Council is headed by Wang Ilung-wen and
includes female member of the Central Committee and Shanghai
party secretary Wang I'siu-then (with Wang flung-wen an early
leader of the Shargh.1 workers movement during the cultural
revolution), another female Central Conunit.tecr member, a male
alternate member., it standing committee member of the Shanghai
party committee, and a vice chairman of the old Shangha' Trade Union
Council. Peking's trade union is led by worker member t.f the
Central Co'nm1Ltee Ni Chih-fu and includes another full member of the
Central Committee and an alternate member, a vice chairman of the
old Peking Trade Union Council, and a female delegate to the last
NPC.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
111;;1 I~+; 111 I;tl'; I:tl';1)';
AI IT l I. I'I 1 1
hr A Apt I I I'L111'I W n 11; 114 ud! -, ": irrt Iii; flu' lwn 1'?.1ttk;rc?n"r11
rvca I i rct i hr 11'.111 i Ily; W 1+1 ,? in car t y 1 tly: t+llt i hI' ;;hail. 1i: i
".tallu.lry 14'V.+lnt i+n ll l'l1'% ..,1,1 1+II' In ll111i1v:lll?111 Illkt lt:ltlln
C.11111 for 11111 wtlrl? In;, i a?c; I ,I I l 1 all( 1 :h 11. I11 I lu+ rnnntnrr k..
1 1 1 6 H (whl?n , ' t , L l l t t l 1 .in.n l l v wa4 .if t i ny; t l u t of I l a i t t l ) 1 hr .Il i I nr f a 1
sit.Lac'4rd 11111+I it Ic.II it,+indIrr?i" I I I r I, Ili :;h;to -(,It I il'r Li yInk; to
turn wI)rI.v I " awav I ,'1.111 t Iann '.1 1 ug , I.' A"d I t+1 .nc?II 111:11 I ac I r"" a';
1' Co 1101111 r;111 ?llltl (if Ilry;slt ill,; 11.11 t 11?.1l''I ;h 111 t1v 'i i It(' t tall(, till f nllti.
IIII? rdILut.ial Ifllit?Itr11 n11 II?,j11.ttalit .t1lr I11r uuf1111" I+1h:'r t.Ii;in :1!t
.1 t:I1.111:1r1 1111 ti.ii tlliIt Illy j+.ll t v 1111,1.1 and Itlc'rt?a"Iilk;, i)rtl/lcictlull.
t llllul;ll I L t1 !II r: L.It 1? that tI u;{ l n?; ,.h l+tl l ll "111?conl'? ,; drol(((l l or
i'duc.lting wUiirt'. with Ct1mi11111?I .1 111r.'." and :111+111It1 flay at tent I on
LO the wr 1 1 - hr i ny; of t hr In.1 .?.r . of ,:nrl 1?r" and t I,if r lam! i f r?l.
Noli1.? of I ilk, 1 k?j+.11 t'. 1111 t 1 :IIII Ili(i 1 `11'. ho.: ml?I1L i (+111'11 tit(- right to
tiLr11r ,;ranti by 1hi? dial I part, n"! tut i.1n which wam c rculatvcl
In l.lty 1111t) lit mm/?1 put in11+ It+111', prr?it1m.Ih Iv a?; .1 ,,'1111I of
11?atler!.11 I j' c.+nl I UK K which I,ry;.in to nl I aci at the "ccunc) par tv
p1k?num In r.11 1v I all LiI.It war.
The cti I L o r I.11 ,; I ng Ir11 11ut t.lts? ? rcunll p It?nur,1 In cunc lntl Ind; wi Lh a
call tor full I I i ink; Or WON .rt O v Or jlart.v'1; ninth t:t?ntral
OW l tee 'anal i LI seL.lnil i+11.1:.1 ?. n,?,,., i++n. I hr rrcuilr:t i Lut fun
uI Li it j1.IrLy .Itul IL'; 11:.11;!. 1, rf,.111I::atIt+n:;, 1;. 1;111ii,m1?nL1?tl by Llle rehahl -
IIL.It.iun of ;hell Ir 1(lrr?. an II?ng linlatl-i+iny;, Ir1 prrr.umaill?, rr:)jltlnr;lve
Lu MIS L.1i1 and pi .)v111'; uomm n y;r111111! Ior K" m lit-IaI ?m tither;
I11,c (.11.u; uhuI I-L:li.l,) and ?i.1, '.;rn-':u.ln h.lvit.,; .1 vt?';Le(I I tit 4,i-('!;L 111
tlar iv j/I v-etni nr t& a.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060017-1
111,111, ,~ I;tr. I IIrl; IIf I.IO:,
AP H 11, 1 4 1 1
USSH
USI IrAh' 11N114 /VJPJiVI (VARY ,1i.(l>Fti. uv-KJ:YCL), OPTIFIIsrIC
In Irk I I, !.t .t1,l,catanr I' a" pal I'. !:1,Irl-.r!l,n.ln ern a in.1lilt I'I`r* n w1:11
I , ' FAA"", I ' n l I 1 h 1 1 1 ? 1.111,d I,I.I i r' Itlr'!11t,r'1 111mI iiv i'!:t Into gnVr? 4 1t1W^-
krycd, };1?ncial Iv "pt inli!:1 it .1':?:t'r:..rlr?nt oI .;oval doniar:l Ic and
forrll;n pol lr y In hi': addrl".: 11,noring tht? IO { l .Innfvrt?!lary of
Lrninl!1 III I I It at .1 K1cm1 111 II 1 1,1 0.1 on 'O \Ili I I . A!:iIli, I rom
i'onomarrv0r. !:prrrh r f114 L'1I It 1 con 11,I-vnt't' Irn th0? t;omrnunir.t
Mall III'l:tI, In I I `talc((, 111{!1 ,,1:: 111? IIr':t Iornl.lI I'olfthur.'-
Irvvl !:L:Itt'mt'nt on national and world :11}.ir!1 !:incr the hrylnnit
of the yr.t t .
Ili] rrlat ion!: with 1110? Viiit??rI :.r.ltr?P., 11!;1 inov drew '11(ention both
o t l i t , por i f i v'? I mf,I?t u!: g I V4 -11 I,y t ii' ,''iol:cow !:unrtn I t and 110 t III,
p,1? :rllbI I it fr,: for i.1Vorahir d1?v ?Iopmvnt!: In tllr {(hurt,. Whi It,
!:tllkitl}, .r Iloty I+I 1r,ntiuy;t'ncy I'y reft?rrln), to thi` "lord,,;
wor!