TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 5, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
Confidential
in Communist Propaganda
STATSP EC
Confidential
5 JULY 1973
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSP EC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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5 JULY 1973
C ONTENTS
U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT
Moscow Stresses U.S.-USSR Cooperation as Basis for Peace . . . . 1
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
USSR, Allies Seek Status Quo Approval, Quick Second Phase. . . . 3
CHINA
Nuclear Test Announcement Reflects Gesture to United States. . 5
INDOCHINA
PRG Political Platform Elaborated at Meeting with GVN 7
Sihanouk Returns to Peking after Two-Month Foreign Tour 12
USSR
Polyanskiy Endorses Moldavian Kolkhoz Council Experiment . . . 16
Uzbek Gosplan Chief Defends Republic Interests 17
NOTES
Chinese Party Anniversary, China Agriculture, Sinkiang
Leadership 18
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
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U. S. -SOVIET sunnIT
MOSCOW STRESSES U,S, -USSR COOPERATION AS BASIS FOR PEACE
In keeping with the historic significance it has ascribed to
the summit agreements, the Soviet Union has placed new stress
in the aftermath on the joint nature of the responsibilities the
two countries have undertaken to insure the successful realization
of the prospects these agreements have opened up. In so doing
it has come very close to implying that international security
is as much a function of U.S.-Soviet cooperation as of its own
unilateral efforts -- a proposition that makes sense as a hedge
against possible disappointments, but one which also reflects
a departure from the traditional class analysis of international
relations. It is perhaps in recognition of this that Moscow
has shown concern to rePssure its allies that its actions at
the summit were consis# at both with their interests and with
its own responsibiliti-u as a socialist state and as a champion
of peace.
This description of the factors governing the prospects for
world peace was presented in two important official documents:
a statement approving the results of the summit conference
issued on 29 June and signed by the Politburo, the Council
of Ministers, and the Oupreme Soviet Presidium, and a PRAVDA
editorial of 2 July, reporting and commenting on the same events.
Noting that Soviet-American relations had previously been a
source of discord in international relations, these documents
pointed out that the recent favorable development of these
relations now serves as an "important element in the radical
improvement of the international situation." They concluded
that the faithful implementation by both sides of the commitments
that had been undertaken "is the condition for turning Soviet-
American relations into a permLnent factor of international
peace and for insuring the irreversibility of the process of
relaxation."
Moscow's concern to reassure its allies in the socialist community
and the third world in light of the new approach has been apparent
throughout the visit. It was highlighted by Brezhnev's meeting
with socialist ambassadors in Moscow before the visit and by
Gromyko's meeting with the same group promptly upon the delegation's
return. But the assurance emerges primarily through the
affirmation expressed repeatedly that whatever furthers a
relaxation of tension between the two nuclear superpowers must
benefit the rest of the world as well.
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In its assessment of the Implications of Brezhnev's visit,
Moscow appeared particularly concerned to suggest that
measures aimed at reducing the military confrontation might be
expected to follow on the heels of the Washington summit,
particularly in Europe. Drawing on language in the joint
communique, PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials on 27 June both
emphasized that the agreement on the nrevention of nuclear
war and other results of the summit meant that "political
relaxation is now being supplemented by military relaxation."
Gromyko revealed the most immediate focus of that assessment
in his opening remarks at the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki on 3 July as he linked it
with "confidence-building" measures to be applied to forces
in Europe.
Notably absent in the aftermath of the summit was any publis
concern about the ideological consequences of the alterLtion
in the international situation. There was no mention of a
continuing struggle in the ideological realm nor was there
a suggestion that capitalism and socialism were still arrayed
against each other around the world. Though the joint party-
government statement asserted that the USSR will continue to
oppose resolutely any "intrigues of aggressive imperialist
forces," these words appeared to be aimed at political
forces within Western states, not at the states themselves.
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EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
USSR, ALLIES SEEK STATUS QUO APPROVAL, QUICK SECOND PHASE
Moscow and its orthodox East European allies, in the opening statements*
at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) on 3 and 4 July, have clearly revealed their goal of gaining
general recognition of the postwar status quo by pointedly stressing
the importance of the principle of the inviolability of borders.
GDR Foreign Minister Winzer on the 4th went so far as to urge
that the ccnference give "multilateral confirmation" to the postwar
"territorial realities."
USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko used his position as leadoff speaker
at the conference to table the Soviet draft "reclaration on the
Fundamentals of European Security and Principles of Relations
between States in Europe" and to outline in general terms the
principles that should guide interstate relations in Europe.
On the divisive issue of cooperation in the humanitarian and
cultural areas, Gromyko aseerted that cooperation in this
sphere must respect the principles of sovereignty 'and
noninterference and that departure from these principles would
be "justly regarded as an atteiupt to intervene in the affairs
of others." The TASS summary of Gromyko's speech did not cite
his remark, noted in Western press accounts, which urged
"strict observance of the laws, customs, and traditions of
each other" and declared that the USSR "will proceed from this"
basis.
In what appeared to be a desire to conclude the work of the
conference as rapidly as possible, Gromyko called for the
convocation of its third phase a tiv?. "summit" level "toward
the end" of 197'3. Similarly, Bulgaria's Mladenov on the
4th, according to BTA, said the cunference's second phase should
begin in the first half of September. Perhaps with an eye to
Brezhnev's stopover in Paris and with West European sensitivities
in mind, Moscow had downplayed the statement in the Brezhnev-
Nixon communique which said the two governments would work for
a rapid conclusion of the CSCE and foresaw the possibility of
* The speeches of all the Soviet bloc foreign ministers are
currently available, in text or summary form, except for that
of Budapest's Janos Peter.
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4
completing the conference "at the highest level." The
29 June Soviet party-government statement approving the Brezhnev-
Nixon talks and the 2 July PRAVDA editorial, for example,
totally ignored the call for a summit-level meeting to wrap up
the CSCE.
The foreign ministers' speeches displayed a clear division of
labor among Moscow and its allies, with the USSR advancing its
draft of general principles on European security, the GDR and
Hungary offering a draft proposal on economic and technological
cooperation, Poland and Bulgaria offering a draft document on
human contacts, and Czechoslovakia outlining a detailed p1.t.
for permanent post-conference machinery in the form of a
"consultative committee." In an obvious reference to Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Poland's Olszowski declared on
the 3d that "we will also have to eliminate the still existing
meehLnism of subversive pioliaganda set up in the period of
the cold war."
FORCE REDUCTION TALKS In his Helsinki address, Gromyko
followed the general line of down-
playing the issue of force reductions in Europe. He dropped
the words "associated measures" from his description of the
formal negotiations that are to begin 30 October, calling
them "talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in the
area of central Europe." Stressing the familiar theme, Gromyko
that all participants in the Vienna talks must accept the
principle of "undiminished security" for all.
Following the issuance of the Brezhnev-Nixon communique, which
contained the announcement that the Vienna talks on force
reductions would start on 30 October, Moscow has not sought to
exploit the elimination of "balanced" from the formal nomenclature
of the talks. Moscow apparently is seeking to allay suspicions
openly voiced in the West European press that the agreement to
start the force reduction talks in October was part of
a deal to get Washington's agreement to a CSCE summit. It is note-
worthy in this connection that the 29 June Soviet party-government
statement on the summit avoided comment on the force reduction
issue.
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CHINA
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NUCLEAR TEST ANNOUNCEMENT REFLECTS GESTURE TO UNITED STATES
Peking's 28 June announcement of its nuclear test on the 27th
conveyed a conciliatory gesture to the United States while
reflecting Chinese wariness toward arms control negotiations
that might inhibit the PRC's nuclear program. Again using the
short format adopted in November 1971, the latest announcement
repeated the statement in the last previous one (on 9 January
1972) that the PRC conducts "necessary and limited' nuclear tests
for the purpose of "breaking the nuclear monopoly" of the super-
powers, but it omitted the previous announcement's explicit
reference to "nuclear blackmail" by "two" superpowers. Given
Peking's intransigent stance toward the Soviets compared with its
mild treatment of U.S. policies, thesu omissions may be seen as
a good-will gesture to Washington.
Against the background of the recent U.S.-Soviet summit, and
particularly the agreements on SALT and prevention of nuclear war,
another notable omission is the failure to repeat the previous
announcement's assertion of Peking's readiness to attend "a world
conference" to discuss the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons
and, as a first step, to reach an agreement on nonuse of nuclear
weapons. That offer contained a hint of flexibility?earlier
intimated in Chiao Kuan-hua's UNGA address the previous November--
by relaxing Peking's longstanding proposal for a world "aummit"
conference on nuclear disarmament. In reiterating Peking's summit
conference proposal in his 24 November 1971 speech, Chiao indicated
that the Chinese "are also prepare o to hear and consider different
opinions" on the level at which a world conference would take place.
The omission of the proposal on a world disarmament conference may
reflect Peking's concern over the agreements in the nuclear field
reached at the U.S.-Soviet summit. Last year's UNGA session had
witnessed a bitter Sino-Soviet contest over Moscow's proposals on a
world disarmament conference and nonuse of force, and the Chinese
may now feel that it is no time to show flexibility. However, in
keeping with Peking's line that the nuclear powers undertake not to
be the first to use nuclear weapons, the 28 June announcement
repeated the standard Chinese pledge not to be the first to use
these weapons. It also reiterated the Chinese desire tu "work
together with the other peoples and all other countries that love
peace and uphold justice" in the struggle to achieve the complete
prohibition of nuclear weapons.
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MOSCOW Characteristically, Moscow reacted to the Chinese
test by publicizing protests from other countries.
Though usually cautious about placing Chinese developments in
a trIongular context, Moscow hao been increasingly blunt in
counterposing the test to the recently signed U.S.-Soviet
agreement on prevention of nuclear war. A broadcast to Southeast
Asia on 2 July cited foraign comment that called the test a
"diplomatic maneuver to .attentionally show China's negative
attitude toward the treaty on prevention of nuclear war." The
hulk of Moscow's comment on the test has treated it as a glaring
contradiction to the general trend toward international detente.
A Soviet broadcast to China on the 28th contrasted worldwide
recognition of the summit's contributions to peace with the
outrage caused by the Chinese test. The Chinese listeners were
told that the test will have srious repercussions internationally
and will ham the PRC's international prestige.
Moscow's Polish and Czechoslovak allies were more direct in drawing
the international implications of the test. The Polieh press
agency PAP, for example, called the test Peking's "comment" on the
U.S.-Soviet summit.
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INDOCHINA
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In the wake of the joint communique signee in Paris on 13 June,
Vietnamese communist propaganda has indicated no modification of
the PRG's basic differences with Saigon over the futuee course
of a settlement in South Vietnam. When the Paris consultative
conference sessions were resumed on 28 June--after a month's
hiatus--there was no sign that either side would retreat from
political positions set forth last April. Moreover, the PRG
has continued to charge that the Saigon regime has failed to
observe the cease-fire, citing as evidence major military
operations in Kontum and Chuong Thien provinces.
The 13 June communique signed by the United States and the
three Vietnamese parties did alleviate some problems between
Washington and Hanoi, allowing the resumption of their joint
economic talks and U.S. minesweeping operations in North
Vietnamese waters. However, Hanoi has complained that not all
the mine-clearing provisions are being implemented and that
weekly liaison flight:, between Saigon and Hanoi have been
canceled. At the same time, the United States continues to be
assailed for failing to urge Saigon's implementation of the
peace accord and for allegedly violating the cmmunique with
Its continued bombing in Cambodia.
Sihanouk returned to Peking on the 5th after completing a two-month
tour of Africa and Europe. His return came in a setting of new
Sino-U.S. Lontacts and a 15 ugust deadline for U.S. military
actions in Cambodia.
PRG POLITICAL PLATFORM ELABORATED AT MEETING WITH GVN
The session of the GVN-PRG consultative conference on 28 June
was the firs since 31 May when the weekly meetings were suspended
pending the Tesults of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks. At the
14th session on the 28th, PRG chief delegate Nguyen Van Hieu
complained particularly about the GVN's failure to recognize the
?RG as a legLtimate rival administration.
hieu recounted the PRG's six-point proposal for a settlement which
hal been introduced at the 8th session of the consultative
conference on 25 April. In some of the points, lieu only modified
the language to accord with the 13 June Paris communique. For
example, point one in the April proposal called for an "immediate"
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cease-tire, but the first point in Hieu's statement on the 28th
calls for the strict observance of the communique's 14 June
cease-fire deadline. But in some other instances, Hieu's
elaborations in effect resurrected proposals from the communist
negotiating package prior to the Paris agreement which had been
vehemently opposed by the GVN. Saigon proposals at the session,
for the formation of subcommittees to deal with various
problems and for a timetable leading to elections in December,
were promptly rejected by the PRG.
Following the outline of the 25 April six-point proposal, lieu
offered the following variations on the PRG position:
4- The second point, dealing with the re.:urn of prisoners, cited
the call in the 13 June communique for ne return of all detained
personnel--within 45 days, if possible--and for the inspection
of detention sites by national Red Cross societies. lieu did not
repeat the April proposal's specific points defining such
personnel in broad terms as those associated with the PRG and
those "belonging to neither side, captured and detained for
having struggled for peace, independence, better living conditions,
and democracy, as well as all other persons captured during the
war." Despite this omission, presumably the communists' demands
for the release of large numbers of civilian prisoners stand:
Hieu's statement, like the joint communique, endorsed the broad
definition of such piisoners offered in Article 7 of the protocol
on prisoners in the January peace agreement. Article 7 accepted
the description of civilian prisoners in the 1954 Geneva agreement
as "persons who, having in any way contributed to the political
and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for
that reason and have been kept in detention by either party."
Differences between Saigon and the communists on the definition of
prisoners to be released continue to be pointed up in the
propaganda; a 4 July QUAN DOI NHAN TAN article, for example,
deplored reports in the Western press that Saigon has denied it
holds any political prisoners and repeated the charge that
200,000 to 300,000 such prisoners are incarcerated in the South.
Folloaing point two, Hieu noted that the cease-fire and prisoner
queotions fall under the purview of the two-party Joint Military
Commission (JMC), but added that: "in case of a hinderance which
necessi.:ates settlement at a higher 1eve..1, the consultative
conference between the two South Vietnamese parties will discuss it
and find a solution in time." Presumably the conference would,
under this guideline, consider these two points, since the communists
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claim that Saigon is not implementing the cease-fire and that it
is blocking JMC action on the prisoner issue. On the latter
point, a 29 June Liberation Radio broadcast charged that Saigon's
"delays and evasions" at a series of four JMC subcommittee
meetings, from 16 to 27 June, prohibited progress in the return
of prisoners and the invitation of Polish and Canadian Red Cross
societies to visit prisons.
-I- Point three, detailing the PRG's interpretation of "liberties"
which should be guaranteed under Article 11 of the Paris accord,
drew a clear battleline on the most crucial of these liberties.
Going beyond the general listing of reforms demanded in the
April FRG proposal, the current one included a specific call for
the two parties to publish a "decision" (quyeets dqinhj) on
"allowing all persons of all political and religious tendencies
to freely carry out their activity in the two zones" and "allowing
the free circulation of papers of all tendencies between the
two zones." The PRG's determination to acquire guarantees that
it can freely pursue a political struggle throughout the South
was underlined in concluding "concrete proposals" offered by
Hieu. His first suggestion was that the "two governments" in the
South "make public immediately a law (sawcs linhj) fully
guaranteeing the exercise of democratic liberties" as specified
in the peace agreement, the joint communique, and his statement.
Hieu's fourth point, on the National Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord, went far beyond the April proposal
which had done little more than reiterate the stipulation of the
Paris accord that the three-part Council would promote the
Implementation of the agreement, the achievement of national
reconciliation, and the insurance of liberties, and would organize
general elections. In his current statement, Hieu defined the
functions of the council within this broad charter so as to give
it virtually the powers of a coalition government with authority
over the two South Vietnamese contenders. Thus, for example, Hieu
specified that the Council would assume the task of promoting
the application of the cease-fire provisions of the agreement and
that the two parties would have to submit reports to it on the
implementation of the agreement. He went even further with regard
to the stipulation of the agreement on democratic liberties,
suggesting that the Council would "follow and control' the
implementation of these provisions, "prevent violations" and
investigate and seek solutions for violations when they occur,
and "promote" the abolition of policies and laws contrary to
provisions of the agreement.
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Hieu also discussed the formation of the Council in his fourth
point. He did not specify how the third component of the
Council should be chosen, but noted that it must be composed
in such a way as to ensure that political and religious tendencies
which do not side with either party "have their voices heard,"
be really representative, and play an "independent and equal
role within the council," Hieu suggested that the Council be
composed of 36 members and have a presidium of six members. He
Insisted that it be guaranteed total security and all facilities
to discharge its tasks. Whereas the GVN delegate at the 23 June
session suggested that the Council be corvened by 11 September,
Uu underlined its importance with a F,ggestion that it be
functioning by the end of July. Bleu left thP timiag of the
formation of councils at lower levels up o the National Council,
but specified that they should be forme "in all administrative
units: province, town, district, village, and quarter." The
Paris agreement merely noted on this point that the two South
Vietnamese parties would consult about the formation of councils
at lower levels.
-I- The fifth point of the PRG proposal last April merely recalled
previous proposals for the election of a constituent assembly
and then went on, in accordance with the Paris agreement, to
reierate PRG willingness to consult with the GVN on the
institutions to be set up through general clectiong. By contrast,
Hieu's 28 June statement contained no suggestion of flexibility
on this pr):_nt, instead statinE 04:ectly that elections would
be held for a constituent assemoly which would work out a
constitution and then proceed to form a new government. Unlike
the GVN, Hieu offered no suggested timetable for the national
elections, indicating as he did last April that they should occur
after an effective cease-fire has been observed and democratic
liberties ensured.
Prior to the 25 April proposal, the PRG had not publicly advocated
that the elections be for a constituent assembly since the first
week of October, before the start of the U.S.-DRV negotiations
leading to the Paris agreement. Hieu's stronger stance on this
issue in his 28 June statement would appear to represent a
hardening of the PRG position on this critical question. In a
press conference statement after the 28 June meeting, carried in
VNA's service transmission from Paris to Hanoi, Hieu pointed up
PRG differences with Saigon on this point, accusing the GVN of
"plotting" to carry out an election "farce" within the framework
of "its constitution, fascist laws, and coercive machine."
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Hieu also ignored the Paris agreement's stipulation that the
two parties would agree upon what local elections were to he
held: He specified, unlike the April proposal, that "local
elections shall be organized to name the councils of representa-
tives of provinces, towns, district, and villages and wards
throughout South Vietnam."
Point six in the 28 June Hieu statement amplified upon the
similar point in the April proposal, which had repeated Article 13
of the Paris agremeent stipulating that the two sides should settle
the question of Vietnamese armed forces in the South and that
their discussions would include such questions as measures to
reduce military affectives and Lo demobilize troops being reduced.
Hieu's current statement however, gave less weight to the question
of troop reduction--the portion of the Paris accord which the GVN
views as covering the question of the withdrawal of Worth
Vietnamese forces. Instead he stressed the need or the two
sides to guarantee that their forces observe the cease-fire
and demanded an end to forcible conscription and tle reinforce-
ment of regular units by the transfer of paramilitary forces.
By contrast, the GVN proposal at the 28 June meeting included
the reduction of forces--i.e., North Vietnamese withdrawal--in its
timetable for a settlement, suggesting that it begin at the end
of July and be completed by 11 September. A 30 June NHAN DAN
editorial on the PRG statement scored this Saigon proposal,
claiming that the GVN was raising a point which had been rejected
in the Paris accord and that the GVN was dodging the implementation
of democratic rights by trying to connect this question with tilt
"unreasonable" question of withdrawing non-South Vietnamese forces
from South Vietnam.
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SIHANOUK RETURNS TO ?EKING AFTER TWO-MONTH FOREIGN TOUR
In a setting of new Sino-U.S. contacts and a 15 August. deadline
for U.S. military action in Indochina, Cambodian Prince Sihanouk
returned to ?eking on 5 July after completing it two-month tour
of African and European countries in his quest for added diplomatic
leverage. He was greeted on his return by a Chinese IP.adership
turnout headed by Chou Eu-lal. Sihanouk and hls goverment
(RGNU) have not responded authoritatively. to the swirl of
speculation over posaible negotiations on a Cambodian settlement.
Sustaining their time-matking approach of recent weeks, Sihanouk
anl the insurgent leaders have avoided renewing the strident
denunciations of "sham peace maneuvers" that had marked their
reaction to earlier speculation about a settlement in the wake of
the Vietnam agreement and during the Kissinger-Tho talks in May.
Sihanouk's last major statement on the Cambodian situation, in a
speech at a banquet given by Romanian President Ceausescu in
Bucharest on 22 June and carried by NCNA, reaffirmed RGNU positions
In general terms. He aguir chided the Nixon Administration for
rejecting his proposal'..or bilateral talks on the pattern of the
U.S.-DRV negotiations, affirmed the insurgents' resolve to restore
peace in Cambodia on the basis of "total independence, national
unity, and territorial integrity" and the recovery of rights
"usurped" by the Lon Nol government, and declared again that
the Cambodian question would be solved "once the United States
stops giving military aid and air protection to the puppet Lon
Nol regime."
Stock affirmations of the insurgents' line have also been contained
in two recent RGNU statements criticizing the United States
and Saigon. A 29 June statement by the RGNU Information and
P:opaganda MiniF;try underscored the insurgents' resolve to "undergo
all sacrifices" in order to achieve the goals set forth in
Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration, and it expressed
a determination "to topple the traitors Lon Nol, Sink Matak,
Son Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam" and "to chase the U.S. imperialists,
the Saigon puppets and other lackeys out of Cambodia." A 30
June RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, seconding
an earlier FRG allegation of U.S,-Saigon vinlati ns of the 13
June Paris communique, pledged to continm'l the struggle "without
compromise nor flinching" until the five points are achieved.
Though there has been no repetizion of the earlier spate of
attacks on moves toward a negotiated settlement, an undercurrent
of przsisting suspicion regarding American efforts to promote
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negotiationa has been reflected in occasional low-level comment
and, most notably, in a 24 June statement issued in the name of
the RGNU by the leading in-country Insurgent leader, Khieu Snmphan.*
Appealing for world support against U.S. military attacks and
moves to pvomote a compromise peace settlement, the statement
denounced President Eixon and Kissinger by name for "openly and
clandestinely" conducting a "Munich-style" maneuver designed co
place the blame for the Lontinuing Cambodian war cn the FUNK
while mustering In partners to force the Cambodian
p'op ft "to lay down their weapons and surrender to the U.S.
imperialists and their lackeys." The statement did not specify
which states were allegedly assisting the United States, but
seemed to exonerate China and North Vietnam by expressing "sincere
tIwnks" for their support. That th,.: Soviet Union remains a
target for criticism was indicated by an AK1 commentary on 1
July that alluded to the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in an unfavorable
light. Citing a Western press report, it said that "R. Nixon
recently made a compromise with a superpower on the European
security question, and with this, assumed the right to continue hia
bombing of Cambodia."
FOREIGN SUPPORT Chinese coverage of Cambodian developments
has been limited largely to replays of RGNU
pronouncements, including the text of the 30 June RGNU Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement and n shorter version of Khieu
Samphan's 24 June statement. Peking also reported on PRG and
DRV Foreign Ministry .ntements in support of Khieu Samphan's
appeal but issued no supporting comment in its own name. Its
only recent authoritative comment was contained in the customary
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking Sihanouk's return to Peking on
the 5th which hailed his foreign tour as a "great event" that
has reaffirmed and strengthened the international position of the
RGNU as "the sole legal government of Cambodia." Calling
attention to the "new situation" in Cambodia brought about by the
insurgents' battle victories in the wake of Sihanouk's tour of
the interior in March, the editorial highlighted Sihanouk's
condemnation of U.S. "aggression" and reaffirmed Chinese support
for his "just" five-point stand on a peace settlement. It
characterized the insurgents as having "firmly grasped the
initiative on the battlefield," while "huddled in the isolatec
city of Phnom Penh, the traitorous Lon Nol clique is in dire
* The FUNK radio on 26 June said the statement was released on the
24th; subsequent Chinese and Vietnamese pickups of the statement
dated it 10 days earlier, on 14 June.
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straits. ItH dayH are numbered." Unlike RGNU statements, Pekinn
avoids attacking the other three members of the ruling four-man
Phnom Penh poliaccl council.
In what may be a sign of Chinese flnYtbility, NCNA's reports on
President Nixon's 27 June veto of egislation calling for an
Immediate end to U.S. military action in Cambodia and his subsequent
signing of the compromise bill setting the 15 August deadline gave
considerable play to the President's stress on achieving a
Cambodian Hettlement. Both the 28 June and 2 July NCNA reports
cited the President's contention that a sudden cutoff of U.S.
support would destroy chances for a negotiated settlement, and NCNA
quoted him as saying a responsible settlement in Indochina remains
a matter of greatest urgency- The 2 July report also noted his
assertion that he would request Congress :o help if after 15 August
further actions were nLeded to achieve peace.
The 29 June PRG and 3 July DRV Foreign Ministry statements
responding to Khieu Samphan's 24 June appeal duly demanded an
end to U.S. bombing and milit.try actions, and the DRV also
endorsed Sihanouk's five pointy. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in
a 1 July joins : '.ommunique mark:sig his visit to North Korea
underscored Kanoi's support for Sihanouk as "head of state"
and "the legitimate, genuine, and congistent representative of
the state of Cambndin," and demanded tl.at the Cambodian problem
be settled on the basis of the five points. A 4 July NHAN DAN
commentary on Sihanouk's trip abroad also lauded the prince and
hailed the rising international prestige of the RGNU as "the
legal and sole authentic government" of Cambodia. Other low-
level Vietnamese commen: has criticized the President's 27 June
veto decision and has assessed the 15 August deadline as an
Administration "7;cheme" and "delaying tactic" designed to buy
time to cope with Congressional opposition.
In contrast, Moscow seized on the signing of the compromise bill
as a sign of the ,uid of U.S. involvement. A 1 July Soviet report
quoted Senator Fuibright's observation that "this decision will
finally end" U.S. intervention in Indochina. At the same time,
Moscow has taken a further step toward acknowledging Sihanouk's
claims to legitimacy in what may be a move to help foster a
negotiated settlement in Cambodia. In early June, TASS had
carried the first Soviet reports on the prince's foreign tour by
taking note of his stops in Algeria and Yugoslavia. These reports
marked the first mention of Sihanouk in Soviet media since the
signing of the Vietnam agreement. In keeping with Moscow's
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FBIS TRENDS
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recognition of the Lon Nol government, the reports in early
June made no mference to Sihanouk's claim to be heo.1 of state,
hut a 29 June TASS report on his visit to Romania did so
indirectly by citing the Romanian agency AGERPRES' reference
to the prince as "head of state of Cambodia."
Soviet reports on the military situation also seem somewhat more
forthcoming in acknowledging the insurgent e0 position. TASS
accounts on 20 June and 4 July noted that "the patriotic forces"
firmly "hold the initiative," and a 3 July report favorably
compared living conditions in the "liberated areas" with those
in territory under the control of "the Phnom Penh authorities."
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USSR
FBI3 TRENDS
5 JULY 1973
POLYANSKIY ENDORSES MOLDAVIAN KOLKHOZ COUNCIL EXPEMMENT
CPSU Politburo member and USSR Agriculture Ministr Polyanskiy
has apparently endorsed the Moldavian experiment in transferring
management of kolkhozes and interkolkhoz organi;ations from the
agriculture ministry to kolkhoz councils.* Polyanskiy's attitude
toward the controversial innovation was revealed in a report on
the 5 March session of the All Union Council of Kolkhozes psblished
in the June issue of the agriculture ministry's journal ECONOMICS
OF AGRICULTURE. According to the report, Polyarmkiy discussed the
Moldavian experiment in his inaugural address t the council as
chairman. He evidently viewed the experiment favorably since the
report based on his remarks drew the conclubion that the Moldavian
Innovation was "a very important state experiment," the results of
which "will help more correctly determine the path for future
improvement of the leadership of kolkhoz production."
Polynnskiy's attitude toward the Moldavian innovation has been
unclear. Although he endorsed a similar "kolkhoz union" scheme in
1959, he has not addressed the subject since. In addition, as
agriculture minister he presumably might have opposed the Moldavian
innovation since, if applied nationally, it would strip the
agriculture alinistry of most of its power. His predecessor,
Matskevich, a longtime kolkhoz union foe, visited Moldavia in
January to observe its agricultural innovations and, perhaps
because of his continued resistance, was soon afterward removed
and sent to Czechoslovakia as lmbassador.
In an early March speech Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul had
clearly indicated that under his plan the agriculture ministry will
be reduced to handling agricultural science and services. In a
31 May RADYANSKA UKRAINA interview Bcdyul disclosed that rayon
agricultur31 administrations--forrerly the key link in agriciOtural
management--have been reduced to small rayon departments and that
kolkhozes have been subordinated to the republic council of ministers
instead of the agriculture ministry.
Despite Polyanskiy's stress on the importance oi the oxpeent,
publicity on its features in the central press has been limiZ.ed
solely to a 24 1.iar.:11 RURAL LIFE article, and opposition has persisted
at the republic level. A January KOMMUNIST ESTONII srticle by
* For background, see the TRENDS of 14 Narch 1973, pages 25-26.
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M. BronshLeyn praisee. coordin-htion of kolkhozes and sovkhozes
by rayon agricultural admiaistrations and, while insisting that
Estonia is not opposed to experiments, warned that new forms of
interkolkitoz cooperation cannot be applied to the entire country
at once. The Estonians have long been outspoken foes of kolkhoz
unions and defenders of the aviculture ministry and its local
agencies.
UZBEK GOSPLAN CHIEF DEFENDS REPUBLIC INTERESTS
Proposals by central ministry officials to reduce the rights
of union republics in the formulation of economic plans have been
countered by the head of Uzbek Gosplan.* Writing in ECONOMIC
GAZETTE No. 26 for 25 June, S. K. Ziyadullayev defended the
prac.Ace of balancing branch plans with territorial plans al) an
"effective means for implementing the Leninist nationality policy"
and as a means of preventing a "narrow departmental approach."
Criticizing a number of central ministries for violating regulations
by sending incomplete and late draft plans to republic planners
and by 'hanging plans without informing the republics, Ziyadullayev
proposed that republic officials attend Gosplan sessions considering
draft plans affecting their respective republics.
* For background on the movement to reduce republics' rights
see the TRENDS of 23 May 1973, pages 17-19.
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NOTES
CHINESE PARTY ANNIVERSARY: In its treatment of the CCP's anniversary
Jr' 1 July Peking continued its practice since tha 1971 Lin Piao
affair of scaling down anniversary celebrations and departing from
potr.erns followed during the cultural revolution. As such, this
protice confirms trends toward normalization and away frmilt cultural
revolution behavior. As in 1972, Peking marked the party anniversary
only by printing a large picture of Mao in thc papers and by
carrying a number of articles on progress in building the party.
Last year most of the leaders appeared ac an athletic tournament
on 1 July to mark the 20th anniversary of a Mao inscription on
promoting physical culture, and there was a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial on 6 July dealing with cadres' study of Marxist theory
siAce the crucial second plenum.
The party anniverpary has never ranked with National Day or May
Day as an occasion for leadership appearances, nor did it occasion
major editorials prior to the culcural revolwion. judging from
the practice since Lin's fall, PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION
ARMY DAILY joint editorials may be expected as a matter of course
only on New Year's Day, Army Day, and National Day, while regular
leadership appearances have been reduced to May Day and National
Day.
CHINA AGRICULTURE: Continuing problems with this year's grain
harvest and grain supply shortages resulting from last year's
shortfalls were indicated by a 28 June broadcast from Shantung
province which asked commune members to retain less grain than
usual this summer and make up the difference in the fall.
Production teams were encouras-ld to sell more to the state now
on the grounds that they would be paid now for their summer crop
and the funds they thus receive can "contribute to e bumper
harvest in the autumn."
SINKIANG LEADERSHIP: A Sinkiang leadership turnout on 3 July
to greet Sihanouk on his return to China has revealed the
appointment of Saifudin as new Sinkiang first secretary,
revolutionary rommittee chairman, and milita-cy first political
commissar. Slifudin has been the leading figure there since
former first secretary and military regior. commander Lung
Shu-chin dropped from public view in early 1972 in the wake of
Lin Piao's fall. The NCNA account of the arrival also named
Yang Yung, former Peking military region commander purged during
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FBIS TRENDS
5 JULY 1973
the cultural revolution, as the Sinkiang commander and second
secretary. Yang reappeared as a "responsible person" in the
central military hierarchy last summer. In other changes reflected
in the NONA account, party oecretary Tsao Ssu-ming, who was the
senior figure in Sinkiang during Saifudin's absenceo in Peking
for nis duties as NPC vice chairman, was identified as a third
secretary (making Sinkiang the firat province to have this position),
and Ho Lin-chao was identified as a secretary and regional ,2cputy
political commissar. The changes in Sinkiang do not affect the
overwhelmingly military appearance of the border region's leadership,
though political commicsars rather than commanders now predominate.
While baifudin was governor of Sinkiang from 1955 until the post
was abolished during the cultural revolution,he concurrently served
as a deputy commander until as recently as last year.
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5 JULY 1973
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APPENDIX
:.0SCOW, PEKING BROL:CAST STP.TISTICS 25 JUNE - 1 JULY 1973
Moscow (2791 items)
Peking (1218 items)
Brezhnev Visit to U.S.
(55%)
31%
Domestic Issues
(42%)
47%
[Joint Communique
gfl
Korea
(9%)
17%
[Sovie' Party-Gov-
ernment Statement
(--)
/.1%]
[Kim Il-song Speech
on 23d Liberation
(--)
7%]
Brezhnev in France
(1%)
19%
Anniversary
[Soviet Party-Gov-
(--)
470]
Mali President in PRC
(13%)
8%
eminent Statement
Vietnam
(4%)
7%
[Joint Statement
(--)
2%]
[DRV Leaders in
(--)
370]
China
(3%)
3%
Mongolia, DUX
European Security
(--)
2%
Cambodia
(5%)
4%
Conference
PC Nuclear Test
(--)
3%
Indochina
(2%)
1%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given majox attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issued;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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