TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060039-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 12, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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on'ic ential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
12 SEPTEMBER 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. ~7)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propag;nula analysis report is h;csrd exclusively on nmlterial
c+u'ricd in frncign hrovlcust and pass nuvdia. It is published
by FHIS without coor(lination with other U.S. C(worument
components.
STATSPEC
NA'IIONAI, SI?(,IIHITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sauctionr:
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C0jjTLJTS
Lao Front Scored Delays Prior to Initialing of Protocol. . . . . . . . 1
Sihanouk Rejects Compromise; NCNA Scores Lon Nol-USSR Ties . . . . . . 4
Moscow Affirms Identity with Nonalined Cause, Rebuts Peking. . . . . .
Peking Stresses Divergences Between Moscow and Third World . . . . . .
East European Mavericks offer Familiar Views on Conference . . . . . .
Moscow Downplays European Criticism of Domest'.L Crackdown. . . . . . . 12
Chinese Leadership; CCP Statistics; PRC Provincial Leadership. . .
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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INDOCHINA
LAO FRONT SCORED DELAYS PRIOR TO INITIALING OF PROTOCOL
Two recent statements from the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) revealed
some aspects of the tortuous negotiations leading to the initialing,
on 12 September, of the protocol on the implementation of the
21 February Vientiane peace agreement. Both statements, issued
by the LPF secretary general and LPF Central Committee on 4 apd
7 September respectively, accused the United States and the Royal
Lao Government (RLG) of delaying agreement. The statements
differed somewhat, however, it their accounts of exchanges
surrounding several alleged LPF concessions.*
Both LPF statements admonished Premier Souvanna Phouma for permitting
the "Sananikone ultrarightists" faction in his government to
undermine the negotiations; but the U.S. Government and the "pro-U.S.
reactionaries in Laos" were charged with the main res>onsibility
for the stalemate. Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, the ranking
LPF negotiator, contended in his statement that U.S, Charge
d'Affair( John Dean and RLG Premier Souvanna Phouma had reneged
on assurances that a draft protocol, agreed upon following LPF
concessions on 27 July, would be signed. Toe Central Committee
state, ent did not reiterate Phoumi's charge that Dean and Souvanna
had gone back on their promise; however, it disclosed that, in
addition to the concessions on 27 July, the LPF ~,.id made further
concessions in meetings with Souvanna on 23 and 24 August, following
demands put forth by the Premier on the 15th,
The two LPF statements chronicled the Front's concessions in the
following areas:
+ Deputy premiers: Both statements indicated that in the 27 July
concessions the LPF r.greed to the creation of two deputy premier
posts, with a "firr,c" deputy to be chosen by the LPF and a "second"
deputy to be chosen by the RLG. Phoumi added that the Sananikone
faction was demanding that the two deputy premiers enjoy equal rank;
but only the Central Committee statement revealed that the LPF
acceded to this c-and on 23-24 August, with the q"+alification that
the LPF deputy premier wou~td exercise the premier's powers in his
* The lant previous authoritative LPF statement on the negotiations
was a 31 May Central Committee memorandum reviewing the progress of
the talks after 'he first 100 days. (See the TRENDS of 6 June 1973,
pages 7-9.)
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absence. The February agreement contained no provision for a
deputy premier, but the LPF has consistently agitated for ine
right to fill the number-two position in the government, assuming
that Souvanra would be the premier.
4- Ministers: The LPF claimed that agreement had been reached by
the end of July on the division of cabinet posts in the new
government, with each side assigned control of five ministries.
The agreement, according to the Central Committee statement, was
the result of Front concession to the RLG on 27 July of the choice
of the ministers of interior and education. The ministries of
defense, finance, and health were also to be assigned to the
Vientiane side. Phoumi pointed up the extent of the Front
concessions when he noted that "three out of the four important
portfolios" had been given to the RLG.
The Central Committee statement also listed the proposed LPF-
controlled ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry
of Information, Propaganda, and Tourism; Ministry of Economy
and Planning; Ministry of Communications and Public Works; and
Ministry of Culture. Neutral ministers were slated to head the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
f Boundary markers: The 27 July concessions also were said to
include LPF agreement that the number of markers delineating the
c.ase-fire line could be reduced from 32 to 27. Phoumi complained
that the Sananikone faction wanted to omit two more markers; but
i_ was left t.) the Central Committee statement to acknowledge that
the LPF in August apparently bowed to this demand and agreed to the
placement of only 25 markers. LPF media had earlier criticized
the RLG for trying to obtain approval for the deployment of joint
military teams in LPF-controlled territory.
-T? Military forces in capitals; Phoumi indicated that at the end of
July the LPF also had agreed to cut by two-thirds the size of the
military force th` Front had proposed to station in Vientiane and
Luang Prabang. The Centr"l Cor.mittee statement did not list this
point among the 27 July concessions; but it revealed that the July
agreement had stipulated tnat each side would station 1,000 policemen
in Vientiane and 500 in Luang Prabang, and that each would contribute
"an equal number of troops with equivalent equipment" to a battalion
defending Vientiane and two companies defending Luang Prabang. The
LP} had pushed hard for the right to station policemen and troops in
th.2 two cities, in order to insure the "Safety" of government officials--
a demand related to the assassination of an LPF cabinet minister
(lu:inr a previous coalition government.
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+ U.S. aid: Phoumi charged that, after the 27 July protocol had
been agreed upon, the Sananikone faction urged that the provision
on U.S. contributions to the post-war reconstruction of Laos
be cancelled. He did not indicate that any subsequent changes
were made on this point; but the Central Committee statement
revealed that the LPF's concessions on 23-24 August included
agreement to alter the language of this point in the protocol:
The 27 July draft protocol, as reported by the Central Committee
statement, stipulated that the new provisional government "will
discuss" U.S. contributions to the healing of the wounds of war
and to the post-war reconstruction in Laos. In August the LPF
reportedly agreed to vaguer language providing that the LPF
and RLG would "promote the provisional national union government
to carry out" the provisions of the February agreement on U.S.
aid.
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SIHA.NOUK REJECTS COMPROMISE; NCNA SCORES LON NOL-USSR TIES
With further developments in Cambodia now apparently hinging on
the outcome of military action, comment by Sihanouk's Front and
his Peking and Hanoi allies has assumed a time-marking character.
Sihanouk and his principal Front spokesmen have maintained an
intransigent position on the question of a settlement and have
reaffirmed determination to gain control of the entire country.
However, insurgent forecasts of the imminent collapse of the Phnom
Penh administration, common in propaganda at the time of the
mid-August U.S. bombing halt, have steadily declined. Addressing
the nonalined nations' summit confer:.tce on 6 September, Sihanouk
lambasted the Nixon Administration for continued it"erference in
Cambodia, claimed that over 20,000 Saigon and Bangk)k troops
are currently in Cambodia supporting Lon Nol, and rt'led out a
settlement short of RGNU control of the country. A statement from
the RGNU prime minister's office, broadcast by thr; insurgent's
radio on the 5t1, more bluntly affirmed that the Front will never
have contact or enter into negotiation with the Phnom Penh
government.
Both Peking and Hanoi have maintained their low posture of recent
weeks, originating little comment on Cambodian developments.
Peking has continued its practice of replaying major Front
statements, but recently lies heavily edited insurgent pronounce-
ments that have raised issues related to broader Chinese interests.
Most notably, NCNA's abbreviated replay of Sihanouk's 6 September
address in Algiers deleted all criticism of the Nixon Administration
by name, the claim that the United States was behind his overthrow
in 1970, and allegaticns about Thai and Saigon troop support.
PEKING CRITICISM While soitpedaling Sihanouk's criticism of the
OF USSR POSITION United States and its allies, Peking has
predictably given full play to his rec en,;
attacks on the Soviet Union. Thus, NCNA on 7 September repotted
Sihanouk's impromptu remarks that day in which he disputed Cuban
Prime Minister Castro's characterization of the Soviet Union as the
friend of oppressed nations by notin,, Moscow's continued ties with
Lon Nol and refusal to recognize the RGNU. Peking's first comment
on recent Soviet efforts to pose as a consistent supporter of
Sihanouk's Front came in a 9 September NCNA correspondent's report
which charged Moscow with perfidy tow?rd Cambodia. NCNA assailed
the USSR for refusing military aid to the insurgents, attempting to
bring about a cmmapromise political settlement of the war contrary to
the Front's objectives, granting economic assistance to Lon Nol,
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and refusing to break ties with Lon Nol or withdraw its diplomats
from Phnom Penh in conformity with Sihanouk's 10 August statement
to foreign embassies in Cambodia. Bitterly castigating Soviet
intentions, Peking charged that Moscow is sticking with Lon Nol's
regime so as to use it as a tool for future intervention in
Cambodia and expansion into Southeast Asia. In this connection,
NCNA quoted a Thai official for the observation that Moscow covets
Cambodian port facilities, particularly in Kompong Som, adding in
its own name that the recent outpouring of Soviet calls for Asian
collective security in the wake of the Vietnam war. is designed to
encourage the replacement of the "hegemony" of the United States in the
area with that of the Soviet Union.
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- 6 -
N 0 N A L I N E D CONFERENCE
MOSCOW AFFIRMS IDENTITY WITH NONALINED CAUSE, REBUTS PEKING
Moscow's coverage of the fourth nonalined summit conference, held
in Algiers 5-9 September, focused on countering Peking's efforts aimed
at changing the "anti-imperialist orientation" of the third world
and rendering it eq?ially opposed to the capitalist wcrld and the
Soviet bloc. Soviet media denounced the "absurd pseudotheory" of
dividing the world into rich and poor countries as a misguided
attempt to convince the nonalined states of a "superpower
conspiracy" against their interests. Moscow complained that this
dichotomy ignored class distinctions between the developed
capitalist and socialist countries, as well as the class content of
the nonalined movement. The Soviet definition of nonalinement as
anti-imperialist and, by implication, anti-Western is consistent
with Moscow's comment on previous nonalined summit conferences.
BREZHNEV MESSAGE The thrust of the Soviet position was set by
Brezhnev himself in a message to conference
host Boumediene on the eve of the conference--a message publicized
by Algerian media on 1 September but not acknowledged in Soviet media.*
In his letter Brezhnev warned of "imperialist" and "reactionary"
attempts to water down the anti-imperialist content of the nonalined
movement, prevent expansion of the "zone of detente" and set the
nonalined countries against the socialise states, thereby depriving
them of their "natural and most reliable allies." Brezhnev also
rejected the concept of dividing the world into rich and poor states--
an implicit swipe at the Algerian president, who had declared in a
late August interview with the Belgrade BORBA that unbalanced
economic relations between the industrialized powers and the developing
states were a chief preoccupation of the nonalined countries.
The formal message of greetings from Podgornyy and Kosygin to the
conference itself, carried by TASS on the 4th, conveyed in bland
fashion Moscow's view that positive trends in the world benefited
all peoples and pledged coi.inuing Soviet cooperation with the
developing countries. Moscow predictably publicized remarks by
conference speakers appreciative of the USSR or consistent with
Soviet positions, giving extensive attention to Castro's speech on
the 7th in defense of Soviet policy and condemnation of the United
States. Castro's "sharp criticism" of "pseudorevolutionaries" was
* Czechoslovak and GDR dispatches from Algiers on 1 September
curiously hailed Brezhnev's message, CTK citing "political observers"
as attaching great importance to the letter.
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repeatedly employed to rebut the speech by Libya's al-Qadhdhafi,
the target orL periodic Soviet criticism for his anticommunist
views. Coverage of the conference proceedings also underlined
the participants' concern with economic questions, depicting
speakers as seeking the economic liberation of their countries
from the domination of "imperialist monopolies" and the
establishment of national control over their natural resources.
POLEMIC WITH PEKING A particular effort to counteract Peking's
anti-Soviet line before a largely
sympathetic audience was evident both in Brezhnev's message and
in the spate of Soviet commentary on the conference. Although
the Soviet leader did not point an accusing finger directly at
Peking, he complained about attempts to place the Soviet Union
"on the same footing" as the "atost important capitalist countries,"
a prominent element in China's anti-Soviet propaganda. A PRAVDA
article by Orestov on 1 September enlarged on the Brezhnev
thesis by warning that "some people" in the nonalined states had
been influenced by Peking and as a result were downgrading the
campaign against imperialism and engaging in activities harmful
to the beneficial relations between nonalined countries and the
socialist states headed by the Soviet Union.
Moscow also attempted to tarnish Peking's third world credentials.
A PRAVDA article by K. Brutents on 30 August boasted that the
actions of the "Maoist leadership" against Soviet detente
policies had not met with the expected response in the nonalined
countries, and a 5 September. IZVESTIYA article by G. Bondarevskiy
and V. Sofiaskiy accused "the Maoists" of acting "as the shameless
enemies of the nonalinement movement." Less authoritative comment
raised doubts about Peking's dedication to anti-imperialism by
pointing out that Chinese policies "coincided in many respects"
with those of the capitalist states. Several broadcasts to inter-
national audiences also charged that Peking had tried to prevent
the adoption of "constructive" decisions at the conference. Moscow
termed "a gross lie" and a "slanderous concept" the reference to
"superpower hegemonism" in Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's message
to the nonalined conference. Peking was also accused of having
taken up policies pursued by John Foster Dulles and his followers
concerning "great and small, rich and poor countries."
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Assessing the results of the conference, PRAVDA acknowledged on
the 10th that there were differences of opinion during the
conference stemming from varying foreign and domestic policies,
but maintained that debates brought out a "certain degree of
unity or similarity" of positions.
PEKING STRESSES DIVERGENCES BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THIRD WORLD
Peking devoted considerably greater attention to the Algiers
conference than it had to the last nonalined summit in Lusaka
in 1970, reflecting the intensification of Chinese efforts to
undermine the Soviet Union in the third world. As in 1970,
Chou En-lai sent a congratulatory message stressing the
increasingly important role being played in international affairs
by nonalin-i nations, especially in the struggle against "big-
power heiemonism." In keeping with past practice, Peking will
presuma ly assess the results of the conclave in a PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial in the next few days.
While duly reporting speeches and resolutions at the conference
condemning the United States on such issues as Vietnam and
Cambodia, the Chinese took special pains to support the complaints
voiced by some of the conferees that the Soviet Union does not
represent the interests of the developing nations but is engaged
in competition with the United States at their expense. Notably,
an 8 September NCNA article based on Western press sources reported
the indignant reactions of the conferees to Brezhnev's message
to Algerian President Boumediene on the eve of the conference.
The article pointedly criticized the Brezhnev message as a
"crude attempt" to influence the deliberations of the conference
and likened it to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The
presence of Soviet tanks in Prague as well as the B-52 bombings
of Hanoi were treated in the article as proof of the collu.:ion
of the superpowers in disregard of the interests of smaller
nations.
The determined Chinese effort to tar the Soviet Union was evident
in the treatment of Castro's 7 September speech defending ?:oscow
and scoring "those who speak about two imperialisms." Reporting
the address without comment, a lengthy NCNA account described
the ensuing contretemps at the session as evidence of wide
disapproval among the participants of the Cuban leader's stance.
Thus NCNA reported that all lights in the conference hall "suddenly
went out" during Castro's speech, and that Cambodian Prince
Sihanouk interrupted the proceedings to ask Castro to have Moscow
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prove its intentions toward the third world by Establishing
relations with his government and breaking ties with Lon Nol.
NCNA pointedly observed that "warm applause" greeted Sihanouk
at the close of his remarks. Peking also disclosed that Libyan
Chairman al-Qadhdhafi walked out of the session during Castro's
speech, and quot?d the Libyan leader as stating that Castro is
a Soviet ally and therefore speaks in defense of Soviet interests
and that "the Soviet Union is world imperialism, the same as the
United States."
EAST EUROPEAN MAVERICKS OFFER FAMILIAR VIEWS ON CONFERENCE
While Moscow's orthodox allies in East Europe followed its lead,
Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania offered independent assessments of
third world developments. Tito, the only representative of a
European socialist state to attend the conference, hailed the
progress of the nonalined movement--with Yugoslavia an integral
part--in his speech to the gathering; Romania's Ceausescu implicitly
identified his country with the aims of the movement; and Tirana
used the occasion for new attacks on Moscow and Washington.
YUGOSLAVIA In a speech marked by bland generalities at the
opening session of the conference, Yugoslav
President Tito stressed the growth of the nonalined movement as
a major factor in relaxation of international tensions. In
particular, he noted that Eurooe "is no longer a hotbed of any
immediate danger of war," a trend evidenced by the European
security conference. He balanced this assessment, however, with
a reminder about the unevenness of the positive trends in world
affairs and the continued role of force as a "dominant" factor
in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa and Latin
America.
In contrast to his speech at the Lusaka conference in 1970,
which had been heavily conditioned by the Czechoslovak invasion,
Tito stuck to generalities on the score of pressure by the great
powers on smaller countries. Thus after noting the weakening
of "bloc polarization," he merely urged that nonalined countries
strengthen their solidarity and mutual support "in case" one
of them is threatened or "exposed to foreign pressure."
Without mentioning Moscow or Washington, as he had in Lusaka,
Tito advised the third world to shape its own destiny and not to
rely on the great powers 'hven when they are motivated by the
best intentions."
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While halting the progress of detente, Tito deplored the "absurd"
situation in which the a velopment of science and the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy were actually widening the gulf between
the developed and develop:.ng countries. To counter this trend
he urged that the nonal.ined countries step up their cooperation
in utilization of their "vast sources of power and raw materials"
in Lrder Lo be able to deal with the developed countries "in a
more organized way."
Tito was somewhat ;cure specific in an interview for Algerian
television or the 9th, the conference's last day. As reported
by TikNJUG the eagle. day, he remarked that, in contrast to the tense
atmosphere prevailing at the time of the flit nonalined conference
in Belgrade in 1961, "today the great powers are talking, acid
this is something positive." Ile added that "this is confirmed by
Brezhnev's visit to Washington, Nixon's trips to Moscow, China,
etc." Declaring that "only one question ha" been 3uived, the
question of war or peace," he again urged intensification of
"organized" economic cooperation among the nonalined countries
based on the large raw material resources at their disposal and
their ability to manipulate the prices of such raw materials to
their advantage.
ROMANIA As in 1970, Ceausescu used his message to the
conference as a vehicle for reiterating the main
tenets of Bucharest's independent stance, now updated in cognizance
of recent progress toward detente. In his message, carried by
AGERPRES in English cn the 5th, the Romanian president noted that
the conference was taking place at a time oi. "profound positive
._.;litical and social mutations" in international affairs. He
expressed the hope that the Algiers conference would promote
the establishment in international relations of the principles of
equal rights, independence and sovereignty, noninterference in
internal affairs, "and every people's right to self-dependently
decide its economic and social development." Calling European
security the key factor in world race, Ceausescu characteristically
stressed that it should be achieved through cooperation of "all
states of the continent, irrespective of social system" on the
basis of equality. He also called for the liquidation of bases,
the removal of troops from foreign territories and the establish-
ment of denuclearized zones, and he urged Moscow--in an appeal
ostensibly a.ldressed to the great powers--to refrain from policies
of "strength and diktat" and "oppressing and dominating other
peoples." Unlike his 1970 greeting, Ceausescu's message avoided
any reference to "all socialist states"--a contentious concept
intended to embrace Peking.
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ALBANIA An editorial in the 8 September ZERI I POPULLIT
predictably denounced the attitudes of Washington
and Moscow toward the Algiers conclave. Reserving its main
venom for. Moscow, the editorial seized on Brezhnev's message to
Algerian President Boumediene which had "complained that 'the
Soviet socialist state and the big capitalist powers are
being placed on the same level."' Noting that Brezhnev's
"threatening" message was not published by Soviet media,
ZERI I POPULLIT pointed with satisfaction to a statement by
Cambodian Prince Sihanouk at an Algiers press conference that
the nonalined countries want neither threats nor advice and
that "we relinquish recognition of our movement by the USSR."
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
MOSCOW DOWNPLAYS EUROPEAN CRITICISM OF DOME;,TIC CRACKDC'Y;N
In line with Its effort to deflate the international impact of
its domestic crackdown on dissidence, Moscow has presented a
highly selective account of West European reactions to the
Saklarov and SolzhenLtsyn affairs. It has acknowledged in
general terms the emergence of a strong Western reaction to
these affairs, but it has interpreted this reaction as reflecting
resurgent cold war attitudes on the part of opponents of peaceful
coexistence. It has been similarly selective in its treatment of
West European communist comment, pr,-senting it as reinforcing the
Soviet contention that anti-detente :orces are supporting the
dissidents. The Issues of political censorship and intellectual
freedom raised in both the communist and non-communist European
comment have been predictably ignored by Moscow.
NON-COMMUNIST REACTION t sketchy image of the West European
reaction to the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn
affairs has been conveyed in several recent Soviet commentaries.
A major article in IZVESTJYA on 4 September, for example, devoted
substantial attention to the subject in the context of a sharp
attack on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Characterizing
the two radios as instruments of the U. S. "special services,"
the article asserted that their continued existence contravened
not only "the improvement of relations which has begun to emerge
among states with different political systems but also generally
accepted international legal practice." It asserted that Radio
Liberty had recently shown "particular diligence" In disseminating
the writings of "so-called dissidents, morally deprived persons"
--a characterization which it specifically tied to Sakharov and
Solzhenitsyn. In similar vein, a commentary by N. Andreyev,
carried by Moscow domestic service on b September, denounced the
"outcry" raised in the Western press over the Sakharov affair.
Ascribing this agitation to anti-Soviet forces that are attempting
to "reverse the relaxation of tension," Andreyev asserted that
it was intended to create an atmosphere of "psychological pressure"
on the Soviet Union with the purpose of gaining concessions.
Soviet media have ignored the statements of support for the
dissidents voiced by West German Chancellor Brandt and the U.S.
Academy of Sciences. Moscow has alluded indirectly, however,
to criticisms of the Soviet domestic crackdown made by Austrian
Chancellor Kreisky and Swedish Foreign Minister Wickman on 3
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and 5 September, respectively. TASS on the 8th commented that
it was strange that "some statesmen in Sweden and. Austria" should
have joined their voices to those of the opponents of detente.
Cc +1UNIST aE,\CTIONS itoscow has reported only selectively on
the West European communist reaction to
the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn affairs. It has ignored the
formal support for I ii1le~.tual freedom voiced by the French and
Italian communist parties, ;tnd has reported only selectively on
n few other statemcntr; expressing support for the Soviet position.
%Iie French party has been by far the most voluable on commenting
nn the subject. Pressed to maintain a respectably libertarian
Image by the requirements of its electoral. strategy, as well as
by a current press debate concerning the role of intellectuals
in a socialist regime,* the PCF has expressed support for, the
"right" of the Soviet dissidents to voice their criticisms of
government policy. In a series of commentaries on the 23d, 24th,
and 29th of August, L'UWtANITE balanced this support with an attack
on "reactionary forces" hostile tc, the Soviet policy of detente and
tc the left alliance in France. On the 29th, the paper declared:
"I:, the socialist France we desire, freedom of opinion and expression
will be guaranteed for all, including dissenters. . ." None oZ
these arti^1es have been reported in the Soviet media.
Moscow did report, however, a press statement by PCF Secretary
General George Marchals, on 29 August, strongly defending the
Soviet position. In his statement, I1ar:.hais attempted to downplay
the significance of the ;`fair by asserting that only a "dozen
names" were involved and that some of them, like Sakharov, had
been ,-able to express their views. He went on to say, moreover,
that the "methods dating from the time of Stalin's personality
cult" had been condemned by the 20th CPSU congress and no longer
prevailed in the Soviet Union. TASS in reporting this statement
on 30 August deleted the reference to Stalin but ,etained the more
euphemious "personality cult era." PRAVDA's version of the TASS
item and a domestic broadcast summarizing Marchais' remarks showed
even greater sensitivity about de-Stalinization by deleting
the reference to the 20th party congress.
* The dispute has been carried on by PCF member Pierre Daix and
? Politburo member R. Leroy and has concerned charges made by the
former, in a recent book on Solzhenitsyn, that repressive methods
continue to be applied in the Soviet Union.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 SEPTEMBER 1973
The Italian party in commenting on tit.' Soviet crackdown was
even more outspoken in asserting its commitment to the principle
of l.ritellectual freedom. A commentary .n L'UNITA on 29 August
asserted that "open critical debate" was one of the "ind:Lspensable
methods by which a society argues about itself." Will le taking
care to reserve for the party the same rights of free debate
that it granted to the dissidents, the article did it aL'tack
Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn personally, nor did it attempt tr
downplay the affair by linking it with the agitation of anti-
Soviet forces. MoscoAr has not reported the L'UNITA article.
LINKAGE WITH CSCE Moscow's treatment of the West European
reaction to its domestic crackdown has
obviously been calculated with the forthcoming Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in mind. Aware t: at
its vulnerabilities on the Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn a:fairs
could expose it to increased pressure for accommodation on the
cult,,ira1 exchange issue at the conference, Moscow haF, sought to
discredit Western criticism by ascribing it to anti-detente
motivations. Along with this, it has vigorously reasserted
its long-standing position that cultural exchanges are matters
to be arranged and regulated by state agencies, not left to the
initiative of individual persons. On this point, it has
reiterated a principle that could serve as a rationalization
for its position at Air' conference. Referring to an opinion
assertediy offered by a "pr.Dminer.t U.S. international lawyer"
in 1945, IZVESTIYA on 4 September declared that the "principle
whereby each state possesses a sovereign right in the matter of
the dissemination of mass information on its own territory is
receiving increasing reco;;nition."
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CONFIDENT IAl., FillS TRENDS
1.2 SEPTEMBER 1973
N 0 T E S
CHINESE LEADERSHIP: NCNA's 12 September account of Mao's meeting
with President Pompidou highlighted the new status of Wang Flung-wen
and the continuing deflation of the Mao cult. In a greeting
without precedent in PRC practice, Warr Hung-wen, identified
by his new title as party vice chairman, met Pompidou and Chou
En-lai at the entrance to Mao's home. Wang's new role as host
for Mao indicates a close association between the aging leader
and China's new third-ranking leader.
The NCNA account referred to Mao only as "Chairman", omitting
all of the usual honorifics. While some diminution in honorifics
had been signaled by the.t4CNA account of a rlao meeting with
Chinese-American doctors on 2 August which designated ilao "leader
of the Chinese people" instead of "great leader of the Chinese
people," tenth congress documents had used the "great leader"
formulation several times. The new formulation omitted the
phrase entirely.
Pompidou's 11 September arrival in Peking was the occasion for
NCNA's first non-stroke order listing of tenth Politburo members,
plq,:ing Yao Wen-yuan above Li Hsien-Tien and Wu T. Yao ranked
above Li in the last Politburo and his retention of this position
might also indicate that although his mentor Chiang Ching failed
to reach she top rungs of the new Politburo, she still retains
her rank above other ordinary members of the Prlitburo.
CCP STATISTIC: The Wuhan radio on 28 August revealed that in
klupeh 82 percent of the 300,000 party members chosen since the
ninth congress are under 35 years of age and that 20 percent are
:amen. If i:?tional figures follcw the same lines is proportion
co Flupeh's populition, some six to seven n!illion new members
have been chosen since 1969 and significant progress has been made
in bringing "millions of successors" into the party. According
to tenth party congress documents there are now 27 million members
of the Chi,iese Communist party, up from 17 million members in the
-arly sixties before the decimations of the cultural revolution.
PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: Shantung's sacond secr,tary Yuan
Sheng-ping, dropped from the central committee by the tenth
congress and out of public view since June, has been purged.
A prov:.neial broadcast on 10 September identified Pai Ju-ping,
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CONFIDENTIAL FMS TRENDS
12 ' 'TEMBER 1973
formerly n provincial deputy secretary, as second secrrtary.
Pn.L had been named n full membe, of the tenth centrra committee.
The broadcast also quoted from 41 spetch by provincial chief
Yang Te-chih in which he alluded to recent provincial problems,
warning specifically against "getting entangled in settling old
scores" and avoiding "r~lc;-.lessly using such slogans as 'tie in
both the higher and lower levels."' He Also seemed to refer to
tht Yuan affair in echoing Chou En-lai's political report treat
"certain wrong tendencies" exist and that it is necessary to
`correct the shortcomings and mistakes with regard to our
1Padership."
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F B I S TRENDS
Il_ SI:I''I'EMBGit 1973
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATLSTICS 3 - 9 SEPTI'MBEI( 1.973
Moscow (29%11 ir.ems)
Peking (1050 items)
China
(L 37.)
87
DotnestIc I.ssue,g
(57%)
45%
[CCI' 10th Congress,
4
(2)
3% ]
[C(E' 1.0th Congress
(37%)
40%)
th Nonalined Summit
(2%)
8%
Tr icontinenLill 'fable
(15%)
17
Conference, Algiers
Tennis Tournament,
DPRK National Day
(--)
6%
Peking
Bulgarian National Day
(--)
5%
4th Nonalined Summit
(--)
14%
Afro-Asian Writers
(.1Z)
5%
Conference, Algiers
Conference, Alma-Ata
DPR.K National Day
(--)
5%
Vietnam
(5%)
4%
Vietnam
(4%)
2%
Cambodia
(4%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In pn cntheses indicate volume c.f cornment during the preceding week.
T.,plcs and events given major atteictlon in terms of volume are not always
liscussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues:
iii other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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