(UNTITLED)TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060048-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: November 14, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Corbfidentia'
14 NOVEMBER 1973
CVOL. XXIV, NO. 46)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordinat?on with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY TNFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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14 NOVEMBER 1973
CONTENTS
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Noscow Has Little Comment on New Egyptian-Israeli Agreement.
Moscow Depicts Deepening World Crisis Over Oil Cutbacks. . . .
6
Moscow, East Europe Diverge on Treatment of Watergate. . . . . . .
9
SING-U.S. RELATIONS
i(isctngar Coverage Reflects Progress in Bilateral Relations. . . .
10
INDOCHINA
GVN Air Strikes, Alleged U.S. Flights Over DRV Draw Protests . . . .
12
RGNU Ministers Transferred; Ieng Sary Leaves for Cambodia. . . . .
17
Le Duan Leads First DRV Party-Government Visit to Laos . . . . .
21
Traditional DRV Celebrations MLrk Soviet Anniversary . . . .
23
USSR
Estonian Proposes Alternative Farm Management System . . . . .
25
NOTES
Moscow on U,.S. Trade; Peking on Soviet-Japan=se Relations;
PRC Language Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . .
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ARAB - ISRAELI C ONFLICT
MOSCOW HAS LITTLE COMMENT ON NEW EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT
Moscow has reacted to the six-point Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire
stabilization arrangement, signed on 11 November, with the same
caution which has been displayed in the race of past U.S.-
initiated peace moves in the Middle East. The minimal followup
comment on the agreement has deferred to Egyptian interpretation,
a pattern consistent with Moscow's handling of the June 1970
U.S. initiative calling for a cease-fire and a resumption of
the Jarring mission.
While TASS did not report the six points of the agreement until
almost 24 hours after they had been made public on 9 November,
this may well have stemmed from the confused sequence of reports
from Cairo. Soviet media had displayed some concern to cite
Cairo as the source of the details of the agreement. Most
Soviet reportage, before and since the signing of the agreement,
centered on alleged Israeli cease-fire violations and on
Israeli obstruction of the UNEF functions.
In an effort to balance the U.S. initiative, Moscow has taken
pains to play up Arab expressions of gratitude for its aid and
support and has reiterated that such assistance would continue.
Receiving the new Kuwaiti ambassador, Podgornyy declared,
according to an Arabic-language broadcast on the 12th, that the
USSR would continue its "active assistance" to secure a just
peace and insure the security of all countries and peoples of the
Middle East. Brezhnev referred to "effective support" for the
Arabs provided by all socialist states in his 12 November speech
in Kiev at a dinner for Yugoslavia's Tito. He otherwise mentioned
the Middle East only in citing the war there and the Chilean
situation as attempts by "imperialist reaction" to counteract the
deepening of detente.
At the same time, TASS selectively quoted Secretary Kissinger to
demonstrate that detente has not beer affected by the Middle
East crisis. In a brief 13 Ncvember report da.;elined New York
on Kissinger's "interview with Amer!can televiG:!on stations"--not
identified as taking place in Peking--TABS featured his rejection
of the idea that events in the Middle East "allegedly 'exposed
the myth"' of Soviet-U.S. detente. The account summed up his
remarks oa the Arab-Israeli conflict in one paragraph, noting
that II.S, goals were stabilization of the cease-fire and the
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holding of a peace conference. TASS added that Kissinger stressed,
however, that the United States would continue unconditional
support to Israel which was "allegedly necessary to guarantee
Israel's 'existence."' The dispatch concluded by reporting
Kissinger as saying the Arab decision to limit oil production
would not influence the U.S. position.
Follow-up to the 11 November agreement cited an Egyptian spokesman's
explanation that it was a first practical step toward' implementation
of UN decisions providing for complete Israeli withdrawal from
occupied Arab territory. The spokesman was also quoted as saying
the measures being taken are in preparation for a peace conference.
Moscow has made a few other passing references to peace negotiations,
and in one notable instance, a Volskiy article in NEW TIMES of
9 November, indicated that "most" of the Palestinian leaders did
not object in principle to participation in peace talks.
REPORTS OF TASS' belated and confused handling of the six-
SIX POINTS point agreement, outlined by Secretary Kissinger
in a letter to UN Secretary General Waldheim
and made public on the 9th, may have been due to conflicting
reports from Cairo and uncertainty over Israeli acceptance.
Joint announcement of the agreement in Washington, Cairo and
Jerusalem was scheduled for 1700 GMT on the 9th. The announce-
ment actually came first from Washington an hour or so in
advance of the scheduled time. The agreement calls for Egyptian-
Israeli observance of the cease-fire; discussions to settle the
question of return to the 22 October positions "in the framework
of agreement on the disenga,ement and separation of forces"
under UN auspices; supplies to the town of Suez and evacuation
of wounded Suez citizens; no impe;iment to the movement of
nonmilitary supplies to the east bank of the canal; replacement
of Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road by UN checkpoints,
with Israeli participation at the Suez end "to supervise the
nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal"; and
exchange of all prisoners of war "as soon as the UN checkpoints
are established."
+ The Israeli radio at 1800 GMT on the 9th carried the text of
the six points as officially announced in Washington; at 2300 GMT
the radio reported an Israeli cabinet announcement that the
government's position was "positive" regarding the signing of the
agreement, but that further contacts with the United States would
be held. A newscast at 1100 GMT on the 10th said the signing
would not take place that day since some points still "required
clarification." It was not until 1800 GMT on the 10th that
Mrs. Meir was reported as stating that authorization to sign the
agreement had been given.
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+ In Cairo, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) at 2010 GMT
on the 9th incorrectly reported a set of four points said
to have been agreed upon as a result of Secretary Kissinger's
visit; this erroneous report was repeated by Cairo radio at
2100. But at 2225 GMT MENA carried the text of the actual
six-point plan.
+ TASS in a dispatch from New York at 2208 GMT on the
9th reported that Kissinger had sent Waldheim a letter
stating that during his consultations with Egyptian and
Israeli representatives an "understanding" was reached on
settling a number of matters pertaining to the cease-fire.
On the 10th at 1223 GMT a TASS multi-datelined item from
Cairo, Washington and Paris juxtaposed the incorrect MENA
report on a four-point agreement with the six-point "text
of the agreement quoted in Kissinger's letter" to Waldheim.
The latter was an accurate rendition except for the omission
of one clause providing for Israeli participation in
supervising the nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the
Suez end of the Cairo-Suez road. TASS went on, under the
Paris dateline, to point to discrepancies "noted here" between
the Cairo and Washington versions.
While TASS thus failed to acknowledge the second, correct MENA
report on the agreement, at 1528 GMT it killed the multi-date-
lined item incorporating the erroneous MENA report and
substituted the text of the six points as "reported in the
Cairo press." The overlooking of the correct MENA version
is inexplicable, but it would seem that TASS, while it had
a correct text in hand from Washington, was waiving to
attribute it to an official Cairo source.
The confusion over the versions of the agreement and
Egyptian-Israeli acceptance seems also to have been
reflected in remarks by PRAVDA political observer Zhukov
in his television program on the 10th. Excerpts of his
TV remarks were broadcast by Moscow radio's domestic service
at 1745 GtTT, ?gut according to Hoscow's TV program schedule,
his television appearance was some two hours earlier. Thus
his statement would appear to have been prepared while
there was still some doubt as to what set of points Cairo
had actually accepted. Zhukcv noted the Kissinger letter to
Waldheim enumerating "several, questions" connected with
implementation of the cease-fire on which Kissinger "supposedly"
reached agreement with Egypt and Israel. He went on to say
? that the Western press and radios had carried a host of reports
on this matter, some of them contradictory, and added that it
was his impression these reports should be treated "with utmost
caution while waiting for the real state of events to be clarified."
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The signing of the agreement at 1300 GMT on the 11th was reported
by Soviet mudlo. shortly thereafter--in an Arabic-language broad-
cast at 1730 GMT and by TASS at 1817 GMT. The TASS account
referred to the signing of "a protocol on the observance of
the cease-fire, ending of military operations, and the return
of troops to positions they occupied on 22 October." This
language paralleled to some extent the MENA announcement on
the signing of the "UN document" concerning the cease-fire
arrangement on the West bank "and the return of Israeli forces
to their positions at the time of the cease-fire on 22 October."
PALESTINIAN The Volskiy article in NEW TIMES (No. 45,
ROLE IN TALKS 9 November) for the first time broached the
possibility of Palestinian participation in
the peace talks called for in Security Council Resolution 338.
In line with the USSR's previous caution vis-a-vis its
relations with the Palestinian organizations, Moscow had
ignored the flurry of reports in Arab media since tte end of
October that the Soviet Union, through its ambassador to
Lebanon, had advised the Palestinians to he prepared to
participate in a peace conference. According to Arab reports,
Mcscow also brought up with the Palestinians the question of
formation of a Palestinian state and of a Palestinian govern-
ment in exile.
Volskiy summed up the readiness or interest expressed by Egypt,
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon in participating in peace talks,
adding that the Palestine Liberation Organization (k'LO) leader-
ship was also discussing its attitude toward talks, He noted
that PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat had held a series of conferences
on this topic with leaders of various Palestinian organizations,
and attributed to the Beirut paper AN-NAHAR the view that "most
of them" did not object in principle to participating in such
talks. Volskiy went on to observe that "despite certain shades
of differences" between their positions, the leaders of the
Arab countries and peoples were displaying a "constructive
approach" to a just settlement of the conflict.
Other than a scattering of reports on fedayeen participation
during the fighting, Soviet media have made few references to
Palestinian activities. TASS did report from Beirut on
20 October a PLO Executive Committee session chaired by
'Arafat, noting that a PLO spokesman said results of the
session would promote a stepup in Palestinian fighting against
Israeli troops. TASS and Moscow's Arabic-language service on
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11 November and PRAVDA on the 12th reported 'Arafat's arrival
in Cairo, the Arabic broadcast adding that he had previously
visited other Arab capitals, For the past few days Arab
media have carried a spate of rumors about an imminent
visit to Moscow by a Palestinian delegation led by 'Arafat,
along with reports of postponements and denials of such a
visit. In light of past practice, Moscow would not be
expected to give advance announcement of such a visit.
An 'Arafat message of congratulations to the USSR Supreme
Soviet: Presidium chairman on the October Revolution was
broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 11th and published in
PRAVDA the following day. 'Arafat praised the USSR's
"firm support" for the Palestinians "national rights and
legitimate aspirations" and referred to the "unlimited aid"
given by the Soviet people to the Arab people in general
and the Palestinian people in particular.
BACKGROUND ON The U.S. initiative of June 1970, which
1970 INITIATIVE called for resumption of the Jarring missicn
and a cease-fire, was also handled by Moscow
in a cautious fashion. Initial response to that move was
largely confined to replays of Arab and West European assess-
ments that the U.S. proposals contained nothing new. After
President Nasir's acceptance of the U.S. t.nitiative in his
23 July anniversary speech--somewhat belatedly noted by
TASS--Moscow comment repeated Nasir's argument that the U.S.
plan did not differ from Security Council Resolution 242.
Moscow did not specifically address itself to the substance:
while it did endorse resumption of the Jarring mission, references
to a cease-fire were infrequent and imprecise. Soviet media did
attempt to bolster Nasir in the face of Arab cr.ticism of his
acceptance of the U.S. initiative and accusations of a sellout
on the Palestinian issue. Coordinated Egyptian, Israeli, and
U.S, announcements of a cease-fire effective August 7 were
promptly reported by TASS in a brief triple-datelined item, and
Moscow began crediting the agreement to an "Egyptian peace
initiative."
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EAST - WES RELATIONS
MOSCOW DEPICTS DEEPENING WORD) CRISIS OVER OIL CUTBACKS
The Arabs' oil squeeze on the West and the efforts by the
Western countries to deal with the crisis have been a
constant though subordinate focus of Soviet news reporting
since the Leginning of the recent Middle Eastern fighting.
Relying mainly on foreigr, news reports and keeping self-
initiated comment to a minimum, Moscow has presented a
picture of deepening crisis, in the West brought about both
by the imminence of severe oil shortages and by the inability
of the oil-consuming countries to devise an effective common
policy. The disruptive impact of the crisis on Western
alliance relationships has been particularly noted. While
Moscow has assumed an air of detachment in reporting
these developments, it has taken care to remind the West
of its own oil resources and to hint at the prospective
advantages of commercial arrang%;ments for exploiting these
resour,,es.
WESTERN C;ISCORD Moscow has shown ill-concealed relish
in reporting signs of discord in he
West provoked by the Arab o>.1 squeeze. This wfs a major
element in its interpretation of the rift between the
TJnited States and its NATO allies at the end of October.
Moscow repeatedly pointed out at that time that the
resistance of the FRG and other NATO countries to he U.S.
supply of war materials to Israel was prompted by a
self-interested concern to avoid Arab retaliation. More
recently, it has reported in minute detail measures adopted
or suggested by various Western countries which reflect
a differentiated response to the oil embargo. It has
noted, for example, the decision of a Japanese oil company
to stop oil supplies to the U.S. armed forces, and it has
reported a suggestion by Denmark that NATO forces
participating in a current military exercise bring their
own fuel.
Moscow's main exhibit in this line of reporting was the
resolution adopted by EEC foreign ministers at their meeting
in Brussels on 6 November. Widely regarded in the West as
at best a stopgap declaration designed to reassure the
Arabs regarding Europe's interest in a "just" Middle East
settlement, the resolution has been presented by Moscow
as an example of European faint-heartedness. Accurately
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anticipating the tone of the resolution, a PRAVDA commentary
on 6 November reported that the EEC members were showing
little enthusiasm for a Netherlands' proposal to pool
thet oil stocks of the member countries for future rationing
according to need. Quoting the London TIMES, it observed
that the attitudes -3f the European countries proved once
again that at a time of trial for the rival partners of
the Common Market "charity begins at home."
A TASS report on the resolution the next clay expanded on
this theme. Noting that the ministers evaded an answer to
the Dutch proposal, it observed that the "partners of
Holland clearly could not bring themselves to come out
in her support for fear it would lead to an extension
of the Arab boycott to other countries of the European
Economic Community." Neither in this report nor in others
has Moscow referred to reports. noted'in the Western press,
that the EEC declaration was influenced by tacit assurances,
conveyed through the French, that Europe, including the Dutch,
would not lack for oil. Nor has it noted that the Netherlands,
as a member of the "Nine," participated in formulating the
EEC resolution.
SOVIET OIL RESOURCES Moscow has taker, pains to emphasize
the contrast between the West's
straitened circumstances and its own favored situation
with respect to oil resources. It has suggested, moreover,
that the West might find a solution to its energy problems
by taking advantage of the offers of improved trade relations
that the Soviet Union has extended. In a discussion program
beamed to Worth America on 4 November, for example, one
commentator asserted that the Soviet Union's energy resources
could "contribute most decisively to taking the edge off
the American energy crisis."' He went on to quote a Soviet
scientist: as saying that the day might come "when cold
Siberia will light and heat New York." Another commentary
beamed to North America on 13 November described with
approval the interest being shown by many American companies
in joint arrangements for developing Soviet energy resources.
The Soviets have also conveyed more specific assurances
along this line to other countries victimized by the oil
squeeze. In an interview with DER SPIEGEL on 12 November,
CPSU Western affairs expert Vadim Zagladin responded to
a question whether the FRG could get energy from the Soviet
Union in the event of shortages produced by the Arab embargo, by
saying that such an opportunity existed and, indeed, was
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aireelly being implemented. He insisted, under close
questioning, that the FRG could rely on any commitments
the Soviet Union made to supply energy in the future.
These topics were apparently discussed by FRG Foreign
Minister Scheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
during the former'b visit to Moscow at the beginning of
November. According to a DPA report on 2 November,
Gromyko assured his visitor that the Soviet Union would
"favorably examine" the questions of Soviet deliveries of
oil and natural gas to the FRG. Tokyo sources have also
reported that the Soviet Union has decided to increase
oil supplies to Japan, although no Soviet confirmation of
the decision has been published.
In the meantime, indications have begun to emerge'in
Eastern Europe that the Soviet bloc has not escaped
entirely unscathed from the Arab cutbacks of oil production.
On 8 November the Moscow domestic service reported in
a seemingly gratuitous reassurance that the supply of
oil to Soviet refineries from the CEMA countries was
proceeding without interruption and "in complete accordance
with th;i plans." On 13 November, AGERPRESS reported that
the Romanian party central committee had adopted a number
of measures aimed at conserving energy resources. The
text of the Romanian decisions published the next day
showed that the measures included such stringent economies
as cutting down on highway speea limits and reducing
the consumption of fuel for heating. No explanation of
these events has been provided by Soviet bloc sources.
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MOSCOW, EAST EUROPE DIVERGE ON TREATMENT OF WATERGATE
After displaying its pique over the U.S. military alert by
linking it to Watergate, Moscow has returned to a posture of
implicit support for the President's position. As in the past,
Moscow's views have been conveyed through selective reporting
of U.S. developments rather than by direct comment.
Remarks by Commerce Secretary Dent published in the central
press on 12 November under a New York dateline featured his
statement that the attacks on the President are "a scandalous
campaign . . . causing great damage to the country." The
TASS dispatch quoted Dent's characterization of those calling
for the President's removal from office as a "vindictive
and irresponsible group" representing "only a few members of
Congress." The dispatch on Dent's remarks was a tribute to
TASS's diligence as well as a measure of Moscow's sympathies,
as the speech had been delivered on the 8th to a Chamber of
Commerce group in Montgomery, Alabama and had not received wide
publicity in the United States. A subsequent report on Moscow
domestic radio on 13 November, carried in the press the following
day, highlighted the President's latest statement of his willing-
ness to turn over to the courts "all material requested." It
cited the assessment of "American political observers" that the
President's statement was motivated by a desire to dispel
"doubts" aroused by Watergate and "the press campaign against the
government."
Moscow's subtle support for the President stands in marked
contrast to the positions of some of its East European allies.
While most Warsaw Pact countries have maintained a virtual
blackout on Watergate, Prague and Budapest have underscored the
seriousness of the Presidential crisis. Czechoslovak comment
has treated the crisis in conventional ideological terms as
symptomatic of fundamental defects in the U.S. political system
and has relied largely on replays of U.S. press and public
criticism of the President. By contrast, Budapest has
registered direct criticism of the President. For example,
MAGYAR NEMZET's Washington correspondent, in a dispatch carried
on the 10th, observed that "only a miracle" could save the
President, and he completely absolved the Democrats in Congress
of scheming to replace the President by a member of their own
party. Budapest comment on the President's energy speech
likewise scored his "unjustified dramatization" of the energy
crisis as an attempt to "save hic Presidency."
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- 10 -
SI1VO-U, S, RELATIONS
KSST;JGER COVERAGE REFLECTS PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS
The 14 November Joint communique marking Secretary Kissinger's
10-14 November visit to Peking maintained the forward momentum
in Sino-U.S. relations while refining bilateral positions on
the crucial Taiwan Issue. This represents the first such
treatment of the obstructive Taiwan problem since the 28 February
1972 Shan.ghai communique following President Nixon's visit.
Notably omitted from the c,uri:ent communique was all reference
to U.S. forces in Taiwan, which the Chinece side had pointed to
in the Shanghai communique as part of the Taiwan question.
In contrast to their previous detailed treatment, the Chinese
this time briefly stated that the normalization of relations
can be realized only on the basis of "confirming" the principle
of one China. The U.S. ;side reaffirmed its previous stance that
it "does not challenge" the position that there is but one
Chi,aa and Taiwan is part of China.
The communique characterized the talks Kissinger had with Chou
En-lai and other Chinese officialz as "frank and serious," a
formulation similar to the "earnest, frank and constructive"
talks noted in previous visits. However, Peking this time
carefully balanced the formula,by noting that the Secretary had
a "friendly" conversation with Mao, and by reporting for the
first time in such a statement that in Mao's talks with Kissinger,
Mao and President Nixon had conveyed mutual rc;ards.
The two sides broadened the scope of their ori'-inal Shang':ai
communique commitment to oppose "hegemony" in ; a Asia and
Pacific region, adding now "in any other part of the wo:;ld,"
and reiterated their previous agreement to settle differences
without resorting to the threat or use of force. Reflecting
the "good progress" made in lower-level consultations during
the the sides agreed that the responsibilities of the
liaisuri :ices should be expanded, noted that agreement was
re?c.hed on a number of bilateral exchanges and held that con-
ditions should be created for further development of trade.
Both noted the "particular importance" of "frequent cont,;.ct
at the authoritative level" and duly affirmed bilateral de-
termination to nor;nalize relations.
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Peking's general treatment of the Secretary's visit also suggested
progress in Sino-tT.S. relations by offering measurably more
forthcoming coverage the:i during his previous stays. Most notably,
i4CNA's account Df Kissinger's 12 November visit with Mao charac-
terized it as a conversation. "on a wide range of subjects in a
friendly atmosp[,ere," in con,`.rast to the description in February
1973 a. "a frank and wide-rauging conversation." NCNA repeated
Mao's a pression of regards ~or-resident Nixon in the same terms
used last. Bebruary, but added 0;ct the Chairman this time
"expresso..: welcome" to Secretary Kissinger. The members of the
Chinese delegation at the meeting were the same as last February,
with the addition of Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, who pre-
sumably attended in recognition of Kissinsotr's new status as
secretary of state. Absent from the session was party Vice
Chairman Wang Hung-wen, who has attended every other publicized
Mao meeting with n foreign visitor since the 10th CCP Congress
last August.
NCNA coverage of previous Kissinger visits had been limited to
brief, straightforward reports of his meetings and receptions
with Chou and other Chinese officials, but Peking this time,
perhaps reflecting his new official status, gave the Secretary
treatment approximating that for a visiting foreign minister of
a country having diplomatic relations with :eking. NCNA reported
a welcoming banquet hosted by Chi Peng-fei and attended by Chou
and party Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying on the 10th, noting the
toasts by the two foreign ministers, and also reported Kissinger's
reciprocal banquet on the 13th. In his remarks on the 10th, Chi
briefly touched on Peking's current sanguine view of the international
scene and o`fered the most positive Chinese assessment of Sino-U.S.
relations to date.
While noting continued Sino-U.S4 differences. ^?i favorably re-
viewed developments since President Nixon's visit, affirming that
"a good start" had been made and that the goal of normalized re-
lations can be achieved. In his similarly forthcoming remarks
on the 13t.h, Chi underlined evidence of Chinese support for
President Nixon by formally proposing a toast to the health of
the U.S. leader.
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INDOCHINA
SVN AIR STRIKES, ALLEGED U.S, FLIGHTS OVER DRV DRAW PROTESTS
The 7 November air attacks by the GVN and the alleged U.S. air
reco.inaissance flights over North Vietnam on the 8th have
drawn a welter of protest from communist propaganda culminating
in PRG and DRV government statements decrying "Intensified wsx
acts" by the United States and Saigon. In a somewhat more
conc!liatory vein, the head of the PRG military delegation to
the joint Military Commission has put forth a five-point
proposal for observance of the cease-fire, and a low-level
LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY article has called for a new four-party
meeting in P:ris as a possible solution to the current military
impasse in Suuth Vietnam.
GVN AIR ATTACKS Within an hour of the 7 November GVN bombing
of Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province and Bu Dop
in Phuoc Long Province, Liberation hadio was telling its
listeners that the GVN aircraft had killed many civilians and
destroyed many homes and other property; F.ollowup reports the
same day described the action as a "new, extremely grave act of
war" and a "new, extremely barbarous criminal act" by Saigon.
Reflecting similar stridency and automatically accusing the
United States of complicity, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary
publ-l'.shed the day after the bombings said they constituted a
"frenzied war crime and a very serious new military adventure
of the United States and its lackeys." The commentary maintained
that, although Saigon, "incited and assisted" by the United
States, has been sabotaging the Paris agreement for the past
nine months, since mid-October the "tempo" of its "nibbling,
bombing, and shelling operations has increased markedly" and
the latest bombings have "escalated its war crimes to a high
degree." Responu1ng to the current situation by invoking the
15 October order of the South Vietnamese liberation army, the
commentary asserted that "our compatriots and combatants are
determined to counterattack all acts of war by the United Std%co
and its lackeys in all places and in appropriate form with
appropriate force." In a concluding threat, it speculated that
the "warlike clique has not learned its lesson from the Minter-
blows in Chu Nghe [Le Minh], Thanh Duc, Bach Ma, Bu Borg, rind
Bien Hoa.
A NHAN DAN commentary on the bombings, also broadcast on the 8th,
gave vent to an equally strong outburst, terming the attacks by
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the Saigon air force "the most serious net of war by the United
States and the Saigon Administration singe Z8 Jnnuary."
Buttressing the repented communist contention that the United
States is responsible for calling the shots in South Vietnam
and is anxious to resume the role of "international gendarme,"
the same commentary claimed that: "Kissinger on 3 November
ordered the Pentagon and the S..te Department to closely
watch what he called North Vistiam's strengthening of itq
military forces in South Vietnam. He also said menacingly
that the fact that Nixon ordered all U.S. armed forces to be
placed on alere durin3 the Mideast crisis proves that the
United States will not sit with yoldecl arms."
ALLEGED U.S. The DRV response to alleged U.S. air
OVERFLIGHTS reconnaissance over North Vietnam was routine
and relatively mild, considering that the
intrusions supposedly took place over the heartland of North
Vietnam. The a November foreign ministry spokesman statement
charging the flights is the fourth auch protest since the signing
in Paris of the 13 June join'.: communique which explicitly
prohibits such flights. Although .he three earlier protests
cited, aleged flights only over coastal provinces, while the
current statement claims intrusions over a "number of localities,
:including Hanoi and Haiphong," all of Hanoi's protests on
overflights have been issued at the same level of authority and
have been consistent in their language. The current protest
marks the first time Hanoi has charged U.S. overflights of its
interior since lcc,t April, ;vher: the United States acknowledged
that flights hacl occurred on the 19th and 24th.
Although the Januti,ry Paris agreement does not explicitly ban
such flights, Hanoi has L.nstrued Article 2, which calls for a
termination of all military activities by the United States
against the DRV, as encompassing reconniassance. Thus, the
current protest says the U.S. vi.:ti.on "blatantly violates"
Article 2 of the Paris agreement and Point one of the 13 June
communique. (Point one of the 13 June joint communique states
that "the United States shall cease immediately, completely,
and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of
the DRV.")
PRG, DRV GOVERNMENT The latest round of communist complaints
STATEMENTS over Saigon air attacks and alleged U.S.
aerial recc'.naissance reached a climax
with the release of PRG and DRV government statements on 9 and
10 November, respectively. Although issued at a highly
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autttnritative lrivel, both statements were restra!ned when
comr;ired with he initial propaganda reaction to the air attacks.
The PRG statement opened with a perfunctory indictment of the
Unite,' States for its continued "military involvement and
interference" In rite internal affairs of South Vietnam and
of the GVN's "n1.17'.+Y.1ng opurat:ons," "brutal p:'araecution" of
people under its control, and "insolently provocative attitude'''
raid to have cnusr,d a ritalematr: in the Joint Military
Commission and 1:'ie Paris consultative conference. The 7 November
air raids, howev,r, are characterized only as "more serious
still" and as evidence of U.S. and Saigon attempts to "do
away with the revolutionary achievements of the South Vietnamese
people, and negate the revolutionary administration, the
liberation armed forces, and the zone of control of the PRG
in South Vietnam."
After leading off with an affirmation of the DRV and PRG's
good faith in implementing the Paris agreement, the DRV statement
closely paralleled the Pi1~'s presenta,,ion, charging illegal U.S.
interference in the Sot+.th and Saigon "sabotage of the cease-fire,"
and labeling the 7 November bombings "parti,'ularly serious."
Unlike the PRG statement, it went on to repeat a13.ugation, that
U.S. reconnaissance planes intruded into DRV territory and the
standard complaints that the United States has "refused to
carry out its obligation to contribute to the healing of the
wour-?s of war and the post-war reconstruction of the DRV." It
underlined its accusation with the claim that Lhe United States
and Saigon "are the only cause of the aggravating tensia;t now
obtaining in South Vietnam."
Although Hanoi and the PRG have on two occasions 28 January
used the vehicle of government statements to protes,_ what they
consider to be U.S. and Saigon cease-fire violations, the previous
statements--issued at that end of February and March--were in
effect recapitulations of alleged violations that oczurred
during the first and second months of the cease-fire and were
not pegged to specific incidents as the current ones were.
During the war, such high-level official reaction was usually
prompted either by actions that he communists regarded as
unusually serious or as reflecting a major change in U.S. policy.
FIVE-POINT In the midst of the many protests flooding
PROPOSAL communist media in reaction to the air attacks,
Liberation Radio on 8 November broadcast a note
dated the 6th from the head of the PRG's JMC delegation to his
Saigon counterpart, sug';eating an immediate in-place cease-fire.
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-1.5-
The note detailed cease-fire violations allegedly committed
by Saigon from 28 January to late October, vowed that further
encroachments into the "liberated area" would be defended
in accordance with the 15 October I'LAF command order,
pledged that the 111IG would do "its utmost" to implement the
Paris agreement, and set forth a "five-point initiative for
the observance of the cease-fire."
In clahorating on how best to implement a cease-fire, the note
asked twat "all deployment and use of reserve support forces
(artillery, armor and air forces) in places of conflict" be
prohibit~!d and urged that "both parties" immediately order
commanders at various echelons to meet and discuss measures
to end and prevent conflict. Without details, it went on to
advocate the strict implementation of articles two and three
of the protocol to the January pence accord concerning
cease-fire--articles which it noted had been incorporated in
their entirety into the 13 June Joint communique. The fourth
point of the note proposed that joint teams be dispatched to
places of conflict, and the fifth and final point called for
"nibbling forces" to bt, withdrawn to positions held prior to
28 January and for areas of control to br designated.
The PRG's motivction in offering this new cease-fire proposal
is unclear since it in essence restates the main points of
the January cease-#iie protocol and the 1.3 June joint communique.
The only known explicit mention of the proposal in follow-up
propaganda came in a 10 Vovember NIIAN DAN editorial pegged to
the PRG government statement. The editorial cloaked the
wive-point proposal in a mantle of some authority by linking
it with previous PRG proposals made at the higher-level GVN-PRG
consultative meetings* in Paris--namely, the 25 April six-point
proposal wetting forth the PING program for settling outstanding
problems existing between the two parties; the 28 June statement
amplifying upon the 25 April proposal; and an 18 July proposal
on ensuring the democratic liberties in the South.
FOUR-PARTY TALKS A commentary, transmitted by the PRG news
agency LPA on 11 November, departed from
the standard communist propaganda line by raising the question
of resuming four-party talks in Paris. After a rambling
criticism of the United States for continued involvement in
* Saigon's refusal to meet with the FRG because of their recent
military operations in the South has resulted in the Paris
meetings not being convened since 25 October when the 29th
session was held.
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South Vietnam in violation of the terms of the Paris agreement,
the commentator gratuitously called for a :--:1w quadrapartite
"iris meeting because of the "grave situation" created by
continued U.S. military commitment to Saigon.
Tha commentary concluded by warning President Nixon and
Secretary Kissinger against disregarding "various agreement
with V?Latnam." In a gratuitous allusion to the Secretary's
trip to Hanoi last February, it said that such disregard
for treaties ib not in accord with his attention to a
Vietnamese poem "which impressed him" during his visit to
Far&oi'a historical museum:
Over the mountains and rivers of the South
rules the emperor of the South,
As fated in the book of heaven,
Oh you, barbarians who dared invade our land,
You will be wiped our, without mercy.
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RGNU MINISTRIES TRANSFERRED, IENG SARY LEAVES FOR CAMBODIA
Coincident with the 20th anniversary of Cambodian independence
on 9 November, the insurgents' front (FUNK) and government (RGNU)
took a dramatic step to improve upon their international image
as a government in exile by announcing the transfer to the
Cambodian "liberated zone." of the many RGNU ministries that had
been bused in Peking and. elsewhere abroad. At the same time,
FUNK "special envoy" Ieng Sary has ended his stint of more
than. 2 years in Peking as official liaison between FUNK re-
presentatives in Cambodia and those in China and departed for
Cambodia via Hanoi on the 9th. These two developments appeared
to underline the gradual public shift in power within the Front
over the past three years--away from Prinr:e Sihanouk's entourage
in Peking to the Khmer Rouge incurgeut leaders in Cambodia led
by Khieu Samphan. Transfer of the ministries will also pre-
sumably strengthen the RGNU's domestic political apparatus at
a time when the insurgent leaders have been calling for a
"decisive" offensive to seize power. Prince Sihanouk has remained
out of public vier since receiving his rather in Canton on 3
November, and thuc far has not officially reacted to the recent
developments.
Front comment on ti,,a Cambodian National Day anniversary has
reiterated the insurgents' commitment to a dry season offensive
and opposition to iiegotiations; Peking and 'ianoi comment continues
to reflect their more moderate postures of recent months.
MINISTRIES' SHIFT The 9 November communique from the RGNU
Prime Minister's office announcing the
transfer of the ministries to Cambodia was reported by the insurgent
news agency AKI and NCNA. Claiming that the Cambodian struggle
"has reached its final phase" that will lead "irreversibly to
total victory," the communique reported that the decision to
transfer the ministries had been made, "with the agreement
of-head of gcate" Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth,
so that the RGNU wil'_ to "entirely installed in Cambodia,"
where it will exercise "full and entire authority." The communique
linked the announce.i government shift with a firm reaffirmation
of the current hard Front line on a sett_.:ement, asserting that
the insurgents will continue, "with ne~;_her compromise nor re-
treat, thaw sacred fight" until Sihanouk's five points are
achieved.
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SIHANOUK SILENCE Princ? Sihanouk continues to be officially
quieFcenL. He d.1.d not return to Peking
for farewell. celebrations for Ieng Sary--an absence perhaps
related to l,he expect?;: arrival in the capital of Secretary
Kissinger on the 10th, and he was not reported to have celebrated
the Cambodian annivo,rsary on the 9th. Last year Sihanouk noted
the date during his tour of North Korea at a reception hosted by a
DPRK vice premier, and in 1971 and 1970 he spoke at celebrations
in Peking attended by Chou En-lai. His only notable recent
official statement was a 4 November message. routinely thanking
the Front's chief in Cambodia, Khieu Samphan, for his birthday
greetings last month, and duly paying tribute to the i^.cerior
minister's announced resolve to fight "without the spirit of
retreat or compromise."
IENG SARY TRIP NCNA noted on the 9th that a high-level Chine3e
leadership group Led by Chou En-lai gave a
farewell banquet for Sary on the 6th, and that he was seen off
by party Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying on the 9th. NCNA on the 8th
reported that RGNU Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak gave a reception
for Sary that evening, "in the name of" RGNU Prime Minister Penn
Nouth, that was attended by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Neither
report characterized the atmosphere at the celebrations nor re-
ported on speeches by either side.
VNA promptly reported Sary's arrival in Hanoi on the 9th, dis-
closing like Peking that he was "on his way home." Foreign
Minister Trinh welcomed him at the airport and gave a reception
in his honor that evening which VNA said took place ',n all
"atmosphere of warm friendship and close solidarity." Pham
Van 1)ong received Sary on the 12th in an atmosphere of "close
solidarity and fraternal friendship." According to VNA, Dong
offered to "fully support" the Cambodian struggle, while Sary
conveyed "heartfelt greetings" tc the DRV leaders from Sihanouk
and Penn Nouth and reaffirmed Vietnamese-Cambodian solidarity.
Sary was accompanied to the DRV by two RGNU ministers who are
responsible for insurgent military supply and coordination,
suggesting that DRV support for the coming dry season offenaive
may have been discussed. One of the RGNU officials, Minister
of Military Equipment and Armament Duong Sam 01, also visited
Hanoi with Sary prior to the dry season offensive of 19:1-1972,
and was with another RGNU delegation in Hanoi before the 1970-71
offensive. Hanoi gave more attention to Sary's visit in November
1971. than to his current stay, but he was paying an of.E_-'r_ia',
visit then, rather than merely passing through.
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BACKGROUND While initial announcements on formation of the
Front and the RGNU in the spring of 1970 gave
only pausing attention to Samphan and his two leading colleagues
in the interior, (lou Youn and Hu Nim, since then their public
stature--particularly that of Samphan--has grown in step with
the gradual expansion of the Cambodian "liberated zone." Thus,
Sihanouk acknowledged in, an official pronouncement on 12 May
1970 that the three leaders were playing the chief role in the
fighting in the interior, while a FUNK Central Committee meeting
in August 1970 announced that Khieu Samphan had been elevated
to RGNU Vice Premier, ccncurrent with his post of defense
minister. The ministers' autonomy in Cambodia was underscored
by AKI coverage in March 1971 of a report by Sam han at a con-
ference of "members of the RGNU responsible for the interior"
that dealt with varied fields of activity in Cambodl.a. On 3
June 1971 Penn Mouth added to Samphan's standing by formally
announcing his appointment as "commander in chief" of the CPNLAF.
A 20 August 1971 RGNU communique marking Ieng Sary's arrival
in Peking reported that the envoy had delivered a message to
Sihanouk from those with "respunsiblity" for the struggle in
the interior "under the leadership of Khieu Samphan." More
recently, Sihanouk acknowledged the interior ministers' rule
over affairs in Cambodia, and his own delegation to a "mission
abroad," in speeches during and after his tour of the liberated
zone this spring. Subsequently, Front pronouncement on the
landmark "national congress" held in Cambodia on 19-21 July,
which set forth future goals of the Front's struggle, indicated
that the congress had been dominated by Samphan and gave no in-
dication there was any participation by Sihanouk's group in
Peking,
CAMBODIAN ANNIVERSARY The usual RGNU statement marking the
OBSERVANCE, MESSAGES Cambodian independerce anniversary--
this year issued in the form of an
8 November message by Prime Minister Penn Nouth--focused on
the coming dry season offensive. It echoed recent Front comment
that the struggle is entering "the decisive phase" and "advancing
towards complete victory," reaffirmed an uncompromising settlemen-
stance, and warned specifically against maneuvers by "Nixon and
Kissinger," who were portrayed as being in "utter distress"
ove,: the CambodLan situation. The message seemed to allude to
the imminent.RGNU ministry shift in noting that the Front should
accompany %ts "more crushing offensives in the 1973-74 dry
season" with "all necessary preparations for the forthcoming
complete liberation of our country."
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Reflecting the absence of Sihanouk End Penn Nouth from Peking,
there was no repeat of previous years' gatherings in the Chinese
capital which had occasioned a speech by Penn Nout,h last year
and speeches by Sihanouk and Chou En-lai in 1:)71 and 1970. The
usual Chinese leaders' message dated 8 November was specifically
addressed to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth in "Canton." Both the
message and the 9 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial reaffirmed
Chinese support for Sihanouk as "head of state" and criticized
the "traitorous Lon Nol clique," but they softened last year's
criticism of the United States and played down Chinese support
for the Cambodian struggle. Notably, last year's message had
cited Mao's promise of "powerful backing" and pledged to give
"all out support and assistance," while this year's greetings
merely offered to "firmly support" the struggle. Underlining
Chinese discretion, NCNA's carefully edited replay of Penn
Nouth's 8 November message dropped his criticism of compromise
maneuvers by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. Last
year NCNA provided the text of the RGNU anniversary statement.
A more marked reduction of support was evident in the DRV leaders'
message to "head of state" Sihanouk. Unlike last year, the
Vietnamese did not refer to Sihanouk as the "representative of the
legality, legitimacy, and continuity of the Cambodian state,"
dropped criticism of the Phnom Penh leaders by name, sidestepped
support for Sihanouk's five points, and failed to endorse the
RGNU directly as the sole legal and legitimate government of
Cambodia. (The Joint DRV-LPF statement of 6 November marking Le
Duan's recent tour of Laos duly restated DRV support for the RGNU
and the five points, while criticizing the "Lon Not clique of
traitors.")
Moscow did not take note of the Cambodian anniversary, but did
report the communique on the transfar of the RGNU ministries
to the interior in a brief 12 November TASS report. PRAVDA
on the 9th carried a notably warm message from Sihanouk
and Penn Nouth to Soviet leaders on the anniversary of the
October Revolution, expressing "deep gratitude" for Moscow's
"resolute support" for the Front as well as for Soviet recogni-
tion of Sihanouk and the RGNU. Pelting, meanwhile, finally took
note indirectly of the changed Sihanouk-Moscow relationship,
noting an NCNA 7 November report that Soviet Ambassador
Tolstikov's reception on the October Revolution anniversary was
attended by the RGNU foreign minister.
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LE DUAN LEADS FIRST PARTY-GOVERNMENT VISIT TO LAOS
Hanoi's backing for the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) was graphically
reinforced by the 2 to 6 November visit to Laos by a DRV delegation
led by VWP First Secretary Le Duan. This was the first such high-
level DRV delegation to visit Sam Neua, the LPF headquarter] in
northeastern Laos, although LPF leaders have journeyed to Hanoi
on several occasions in the past. Reports on the trip do not
reveal whether its timing was related to developments in Indochina,
such as the s1r.epped-up fighting in South Vietnam, the predicted
Cambodian dry season offensive, or the delays in implementing
provisions of the agreements between the LPF and the Royal Lao
Government (RLG). The visit had been anticipated as far back
as April, when 1:he joint communique on a Hanoi visit by LPF
Standing Committee member Nouhak Phouaisavan noted the ;tetn.amese
had accepted an invitation to send a delegation.
Le Duan's delegation included Secretariat member and Vice Premier
Hoang Anh, Vice Minister of Defense Maj Gen Nguyen Don, and Maj
Gen Nguyen Trong Vinh. Vinh, who was not identified by his
military position in the communique, presumably has special
responsibility for Lao affairs: He is not known to have been
active in public since early 1960 except for appearances he made
in Hanoi during an August 1972 visit by an LPF delegation headed
by Nouhak.
The Le Duan visit was not reported in the media until 7 November,
after his return to Hanoi, presumably for reasons of security.
In the days following the announcement Hanoi and Lao media
publicized the activities and speeches during the trip, and
tl'e concluding joint communique was publicized on the 10th.
According to the communique, the two sides held talks on the
situation in Vietnam and Laos and on the "solidarity and relations
of fraternal cooperation" between the two peoples. The atmosphere
of the talks was described in standard terms as one of "militant
solidarity, fraternal friendship, and complete confidence."
Both Hanoi and Pathet Lao radios indicated that the two sides
"reached unanimous agreement on all the issues they raised."
(This point was not included in either side's English-language
news agency "text" of the communique. Since the language of the
two English versions is nearly identical, it is likely that
this omission occurred inadvertently in both news agency versions
because they were using the same English translation.) Unanimity
of views was similarly claimed in the DRV-Lao communique on Nouhak's
visit last April and at the time of LPF Chairman Souphanouvong's
last visit to Hanoi in May 1971.
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The communique lauded Vietnam's "wholeheatte: assistance" to
Laos and noted that Vietnam had "accepted enormous sacri,ices"
in assi,.ting the Lao struggle; but it was restrained in its
anticipation of future support, pledging the Vietnamese to do
their best ti do a "modest share" with the LPF in reconstruction
in Laos and the struggle to preserve a durable peace there.
The two sides expressed strong support for the formation of the
new government in Laos and Hanoi indicated readiness to establish
relations with it, Hanoi's commitment to the Lao settlement was
underlined in a v.,,aage pointing out that the independence and
peace of Vietnam aad Laos are "related" and that "for that
reason both the Paris agreement on Vietnam and the Vientiane
agreement on Laos must be scrupulously observed."
The Vietnamese stde also reaffirmed that the DRV wants to have
"at its western frontier a genuinely independent, peaceful,
and neutral Laos." The LPF responded by defining the foreign
policy stance it felt the new Provisional National Union Government
should adopt. The LPF, which will head the foreign ministry in
the new administration, said that the government should follow
a line of peace and neutrality, "support all the efforts" of the
DRV and the PR^, to implement the Paris agreement, and "recognize"
that two administrations exist in South Vietnam.
The two sides expressed gratitude to "the socialist countries"
for their support but did not specifically mention the Soviet
Union and China. This is a departure from such recognition
specified in the joint communique signed in May 1971 when
Souphanouvong visited Hanoi, but is in conformity with the
communique issued after Nouhak Phoumsavan's visit earlier this
year.
HANOI COt+1ENT NHAN DAN editorials :,n the Le Duan visit,
published on 8 and 11 November, particularly
stressed the importance of solidarity between Vietnam and Laos.
The editorial on the 8th maintained that the consolidation of
Indochinese solidarity is the "one path to follow" and warned
of the Nixon Doctrine's "tricks" to "divide and rule." Neither
editorial discussed Cambodia in this context, although the
editorial on the 11th may have had the Cambodian insurgents in
mind when it expounded at length on the rewards from the "model
relationship" of Laos and Vietnam. It hailed the "correct
international lines" of the North Vietnamese party and the LPF
and claimed that their solidarity demonstrates that combining
"genuine patriotism" and internationalism is a source of strength.
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Published the day after Secretary Kissinger's arrival in Peking,
the editorial on the 1.1th referred derisively to the U.S. role
in the world. It warned that the Nixon Doctrine does not
always show the "real nature of the U.S. imperialists" but "also
operates behind the scene by wirepulling such Hitlerite-type
bloody coups as the one in Chile, or playing such perfidious
roles as pilgrims for peace or mediators, as in the case of the
Middle East." The paper added that: "Under such circumstances,
Vietnamese-Lao militant solidarity, with its exemplary purity,
with the considerably: effect it has exercised, and with the
thoroughgoing revolotionary spirit it emb,)dies, is filled with
a historic epochal significance just like the victories of the
two peoples for which it constitutes a decisive factor."
TRADITIONAL DRV CELEBRATIONS MARK SOVIET ANNIVERSARY
Hanoi observed the October Revolution anniversary in traditional
fashion with a message of congratulations to the Soviet leaders,
a grand meeting," editorial comment, and the appearance of
several North Vietnamese leaders at a Soviet embassy reception.
The turnout of DRV leaders at the Soviet embassy included
Politburo members Truong Chin.h, Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy
Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi--all of whom attended a similar reception
1< . year, as had the absent Vo Nguyen Giap* and Tran Quoc
Hoan. Also present this year were Hoang Van Hoan and Van Tien
Dung, who had not attended the 1972 reception. As usual the
reception speeches were delivered by Premier Pham Van Dong and
the Soviet ambassador. VNA's summary of the remarks noted that
Dong expressed gratitude for the USSR's "great and precious
support alLd assistance," and that the ambassador reiterated
Soviet support and "demanded a halt to all violations of the
Paris agreement by the United States and the Saigon administration."
The anniversary message, signed by Ton Duc Thang,'Le Duan,
TrLong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, for the most part followed the
pattern of previous years. The message, like other anniversary
comment, followed the pattern of Soviet media since the April
CPSU plenum in singling out Brezhnev by name in a passage on
the Soviet people's endeavors under the leadership of the party
* Giap has not been reported at a public function since 6
October--see discussion in TRENDS of 31 October, pages 24-25.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 NOVEMBER 1973
and its Central Committee "headed by, Comrade- L. I,. Brezhnev."
This treatment of Brezhnev'accords with that during the July
visit to the Soviet Union by a?DRV delegation- led by Le Duan
and Pham Van Dong,
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CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
14 NOVEMBER 1973
USSR
ESTONIAN PROPOSES ALTERNATIVE FARM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A prominent Estonian economist has proposed that Estonia be
allowed to test a new system of managing kolkhozes and sovkhozew
jointly through radically revamped rayon agriculture administrations--
a proposal. running directly counter to current trends of agri-
culture administration. In advancing this proposal in the October
QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, N. Bronshteyn, head of the political
economy chair at Tartu University, also explicitly challenged
certain national programs and regional innovations that have
recently gained prominence. Bronsht.eyn's proposal, despite its
controversial nature, is consistent with the independent positions
on agricultural matters held by Estonian party at.-d government
leaders for many years.
ESTONIAN PROPOSAL Bronshteyn proposed that management of both
kolkhozes and covkhozes be concentrated in
rayon agriculture administrations and that the latter be converted
from purely administrative bodies to production associations
operating on principles of cost accounting. Since ti;o production
associations under Bronshteyn's proposal would be funded from the
profits of participating farms, they would have a direct incentive
to promote the most efficient methods of farming. The participating
kolkhozes and sovkhozes would bi represented in the associations
by councils and would thus have a voice in the distribution of
investment to backward farms and new agricultural complexes.
Bronshteyn proposed that the new system of agricultural admin-
istration be initiated on an experimental basis in Estonia before-
its application on a broader scale. Estonia trans_rred its
sovkhozes to cost accounting in 1967, and the success of this
experiment led to nationwide adoption of the practice.
In justifying his proposal Bronshteyn condemned the trend toward
separating kolkhozes and sovkhozes into mutually exclusive
"closed" systems, arguing that this created obstacles to "bringing
together and eventually combining" the two forms of property.
As examples of "dangerous tendencies" in this regard, he pointed
to the creation of rayon sovkhoz trusts in Kazakhstan and kolkhoz
councils and interkolkhoz processing plants in Moldavia.
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CON FIDI-N'1'IAl, i nl;i 'rRP:NI)y
14 NOVEMilIiR 1973
Bronnhteyn criLI.tzed the current emphasis on reorganizing
administration into epccinlized production associationo and
concentrating agricultural lnveHtme110; On the construction of
large livestock complexes. Ile claimed that creation of separate
auf;ocintionH for different agricultural branches led to dupltentton
and complicated the tasks of ngricultural coordination, and
he maintained that territorial production associations would give
Eslonla and othe,' localities better supervision over production
that? branch asso;i.ttionH run from Mosev.4. Ile charged that ton-
centrating investm,ynt on construction of n few large complexes
neglected the interests of the majority or farms and served to
retard agricultural progress.
In this connection, he argued that the proposed nsHrciations would
facilitate solution of the explosive problem of balancing the
divergent interests of rich and poor firms. While conCeuing
that income redistribution within the irsocintions would pose
"serious difficulties," he pointed out that farms would find
It more palatable to share their profits If decisions on this
matter were made at the local level with participation by farm
representatives.
flACKGROUND Bronshteyn's proposal reflects Estonia's longtime
insistence on Joint management of kolkhozes and
sovkhozes by rays:n agriculture administrationq under a strong
agriculture ministry and clearly runs against the current trend
toward separate administrative systems for kolkhozes ttd sovkhozes
and a proliferation of specialized farm organizations. A major
step in this direction was taken in 1972 with the creation of an
!`S.1SR Ministry of Sovkhozes comprising republic-wide branch
associations and specialized administrations--for poultry, pigs,
fruit, etc.--and specialized sovkhoz trusts. The new minister
for sovkhozes, I. P. Volovchenko, defended the reorganization in
the September 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE on grounds thr.t
"experience has shown" that agricultural problems often cannot
be resolved within territorial boundaries and "life insistently
requires their resolution by branch."
The first move toward establishing a parallel kolkhoz system of
administration occurred in early 1973, when Moldavia was granted
permission to transfer kolkhozes from the Agriculture Ministry
to an independent system of elective kolkhoz councils.* The
For background, see TRENDS of 14 March 1973, pp 25-26.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Ct -,11' t )1 ! l' 1 Al, Flip? '!' R I?11)',
t4 iolo l;M111at 1'_' 7.i
l;stottians have Ionp opposed 01114 idea, and l;t:tottian Firtat
:Yerretrtry t. G. Kebin W"114 notleeabiy cool. toward Clip. Moldaviiatt
exlierIment. (IurIttt? n visit to that r?'pul) It I?ut rac?mmer.*
Ilronshteyn'P complitint nt;ntttst "excttnstve rnnr_entri.tt Ion" of
Inventr!acntri 'A 1nrt,l, ltvt tack cutnplexen nlso conflicts with it
national prat;, am. Me program was ptoti oe.red In Ilelgcsrod obinst
in Lite mid-1900'ri and with Widely p,.tbltcized it) curly 1971, when
tlelgorod F.irrtt :ic -retary N. F Vaat lyev writ promoted to RSF5ti
F!'?nt Deputy 1'remlor. Estonian First Deputy Premier L. G.
Tynur[st crittc'Izcd the practice of t?oncent.rattug on big livettto'-k
complexeK .trt vconomi~nlly wasteful In the 10 April 1970 I7VI:5'I'tvA
and again in the 10 December 1971 11RAVDA--bet"ore and nfter tltc
Isetgorod program gni ictl ticceptanr,e in Moscow. According to
llronrahtc'yn, E;ton[a hart built only "n small numb-, of very
large experimental c.ompirxes" and ht conti;entrated Inattend on
building modium-sized complexes and on ramodelinp old livestock
farms--nn approach which lie claims mnkeq Industrialization Cheaper
and av,atlitble to n larger number of farms.
* For an analysis of Kebin's reaction, see TRENDS of 15 August
1973, pp. 20-21.
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(;(.ONV11)ENTIA1, 1'ti1,- 'I'IILNi)S
14 t4uVLt113Ltt 1911
X10 F L S
2N:()W ()fl 11.5. IPAt.n..: lAloncow Coll ttnuel; to project optimIHm
about the prc)r;pr_cI for 11.S.-Suvi.eL Veonott)ic cooperation.
'there ban been no foll.O%Jttp to tltc momentary doubt Implied
to the 3 UUovvmber [ZVLS"i; IYA by commentator ?tntveyev, who
ciucntIoned urn AdmInIntrrttton's moLives in dclnying it,;
requent for most-favored-rat ton, st:Curt for t1!e USSR. The
media to recent dEtyt; have reported growing intere, in
U.S. buninesu cireleu In trade with ;tot;cow. 'PASS on
13 November reported AsuluLanL Secretary of Commerce
Henry Turner's rerlarkr; in :loscow that "Lite United Staten
(:ovcrutnent is sincerely interet;Led in Lite development
of trade with the Soviet Union." The medin have ignored
Lite President'ri announced goal, In his 7 November energy
mcsr~age, of self-sufficiency in energy renources by 1980,
and have continued to depict :strong interest tit Lite
United Stated in cooperating; to develop Soviet oil and
gas depot;iti;.
PLI,Irx, ON sOvILr-JApAN1_`Sf_ 1 LLATIONS: In the aftermath of
Prime Minister Tanaka's talk:; In ;loucow hint month, Peking
has begun to explicitly portray the Soviet Lhrcat to China
as it danger to Japan. Adding to 1t:i regular warnings of
Lite serious military threat Japan fares because of Soviet
naval and air activitier,; around Japan, Peking In now
warning; that Soviet troops on the Chinese border threaten
Japan. Using selective quotes from the Japanese press,
NCNA on 1t! October lashed out ,tL the Soviet Union for
occupying the four northern islands and for "'amassing a
huge army alDng the frontier with China." Sharpening
this Image, NCNr1 on 8 November focused on remark by
one speaker at an anti-Soviet rally held In Tokyo to
assert that the stationing of Soviet troops along the
Sinn-Soviet border "is not only a threat to China but
also a great threat to Japan." Peking has not originated
at;y continent of its own on Tanaka's `Ioscow visit,
confining its coverage to carefully selected pickups of
Japanese news reports to develop Lite argument that no
progress was made on the return of the four Soviet-held
northern islands or on the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet
peace treaty. A 22 October NCNA report on Foreign
Minister Ohira's 11 October press conference, for example,
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF'IUI:N7'r,\i.. F81.$ TRENDS
14 NOVEIII.IEIL 1973
-29-
only quoted Ohirii's expression of regrcr that the aumrii t
mc:~ting failed to produce a final 'Jett .lement on return
of the islands. NCNA omitted n portion of Chirn'n
statement, widely quoted In Lite Jnpaneuc preys, which
noted that Japan did nuccet.'d in persuading th;t Soviet
Union to sit at the negotiation table to thrash out
the terriruri.nl dispute.
PRC LANGUAGE. REFORM: For tl)o first time since the cultural
revolution, the possibility of reforming the Chinese
written language through the adoption of Latin characters
hag been openly raised by Peking. A 5 November NCNA
article relating the success of the new Latinized
Uighur and Kazakh written ncriptA noted that the "I.ntir
alphabet in the most popular in the world" and stated
that "the reform of the Ilan (Chinese) language is based
on the Latin alphabet." During the cultural revolution's
rejection of things foreign, all mention of language
reform erns dropped. Even after language reform regained
respectability, the use of Latin characters has been
treated 3ingerly. There have been n number of Sinkiang
broadcasts on the new wr.tttcn Uighur and Knzahk scripts
over the past two years, but none has mentioned that
Latin characters are bring used. The central KWANCItING
DAILY restored its column on ?.anguage reform on 9 May
this year, but is Introductory article avoided specifically
mentioning the adoption of a Latin alphabetical system.
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FliIS TRENDS
14 NOVEMBER 1973
APPENDIX
MOSCOW;, PEKING, 21RO CAST STATISTICS 5 - 1,1 NOVEMBER 1973
Moscow (2202 items)
October Revolution
(2%)
39%
Peking (1129 items)
Domestic Issues (39%)
37%
Anniversary
Sierra; Leone Preside ,,t (--)
16%
(Kirilenko Speech
(--)
DI .J
in PRC
[Grechko Speech
W
(--)
5%]
Cambodia
(3')
14%
orld Peace Congress in
M
(40%)
13%
(20th Anniversary
(--)
8%]
oscow, 25-31 Oct.
Middle East
(6%?
4%
of Independence
Middle. East
(21%)
7%
Chin.
B
(3%)
4%
Kissinger in PRC
(--)
2%
rezhnev Meeting With
(--)
3%
Iraqi CP Leader
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern.
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention In terms of volume are not always
d:-cussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior issues:
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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