TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0
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April 7, 1999
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8
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February 21, 1974
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Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Confidential FBIS TRENDS In Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R0003 ~ Y? 1974 o. 8) 1/ Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. STATSPEC NAT!ONAL SECURITY INFOF!MATION Unauthorized disclosure subject to Approved For Release 1999MY)FH. I-*DP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1.974 CONTENTS SOLZHENITSYN Moscow, Allies Mount Public Campaign Against Exiled Writer. . . . . . . 1 U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS Soviet Debate Continues Over Implications of Arms Race. . . . . . . . . 6 Peking Sees "Impasse" In. U.S.-Soviet SALT Negotiations. . . . . . . . . 9 ENERGY CRISIS Moscow Media Obscure Gromyko Backing for Special UN Session . . . . . . 10 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT USSR Notes New Kissinger Trip, Has Little Comment on Mideast. . . . . . 12 CHINA PEOPLE'S DAILY Stresses Party Role in Anti-Confucius Campaign . . . . . 15 PRC Sustains Interest in Better Relations With Southeast Asia . . . . . 17 ASIAN SECURITY Moscow Scores U.S. Plans for Indian Ocean Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 VIETNAM DRV Trade Union Congress Continues Accent can Economic Recovery. . . . . 20 PRG Pushes Recognition Campaign at- Geneva Law Conference. . . . . . . . 23 Pro-Russian Ukrainians Seek to Downgrade Ukrainian Heroes . . . . . . . 24 New Lithuanian First Secretary Chosen Over Incumbents . . . . . . . . . 25 Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . j Approved For Release 1999/09/~ ,P85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 S 0 L Z H E N I T S Y N MOSCOW, ALLIES MOUN' PUBLIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST EXILED WRITER In an effort to c.ouate.ract the adverse impact of Solzhenitsyn'd expulsion Mc3cow ha.i mounted a closely orchestrated show of public support for the official action. The Soviet media campaign against the exiled writer was accompanied by ominous threats to the diss{dent scientist Sakharov and other domestic critics of the regime. 'P}'F: East. European comuncrmict regimes for the most part supported the Soviet action, with reactions ranging from effusive praise to minimal reportage. The West European CP's reacted along their customary lines, evidently mostly out of domestic embarrassment, with the French expressing cautious disapproval and the Italians offering a somewhat stronger condemnation. There has been no monitored mention of the expulsion by Peking, Hanoi, or Havar,.a. SOVIET UNION The Soviet. propaganda machine moved swiftly into action almost before the ink was dry or. the 13 February TASS announcement of Sclzhenitsyn's loss of citizenship and expulsion from .he USSR. Immediately following publication of the announcement in PRAVDA the next_ day, letters and statements denouncing Solzhenitsyn and approving the official action began t:o appear in all central :newspapers and on Moscow radio and TV. The largely stereotyped expressions of "unanimous" support from individuals in all walks of Soviet life were also broadcast to foreign aud:.er.ces in many different languages. In addition to conservative writers who participated in the letter writing, a few moderates--notably Boris Polevoy; Valentin Katayev and Stepan Shchi.pachev--also lent. their names to the campaign. In vilifying Solzhenitsyn as sn inveterate enemy of the Sovie'.: system and a notorious opponent of international detente, the letters and statements sought to convey an impression. cf overwhelming public support for the official action., Expressions of outrage over his "subversive" and "slanderous" writings were coupled with declarations of "unanimous" satisfaction over his "natural and just" fate. One PRAVDA writer suggested that "foreign reactionaries" themselves would soon lament Solzhenitsyn's presence in their midst because the "melodies of his subversive ideological activities" would no longer have the same appeal they enjoyed when he was a Soviet citizen. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 An unattributed TASS roundup of world opinion on the expulsion, broadcast in many foreign languages on 16 February and published in all central papers the next day, was contrived to show widespread foreign approval. Solzhenitsyn's deportation, according to the roundup, was viewed as a "legitimate'' act by the Soviet state not only by communist papers but by noncommunist spokesmen as well. The roundup featured a selection of noncommunist statements questioning Solzhenitsyn's popularity in the Soviet Union as well as his judgment in defying Soviet authority. In an effort to cloak the Soviet action with legality, Moscow radio on 18 February reported an interview with Deputy Prosecutor General Mikhail Malyarov. According to the report, which was broadcast to France and in English to the United Kingdom and North America, Malyarov explained that Solzhenitsyn's arrest was based on a provision in the RSFSR legal code relating to "aiding foreign states in pursuing a policy hostile to the USSR" and that his deportation was governed by a provision in the law on Soviet citizenship covering "actions incompatible with that lofty title." He even intimated that such deportations were not uncommon in the West, naming France in particular. Although Solzhenitsyn bore the brunt of the campaign of public abuse, the dissident scientist Sakharov was linked with `..aim for criticism in an 18 February Moscow TASS dispatch in Inglish. According to the dispatch, the two most prominent Soviet dissidents were attacked in an article in the newspaper VOICE OF THE MOTHERLAND by the historian Nikolay Yakovlev. Cali)Ing them "first class dissidents," Yakovlev reportedly charged that their "phony arguments" about the "perfidious nature" of the Soviet system served the cause of foreign enemies of the Soviet Union and opponents of detente. While depicting Solzhenitsyn as a solitary figure in total isolation from Soviet society, the media drew a tight curtain around the various domestic expressions of concern over his fate by Yevtushenko, Sakharov and others, reported in Western media. Moscow maintained a complete blackout on poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko's =.:tter of protest to Brezhnev and the statement he circulated in Moscow explaining his action, which was published in the West. The only outward sign of official displeasure toward Ycvtushenko was the cancellation of his scheduled Moscow TV appearance on 16 February--a change recorded in PRAVDA's TV schedule that same day. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 EAST EUROPE Moscow's orthodox East European allies, with varying degrees of invective, strongly supported the Soviet action against Solzhenitsyn. The exiled writer was denounced in doctrinaire terms as a tool of anticommunist and anti-Soviet forces by Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary, while Polish comment showed some restraint. Bulgaria, which had strongly criticized Soizhe.nitsyn, and Romania, which had not mentioned his case, have so far only reported the 1.3 February TASS announcement of his expulsion. Yugoslavia, which had treated the Solzhenitsyn controversy with marked caution, has not commented since TANJUC reported on the 13th the circumstances of his arrest, Albania has not mentioned Solzhenitsyn's arrest and expulsion, after having earlier denounced him as, among other things, "an ugly offspring of capitalist degeneration in the Soviet Union." Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 16th carried a dispatch from its Moscow correspondent, who approvingly noted the "indignation" of the Soviet public over Solzhenitsyn. After reporting that Soviet papers had carried letters from Sc?iet citizens approving the official action the dispatch predicted that the West would raise a hue and cry about the case in order to conceal the fact Soviet organs had acted "Justly and humanely" toward the exiled writer. Uniquely among the East European countries, c e Bratislava radio on the 14th reported an organizational denunciation of Solzhenitsyn, by the Czechoslovak Committee of Writers Union; meeting that day in Prague. Also on the 14th the Prague radio carried a commentary by Soviet NOVOSTI editor. Korolev which gloated that alleged Western hopes that Solzhenitsyn would be "crucified" as a Christ figure failed to materialize and that his expulsion had turned him into "a mete blank cartridge." The same day the Bratislava radio surmised that the FRG would not welcome Solzhenitsyn as a permanent resident, as this would "discredit the Federal Republic before the Soviet Union" in the current era of detente.. The East Berlin domestic service on the 13th commented sarcastically that the exiled author was now free to arrange his life in a country which "should suit him better" than his native country, which h:! had slandered. The commentary declared that the Soviet authorities had adequate legal grounds for the move against Solzhenitsyn and that their avoidance of more drastic action was an "annoyance" to those in the West who wanted to make him a martyr, The next day, a Raabe domestic CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 radio commentary ref,:rr.ed to Solzhenitsyn in terms of Marx's characterization of perple "wno immediately wither into everyday figures as ijuon as their situation calls on them to perform miracles." The talk declared categorically that "the Solzhenitsyn story is over." A 14 February NEU^S ,`DEUTSCHLAND article by Harald Hause likewise predicted that the Solzhenitsyn affair would be forgotten "as now the sensation of Mre. Alleluyc:va has i. been, forgotten.," The Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG waited until the 19th to publish a blistering editorial which contrasted markedly with Budapest's customary restraint on such matters. The editorial charged that the exiled author "twists everything" and "dirties even the finest pages and most heroic struggles of history." In terms similar to those employed.by Prague and the GDR, the paper declared that Solzhenitsyn's anti-Soviet bubble had burst, and that all that was left to him was employment with Radio Liberty and the "sympathy" of the West German neo-Nazi party leader Adolf von Thadden. Uniquely in the East Europe comment,.NEPSZABADSAG conceded that the Stalinist targets of Solzheni,tsyn's criticisms were genuine, but it went on to charge that "he blows up the faults and mistakes which did in fact exist--but which he was not the first to expose--to a disproportionate size." An article in the 15 February issue-of the k'arsaw military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI strongly defended the Soviet action against Solzhneitsyn. In somewhat more restrained tones than those of Moscow's other allies, however, the paper echoed the stock themes that Western hopes for the writer's "martyrdom" were now disappointed and that he was now just "one more White emigre." Also on the 15th, the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY published a shorter version of the commentary b; NOVOSTI editor Korolev. which the Prague radio had also carried the.day before. ZYCIE WARSZAWY added to the NOVOSTI dispatch its own observation that Solzhenitsyn would "now become the West's internal matter." WEST EUROPE CP'S The West European communist parties' reactions to Solzhenitsyn's expulsion ranged from cautious disapproval by the French CP to more critical statements from the Italian, Spanish, and British communist parties. The domestic embarrassment caused by the issue to the two major West European communist parties was apparent in the low-keyed French and Italian communist media coverage of the event, as well as in their parties' behavior at the recent Brussels communist Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 summit conference. The Brussels meeting avoided dealing with the Solzhenitsyn affair and Soviet dissidence, and its call for intellectual freedom was restricted to capitalist countries in West Europe. Reflecting both sensitivity to domestic political requirements and its traditional pro-Soviet orientation, the French Communist Party responded to the Solzhenitsyn issue by acknowledging the r.uthor's right to free expression while at the same time emphasizing the anti-Soviet nature of the campaign mounted iii the West on his behalf. These themes appeared in a 1.5 February commentary in L'HUMANITE which went on to accuse Solzhenitsyn's supporters of hypocrisy in neglecting the victims of dictatorial regimes in Greece, Chile,, and South Vietnam,, An earlier L'HUMANITE commentary on the 6th, observing that Moscow had denounced "events" criticized by Solzhenitsyn as far back as the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, charged him with condemning the Soviet Union from "Lenin to Brezhnev," The Italian Communist Party organ L'UNITA, in a 13 February brief editorial comment on Solzhenitsyn's reported arrest, conceded that his "arguments" were hindering the process of detente but objected to the use cf "administrative and judicial meabur.es" in dealing with intellectual dissent. Even "unacceptable" political and ideological views, the editorial argued, should be met on the "battlefield of ideas." The following day L'UNITA reported Solzhenitsyn's expulsion without comment, together with a statement by Italian trade unions in support of intellectual dissent as "an inherent part of freedom of thought," that should not beco-,ne an "object of repression." The Spanish Communist Party, in a 14 February Radio Independent Spain commentary, asserted that despite the exploitation of the Solzhenitsyn issue by anti-Soviet elements, "we do not advocate an official philosophy, censorship, or a political or administrative center to dictate laws to art or science." British Communist Party leader Gcllan, in remarks reported in the London MORNING STAR cn the 14th, echoed the Italian stand calling for "political discussion" rather than administrative procedures.in dealing with intellectual dissent, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 U. S,-SOVIET RELATIONS SOVIET DEBATE CONTINUES OVER IMPLICATIONS OF ARMS RACE The apparent stalemate reached in East-West negotiations on arms control has evoked expressions of concern and sharply different conclusions by military and civilian spokesmen in Moscow., Military writers in RED STAR have pointed to the continuing pace of arms development in the West as justification for strengthening; Soviet military might. However, a less alarmist view of these developments has recently been strongly asserted by two members of the USA Institute in Moscow--director Georgiy Arbatov and military specialist G. A. Trofimenkor They have argued that the appropriate Soviet response to the continuing arms race should be in the political, not the military, sphere. Army Gen. Ye. Maltsev, writing in the 14 February RED STAR, acknowledged that the danger of a world nuclear war has begun to diminish, but he called attention to "the further broaden- ing of the arms race" in the West. He argued that in light of such developments as the proposed increases in the U.S. military budget and the advocacy by U.S. military leaders of a "new generation of nuclear missile weapons," the USSR and the Warsaw Pact "are forced, in the interests of the reliible defense of socialism, to take appropriate steps to strengthen their military puteol.ta.t." Maltsev echoed remarks made a week before in RED SLxR by Rear Admiral V. Shelyag in assert- ing that, though a "deepening of detente" was desirable, Moscow "must continue to be prepared for any turnabout-in the development of world events." TROFIMENKO ARTICLE Trofimenko, writing in the February issue of USA, also showed concern that "the arms race in the world as a whole is not substantially easing off." He attributed this in part to the persistence of long-ingrained cold war attitudes which were not being dispelled "as rapidly as detente demands." However he went on to warn that advocates of new weapons systems in the United Staf: s should consider the impact of their appeals in Moscow-- having notee earlier in the article that "the Soviet Union was compelled to react appropriately to the intensification of the strategic arms buildup in the United States" in the 1960's. But in contrast to Maltsev and other recent articles in the military press, Trofimenko argued that: the danger of war cannot be permanently eliminated "within the framework Approved For Release 46NAnk CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 of a purely technical solution of 'attack and defense:"' Amplifying this stand, he asserted that "only solutions in the political sphere relying on the firm will for peace of the broadest segments of humanity can be a real 'antibomb'--a method of achieving a stable, secure peace." In support of diplomacy, he called for "the implementation of the tasks advanced in the [Soviet) peace program" as "the best guarantee that the changes now taking place in the internattunal si 'potion ' will- be.pteadfast and stable." ARBATOV ARTICLE Arbatov, in the February issue of PROBLEMS OF PLACE AND SOCIALISM, also expressed concern over the lag between political and military detente. Like Trofimenko, he complr.ined of "cold war inertia" and quoted Brezhnev's remarks on this, subject in Washington last June which had referred to foot-dragging in both the United States and the Soviet Union. As in previous articles, he was more forthright than other commentators in complaining about U.S. developments. He was critice.1 of "the many obvious contradictions in U.S. policy," in particular the official recognition of the principle of "equal security" in bilateral relat:_ons coupled with simultaneous attempts to "step up the arms race." In response to ominous developments in the United States, Arbatov counseled patience on Moscow's part, arguing that it was at present still "difficult to envisage" any development in the field of armaments that could upset the present strategic balance. He also went on to argue, even more forcefully than Trofimenko, for political rather than military response.: by Soviet policymakers. As on previous occasions in the past four years, he pointed to the "inexorably shrinking phsre of applicability of military force" in international affairs and to the fact that "nonmilitary factors are becoming increasingly paramount" in calculations of the strength of nations. Arbatov professed to see the recent "revival of interest" in the United States in a "counter#orce" strategy as an attempt to restore the utility of military force. in so doing, he offered the most detailed Soviet criticism of the theoretical premises underlying the recently announced changes in U.S. missile targeting and the deployment of "mininukes." Although the article was signed to press before recent statements by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger gave wide publicity to the strategic debate, Arbatov was responding to earlier indications that such issues were again under discussion, Drawing or arguments made by U.S. arms control specialists, Arbatov criticized the new developments because they would "cultivate a more tolerant attitude to nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare" anr' cause an acceleration of the arms race. The latter would result, he CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 maintained, from the requirement for more accurate and more potent weapons to support the counterforce strategy. In attacking the counterforce concept, Arbatov clearly implied that deterrence based on mutual. assured destruction was the only viable alternative until substantial disarmament measures have been agreed upon, although he expressed distaste for the need to accept a "peace built on terror." THEORETICAL The contrasting pozitions of Soviet military DEBATE and civilian spokesmen on practical policy issues w're highlighted by their differing attitudes toward the Clausewitz-Lenin doctrine that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Military spokesmen have been vigorously defending the doctrine in the face of charges that it has been invalidated by the advent of nuclear weapons. In the most recent defense, Rear Admiral Shelyag in the 7 February RED STAR article noted that the critics of the doctrine tend to "oversimplify" the consequences of nuclear war by dwelling on unacceptable levels of destruction in any..nuclear exchange. By contrast Arbatov, in his recent article, clearly came out as a critic of the doctrinaire military viewpoint, arguing chat nuclear weapons have indeed altered the relationship between war and p.l.icy: "No policy can have the objective rf destroying the enemy at the cost of complete self-annihilation." Referring to a dichotomy used by Clausewitz, he added that "with the emergence of nuclear missiles any correspondence between the political ends of war and the means was lost." Arbatov found further support for this position in the words of Lenin. He cited Krupskaya's book for LeninIs observation that "modern technology is increasingly fomenting the destructiveness of war. But there will 'be a time when war will become so destructive that it becomes impossible." The position taken by Arbatov seemed ir~plicit in a 14 February PRAVDA article on:.SALT attributed to "A. Platonov and L. Alekseyev" which singled out the urgency of the "problem of preventing a nuclear war which could turn into a genuine disaster for all mankind." The article also echoed the reasoning of.:Arbatov in citing statements by U.S. observers problaiming the failure of increases in strategic weapons arsenals in recent years to enhance national security. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 PEKING SEES "IMPASSE" IN U,S,-SOVIET SALT NEGOTIATIONS Peking has recently displayed a markedly more negative view on the chances for progress at the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limta- tion talks that resumed this week in Geneva. A series of un- usually lengthy Peking commentaries dealing with the SALT resumption represents a significant departure from China's previously cautious and reserved assessme?:.t, which had acknowledged the possibility of at least temporary compromises and agreements in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Taken together with sustained Peking reports of a lack of movement in East-West talks on European security and force reduction,* the commentaries suggest growing Chinese confidence that detente policies have reached a major impasse and that over- riding U.S.-Soviet differences will provide continuing opportunities for advantageous Chinese maneuvering in the triangular relationship. Peking has especially played up what it views as a growing Washington realization that Moscow is using the talks to lull the United States into weakening its defenses so that the USSR can achieve a superior strategic position. Typically, a 30 January NCNA article described the talks as "more dead than alive" because of Washington's increas- ing awareness that Moscow's "tough stand" in the sessions underlines a "Soviet intention to achieve all-round nuclear superiority." It went on to hail U.S. determination, evident in Secretary Schlesinger's repeated announcements that Washington would not tolerate a position of inferiority to Moscow, and it noted various new U.S. defense moves, including increased military spending and a revision of missile targeting strategy. A 4 February NCNA report similarly referred to the "stalemate" at the Geneva talks while crowing about the "failure" of Soviet detente policies in 1973 despite intense personal diplomacy by party chief Brezhnev. And an 11 February NCNA report of U.S. press comment on the alleged crumbling of detente emphasized that the United States has become seriously disillusioned in SALT over the Soviet failure to follow through on its announced intentions by offering meaningful compromises in the talks. * For a discussion of earlier Peking commentaries pointing up lack of progress in the. European security and force reductions talks, see the 19 December J.97:~ TRENDS, pages 10-12. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: Cb?t U0875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 ENERGY CRISIS MOSCOW MEDIA OBSCURE GROMYKO BACKING FOR SPECIAL UN SESSION Soviet media are not known to have publicized thus far statements in Europe by Foreign M'niscer Gromyko offering explicit Soviet support for Algeria's call for a UN General Assembly session on raw materials. Western media, inciuding the New Y-rk TIMES, reported that Gromyko had confirmed in Paris and Rome on 18 and 19 February that the Soviet Union supported the Algerian Initiative for a UNGA conference. Moscow media have noted only that Gromyko told a Paris press conference that the USSR backs energy talks "by all sides concerned," and that such discussions would help to improve the. international situation and establish mutually advantageous cooperation. Neither have Soviet media provided any confirmation of a 20 February Algiers radio report that Gromyko had sent a message to Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika advising him that the Soviet Government had decided to support Algeria's conference proposal. Moscow media previously have given sparse and low-level publicity to proposals by Soviet oil expert Boris Rachkov for a world conference on energy attended by both communist and noncommunist countries.* WASHINGTON ENERGY In the aftermath of the Washington energy CONFERENCE conference, Moscow has continr-=d to cast doubts on U.S. motives and to focus attention on the disagreements between France and the other participants reveal.pd at the conference. While continuing to .;void authoritative comment of its own, Moscow has replayed numerous r;egative assessments by the U.S. and Wes. European press and dispatches from Soviet correspondents abroad continue to display sympathy for the French position of support for bilateral oil arrangements and opposition to combined Western efforts to deal with the measures imposed by the oil-producing countries. An article by Yuriy Khar;anov in PRAVDA on the 16th maintained that during the conference the United States "sought, found, and deepened cracks in the ranks" of the EC countries in an effort to exploit their differences, and IZVESTIYA's correspondent in * For background on the Rachkov proposal, see the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 9-10. Approved For Release I 999 912 A-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 WasleingL:.' said on the 15th that the final communique contained no analysis of the real causes of the energy crisis and reflected only the dissatisfa.cLion of the participants. The only Peking comment on the Washington conference to crate is a 15 February NCNA report asserting that the United States called the meeting "to rebuild its hegemonic position in the Western world, thereby enhancing its struggle with the other superpower, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, in the Middle East and Europe." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CON F1bEN'1'I_A1, F1II:S TRENDS 21. FEBRUARY 1974 - 1.2 - ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT USSR NOTES NEW KISSINGER TRIP, HAS LITTLE COMMENT ON MIDEAST Suv Iet used is h:.lve m:.l InLatned v1.rtual sl lcnce on the issue of furLher steps for a Middle EaSL peace se~ilcrnent. Moscow has brLef1y reported on Secretary K.i.ssiugcr's plans for a new Mtddic East trip next: week, the steps Ln Lite Egyptian-Israeli d lsell};a};emcut. process, ,and Lite continuing Syrian-Israeli clashes, but has offered very little collllllent. An exception was it Losev conunellLiry broadcast In English to North America on the 8th which asserted that the USSR regardcc Lite Egyptian- Israeli disengagement agreement as constructive but only a ''part.ial measure," and that the Geneva conference should move ahead to a "radicaa" set:Bement guaranteeing security for all stage:; and pvop.l.es of Lite area. Moscow reported without corlunent President Nixon's 20 February announcement, after his meeting with tie Egyptian and Saudi Arabian foreign ministers, that Secretary Kissinger would leave for the Middle East next week to discuss Syrian-Israeli ili:;eugagmenL. Reporting the arrival in Washington of the two Arah ministers, Moscow on Lite l7th had noted that they had been sent by the participants In the four-nation Arab summit conference to discuss plans for Syrian-Israeli troop disengagment and "a possibility" if lifting Lite oil embargo. Soviet media had prevLousiy reported that these topics were discussed by the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Algeria at their. 13-14 February meeting in Algiers. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 14th cited unidentified "reports" that Algerian President Boumediene had called at the conference for continued use of the "oi'. weapon" and that Syrian President al-Arad had insisted that the oil embargo continue until Israel accepted Syrian conditions for it disengagement of forces. IZVESTIYA on the 16th, however, observed that, Judging from Arab press reports, there was no specific decision on the oil question at the Algiers summit. SOVIET "ALERT" The first known reference in Moscow media to IN OCTOBER WAR a Soviet military alert during the October war appeared in a 16 February Moscow Arabic- language broadcast of an interview with Cairo AL-AKIIBAR chief editor Husayn Fahmi. In the Moscow radio interview, Fahmi said that "the strong Soviet intervention, the stern Soviet warning Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFI.>>! fiAT, FBLS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 to larae.l, and the alerting of the Soviet forces to go to the Middle East to establish pence and top the aggression" changed the situation completely. It l.ed, he said, to the intervention of the two superpowers and their rledge to establish a just pence in the Middle East. Fahmi was responding to a question on the effect of the October fighting on Arab-Sovv1^t friendship. His remarks come against the background of Moscow's low-keyed campaign to convince the Arabs of the advantages of Soviet friendship and cooperation and to rebut alleged "imperialist" and "Zionist" attempts to denigrate Moscow's Middle, East policy. Tahmi asserted that the October war gave new impetus to Soviet-Arab friendship by destroying Imperialist and Zionist fabrications about the "ineffectiveness of Soviet weapons" and the adverse effect that Soviet-U.S. detente would have on Soviet support for the Arabs. In reacting to the 25 October U.,S, worldwide mi1.,.4ary alert, Moscow had obscured the President's and Kiesinger.'s explanations that the U.S. action had been taken because there was evidence that certain Soviet units had been alerted for possible dispatch to the Middle East. A TAGS statement on the U.S. alert issued on 27 October had rejected "absurd" allegations that some actions of the Soviet Union had supposedly given cause for concern. And Brezhnev in his World Peace Congress speech on 26 October spoke cryptically of actions "in some NATO countries" di-,sominating "fantastic speculations" concerning Soviet intcnti ris in the Middle East. Brezhnev went on to disclose that in response to Egyptian President aa-Sndat'q request for U.S. end Soviet troops, the Soviet Union had already sent "representatives" and hoped the United States wo~lld do the same. "PEACE AND PROGRESS" Moscow on 15 February inaugurated daily PROGRAMS IN ARABIC broadcasts in Arabic of the "unofficial" Rudic Peace and Prcgress programs. Broadcasts by Radio Peace ind Progress in English to Africa, which had been the vehicle for news and comment depling with Middle East developments, are continuing, as are Radic Peace and Progress programs in Hebrew tailored for Israeli audiences. News and commentaries in the new half-hour Arabic-'language programs have predictably focused on continuing Israeli "provocations" against neighboring Arab countries, Israel's "expansionist" intentions, and U.S. support and encouragement-for Tel Aviv's policies. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL L'BIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 Ct.mmont has also expressed concern over "rightist" trends in the Arab world, complaining that the United States was manipulating "local reactionaries" in an effort to incite the Arabs against the Soviet Uniot?, divide the ranks of the "patriotic,. revolutionary forces," and divert the Arabs from their social, economic and political goals. Approved For Release 1/U4ICIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 CHINA PEOPLES DAILY STRESSES PARTY ROLE IN ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN A 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial has emphasized that the party has organizational control over the assault against Lin Piao and Confucius. Unlike a 2 February editorial in the same paper, which identified the struggle as being "initiated and led" by Mao himself, the editorial on the 20th provided an organizational imprimatur, asserting that the campaign is under the leadership of "fhe Central Committee of the CCP headed by Chairman Mao." In Al o?at',variance with the previous editorial's sharp warning that the campaign would be ;.a "test for every lending comrade," the editorial argued that "we ehould have confidence" that leading comrades will be able "to maintain the general orientation of the struggle."* The editorial positively assessed as "fairly good" the results of the campaign thus for, In still another contrast, the 20 February editorial did not repeat the 2 February editorial's call for' the masses to "rise in action" and previous high praise for the masses as the "main force" in the campaign. Instead, it stressed the need for party committees to play the venguard role, "arouse the masses," and guide the movement along the "correct track." In an apparent attempt to limit the scope of subjects eligible for review in the context of the anti-Confucius struggle, the editorial called upon party committees to help the masses "avoid getting entangled in particular questions at the expense of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius." It said that party committees must "correctly" handle contradictions among the people and try to combine the old, middle-aged and young in order to unite with 95 percent of the cadres and masses. The ideological campaign against Lis and Confucius has still not produced any clear target for attf,ck, and Peking han strongly warned against allowing contradictions among the people to cause polarization among,various group:?. An 18 February NCN. report on recent PEOPLE'S DAILY articles condemning Lin's influence within the ranks of the people, for example, asserted that "active ideological struggle does not turn our comrades into enemies", and will only "enhance the revolutions.-y unity of cur comrades." And on the provincial level, a 13 February Foochow broadcast of * See 6 February trends, pages 13-14. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFICLNTIAL Ft3IS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 a poster criticizing a local teacher noted that teachers and school leaders shotY1d "not be annoyed by the few big-character posters put up in tltca school, thinking that: you will, be unable to control the students." The student's poster confidently asserted thet. once the erring teacher under attack had corrected his mistakes, he would "be our good teacher." Judging by a recent speech by CCP Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching, the anti-Confucius campaign does not appear aimed at allowing criticism to adversely affect production. Wei's remarks at,-1ocal anti.-Confucius meetings, broadcast by Nanning radio on 18 February, emplasized party leadership over the campaign and stressed the constructive spinoffs expected from the struggle. Focusing can the importance of ideological campaigns in promoting production, Wei argued that the new upsurge of criticism of Lin and Confucius is "bound" to result in a "new upsurge of production...because to make revolution is to liberas:e the productive forces and to stimulate their development." Wei then relegated criticism of Lin and Confucius to the workers' "spare time" so thatt, victories can be won in both revolution and production. Approved For Release 199T 4-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL, FBIS TRENDS 2.1 FEBRUAE'.Y 1974 PRC SUSTAINS INTEREST IN BETTER RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ;SIA Peking has rr.cently reconfirmed its 1, tcrob: in improvinn, bilateral relations with the noncommun;,st states of 3outhcast Asia and its approval, for regional alliances in this area to counter Soviet inroads. For the first time to recent years the possibility of Chinese participation in a regional alliance has been preee.rted In a positive context, in a 14 February NCNA report on Australian Prime Minister Whitlam's recent tour of six Southeast Asian: states. NCNA did so by reporting positively Whitlam's proposal for a broad regional group centered on Southeast Asia and quot,ng his companion admonitioki rhpt "any organization in Asia and the Western Pacific would be incomplete and grievously inadequate if China were omitted from it." Peking's current positive out- look contrasts sharply with itg intense. suspicion of Asian regional groupings as fronts for imperialism in the 1960's, but Is con- sistent with its increasingly favorable treatment in the past year of such regional organizations as ASEAN that ate not linked with the superpowers.* The Peking report on Whitlam's visit underi.ined China's position that Moscow is the major threat to the region, while the United States and its SEATO military alliance are favorably viewed as instruments blocking the USSR. Thus, though duly noting Whitlam's general characterization of "big power contenticn" as a threat to the region, NCNA specifically pointed up Whitlam's reference to "Intensified Soviet activities" while ignoring his accompanying criticism of the United States. Moreover, NCNA misrepresented the Australian Prime Minister's anti-U.S. criticism of "Dulles' concept o5 military containment of China," presenting Whitlam's remarks as though they were equally applicable to the Soviet Union and the United States, and pointedly ignored his companion criticism of the SEATO alliance, which had been a major bulwark In Dulles' containment policy. THAI DELEGATION Sustained Chinese interest in improving bilateral VISIT relations with Southeast Asian states was evident in Peking's warm reception last week for a visit- ing Thai sports delegation led by Defense Minister Thawi Chunlasap, * For a discussion of Peking's recent attitude towards nonalined Asian regional organizations sues as ASEAN, see 1 August 1973 TRENDS, pages S1-S5. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 the highest ranking Thai official to visit China in two decades. The group was duly entertained by PRC sports figures, met with Chou Ens-l.ai and Vice Premier Teng lisiao-ping on the 12th for a "friendly" conversation, and "amicably exchanged views" in separate meetings with the Chinese foreign trade minister and a vice foreign minister on,9 February. Such treatment accords with that given Thai visitors to Peking since the breakthrough in relations in September 1977. In a marked departure from the generally modest visit accomplish- ments claimed by previous Thai visitors to China returning to Bangkok, Thawi told journalists on the 16th that Chou En-lai had indicated that Peking had relinquished support for the Thai CP insurgents, and that he had offered-to sell Bangkok needed dicsel oil in addition to the 50,000 tons agreed to last December. Peking has not reported the defense mtnister's remarks. Approved For Releaseca/K: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL HIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 ASIAN SECURITY MOSCOW SCORES U1S, PLANS FOR INDIAN OCEAN BASE U.S. plans to expand naval and air facilities on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean have recently been criticized in several Soviet central press articles and Moscow radio broadcasts to Asian and African nations. Articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR criticized Britain's agreement to the U.S. expansion, contending that U.S. efforts to control the Persian Gulf "oil funnel" would jeopardize the region's security and intimidate the national liberation movements in Africa and the developing countries of Asia. Numerous Moscow radio foreign-language commentaries for Asia have accused the United States of planning to construct a Diego Garcia base that would handle the same strategic bombers used over Vietnam and nuclear submarines that would keep a considerable part of Asia and Africa "at gunpoint." Moscow media pointedly contrast the U.S. efforts to expand bases with Soviet efforts to relax tension, exemplified in Brezhnev's Asian collective security system proposals and Soviet support for the Indian and Sri Lanka proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a peace zone. The current Moscow reaction is consistent with long- standing Soviet sensitivity to U.S. military acti?;ir.ies in the Indian Ocean--manifested after Anglo-American agreements on Diego Garcia were reached in 1966 and 1972, and whenever the U.S. navy made a show of strength in the area. Moscow's current campaig-. Includes exploitation of public protests against: the expansion by various littoral countries. Commenting defensively on published U.S. claims that reopening of the Suez Canal would permit a buildup of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, PRAVDA Commentator Vladimir Ozerov on 10 February defended the Soviet naval presence, insisting that plying normal sea routes was not "exceptional" and constituted "a generally accepted practice." Similarly, in an article in RED STAR on the 13th, Captain First Class V. Pustov exposed "the falsehood of U.S. propaganda statements" alleging the USSR would gain a strategic advantage when the canal was opened, according to TASS. Several foreign-language radio commentaries denied that the Soviet Union was operating naval bases in the area and countercharged that the United States was planning to constuct a chain of bases to control the sea routes and intimidate the littoral nations. Approved For Release 1999/09/25~ICYAQR5P 5T00875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 VIETNAM DRV TRADE UNION CONGRESS CONTINUES ACCENT ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY VWP First Se.%retary Le. Duan, In his address at the opening meeting of the third Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions Congress on 1L February, gave a frank appraisal of the "many difficulties and great problems" facing the postwar DRV economy and pointed out. the "imperative need to accelerate socialist industrialization." The VFTU ^_?)ngres4, the first since 1961, is the first of three announ-ed DRV mass organization congresses scheduled in 1974--the f:~urth congress of the Ho Chi. Minh Working Youth Union opened on 18 February, and the fourth congress of the Vietnam Women's Union wi.ll be held later this year. Predictably, the congress speeches and closing resolution reflect: Han.oi's continuing emphasis on returning the country to normal peacetime conditions and on economic reconstruction as set forth in the general tasks of the VWP Central Committee's 22d plenum--a theme given detailed treatment at the DRV National Assembly session which closed on the 9th.* LE DUAN Playing the same role of keynoter as he did at the last ADDRESS trade union congress in February 1961, Le Duan in his address to the congress informed the delegates that the present congress would be conducting its activities on the basis of the. "extremely important resolutions" recently adopted by the 22d plenum. The first secretary gave high praise to the DRV social system for having survived a "most barbarous. . war of aggression" and claimed that :.n 1973 "a substantial portion" of the dire(..t consequences of the war had been overcome. To offset any unfounded optimism these remarks might engender, Le Duan hastened t_v remind his ]4steners of the key problems presently facing North Vietnam. He said that "in view of the noble objectives of communism," there should be no e.vitisfaction with the current situation, "especially in economic life." To drive home his point, he acknowledged that war devastation "has caused our originally undeveloped economy, which had made a step forward, to regress to where it was more than a decade ago." Le Duan made it clear, however, that the war was not the entire cause of the North's economic predicament, noting that inherent to the DRV's "underdeveloped" economy were "shortcomings and immaturity in economy;. leadership, guidance and management," * See the TRENDS of 6 February 1974, page j, and 13 February 1974, pages 12-15 for discussion of the assembly session. Approved For Release I 9~ kq b RTYCLIA-RDP85TOO875R000300070008-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 Dealing with the DRV's population growth, an issue that seems to be of heightening concern to the DRV leadership, Le Duan stated that the population increase has been too rapid--"more than 10 million people from 1960 to 1973"--and this has brought about an "acute imbalance" between demands and the economic and financial capabilities available to meet them. Deputy Premier Le Th.anh Nghi, in his government report to the recent National Assembly session, had voiced similar apprehension about the DRV's soaring birthrate, declaring that it was necessary to initiate a birth control. movement. While the "imperative need to accelerate socialist industrialization" was listed as one of the five main topics for. Le Duan's address,* he never elaborated in detail on this subject but merely cataloged the many problems of socialist construction. He concluded that socialist industrialization and "rapidly" moving forward to large-, scale socialist production would solve the DRV's economic dilemma. Le Duan noted that the resolutions of the Central Committeuu's 19th, 20th, and 22d plenums were framed with this basic objective in mind and dealt with "economic constructicn and development and economic leadership and management."** After an essentially theoretical discourse on the DRV economy's planned progression from small-scale to large-scale production, Le Duan warned that the DRV "can neither develop industry nor build heavy industry unilaterally" in its advance toward large-scale socialist production. There has to be, he pointed out, a balance between agricultural and industrial development, although he noted that re- commending sole reliance on agriculture would be "incorrect," Summing up the economic priorities, Le Duan stated: The path leading toward large-scale production in our country must be: rationally develop heavy industry on a or.i.ority basis and on the basis of agricultural and heavy industry development; build the economy at the central level while developing it at the regional level; and combine the building of the economy with nati:nal defense, * Hanoi radio, in broadcasting Le Duan's speech on 12 and 13 February, indicated it was a complete text. ** Hanoi media still have net been heard to mention the convening of the 21st plenum. Le Duan's exclusion of it in his listing would suggest that economic affairs had little impact on its discussions. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 While a^_,knowledging that "priority development of industry" is a fundamental law, Le Duan asserted that "this line. . .enables us to avni_d unnecessaty strains on our economic and social life that may result from the unilateral priority development of heavy industry." SPEECHES, Vice Chairman Nguyen Duc Thuan, in his "report RESOLUTION on the situation and tasks" of the VFTU executive committee, provided a lengthy assessment of trade union activities and achievements since the second congress and a discussion of present trade union tasks. In listing the trade unions' major tasks for 1974-1975, Thuan gave precedence to launching a movement: for "productive labor and practicing thrift to build the counr..r;;" and observed that this movement should in turn stimulate the m?:'ve.menr to assist agriculture and consolidate the worker-peasant al.lianc,e. To underscore the significance of linking the two movements, Thuan :?tat:ed that agricultural production remains the "central task" for the period 1974-1975 in the plan for economic rehabilitation-arid development, In addition, Hoang Quoc Viet gave the inaugural address and the closing speech, and Premier Pham Van Dong was reported to have spoken, but available Hanoi media have not publicized Dong!!s remarks. This is consistent with the scant media attention also ac.corded to Donb's speech at the recent National Assembly session. The Lrade union congress resolution, thus far available only in excerpt form as broadcast by. Hano:L radio, 'reiterated .the, of the speeches and enumerated six "concrete tasks" for the trade unions: providing adequate and timely assistance for southern laborers and compatriots; organizing a movement for labor pro- ductivity and for building socialism economically; caring for the livelihood wozkers and office employees; educating and developing wor.kers and r,1f..ic.e employees able to fulfill the requirements of the revolution; improving trade union organization and training and improving trade union cadres; and contributing to the solidarity and unity of t1i. world trade union movement. CONGRESS All of the DRV leaders except Defense Minister ATTENDANCE Giap were reported present at the congress and as members of the presidium: Ton Duc Thang, Nguyen Luong Bang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Van Tien Dung--apparently standing in for Giap. The new VFTU Central Committee elected at the congress continued Hoang Quoc Viet in his position as chairman and Nguyen Duc Thuan, Nguyen Cong Hoa, and Truong Thi My in their positions as vice chairman, Additionally, Nguyen Duc Thuan was listed concurrently as secretary general--a position in which he has not been previously noted. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 China was the only socialist country that did not have a delegation attending this VFTU congress, which drew visiting delegates from the Moscow-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions and all other socialist countries, including Peking's ally Albania, as well as third world delegates--mostly from the Middle East--and trade unionists from France and Italy. The unexpected attendance at this congress by Albania, the only communist country that had not been at the last VFTU congress in 1961, pointed up the Chinese absence--a situation duly exploited in Moscow reports on the congress. The only known PRC acknowledgements of the VFTU congress were a message. from the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and a lengthy 15 February NCNA report pegged to its closing. PRG PUSHES RECOGNITION CAMPAIGN AT GENEVA LAW CONFERENCE The PRG, continuing its longstanding campaign to gain wider inter- national. recognition, has launched another effort in connection with the Geneva conference on international humanitarian law that opened 20 February. The PRG sent notes to the Swiss Government declaring its adherence to the four Geneva conventions on. humanitarian law for the protection of war victims, according to LPA; and on 18 January Switzerland took note of the PRG declaration and in turn informed the other participating countries. A 20 February PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, responding to what it termed a U.S. threat to withdraw if the PRG took part in the Geneva conference, declared. that the PRG was "fully qualified and empowered" to attend and that any U.S. "attempt to prevent the PRG's participation . . , was completely il.legal," An, earlier more detailed justification for the PRG's action in a 14 February foreign ministry statement declared that the PRG would not oppose participation in the conference by other South Vietnamese parties, even though the PRG was the "true, sole representative of the South Vietnamese people." This statement pointed out that PR.G participation should not be construed as recognition of other parties present at the conference, nor would it mean recognition of the PRG by other countries. A DRV Foreign Ministry statement also issued on 14 February in s.upport of the PRG initiative declared that the PRG had "full Juridical and moral right" to attend the conference, PRG and DRV broadcasts have not provided any confirmation that a PRG delegation will attend. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TFENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 U S S R PRO-RUSSIAN UKRAINIANS SEEK TO DOWNGRADE UKRAINIAN HEROES Ukrainian proponents of russif.i.cation have begun a move to whittle rlcwn the reputations of two of the most popular defenders of Ukrainian culture, onetime Ukrainian Education Minister Mykola Skrypntk and young poet Vasyl Symonenko. The two men, both dereased, have been treated as folk heroes in recent years by many Ukrainians--to the obvious displeasure of pro-Russian ympathizers. Since the 1972 ouster of Shelest as Ukrainian party first secretary and Shcherbitskiy's rise to power, officials suspected of Ukrainian nationalist sympathies have been removed, and writers expressing nationalist sentiments have been condemned and in some cases arrested. One of the most. notorious russifiers, Mykola Shamota, who is director of the T.G. She.vchenko Institute of Literature, attacked Sym-'nenko in a speech excerpted in the 8 February LITERATURNA UKRAINA. Bitterly complaining that Symonenko is constantly called the "model for ycut.h" and the "poetic conscience of a whole genera ," Shamota reminded his audience that Symonenko had also written "i.mmat:ur.e, ideologically imprecise" works and had repeatedly expressed nationalistic sentiments that were used by Ukrainian emigrees abroad. Without repudiating the totality of Symonenko's work, Shamot.a insisted that the practice of holding him up as a model. '.or young writers" and an example of "civic courage" must be "decisively stopped." Symnner1'.(.,) h.as been in official favor in recent years, even though tip has served as an inspiration for many Ukrainian literary dissidents. it the. rime. of his death in December 1963, at age 27, he was a leader among young Ukrainian writers and the author of many unpublishc;.d nationalistic poems. Thanks to the efforts of his friends Ivan Dzvuba and Ivan Svitlichnyy--the two most prominent Ukrainian literary dissidents--he became a symbol of anti-russification after his death.. Svit.lichnyy managed to send Symonenko's unpublished writings abroad, where they were published by Ukrainian emigres in January 1'65. Svitlichnyy and several others were arrested for this in August of that year., In January 1965 Dzyuba turned a celebration. of Symonenko's birthday into a demonstration against r.ussification, and he was also arrested and held for a short time, In late 1965 on. suspicion of involvement in secreting the deceased poet's writings abroad. Svi.tlichnyy is still in prison, while Dzyuba Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTJAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 was recently released after publicly recanting for Ariting his book "Internationalism or Itussification?". Dzyuba is now engaged in writing articles on factory life for LITERATURNA UKRAINA. Shamota's attack followed a move by Ukrainian Central Committee ideology Secretary Valen tin Malanchuk to prevent '.Jkrainian writers and historians from portraying Slrypnik--education minister from 1.927 to 1933 and the best known symbol of "Ukrainianization" since the revolution--in an overly favorable light- in a December VITCHIZNA article based on a 22 October speech to Kiev writers, Malanchuk acknowledged that Skrypnik Iliad been a "prominent" leader who had been wrongly vilifi^d. But he accused Skrypnik of having exaggerated the importance of the nationality questi,n in the Ukraine, and he warned historians not to disregard these mistakes. During Khrushchev's de-Stalinization Skrypnik was rehabilitated and lauded even in Moscow as an implacable foe of Ukrainian nationalism who had been driven to suicide in 1933 by unjust accusations of nationalist deviation. A 25 January 1962 IZVESTIYA article declared that he had committed certain mis.:nkts "but they did not have a political character," while PRAVDA on the same day likewise stated that Skr.ypnik's mistakes were typical and that h, was a "true internationalist," NEW LITHUANIAN FIRST SECRETARY CHOSEN OVER INCUMBENTS Bypassing the ranks of incumbent. republic leaders, Moscow has chosen young,Vil.nyus city First Secretary P. P, Gr.i.shkyavichyus ac new Lithuanian Central Committee first secretary, succeeding A. Yu. Snechkus, who died on 22 January, The choice of the 48-year old Grishkyavichyus at an 18 February Lithuanian Central Committee plenum may reflect displeasure with. the. present leadership for poor handling of recent nationalist unrest or simply a desire to infuse new blood in the aging republic hierarchy. This is the first change in Lithuania's top post since the republic was established in 1940 with Snechkus as first secretary. Gri.shkyavichyus, trained as a Journalist, began his career in that profession but later engaged in party work, becoming secretory of Vilnyus city from 1955 to 1964. In the early and mid-1960's he also worked on the republic council for atheistic propaganda and headed the Viluuyus volunteer people's guards, where he presumably gained experience in dealing with religious and nationalist unrest. In December 1964 he was selected at the age of 38 for the sensitive Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBI5 TRENDS 21 FEBRUARY 1974 post of head of the Lithuanian Central Committee's party organs se:~tion. In March 1971 lie was elected Vilnyus city first secretary and member of the Lithuanian Central Committee bureau. Grinhkynvichkyus was not elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee at tho 24th CPSU Congress in 1971. It is not unprecedented for a republic party first secretary to lack membership in the Central Committee in cases where sudden changes have occurred by deaths or transfers, and Grtshkyavlchyus presumably will gain Central Committee membership at the next congress. Che choice may reflect a lessening of Politburo member Suslov's Influence in Lithuania. Suslov, long the unofficial patron of Lithuanian leaders since he supervised the republic In the mid-1940'x, was extravagantly praised by Snechkus and republic Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Sliumauskas during his late November visit to Lithuania. When Snechkus died in January, however, his funeral was attended by Central Committee cadres Secretary Kapitonov, rather than by Sualov. Approved For Release 199c9% J/25 UENTIAL- Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0 FBIS TREND$ 21 FI.BRUARY 1974 APPENDIX MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCA07 STATISTICS 11 - 17 FEBRUARY 1974 Moncow 2854 items) Peking (927 Items) Brezhnev Cuban Visit (29X) 9% Domestic (54X) 592 China (GX) GX [Criti.cism of Lin (6%) 12%) Supreme Soviet Decree (--) 5% Pino and Confucius on Solzhenltsyn Expulsion Indochina (7X) 5% WashJngton Energy (1%) 5% Attacks on Antonioni (3%) 4% Conference Konygin Message to (--) 3% Film U.S.-Soviet Strategic (--) 3% World Peace Council Session, Sofia Arms Talks PRC Foreign Minister's (--) 3% Chile (1%) 3% ;support for Special IJNGA Session These statistics are based on the vo!cccnst commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and International radio servlcec. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press nrt!cla or edltorini, govern- ment or party ntntement, or diplomatic note, Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and tvents given major attention In terms of volume are not ulways discussed In the body of the Trends Some may have been covered In prior lss;:,a: In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0