TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 3, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
STATSPEC
MEN& I"
va, Ema NO
In Communist Propaganda
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:
Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences
STATSPEC
Confidential
3 APRIL 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 14)
A / i777/
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Covernment
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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3 APRIL 1974
C 0 N TE11TS
Moscow Affirms Kissinger Accomplishments, Points to Summit . . . . . . 1
Moscow Raps West European Defense Plans, NATO Anniversary. . . . . . . 2
Yugoslav Commentator Deplores Lack of Soviet Bloc Support. .
DRV Assails Kissinger Letter, Nixon Administration Policies. . . . . . 7
Hanoi Gives High-Level Welcome to Cambodian Front Leader . . . . . 9
Cuban-DRV Communique Proclaims Solidarity, Unity of Views. . . . . . . 11
TASS Statement Backs PRG's 22 March Six-Point Plan . . . . . . . . . 12
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Challenge?to,Party Domination of
Soviet Social Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 1
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
MOSCOW AFFIRMS KISSINGER ACCOMPLISHMENTS, POINTS TO SUVM1IT
Moscow has marshaled its forces to reject assertions in the West
that Secretary of State Kissinger's 24-28 March visit to Moscow
failed to achieve its objectives.
On the eve of the visit, Moscow made clear its feeling that the
U.S.-Soviet consultations should provide a new impetus to the
process of improving relations and thereby counter increasing
pessimism about detente in the West. And since the visit it has
painstakingly shown that it did just that, despite the absence
of specific results to announce. Moscow radio observer Valentin
Zorin summed up this view in the 31 March international observers'
roundtable, saying the visit "showed the groundlessness of allegations
that the process of further improving Soviet-U.S. relations has no
future." In a widely broadcast 29 March commentary, Vladimir Volgin
argued that the visit invalidated pessimistic forecasts in the U.S.
press about the prospects for SALT and economic cooperation in
particular. An assessment by IZVESTIYA,observer Aleksandr Bovin
on 30 March in effect acknowledged that the Moscow consultations
had pointed up some difficult issues: he concedes that further
agreements, particularly in SALT, will not come easily. But
Bovin argued that such difficulties only illustrate the need "not
to slow down, but to intensify the persistent and patient work"
aimed at overcoming them.
Since the visit Moscow has clearly implied that it. still looks
to the new summit itself to provide the kind of specific results
needed to calm critics at home as well as abroad. In the 31 March
roundtable discussion, Zbrin acknowledged that "the thing now is
for both sides to take specific steps in the direction already
outlined." Taking a cue from a similar prediction by Foreign
Minister Gromyko at the 27 March luncheon in Moscow given by
Secretary Kissinger, Bovin expressed confidence in his IZVESTIYA
article that it is precisely the forthcoming summit that will
yield "the major new steps" that are now called for.
Moscow went out of its way during the visit to express confidence
that both governments intend to continue strong support for improving
relations, while suggesting that the difficulties now arising result
from opponents of Administration policy within the United States. In
the words of the TASS report of the 27 March luncheon, "Andrey Gromyko
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welcomed the determination of the U.S. Government, reaffirmed
by the U.S. Secretary of State, to continue support for the
cause of improving and intensifying Soviet-U.S. relations."
Nevertheless, concern about the U.S. position at SALT was clearly
reflected in Bovin's analysis. He quoted one Western newspaper
on the "sharp differences in view over the American position"
and went on to acknowledge that those "observers are right who
note the distinct influence of the military-industrial complex
on the position of the American side."
MOSCOW RAPS WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE PLANS, NATO ANNIVERSARY
Against the background of public recriminations between the
United States and the EC in recent weeks, Moscow has reminded
West Europe that the USSR remains firmly opposed to proposals
for increased defense cooperation among West European countries.
Moscow restated its long-standing opposition to such proposals in
an authoritative article in IZVESTIYA on 28 March and also reiterated
some of the same themes, as well as more general criticism of
Western defense policies, in comment pegged to NATO's 25th anniver-
sary on 4 April. The IZVESTIYA article by D. Proektor, a specialist
on European affairs with the Institute of World Economics and Inter-
national Relations, is the most extensive treatment of West
European defense cooperation to appear in the Soviet central press
since a PRAVDA article by political commentator Yuriy Zhukov on
25 December 1973.*
ANTI-DETENTE As in past Soviet comment on the issue, Proektor's
FORCES main theme is that European defense represents an
effort to block detente. Asserting that pre-
conditions "now exist" for establishing a system of collective
security in Europe, Proektor scores "opponents of European detente"
who seek to postpone and prevent creation of such a system. He
singles out in this regard advocates of "the plan for so-called
West European military integration." As is typical in Soviet media
treatment of this issue, Proektor makes little attempt to deal with
specific European proposals or with the issues that have emerged
in the European dialogue. He concentrates instead on disparaging
the alleged motives behind such proposals and on warning of the
uD.desirable consequences of their implementation. Thus, projects
* For a review of the Zhukov article, see the TRENDS for 9 January
1974, pp. 4-5.
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for n ilitary cooperation in West Europe are said to be stimulated
ti in part by arms monopolies for profit motives and promoted by
certain "reactionary circles" for anti-Soviet and antisocialist
military purposes. Other advocates are said to include those who
fear the influence of socialist ideas and seek a way to shore up
capital and monopoly interests at a time when "the general crisis
of capitalism" is deepening.
Somewhat inconsistently, but also in line with past Soviet comment,
Proektor charges that West European proposals for defense cooperation
are also intended to resolve "contradictions" and divergent national
interests between the United States and the EC.' Citing the areas
of world trade, currency matters, and energy and defense policies as
examples of differences, Proektor comments:
It is not for nothing that part of the West
European press explains the present plans
for military integration as the desire of
the EC countries to raise their status and
exert political pressure on the United States
on a broad range of existing contradictions.
Proektor stresses, however, that "irrespective of the avowed in-
tention," West European plans for increased defense cooperation
would be disadvantageous and dangerous for West Europe, because
military ties with the NATO system would be strengthened rather
than dissolved, due to requirements for a unified military strategy,
and because such plans "lead not to peace but to hostility [and]
confrontation" between NATO and the socialist countries. To
reinforce the point, Proektor alludes to the possibility that West
Germany could acquire nuclear weapons under proposed new defense
arrangements.
NATO ANNIVERSARY In recent comment on NATO's 25th anniversary,
Moscow has also pressed the theme of a military
danger to Europe inherent in the confrontation of rival military
blocs. IZVESTIYA observer M. Mikhaylov, for instance, in the weekly
observers roundtable broadcast over Moscow radio on 31 March, used
the well-worn accusation that the establishment of NATO had caused
the postwar division of Europe and the "dangerous military con-
frontation" there. TASS on 29 March, reviewing a RED STAR
article on NATO titled "Jubilee Without Drums," cited several
passages condemning NATO for having caused various world crises
and for having sparked an arms race in Europe.
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In general, recent Soviet comment on NATO has stressed the line
that NATO is an anachronistic organization, "fruit and remnant
of the cold war," having nothing in common with the principles of
peaceful coexistence and European security. Moscow has sought
to depict NATO as an organization deprived by detente of its
rationale for existing and increasingly deprived of public support.
Although some comment has noted that NATO documents have expressed
approval of various aspects of European detente--including such
events as the ongoing CSCE and MBFR talks, treaties between the
USSR and Poland and West Germany, and the Four-Power Agreement
on West Berlin--Moscow has characterized NATO's approval as
acceptance "in words" only, more than counterbalanced by
continued pursuit of its previous cold war policies. Several
commentators have also sought to portray NATO as racked by
conflicts between the United States and its West European allies,
noting in addition that the recent rift in U.S.-EC relations had
greatly dampened NATO's original plans to mark its anniversary.
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BELGRADE - ROME D ISPUTE
FBIS TRENDS
3 APRIL 1974
YUGOSLAV COMMENTATOR DOLORES LACK OF SOVIET BLOC SUPPORT
While Belgrade media have sustained a broad campaign of defiant
comment against Italy's "irredentist" position regarding
Yugoslav administration of the Zone B region south of Trieste,
a late March talk by prominent Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic
juxtaposed such anti-Italian thrusts with -criticism of Moscow
and its Warsaw Pact allies for failure to support the Yugoslav
side of the border quarrel. Sundic also pointedly noted that
Moscow had never explicitly denied an alleged Soviet plan to
invade Yugoslavia after Tito's departure from the scene, a plan
detailed recently on Austrian TV by emigre Czechoslovak General
Sejna. Almost simultaneously with Sundic's criticism, the. Soviet
and Czechoslovak press belatedly publicized Belgrade's anti-Italian
attacks and its standard line that the invasion plan aired by Sejna
was part and parcel of the same "Western pressure campaign" on
Yugoslavia exemplified by the current Belgrade-Rome border dispute.
The Yugoslavs had brought the dispute with Italy out into the open
on 20 March with a government statement denouncing the Italian
Government's 11 March note to Belgrade protesting. Yugoslavia's.
posting of border signs in Zone B, south of Trieste, which has been
under Yugoslav administration under tt. `erms of international
agreements in 1947 and 1954.
Sundic, aside from reiterating current Belgrade grievances against
the Italians in his commentary broadcast by Zagreb on the 29th,
uniquely added the complaint that "even certain socialist
countries have not properly supported Yugoslavia's stand regarding
the Italian Covernment's note." While naming only Bulgaria--a
frequent target of Belgrade criticism on the Macedonian issue--
Sundic specified that he had in mind "not just Bulgaria" in asking
rhetorically which side the socialist countries were on in the
current dispute. Zeroing in more directly on the USSR, Sundic
went on to note that "those to whom Sejna's discoveries about the
Poljarka plan [for invasion of Austria and Yugoslavia] primarily
refer have denied . . . only one of its parts, the part dealing
with Austria."
In Moscow's belated publicity for the Belgrade-Rome border quarrel,
PRAVDA on 28 March reported a BORBA commentary as scoring "the
Italian Government's flagrant attacks" as well as "bourgeois"
speculation about the 'threat' which Yugoslavia allegedly faces
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from the East" and about "the age of our president or the fact
that he is on vacation." Radio Moscow reported the PRAVDA
item to Yugoslavia in a Slovene broadcast the same day.
Czechoslovakia's Bratislava PRAVDA on 29 March echoed standard
Yugoslav comment to the effect that an orchestrated Western
"anti-Yugoslav campaign" was evident in the beginning of
joint Italian-U.S. military maneuvers on that day, the 11 March
Italian Government note, and the publicizing in Italian papers
of allegations about Soviet plans to invade Yugoslavia that had
first appeared in the Austrian TV interview with Czechoslovak
defector General Sejna.
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INDOCHINA
DRV ASSAILS KISSINGER LETTER. NIXON ADMINISTRATION POLICIES
Secretary Kissinger's 25 March letter to Senator Kennedy
explaining U.S. commitments in Vietnam was promptly denounced
in Vietnamese communist broadcasts on 1 April, the day after
its release, and drew a bitter response from Hanoi's leadership
and the press on the 2d. Hanoi comment hag focused on
Kissinger's contention that the Paris agreement and lengthy
U.S. involvement in Vietnam have committed the united States
to military and economic support of the Saigon government.
North Vietnamese Politburo member and Acting Premier Le
Thanh Nghi, speaking at a 2 April reception for visiting
Laotians, claimed that the Secretary was justifying the
intensification of military aid to Saigon and the continued
presence of U.S. military advisers, and charged that this
position was "in flagrant contravention of the spirit and
letter of the Paris agreement."
The most authoritative press comment came in a 2 April
NHAN DAN article signed by Tran Kien, an author who has
previously written on U.S. policies in the party paper and
who was identified in 1970 as a member of its editorial board.
Tran Kien charged that Kissinger's "allegations" were "extremely
serious" because he was the "key negotiator and initialer" of
the Paris agreement and is now Secretary of State. An article
in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 2d used sharper language in
explaining the particular significance of the Secretary's
statements, referring to him as "Nixon's brain and- mouthpiece."
Comment has quoted Sen. Kennedy's expression of concern
over the policy set forth in the letter, and Tran Kien
observed: "Certainly, the American people will not let the
Nixon Administration drag them and their country into new
dangers."
ANNIVERSARY OF The first anniversary on 29 March of the
U.S. WIT}-DRAWAL final withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Vietnam prompted editorials in the Hanoi
press acclaiming the "victory" a year ago and assailing
continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A broader appraisal
of U.S. policies was offered in an anniversary article,
published in the March issue of the North Vietnamese party's
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theoretical journal HOC TAP, which reiterated Hanoi's
long-standing apprehension that U.S. policies of detente
with Moscow and Peking would undermine DRV interests.
The HOC TAP article was attributed to "Huong Nam," a
probable pseudonym that has been used since 1969 for almost
a dozen HOC TAP articles dealing with diplomacy and U.S.
policy.
Huong Nam raised the issue of U.S. relations with the
DRV's major allies in the context of an attack on the
Nixon Doctrine, which he said uses negotiations, "especially
with the USSR and China," in order to take "full advantage
of the contradictions between these two countries and
divide and weaken the anti-imperialist forces in the world."
The article accused Washington of trying through negotiations
to "limit and prevent international support and assistance
to Vietnam," and noted that "it is likely that at the end
of 1971" the United States "entertained many illusions" and
.that, "following the.U.S.'global diplomatic'activities,"
the Administration?thought '"the resistance forces were
'exhausted' and their supplies from outside were depleted.'
Huong Nam has discussed U.S. overtures to the Soviets and
Chinese before, most notably in an April 1972 HOC TAP article
that underlined Hanoi's opposition to detente policies
only a month before President Nixon's visit to Moscow.
U.S. RECONNAISSANCE Hanoi continues to protest U.S. air
reconnaissance flights over the DRV
in standard statements issued by the foreign ministry
spokesman. The latest such statement, issued on 28 March,
employed the usual terms to denounce two SR-71 flights that
day "over many areas, including Hanoi and Haiphong,'.' and
to demand an end to such reconnaissance. Hanoi first
alluded to the use of SR-71's in a spokesman's protest
on 8 November 1973. The current statement is the eighth
such protest; the last one was on 15 February.
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HANOI GIVES HIGH-LEVEL WELCOME TO CAMBODIAN FRONT LEADER
Hanoi gave a high-level, welcome to a delegation from the
Cambodian interior led by commander of the insurgent forces
Khieu Samphan, deputy premier and defense minister in Sihanouk's
government. During the delegation's stay in Hanoi from
28 March to 1 April it was hosted by Politburo member
Truong Chinh, acting in his positions in the government
and the Vietnam Fatherland Front. The delegation was
received by Le Duan, who turned out--along with all other
active members of the Politburo currently in Hanoi--for
the receptions given by each side. Ieng Sary,,deputy head
of the delegation and a special adviser to the deputy
premier's office, had similarly been warmly treated,
though not at such a high level, in November 1971 when
he led the last such delegation from the Cambodian
interior paying an official visit to Hanoi.*
Khieu Samphan's Hanoi visit, the first leg of a tour that
will include China and North Korea, represents a new step
in his steady rise to prominence in the past four years.**
Sihanouk took note of Samphan's new role in external affairs
in a message to him, dated 27 March and. publicized on
1 April, which expressed "enthusiasm" for his "first entry
onto the international stage." In speeches during and
after his visit to the Cambodian liberated zone a year
ago, Sihanouk had acknowledged the leading role in Cambodia
of Samphan and other ministers in the interior, while
claiming for himself a "mission abroad."
Samphan, speaking at a 29 March Hanoi reception in his honor,
maintained that the Cambodian people are united in the face
of efforts to divide them, while warning that Washington
and Phnoa Penh "are carrying out their divisive scheme through
propaganda and distortion in order to sow suspicion" within
the insurgent Front. He went on to condemn the "plot" of
a "false cease-fire and peace negotiations" aimed at giving
Phnom Penh a respite to prepare for an offensive. Samphan
* Ieng Sary's 1971 visit is discussed in the TRENDS of
17 November 1971, pages 8-10.
** For background on Khieu Samphan, see the TRENDS of 14
November 1973, page 19.
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reaffirmed the demands in Sihanouk's five-point declaration
of March 1970 and asserted that "in the present situation,
there is only one way to solve the Cambodian issue"--by
the United States ending its "aggression" in Cambodia
and assistance to the Lon Nol government and allowing the
Cambodians to "settle their internal affairs by themselves."
Samphan did not echo Sihanouk's view, set forth most
recently during his visit to Laos last month, that there
could be negotiations between his government and the United
States.
In line with recent Front propaganda, Samphan's speeches
in Hanoi generally were cautious about the military situation
in Cambodia. Thus, for example, at a public meeting in
Hanoi to welcome the delegation, both Samphan and the
Vietnamese speaker, Le Thanh Nghi, in effect explained the
current military stalemate by claiming that the Lon Nol
government continues to survive because of U.S. aid.
Samphan wwwas more optima ,tic in a 30 March interview with a
Hanoi radio-TV reporter, when he claimed that "we are
advancing to wrest total victory in the near future." But
he did not go on to suggest, as he had in statements last
fall, that the Phnom ?enh government might be overthrown
during the current dry season offensive.
Samphan's 29 Ilarch reception speech paid tribute to Vietnam's
"vigorous;.' assistance to the Cambodian insurgents and asserted:
"Our successes are inseparable from the assistance and support
of the world peoples--especially of the Vietnamese, Lao,
Chinese, Korean,. Albanian, Cuban, and Algerian peoples.
Speaking on the same occasion, Truong Chinh reaffirmed the
DRV's "unchanging policy" of support for the Cambodians and
added: "No intrigue, however vicious, no threat, however
impudent, will ever deter the Vietnamese people in their
internationalist obligation to the Cambodian people's
struggle. . . ." Samphan underlined the importance of
this Vietnamese pledge in his speech at a 31 ltarch farewell
reception, recalling the pledge and expressing the "deepest
thanks" to Truong Chinh for making it. 4
The joint statement at the conclusion of Samphan's visit
reported that the two sides had exchanged vitas on the
situation in Vietnam and Cambodia and on the "friendly
relations" between the two peoples. According to the
communique, they "reached complete unity of views on
all questions" discussed. The Vietnamese side at the
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formal talks included two Politburo members--Truong Chinh
and Le Thanh Nghi--and the Cambodians had separate
meetings with Politburo''member and VPA Chief of Staff
Van Tien Dung.
CUBAN-DRV C941UNIQUE PROCLAIMS SOLIDARITY, UNITY OF VIEWS
A North Vietnamese party-government delegation led by Premier
Pham Van Dong and including Foreign iiinister Nguyen Duy Trinh
has concluded a 22-28 March visit to Cuba and on 2 April--after
a short interruption--began a visit to Algeria.. The delegation's
announced mission is to fulfill Ho Chi Minh's behest to thank
countries that provided aid during the Vietnam war; its
itinerary is reported to include Yugoslavia and Sweden as well.
The DRV delegation was given a warm welcome on its arrival
in Havana, where it was met by Cuban Premier Castro, President
Dorticos, and other Cuban officials. Speeches during the
visit affirmed the two nations' "militant solidarity" and
"mutual support," and Castro and Dong, at a mass rally on
the 26th, recounted the history of Cuban and Vietnamese
"anti-imperialist struggles" and lauded the achievemento
of the two nations.
The joint communique at the conclusion of Dong's visit
indicated a "complete unity of views" was reached on all
questions raised. Both sides condemned alleged U.S.-Saigon
violations of the Paris agreement and registered support
for the PRG's latest six-point proposal; and both condemned
U.S. intervention in Latin America and the Chilean, "fascist"
regime, and endorsed Cuba's views on the situations in
Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Argentina. In line with
the joint statement on Castro's visit to Hanoi last September,
both sides again echoed Hanoi's standard pledge to "strive
for the restoration and consolidation" of the unity of the
international communist movement.*
Following the delegation's departure from Havana on the
28th, Nguyen Duy Trinh--but not Pham Van Dong--was reported
by Hanoi and Budapest to have gone on to Hungary for an
"official" visit. Available news reports gave no indication
of Pham Van Dong's whereabouts until 2 April, when VNA said
* Castro's September visit to Vietnam is discussed in the
TRENDS of 19 September 1973, pages 8-10.
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that the premier had met with Hungarian part;; leader Kadar
on the previous day during a stopover en route to Algeria.
A 3 April Hanoi report on Dong's departure from Budapest
indicated he had been there for a "four-day stopover."
TASS STATEMENT BACKS PRG'S 22 MARCH SIX-POINT PLAN
Moscow on 31 :larch issued a "TASS statement" supporting the
22 March PRG Government statement with its six-point
proposal for a South Vietnamese political settlement.
This is the first TASS statement on Vietnam singe the
January 1973 peace agreement, the last previous one having
been issued by Moscow on 19 December 1972 in condemnation
of the large-scale U.S. bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
PRG and DRV government statements in the past year charging
U.S.-Saigon violations of the peace accord have not drawn
such statements from the Soviets. Moscow apparently felt
compel.l^d to endorse thr PRO six-point proposal since
it was issued as a government statement. Virtually
identical PRG proposals on 25 April and 25 June were played
in low key by the Vietnamese--in reports on the Paris
PRG-GVN bilateral negotiations--and prompted only routine,
low-level Soviet attention.
Typically reflecting Soviet circumspection on the U.S.
role in Vietnam, the TASS statement vaguely called upon
Saigon and the "external forces patronizing" it to manifest
"realism" and a "positive" approach to the PRG proposals.
The statement noted that the PRG initiative was met with
"great satisfaction by authoritative Soviet circles."
Consistent with this low-key response, the PRG's April
and June proposals were not mentioned in joint communiques
on the iloscow visits by a DRV delegation led by Le Duan
in July 1973 and a PRG delegation led by Nguyen Huu Tho
in December 1973. However, during Pham Van Dong's recent
stopover in Moscow on the way to Cuba, Kosygin may have
been anticipating the current official endorsement when
in his 20 March talks with Dong he reportedly voiced support
for the PR.G's efforts toward a "just settlement of the
internal political problems" in South Vietnam.
Moscow continues to avoid official response to high-level
DRV and PRG protests over alleged U.S.-Saigon violations of
the Paris agreement. Thus, on 31 March, the same day the
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