TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070025-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 12, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FillS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
12 JUNE 1974
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This propaganda analysis report Is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
urimponents.
STATSPEC
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclowre subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONTENTS
NIXON MIDEAST TOUR
Moscow Avoids Comment on President's Trip, Plays Up Detente. . . . . . 1
Hanoi Reacts to Nixon Middle East Tour, Planned Soviet Trip. . . . . . 2
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Grechko, Yepiahev Defend Military Priorities Under Detente . . . . . . 4
EUROPE
USSR, Allies Reject CSCE Pessimism, Suggest Delayed Summit . . . . . . 7
Moscow Minimizes EC Ministers' Agreements, Stresses Problems . . .
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Moscow, East Europeans Step Up Pressure for World Conference . . . 12
Moscow Rediscovers "Different Roads to Socialism" Doctrine . . . . 14
VIETNAM
Kissinger's Remarks on Vietnam Draw "Commentator" Article. . . . . . . 16
PRG Agrees to Resume Participation in JMC Talks.. . . . . . .,. . . . 18
Customary Celebrations Mark PRG Fifth Anniversary. . . . . . . . . . . 19
Truong Chinh Delegation Concludes Visits in East Europe. . . . . . . . 23
PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS
Peking Views Favorably U.S. Policy Prior to Moscow Summit. . . . 24
Peking Reiterates Approval for European Unity, U.S. Alliance . . . . . 25
CHINA
"Worker Theorists" Organized to Help Guide Anti-Lin Campaign . . . . . 27
USSR
Petrenko Upholds Collegiality, Scolds Party'Apparatus. . . . . . . . . 29
Ukraineo,Moldavia Break Ranks on Academic. Celebration. . . . . . . . . 31
FirJ-:.ng of History Institute Director Volobuyev Detailed. . . . . . 33
NOTE
Moscow on Palestinian Issue. . . . . . . 36
APPENDIX
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NIXON MIDEAST TOUR
MOSCOW AVOIDS COMMENT ON PRESIDENT'S TRIP, PLAYS UP DETENTE
Moscow has given minimal coverage thus far to President Nixon's
Middle East tour, apparently deciding that the best way of
handling the awkward sequence of the President's Mideast and
Moscow visits is to play down the former. The only suggestion
of Soviet concern over the possible impact of the trip came in
remarks cr Soviet foreign policy by Gromyko in his Supreme Soviet
election speech in Minsk on 10 June. Referring to the "high"
prestige of the USSR's foreig policy, Gromyko declared that no
important'international problem could be solved without Soviet
participation, and added that "it certainly cannot be solved
to the detriment of the Soviet Union's interests."
Reportage on the President's tour so far has been confined to
terse TASS and Moscow domestic service newscast reports on the
President's departure for Europe on the 10th and his meeting on
the 11th with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky in Salzburg. The
sole Moscow observation on the visit came in PRAVDA's international
review on the 9th, which merely noted that a large part of the
world press regarded the Nixon tour, and the possible resumption
of U.S.-Syrian relations, as evidence of an American desire to
normalize U.S.-Arab relations which had been "undermined" by U.S.
support for the Israeli "aggressors."
Moscow has also given short shrift to recent U.S. policy state-
ments on the Middl
e East. Soviet accounts of the President's
5 June Annapolis address failed to mention his remarks on the
Middle East, including his statement on the urgent need for a
stable solution "among the regional parties as well as between
the great powers." Nor did Moscow report Secretary Kissinger's
statement at his 6 June news conference that the Middle East is
obviously an area of great concern to the Soviet Union, and that
the United States has neither the intention nor the capability
of expelling Soviet influence from the area.
At the same time, with the forthcomin
Mos
i
e
g
cow summ
t m
eting
obviously in mind, Soviet commentators have
one out of th
i
g
e
r
way to play up the benefits of detente. Thus, Kolesnichenko's
Meekly review bro
d
a
cast to North America on the 10th singled
oUt Nixon's Annapolis remarks on `the importance of detent
d
e an
went on to cite the MiddleEast as an' example, claiming that
the redu
ti
n.
c
o
of tension in U.S.-Soviet relations "made ossible"
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the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. In the same vein,
a TASS report on Syrian President a:l Asad'a interview for American
television on the 9th noted that he "highly appreciated" the
process of relaxation of tension between the USSR and the United
'States, without mentioning his replies to questions on the Preaident's
forthcoming visit and Syrian-U.S. relations.
A blatant example of Moscow's efforts to avoid comment on the
President's tear was provided by a Radio Peace and Progress
broadcast in Arabic on the 10th. It analyzed what it described.
as an upsurge of U.S. press interest in the Arab world, demonstrated
by visits to the area by a "big team of U.S. reporters" representing
some 70 papers and magazines, but failed to mention that the
journalists were covering the President's visit. The broadcast
listed some factors which it asserted had "compelled" the United
States to "introduce some changes" in its Mideast, policy, such
as an effort to rectify the. mistakes of the Dulles era, the
"consolidation" of Soviet-Arab ties, and the improvement in the
international situation "due to" Soviet efforts for peace.
HANOI REACTS TO NIXON MIDDLE EAST TOUR. PLANNED SOVIET TRIP
Hanoi's predictable misgivings about. President Nixon's visits to
the Middle East and the Soviet Union have been reflected in articles
by prominent North Vietnamese newspaper commentators warning of
alleged U.S. duplicity and sinister, motivations. The first avail-
able Hanoi reference to the Middle East tour came in a.3 June NHAN
DAN article by Dieu Binh, a regular commettator on international
affairs in the party paper. Dieu Binh noted that the Syrian-Israeli
disengagement agreement nad been reached just prior to the announce-
out identifying, statements'by the President. during those trips. By!
meat that the President "is about to visit a number of countries
in the Middle East." Hanoi's view'of.both Presidential tours
seemed to be indicated in a 7 June article by Nguyen Huu Chinh,
another NHAN DAN commentator on the international scene and U.S.
policy, which criticized recent Administration official state-
ments which it claimed were in preparation for the President';
visit to "various countries." The Soviet trip was explicitly
mentioned on the following- day. in a NHAN DAN report on Secretary
of State Kissinger's 6 June press conference.
In 1972 Vietnamese communist media had studiously, avoided explicit,
mention of. the President's visits to Peking and Moscow, although
they made their displeasure clear and even pointedly derided, with
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contrast, in step with Hanoi's own moves toward accommodation
with the United States following the Paris peace agreement,
North Vietnamese media had duly reported without comment
Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to the United States. Unlike Hanoi,
Liberation Radio ignored even the Drezhnev visit, and similarly
it has not acknowledged the current Presidential tour--concealing
the fact even while reporting derisively on Secretary Kissinger's
11 June press conference in Austria.
Dieu Binh's 3 June article-stressed that the United States is
pursuing its - own unchanged' interests - in the Micdle East and
sarcastically questioned Kissinger's portrayal to the Arabs as
"a friend, as a reliable and flexible negotiator who lives up
to his promises," and as one who "brought about a radical change
in U.S. foreign policy" by accepting~a'fair Arab-Israeli settle-
ment as in the interests-of the United States., Dieu Binh maintained
that U.S. policy has not changed and that it still attempts to
protect Israeli interests and divide the Arab states. The article
was critical of Egypt's improvement of relations with the United
States, but noted with approval continuing Syrian circumspection.
The 7 June article by Nguyen Huu'Chinh criticized recent state-
ments by the-President-and secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger
and denounced U.S. foreign policy as ambiguous and double-dealing.
Chinh only referred directly to the President's Middle East tour
in disparaging his planned visits to "various countries," but some
of the author's comments seemed directed at the later trip to Moscow.
Thus, he dismissed President Nixon's advocacy of detente with the
USSR in his 5 June Annapolis-speech,, arguing that the President's
words were belied by U.S. actions and policy. Chinh warned that
the United States is "continuing to step up the arms race and war
preparations in an attempt to achieve the military superiority
that it lost" in Indochina. He' endorsed' the views of Soviet
Marshal Grechko in this-respect, citing his 4 June election speech
"
statement that the
danger of war is a sad reality in our era"
and that, the Soviet Union must "maintain its vigilance and in-
crease its military strength."
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
GRECHKG. YEPISHEV DEFEND MILITARY PRIORITIES UNDER DETENTE
,Soviet military leaders again appear to be on the defensive in
the recurrent internal debate over military expenditures under
detente. Defense Minister Grechko and Main Political Adminis-
tration head Yepishev have notably borrowed from the debates of
,,an earlier period in Soviet history to buttress their case that
detente does not allow a shift of resources from the military
sector, since defense planning must be based on "worst possible
case" assumptions and not simply on the most probable course of
events. This marks a new turn in the detente-defense debate,
which first surfaced last yea..r'in the form of an obscure polemic
couched in turgid doctrinal terms.*
YEP.ISHEV Yepi.shev, writing in KOMMUNIST No. 7, signed to press.
on l3 May, presented an unusually forthright state-
.meat of the military case in an article nominally keyed to the
29th anniversary of the victory over Germany in World War I!. The
reasons for the renewed expressions of concern from the military
emerge most clearly from his article. Yepishev observed that "one
cannot help but take into account that under conditions of detente
someone might raise the question: is such attention to preparation
of the population for armed defense of the Fatherland necessary,
considering that a certain retreat of militarism has become
apparent?" Yepishev rejected such a linkage, citing in support
a,comment by Lenin to the effect that "our steps toward peace
must be accompanied by enhancement of our military preparedness."
Iii an article that argues vigorously for the role of military
power in maintaining peace, Yepishev warned twice against "voluntary
or involuntary underestimation of the military danger from imperialism."
Granting that the international situation has improved, he countered
that history has shown that "one must take into account not only
the most probable course of events but also,be prepared for possible
unexpected reversals, dangerous provocations and adventures on the
part of the most frantic enemies of socialism." Elsewhere Yepishev
aud publicists were reexamining Lenin's thesis that war is a continuation
of.policy in the light of the U.S.-Soviet prevention of nuclear war agree-
ment. The early debate is discussed in "Soviet Debate over Role of Military
*,.The issue emerged in the central.press last summer when Col I. Sidelnikov
complained in'the 14 August RED STAR that some unnamed "military theoriEts
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'warned in.particular'against.the.possibility that madmen, capable
of forgetting the lessons of history," could still come to power
in the. West. This formulation, a staple in the pronouncements of
the Khrushchev period, has not been seen in recent years since
Brezhnev last made reference to such "madmen" in speeches of
October and November'of 1967. Military spokesmen cited Brezhnev's
remarks in the late 1960's to argue the need for continued vigilance.
GRECHKO Grechko and'deputy Navy chief Kasatonov, in their
Supreme Soviet election speeches, also cited Lenin's
dictum on the indivisibility of the tasks of strengthening inter
national security and strengthening the country's defenses, though
only Kasatotiov,,aa reported in SOVIET ESTONIA of 24 May, attributed
the thesis to Lenin. Grechko, speaking on 4'June, went on to warn
in terms identical to Yepishev's that Soviet foreign policy "must
not only be cognizant of the most likely course of events but must
also remain prepared for the most unexpected reversals, dang::roua
provocations and adventures on the part of the enemies of socialism
and peace." He cautioned against "complacency" in the face of the
continuing "material preparation for war" in the West.
So far no political figure has.offere.d public support for Grechko
and Yepishev in their-new line of argumentation on detente-defense
issues. Internal security chief Andropov seemed to be presenting
the opposite case, however, in his election speech on 5 June. As
reported in the central press-on the 6th, Andropov played down the
need for concern about the continuing.opposition to detente in the
West, arguing that Western leaders had little choice but to accept
the realities of the new international situation. In Andropov's
words, "real changes in the correlation of forces inevitably bring
forth changes in the views of people and in the minds of pcliticians.."
In an award ceremony speech in Estonia at the turn of the year,
Andropov had also made an-exceptionally strong case for detente.
The use of formulas from the past to justify continued defense
priorities was also evident in a review of Grec';tko's new book,
"The`Armed Forces. of the Land of the-Soviets," in the 29 May PRAVDA.
17. Kuzmin, in an otherwise briefand generalized review of the book,
cited remarks that Brezhnev had made in p June 1966 Supreme Soviet-
election speech, though tile, .reviewer failed to give the date of the
citation. Brezhnev had noted ?that Moscow' in taking "necessary
measures" to equip the armed forces,, had been compelled to spend;
scarce funds on defense, but that "the people understand and support
this." Brezhnev had made the statement in the context of arguing
that "the situation still does not. permit us" to accelerate economic
development by."dropping from our shoulders'at least part'of the (defense
- to .. . . .
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BACKGROUND Brezhnev's evocation of "madmen" in the fall of
1967 came hard on the heels of the September
announcement that in the following year light industry was
scheduled to grow at a faster rate than heavy industry for the.
first time in the post-Khrushchev period. It thus seemed de
signed, like his 1966 election speech remarks, to frustrate
efforts to draw the resources for that shift from the military
sector. Yepishev, in resurrecting the formula, and Kuzmin, in
going back to 1966 for an appropriate quotation from Braishnev,
may have wished'to recall the circumstances of this earlier
debate over resources in which Brezhnev stood squarely on the
side of the military, a debate whose resolution was presumably
responsible for the continued rapid expansion of Soviet forces
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EUROPE
USSR, ALLIES R JECT CSCE PESSIMISM, SUGGEST DELAYED SUNr1IT
Ag.ainct the background of speculation in the West that the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) may be
stalemated over the USSR's refusal to meet basic Western demands
on humanitarian issues ("basket three" of the agenda), Moscow
and its orthodox allies have maintained a show of confidence
that the talks are proceeding satisfactorily and that a sincere
effort by all concerned will bring the talks to a successful
conclusion. While Soviet bloc spokesmen have continued to
press for a summit-level concluding session of the conference,
they have become less insistent that the concluding session be
held this summer. They have also stressed that the conference
should be regarded as'the beginning of a process, rather than
the end, suggesting that Moscow may regard the symbolic value
of a formal, conference.,'conclusion an acceptablev?prel.iminary result,
ap.art;from whatever `specific agreements may be achieved.
VAGUENESS ON TIMING, Soviet spokesmen and commentators since
OBJECTIVES the April recess have continued to insist
that the talks should be concluded by a
summit-level meeting, but 'they have become increasingly vague
about its timing. Reflecting thi6 trend, statements by Soviet
leaders Kosygi.n and Kirilenko on 28 May, Katushev on the 30th,
and a PRAVDA editorial on the 29th called for a summit meeting
without the usual time specifications--"at the earliest date,"
"as soon as possible," or "in the near future." But Foreign
Minister G'omyko on 10 June included the phrase "in the near
future," the first such specification by a Soviet elite-level
spokesman since the beginning of May.
Along with this increasing-vagueness as to timing,. Soviet spokesmen
have become less specific as to the substance of the agreements
they anticipate. Instead they have stressed the importance of a
formal conclusion of the conference, seeming to suggest that the
conclusion of the conference. would have a symbolic significance
entireii apart from the specific agreements it might ratify.
This suggestion that Moscow may be satisfied with something less
than full satisfaction of its-demands .at the security conference
is reflected most clearly in.Gromyko's 10 June electoral ' speech..
Accorning to a TASS summary of, the speech,'Gromyko asserted that
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the conference is "not the end-all of life- and politics in
European affairs. Much work still has to be done so that Europe
should become a continent of durable peace and cooperation."
This formulation, which has the effect of lessening the importance
of the conference, may be interpreted-as a new wording of the
statement in the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee
communique of 19 April, which said that the conference was "not
a goal in itself" but "a starting point of the historic work to
build new relations between all the states of the European
continent." Moscow radio commentator Vladlen Kuznetsov, in a
broadcast carried four days before Gromyko's speech, said much
the same thing in more direct form:
Moreover, even if the results of the conference
should be confined to one act, that is, the
codification of the results of World War II and
postwar developments on an all-European basis
and with the participation of the United States
and Canada, this would in itself be an act of
truly historic significance.
POSSIBLE ADJOURNMENT Moscow commentators have noted only in
passing Western speculation that certain
West European states may seek an adjournment of the conference
until September, when phase two would then be continued, in order
to reassess the entire CSCE situation--a suggestion prompted by
Moscow's failure to move ahead on "basket three" after having
indicated that its major demand had been.met by the West's agree-
trient to the inviolability of borders principle. However, Hungary's
Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy-on 30 May hinted in a unique state-
ment that the socialist states could live with such a delay.
While asserting that the socialist countries would still prefer
that the closing session in Helsinki be held in July at the
summit level and reiterating the bloc's adamant stand on "basket
three,!' Nagy declared, according to NEPSZABADZAG on the 31st,
that "those who think the socialist states are prepared to pay any
price at all for" such a summit in Helsinki "are seriously mistaken."
He added:
In any case, whether it is 'a question of a few weeks
or a few months is not the essence of the matter;
rather, it is the fact that the concept of European
security is profoundly approved by the public opinion
of both East and West. A great responsibility would
be assumed by those who, ,realizing this, would try to
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for concluding the conference in July. He said he based his-
11
"
Some East European commentators have pointed out that a Helsinki
summit would be an excellent opportunity for all the new West
European leaders to meet their counterparts. At the same time,
comment has criticized alleged attempts in the West to exploit
the recent governmental changes as a means to delay the final
session.
The Polish leaders have- even gone so far as to try to preempt
the decision on the form of the final session by declaring that
they would attend. Premier Jaroszewicz was reported by PAP on
6 May as saying that the "party and state leadership are deter-
mined to participate personally in the third stage.", This state-
ment of intent has since been interpreted in the Polish press
and by Foreign Minister Olszowski as a virtual fait accompli,
with the implied meaning that other countries' leaders should
get on the bandwagon.
INFLUENCE OF SUMMIT Linking prospects for a breakthrough at
the CSCE talks with President Nixon's
imminent visit to the USSR, Eaut German leader Honecker, in an
interview with the Associated Press published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
on the 4th, asserted that there were still "real possibilities"
o
be s w
has publicized the statement widely and has drawn particular
attention to Honecker's optimistic prediction. Moscow radio
summarized the interview, TASS included the Honecker speculation
in its long summary of the interview, and PRAVDA, on the 5th,
carrying only a brief summary of the interview, highlighted
the passage linking the Moscow summit to the success of the
conference.
optimism
on the resumption of the Brezhnev-Nixon dialo Mo c
MOSCOW MINIMIZES EC MINISTERS' AGREEMENTS, STRESSES PROBLEMS
Moscow has provided a mined appraisal of the series of EC minister-
ial meetings held 4-11 June, noting that decisions were reached on
aeveral contentious issues, but stressing that these achievements
occurred in a setting of persistent EC problems. Typical in this
ragird was an R. Puchkov commentary in PRAVDA on 8 June which, in
reviewing results of the EC.foreign ministers meeting on 4 June,
aaserted that'decisions by the EC are reached-"against the back-
ground of acute differences characteristic of the situation in the
Commou iciark.'t." In commenting on specific aspects of the recent
round of. EC meetings, Moscow has paid special attention to Britain's
request for renegotiation of the terms of its membership, the issue of
EC-Arab discussions, and the question of U.S.-EC consultations.
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cedures for close:nand timely consultations with Washington during
decision on 10 June to establish pro-
U.S.-EC'CONSULTATIONS Moscow's initial reantinn fn *t,n rn
expose the EC countries to intense Arab political pressures.
foreign ministers' decision to propose that a dialog be opened with
'20 Arab countries to promote improved economic and political
cooperation, Moscow has offered little initial comment, but it has
noted that developing such a dialog would require time to work
out and that it may encounter opposition from the United States.
An East German radio broadcast on 11 June, while remaining noncom-
mittal on the desirability of EC-Arab discussions, emphasized
that the United States had objected to such an approach when it was
proposed in the ECG several months ago, preferring that a larger
collective of oil--producing nations than the EC Nine meet with the
Arab countries. The broadcast continued that the EC decision
announced on 10 June "cannot have been to the liking of the United
States." TASS on 8 June had carried a brief summary of a New York
TIMES article which alleged that the United States had warned the
EC states against developing an EC-Arab dialog because it would
on iscussions with the Arabs touches an old sore point in EC-U.S.
relations. In reporting the announcement on 10 June of the EC
Opposition in Britain to the Common Market.
EC-,'ARAB DISCUSSIONS Soviet and East European commentators have
been quick to point out that the EC decision
BRITISH MEMBERSHIP Soviet commentators have noted that Britain's
current position on whether to remain in the
EC, as outlined in Foreign Secretary Callaghan's speech to the EC
Council on 4 June, is more moderate and conciliatory than the
position Callaghan expressed to the same forum two months earlier.*
Generally interpreting this shift as reassurance by Britain to its
EC partners that it wants to remain an EC member, Soviet comment
has accused the Labor government of reneging on its election
promises to achieve fundamental revisions in the terms of Britain's
EC membership and to hold a national referendum on the results.
Moscow has continued this line of criticism in its initial reaction
to an 11 June House of Commons debate on EC membership. TASS
correspondent V. Vasilets commented on 12 June, for instance, that
Callaghan's remarks during the debate suggest the government would
accept "partial concessions" from its EC partners but that the
debate showed a divided Labor Party and continued widespread
* For Moscow's initial reaction to the British reeupae_ pap rho
wr v_b ror to April 1974, pp. 4-50
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EC decision-making processes has been limited, but appears to
be in line with past Soviet treatment of U.S.-EC relations that
stressed a disparity and divergynce of national interests. A
TASS report of the press conference held on 11 June by the current
chairman of the EC Council of Ministers, FRG Foreign Minister
Genscher, referred briefly to the question of U.S.-EC consultations
but mentioned only Genscher's remark that to hold such consultations
would require the unanimous consent of all members. An East German
broadcast on 11 June added that Genscher had stressed that U.S.-EC
consultations should not be a "one-way street" and that the EC
states assumed they would likewise be informed of U.S. decision-
making. Moscow apparently did not anticipate the EC decision on
U.S.-EC consultations, to judge from a TASS report early on 10 June
by commentator V. Osipov. Recalling that previous attempts by the
EC to agree. on this issue had been blocked by France because con-
sultations would be "tantamount to subjecting the Common Market
to U.S.'diktat," Osipov predicted that "France has no intention
of chancing its attitude on this issue at the present meeting."
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MOSCOW,r EAST EUROPEANS STEP UP PRESSURE FOR WORLD CONFERENCE
Moscow's recently more direct support for a new international
communist party conference was clearly in evidence in a 30 June'
election speech in Kalinin by Ponomarev, CPSU Politburo candidate
member and secretary in charge of relations with nonruling communist
parties. Noting that "many fraternal parties have come'cut
lately with initiatives to hold new large scale international
forums," Ponomarev declared that "supporting these ideas to the
full, our ,arty . . . welcomes these initiatives and undoubtedly
will take the moat activa part in their implementation." This
statement, which appeared toward the end of the Moscow domestic
service report of the speech, was placed at the,beginning of the
TASS English report the same day. An authoritative 5 June PRAVDA
editorial article, pegged to the fifth anniversary of the start
of the 1969 Moscow conference, had been somewhat less direct in
registering Moscow's support for "new collective steps" aimed at
consolidating the world movement.*
Where Soviet pronouncements have been vague on the degree of support
for a new world conference, Poland's Gierek, speaking at a Warsaw
rally on the 8th in honor of the GDR's Honecker, declared flatly
that the "great majority" of parties back a new world conference,
as well as a prior conference of European OP's. Support for a
conference, while not echoed by Honecker at the Warsaw rally,
was duly recorded in the 9 June joint communique issued at the
and of Honecker's visit to Poland.
will suggest new and important initiatives for the cohesion and
mobilization of the world communist movement forces."
Like PRAVDA, the leading party dailies of Moscow's orthodox East
European allies carried editorials or major articles on the occasion
of the fifth anniversary of the opening of the 1969 conference.
And on the 6th these papers published extensive reviews of the
5 June PRAVDA editorial article. The 1969 conference anniversary
has been ignored so far by the Romanians, who attended that
gathering but consistently oppose a new conference convened for
the purpose of criticizing "any one party"--the Chinese. On the
eve of the anniversary, an Ilyin commentary broadcast by Moscow
radio only in Romanian on the 4th reminded Bucharest'that, in
view of the "new situation" as compared to 1969, "experience itself
See the TRENDS of 5 June, pages 10-11.
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HUNGARIAN ARTICLE While the East European commemorative
articles generally included pro forma
reiterat'.;ins of earlier endorsements of a new European and
world party conference, Hungary'sNEPSZABADSAG additionally'
took an unmistakable slap at the Romanians for their implukatle
attitude toward a new world gathering. Repeating some of the
phraseology used in an article by Ferenc Varnai in the 4 April
NEPSZABADSAG, the paper',-. 5 June editorial article voiced U,s
agreement with "those who fear that their parties' independence
may be jeopardized" by r conference. It further echoed Varnai
in asserting that independence means^_sch party's determination
of how it will serve the cov;mon cause, that those who serve their
own goals are "no internationalists," and that "no single party"
cat decisively influence world developments.
The editorial went beyond the Varnai article in denouncing
"neutrality" and "appeasement" in the fight against Maoism..
It also explicitly dismissed Bucharest's condition that it would
only attend if "all" parties participated, recalling that the
1969 conference--attended by 75 of the 89 world communist parties
recognized by Moscow--proved that such a gathering can strengthen
unity "even if all sister parties are not present." The tougher
stance toward the Romanian position was further in evidence in
the 5 June NEPSZABADSAG editorial article's failure to reiterate
Varnai's assurances that there was no "center" or leading party
in the movement, and that there was no intention to use a new
conference to excommunicate Peking.
The Hungarian stance on the position of maverick parties seemed
to stand in contrast to that of the 5 June PRAVDA editorial
article itself.. PRAVDA, perhaps to reassure parties still cool
toward new collective ventures, adopted a more c3nriliatory
posture on the acceptability of diversity within an anti-imperialist
coalition which echoed the guidelines issuing from a March con-
ference of Soviet, East European and Mongolian party theoreticians
held in Moscow under the auspices of the CPSU Central Committee's
Institute of Marxism-Leninism.* PRAVDA acknowledged that "dis-
agreements on individual, sometimes even substantial and acute
problems, do not bar the way to achieving unity on essential
questions of the str.tggle against imperialism."
For details on the March conference, see the following article.
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repeated references to "creative development", of,71arxism-Leninism
and its "enric.iment with new basic theses.." In this respect, as
well as in the candid thigh cautious treatment of sensitive political
issues by tl;e discussants, the March meeting was a far cry from the
orthodoxy a~'ad crypticism which characterized the 18"19 December
Moscow international conference of communist party secretaries on
'ideological cooperation" and the 7-9 January Prague conference
commemorating 15 years of, publication of the journal PROBLEMS OF
PEACE AND SOCIALISM.
MOSCOW REDISCOVERS "DIFFERENT ROADS TO SOCIALISM" DOCTRINE
At a 12-13 March meeting in Moscow at the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism, party, theoreticians from the Soviet Union, East Europe
and Mongolia discussed new political guidelines emphasiziv,,;,
Gooperstive'relations between socialist states and diversity in
national forma of political, economic and social organ1.zatiza,
The participantt'in the discussion, which was summarized in the
May issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, stressed the urgency of
developing effective ant, above all, resp.;nsive mechauiams for
coping with dea-rooted historical diversities in their respective
nations. Without, 'mentioning the doctrine of "different roads to
.socialism" made familiar in the.Khrushchev era, the conferees
uniformly, ecgued that "unity" in the socialist world--i.e.,
politl.cs1. stability--could only, be maintained by encouraging
natirnal diversity.
UNITY THROUGH DIVERSITY The Moscow mee''.ng, Lrmed an."inter
::ation,al scien citic:-theoretical . symposium,"
was attended by party theoreticians from the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism and.i.a cosnterparte in Mongolia nd. all East European
countries except. Yugoslavla The discussion was notable for,Its
dictum that the "revolutions:: class must be prepated for the most
rapid and unexpected changa.from one form [of social. or political
act{vity] to another"--& statement emphasizing the great urgency of
in details, in local peculiarities and in methods of approaching
the cause." In laying stress oa this theme, iagorov, and a coller,3ue
at the institute, S. V. Aleksandrov, reiterated a rarely used Leninist
states would not be undermined,bt;t would bey"guaranteed by iveraity
The central theme of the. discussion, which was opened by the new
.director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Anatc,liy `tegorov,
was the need ::o determine what forms of political., economic and
c.alopment were suitsd to the varying needs of different
socialia t states. Yegorov and other speakers took pains to, cite
the authority of Lenin for the notion that "unity" among socialist
official responsiveness t:*Y'societal problems.,
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The urgency of finding more effective forms of accommodation
between state and society ran like a red thread through the
discussion. While paying lip service to the common denominators
of socialist unity, speaker after speaker stressed the need to
pay heed to their respective national "peculiarities"--in economic
development, hietoricai traditions, and ethnic culture.
The overriding concern over ways and means of insuring social
b
stability was later expressed more openly by a CPSU Central
Committee functionary, F. F. Petrenko, in the April issue of
QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, which also directed a thinly veiled
attack at Brezhnev. It is also noteworthy that follo-wing the
Moa ow meeting, Yegorov briefed Kurt Hager, GDR secretary for
ideology, in East Berlin on 24 April, and two weeks later, on
14 May, Hager authored an article in PRAVDA which endorsed a
f amil i
familiar revis onist thesis of the Khrushchev era-the primacy
of economics over politics--in keeping with the main theme of
the March meeting in Moscow.
Apart from its international implic..itions, the Moscow meeting
in March was notable also for its domestic implications. The
identification of Yegorov as director of the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism as early as 12 March--he had previously been identified
in this post on 16 April--suggests that he had a hand in the
remarkable public attack on Brezhnev r?ade by CPSU Central Committe
official ". F. Petrenko.* The Petrenko attack appeared in the
April issue of a journal under Yeyorov`a direct supervision,
QUESTION:? OF CPSU HISTORY, in an issue prepared for the printers
28 1 March _ and sent to press or. 28 March. **
on February Foy' bac round, on. Ye8or'ovr ,see ''the TRENDS Supplement of .29 May
* o
u
19Y4
"The Struggle for Change in Soviet Social Sciences."
? ** For background, see the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 23-29. F
a more recent Petrenko attack, see the USSR section of this issue
TRENDS .
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KI SSI NGER' S REMARKS ON VI ETt4kM DRAW 'CCMTIENTATOR': ARTICLE
Secretary Kissinger'A recent testimony before U.S. House and
Senate committees on the foreign aid bill and hiu 6 June press
conference remarks, on the withdrawal of U.S. civilian personnel
from South Vietnam have prompted authoritative and high-level
respono4s from Vietnamese communist media. In addition to a
sizeable volume of routine Hanoi and Front comment, reaction
has included; DRV Fore'.gn Ministry protests condemning the
United States for "increased military aid" to Saigon and fcr
"not yet fulfilling its commitment to contribute to healing
the wounds of)war" in the DRV, and a wide-ranging NHAN DAi
"Commentator". article--the first since December--summing up
these earlier complaints and attacking Kissinger or what was
yarmed;his "betrayal" of U.S. commitments.
Hanoi's reacting to. Kisstnger irA the form of an article under
the now rarely used but highly authoritative byline of Commentator
suggests that the Secretary's latest statements may have touched
an especially raw nerve in the Hanoi hierarchy. Commentator
accused ,the Secretary of advancing "roundabout arguments" in his
e#orts to "quickly" obtain congressional endorsement of the
pet=ding GVN aid bill and of "freely" interpreting important provisions
of the Paris agreement at his 6 June press cor. erence. According
to the article, Kissinger's arguments were "at variance with the
spirit of many provisions" of the agreement he negotiatted and
initialed. Contending that the Nixon Administration has "openly
publicized" policy that is "at variance" with what it has pledged
to implement, Commentator specifically cited "continued military
MA" to Thieu, "refusal to withdraw all military, personnel disguised
as civi''.ians," and "refusal" to implement Article 21 of the Paris
agreerent--the article that sets forth U.S. intentions to provide
aid for DRV reconstruction.
Deploring U.S.."Justification" for its "wrongdoing," the article
claimed that_Masinger described the U.S. commitment to the GVN
as "ethical and political, not 'to mention a legal commitment'. and
agreement constitutes a "new basis" for the United States to
prolong, its commitments to Saigon. AL-6 June !'feature" broadcast
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by Hanoi differed from this interpretation in alleging that "at
present" Kissinger had "changed his tune" with regard to the U.S.
commitment to give aid to Saigon: that is, he no longer contended,
as he had in his letter to Senator Kennedy, that tha commitment
originated from the Paris agreement. Instead, the broadcast quoted
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Paris agreement. As a result of these statements, Commentator concluded,
Kissinger has, as representative of the United States in negotiations
on, Vietnam and in signing the Paris agreements and the 13 June joint
co,n4munique, "betrayed. . . the U.S. commitments-and his own signature."
BACKGROUND ON During the war years, NHAN DAN Commentator articles
that these issues are covered by the "written , provisions " of the
cannot "conceal the vile, crooked U.S. trick," the article noted,
on other9," Commentator declared that the secretary "fabricated
such stories" about North Vietnam maintaining "substantial military
forces" in the South and about the North "waging war and preparing
for a large-scale offensive" in order to justify supplying Saigon
with the means of self-deferae. The article disdaini+.slly discounted
these "shopworn allegations" as similar to those Kissinger "had
to take back" during the Paris negotiations.
Responding to Secretary Kissinger's 6 June pass conference statement
discounting the force of private unilateral statements of intention,
Commentator avoided confirming that there-were-any unwritten U.S.
understandings with the DRV. After briefly summarizing the Secretary's
view that unwritten understandings cannot be considered in the r.9,me
cacegory as written agreements, Commentator asked rhetorically what he
meant by that and promptly pointed out that a U.S. State Department
spokeman had previously said the U.S. government had, no secret
commitments to North Vietnam ou thra withdrawal of U.S. ivilians
from the South or on U.S. reconstruction aid for, the North. Contemp-
tuously characterizing theoe as "cunning, ambiguous" statements that
Lashing:'.out at Secretary Kissinger for his "habit of casting blame
legal commitments but on political and more moral ones, and it
described this as a "step backward" for the Secretary..
Kissinger as saying U.S. assistance to the GVN was based not on
COMMENTATOR were the consistent vehicle for Hanoi' o comment. on
to a Kissinger press conference assertion that the.South Vietnamese
U.S. policy and on major Presidential, pronouncements.
Since the 1973 peace agreement only two Commentator articles hay; a been
released--a 7 April 1973 article carrying an unusually.argumentative'
attack against. the`N1xon Doctrine and an 8 December article responding
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conflict was a civil.'.war.* While neither of these articles
addressed themselves directly to U.S.-DRV.negotiatfans, they
were shortly followed by the 11 May and 13 December announcements
of forthcoming Kissinger-Le Due Tho talks in Paris.
PRG AGREES TO RESU"IE PARTICIPATION IN JMC TALKS
The PRG military delegation to the Joint Military Coma,issien (JMC)
reacted favorably to Saigon's restoration of certain PRG "privileges
and immunities" by agreeing to end its suspension of participation
in the JMC talks.** First announced at an 8 June press conference
held by the PRG delegation and followed up by a PRG Fore:gnY Ministry
stateient of the 10th, the PRG response made no explicit commitment
to return to the PRG-GVN consultative conference at La Cell'.-Saint-
Cloud, although the foreign ministry statement asserted the PRG was
ready to resume negotiations there as well once Saigon had met .Lts
"minimum, just, and necessary demands." The foreign ministry state
cent declared the PRG delegation would be attending both thu two-
party and four-party JMC meetings to give Saigon an opportunity
to demonstrate a "serious attitude" toward present negotiations.
An 11 June DRY Foreign Ministry statement supporting the PRG move
failed to spell out DRV intentions with regard tr its own withdrawal
from the four-party talks, but VNA`on the 12th cited,a note from the
DRV delegation indicating it would participate it the i?