TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070030-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 17, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
17 JULY 1974
(VOL. XXV1 NO. 29)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on uutteriul
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Covernment
components.
STATSPEC
C
National Security information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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CO l T E N T S
'LASS Statement Holds Greece Responsible for Makarios Ouster. . ? . . 1
U.S.-SOVIET SIJ14I4IT
Results of Arms Talks Defended, Rolo of Soviet Power Debated
Peking Views U.S. Policies Favorably After Nixon Visit . . .
Sihanouk Rejects Lon Nol Proposal for Negotiations . . . . . . . . . 11
DRV Delegation Discusses Economic Cooperation in Sofia, Berlin . . . 12
RED FLAG Articles Stress Party Leadership, Unity 14
DPRK Marks Anniversaries of Treaties With PRC, USSR. . ? ? . . . . . 16
Reformist Line on Foreign Trade Defended, Controversy Hinted . . . . 18
Leadership Disarray Persists on December Plenum Issues . . . . . . . 19
Tito-Ceausescu I*_eeting; Moscow on Canadian Elections;
Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . . . . . . . .
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CYPRUS
TASS STATEMENT HOLDS GREECE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKARIOS OUSTER
Moscow's initial coverage of the 15 July coup staged by Greek-
commanded units of the Cyprus National Guard focused on the fate
of President Makarios, who reportedly had been killed, and on
resistance by government loyalists. The first authoritative
reaction came in a TASS statement released late on the 15th and
dated the 16th, which accused the Greek Government of interference
in Cyprus' internal affairs and seemed to imply Soviet interest in
Western and/or Security Council action on the crisis. Presumably
in light of Makarios' arrival in London on the 17th and his
probable appearance before the Security Council, Moscow's domestic
service at 2000 GMT on the 17th began broadcasting a Soviet
Government statement on Cyprus, text of which is not available
at this writing.
The TASS statement made no suggestion of any Soviet initiative, and
Moscow reported without comment Makarios' appeal on the 16th,
broadcast from Paphos, to "all the great powers," friendly countries,
and peace-loving peoples to support the Cypriots in their struggle
for independence and refusal to accept "Greek dictatorship." Soviet
"public" reaction has come thus far only in a statement of support
for the Cypriot people from the Sov{et Committee of Solidarity with
Greek Democrats and an expression of solidarity with Makarios from
Patriarch Pimen. Moscow has indicated its contempt for the new
regime in Cyprus, branding Nikos Sampson as a creature of the Greek
military junta.
TASS STATEMENT The 16 July TASS statement supported Makarios as
the legally elected president and blamed the
"Greek military" for the antigovernment putsch, demanding that the
Greek Government immediately end the "open interference" in Cyprus'
internal affairs. TASS pointed out that the coup was led by Greek
officers serving in the National Guard whose removal had recently
been demanded by Makarios "in connection with their antigovernment
activities." The statement held the Greek Government responsible
for the conoequences should the "interference" continue.
The statement was notable for the absence of the usual stereotyped
charges that "NATO circles" were masterminding subversion,and
terrorism on Cyprus through mainland Greek and Cypriot reactionary
agents. Comment prior to the coup and continuing reportage on
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events have routinely charged NATO interference in Cypriot
affairs--long a basic element of Coviet comment on Cyprus.
But the TASS statement toned down such accusations and merely
professed to see threads of the plot leading to external
forces which it said had long plotted against Cyprus' independence
and sovereignty, The last, previous TASS statement on Cyprus, in
February 1970, had included the usual cliches about "criminal
anti-state activities" in Cyprus as components of a plan fostered
by "NATO circles" for a settlement of the Cyprus question which
would be prejudicial to the interests of the Cypriot people and
to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.
The present TASS statement failed to link the current crisis to
'security in the Mediterranean and made no reference to a
"settlement" of the Cyprus issue. But PRAVDA's Greek and Cypriot
commentator Nikolay Bragin in an article on the 17th, as reported
by TASS, made up for these omissions. Denouncing the "plot of
the Greek military" against Cyprus' freedom and independence,
Bragin asserted that the masterminds of the "rebellion" tried to
force on the Cypriot people "a regime and a solution" of the Cyprus
issue that had nothing in common with the will of the Cypriots.
Bragiri'declared that the "military mutiny" would unavoidably lead
to the heightening of tensions In the eastern Mediterranean and to
aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations.
The TASS statement said that events in Cyprus might cause rerious
international complications, and complained that they went against
the trend toward international detente. The statement did not
indicate any Soviet course of action, but did seem to suggest that
Moscow envisioned action by Western powers and/or the Security
Council when it concluded that the Soviet Government was undertaking
demarches to the governments of Greece and Turkey as well as to the
United States, Britain and France as permanent Security Council
members.*
U.S, ROLE TASS seemed implicitly critical of U.S. inaction in
reporting on the 16th that a State Department statement
described the armed coup "against the legitimate government" as an
internal Cypriot affair and said the United States supported Cyprus'
* In the past, Soviet demarches on Cyprus have gone unheralded in
Moscow media, but have been publicized by the AKEL (Cyprus communist
party) organ KHARAVYI. Sec the TRENDS of 24 April 1974, pages 14-16,
and of 26 March 1970, pages 4-5.
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independence, territorial integrity and constitutional institutions.
TASS juxtaposed to this item a report on a 16 July Washington
POST editorial whic;t noted that while the State Department'had for
months received warnings that At%ens might try to "fan nationalist
conflict" in Cyprus, it had failed to, warn Greece against interference.
In the same vein, TASS reported on the 16ththat.a group of,U.S.
Congressmen, expressing concern over the threat to, Cyprus'
independence and to peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean,
had sent a message to the Secretary of State urging the U.S.
Government "to take necessary steps to insure appropriatenter-
national actions" to avert the military threat to, Cyprus and its
lawful government.
GUARANTOR POWERS, Moscow thus far has avoided any reference to
SECURITY COUNCIL Turkey's right, as one of the three guarantor
states (Turkey, Greece and Britain) under the
1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to intervene in Cyprus.. But Moscow has
publicized calls by British "progressive circles" urging the govern-
ment to take "decisive action" to support President Makarios and to
prevent the establishment of a "fascist regime" in Cyprus. TASS on
the 16th cited the British CP organ MORNING STAR as calling Foreign
Secretary Callaghan's reaction "so far totally unsatisfactory" and
declaring that what is needed is not "diplomatic evasiveness" but
action to "end the aggression?" The TASS dispatch also cited a Labor
MP as asserting that Makarios' chances of reestablishing order were
very strong, and pointing out that under the Treaty of Guarantee
Britain "was obliged to act" if Cyprus'independence was threatened.
Other TASS reports from London on the 16th noted Britain's
permission for Makarios to enter the British sovereign base areas,
and cited a Foreign Office spokesman as saying that Britain continues
to regard Makarios as president. The spokesman was reported as
adding that Britain had expressed to Greece its concern over events
in Cyprus and their effect on the situation in the eastern Mediterranean,
and that London was also in touch with other NATO countries.
Reporting from Istanbul, TASS cited a Turkish Government spokesman as
saying that Turkey had appealed to Britain to use British troops in
Cyprus for joint Turkish-U.K. action in case the "leaders of the
military rebellion" acted contrary to the interests of the Turkish
Cypriot community or tried to,annex Cyprus to Greece. TASS reported
the Turkish. information minister as saying that intervention in Cyprus
might be undertaken in order to protect the Turkish community there,
and later noted that the Turkish president was convening a session of
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the Grand National Assembly on the 18th to "decide the question
about the possibility of Turkish military interference" in Cyprus.
TASS also quoted Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit as declaring that
"Greece is violating the independent status of Cyprus."
Moscow has persistently stressed the Greek role in the coup, and ite
minimal reportage from Athens, in contrast to essentially straight-
forward reporting from other capitals, has been caustically critical.
Thus TASS on the 16th in a dispatch from Athens observed that a
broadcast statement by the Greek foreign minister was an attempt
by the Greek authorities "to absolve themselves of responsibility
for actions" against Makarios. The statement, TASS charged,
"deliberately ignores the Greek Government's direct responsibility
for systematic subversive'actil ities" in Cyprus by Greek officers
of the National Guard who acted against Makarios.
Brief accounts of the 16 July Security Council. session, Jointly
called by UN Secretary General Waldheim and Cyprus' UN representative,
reported that Soviet delegate Safronchuk "strongly denounced" the
interference of external forces in Cypriot affairs and urged the
Security Council to take "necessary decisive steps" to end the armed
"Greek military interference" and "insure immediately the withdrawal
of Greek servicemen from the territory of Cyprus." Moscow apparently
has not mentioned Britain's request to Greece, reported by Foreign
Secretary Callaghan to the House of Commons on the 16th, that Greece
"replace" as soon as possible the Greek officers in the National
Guard in order to reduce tension.
DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS Moscow has conveyed its antipathy to the
new regime of Nikos Sampson established
on the day of the coup; no Soviet acknowledgment of the takeover was
made until the afternoon of the 16th, when the domestic service and
TASS remarked that "self-styled president" Nikos Sampson had been sworn
in by the discredited former bishop of Paphos, Gennadios, who was
defrocked last year. The accounts described Sampson as editor of the
"extreme rightwing" paper I MAKHI, "known for his close links with
the Athens regime and with EC!A-B conspirators." Moscow pointed out
that he had returned only two or three days before the coup from
Athens, where he "evidently received instructions" from the Greek
circles "inspiring the present mutiny."
Moscow has publicized two statements by?AKEL (the Cyprus communist
party) as well as-one by the KKE (the Greek CP) denouncing the coup.
A TASS dispatch from Beirut on the 16th carried the text of an A1(EL
appeal to the Cypriot people to "offer resistance" and rally around
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Makarios, and.. the agency reported ,a statement by AKEL Deputy
Secretary General Fantis, now in Moscow, who ascribed the coup to
Greece, attacked Nikos Sampson, and declared that the Cypriot
people "badly need support and solidarity from progressive '
forces." Soviet publicity for-AKEL pronouncements is in no way
unusual and would certainly-be expected in the circumstances. Thus,
while it.is plausible that Moscow would view AKEL'as a core of any,
resistance to the new recime, publicity for AKEL statements is not
necessarily evide,.ce that the'Soviet Union is promoting resistance
activity. The TASS statement's assertion that the Soviet people'
"are fully on-the side of those who are giving a rebuff to the
mutineers" would seem to be, at this stage, only a generalized
expression of support. TASS reports of'loyalist resistance to the
takeover have somewhat diminished.
EAST EUROPEAN REACTION. Yugoslavia and Romania have been the
most vigorous in their protests against
the coup in Cyprus. Statements'by Yugoslavia'sFederal Executive
Council on the 15th and by AGERPRES on the 16th avoided holding
their Balkan neighbor responsible for the action, but Bucharest
followed up th:: AGERPRES statement by reporting on the 16th that
Foreign Minister Macovescu had summoned the Greek ambassador to
express the Romanian Government's anxiety over the coup "organized
by Greek officers," According to AGERPRES on the 16th, Macovescu
declared that Bucharest recognized only the lawful government led
by President Makarios, considered Lhat "every measure be taken for
the withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus," and expressed
conviction that the Greek Government would act to "liquidate the
situation created which nobody can accept."
President Tito, in a statement on the 16th, categorically denounced
the "attempted putsch" on Cyprus, "behind which stands a foreign
country," and expressed his indignation at the attempted "physical
liquidation of my great friend and Yugoslavia's friend President
Makarios." TANJUG has reported Yugoslav diplomatic approaches to
both Greece and Turkey,. conveying to the former Belgrade's "serious
concern over the coup.
The official Yugoslav and Romanian statements, as well as one by the
Bulgarian news agency BTA on the 16th, expressed concern that the
events in Cyprus increased danger to peace, and security in the
Mediterranean and elsewhere, with AGERPRES also specifying the Balkans.
The statements from Belgrade and Bucharest--like that of TASS--
condemned the intervention as a violation of the UN Charter'and
basic principles of international law. All three were emphatic in
their support of the legitimate Cyprus Government of President Makarios.
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The BTA statement, while not holding Greece responsible, did say
that Greek officers in the Cyprus National Guard, "directed by
certain circles abroad," had mounted the coup against the'Makarios
government. BTA called for Sacurity Council measures to halt
interference in Cyprus' internal affairs and "restore democratic
order." A Polish news agency statement issued late on the l6tI
also condemned the attempt to overthrow the "rightful" Cyprus
Government, engineered by "external forces." East Germany and
Hungary have weighed in with starements by peace councils and other
groups.
Czech reactions have thus far been confined to press comment, with
RUDE PRAVO on the 16th asserting that the Greek regime had "finally
seized the island." The paper was unique in offering some mild
criticism of Makarios: Despite his progressive views, he was a
"disciple of bourgeois policy and had too idealistic views and could
not rightly estimate the monstrosity of fascism." In a commentary on
the 17th RUDE PRAVO assailed the Athens regime for its "impudent lie"
that the events in Cyprus were an internal matter and went on to
criticize the United States' official statement as also "putting a
mask of 'internal affairs"' on Cypriot developments.
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U, S. - S O V I E T S U;i 1I T
RESULTS OF ARMS TALKS DEFENDED, ROLE OF SOVIET POWER DEBATED
Editorials in PRAVDA,' IZVESTIYA and RED STAR registered a large measure,
of agreement in assessing the results of the recent .U.S.-Soviet summit
but differed in analysing the factors contributing to its favorable
outcome. All three presented the third Nixon-Brezhnev meeting as the
culmination of two years of the new direction in relations begun during
the President`s first visit and stressed the importance of U.S.-Soviet
cooperation in Europe, the Middle East and Indochina, RED STAR went
on to point to the continuing military danger and the role of Soviet
power in maintaining world peace. Like the comment surrounding the
summit, the editorials eschewed last year's plaudits for Brezhnev's
personal role in improving U.S.-Soviet relations. While the mainstream
of Soviet commentary has denied that the summit ran into difficulty
on SALT, broadcasts to North America have blamed forces within the
United States for the failure of the summit to produce an agreement on
this subject. Concern over continuing arms development has led USA
Institute director Georgiy Arbatov to warn of the possibility of
a. new acceleration of the arms race and a consequent setback Lo U.S.-
Soviet detente.
RED STAR's editorial on 9 July, unlike those in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA
on the 7th, called for continued vigilance in the face of unabated
military preparations in the West. The editorial went from quoting
an assertion of the New York TIMES that 1974 had been the most peaceful
year since World War II to warning that "the clouds of military danger
still darken the sky above our plane;." That caution echoed recent
speeches by i)efense Minister Grechko in 'iloscow or. 4 June and, in Chita
on 11 July. In his 4 June election speech Grechko had warned that the
danger of war was still a "grim reality." The paper also reiterated, the
theme, stressed by Grechko and other military spokesmen over the past
year, that the stability of peace depencs on the enhancement of Soviet
might.~~ "In increasing the power and might of the Soviet Union, it
said, we are thereby strengthening the foundations of a stable peace
on earth."
ARBATOV ASSESSMENT USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov offered
his assessment of the summit in a 13 Jul
y
IZVESTIYA article. He also strongly defended the summit's utility
d
tre
an
s
ssed in particular that the discussions on SALT in Moscow
and Oreanda "marked a considerable advance on very important militar
-
y
`political questions." But he showed marked concern about continuin
g
arms developments despite U.S.-Soviet efforts thus far. Further
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developing a thesis he has spoken of since the aftermath of the
Middle East crisis last fall, Arbatov warned that new agreements
are needed soon or "a new turn in the arms spiral will inevitably
begin," with resulting adverse ramifications in the political
sphere as well. He offered a clear rebuttal to the arguments of
military spokesmen who have, as in the RED STAR editorial, linked
the stability of peace with enhanced Soviet military strength.
Addressing the claim that it is risky to limit arms and even more
so to reduce them, he reiterated Brezhnev's 14 June rejoinder that
"it is an immensely greater risk to continue to accumulate weapons
without restraint." In'a post-summit assessment in last year's
22 July PRAVDA, Arbatov had taken issue more specifically with
the power-behind-peace thesis, arguing that "power in itself does
not guarantee peace, much'less detente."*
U.S. PESSIMISM Assessments of the summit for the Soviet audience
ON SALT have, also takou issue with Western accounts
denigrating the summit's accomplishments on
SALT. Most notably, a posture like Arbatov's on the Nixon-Brezhnev
discussions and the value of the new instructions to the delegations
in Geneva was exhibited in Yuriy Zhukov's normally frank questions
and answers session on Moscow TV on 6 July as well as in a TV
roundtable assessing the summit on the 11th in which prominent
academic and government officials participated. According to a
lengthy TASS account of the roundtable, TASS head Leonid Zamyatin
argued that the decision to reach an agreement extending until
1985 and the formulation of new instructions represented "a major
and positive victory". Zamyatin showed sensitivity to criticism
of the partial nature of the test limitation treaty signed at the
summit, asserting that Moscow had argued for a complete ban only
to be frustrated by the traditional sticking point of U.S. insis-
tence on on-site inspection.
Taking a different tack on the Western criticism of the arms dis-
cussions, one commentary to ?earth America on 11 July cited recent
remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger and Senator William Fulbright
to support the claim that the failure of the summit to reach a new
SALT agreement was the fault of pressure from the U.S. military and
its friends. A roundtable discussion broadcast to North America on
* Arbatov's article and other contributions on this issue are dis-
cussed in the 23 August 1973 TRENDS, SUPPLEMENT, "Soviet Debate over
Role of Military Power During Detente."
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the 14th echoed reports in the U.S. press of Moscow's own hesitancy'
to take major steps in any case because of the President's precarious
domestic situation. According to an observer on the broadcast,
"There is also reason to think that had any agreements been concluded
in the area of offensive weapons they would have been labeled as
concessions to communism and used to whip up hysteria by those forces
that are dead set against putting'an end to the arms race."
CONTRASTING MEDIA In 1972 and 1973 RED STAR's immediate
TREATMENT OF SUMMITS evaluation of the summit had more closely
followed the line of the central press
as a whole and failed to place any notable stress on. remaining pitfalls
in the international situation. Nevertheless, military spokesmen
writing in the paper after the summit forcefully reasserted the
need to maintain military priorities in. a period of detente.*
Seeming lessened concern to maintain a uniform assessment of the
summit in the major editorials this year accords with other commentary
throughout the talks which failed to dampen critical evaluation of
U.S. policies.and the U.S. internal scene. By contrast last year's
Brezhnev visit was marked by a virtual embargo on direct criticism
of U.S. policy.
PEKING VIEWS U.S. POLICIES FAVORABLY AFTER NIXON VISIT
In the wake of China's discreet initial reaction to this year's
U.S.-Soviet summit,** Peking has taken pains in recent continent to
highlight evidence of U.S. resolve to improve relations c?'i.th China
while concurrently showing approval for what it sees as the Nixon
Administration's continued firmness in dealing with Mo..cow on
critical East-West issues. Peking's post-Moscow summit comment
has been similar to its favorable treatment of the United States
in the weeks preceding it,** *suggesting that Peking is sanguine
* Developments in the wake of the 1972 and 1973 summits are dis-
cussed in the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 28-30, and in the
23 August 1973 TRENDS SUPPLEIIENT.
** Peking's initial response to the summit was discussed in a
FBIS Special I4emorandum of 9 July 1974, "Foreign Radio and Press
Reaction to President Nixon's Second USSR Visit," page 13.
*** For background, see TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 12-13.
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that there were no great advances in U.S.-Soviet cooperation during
the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings. At the same time, the President's
remarks on U.S. Policy toward China made to the visiting PRC Wusbu
delegation were promptly publicized by NCNA on 13 July. It cited
particularly his observation thatt normalization of Sino-U.S. relations
remains a "major goal of American foreign policy" and his request
that the delegates convey his regards to Chairman Mao, Premier Chou
and other "good friends" he met in 1972.
In contrast with its circumspect: propaganda following previous
Nixon-Brezhnev meet;i.ags, in the wake of this year's summit Peking
has commented more bluntly on continued superpower rivalry over
Europe, the Middle East and strategic arms. A 14 July NCNA commentary
went to unusual lengths to portray President Nixon!s visit to West
Europe prior to the Moscow meeting and Secretary Kissinger's
consultations with West European leaders after the summit as evi-
dence of U.S. determination to siore up the allied position on the
continent against suspected Soviet encroachments. The commentary
acknowledged that U.S.-West European frictions had increased following
the start of the Middle East war last October and over pressing
economic problems, but it pointed taut that "Soviet social-imperialism's
expansionist ambitions and its military threat to Western Europe" had
prompted renewed Nixon Administrat,`,.on efforts to resolve disagreements
with its NATO allies as well as inc,.-eased West European receptivity
to thoseefforts. It noted in this regard that mutual U.S.-West
European concessions had resulted in successful shows of NATO unity
at the 18-19 June NATO foreign m:4-sisters' meeting and at the 26 June
NATO summit prior to the President's trip to Moscow.
Peking has continued to point up superpower rivalry as the salient
feature of the Middle East situation, presenting U.S. diplomatic
successes as Soviet setbacks, This view was reaffirmed by Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei at separate banquet speeches this week for
visiting foreign ministers from Turkey and Tunisia, while a 13 July
NCNA report portrayed Brezhnev's decision to postpone the expected
Moscow visit by Egyptian Foreign :sinister Fahmi as a sign of Soviet
displeasure with Washington's recently expanded influence in Cairo
at Soviet expense. Peking has also indicated it sees the arms
limitation agreements signed in Moscow as having little effect on
the superpowers' arms race, noting in an 11 July NCNA report that
both sides renewed underground testing only one week after the
signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreement to curb such tests.
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INDOCHINA
SIHANOUK REJECTS LON NOL PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS
The 9 July Lon Nol proposal for unconditional negotiations with
Cambodian opposition forces was rejected in a lengthy statement
by Prince Sihanouk the following day. Sihanouk reiterated the
Front's stance, voiced by insurgent leader Khieu Samphan on his
international tour this spring, that ending the U.S. involvement
in Cambodia was the key to peace.* The insurgent press agency AKI
carried the text of Sihanouk's statement on 12 July, following up
a day later with a communique which did not directly mention the
peace proposal but scored the Phnom Penh leaders for their "tricks"
to mislead the Cambodian people. The Cambodian Government's last
major peace proposal, on E? July 1973, was first rejected in a
statement by the Front Propaganda and Information Ministry and later
criticized in Sihanouk's 43d message to the Cambodian people.
The current Sihanouk statement demanded an unconditional, immediate
end to U.S. "interference" in Cambodia and maintained that "the sole
abettor of war in Cambodia is U.S. imperialism" and that "the key
to war and peace in Cambodia" is in U.S. hands. Echoing the stance
he took in response to Lon Nol's peace proposal a year ago, Sihanouk
affirmed that without a U.S. disengagement, the Front would "fight
the enemy to the death." He reiterated complete opposition to
negotiations or formation of a coalition government with the Phnom
Penh regime, and did not .repeat his previous offer of negotiations
with the United States. Sihanouk affirmeC. that "the return of peace
to Cambodia does not need to go through 'negotiations' or an
'international conference,"' but can be realized merely by an end
to U.S. "interference" and military aid. The Prince's statement
appeared to reflect less concern than last year about international
pressure on the Front to compromise; it did not repeat the criticism
in his July 1973 message of unspecified foreign powers for attempting
to bring about a settlement contrary to the insurgents' interests.
The brief AKI communique and lower-level Front comment have backed
Sihanouk's adamant stance with reaffirmations of resolve to continue
fighting until achievement of the Front's five-point program.
Commentaries have scorned the peace initiative as a U.S.-sponsored
maneuver reflecting the weakness of the Phnom Penh government. Though
categorically condemning chief Cambodian Government leaders by name,
* For background on Khieu Samphan's statements on the U.S. role, see
the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 12-13.
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the comment has in some cases implied Front flexibility in dealing
with lower-level Phnom Penh supportern--a line first put forth
authoritatively in Sihanouk's 43d massage to the Cambodian people
marking the Lon Nol peace offer last year. An AKI commentary on
the 13th carefully specified that the "ringleaders" in Phnom Penh
who must be annihilated represent "only seven individuals," and
indicated that their removal would open the way for Cambodian
reconciliation.
Chinese and Vietnamese communist media have avoided authoritative
comment on the latest Lon Nol peace offer--a pattern consistent
with the low poature adopted in their reaction to the peace plan
last year. Peking, promptly replayed Sihanouk's 10 July statement
but carefully deleted passages harshly critical of President Nixon
and Secretary Kissinger. NHAN DAN and LPA commentaries un the 14th
attacked the Lon Nol proposal, reaffirmed support for the five
points, and called for an end to J.S. involvement in Cambodia.
DRV DELEGATION DISCUSSES ECONOMIC CCOPERATI0 IN SVIA, i3ERLIN
The North Vietnamese delegation .urrently being led by Vice Premier
and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi on a tour of Eastern Europe has
broken with the patter;, of past economic miseirns headed by Nghi
during the war which traditionally visited Hanoi's major communise.
allies each year to, sign agreements on economic and military
assistance.* While some ai,d agreements may yet be reached during
the trip, none was signed during the delegation's first official
visit, in Bulgaria. The delegation's talks in Si;fiia evidently
focused on long-term economic coordination betwecm the two countries
and may have laid the groundwork for conclusion of an aid agreement
later this year. The composition of the delegation appears to
reflect its different emphasis: It includes State Planning Commission
Vice Chairman Le Khac, but there have been no reports of the usual
representatives from the ministriAs of defense and foreign trade
who accompanied Nghi in the past.
During its 9 to 13 July stay in Sofia the DRV relegation was
received by party chief Zhivkov and held talks with Deputy Chairman
of the Councii of Ministers Ivan Iliev. According to Bulgarian media,
* Annual aid agreements were also concluded in the first postwar
year, 1973. The DRV's aid agreements for 1974 with East European
countries were discussed in the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 3-6;
1 August 1973, pages'20-21; 15 August 1973, pages 3-5; 25 October 1973,
pages 19-21; and 31 October 1973, pages 25-26.
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t-:v talks covered "questions of cooperation between the two
countries for 1975 and the period 1976-1980 in the sphere of
planning." Sof d has also reported that the two countries
"reached agreement on coordinating their plans durirg the next
f.tva-year elan period . . . ." (Le Thanh Nghi in a February
1974 report to the DRV National Assembly had announced North
Vietnain's intention to uradert, ke a new five,-ys6e plan bogs nnirg
in 3.97F, but there hao boon little elaboration on the plan in
subsequent Hanoi comment.) JNA's Pnglish-language report on the
delegation's stay in Bulgaria did not provide such details jn
the economic talks but did state that,Nght and Iliev h'Ljned
"documents" ("a document," according to VNA's Fre__ch transmission)
on the "strengthening of the econom.: cooperation" between he,
two, countries. Sofia's reports state that an "aide-miamoire"
(pametna zapiska) was signed "on the visit of the delegation."
The DRV delegation arrived in Berlin on the 13th and has been
received by SED Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of
Ministers Horst Sander-nann and held talks with Gerhard Schuerer,
candidate member of the Politburo, deputy chairman of the Coun.il
of Ministers, and Chiinzan of the State Planning Commission. VNA
on the 16th reported that the talks dealt with the "development
of the economic cooperation and goods exch?dnges between the two
countries for the preser..t and the future," and with "GA;` aid to
the DRV in 1975." No mention -f aid was made, however, in an East
Berlin radio report on the 1`th, which des,:ribed the talks as
covering "the deepening of economic and scientific and technical
cooperation" acid the planning of the two countries' ecotomLes "down
to 1980."
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CHIIA
RED FLAG ARTICLES STRESS PARTY LEADERSHIP. UNITY
Peking's continued det,rmination to restrict the c iu;'paign against
Lin Piao and Confucius so that it does not result in factional
strife affecting economic production was illustrated by articles
in the July RED FLAG affirming the need for party leadership
and unity. An article on strengthening ideology in the party
sharply pointed up to party members--especially new members--that
they are expected to play a major role in leading the mass
movement. Cautioning against the view that "party members take
part in the mass movement the same way the masses do," the article
warned that new members in particular "still lack tempering in
party life."
Like the 1 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the party anniversary,
the RED FLAG article stressed that the ideological campaign should
strengthen the party and must be conducted under party committee
leadership. The article, however, placed special importance on
the role of new members, instructing party committees to regard
education of new members as an "urgent task." Perhaps with
special reference to problems cause;i by some new members, the
article cautioned committees that it was a "grave mistake" to
work "for the interests of oneself and a few people." Party
members, the article declarQd, must abide by the party principles
o4 "discipline" ..ad "unity" and should fight against all acts
"which weaker. party leadership, violate itc discipline or hamper
iLs interests."
Peking's 4fforts to build the party into a more disciplined and
reuponsiVe control organ appear aimed most immediately at insuring
that undisciplined mass groups operating ou..bide the party's
auth',rity do not hamper economic production and marketing. Another
article in the July issue of RED FLAG contained an elaboration on
themes expressed in a 3 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which had
instructed party committees to take "active measures" to insure
the transport of commodities from t'e countryside to the cities.*
Stressing the importance of transportation, the article faulted
certain members of a party blanch of a Tsinan railway subbureau
for failing to play their leading .ole after being criticized
by the masses in big-character postf ? and being faced with "certain
See the TRENDS of 3 July, pages 21-22.
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Signs of disunity." Some members of the party branch apparently
overreacted to the poster criticism and "hastily dealt with some
policy matters," aggravating problems between 'the leadership and
the masses and r:.-eakening unity within #.he railway subbureau1. To
correct these shortcomings, other members of the party branch
held "heart-to-heart" talks with those criticized cadres who were
reluctant to boldly exercise firm leadership over the masses.
Placing considerably more stress on the responsibility of party
members to lead the campaign than on having cadres turn inward
and look for mistakes in their own work, the article strongly
recommended that it was "immeasurably better" for party leaders
to "take the initiative in accepting education and correcting
mistakes rather than waiting and makingpassive self-examination."
The party branch at the railway subbureau was lauded for taking
this approach to the campaign and directing the enthusiasm aroused
among the masses "into production."
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KOREA
DPRK MARKS ANNIVERSARIES OF TREATIES WITH PRC, USSR
PEKING The anniversary of the 11 July 1961 DrRK-PRC treaty of
friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was
observed with banquets in both capitals and press comment, as it
has been for the past several years. In a marked departure from
Pyongyang's increasingly harsh public portrayal in recent months
of events in the South, the KCNA reports of the banquet speeches
showed unusual attempts to soften anti-U.S. and ROK rhetoric even
below the relatively subdued level of the 1972 and 1973 banquet
speeches. KCNA versions of the Korean speeches contained virtunlly
no mention, much less condemnation, of the United States or the
Pak government, although the NCNA versions reported, without any
detail, that the North Korean speeches had included such denunciations.
As he did last year, KPA Chief of Staff General 0 Chin-u spoke at the
Chinese charge's banquet in Pyongyang. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien,
who also spoke in 1973, addressed the DPRK ambassador's banquet in
Peking. DPRK press comment was headed by a NODONG SINMUN editorial
article and Peking comment by a PEOPLE'S DAILY article.
Both sides portrayed their relationship as strong and enduring;
however, Peking media treatment indicated increasing PRC sensitivity
over the security aspects of the treaty and the military nature of
the alliance. Whereas KCNA reported that, as in 1973, both speakers
at the Pyongyang banquet had cited the treaty as "defending the
security interests of the two countries," NCNA versions omitted such
references, which it had carried last year. NCNA also dropped
General 0 Chin-u's reference to China's "might" as demonstrated by
her nuclear tests and satellite launchings, an apparent Pyongyang
attempt to rattle Peking's saber. Although banquet speeches by the
Chinese raised the issue of the U.S. presence in. South Korea, NCNA
omitted the Chinese charge's demand at the Pyongyang banquet, as
carrieJ by KCNA, that U.S. troops "quit South Korea at once."* In
Peking, Li who had not raised the issue in his 1973 speech, said
only that the Chinese supported the Korean demand that U.S. troops
be withdrawn "completely." Pyongyang, perhaps disappointed with
this less-than-stirring statement of Chinese support, did not include
it in the KCNA version of the Peking banquet speeches.
' For a discussion of Chinese comment on U.S. troops in South Korea
on two recent anniversaries, see the TRENDS of 26 June 1974,
pages 19-20; and 10 July 1974, pages 8-9.
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'IOSCOW Soviet treatment of the 13th anniversary of the
6 July DPRK-USSR treaty of friendship, cooperation,
and mutual assistance was considerably muted, even compared to
the generally low-key treatment of the anniversary for the past
several years. Unlike last year, there was apparently no rally
in Moscow to mark the event, and Moscow did not report the speeches
given at the usual receptions in Moscow and Pyongyang, restricting
its coverage to brief comment and reports.
Pyongyang did not report the speeches at the Moscow reception, but
did carry those by the Soviet ambassador and Vice Premier Choe
Chae-u at the banquet in the North Korean capital. In his speech
Uhoe emphasized DPUUr, attempts at negotiations, while the Soviet
ambassador, according to KCNA, noted Soviet support for the North
Korean demand for U.S. troop withdrawal. Using phraseology the
North Koreans generally avoid, a NODONG SINMUN editorial article
on tie anniversary stated that Korean-Soviet friendship would
develop "in the interests of socialism and the international
communist movement." The phrasing may reflect recent discussions by
a Korean Workers Party delegation to Moscow which, according to
Moscow radio on 10 July, discussed "topical questions concerning the
world communist movement."
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USSR
REFORMIST LINE ON FOREIGN TRADE DEFENDED, CONTROVEF?3Y HINTED
Stro'igly reformist proposals on Soviet foreign trade, made in
a December 1973 NOVY MIR journal article by Deputy Foreign Trade
Minister Nikolay Smelyakov,* have been given a further boost
and defended against sensationalist treatment by the foreign
press in a recent article in the same journal. V. Yeliseyeva,
a little known commentator on international affairo writing in
the May (No. 5) issue of NOVY MIR on Smelyakov's proposals,
argued that his suggestions had firm foundations in'Lenin's
writings and had in fact been preceded by similar criticisms
from Brezhnev himself. While ostensibly aimed at certain foreign
journalists, it seems virtually certain that the latest article
also sought to defend Smelyakov's proposals against intein:11
critics and opponents of reform.
The original Smelyakov article in the December 1973 (No. 12)
issue of the journal was indeed vulnerable to charges of blacken-
ing Soviet reality and presenting the USSR in an unfavorable
light. It complained that Soviet industry was not producing gocds
which could compete on the world market and that Soviet trade
and industrial agencies were ineffective ia promoting exports
because of inflexibility, backward attitudes and tra&tional
isolation. Tt argued that the Soviet Union should modernize
its industry, raise the quality of its products and "learn
from the West" in order to compete in the export market as a
modern great power. Although 4mpl:'.citly criticizing bureaucratic
restraints and political controls, Smelyakov had insisted that
adapting the Soviet economy to the demands of the world market
"will not cause damage to our planned economy, nor to the laws
of soc.-*List production, nor in particular to communist ideology."
Nevertheless, his exposure of Soviet shortcomings appears to
have been overly frank for some officials.
In the May article Yeliseyeva complained that certain articles
in the NEW YORK TIDIES and the Japanese DAILY YOMIURI made
Smelyakov's article into a "supersensation" by claiming that
it amounted to a virtually unprecedented admission by the Soriet
press of the "advantages of the capitalist system over the
* For a detailed analysis of the Smelyakov article, see FBIS
Special Report "Pressures for Change in Soviet Foreign Economic
Policy," 5 April 197(, pages 10-13 and Appendix A.
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socialist system." Ridiculing the fuss made over Smelyakov's
"arch-seditious" call to "learn from the West," she points
out that Lenin long ago had called for this also. Countering
the NEW YORK TIMES claim that Smelyakov "incautiously" had
revealed "some hidden arguments in the Kremlin" by exposing
shortcomings in Soviet industry and export trade, Yeliseyeva
declared that criticism of such shortcomings was commonplace
in the Soviet press and pointed out that Brezhnev himself,.
during a June 1973 talk with U.S. businessmen, had revealed
that a recent Central Comm'.'-tee plenum had ahar-?y criticized
Soviet foreign trfde agencies for shortcomings. Snmelyakov was
simply amplifying Brezhnev's remarks and attempting to help
find a remedy for the shortcomings noted, said Yeliseyeva.
Countering the Japanese paper's claim that the Smelyakov article
represented a "call to abandon communist ideology," Yeliseyeva
presented quotations from his article to prove the firm ideological
basis of the article, referring among other things to his statement
that a "class approach" was necessary in foreign trade competition
with capitalists.
Furthermore, in what may have been a double edged admission,
Yeliseyeva noted that Smelyakov's article was well received
by Soviet readers and in fact stirred so much interest that
Moscow journalists asked Smelyakov to hold a news conference
in early 1974--a "lively and friendly" meeting, she said, at
which the minister, answered many questions about US-Soviet
trade.
LEADERSHIP-DISARRAY PERSISTS JN DECEMBER PLENUM ISSUES
A review of the public evidence on the implementation of the
December 1973 CPSU.plenum decisions reveals few concrete results
thus far and considerable disarray among the leaders over what
further measu--s should be taken. Only two measures directly
traceable to the plenum have been enacted: the 12 January decree
on socialist competition which it? associated with Brezhnev, and
the 22 April decree on light industry, which is clearly linked
to Kosygin. As for the much touted major'revision of the "whole
system" of economic management said to have been proposed by
Brezhnev at the plenum, few major changes are yet obser%able.
The leaders have d1 cussed various aspects of the economic reform
issue in their election s*?eeches, however, and the differing
attitudes they have revealed may provide some clue as to the fate
of these proposals, as well as the apparent stalemate over other
issues.
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DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF PLENUM Various leaders have' presented
the economic measurei discussed plenum. characterizations ioi of
in the
version of his remarks published in a recent collection of his
speeches on agriculture, said that "partial measures" of reform
had been proved insufficient and that the time had come to take
up "the question of working out a whole system of serious measures
to impro-' administration and planning and to improve the whole
economic mechanism." What precisely he had in mind is not revealed
in the published excerpts.
Shelepin has gone furthest in stressing the magnitude of the
contemplated measures, characterizing them as comprehensive in
two recent speeches. In a December speech in Turkmenia, as reported
in the 26 December TURKNIENSKAYA,ISKRA, Shelepin declared that
Brezhnev's plenum speech had proposed a "whole system of planning,
economic and organizational measures, aimed at improving all our
economic mechanism and raising the effectiveness of its work and
of its administration." In a June Leningrad election speech,
reported in the 4 June LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, Shelepin stated
that Brezhnev's plenum speech had posed "important measures
relating to all spheres of the economy--economic, planning and
organizational" and that the plenum had attacked the inertia and
poor methods of management and planning which were hindering a
'"sharp turn" to quality in production.
In his report at the March Moscow city party election conference,
reported in the 15 March NOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, Grishin also pictured
the measures as wide-ranging, declaring that Brezhnev's plenum
speech had outlined measures to "improve the organizational
structure of economic administration, to improve planning,.and to
strengthen economic incentives." Ponomarev's 22 April Lenin
anniversary speech declared that the December plenum had "outlined
improvement of the organizational structure of the administration
of the economy--which is now the key link in rbalizing the available
opportunities."
On the other hand, Podgornyy appeared to play down the prospects
of far-reaching changes, especially in organization. Referring
to the plenum discussion in his 26 December Riga speech, he
declared that "it is not a matter of some sort of radical re-
organization of the existing system of administration--the branch
principle has withstood the test of time," but he did note the
need for more flexibility in economic leadership, improvement of
the planning and organizational structure, and for fighting
departmental and localist tendencies.
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Others have characterized the plenum discussions in narrower
terms, and Brezhnev himself has recently implied that she plenum
had concentrated on shortcomings in consumer goods production.
In his 29 May Supreme Soviet election speech, Central Committee
Industry Secretary Dolgikh declared that the plenum had "especially
sharply raised questions'connected with improving the quality of
products, expanding their assortment, and improving consumer
qualities of goods." In his 14 June Supreme Soviet election
speech, Brezhnev, instead of citing the comprehensive nature of
the plenum's discussion, stated that it had concentrated on
bottlenecks and unused reserves, "in particular. in the food and
light industries and other branches of group B, the growth rates
of which still do not satisfy us." IZVESTIYA immediately took
up Brezhnev's new characterization in a 18 June editorial, declaring
that the plenum had "concentrated attention primarily on still
unresolved questions," especially in the food and light industries
and other branches of group B where growth is lagging.
KOSYGIN'S "DIRECT TIES" Aside from the 12 January joint decree
on socialist competition, which is
directly traceable to the enthusiastic support for this measure
voiced by Brezhnev in his plenum speech, the most notable action
stemming from the plenum has been the 22 April Central Committee-
Council of Ministers decree "On Some Measures to Improve Planning
and Economic Incentives for Production of Goods of Light Iniastry,"
The specified purpose of the decree was to give production associ-
ations and enterprises of the Light Industry Ministry the right to
set consumer goods production on the basis of orders from trade
outlets, hence forcing producers to respond to changes in consumer
demand and forcing them to improve product quality. The system
of "direct ties" between enterprises and retail outlets had been
introduced in 1965 as part of Kosygin's economic reform, but the
intended extension of the system beyond the initial enterprises
was not carried out.
The idea of increasing the consumers' power to influence assort-
ment and quality of goods by widening of "direct ties" appeared
prominently in several important articles closely following the
December plenum, suggesting that the subject was one of the key
matters discussed at the plenum. Both leading innovative economist
N.P. Fedorenko, in a late November speech reported in the 7 January
ECONOMIC GAZETTE, and his longtime conservative critic, Gosplan
Deputy Chairman A.V. Bachurin, in a 11 February ECONOMIC GAZETTE
article,complained that consumers need more rights in relation
to producers and urged widening of "direct ties." jn a 11 January
PRAVDA article on improving the economic mechanism, PRAVDA first
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deputy chief editor V.G. Afanasyev argued that the power of the
consumer in relation to the producer must be raised and that
extension of "direct ties" would facilitate this. And in the
4 February ECONOMIC GAZETTE, N.F. Lobachev,.deputy head of the
Central Committee's section for planning and financial, organs,
complained that the 1965 decision to widely introduce "direct
ties" was only being slowly implemented and proposed that enter-
prises' plans be considered fulfilled only when they have completed
delivery of all goods contracted for.
Despite the enactment of the decree, the leadership's support
for the measures has been lukewarm. Only IZVESTIYA published
the decree--on 17 May, 25 days after its enactment. PRAVDA
did not publish the decree, even though it found space to
publish Central Committee-Council of Ministers decrees on such
subjects as young pioneers, molecular biology, and on libraries
during May, and despite the fact that it had prominently published
the March 1973 decree on production associations. It was Kosygin
who publicized the decree by holding a 24 April Council of Ministers
meeting at which the decree was first announced. The decree had
been signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin only two days earlier, and on
the same day--22 April--Kosygin also ise.&ied a separate. Council of
Ministers decree following up on the joint decree with measures
to improve the quality and assortment of light industry goods
and improving the ties between trade and industry. Although
similar meetings of the. Ukrainian and RSFSR councils of ministers
ware held on 26 April and 29 April, there was no mention of the
decree in the press reports on these sessions. In one of the
rare articles describing the decree, a 13 May ECONOMIC GAZETTE
article characterized it as "exceptionally important" and a
"further development. of the economic reform." It is indicative
that during the June 1974 Supreme Soviet election speeches
Kosygin was the only leader to even mention the decree.
Kosygin appears to have paid a price in terms of client tradeoffs
for the leadership's endorsement of the decree. In January a
one-time Brezhnev subordinate, Alma-Ata Gorkom First Secretary
F.I. Mochalin, was appointed head of the Central Committee's
section for light and food industry, replacing one-time Kosygin
subordinate P.K. Sizov, who had been removed in July 1973.*
On the other hand, Kosygin may have gained in the appointment of
Minsk Gorkom First Secretary N.N. Slyunkov as deputy chairman of
Gosplan in mid-January. From 1965 to 1972 Slyunkov had been
See the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, page 23.
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director of the Minsk Tractor Plant, which had won high praise
for its computerization and use of modern management methods.*
The plant also used "direct ties" with its suppliers, according
to a May 1972 KOMMUNIST article by Lobachev. During his November
1973 visit to Minsk Kosygin visited the plant, accompanied by
Slyunkov, and in a 29 April 1974 speech Belorussian First Secretary
Masherov praised the plant as do example of what good management
and scientific progress can produce.
OTHER MEASURES In addition to the decree on "direct ties"
in light industry, there are indications
that some other decisions have quietly been mad%_ _iso. A 28 May
SOCIALIST INDUSTRY editorial revealed that "in conformity with
decisions of the December plenum," a new system of evaluating the
work of associations and enterprises will go into effect starting
the second half of 1974. Henceforth, plans will be considered
fulfilled only when contracts for delivery of goods are fulfilled.
The editorial did not specify which branches this system would
encompass, but the context in the editorial did suggest that
it was not limited to light industry alone. In a 10 July SOCIALIST
INDUSTRY article, V. Selyunin elaborated on this, indicating that
the new system had started on 1 July and that bonuses would be
cut for nonfulfillment of contracts.
In addition, in a 12 May PRAVDA article N.P. Fedorenko revealed
that it had recently been decided to finally extend the new
planning system introduced in the Moscow Main Administration for
Vehicle Transport in 1965 to various other motor transport
organizations. This experiment had also had Kosygin's enthusiastic
support in 1965.
Further, Mazurov, Grishin and Andropov in their June Supreme
Soviet election speeches indicated that new measures based on
the December plenum decisions were still being worked on.
Mazurov in particular, according to the 8 June SOVIET BELORUSSIA
account of his speech, specified that measures were being worked
on to improve planning, to provide more effect for economic levers
and incentives "to raise the interest of enterprises and associ-
ations in adopting tight plans, and to insure the introduction
of the achievements of science and technology into production."
Gosplan Chairman N.K. Baybakov in the 23 May TRUD also stated
that Gosplan was now considering introducing some new planning
indicators, including ones reflecting introduction of scientific-
technical achievements.
* See the TRENDS of 13 March-1-9-74,
page 14.
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THE PARTY ROLE Differences have been expressed also over
the appropriate division of responsibilities
between party overseers and technical specialists in the manage-
ment of the economy. Brezhnev in his December plenum speech
stressed that running the economy is a "political matter," called
for upholding a "truly party style of work, a party approach in
all spheres of economic activity," and declared that nne cannot
approach leadership of the economy "from narrow economic, much
less technocratic, positions." Brezhnev's warnings against a
"technocratic" approach were repeated by PRAVDA editorials on
11 and 15 February.
In contrast, a 31 May IZVESTIYA editorial addressed to the "huge
army of economic leaders" stated that during the scientific-
technical revolution the economy becomes too complex to rely on
"traditional methods, practical habits and intuition" in making
decisions. Intuition and experience are important, it admitted,
but must be combined with a "strictly scientific approach."
Further, IZVESTIYA cautioned executives to rely on specialists
rather than issuing uninformed orders. It quoted Lenin as
writing that "if a communist is an administrator, his first
duty is to avoid getting carried away by giving orders, to be
able to first consider what science has already worked out, to
first ask whether facts have been checked, to first seek knowledge
(tn reports, in the press, at meetings, etc.), and only on this
basis to change what is being done."
In their Supreme Soviet election speeches some leaders also
reflected a clear desire for new methods. Masherov in particular,
even while pursuing his customary hardline stress on ideology,
emphasized the use of computers and mathematical methods, praised
experimentation, and condemned cadres who do not want to abandon
"archaic" methods of administration for modern, scientific methods.
Kulakov, Mazurov.and Demichev also appeared enthusiastic about
modernizing administration and production.
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NOTES
T TI O-CEAUSESCU MEETING: The Joint communique on Yugoslav President
Tito's 8-11 July visit to Romania described the atmusphere of the
talks as one of "friendship and sincerity, mutual respect and
complete understanding." The repeated emphasis this year on
s.vereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and noninterference
pointed up the concern of the two leaders to maintain a bold front
against Soviet pressures. Only a single reference to this set of
principles appeared in the 16 July 1973 communique. In a further
gesture of independence, this year's final document said the"LCY
and RCP would work for unity of the world communist movement through
cooperation with "all" communist, parties. NCNA on the 12th carried
an extensive, favorable report on the Tito-Ceausescu communique.
Radio Moscow on the 16th reported a PRAVDA commentary which denounced
Western press speculation about "the alleged intentions of the Soviet
Union to exert pressure on Yugoslavia and Romania." :RAVDA had
earlier reported the Tito-Ceausescu meeting without comment on the
12th.
MOSCOW ON CANADIAN ELECTIONS: Moscow has expressed approval of the
results of the 8 July parliamentary elections in Canada. A commentary
in PRAVDA on the 11th said that a key factor iu the "convincing
victory" of the Liberal Party had been "the foreign policy course
pursued by the.Trudeau government," including "the aspiration to
develop mutually advantageous cooperation with various countries,
"including the Soviet Union and other socialist states." A PRAVDA
article on the eve of the elections stressed that none of the contending
parties had taken issue with the Trudeau government's foreign policy,
while all political leaders had "reflect%d Canadian public attitudes
by stressing the importance of further moves to relax international
tension." Soviet commentary on the election pointed up support by
Canadian figures for measures to rurther limit the "domination" of
the economy by American capital and to reduce Canada's role in NATO,
but it also stressed Canadian support for improved U.S.-Soviet relations
and further progress on strategic arms limitation.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL F'BIS TkENDS
17 JULY 1974
NORTHERN IRELAND: Soviet media have been highly critical of
Britain anew policy for Ulster, outlined on 4 July in an official
"white paper." The cri:icisms are in line with Moscow's past
appraisals of developments in Northern Ireland, emphasizing
the themes that Protestant extremists seek unrestrained dominants
over Ulster's affairs, that the rights of the Catholic minority
remain unprotected, and that power-sharing arrangements between
Protestants and Catholics will not work. Referring to the new
British proposal that Ulster elect a 78-member constitutional
convention to devise a new form of government, for example,
commentator Igor Biryukov in PRAVDA on 10 July professed to
see "profound contradictions" in the lack of guarantees against
"arbitrary tyranny of armed Protestant gangs" and "usurpation
of power" by Protestant Unionists. Speaking on Moscow radio's
"Glance at the British Scene" on 5 July, political observer
Anatoliy Can was more direct, asserting that Britain's new
policy "in effect delivers Northern Ireland to the
f
mercy o
the
victors [in the mid-May general strike], the Protestant extremists."
In recalling the mid-May events, which ended nix months of
power-sharing and led to restoration of direct rule by Britain,
Can accused London of having yielded "on every point" and of
having "reaffirmed this surrender in its white paper." Soviet
comment has also reiterated several proposals of 'ling standing
which Moscow and "progressive forces" in Ireland and Britair
have advanced as prerequisites to a just settlement of Ulster's
problems. As cited by TASS on 15 July, these preconditions
include withdrawal of British troops to their barracks, an end
to the internment of pclitical prisoners, and the adoption of
a formal bill of rights.
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APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8 - 14 JULY 1974
Moscow (2788 items)
P
ki
e
ng (932 item!)
Nixon USSR Visit
P
(28%)
10%
Law of the Sea
(18X)
21%
odgornyy in Somalia
(--)
10%
Conference
(Podgornyy Speeches
(--)
5%]
Criticism of Lin ?iao
(8%)
9%
USSR-French Relations
(--)
7%
and Confucius
[French Foreign
'
(--)
5%]
Indochina
(7%)
4%
Minister
s Visit
Chi
[Sihanouk Rejection
(--)
31]
na
(4%)
6%
of Lon Nol Coali-
(Senator Jackson's
(--)
2%]
tion Government
Visit
Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 Mission
Chil
(5%)
4%
Proposal
Japan
(2%)
4%
e
(3%)
4%
PRC-DPRK Treaty 3d An-
(--)
3%
Mongolian Revolution Anni-
4%
niversary
versary
Albanian Army Day
(--)
22
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
courted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Top'cs and events given major attention In terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior Issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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