TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070031-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 24, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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 FBIS
TRENDS
Confidential
In Communist Propaganda
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STATSPEC
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CONTENTS
USSR Focuses on UN Action, Castigates Greece, "NATO Circles" . . . . . 1
East Europe, Peking Cautious on Post-Coup Developments . . . . . . . . 7
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Brezhnev Joins Detente-Defense Debate, Cites Summit Results. . . . . . 10
USSR-POLAND
Brezhnev, Gierek Praise Ties, Endorse Wbrld "Conferences". . . . . . . 13
USSR-GDR-FRG
Moscow, East Berlin Warn Bonn on West Berlin Office. . . . . . . . . . 16
INDOCHINA
DRV Media Play Down 20th Anniversary of Geneva Agreements. . . . . . . 19
DRV Media See Guerrilla Warfare as a Counter to Pacification . . . . . 20
AFRICA
Podgornyy Visits Somalia, Signs Friendship Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . 22
CHINA
Peking Notes Anniversary of Chiang Ching Cultural Talk . . . . . . . . 25
Party Authcrity Strengthened to Safeguard-Economic Production. . . . . 27
Many Provinces Note Use of Revised Entrance Examinations . . . . . . . 28
USSR
Defiant Ph9lo3ophy Journal Continues Campaign for New Ideas. . . . . . 31
Ukrainian Leadership Rebuked for Neglect of Consumer Goods Output. . . 33
NOTE
FRG-Czechoslovak Treaty. . . . . . ? ? 37
APPENDIX
Mosc,:,w, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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CYPRUS
USSR FOCUSES ON UN ACTION, CASTIGATES GREECE, "NATO CIRCLES"
Soviet reaction to the 15 July Cyprus coup ousting President
Makarios and the ensuing crisis was highlighted by government
statements on the 17th and 20th which, like other comment, focused
on the need to restore Cyprus' independence and sovereignty and
demanded the withdrawal of "all" Greek military personnel and
the restoration of President Makarios' "legitimate government."
Moscow has taken a cautious line on the Turkish armed inter-
vention in Cyprus on the 20th, abstaining from any prior calls
for restraint and avoiding either criticism or endorsement of
the action.
Moscow expressed general approval of the UN Security Council
resolution of the 20th, which among other things called for a
cease-fire, but has shown irritation over Western preeminence.in
obtaining Turkish and Greek agreement for a cease-fire on the
22d. Moscow has reported but provided little comment on develop-
ments in the wake of the cease-fire agreement--the agreement on
British-Greek-Turkish talks in Geneva, the transfer of .the.Gypriot
presidency from Nikos Sampson to House of Representatives president
Glavkos Kliridhis, and the Greek military junta's handing the
reins over to a civilian government headed by former prime
minister Karamanlis.
SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Following up the initial 15 July TA SS
LEADER STATEMENTS statement on the coup in Cyprus,, the
Soviet Government statements of the 17th
and 20th constituted a call to the United States and other
Western powers to back strong Security Council action to remove
"all" Greek military personnel from the island. The statement
of the 17th, coming just before Makarios' departure from London.to
address the Security Council, seemed designed to support his appeal
and reaffirm his positiv-t as head of the legitimate government.
That the statement was addressed primarily to Washington was
indicated by the assertion that no one could be deluded by Greece's
attempts to conceal its involvement, "despite the fact.that some
people in the West caught up this false version"--an allusion
to the State Department statement describing the coup as an
internal Cypriot affair. Complaining about the position of
"corresponding NATO countries" at the July Security Council
session, the statement echoed the Soviet UN delegate in calling
on all states. to demand cessation of foreign military intervention
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and, as a "first measure," the immediate removal from Cyprus
of "the entire Greek military personnel." The statement said
that the position of the "corresponding NATO countries" at the
council. session showed that "certain NATO circles" planned the
coup because of antipathy to Cyprus' independence and its non-
alined policy.
Further charges of NATO complicity with Greece in the coup as
well as complaints about the stand of "some NATO members" were
registered in the government statement of the 20th, which contained
Moscow's first cautious official reaction to the landing of
Turkish forces on Cyprus that morning. The statement noted that
the situation in Cyprus had not changed for the better, but rather
had become more dangerous and tense. It went on to charge Greece
with continued "aggressive actions," dealing with the Turkish
intervention in a later passage which merely cited Ankara as
declaring the action was taken to protect the Turkish community
and restore Cyprus' independence and its "legitimate government."
Like the statement of the 17th, the second one urged removal of
all Greek servicemen. from the island and restoration of Cyprus'
position as an independent and sovereign state. It repeated
previous Soviet calls for an end to outside interference in
Cyprus' internal affairs, allowing the Cypriot people to decide
their destiny by themselves.
Brezhnev's brief remarks on Cyprus in his 21. July Warsaw speech
at the Polish Sejm made no mention of Turkey's intervention,
merely reiterating the theme that the events in Cyprus were a
result of the Greek regime's "quite unconcealed armed aggression"
and that "certain NATO circles" also bore respon?3ibility. He
called for an end to outside military interference and restoration
of Cyprus' independence and sovereignty. Podgornyy likewise
urged an end to outside interference and blamed the coup on the
Greek military and "certain NATO circles backing them," in a
speech on the 18th at a dinner for a visiting South Yemeni
party-government delegation.
TASS DENIAL OF Moscow ignored U.S. press reports on the 20th
SOVIET ALERT citing American officials ab stating that the
Soviet Union had put seven airborne divisions
on alert. But a TASS "announcement" late on the 20th attributed
to AFP a report that day that "a part" of the USSR's troops had
"allegedly been alerted" in connection with the aggravation of
tension in the eastern Mediterranean and that "the entire armed
forces" of the USSR were alerted on the afternoon of the 20th.
TASS citecu AFP as reporting further that in response to this NATO
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forces in Europe had been alerted. TASS declared that it was
"instructed by the competent organs" to state that the AFP report
was an "utter fabrication" aimed at further aggravation of the
situation "in the interests of certain aggressive circles," and
concluded that the Soviet armed forces "remained in their usual
state and have not been placed on alert." Fo.llowup to the TASS
denial has been confined to TASS commentator Osipov's 22 July
response to "fantasies" of British General Walker about an
"uilleged Moscow threat" in the Cyprus events, which Osipov dis-
*.,issed as one of a series of fables, including AFP's "invention,"
emanating from "certain Western circles."
Soviet media played U.S. military movements in a low key. Reporting
on the 19th on signs of increasing tension in the eastern
Mediterranean, Moscow noted that the Greek and Turkish governments
were holding urgent sessions and alerting their forces and that
U.S. and British naval units were directed toward Cyprus. TASS
on the 21st reported Secretary Kissinger's statement in San
Clao,eate that he did not envisage U.S. interference in the Greek
and Turkish military actions, nor did the United States intend
to provide military assistance to Greece or Turkey. TASS quoted
the Secretary as announcing that Washington had placed on alert
an air division stationed in Europe and ordered the Sixth Fleet
to sail for Cyprus "for the eventual evacuation of U.S. citizens
from the island."
TURKISH INTERVENTION Turkey's armed intervention has been
handled in guarded fashion. Reportage
prior to the Turkish landing on the 20th charged that the United
States and Britain were concerned not with restraining the
"putschists" in Cyprus but with preventing a Greek-Turkish con-
flict, and were pressuring Turkey to refrain from intervention.
A one-sentence TASS dispatch on the 20th reported a State Depart-
ment statement that the United States regretted Turkey's military
action just as it deplored the previous action of Greece which
precipitated the crisis. TASS reported that the Turkish ambassador,
at his request, had met with Gromyko on the 20th and the 21st;
at the first meeting they "discussed the events in Cyprus" and
at the second they "continued the exchange of opinions" on the
Cyprus situation. Minimal reverences to the Turkish military
action in Soviet comment have tended to deflect attention from
Ankara's intervention; an Arabic-language commentary on the 22d,
for example, blamed Greece for disregarding the possibility that its
military intervention would prompt "grave" reaction from Turkey.
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Soviet calls for an end to foreign military interference have
been aimed at Greece, with Moscow straightforwardly reporting
Turkey's explanations of intervention as aimed at protecting
the Turkish Cypriot population and restoring the "status quo."
But Moscow may have some doubt as to Turkey's ultimate intentions:
In reporting Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's 22 July press con-
ference, TASS ignored his statement that Turkey's presence in
Cyprus was "irrevocably established" and that this situation
created "new possibilities" for finding solutions to the Cyprus
question. Nor has Moscow picked up remarks by other Turkish
officials on, the 23d envisioning some form of a federal system
for Cyprus. Moscow has been insistent in calling for the in-
dependence and "territorial integrity" of Cyprus, and comment
last spring had expressed disapproval of a Turkish-advocated
"federal" solution as amounting to partition of the island
between Greece and Turkey. Current comment has repeated
Moscow's long-standing opposition to enosis, viewing the coup in
Cyprus as a step toward this Greek goal. TASS on the 24th
reported that Makarios, commenting in his New York press con-
ference on "Western press reports" of plans by "certain circles"
for a possible division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey,
called such an approach "absolutely unacceptable." TASS quoted
him as saying that "no decision taken at the Geneva talks will
be valid unless it has my approval."
Reportage on the fighting in. Cyprus left the local population
largely out of the picture, conveying an impression of Turkish
forces battling Greek forces and the "rebel units" of the
National Guard. TASS reports on the 23d noted some skirmishing
after the cease-fire by unidentified combatants in the area of
the airport and along the "Green Line" separating Greek and
Turkish communities in Nicosia. TASS cited foreign correspondents
in Kyrenia as reporting that Turkish troops and National Guard
units had not violated the cease-fire.
WESTERN ROLE IN The government statements urging Security
CEASE-FIRE Council action on Cyprus conveyed implicit
criticism of the United States, as well as
other Western powers, over the timing and content of a council
resolution on Cyprus. The resolution adopted on the 20th was one
Moscow could live with: TASS reported Soviet UN delegate
Safronchuk as expressing satisfaction that it answered two main
demands--supporting the legitimate government of Cyprus and ending
"foreign military interference"--despite the fact that "not all
of its provisions suit the present situation." (A foreign-language
commentary by Zholkver on the 22d expressed hope that, "although
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not all of the resolution is in tune with the time," it would
help restore the constitution in Cyprus.) TASS noted that the
resolution called on all sides to cease fire as a first step and
appealed to Greece, Turkey and Britain to start negotiations for
the restoration of peace and constitutional government in Cyprus.
But Moscow was clearly miffed by the success of Washington's
diplomacy, in collaboration with West European allies, in achieving
agreement on a cease-fire. Prior to the Turkish intervention,
Soviet reportage on the 19th had noted Undersecretary of State
Sisco's talks in London and Athens, but his subsequent shuttle
diplomacy between Athens and Ankara apparently went unreported.
TASS on the 22d promptly reported first British then U.S. announce-
ments that a cease-fire would be effected as of 1400 GMT that
day, following up with reports that Turkey and Greece accepted the
Security Council's call for a cease-fire. TASS later noted that
the "rebel-controlled" Nicosia radio had broadcast a cease-fire
order to National Guard units.
On the 23d Moscow began to display its pique; TASS commentator
Kornilov complained that "certain Western powers" which tried
to prevent the Security Council from taking action to restore
peace were now posing as peacemakers and taking credit-for first
steps toward progress, while ignoring Soviet "diplomatic demarches"
for council action and misrepresenting Moscow's position. Along
the same lines, TASS director general Zamyatin, in a SOVIET RUSSIA
article the same day, similarly accused "certain states" of trying
at first to paralyze Security Council action in support of the
lawful Cypriot government, and of later-trying to "rush through
only a cease-fire resolution," using the landing of Turkish
troops as a "pretext," while leaving aside the need for with-
drawal of Greek officers from Cyprus-and-restoration of
constitutional rule in the country.
Reports of Secretary Kissinger's 22 July press conference-reflected
irritation in observing that he "did not say a word" about the
Security Council role in working out a resolution. TASS remarked
on the 23d that Kissinger "limited himself" to describing U.S.
efforts "within the NATO framework" since "the problem concerns
NATO" and the United States must act in close cooperation with
its allies. TASS noted that in response to questions, Kissinger
said that restoration of "constitutional order" would be a subject
of the Geneva talks under Britain's aegis. On the matter of with-
drawal of Greek officers, TASS reported him as saying that this
problem must be solved in Geneva since "it had one meaning last
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week and can have an absolutely different meaning in some other
context" now that there are big Turkish forces on the island and
the situation is "somewhat different" from what it was last week.
Singling-out London press criticism of British actions, TASSon
the '~3d claimed that such "frank admissions" exposed the con-
tentions of some Western political and press circles that
"possible progress" toward a settlement was "allegedly the result
of efforts by some Western powers." And TASS cited the DAILY
MAIL as saying that while "some people" in the United States were
trying to credit Kissinger with reaching a cease-fire, such an
evaluation "is at variance with the actual state of things."
t' welcomed Kliridhis as "provisional president" who would be "carry-
CHANGE OF CYPRIOT, Moscow has reported but not yet commented
GREEK REGIMES on the 23 July transfer of the Cypriot
presidency from Nikos Sampson to House of
Representatives president Glavkos Kliridhis and the replacement
of the Greek military regime with a civilian government headed by
former prime mini.ster Karamanlis. TASS reported that "President
of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios," at a New York press conference,
TASS also reported ;.`_'hkErios as expressing hope that the.restoration
of civilian rule in Greek would have a favorable effect on the
Cyprus situation. In the first comment on the Greek-changeover,
a Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 24th declared that the
fall of the Athens military government, was the first consequence
of the Cyprus crisis and followiid the failure of the "Junta's
armed interference" in Cyprus' internal affairs. The radio noted
that the news of the army's handove.r of power to a civilian
government had been greeted with "great ~>atis:cactinn" in Athens. On
the other hand, some reservations about the political character
of the new regime seemed reflected in the TASS report of the
announcement of the government's resignation: TASS noted that this
had been preceded by a conference of cabinet members, high-ranking
military, and "leaders of the bourgeois opposition parties."
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EAST EUROPE, PEKING CAUTIOUS ON POST"COUP DEVELOPMENTS
All the East European countries, in official statements and
comment, denounced the 15 July coup in Cyprus and demanded
restoration of the Maksrios government. Reaction to the Turkish
military intervention has been mixed, ranging from factual reports
through various degrees of disapproval. The small volume of
comment on the cease-fire, as well as the timing of the respective
government statements,* reflected caution and general uncertainty
over the course of Cyprus developments. In the only monitored
Albanian comment, the party daily ZERI 19OPULLIT on.the 24th
typically placed sole blarrc for the crisis an the United States
and the Soviet Union.
There has been. little reaction so far from East European media
to the governmental changes in Cyprus and Greece on the 23d. An
initin" response from Hu,igary, a Budapest domestic service
commentary on the 23d, viewed the changes in Nicosia and Athens
as triggered by expediency in an effort. to retrieve somethir.j
from the Cyprus coup, which had "failed." While conceding that
Glavkos Kliridhis had been held in public esteem prior to the
coup, the radio c;,..arged that "this does not alter the fact that
his appointment as head of state is just as illegal as SamIson's
was," adding that the changes in both Athens and Nicosia leave
things "essentially the same."
TURKISH INTERVENTION While East European reaction to the
Turkish intervention has been varied,
some comment has gone far beyond Moscow's cautious factual approach
to voice disapproval and express doubts about Ankara's motivation.
The more guarded reactions came from Bulgaria and Poland: Sofia
radio merely reported factually on the intervention, and Warsaw's
response Las been mild, in keeping with its usual restrained stance
on developments-in the.Middle East. Speaking at a Polish anniversary
meeting in Warsaw on the.21st, PZPR First Secretary Gierek noted
only that the Greek-instigated coup in Cyprus "has triggered action
on the part of Turkey." An East Berlin domestic service commentary
on the 20th portrayed it.as a regrettable development that could
have been averted if the United States and.Britain had not "blocked
the voting" on the Security Council resolution on the 19th.
* Government statements were issued by Yugoslavia.on the 13th,
Bulgaria, East Germany and Hungary on the 18th, Poland on the 19th,
Romania on the 20th and Czechoslovakia on the 22d.
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The Czechoslovak Government on the 22d said Prague "expects"
that immediately following the end of the Greek intervention
"the withdrawal of the armed forces of thy: Turkish Republic from
Cyprus will also be effected." Stronger criticism of the Turkish
action had come in a Prague domestic service commentary on the
20th which derided Ankara's justification of its intervention as
aimed at protecting the Turkish community and restoring Cyprus'
independence. The radio charged that "both are pretexts for
establishing indisputable claim to the disputed oil fields
stretching from Cyprus to Crete."
A Budapest radio commentary early on the 21st charged that the
Turkish action was motivated "not by the defense of justice and
1r.gitimate order but the unfounded fear that Greece will annex
Cyprus." In harsher terms, another commentary later the same day
ridiculed Ankara's alleged pose as "the protector of law and
order," pointing out that the Turkish Cypriots were not threatened
with any immediate danger and that Archbishop Makarios had
condemned the invasion. The radio added that the action represented
a NATO "miscalculation," possibly leading ultimately to intervention
by the "leading" NATO powers.
The Romanian Government in a prompt government statement broadcast,-:.:
by Bucharest radio on the 20th, while condemning the coup and
emphasizing support for Makarios, "at the same time" expressed
"deep anxiety" over Turkey's "military actions." The government
statement called for the immediate cessation of "all military acts
of any state on Cypriot territory" and for the immediate withdrawal
of "foreign troops" as well as for the restoration of the "legal
government led by President Makarios."
Yugoslavia provided the heaviest comment on Turkey's role. While
initial reaction suggested toleration, Belgrade subsequent Ij.'-'.Iil;i~'played
growing concern over Turkey's motives. On 21 July Zagreb radio
commentator Ante Kesic described the invasion as "a military counter-
intervention . . . a foreign intervention to a foreign intervention
needed in order to move the Security Council" to act on the crisis.
The first official Yugoslav comment indicated that Belgrade had
strong reservations about Turkey's military presence on Cyprus.
Foreign Minister Minic on the 23d, according to TANJUG, informed
the Federal Assembly that the government had "officially" expressed
its concern to the Turkish Government. Pointing out that Yugoslavia
could understand Turkey's justification for "military reaction,"
Minic said Yugoslavia expected that the "actual aim" of the Turks
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was limited to full restoration of the pre-coup situation.
Any other aims, Minic said, would deepen the crisis, "creating
a new danger to peace and security."
Elaborating on these official concerns, Zagreb radio commentator
Milika Sundic on the 23d noted that the Turkish rcp resentative
had said he would speak on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots at the
Geneva talks. Sundic saw this as the first clear indication
that "Turkey, too, is questioning Cyprus' sovereignty." He viewed
the representative's statement as an indication that Turkey had
revised its original attitude and expressed fear that Ankara was
"inclined toward a possible division of the island into a Greek
and a Turkish section." Sundic predicted that negotiations would
be very difficult and their possible failure could have "far graver
consequences" than the coup itself.
PEKING In a belated response to events in Cyprus, Peking has
voiced support for President Makarios while avoiding
direct criticism of Greece and Turkey. The Chinese did not take
note of the 15 July coup until a 19 July NCNA report said that
"President Makarios" had been overthrown by the Cypriot National
Guard and had safely left the country after calling for continued
popular resistance against the "rebels." NCNA on the 19th also
replayed Makarios' charges at the UN Security Council meeting that
day of Athens' role in support of the coup, and it noted on the 20th
that Turkey had sent troops to Cyprus and fighting was going on there.
Chinese UN representative Chuang Yen, explaining Peking's support
for the UN Security Council cease-fire resolution on 20 July, firmly
backed the struggle of the Cypriot people under the leadership of
"President Archbishop Makarios, the legitimate head of state of
Cyprus" and opposed aggression and subversion there by "all
foreign forces." Chuang pointed up Chinese concern over alleged
superpower intentions to exploit the present troubled situation in
order to expand their competing interests in the area.
A terse 22 July NCNA report noted that Greece and Turkey had agreed
that day to a cease-fire. NCNA on the 24th carried factual reports
on the transfer of the Cypriot presidency from Nikos Sampson to
Glavkos Kliridhis, as well as the resignation of the Greek military
government and the swearing in of Karamanlis as head of a civilian
government.
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BREZHNEV JOINS DETENTE-DEFENSE DEBATE. CITES SUN1`1IT RESULTS
In his 21 June Warsaw speech to the Polish Sejm, Brezhnev joined
earlier spokesmen in the internal Soviet detente-defense debate
who have warned against relying on military might alone as a
guarantee of Soviet security. In doing so he strongly defended
the fruitfulness of the June Moscow summit and gave his most
forthright defense of Soviet arms control diplomacy since before
the Middle East fighting last fall.
DETENTE-DEFENSE DEBATE Brezhnev took direct issue with the
notion, said to have been dominant "for
centuries?" that a nation's security is best guaranteed by the
formula: "If you want peace, be ready for war." In warning
against the practical consequences of that formula, Brezhnev resorted
to arguments that have long been used by Soviet moderates to urge
restraint in military programs:
In our nuclear age this formula conceals particular
danger. Man dies only once. However, in recent
years such a mass of weapons has already been stock-
piled to make it possible to destroy every living
thing on earth several times.
Brezhnev went on to assert that the best way to insure peace was
instead to "conduct a policy of peace and to fight for that policy."
Hardline spokesmen have countered that such arguments. overemphasize
the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy and have rejected
the notion that the Soviet side would suffer as much as an opponent
in the event of a nuclear exchange. Rear Admiral V.V. Shelyag--a
member of the editorial board of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES
and deputy head of a sector in the Lenin Military-Political Academy--
presented the opposing viewpoint in RED STAR last February, amid
increasing signs that these issues were again under debate in Moscow
under the impact of detente:
Oversimplified arguments about the death of civil=
ization and about there being no victors in a nuclear
war are based on mathematical calculations. The
authors of these arguments divide the quantity of the
stockpiled nuclear potential in the world by the
number of people living on earth. As a result it
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emerges that all mankind really could be destroyed.
This is an oversimplified, one-sided approach to
such a complex sociohistorical phenomenon as war.
Shelyag went on to defend the Soviet Union's acquisition of "modern
weapons" on the grounds that in the event of a world war they would
be a means not of destroying mankind but of "routing the aggressor
and consequently defending civilization."*
Brezhnev's remarks on overkill are his second public statement on
this theme in recent weeks. In his 14 June Supreme Soviet election
speech he responded to those who argued that limiting arms was
risky by saying that "it is an immensely greater risk to continue
to accumulate weapons without restraint." USA Institute director
Georgiy Arbatov warmly endorsed that argument in a 13 July IZVESTIYA
article.
In the late 1960's Brezhnev was an outspoken public supporter of
the rapid Soviet strategic buildup. As the chief spokesman for
Soviet diplomacy in recent years, he has edged toward the center
on these issues and has expressed solid support for specific Soviet
arms control initiatives. Nevertheless, he had continued to avoid
the more outspoken arguments for restraint on strategic arms
characteristic of moderates such as Arbatov and Aleksandr. Bovin,
now an IZVESTIYA observer. Brezhnev now seems to be moving. toward
a more forthright espousal of the soft line position, perhaps in
response to the evolution of debate on these issues in Moscow.
His remarks came in the wake of RED STAR's reaffirmation in its 9 July
editorial on the recent summit that "in increasing the power and
might of the Soviet Union, we are thereby strengthening the
foundations of a.stable peace on earth." This linkage between Soviet
power and peace was also made in May and June by Defense Minister
Grechko and Main Political Directorate head Yepishev. Both referred
to a remark by Lenin that stressed the indivisibility of, strengthening
international security and strengthening Soviet. defenses. According
to Yepishev, in KOMMUNIST No. 7, Lenin said that "our steps toward
peace must be accompanied by enhancement of our military preparedness."
SUMMIT AGREEMENTS Elsewhere in his Warsaw speech, Brezhnev sought
to put the best possible face on the summit's
arms control accomplishments. Reciting the list of agreements signed
in Moscow, he elaborated on the terse language of the treaty limiting
* Shelyag's article, an extreme statement of the military position,
is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 February 1974, pages 6-8.
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underground nuclear tests, stating that the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed to "reduce considerably" the number of under-
ground tests. The treaty itself said that, below the threshold of
150 kilotons, the two countries agreed to limit tests "to a minimum."
Despite this bold front, Brezhnev seemed defensive about the
summit's arms control progress. Returning to a theme he first
broached at the dinner hosted by President Nixon in Moscow on
2 July, he asserted that although the Soviet Union was pleased
with the summit "we would like still more and would be willing to
agree to more" arms agreements.
Becoming specific, he averred Soviet willingness to agree to a total
ban on underground tests and he renewed a long-standing Soviet
proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union should with-
draw their nuclear-equipped naval forces from the Mediterranean.
That proposal had first been made in a 20 May 1963 note to the
United States in response to the initial deployment of U.S. nuclear
missile submarines to the area. Continued Soviet support for a
Mediterranean nuclear-free zone had been voiced as late as 1969
by President Podgornyy. After 1969 Soviet public statements in the
issue became muted as it got involved in the SALT negotiations.
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U S S R - P 0 L A N D
BREZZINB', GIEREK PRAISE TIES, ENDORSE WORLD "CONFERENCES"
The 19-22 July Brezhnev visit to Warsaw for the 30th anniversary
of communist Poland provided the occasion for personal praise of
the Soviet leader and affirmations of the benefits afforded Poland
by its alliance with the USSR and other communist countries. The
two leaders also expressed low-keyed endorsements of another world
party conference, with Brezhnev going on record for the first time
with an authoritative call for a preliminary conference of European
communist parties.
Brezhnev clearly played the starring role at th?; festivities--he was
the only foreign party leader in attendance, other socialist countries
being represented by lower-level figures. At the 20th and 25th
Polish anniversaries, top-ranking Eadt German and Czechoslovak leaders
had also attended, in addition to Khrushchev in 1964 and Brezhnev in
1969. This year, a friendship rally at Katowice--Gierek's home
base--was addressed only by Brezhnev, without the customary response
by the host country's party leader. Brezhnev's role was further
underscored this time by the award to him of Poland's highest military
decoration. As is customary, the anniversary festivities culminated
with a military parade, on the 22d, featuring an address by Defense
Minister Jaruzelski.
BREZHNEV SPEECHES As on previous bilateral occasions, Brezhnev
was moderate in his praise of Gierek's leadership
of Poland's socialist construction, beset with such continuing problems
as slow progress in collectivization of agriculture and public pressure
for an improved living standard. At the Katowice rally, where he was
introduced by provincial party first secretary Grudzien, they Soviet
leader included a single standard passage of praise for Gierek, who
was on the platform, in the context of praise for the PZPR Central
Committee: "The Central Committee of your party and its First Secretary,
that remarkable son of the Polish working class, the son of your glorious
region, that outstanding Marxist-Leninist, Comrade Edward Gierek, enjoy
a high level of esteem in our country, as they do in Poland." Brezhnev
emphasized the close political, military, and economic ties between
the two countries. In addition to mentioning integration under CEMA,
he pointed to Soviet use of ships built in Poland, the large volume of
Soviet petroleum refined at Plock, and the contribution of Soviet
specialists to the building of the Nowa Huts, Metallurgical Combine.
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In his speech before the Polish Sejm on the 21st, Brezhnev's
references to the Pcli h leader were confined to passing allusions
to points Gierek had made in his preceding speech. Th: Soviet
leader also referred to "difficulties" faced by the Polish party
in carrying out the program adopted at its 1971 congress, ,ndicating
as well that the Sov1.t-Polish r.elatior~3hip had its diffic:lt side.
Thus he noted that overcoming Poland's "specific" problems in
socialist building "is a difficult underta"-Mg and will require a
straining of the creative forces of the people," as well as
"discipline." He went on to declare that the USSR's policy was to
"find mutually advantageous solutions to the diverse and at times
difficult problems" that face the two countries.
GIEREK SPEECHES In a ceremony preceding his main address at the
Sejm, Gierek lavishly praised Brezhnev for his
role in Poland's liberation in awarding him the Great Cross of the
Virtuti Military Order. The award speech paid tribute to Brezhnev
as leader of the Soviet Union, "our closest friend, our steadfast
ally, and our most important partner in the fields of social,
economic, and cultural cooperation." Gierek went on to hail
Brezhnev's "indefatigable activity in the international arena" in
implementing the peace prograL. Of the 24th CPSU Congress.
In his main speech, Gierek delivered a lengthy, positive review of
his stewardship since taking over from Gomulka in December 1970,
stressing price stabilization, housing, and public health. At the
same time Gierek underscored the country's social stresses in
declaring that the regime's concern for the welfare of the
individual must be matched by "every citizen's ability to make
proper use of his rights" and "a high degree of discipline." He
added that fulfillment of Poland's plans depended on its membership
in the socialist community and that "the fundamental prerequisite of
the position of our country in the world is the class and national
alliance with the Soviet Union."
COMMUNIST RELATIONS In his Katowice rally speech Brezhnev noted
that "many communist and workers parties
are posing the question now.about the necessity for preparing and
holding new international.meLtings," adding that the CPSU "agrees
with this" and believes.the time has come for "such meetings." He
added, in the first explicit.Soviet.endorsement of the idea, that
"we think the holding.of anew conference of European communist
parties could help to strengthen joint actions" on the continent.
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In his Sejm address the next day, Gierek took a position similar to
Brezhnev's, observing that "the further consolidation of the inter-
national communist movement" is "well served by international
conferences of communist parties." At a rally in honor of the
GDR's Honecker on 8 June, Gierek had declared flatly that a
majority of world communist parties back a new world conference.
He had also on that occasion, though not in his 21 July Sejm
speech, registered explicit support for a Zuropean communist party
conference.
Atypically, there was no criticism of Peking by the two leaders
during the visit. Brezhnev i.n his Sejm speech confined himself
to stressing the alertness of the CPSU and PZPR to the need for
ideological unity in the struggle against "ary deviation from
Marxism-Leninism and sociali6t internationalism." The PRC and
Albania were omitted by Gierek in his enumeration of "fraternal"
socialist countries with which Poland has active bilateral relations.
At the same time, however,P:',P on 22-July did include these two
countries in a listing of those sending congratulatory messages to
Poland on its 30th anniversary.
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USSR-GDR-FRG
MOSCOW. EST BERLIN WARN BONN ON WEST BERLIN OFFICE
Recent Soviet and GDR condemnation of FRG plans to establish the
Federal Environmental Agency (FEA) in West Berlin have been
raised to the official level in obviously coordinated protests
from Moscow and East Berlin that this would be a violation of
the 1971 Quadtipartite'Agreement an Berlin. ASoviet Foreign
Ministry statement, released by TASS on 19 July, said vaguely
that "appropriate measures" would be taken regarding the transit
routes between the FRG and West Berlin if Bonn established the
agency there. But a GDR Government statement released the next
day specified that under these measures the use of the routes
for the transit of FEA personnel, property, or documents would
be prohibited.
USSR STATEMENT The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement, Moscow's
first such public protest regarding West Berlin
and the FRG since the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, charged that
the FEA would "run counter" to the agreemant and be "at variance"
with and "in defiance" of it, noting that establishment of the
FEA would "unilaterally" change the status quo. The statement
warned that if the FEA is in fact set up, the Soviet side would
proceed from "an understanding" that "thee' will arise a necessity
to take appropriate measures to counteract attempts at violating
the four-power agreement and to-protect the legitimate interests"
of the Soviet Union and the GDR. It added that "responsibility
for the consequences of violation" of the agreement would rest with
the "initiators" behind establishing the FEA in West Berlin. The
most recent.Moscow press article on the FEA, a 7 July IZVESTIYA
commentary by G. Sidorov strongly denouncing the Bundestag's
actions on FEA, had warned that by "contravening the four-power
agreement," those responsible in Bonn would be rendering a
"disservice" to the West Berlin people.
The 7 July IZVESTIYA article had made one of the strongest
criticisms of the new Bonn government-since-Brandt's resignation
in charging that "certain circles' of the ruling FRG coalition"
sought "to undermine" the four-power agreement with the establish-
ment of the FEA. In contrast, the Soviet statement, instead
of attacking the SPD-FDP coalition, sought to explain that the
Dundestag decision on the FEA was made "under the pressure of the
CDU/CSU as well as with the active assistance of the West Berlin
Senat," ignoring the fact that the Bundestag decision was un-
animously approved on 19 June..
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Brezhnev in his Warsaw speech on the 21st said nothing about
the Berlin situation, and as regards the FRG limited himself
to expressing "satisfaction" that Chancellor Schmidt had "con-
firmed" his "firm intention" to preserve and augm,_nt that which
was done by his "far-seeing predecessors."
GDR STATEMENT While the Soviet statement did not spell out
what c,unteractions would be taken against
Bonn, the GDR Government statement was more speLific. After
repeating the standard GDR argumentation regarding the FEA of
recent weeks, the statement said that as soon as the FEA legislation
is "effectively" implementert, the GDR, "taking care of its
legitimate interests and with a view to insuring the observance
of the four-power agreement, will be compelled to take the
appropriate measures," defined as follows:
The transit of staff of this FRG Federal office
and the conveyance of the relevant property and
the relevant documentation over the communication
[routes] will be regarded as unlawful. Accord-
ingly, there is no legal basis for transit travel
by representatives of this federal authority.
Echoing the Soviet statement, the GDR statement declared that it
had "repeatedly and duly warned" the FRG and that the latter.
"bears the full responsibility for the consequences of this
violation" of the four-power agreement. GDR Council of Ministers
Chairman Sindermann repeated the East-Berlin warning in a speech
on the 22d.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, in an article on the 13th which forewarned
that establishment of the FEA in West Berlin would "have its
consequences," as well as other recent East Berlin commentaries
have made it clear that the GDR would work to abort the usefulness
of the FEA's work in West Berlin, hinting that the East European
states may not cooperate with the agency in solving environmental
problems in central and northern Europe.
MOSCOW ON DURATION OF In a unique commentary first broadcast by
FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT Moscow radio in its German service on
18 July, observer Valentin Zakharov, a
specialist on German affairs, discussed the duration of the Quadri-
partite Agreement on "West Berlin." While reviewing many established
Moscow points on the FEA question, Zakharov noted specifically and
repeatedly that although the agreement has been in effect for more
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than two years, the agr!-:ment "has no specific maturity." He
argued that "realistic" persons could only realize that "there
are indeed alternatives to the policy of the Quadripartite
Agreement on West Berlin for-the socialist states, but no
alternatives to this agreement for Bonn's foreign policy."
This radio commentary could be read as part of Moscow's psychological
and political pressures on Bonn over the FEA question, but this is
the first known reference in the Moscow media implicitly que tion-
iag the four-power agreement and even hinting at a terminal time
period for he agreement. As a rule, Moscow radio's German
commentaries are finely tuned to issues regarding East-West German
affairs, And commentators reviewing such issues as the agreement
on Berlin are extremely careful in their discussions. This
Zakharov commentary may represent only an atypical lapse of attention
to detail by its author, but at a minimum it is a curious signal
at a critical time.
ONMEN
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INDOCHINA
DRV MEDIA PLAY DOWN 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS
At sharp variance with the fanfare normally accorded decennial and
quinquennial anniversaries, Hanoi media's attention to the 20 July
anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina was at a
lower level and more limited even than that given the 19th anniver-
sary last year. Although attention last year--the first anniversary
after the January 1973 Paris agreements--was somewhat less than in
previous routine years, Lnere was at least an anniversary editorial
in the party paper NHAN DAN. This year NHAN DAN marked the ann..ver-
sary only with an unsigned article, and the editorial that day dealt
with hob raising. Hanoi radio's press review for the 20th described
the editorial in the army paper QULN DOI NHAN DAN as being on the
anniversary, but availr'-Le broadcast versions referred to the
military campaigns in l55; but did not mention the Geneva agreeme.it.
Hanoi's attention to the 10th anniversary it 1964 extended over
several days and included nationwide meetings as well as a r,-Illy in
Hanoi, visits to the DRV by foreign delegations, a DRV Government
statement, instructions from the Vietnam Workers Party Secretariat,
a note to the Geneva conference cochairmen, a Foreign Ministry White
Book, and a Ho Chi Minh interview. The 15th anniversary in 1969
prompted a Ho Chi Minh appeal, a foreign ministry memorandum and
a "grand meeting" attended by high-level DRV leaders, as well as the
traditional editorial comment. From 1970 through 1972 the anniversary
invariably drew a memorandum from the DRV Foreign Ministry and
editorials in the press, and in 1972 President Ton Duc Thang issued
an appeal on the occasion.
The 20 July NHAN DAN article on the Geneva agreements anniversary
presented a standard Hanoi view of the situation in Vietnam, accusing
the United States of violating both the Geneva and the Paris agree-
ments. The 1973 anniversary editorial in NHAN DAN had similarly
denounced alleged U.S. violations of the Geneva and Paris agreements;
but it seemed less pessimistic than this year's article--balancing
references to difficulties confronting the revolution with claims
of "brilliant prospects" and "enthusiasm in the future." The current
anniversary article, like other recent comment, shows concern about
what it calls Washington's attempts to pursue a neocolonialist policy.
And it sees these attempts in the support of Saigon's military forces,
the U.S. presence in Thailand, and U.S. relationships with the USSR
and China.
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This year's 20 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial dealt mainly with
the situation in South Vietnam and, as reported by Hanoi radio, it
made no mention of the Geneva agreements, even though it referred
to the military campaigns in 1954 leading to the cunclusion of
the resistance war against the French. The editorial maintained
that the balance of power "has greatly change-I to the advantage
of our people," and that the revolution in the South is in.a
"strong, offznsive position" although still faced ';ith "difficul-
ties, complexities, and trials."
DRV MEDIA SEE GUERRILLA WARFARE AS A COUNTER TO PACIFICATION
Commentaries in the North Vietnamese press in recent months have
given increased attention to the use of guerrilla warfare in South
Vietnam to counter ,7N pacification efforts. The army paper QT]AP1
DOI NHAN DM dwelt upon this problem in an unsigned serialized
article in May and in subsequent low-level articles and editorials;
and NHAN DAN articles in this past week have stressed the importance
of antipacification efforts. While these commentaries appear to
reflect concern over GVN swscesi in controlling the populace and
may signal a new communist'policy on countering pacification,
comment at such 'a low level cannot be read'. 'as ^cl.ear'-confirmation of
such a shift. There have been feat-high-level. discussions of the military
situation in the South in Vietna::tese communist media since the 1973
Paris peace agreement, and the most notable ones--two series of articles
under the authoritative pseudonym "Chien Thang" (Victor), published
in August and in November and December 1973--were not focused on the
question of guerrilla tactics and population control.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, serialized in the paper from 21 to
25 May but only recently available in translation, provided the
most'-detailed discussion of the role of guerrilla tactics. Observing
that the "determinant of victory" in the struggle against pacification
consists of building up the revolutionary for(.es in the hamlets, the
commentary pointedly reminded its readers that "revolutionary war is
an undertaking of the entire people, not just the armed forces."
Characterizing the arming of the masses and expansion of guerrilla
warfare as part of a "pressing requirement" needed to counter the
"new strategic plan" of the United States and the GVI, the commentary
asserted that the fight in the South is one to "destroy the enemy's
political organizations and build up revolutionary mass organizations,
a fight to shatter the enemy's armed forces and expand guerrilla forces."
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The significance of guerrilla warfare was also stressed in a
21 June commentary in the army paper which boasted of the
"extremely important effectiveness" of guerrilla warfare and
declared that these tactics have been developed in "many areas,"
especially in the Mekong Delta. According to the commentary,
local forces and guerrillas, "the key forces in guerrilla warfare,"
have taken the initiative in launching attacks, have fought
"outstandingly," and are "positively contributing to changing the
balance of forces . . . in the localities and at the basic level."
In this same vein, an article in the 20 July NHAN DAN claimed
that the antipacification struggle in heavily populated areas
controlled by the GVN was "undergoing new developments" and that
guerrilla warfare activities were being accelerated.
While ''/ietnajnese communist comment continues to routinely claim
"vicriries" in the South and that the balance of forces has improved
with the Paris agreement, some comment frankly expressed concern
over the specter of pacification and stressed the need to loosen
the GVN's hold on the population. In particular, the serialized
QUA: DOI NHAN DAN commentary in May warned that since the Paris
agreement the United States and Thieu have "concentrated their
strength on 'pacification,"' terming it a "perfected strategy" of
the Nixon doctrine. Declaring that the program is now geared at
"not only annihilating the revolutionary bases in the countryside,
but more importantly, at taking hold of the people, controlling
them, and building a social base for the Saigon administration and
army," the commentary ruefully observed that this has resulted from
U.S. recognition of one of the principles of "revolutionary war":
the necessity of gaining control of people, not territory. While
acclaiming the "many new effective modes of struggle" devised to
defeat pacification, the commentary admitted that, even with the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South, Saigon still controls
populated areas with a "dense suppression apparatus" and as a
result can conscript, maintain a large army, and augment its other
military forces. To meet this challenge, "to defeat U.S. colonial
warfare," the commentary urged the use of "revolutionary war and
people's warfare" in combination with the traditional political,
military, and diplomatic struggle.
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AFRICA
PODGORNYY VISITS SOMALIA, SIGNS FRIENDSHIP TREATY
Moscow media have expressed considerable satisfaction with the
USSR-Somalia friendship and cooperation treaty, signed at
Mogadiscio by President Podgornyy and Somali Supreme Revolutionary
Council President Mohamed Siad Barre during the former's 8-12 July
visit. The text of the treaty has not yet beer published by the
two governments.* Judging by available repor.;.s on-the treaty from
Moscow and Mogadiscio media, it includes an expansion of the
already substantial Soviet aid program in Somialia and provisions
for closer ties. Moscow commentaries have characterized the
treaty--the first such pact with a sub-Saharan African country--as
a model for future bilateral relationships with "progressive"
African countries.
PODGORNYY VISIT Podgornyy arrived in the Somali capital on
8 July, heading a six-man delegation which
included USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman I.V. Arkhipov,
First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov, and First Deputy
Defense Minister S.L. Sokolov. His return visit represented the
fulfillment of a November 1971 promise during a visit to Moscow by
President Siad Barre. A high-level Soviet delegation last visited
Mogadiscio in February 1972, when Defense Minister Grechko headed
a mission which held talks on military aid.
Speeches by the two leaders at an 8 July banquet honoring the
Soviets, as reported by PRAVDA on 10 July, stressed the close ties
and kindred ideologies of the two countries since Siad took power
in October 1969. Siad appeared to press for a more active Soviet
role in Africa when he stated that "we acknowledge" Moscow gives
"selfless assistance" to the African peoples' struggles, but added
"this support must be further increased." While joining Podgornyy in
expressing a cautiously optimistic view of the new Portuguese
Government, he went on, unlike the Soviet leader, to specifically
demand that Lisbon "unconditionally liberate occupied territories and
hand over power to legitimate organizations."
* Previous Soviet friendship treaties with Third World nations--with
Egypt in May 1971, India in August 1971, and Iraq in April 1972--were
all published during or immediately after the visits by Soviet
delegations.
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TASS reported talks between the Soviet and Somali leaders on
9 July involving "a detailed exchange of views" on "Soviet-Somali
cooperation." The following day Podgornyy was accompanied by
Siad to the industrial port of Kismayu. Addressing a large
rally there, the Soviet President took pains to point out the
friendly and "no strings attached" nature of the Soviet aid
program and, while not mentioning Peking directly, attacked
those "preaching the notorious theory of 'wealthy' and 'poor'
nations."
Moscow radio reports on the USSR-Somali friendship treaty, signed
on 11 July, note that it provides for the "strengthening of
Soviet-Somali relations in the fields of politics, economics,
and culture," and calls for "reguicr political consultations" as
well as broad cooperation in "industry, agriculture, irrigation,
exploitation of natural resources, trade, and navigation." Moscow
also reported that USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Arkhipov
had concluded a protocol to a June 1961 agreement on economic and
technical cooperation.
Speeches by Podgornyy and Siad at a friendship rally on the 11th
hailed the treaty and the close relations between the two countries.
A Mogadiscio radio report on Siad's speech quoted him as asserting
that "it is hi&h time we controlled the destiny of our country,
tied it to those who are friendly, and moved away from our enemies."
A longer account of his remarks, published in PRAVDA on the 13th,
omitted this passage but indicated that Siad had criticized domestic
"reactionaries" who held the view that "the USSR supplies us with
nothing that our people directly need," and that he had noted that
closer ties with Moscow were "not to the liking of our enemies
abroad, who will allege that Somalia is being led along by others,"
A joint communique on the visit, released before Podgornyy's
departure on the 12th, lauded the.friendship treaty as a manifesta-
tion of strengthened Soviet-Somali relations and--presumably to
reassure Somalia's neighbors--vowed that it was not "directed
against any third countries." It acknowledged the two sides'
different points of view in noting.that they had had a "frank and
detailed exchange of opinion," but said that the negotiations
proceeded in an atmosphere of "friendship, cordiality, and mutual
understanding"--a somewhat. warmer formulation than used in the
November 1971 communique on.Siad's visit to Moscow. Claiming a
"broad identity" of views on "a number of topical international
issues," the communique listed agreed stands on several questions,
including a call for Portugal to "take into account" the views of
the leaders of liberation. movements in African territories under its
rule and to grant these areas independence and self-determination.
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SOVIET COMMENT The unexplained failure to release the text of
the friendship treaty did not prevent Soviet
media from depicting it in glowing terms. Soviet radio commentaries
beamed to Africa on.13 July hailed the treaty as a model for Sov'-
relations with other African states and stressed that it was not
aimed at other countries.and would be a major factor in bringing
stability to the situation in East Africa. A PRAVDA article on
14 July underscored Moscow's desire for closer ties with African
countries friendly to the Soviet Union. It cited the treaty with
Somalia as "fresh evidence" that "the community of basic interests
of the USSR and the countries that have taken the road of independence
constitutes a good basis for their alliance."
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CHINA
PEKING NOTES ANNIVERSARY OF CHIANG CHING CULTURAL TALK
Major articles this month by two of the PRC's most prominent
cultural commentators in the campaign to criticize Lin and
Confucius--Chu Lan and Chiang Tien--have commemorated the 10th
anniversary of Chiang Ching's July 1964 talk on contemporary
Peking theatrical works.* According to Chu that talk was a
"declaration of war" which "first started" the revolution in
Peking opera, ballet, and symphonic music. Both articles stress
the formal structure of revolutionary theatrical works and the
struggle to maintain both artistic standards and revolutionary
themes, but Chu places more stress on the struggle as a current
and continuing problem. A third article marking the anniversary,
written by the "writers group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities,"
appeared in the 16 July PEOPLE'S DAILY but the text is not yet
available.
Like most other articles in the July RED FLAG, the Chu Lan article--
broadcast by Peking on 12 July--noted the important role played by
the pa':ty. Stressing the importance of cultural leaders rather
than the masses, Chu claimed that the struggle over revolutionary
literature and art has provided communist party members with an
opportunity to show their "revolutionary courage" and specified
that "the Marxists" led the struggle in.the political and artistic
fields. Making a strong defense of Chiang Ching's leadership,
Chu noted that the proletarian "literary and art contingent"
trained in the course of the past 10 years' struggle, "the pioneering
stage," is the best qualified to continue leading the revolution in
literature and art.
Chiang Tien's article, which appeared in the 12 July PEOPLE'S
DAILY, concentrates almost exclusively on the need to portray
proletarian heroes, beginning with a quote from Chiang Ching's 1964
* The only previous extensive media publicity for the talk came in
1967, when the talk appeared in RED FLAG No. 6, released on 8 May,
and was also published in PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY
on 10 May. A RED FLAG editorial hailed the talk'as an "important
document in the use of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought."
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talk that states: "It is necessary to mold the images of revolutionary
heroes of the time on our stage. This is a task of prime importance."
The article reiterates standard arguments favoring emphasis on
proletarian heroes and details methods for doing so. While noting
that the literary and art revolution must be carried through, Chiang
Tien stresses the past struggle against Lin Piao's literary and
art efforts, not echoing Chu Lan's focus on the current struggle.
BACKGROUND In 1964 when Chiang gave her talk she was just beginning
her role as a cultural leader, apparently having been
encouraged by Mao to do so after a serious illness. While some of her
concepts have become more sharply defined since then, the summary she
gave then of the correct method for creating model theatrical works
still seems a valid presentation of her views. Chiang stated that
plays must be created through an alliance of the leadership,
professional playwrights, and the masses, with the leadership setting
the theme and guiding the effort. Chiang stated that some traditional
?lays might be staged if suitably rewritten, but emphasized the
creation of new works designed "to extol positive characters" in a
revolutionary setting.
Shortly after the fall of Lin Piao and the beginning of the propaganda
barrage against the idea of "genius," Chiang's accent upon the role of
proletarian heroes seemed to run into some opposition. A RED FLAG
article in November 1971 by Chung An, who contributed se?reral art,.les
to RED FLAG on cultural themes beginning in 1970, criticized a film
which stressed the role of a major character who "almost became the
personification of the party and the masses." Chung accused the film
of rejecting the role of the party and of relegating the masses to
only minor roles. Chung dropped out of sight after a final article
in the May 1972 RED FLAG, and since that time there have been no
direct challenges in the media to Chiang's emphasis on proletarian
heroes.
PROVINCIAL TREATMENT The only provincial mention of Chiang Ching
monitored thus for this month was a Wuhan
radio report on a provincial forum on the reform of local opera. The
broadcast called the model operas "personally nurtured" by Chiang Ching
a brilliant example and ordered local troupes to "first of all" adapt
the models to local forms. The report did not specifically refer to
her 1964 instructions, nor did it follow the spirit of those
instructions to focus*attention'on the creation of new works.
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PARTY AUTHORITY STRENGTHENED TO SAFEGUARD ECONOMIC PRODUCTION
Peking's apparent recent decision to tighten the reins on the
campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius seems to be motivated
in part by a firm resolve to prevent any further dislocations
in China's economic base. Though Peking has claimed a "good"
summer harvest as well as higher levels of ind'.. trial output
for many areas throughout the country, several recent provincial
broadcasts have revealed local production problems due to
insufficient party leadership over the mass activities spurred
by the campaign. Peking is taking active measures, including
issuance of a Central Committee directive, to insure that the
criticism campaign stimulates--not interrupts--production.
In an apparent attempt to help party committees regain control
by dampening mass criticism of party leaders, an 8 July PEOPLE'S
DAILY article Spelled out what was not meant by the call to "go
against the tide" in criticizing Lin and Confucius--a slogan
introduced one year ago and endorsed at the party congress last
August. The article drew a sharp line of distinction between the
"correct tide" and the "Incorr::et tide" and declared that it was
wrong to say that "as long as we rebel against the leadership we
are going against the tide." Detailed class analysis under the
party's tutelage was stressed as the means to detect a true "incorrect
tide."
The extent of Peking's concern over the dislocations caused by the
campaign was revealed by a TACHUNG DAILY editorial, broadcast by
Shantung provincial radio on 14 July, which stated that the Central
Committee has issued an."extremely important instruction" setting
increased industrial and agricultural production as a "new require-
ment" of the criticism drive. The directive has not yet been
acknowledged in central media. The new Central Committee directive
was described as a "mighty weapon" that will strengthen party
leadership over production and help fulfill state production plans
while criticizing. Lin and Confucius. Indicating that local
production problems do exist in Shantung, the broadcast made an
unusual call to struggle against the "evil wind of economism" the
practice of using wage increases.and other material benefits to
r.ivert the workers' attention from the struggle. Such calls were
routinely issued during the culturr,l revolution, but have been
extremely rare during-the current campaign. Party members are to
mobilize the masses to refute "all erroneous speeches impairing
efforts to grasp revolution and promote production."
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Kiangsu appears to have been especially hard hit with production
problems resulting from weak party leadership over the masses.
A 15 July Nanking broadcast of a HSINHUA DAILY editorial frankly
warned local party leaders that it was "dangerous" to be too
deeply engrossed in the movement to criticize Lin and Confucius and
fail to "exercise effective leadership over production." The
broadcast revealed that there were weak links in production in
some areas and announced what appears to be a no-growth period
for Kiangsu's total industrial output for the first half of 1974.
Industrial output for the first six months in Kiangsu was
described as "about the same" as that of the same period last year.*
Kiangsu's production problems were also exposed in a 14 July Nanking
broadcast on coal production which played down the masses' role in
the campaign by calling on party members to carry out "ideological
struggles . . . inside the party committees." Party leaders are to
settle "any difference of opinion . . . in meetings so as to achieve
unity of the squad." Party committees were told to exercise leader-
ship over the masses and see that they stay at their work posts and
make revolution in their spare time.
Several other provinces have also revealed local production
difficulties associated with leadership mistakes in the present
campaign. Harbin radio on 14 July warned that "it is wrong" for
leading comrades to set the movement to criticize Lin Piao and
Confucius "against production . . . or to relax their efforts in
exercising leadership over production." Problems with keeping
workers at their production posts were reflected in a 14 July
Nanchang broadcast which s:-ressed the need to "persist in the eight-hour
workday system." And a pointed 22 July Chengtu broadcast of a
SZECHWAN DAILY editorial contained the implicit suggestion that the
criticism campaign msy.turn against those leaders who fail to lead the
masses to increase production. Noting that there were problems and
weak links in production in some areas of Szechwan, the editorial
boldly proclaimed that "all those who do not attach importance to
looking into production are not good leaders."
MANY PROVINCES NOTE USE OF REVISED ENTRANCE EXAMINATIONS
Despite current emphasis-on the role of politics in educat.Lon--a
continuation of last summer's nationwide movement to stress cultural
revolution educational reforms in enrolling new college students--a
modified entrance examination is now being used to aid colleges in
selecting students who have sufficient substantive knowledge as well
* Nanking radio on 30 April had claimed that first quarter industrial
production had increased by 8.6 per cent, indicating a precipitous
second quarter drop.
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as the proper political credentials. The uniformity of the new
guidelines, contained in a flurry of recent provincial radio
reports, suggests that a Central Committee directive has been
issued to explain the function of the examinations in the student
enrollment process. The new guidelines on enrollment examinations
shed light on an issue which has remained sensitive since a
Liaoning youth sparked a successful campaign one year ago to
prevent a return to the old form of examination based on rote
memorization of middle school texts. The return of a reformed
examination system serves to illustrate Peking's basic interest
in achieving the Maoipt goal of "red and expert" graduates by
striking a balance b6-ween political and professional training in
the schools.
Like last year, the general procedure for admission to higher
education still consists of voluntary application, recommendation
by the masses, approval by the leadership, and reexamination by
the colleges concerned. This year's enrollment announcements,
however, place heavy stress on the need for enrollment officials
to make an "overall evaluation" of the applicant's "moral,
intellectual, and physical achievements." The announcements repeat
the stock injunction that political criteria must receive primary
emphasis in judging applicants. All applicants for higher education
must demonstrate a cultural level at or above that of a junior
middle school graduate and have at least two years of practical
experience.
The specific role of the "necessary cultural tests" in the enrollment
process was well illustrated in a 19 July Nanking report on student
enrollment work throughout Kiangsu. The broadcast stressed that
student selection criteria must be based on an "all-inclusive
evaluation of their moral, intellectual and physical qualities,"
with first consideration given to their "political merits." Every
applicant must, however, bt given an examination measuring his
ability to "analyse and solve problems." The examinations mu:'t
use the methods of "investigation, interview, forum, and discussion"
and must reflect "the particular requirements of the professional
course concerned." The names of all applicants who pass the
examination are to be made public to insure that the masses have
actually been consulted in the selection of students. The
applicant must then report to the "school screening board" for
final reexamiation by the schools. Thus far, similar reports on the
use of examinations in local enrollment work have also been received
from Liaoning, Hupeh, Kiangs:;, Heilungkiang, Kansu, and Chekiang.
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A 19 July Liaoning broadcast reporting on the use of cultural
examinations in its local. enrollment drive was accompanied by
a separate report by Chang Tieh-sheng, the student who received
national fame for triggering last summer's attack on the old
examination system. Chang, now a student at the Liaoning
Agricultural College, revealed that he has devoted part of his
time in school to seeking further educations?, reforms. Most
of his time apparently has gone into study, as the broadcast
carefully noted that Chang usually spends "Sundays" leading
investigations to gain information on needed reforms at the
school. Chang urged continued vigilance against those who still.
seek to use entrance examinations to give priority to "intellectual
education and high marks."
A proper balance between "red and expert"--which the guidelines
on student enrollment in force this summer would ueem to foster--
apparently has already.been achieved at Shanghai's Futan University.
A glowing 22 July Shanghai report on Futan's efforts to train
workers in the field of foreign affairs revealed that the 80 students
who enrolled in special foreign affairs training classes that opened
at the university in September 1972 have achieved "encouraging
results" in both "ideology and vocation." While at school, these
students took part in every political movement and also worked hard
to study political theory, international relations and foreign
languages. Recent graduates of the special foreign affairs training
program were characterized.as "eager to go to their respective posts
in the field of foreign affairs."
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USSR
i,EFIANT PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL CONTINUES CAMPAIGN FOR NEW IDEAS
The campaign to promote new, unorthodox ideas conducted by QUESTIONS
OF PHILOSOPHY chief editor I.T. Frolov is continuing despite
strenuous efforts by neo-Stalinist Central Committee science
supervisor S.P. Trapeznikov to reinforce ideological controls.
Even though a commission of the Institute of Philosophy was set
up to investigate Frolov's management of the journal, in a
January editorial he boldly defended his journal's right to pursue
objective truth and warned against heavy handed attacks by
conservatives.* When the commission reported in early February, it
basically sided with Frolov. Shortly thereafter Frolov's mentor,
B.M. Kedrov, resigned as director of the Institute of Philosophy,
but Frolov continued (as of mid-June) to hold his post as chief
editor and to press ahead with the publicatioa of controversial
material.**
An account of the commission's discussion of Frolov's work published
in the June issue of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY illustrates both the
support he enjoys among philosophers and natural scientists and the
enmity he has earned in the Central Committee's science section.
Apparently in response to the complaints of the science section's
head, Trapeznikov, the institute appointed a commission to study the
journal's work and the institute's sr,holarly council took the
unusual step of calling in the editor for a report. The commission's
report, announced at a 5 February session of the council, largely
vindicated Frolov's leadership, a result which was warmly supported
by the speakers at the session.
Institute of Philosophy deputy director F.T. Arkhiptsev presented the
commission's report, lauding the successes of the journal and praising
its editorials and roundtable discussions. His criticisms were mild
and his proposed correctives were minor (closer contact between the
institute and its journal, and periodic discussion of provocative
articles). But Arkhiptsev did drop hints about where the pressure
against Frolov was coming from. He noted that problems pointed out in
See the Supplementary Article in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974,
"Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences."
** For details on Kedrov's resignation, see the TRENDS of 3 July
1974, pages 12-16.
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Trapeznikov's August 1973 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article had not
been resolved, and he termed understandable the "alarm" over the
journal's treatment of dialectical materialism which was felt
"throughout 1973 both in the CPSU Central Committee section for
science and educational institutions and by leaders of our
philosophical science in the USSR Academy of Sciences."
The pro-Frolov tone of the meeting was set by the opening remarks of
Kedrov, who apparently was still director of the institute, although
he was not so identified in the account. While calling for frank
criticism of the journal's shortcomings, he added that in criticizing
the journal, phrases should not be taken out of context and we should
"also criticize ourselves since we are also authors and co-workers
of the journal." Frolov spoke, repeating many of thL ideas in his
January editorial and asserting that at least a third of the journal
should be devoted to debate and arguments. Other speakers, such
as philosopher S.M. Kovalev and biologist N.P. Dubinin, declared that
since all participants in the discussion were loyal communists, the
"victims of the debate" should be "not people, but bad ideas."
Kovalev sympathetically concluded that while the journal's editors
"at first had taken criticism somewhat irritably, later the comrades
understood that these shortcomings must-be eliminated, and I am sure
that these shortcomings will be eliminated by the journal's editorial
collegium and editorial board." Dubinin stressed that Frolov's efforts
to attract natural scientists into philosophical discussions were
highly successful, and other speakers also indicated that Frolov had
developed a strong constituency among natural scientists as well as
philosophers.
Frolov's continuing determination to stimulate debate has been clear
in the most recent issues of his journal, which have devoted
considerable space to roundtable discussions and articles on
controversial topical subjects. In the April issue he began a
discussion on the social implications of the scientific-technical
revolution and enlisted Kosygin's son-in-law, D.M. Gvishiani, to
write the opening article. Gvishi.ani stressed the increasing role
of philosophers, sociologists and economists in developing a theory
of the scientific-technical revolution to help decide concrete
political, economic and ideological problems, and wrote that the
growing importance of science "widens its social functions" and speeds
"penetration of innovations into all spheres of public life." The May
issue continued this discussion, took up problems of international
relations, and began a roundtable on the quality of philosophical
writings. The June issue continued these topics, as well as carrying
the first part of the stenographic record of the 5 February discussion
of the journal's work.
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UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP REBUKED FOR NEGLECT OF CONSUMER GOODS OUTPUT
In a new move in the high-level maneuvering over economic policy which
has characterized Soviet politics since the December 1973 CPSU plenum,
PRAVDA on 14 July published a CPSU Central Committee decree criticizing
the Ukrainian. party and government leadership for neglect of consumer
goods production. Amounting in effect to a rebuke of Brezhnev's
protege V. V. Shcherbitskiy, Ukrainian first secretary avid Politburo
member, the decree points to a sharpening of the leadership rivalries
over economic policy. Although Brezhnev has identified himself with
increased consumer goods production since at least 1971, Kosygin has
done so over a longer period of time and has, moreover, apparently
taken the lead in the post-plenum drive to increase the production and
upgrade the quality of consumer goods. Whereas pr?_vious decrees on
consumer goods have been aimed at Kosygin's central ministries, this
one shifts the brunt of criticism to a republic organization closely
associated with Brezhnev.
PRELIMINARY EXPOSE The current attack on Ukrainian handling of
consumer goods apparently stems from an invest-
igation conducted by IZVESTIYA in March and April. An IZVESTIYA team
visited severe.? Ukrainian cities and in a series of articles on
24 and 29 March, and 2, 5 and 6 April exposed what were described
as massive shortcomings. After the tour the team talked with Ukrainian
Light Industry Minister 0. Ya. Kasyanenko about the shortcomings,, and
finding the minister's answers and actions unsatisfactory, published
a devastating attack on him in the 4 June IZVESTIYA. He was accused
of resisting the introduction of production associations in his ministry,
of creating "artificial" associations, of failing to organize cocialist
competition, of taking a whole month to respond to the IZVESTIYA exposures,
and of doing virtually nothing to correct the situation. The article noted
that in the first quarter of 1974 54 of his ministry's enterprises--more
than last year--were failing to fulfill the plan and that by the end of
April this number had risen to 75.
Shcherbitskiy reacted quickly, calling a meeting of the Ukrainian
Central Committee Secretariat which adopted a decree admitting the
correctness of IZVESTIYA's articles and criticizing Kasyanenko's poor
work. Shcherbitskiy's response -.,,as reported in the 11 June IZVESTIYA.
Shcherbitskiy himself, while chairman of the Council of Ministers, had
promoted Kasyanenko to minister of light industry in May 1972, just
days before succeeding Shelest as republic first secretary.
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CENTRAL MINISTRIES Over the past few years, decrees on consumer
REBUKED goods production have been aimed at Kosygin's
own ministries in Moscow. A 15 September 1971
Central Committee-Council of tinisters decree, for example, published
in the 29 October 1971 PRAVDA, called for sharp boosts in consumer
goods output, allotted additional investments to this end, and
adopted toug:& measures to force ministries--both in light and heavy
industry sectors--to increase consumer goods production.* An article
in the October 1972 PLANNED ECONOMY made it clear that the September
1971 decree had been prompted by a failure of the ministries to
cooperate sufficiently with the government's expressed wishes. Another
Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree published in the 9 December
1972 IZVESTIYA pointed to the need for increased production of equipment
for the light and food industries, and order6J the appropriate ministers
to meet this need. On 28 August 1973 PRAVDA published a Central. Committee
decree which, noting that 2.3 billion rubles had been invested in light
industry in the last two years, censured the light industry ministry
for various shortcomings and rebuked minister N. N. Tarasov--a close
associate of Kosygin since the late 1940's--for "unsatisfactory work."
The consumer goods situation obviously became a subject of increased
attention in late 1973. In his 13 November 1973 Ifinsk speech Kosygin
stressed the need for speeding the development of the light and food
industries in the 1974 plan. According to subsequent statements, the
December plenum discussed the question of increasing the production
and upgrading the quality of consumer goods, while the implication of
Brezhnev's 14 June 1974 Supreme Soviet election speech was that the
discussion had concentrated on unused reserves in the light and food
3nd?atrics.
Following the plenum the Central Committee took two actions to
improve light industrial production. On 6 April 1974 PRAVDA announced
that the Central Committee had approved an initiative by several
collectives for a socialist competition on the use of production
capacity and quality of goods. This decree received considerable fanfare
in subsequent newspaper editorials, which cited "huge" unused reserves in
light industry and criticized the light industry miniL.ry for setting low
targets for some enterprises. On 22 April Kosygin won Central Committee
approval of a decree to loosen controls in light industry, allowing
consumer goods production to be adjusted on the basis of orders from retail
outlets.** Unlike the socialist competition decree, however, this decree
received little publicity.
* See the TRENDS of 26 October 1972, pages 30-31.
** See the TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 19-24.
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"TWO PILLARS" These two actions appeared to represent the
differing emphases adopted by Brezhnev and Kosygin
toward the problem of boosting production, the former appearing more
enthusiastic about hortatory campaigns and moral incentives and the
latter favoring changes in management and planning methods to
activate the economic "levers." Indeed, Brezhnev himself in his
December plenum speech announced that the party's economic policy
was based on "two pillars"--improvement of management and mobili-
zation of the masses. Brezhnev's elaboration on the first approach
has not been published, but his extensive and enthusiastic comments
on socialist competition were carried in the excerpts from his
December plenum speech printed in a collection of his speeches on
agriculture. A socialist competition for prefulfillment of the
1974 plan was announced shortly after the plenum, on 12 January,
followed by Kosygin's "direct ties" decree on 22 April.
A similar dichotomy had appeared at the December 1972 plenum, which
also discussed changes in economic planning and administration. A
socialist competition to prefulfill the 1973 plan was announced on
6 January 1973, followed by a 2 March 1973 Central Co!nmittee-Council
of Ministers decree ordering rjorganization of ministries on a two
or three tier structure based on production associations. Kosygin
in his 13 November 1973 Minsk speech revealed that it had been
Brezhnev who had proposed the socialist competition during discussion
of the 1973 plan in late 1972. The decree on_produc_tion associations,
on the other hand, appeared to reflect Kosygin's influence, extending
cost accounting and facilitating more effective use of the managerial
autonomy granted by the 1965 economic reform.
PAST UKRAINIAN Although most Ukrainian leaders--including former
PERFORMANCE First Secretary Shelest and present First Secretary
Shcherbitskiy--had made their careers in heavy
industry, they had appeared to swing behind the consumer goods program
adopted at the April 1971 24th CPSU Congress, taking measures to promote
consumer goods production, both in light industry and heavy industry,
and harshly attacking some officials for noncooperation. A May 1971
Ukrainian Central Committee ' decree. approved an initiative by-heavy
industrial plant collectives to increase consumer goods production,
and at a June 1971 Ukrainian plenum the then First Secretary Shelest
praised this initiative and also revealed that the Ukrainian Politburo
had recently "severely criticized" leaders of.prominent Kharkov plants
for trying to avoid producing consumer goods at their plants. A
special Ukrainian Central Committee plenum was held in September 1971
to hear Premier Shcherbitskiy report on increasing consumer goods
output as well as upgrading, the quality of the product. A number of
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machine building plants were assailed at the plenum for not
producing consumer goods, and measures were adopted to improve
consumer goods output. Shcherbitskiy again criticized the resisting
heavy industrial plants in a November 1971 USSR Supreme Soviet speech.
In April 1972 the attacks on noncooperation in Kharkov plants
apparently served as a pretext to oust the senior Kharkovite in
the leadership, N. A. Sobol, who also happened to be first deputy
premier in charge of industry. Further attacks followed in
June 1972, when a ,Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium decree criticized
the work of the Kharkov soviet in supervising consumer goods production
and in July, when a Kharkov leader had to admit shortcomings IL his
oblast's consumer goods production at a session of the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet's commission on heavy jndustry. The Kharkov party
organization was subsequently censured fir generally poor leadership
of industry by a CPSU Central Committee decree published in an
October 1973 PARTY LIFE.
But despite the strong push in 1971-72, heavy industry-oriented
Ukrainian officials have been slow to adapt to the stress on
ccnsumer goods production. In a May 1973 article in UNDER THE BANNER
OF LENINISM, Ukrainian Light Industry Secretary Ya. Pogrebnyak
acknowledged failings by light industry enterprises and footdragging
in machine building and ferrous metallurgy plants, especially those
in Dnepropetrovsk. Sobol's replacement as first deputy premier in
charg_., of industry, G. I. Vashchenko, reported to a June 1973
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session that the republic's industries
still suffered from many shortcomings in consumer goon's production.
At the December 1973 USSR Supreme Soviet session, Pogrebnyak
declared that consumer goods production would not reach the level
set in the five-year plan. At a 26 April session of the Ukrainian
Council of Ministers, reported in the 30 April RADYANSKA UKRAINA, it
was stated that some branches were not fully using their reserves for
increasing output, especially output of consumer goods,and improving
their quality- and assortment. '_
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FRG--CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY: Czechoslovak and Soviet media have
stressed that the 19 July exchange of documents ratifying the
treaty normalizing Bonn-Prague relations has finally drawn a
line under the postwar normalization of relations between Bonn
and the socialist countries of East Europe. Comment points out
that this process was implemented through the complex.of treaties
signed by the FRG under Brandt's Ostpolitik beginning with the
1970 Moscow treaty. Regarding the contentious issue of the
interpretation of the validity of the 1938 Munich Agreement,
Prague has continued to take great pains to place its own
interpretation on tht treaty's language: i.e., that the FRG
allegec'ly has recognized the Munich Agreement as invalid from
the beginning. CSSR Foreign Minister Chnoupek,.speaking on.the
15th at the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly session which ratified
the treaty, made this point abundantly clear. Prague media have
been careful not to report FRG Foreign Minister Genscher.'.s 19 July
remarks in Bonn that it was not possible for the two countries to
eliminate all differences over legal interpretations resulting
from the Munich Agreement, but that he was hopeful these questions
were settled "for the future." Chnoupek on the 19th did acknowledge,
however, that the treaty was a "compromise." Both Prague and
Moscow have come down hard on the nearly total CDU/CSU opposition
to the treaty in the Bundeetag ratification process.
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- i -
A P P E N D I >:
MOSCOW, PEKING i OADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 JULY 1974
Moscow (2723 _Ltems
Cyprus Cri ,i F,
[Sovi:: Government,
C .SS Statements
(--)
Polish Liberation 30th (11!0,)
Anniversary
[Brezhnev 3peechef;
in Poland
(---)
Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 (4%)
Mission
China
Nixon USSR Visit
South Yemen Party-Gov-
ernment Delegation in
USSR
Peking (878 items)
1710 Niger Delegation in (--) 12%
8~0] PRC
[PRC-Niger Diplomatic (--) 3%]
16 Relations
Law of the Sea Con- (21%) 10%
5?0] ference
Criticism of Lin Piao (9%) 91".1
6% and Confucius
Turkish Foreign Minister (--) 5%
5% Gunes in PRC
2% Cyprus Crisis (--) 3
2 Sikkim (2%) 3
USSR (1io) 31%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party stater ;ent, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in Parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
,4 )
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070031-4