TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 31, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
31 JULY 1974
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by F23IS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
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CONTENTS
CYPRUS
USSR Statement Reiterates Commitment to Independent Status. . . . .
1
USSR-EGYPT
IZVESTIYA Vents Soviet Frustration Over Egypt's Policies. . . . . .
7
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow Hails Geneva CSCE Progress, Repeats Stands on MBFR . . . . .
11
Recent PRC Comment Depicts "Deadlock" in East-West Detente. . .
12
DRV Economic Mission Concludes Talks in East Europe, USSR . . . . .
14
Vietnamese. Communist Media Praise Attacks in Central Vietnam. . . .
16
Grechko Plugs Brezhnev Cult, Affirms Adequacy of Defense. . . . . .
17
CPSU Plenum Approves Government, Ignores' Substantive Issues . . . .
18
Jaroszewicz Visit to Romania; Purged PRC Military
Leader Appears . . . . . . . . . .
20
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Cambodian Frcnt Policy Shifts
on a Peace Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S1
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . .
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USSR STATEMENT REITERATES COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENT STATUS
Moscow on 28 July took several initiatives on Cyprus, initiatives
apparently prompted by concern over the lack of progress in the
tripartite Geneva negotiations to stabilize the situation on the
island as well as a desire to promote a Soviet role in peace-making.
A government statement was issued--the third wince the 15 July
ouster of Makarios--which presoed for implementation of the 20 July
Security Council resolution, and th.e USSR requested an urgent
council meeting to discuss this problem. The government statement
warned that the "threat" to Cyprus' independence was "acquiring a
new character," raising the "extremely acute question whether
there will or will not remain an independent sovereign stace."
At the same time, in an unpublicize_. move, Moscow sent messages to
London, Athens, Ankara, and the United Nations announcing its plan
to send an observer to the Geneva negotiations.
Soviet media have thus far only briefly reported the 30 July
cease-fire agreement in Geneva by the three guarantor powers--Britain,
Turkey and Greece. A TASS report on the 31st merely said that a
declaration had been signed on consolidation of the cease-fire
agreement in compliance with Security Council Resolution 353 of
20 July, not indicating that the declaration in effect set another
cease-fire as of 30 July after which areas controlled by opposing
forces "should not be extended." TASS noted that the declaration
"mentioned a number of measures" aimed at stabilizing the situation,
and that the next stage of talks would open in Geneva on 8 August
with representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities
"expected to take part."
An English-language Moscow broadcast to Britain noted that representa-
tives of the three sides would be determining the cease-fire line and
a buffer zone to be controlled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force
(UNFICYP) and that an exchange of captured military and civilian
personnel would take place as soon as possible under Red Cross auspices.
The broadcast cited British Foreign Secretary Callaghan as saying that
the next stage would consider "constitutional problems, including
restoration of the legitimate government."
SOVIET STAND ON The 28 July Soviet Government statement again
POLITICAL STATUS stressed Moscow's long-standing commitment to
Cyprus' independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity--a formula which dates back at least as far as a TASS
statement in January 1964. The general themes of Soviet comment on
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on the Cyprus situation have varied little since then---cr:lls
for withdrawal of "all" foreign troops and persistent allega-
tions of "NATO" designs to eliminate the island's independence.
The latest government statement for the first time during the
current crisis hinted at concern over the possibility of
eventual partition; it routinely made "certain NATO circles"
the culprit, accusing them of "cynical haggling" over Cyprus'
independence and territorial integrity to the extent of
confronting the world with an accomplished fact of "a partition
of the country or at lea-3t of conditions created for such a
partition." A Zholkver foreign-language commentary on the 29th,
pursuing this idea, accused "NATO quarters" of plans "to
partition the island, or at least to produce conditions for
partition." Reinforcing this insistence on Cyprus' independence,
the government mtatement declared the inalienable right of the
people of Cyprus, both Greeks and Turks, 'to decide their
problems themselves, to decide the future of their "common
motherland."
In keeping with past evasiveness regarding Turkey's role in the
Cyprus problem, the statement approached Turkey's military
action by indirection, complaining that "foreign armed forces
which are in Cyprus are not being withdrawn but continue to be
built up." Moscow would seem to have in mind Turkey's strengthening
of its hold on the Kyrenia area and the Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor
after the 22 July cease-fire when its statement referred cryptically
to "consolidating the occupation of the island and tearing it
asunder."
Soviet reportage hue singled out Turkish officials' statements to
portray Ankara as committed to an independent Cyprus and opposed
to partition. Thus TASS on the 24th reported Prime Minister
Ecavit as declaring that Turkey had no intention of occupying
and annexing the island, but was concerned to restore the
constitutional system. On the 26th, TASS noted that Foreign
Minister Gunes in a LE MONDE interview "declared against the
partitioning of Cyprus" and also "opposed a federal solution,"
saying "he did not yet have any concrete plan concerning a federal
organization," and that Turkey wanted Cyprus to be a genuinely
independent state separate from Greece and Turkey. tunes in fact
said that no one, except perhaps the Greeks, wanted to see Cyprus
either annexed by Greece or Turkey or partitioned, but he declared
that a federal system "is required," although "I have no precise
plan in mind." In a dispatch from Ankara on the 29th, however,
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TASS reported Ecevit as declaring that after all that happened in
the island, Turkish Cypriots could not live under Greek rule.
He was quoted as adding that "until" the final status of the
island was sorted out, "the Turkish and Greek administrations must
be autonomous."
BACKGROUND: Moscow has long made clear its antipathy to enosis,
or Cyprus' union with Greece, although it was not until April 1972,
during a visit to Turkey, that Podgornyy formally declared Soviet
opposition to the concept--the first such statement at that
authoritative level. The notion of Greek-Turkish partition of the
island or "double enosis," Turkey's answer to Greek demands for
enosis, has also been opposed by Moscow: Concern over "NATO plans"
for partition of the island was expressed in a Soviet-Egyptian
communique in September 1964.
The idea of a federal structure for the island has only occasionally
been broached in Soviet comment, and is known to have been discussed
only once at the elite level, by Gromyko in a January 1965
IZVESTIYA interview, and then in the framework of a single state.
Last spring, when. the inter-Cypriot talks were suspended over the
issue of Turkey's espousal of a federal solution, Moscow expressed
apprehension that federation might lead to partition of Cyprus. In
his 1965 IZVESTIYA interview Gromyko remarked that the internal
organization of the state was a matter for the Cypriots to decide,
and observed that they might choose a federal structure, but that
such a system presupposed the existence of a single central govern-
ment, single defense organization, and centralized administrative
and Judicial system. In the same interview, Gromyko had stated the
Soviet view that it was the "unconditional and inalienable right of
the Cypriot people to decide their affairs themselves within their
own independent state." Aa far back as August 1964 Khrushchev in
a message to Makarios had, along similar lines, called for a
solution of the Cyprus problem which would help the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots to have an oppo,:tunity to work for peace for the
good of their "common motherland."
Moscow's current re-emphasis on the need for the independence,.
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus omits any mention
of the need for a "unitary" state, which received short-lived
currency in this formula at the time of Makarios' June 1971 visit
to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Moscow's formal statements
during the current crisis have also refrained from leaning toward
Ankara with references to "national communities" on the island.
Communiques issued on visits of Turkish officials to Moscow in the
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past, such as Urguplu's September 1965 visit.anci Demirel!s
September 1967 trip, had taken into account. Ankara's sensibilities
in supporting the lawful rights and interests of the Turkish and
Greek "national communities," in keeping.with Turkish. insistence
that the Turkish Cypriots constitute a community rather than a
"minority."
DEVELOPMENTS Reportage on events in Cyprus.has.seemed at pains
IN CYPRUS to obscure what was taking.place. Thus,.TASS
dispatches on the 24th and 25th.reported repeated
violations of the.22 July cease-fire but did not.identify the
combatants, noting only that the violations occurred in Nicosia,
Kyrenia, and the corridor "commanded by Turkish.trocps"between
the two towns. TASS on the 25th cited a Turkish news agency report
that a convoy of 20 Turkish vessels carrying troops and tanks had
sailed for Cyprus. A dispatch the next day cited news agency
reports that Turkish troops had "arrested" EOKA-B members who
attacked Turkish Cypriot villages after the cease-fire agreement,
and that a Greek detachment had opened fire on Turkish troops
in Kyrenia. TASS the same day reported Kliridhis as saying at.a
press conference that hostilities could flare up if Turkish troops
did not stop cease-fire violations, and it noted . his. remark that
"territorial changes" resulting from the Turkish troop landing
should not be .ermanent.
Not until the evening of the 27th did TASS indicate that Turkish
troops had been seizing te-. itory, when it reported from Beirut
that Turkish troops "halted their advance" and,that Turkish
military contingents "somewhat expanded the area under their
control." TASS on the 29th noted that Turkish.troops controlled
several major motor roars and had strengthened positions in
central districts "in recent.days," at.the.same.time reporting that
Greek units had established control over a number of Turkish settle-
ments in the south of the island. The government statement repeated
long-standing Soviet calls for an end to outside.interference in
Cyprus' affairs and the withdrawal of "all" foreign troops from the
island. It specifically mentioned that the Greek military
personnel responsible for the coup had not been removed, but.care-
fully sidestepped any direct reference to Turkish troops.
A Beirut-datelined dispatch by TASS on the.30th finally spelled out
in more detail Turkish gains on the north coast,.noting that Turkish
troops controlled a section 20 kilometers in length. Troop strength
was estimated at 25,000 to 30,000 men with.more than 200 tanks, TASS
said, and "they are able to expand areas under their. control." The
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dispatch reported that the administrative bodies of the Turkish
community were moved to Kyrenia, and that Ecevit said Turkey
did not intend to withdraw its troops to a "definite line."
On the other side of the coin, TASS noted Turkish Cypriot
complaints that National Guard forces had shelled Turkish
localities and forced about 20,000 people from their homes.
The dispatch also cited news agency reports that UN patrols
were "arrested" by Turkish troops en route to isolated districts
to d;.-.liver food and medicine.
Moscow would seem to be keeping its options open with regard to
the government in Cyprus: It continues to refer to Makarios as
the legitimate president but has stopped short of demanding his
reinstatement. Reportage has referred to Kliridhis as having
assumed the presidency temporarily, and the current government
statement charged that power was still in the hands of enosist
"rebels." But a foreign-language commentary on the 29th seemed
to suggest that Moscow's objection to Kliridhis stemmed from his
retention of the ministers appointed to the short-lived Sampson
governmen.t,, and TASS the same day cited a statement by AKEL, the
C'priot ce?arnunist party, calling Kliridhis' assumption of presidential
du`ies a "reassuring" development "opening the way for a return to the
constitutional system."
SOVIET ROLE Moscow gave little attention to the Geneva talks
convened on the 25th, but Soviet discomfiture at
being isolated from the negotiations and dissatisfaction over the
slow progress of the talks seemed apparent in Moscow's request for
a Security Council session to examine implementation of the council
resolu+.- a and in its initiative to send a Soviet observer to
Geneva. TASS reported the attendance of UN Under Secretary Guyer
at the Geneva sessions, but did not mention that U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Buffum was present in Geneva during the
negotiations. Moscow did not publicize its decision to send an
observer to Geneva and, observing customary reticence on diplomatic
contacts, Soviet media have not acknowledged the activity of the
Soviet' ambassador in Ankara. Turkish media reported that Ambassador
Grubyakov met with Defense Minister and Acting Foreign. Minister isik
on the 28th and 29th, and had contacts with "leading foreign
ministry officials" on the 30th.
The Soviet initiative in calling a Security Council. meeting also
received minimal publicity. TASS on the 29th, reporting the
session, explained that the basic provisions of the council's
resolution had not been implemented: Cease-fire had not been
observed, foreign military intervention was continuing, and the
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"legitimate government headed by Makarios" had not been reinstated.
TASS reported the Soviet draft reso.ution as calling, among other
things, for an end to "all acts of coercion" toward the republic
of Cyprus and urging representation of "the constitutional
government" of Cyprus in the Geneva negotiations. The government
statement on the 28th-had urged that the Cypriots be given the
right to decide their future themselves, and had gone on to declare
that "this presupposed" participation of the legitimate Cyprus
Government in all international discussions of the Cyprus problem,
ir-.luding the Geneva talks.
The three government statements issued on the present crisis have
refrained from connecting the Cyprus problem with Soviet security,
as was done in the past: A Khrushchev speech in August 1964, for
example, declared that the Soviet Union would not remain indifferent
to the threat of an armed conflict close to the USSR's southern
borders which might affect the security of the Soviet Union and
its friends and allies. Some current press comment, however, such
as PRAVDA's Greek and Cypriot specialist Bragin in an article on
the 26th, has used a version of the long-standing "proximity"
formula without mentioning the element of Soviet security. And
scattered Soviet comment--again,.Bragin is an example--has cited
detente as afactor in helping contain the present crisis, but has
gone on to complain of foot-dragging by some Western powers which
hindered Security Council efforts to resolve the problem.
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% USSR - EGYPT
IZVESTIYA VENTS SOVIET FRUSTRATION OVER EGYPT'S POLICIES
Moscow's growing displeasure with the course of Egypt's economic
and foreign policies in recent months received prominent expression
on 25 July in a major IZVESTIYA article by chief editor Lev Tolkunov.
The most forthright and critical discussion of Soviet-Egyptian
relations to appear in the Soviet press since the October 1973 war,
the article analyzed positive and negative "trends" in the current
Middle East situation, laying bare in the process Moscow's recurrent
grievances with Cairo over issues of Soviet military aid, Egyptian
economic liberalization, and Egypt's new "balancing act" between the
USSR and the United States.
Tolkunov's article was almost certainly timed to reinforce the impact
of its message. Appearing on the heels of Egypt's 22d revolution
anniversary on 23 July, an event to which Moscow gave token attention,
the article purported to be a trip report based on visits Tolkunov
made "recently" actually last 14arch--to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and
Iraq. And it followed Soviet postponement of a projected July
visit to Moscow by Soviet Foreign Minister Fahmi until "after October,"
according to as-Sadat. The significance Moscow attached to the
article seemed further underscored by the manner in which it was
publicized. On the 24th, TASS carried from that evening's edition
of IZVESTIYA separate brief summaries of certain portions of Tolkunov's
article, dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue, Egyptian economic and
foreign policy, and anti-Soviet attacks by "Arab reaction." On the
25th, some hours after the article had appeared in IZVESTIYA's morning
edition, TASS carried virtually the full text. Although TASS in the
past has occasionally transmitted the text of major articles from
the central press, it has normally done so in advance of or coincident
with their publication. Versions of the Tolkunov article were also
broadcast in Arabic and other languages on the 25th.
SOVIET ARMS' Many of Tolkunov's sharp-edged comments were clearly
intended to acknowledge and answer Egyptian President
as-Sadat's public criticisms of Soviet military aid. Over the past
several months as-Sadat has criticized, in particular, what he viewed
as Moscow's failure to provide on a timely basis the number and types
of weapons he thought necessary prior to the October 1973 war. He has
also complained about the Soviet curtailment of military supplies to
Egypt since the war and has announced his intention to "diversify"
Egypt's source of arms, thus ending his country's dependence on the
Soviet Union for weapons.
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Although Tolkunov did not mention as-Sadat by name, in listing and
responding to accusations which "agents of imperialism and Arab
reaction" have directed against Soviet policies, he cited points
that as-Sadat has made in his speeches and that have been sub-
sequently publicized by Egyptian and other Arab media. Thus,
as-Sadat charged in a 3 April 1974 speech that Soviet arms destined
for Egypt in late 1,971 had been redirected to India for its conflict
with Pakistan, thereby forcing an undesired postponement in Arab
plans to renew military operations against Israel. Tolkunov
dismissed as-Sadat's accusation--which he attributed to "some Egyptian
journalists"--as "absolutely untenable," characterizing it as a
form of "anti-Soviet propaganda."
The Tolkunov article also reflected Moscow's sensitivity to several
other Egyptian criticisms of Soviet military aid. Tolkunov cited
and attempted to rebut, for instance, accusations that Soviet weapons
were of poor quality, "not capable of competing with U.S. weapons,"
supplied too late and in insufficient quantity, and delivered only
in return for hard currency. He also asserted that the October war
had refuted the criticism that the USSR supplied the Arabs only
with weapons for defense and not offense, adding that the distinc-
tion is "entirely relative." Tolkunov denounced as discredited the
contention--advanced by as-Sadat on several occasions--that Moscow
would not permit the Arabs to fight Israel. Pursuing this point,
Tolkunov stressed that Soviet policy had been consistent and
principled, supplying weapons to Syria and Egypt despite "artifi-
cially created negative factors which appeared with regard to
Soviet military experts in some Arab countries"--an obvious
reference to as-Sadat's decision to expel the experts in mid-1972.
ECONOMIC TRENDS In a brief assessment of Cairo's economic policy,
Tolkunov reaffirmed a long-standing Soviet concern
that Egypt might gradually lose its socialist orientation and thus
abandon its economic ties with the USSR and other socialist countries.
Professing to see the beginning of a shift of "anti-Soviet trends"
within Egypt from the area of military affairs to economic matters,
Tolkunov singled out as a special Soviet concern "all sorts of
rumors" that large industrial projects constructed with Soviet aid
were not profitable and could not compete with plants in the West,
and that they represented an approach toward "economic giantism"
which was not in Egypt's best interests. Tolkunov located the
explanation for such thoughts in the desire of certain Egyptians to
promote what he termed a "so-called liberation from Soviet dependence"--
a theme popular with as-Sadat in recent months--and to expand economic
relations with the West. Warning Cairo against "illusions" that the
West would favor Egypt "if it departs further from cooperation with
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the Soviet Union,'' Tolkunov cautioned that increased economic
collusion with Western capitalists could prove, as in the past,
a bitter experience. Tolkunov concluded his remarks by posing
what he designated as "questions which cannot be avoided" by the
Egyptians, namely, what does Egypt stand to gain from the West;
what motivates the West to seek economic cooperation with Egypt;
and how effective and helpful to Egypt can cooperation with Western
capitalists be.
U.S.-EGYPTIAN TIES Soviet concern over the evolving favorable
political relationship between Egypt and
the United States was also evident in Tolkunov's article. This
concern expressed itself partly in reminders to Cairo that resumption
of diplomatic relations with the United States last spring and its
new relationship generally had had no effect on Israel's "aggressive"
policies. By referring to U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel,
Tolkunov gave his point a double edge, implying that it would also
be naive to believe that U.S. policy toward the Arab states had
changed, a position that as-Sadat has expressed on several occasions
in recent months.
Reinforcing the impression of Soviet displeasure over new U.S.-Egyptian
ties, Tolkunov indicated an accompanying. uneasiness over the future of
Soviet-Egyptian relations. He hinted that those Arab countries will not
succeed who "are trying a balancing act to extract dividends from
two poles"--almost certainly a reference to as-Sadat's announced
new "balanced policy" between East and West. Tolkunov also claimed
that Arabs he had met with, in debating the various points on which
the USSR and. Arab states either agree or differ, always concluded
that the. "decisive preponderance will undoubtedly be on the side
of what unites us." Tolkunov observed that ideological and political
differences emerged when one side decides it "does not want peaceful
coexistence" and "pursues certain aims of its own." He warned that
in such cases, the differences can be turned into "a real psychological
war."
ARAB-ISRAELI, ISSUE Tolkunov was also implicitly critical of as-Sadat's
disengagement negotiations through Secretary
Kissinger and seemed to suggestthat the Egyptian president's desire to
prepare carefully for the Geneva talks by holding a series of inter-Arab
and other consultations was delaying resumption of the conference. At
one point he stressed the need to activate the Geneva talks "without
delay and, moreover, most actively and purposefully." (As-Sadat had
asked rhetorically in a mid-July interview "how can the Soviets ask
us to go quickly to the Geneva conference at a time when they are doing
the reverse?") Tolkunov at another point represented "sober-minded"
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Arab personalities as having told him that Geneva should not be
bypassed since it provided the Arabs a broad field of action
through contacts and opportunities to receive support from many
other states. Tolkunov argued that "bilateral contacts through
someone else's mediation" restricted the framework of the Arab
countries' political activity. He attached "special signif i
cane" to the fact that the Soviet Union in its actions concerning
the Middle East was "constantly coordinating with its Arab
friends"--an assertion Moscow made in claiming a tangible Soviet
contribution to the Syrian-Israeli disengagement accord through
Gromyko's visits to Damascus.
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- 11 -
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
MOSCOW HAILS GENEVA CSCE PROGRESS, REPEATS STAND ON MBFR
Soviet media have emphasized the positive in reporting the summer
recess of the Geneva negotiations on the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), hailing partial agreements
while playing down the fact that the talks recessed because of a
lack of progress and to provide time for a reassessment of
positions. At the same time, comment by Moscow and its East
European allies on the Vienna force reductions negotiations,
recessed from 17 July to 24 September, has continued to stre.toa
that their proposals of November 1973, unlike NATO's, are
"realistic."
CSCE PROGRESS, TASS' description of the 26 July-2 September
SUMMER RECESS recess as "a short summer holiday" was typical
of Moscow's effort to obscure the difficulties
in Geneva while all but ignoring its longstanding call for a
late-summer summit finale to the CSCE. Further evidence of
Moscow's accent on the positive was its handling of the "package"
agreement on the eve of thn CSCE recess which, according to TASS,
would outline the principles of cooperation in she humanitarian
and cultural area based on "strict" observation of the "principles
of sovereign equality of the states and noninterference." TASS
quoted a signed article in PRAVDA on the 31st as saying that this
agreement was a solution to "one of the most important issues
facing the conference."
The comment has also repeatedly echoed Brezhnev's statement in his
21 July Warsaw speech in which he in effect sought to limit the
Western goals for CSCE while calling on the conference o wind up
with the accomplishments already reached. Brezhnev assetted that
a solution to many of the issues raised by those in the West who
want to "raise the stakes" at the conference could not be "achieved"
because of 'the limited "level of trust" that has been reached
between the states, adding that the solution to these problems "can
be found later." Brezhnev also ridiculed the "deliberately contrived
minor questions" raised in Geneva, labeling them "irrelevant trifles."
While citing public endorsemento by West European leaders as well as
Secretary Kissinger for a CSCE summit conference, possibly before the
end of 1974, Moscow has denounced those in the West who now think the
conference may not end until next year, if at'all, thus hinting that
a year-end CSCE summit also may be unattainable.
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VIENNA MBFR Moscow and East European spokesmen dealing with
the Vienna force reduction talks broke no new
ground in comments both before End after t'le last
formal session on 17 July. The old charge t"at the NATO proposal
seeks to secure unilateral military advantage over the arsaw Pact
was made again in a press confe;:ence on the 17th by Polish dele-
gation head Strulak, speaking for the Soviet bloc. This charge
was repeated in a rare discussion of XEFR in RED STAR on the 18th.
The author, hardlining military theorist Colonel V. Larionov,
charged bluntly that the NATO call for "asymmetrical" reductions
would "give unilateral military advantages to the West and therefore
it cannot be considered constructive." Strulak also reiterated long-
standing charges that the West European direct participants in the
talks do not want to make a commitment with the USSK, CSSR, GDR,
Poland, and with the United States to reduce their forces, and
that NATO wants to ignore its air and nuclear forces in the negotiations.
That Moscow remains confident in its present negotiating stand
and considers the ball is in the NATO court was revealed in an
unusual pre-recess series of articles in three authoritative Soviet
foreign affairs journals, whi:^h in effect put Moscow's position on
record for public scrutiny -nd comparison with NATO's. The first
and most authoritative was actributed to the head of the U01SR dele-
gation in Vienna, 0. Khlestov, and contained the most exhaustive
Soviet public elaboration to date of the Warsaw Pact's position; it
appeared in the June issue of WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS. This was followed by an article in the July issue of
USA by V. M. Komlev, who prior to this article was the main Moscow
radio commentator on MBFR and had authored articles in PRAVDA on
MBFR. The third was an article in the July issue of the monthly
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS by V. Viktorov, a frequent commentator on
disarmament issues.
RECENT PRC CC11ENT DEPICTS "DEADLOCK? IN EAST-WEST DETENTE
Recent Peking comment on U.S.-Soviet efforts to control the arms
race and reach agreement on European issues has underlined China's
increasing confidence that such detente efforts will achieve no
major breakthrough inimical to China's international interests.
Peking's current portrayal of detente as being in a stage of
fundam.ntal deadloc.: marks a departure from its more equivocal
treatment last year, when it had gencrally predicted only the
eventual failure of U.S.-Soviet reconciliation efforts.*
* For a discussion of earlier signs of Chinese satisfaction on this
score, see TRENDS of 31) May 1974, pages 8-9.
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V
A 26 July NCNA report characterized recent U.S. Congressional
passage of the annual arms procurement bill as a reflection of the
"deadlock" in the SALT talks and the "accelerated pace" of the
U.S.-Soviet arms race. Stressing the bill's provisions on research
and development for a "new generation of strategic weapons" design-
ed to foster a "new nuclear strategy" against the Soviet Union,
Peking quoted U.S. spokesmen to the effect that such steps were
needed because of recent major advances by Moscow in strategic
arms and to "prevt.nt the Soviet Union from gaining a distinct
advantage." In a 21 December 1973 report marking Congressional
approval of a similar defense spending bill last year, NCNA had
not "sed such blunt language on the SALT talks and arms race,
limlLing itself to citing remarks by U.S. representatives that
Washi..gcon might have to increase defense spending and nuclear arms
development if the SALT negotiations failed to make significant
progress.
A similar change has become evident in Peking's coverage of ErAst-
West talks over European security and the reduction. of forces in
Central 'iurope. While in the past Peking had focused on the con-
flicting interests of the Soviet Union and United Otates to predict
eventual failure in the talks, recent Chinese coverage has described
the negotiations as being in a virtual standstill. A 17 July NCNA
article noted that recent force reduction meetings h.d become less
frequent and of shorter duration because of East-West ..ntrarisigence,
and compared the conference to "a snail, crawling without end on
the surface of a round table." A lengthy 27 July NCNA article
ridiculed Brezhnev's Assessment of the European security
talks during his recent Warsaw speech by enunciating a long list
of East-West wrangles over sensitive issues in the talks. NCNA
hailed particularly Western determination to block repeated Soviet
efforts to expedite proceedings in the current second stage of the
conference toward the summit-level, third stage, stressing that the
threat of Soviet military expansion has made the Western partners
especially insistent that "practical results" be achieved before
the summit meeting.
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INDOCHINA
DRV ECONOMIC MISSION CONCLUDES TALKS IN EAST EUROPE. USSR
k North Vietnamese delegation led by Politburo member and vice
Premier Le Thanh Nghi arrived is Moscow on 20 July after concluding
official visits to Bulgaria, East Germany, and dungary. Moscow,
but not Hanoi, reported upon Nghi's a,:rival that he had come to
attend the first meeting of the Soviet-Vietnamese intergoverlimental
comm.ittre for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The
committee was created as part of the December 1972 USSR-DRV aid
agreement, 5ut had not heret-fore met formally.* There have been
no o6h x reports on the DRV delegation's activities since its
meeting with Premier Kosygin on the 23d and sessions of the
Soviet-DPV committee from 22 to 24 July.
Joining in the Moscow discussions, along with Le Thanh Nghi, were
Vice Chairman of the DRV State Planning Commission Le Khac, who '.~ad
accompanied Nghi on his earlier stops in Eastern Europe, and two
other officials who had not been previously reported as part of
the delegation--Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Nguyen Van Dao and
Vice Chairman of the State Commission for Science and Technology
Le K;-.c. The Soviet side in the talks was led by V. N. Novikov,
Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the
CPSU Central Committee, who has participated in previous economic
aid negotiations with the Vietnamese.
VNA reports on the sessions of the USSR-DRV economic, scientific,
and technical committee indicate that it examined .-questions concerning
"assistance" and cooperation and discussed "Soviet aid to Vietnam in
1973." Available Soviet reports make no specific reference to
assistance, stating that the committee reviewed questions of "cooper-
ation" between the two nations in restoring and constructing projects
Important to the DRV national economy. Both Moscow and Hanoi note
that the projects spanned the fields of power engineering, coal
mining, building materials, and other areas, and that a permanent
subcommittee for scientific and technical cooperation was set up.
* Similar bilateral committees had been established with several
East European countries and had met before the USSR-DRV committee
was set up. There were no reports of these committees meeting in
conjunction with Le Thanh Nghi's visits to Eastern Europe this year,
however.
CONFIDENTIAL
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A 26 July VNA report on the visit also noted that on the 24th Le
Thanh Nghi and Novikov signed "documents on the strengthening of
;tr onomic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the two
countries, and on Soviet aid to Vietnam." Moscow media are not
known to have reported that any agreement was signed, although a
Soviet broadcast in Vietnamese on the 24th noted that the
committee had "discussed documents prepared by Soviet and Vietnamese
specialists." The broadcast also said that the committee had
examined various problems concerning cooperation between the two
countries and had "fixed the dates for holding negotiations on
future cooperation within the new five-year plan for 1976-1980."
PRAVDA's 25 July report on the committee's activities merely
said that "agreement was reached on cooperation between Soviet
and DRV planning organs." Nghi's earlier talks in Eastern Europe
appeared to have centered on cooperation in economic planning,
and there were no reports that Nghi had concluded the usual annual
agreements cn aid to North Vietnam.
The last agreement on Soviet aid for the DRV was signed on 14 August
1973 and--according to Hanoi media accounts--covered assistance for
the year 1974.* The agreement has been recalled in recent Moscow
broadcasts in Vietnamese which also lauded the July 1973 visit to
the USSR by DRV party First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van
Dong and the communique at the conclusion of that visit which had
called for intensified DRV-Soviet economic and technical cooperation.
TASS and PRAVDA carried only brief accounts of Le Thanh Nghi's
meeting w3.th Kosygin on 23 July, noting that it: took place in an
atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality" and that questions of the
development of all-round cooperation were discussed. Hanoi's longer
reports on the meeting suggested a warmer atmosp",,:sre of "militant
solidarity and brotherly friendship." According to VNA, Kosygin
"highly valued the Vietnamese people's successes and affirtted that
the Soviet Union has been doing and will do everything in its power
to support and casist Vietnam, 'one of the closest friends of the
Soviet Union."' Nghi,vas quoted by VNA as expressing thanks for
the Soviet's "warm support and assistance to the Vietnamese people
in the new stage of their revolution."'
EAST EUROPE Before its arrival in Moscow the Le Thanh Nghi
delegation had visited Bulgaria--from 9 to 13 July,
East Germany--from 13 to 17 July, and Hungary--from 17 to 20 July.**
* The August 1973 agreement is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 August
1973, pages 3-4.
** The beginning of the East European tour is discussed in the TRENDS
of 17 July 1973, pages 12-13.
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31 JULY 1974
USSR
GRECHKO PLUGS BREZHNEV CULT. AFFIRMS ADEQUACY OF DEFENSE
A bow to Brezhnev's leadership and a strong affirmation of the
adequacy of the coun...ry's defense posture were the main features
of Defense Minister ~.rechko's speech to Soviet military academy
graduates reported in RED STAR on 2 July. The evidence afforded
by this speech does not support inferences drawn from some
recent Grechko writings that Grechko may have become identified
with forces in the leaderslip dedicated to bringing abott,t funda-
mental changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policy, such forces
presumably being alined against Brezhnev.*
Grechko went out of his way in. his military academy speec6L to
identify himself as a Brezhnev loyaliat. He di.1 so by referring
to Brezhnev as the head of the Politburo--a formula which,
although it has lost some of its value as a political indicator
through common usage, still serves as a symbol of personal
deference and a badge of political loyalty. Grechko's use of
the formula is particularly noteworthy, since his practice in
this respect has varied. He was one of the first to use the
formula, and he did it with embellishments, in a speech to the
secretaries of army party organizations in March 1973--a period
just preceding his elevation to the Pc,?itburo. Since joining
the Politburo he has studiously avoided the practice, although
he has included personal pra3,e of Brezhnev in his speeches.
His reiteration of the formula at this time thus takes on the
significance of a singular gesture.
The other main feature of Grechko's speech sheds little light
on the question of his relationship with Brezhnev, but it does
suggest that he has few quarrels with the regime on questions
of defense policy. With all due allowances for the nature of
the occasion, Grechko's expressions of confidence in the state
of the country's defenses seemed to go beyond the requirements
of strict propriety. He asserted that the armed forces have
"everything necessary," and that they are "now equipped with
the most modern weapons and combat equipment." His only
* See "New Grechko Article Reflects Recent Shifts in Official
Outlook," in the TRENDS of 30 May, 1974, page 30.
CONFIDENTIAL
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31 JULY 1974
references to the need for further development concerned matters
of training and personnel skills. He made no references to
imperialist threats or to the danger of war.
In these respects,-his speech recalls his major article in
QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, No. 5, 1974, which provided some
of the evidence for the inferences about a leadership realine-
ment mentioned above. Although,being a longer and more
comprehensive statement, the article had room for a variety of
themes, its dominating theme was one of sell-confidenciD bath
in the trend of world developments and in the ability of the
armed 1!orces to meet the responsibilities which these develop-
ments might impose. While its full significance will no doubt
be clarified by future doctrinal writings and authoritative
statements, it stands at this point as the major Soviet effort
to date to restate a rationale for the armed forces in a perio~
of detente.
CPSU PLENUM APPROVES GOVERNMENT, IGNORES SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The brief official araouncement on the 24 July CPSU Central
Committee plenum--the first since December 1973---indicates that
its purpose was merely to approve the new government and that
no substantive issues were discussed. The three-sentence
anaounceient :stated cryptically that Brezhnev had spoken on an
unspecified subject acid that the plenum had considered questions
facing the Supreme Soviet, which met the next day to reappoint.
the government ministers. On the two previous occasions in the
Brezhnev.era when plenums were held to approve a new government:
(on 1 August 1966 and 13 July 1970), they had been preceded :y
plenums devoted to substantive issues.
The failure to hold a substantive plenum in more than seven
months* suggests a continuing Soviet leadership stalemate over
economic policy, a subject which has been recently discussed
by various Politburo members in their pre"election speeches.
* There have been two exact precedents for the seven and a
half month interval between the last two plenums: from
26-Z7 April 1973, to 10-11 December 1973; and from 9 April 1971
to 22 November 1971.
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31 JULY 1974
The newly elected Supreme Soviet, meeting on 25 and 26 July,
reappointed the Council of Ministers intact, with the addition
of RSFSR First Deputy Premier A.M. Shkolnikov as head of the
USSR People's Control Committee. This post had been vacant
since G.I. Voronov was removed as chairman following his
expulsion from the Politburo at the 27 April 1973 Central
Committee plenum. Voronov had been removed as RSFSR premier
and demoted to this powerless root in mid-1971 as a result
of a long conflict with Brezhnev and Polyanskiy. Shkolnikov
himself, long a close ally of Vorono-r, was appointed RSFSR
first deputy premier in November 1965, while Voronov was RSFSR
premier. No replacement for Shkolnikov in his RSFSR pest has
yet been announced.
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NOTES
JAROSZEWICZ VISIT TO ROMANIA: The communique on Polish Premier
Jaroszewicz's 25-26 July visit to Romania, reported by AGERPRES
on the 27th, assessed economic relations between the two countries
as favorable while calling for "considerably expanding" trade and
other economic cooperation. Although no formal economic
agreements were signed, the communique stated that Jaroszewicz
and Premier Manescu "had agreed on measures, ways and means" to
expand and diversify economic and scientific-technical cooperation.
Romania's distaste for even the phrase "socialist economic
integration" was underlined by its absence from the speeches of
Manescu and President Ceausescu, whereas Jaroszewicz, during a
dinner speech on the 25th reported by PAP that day, emphasized
that Poland in its relations with other countries attaches "the
greatest weight" to the CEMA program of socialist economic
integration. The communique made a pro forma bow to the CEMA
program by noting that the development of economic relations
between the two countries would contribute to realizing the
"complex program of further deepening and improving economic
relations and developing socialist economic integration" of the
CEMA countries.
PURGED PRC MILITARY LEADER APPEARS: Yang Cheng-wu, former PLA
acting chief of staff who was purged in March 1968, reappeared at
the annual Chinese Army Day reception in Peking on 31 July. Yang
ways accorded no title by the 31 July NCNA account of the reception,
but headed.a list of once-purged military leaders said to be "also
present at the reception." Former air force commander Yu Li-chun,
purged with Yang in 1968, also appeared at the reception. A third
military leader purged at the time, Peking garrison commander
Fu Chung-pi, did not appear. The reception turnout was heaaed by
Chou En-lai, marking his first such appearance since his recent
hospital stay. Almost all other Politburo members usually in Peking,
including Wang Hung-wen, Yeh Chien-ying and Chiang Ching, turned out
for the occasion. No speech was given, but Yeh Chien-ying offered
a toast noting that the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius
"is developing in depth."
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31 JULY 1974
- S 1 -
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
CAMBODIAN FRONT POLICY SHIFTS ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT
Recent evidence suggests that in the past few months the Cambodian
Front forces opposing the Phnom Penh government have united on a
more flexible position regarding a settlement that implies
willingness to consider a nonmilitary solution. The current
position appears to be the most moderate Front stance on a
settlement since a brief period of flexibility at the time
of the January 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam and represents a
return to an ostensibly more reasonable posture after long
periods of intransigence and strong anti-U.S. hostility in which
the emphasis had been strongly on a military solution. The
Front leaders--Sihanouk and his entourage in Peking, and the
ministers in Cambodia's interior headed by Defense Minister
Khieu Samphan--continue to espouse Sihanouk's 23 March 1970
five-point program advocating resistance to the United States
and Cambodian President Lon Nol and the formation of a govern-,
ment under Sihanouk, and Sihanouk in early July denounced the
latest peace initiative from Lon Nol. However, a review of Front
statements over the past year and a half reveals that the current
Front stance represents a considerable departure from hardline
positions emphasizing a military solution which were previously
espoused by the insurgent leaders in Cambodia and endorsed,
sometimes with seeming reluctance, by Sihanouk.
EARLY 1973 After the January 1973 signing of the Paris peace
agreement th3re was a significant softening of the
Cambodian Front's public stance on political settlement. Up to
that time Front spokesmen had harshly and repeatedly castigated
U.S.-sponsored efforts to reach a compromise agreement in Cambodia
and had stressed that peace would be achieved after a military
solution involving the expulsion of the United States, t::e
destruction, of the Lon Idol regime, and the seizure of power by
Prince Sihanouk and the Front. Following the signing of the
Vietnam peace accord, however, Sihanouk disclosed in interviews
with Western newsmen during a sojourn in. Hanoi that the Vietnam
cease-fire had prompted a reassessment of Front positions.
Sihanouk emphasized that the Front was now ready to engage in
unconditional talks with the United States on the Cambodian
problem and, though he ruled out peace talks with the Lon Nol
government, he promised a decrease in military action and
provision for a general amnesty in Cambodia. He said that the
new Front approach had the complete support of Peking and Hanoi,
but indicated that Kheiu Samphan and the other insurgents in
Cambodia had yet to give their complete approval.
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At the same time Khieu Samphan and the ministers in Cambodia
demonstrated their intransigence, reaffirming their unwilling-
ness to consider a negotiated solution. In a series of
authoritative pronouncements during May, which seemed to have
been prompted by the U.S.-DRV talks, the leaders warned
shrilly against U.S. moves to foster a settlement and promised
a military solution to the Cambodian problem. Typically,
Khieu Samphan on 10 May charged that the "sham peace, cease-
fire, and national concord maneuvers" of the United States
and Lon Nol were designed to cover their weakness while they
continued "sucking the blood of our people." Calling for
even more intense attacks during the ongoing rainy season
offensive, the defense minister pledged continued armed
struggle until the United States was driven out and the
Phnom Penh regime overturned.
In the wake of the May U.S.-DRV talks, Front statements
muffled warnings against "sham peace maneuvers" and, antici-
pating the impending 15 August halt to U.S. bombing, pressed
optimistic predictions of an early military liberation of
Phnom Pena. Thus, an RGNU statement signed by the three
chief ministers in Cambodia on 21 July, marking the conclusion
of the landmark RGNU national congress session, confidently
predicted that "nothing can remedy" the "disastrous situation"
of the Phnom Penh regime and promised to intensify struggle in
all forms until the Front's maximum demands were achieved.
Sihanouk too reflected more confidence over the likelihood of
military victory, though he continued to focus on U.S. disen-
gagement as the crucial element in resorting Cambodian peace.
When Phnom Penh and other government strongholds did not fall
under insurgent attacks in August and early September, Fror..*
media assumed a low posture, halting the heavy flow of
authoritative statements that had characterized their propaganda
since the beginning of the year. At the same time Sihanouk
assumed a more moderate tone: His 29 September National Day
message to PRC leaders, for example, promised a struggle to
achieve the five points, but did not criticize the Phnom Penh
leaders by name or repeat-the rhetoric of his message on the
same occasion a year earlier, one that had emphasized Front
resolve to carry out a "war of resistance" "without retreat or
compromise whatever may be the sacrifices and duration of the
war."
CONFIDENTIAL
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1973-74 DRY SEASON The start of the dry season in " .:,odia
brought a resumption of authoric.tiva
insurgent statements in late October 1973 predicting military
victory and condemning compromise. Khieu Samphan set the tone
with optimistic assertions that the struggle had reached "a
decisive and irreversible phase that will unavoidably lead soon
to total victory." He promised that the insurgents would
launch wide-ranging offensives to drive out the United States
and destroy the Lon Nol regime, and he derided alleged maneuvers
by Lhe Nixon Administration to find "a way out." Sihanouk seemed
to again be reluctant to echo this militant posture, but finally
endorsed Khieu Samphan's line in a 22 November statement pegged
to the UN General Assembly debate on Cambodia.
The failure of the dry season offensive to dislodge the Phnom Penh
regime was reflected in the moderation of Front military comment
by early January 1974. Consistent with this trend, authoritative
comment on the Front anniversary in March 1974 reflected a somber
evaluation of the.Front position. Sihanouk, speaking in Canton
on 23 March, endeavored to explain the insurgents' failure to
overthrow Lon Nol during the dry season campaign by pointing out
that the Front was struggling against not only Lon Nol but also
the United States--"the biggest imperialism Jr. the world." He
warned that there may be "protracted" struggle that "will
continue for several more years."
The tempering of Front military predictions may have been
influenced by the attitude of its foreign allies as well as
the battlefield situation. Peking and Hanoi both had reduced
their public support for t',e Front in the wake of the Paris
peace agreement, and by March 1974 their restrained attitude
was particularly evident. For.the first time, the usual PRC
leaders' message on the occasion was not carried by NCNA, but
was monitored only in Peking radio broadcasts beamed to
Indochina. The message mentioned the insurgents' striving;
for achievement c the five points but avoided any direct PRC
endorsement of t. i :: Front settlement position . Similarly, ti%e
DRV leaders' message and remarks by DRV spokesmen at the RGNU
Ambassador's reception in Hanoi were much less effusive than
in the previous year.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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31 JULY 1974
CURRENT PERIOD Against the backdrop of reduced military
prospects
has continued tostress that iinsurgents u end to U.S. interference
would solve the Cambodian problem and, during a visit to Laos in
March, he revived his offer to negotiate with Washington. More
importantly, Khieu Camphan statements, during a three-month
tour abroad beginning at the end of March, have reflected the
first significant moderation of the interior ministers' position
on a settlement since the time of the Paris peace agreement in
January 1973.
Khieu Samphan's speeches during his tour implicitly recognized
the failure of his previous calls for an all-out dry season
offensive, echoing prevailing Front comment which blamed the
continued military standoff on increased U.S. aid to Lon Nol.
He was at pains to show the reasonableness of the Front position
on a settlement and its sincere desire for peace. He soft-
pedaled past concern with the military liberation of Cambodia,
emphasizing instead the contention, long voiced by Sihanouk,
that the Unit-1 States was the key to peace. He repeatedly
asserted that U.S. disengagement was the "only way" the Cambodian
problem would be solved and explained that the Front was con-
stra..ned to continue fighting since the United States continued
it" :Lnvolvement in Cambodia. Though he did not endorse Sihanouk's
call for negotiations with the United States, the defense minister
did not repeat previous harsh criticism of U.S. peace moves and
avoided directly ruling out talks with Washington.
Subsequent Front comment has followed the new direction reflected
in Khieu Samphan's statements. Most recently, Sihanouk's
10 July statement, rejecting Lon Nol's call the previous day for
unconditional peace talks, affirmed that "_he key to war and
peace in Cambodia is in the hands of the United States."
Persistently refusing talks with Lon Nol, he stressed that
an end to U.S. interference would restore peace. He added
that there was no need for negotiations or an international
Conference on Cambodia, but refrained from directly spurning
talks with the United States. Sihanouk saw little-likelihood
of an expeditious military liberation of the country in the
absence of U.S. disengagement, indicating that heavy U.S. aid
might necessitate a prolonged armed struggle. There has been
no comment from the interior ministers on the Lon Nol proposal.
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There is no indication that the Cambodian Front leaders have
abandoned any of their basic aims; however, their current
public position suggests a willingness to conbiider a nonmilitary
solution and greater flexibility in achieving it:
+ Feout media reflect a more somber assessment of the military
balance in Cambodia, demonstrating a judgment that military
victory over Phnom Penh may be achieved only after protracted
struggle. There has been a corresponding decline in authori-
tative comment calling for all-out military offensive as the
proper means to achieve the total liberation of Cambodia.
+ While reducing attention to a military solution, comment has
emphasized the insurgents' sincere desire for peace. U.S. die-
engagement is presented as the key, to peace.
+ In focusing on the U.S. role, comment has markedly reduced
attention to the two former Front preconditions for peace:
that the Lon Nol regime be destroyed and that the Front be
installed in power over all of Cambodia.
+ Comment has consistently ruled out talks with Phnom Penh,
but has not sr essed concern over U.S. moves to achieve a
peaceful settlement. It has carefully refrained from closing
the door on direct talks with the United States.
ENTIAL
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 FBIS TRENDS
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APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 JULY 1974
Moscow 2482 items)
Peking (921 items)
Polish Liberation 30th
(16%)
13%
Law of the Sea Conference (10%)
20%
Anniversary
Criticism of Lin Piao (9%)
9%
[Brezhnev Speeches
(5%)
5%]
and Confucius
in Poland
Cyprus Crisis (3%)
5%
Supreme Soviet
(--)
11%
Niger Delegation in PRC (12%)
5%
Presidium Sessi
on
Indochina (2%)
3%
Cyprus Crisis
(17%)
9% Death of Romanian Leader (--)
3%
(Soviet Government
Statement 28 Jul
(--)
2%] Constantinescu
y
Cuba 26 July Anniver-
(--)
6%
sary
China
(5%)
5%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio sarvlces. The term, "commentary" is used
to denote tht lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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