TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 21, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
21 AUGUST 1974
(VI)L. xXV, NO. 34;
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CONIC IDI NT!AL
'1111s propaganda aualysim rrlxlrt I. Ii.rd rte lusivrl). on ntalrrial
raRlyd In foreign 11IM141caft and prrn nlrtlia. It 1s puhlishrd
by FIBS withlnit t?orlydinalfon Willi other U.S. (:nvrrnnlrnt
onlponrnts.
STATSPEC
National Socvtiti, InlatmatlO.
UnaviIOti,od diakwto subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL. PSIS TRENDS
21 AUGUST 1914
CONTENTS
Moocow Ambivalent on Turkish Action, Holds Opti?is Open. . . . . . . .
1
USSR, Warsaw Pact Allies Comment on Greek Withjdr:qal From NATO . . . .
6
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Soviet Scholar Sees Institutionalization of Detente in U.S. .
9
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow Plugs Brezhnev Call for Nuclear-Free Mediterranean. . .
11
PORTUGAL
USSR Laudatory, Optimistic on Portugal's African Policy. . . .
12
VIETNAM
President's Speech Assailed, Calls for Thieu Ouster Revived. .
14
CHINA
New Stress on "Self-Criticism" Narrows Anti-Lin Piao Campaign.
18
KOREA
Pyongyang Denies Involvement in Pak Assassinztion Attempt. . . . . . .
20
USSR
Polyanskiy's Agriculture Ministry Rebuked by Central Committee . . .
21
NOTE
Moscow, East Europe on Rockefeller Nomination.
24
APPENDIX
Moscoi, Peking Broadcast Statistics, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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CONFIDENTIAL FBiS TRENDS
21 AUGUST 1974
CYPRUS
MOSCOW AMBIVALENT ON TURKISH ACTION, HOLDS OPTIONS OPEN
In an apparent propaganda holding operation, Moscow has b'e3n
providing reportage on the fighting in Cyprus, which was renewed
on 14 August, and related developments whilt. generally confining
comment to standard charges that "certain NATO circles" are
responsible for the creation and continuation of the crisis.
While not identifying the "narrow NATO circles," Soviet media
have obliquely indicated Washington and London in citing French
press comment on the failure of Anglo-Saxon diplomacy. Britain,
Turkey and Greece, &.e guarantors under the 1960 agreement, have
been indirectly criticized in charges that the "so-called
reliable guarantees" were used for direct NATO interference in
Cyprus' affairs. The guarantor states have been tagged as members
of the narrow NATO circles attempting, through the Geneva talks,
to solve thbt Cyprus question behind the backs of the Cypriot
people. Moscow has also replayed American press criticism of
U.S. pclicy as too inflexible and Ineffective, too little and too
late.
Soviet media carried straightforward reports of Turkey's second
military offensive, initiated on the 14th, to seize the northern
third of the island. Moscow seems undecided as to hog' to approach
the de facto division of the island resulting from the Turkish
action. TASS director general Zamyatin, for Instance, seemed to
intimate on the 18th that the Soviet Union was adapting to the idea
of a federated Cyprus, but other radio and press commentators on
the 18th and 20th again conveyed concern that "NATO circles," under
cover of the tripartite guarantees, planned consolidation of the
situation, thus dividing the republic. Such expressions of concern,
voiced as the Geneva talks reopened on 8 August, had diminished with
the onset of Turkey's renewed military operation.
In denigrating the aborted Geneva negotiations conducted within
the "NATO family," Soviet comment has continued to press for an
enhanced Security Cou.icil role. But Moscow's suggestions for
council actions have not gone beyond renewed calls for a council
mission to Cyprus with the imprecise function of "collecting
objective information" on the situation, along with even more vague
demands for r "reliable system of international guarantees" to
replace the Zurich-London a,reements "imposed" on Cyprus.
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Moscow has not commented on the murder of U.S. Ambassador Davies
in Nicosia on the 19th, but, TASS dispatches have pointed to an
EOKA-B hand: The initial "CASS report, citing Kliridhis' announce-
ment of the killing of the ambassador, noted that according to an
AP correspondent eyewitnesses at the demonstration said EOKA
members fired at the embassy. And TASS later reported from London
that Makarios had blamed Davies' death on EOKA-B.
TURKISH OFFENSIVE TASS reports factually covered the advance
of Turkish troops, but Moscow ham refrained
from explicit criticism of Ankara's action. Some press comment,
however, has subsequently indicated disapproval and even seemed
to deflate Ankara's claims of military prowess. TASS on the 16th
noted Prime Minister Ecevit's statement that Turkey did not intend
to capture the whole island but, despite its strength, would stop
where it planned "if the disputable issues" were settled at the
negotiating table. Reports the same day on the taking of Morphou
said this meant Turkey's operation for establishment of control
over the northern part of Cyprus was probably nearing cocpletion.
TASS on the 18th suggested some misgivings about Ankara's
intentions when it cited unidentified "political commentators"
for the view that the capture of the village of Pyroi "has shifted
Turkish positions far south of the lines which were presumed to
become the southern limit of the part of the island controlled by
the Turks."
Without naming Turkey, a Vladimirov article in IZVESTIYA on the
18th criticized the "NATO military" for the buildup of "NATO troops"
on the island and for using "brute force." An article in the
military organ RED STAR the same day directly addressed itself to
the Turkish operation, in effect questioning Ankara's military
abilities in observing that Turkish troops, variously estimated at
20,000 to 40,000, faced a "considerably inferior force" in both
men and arms, with the National Guard r.-umbering only 10,000 and
"12 tanks." As for Greek mainland troops, RED STAR cited Prime
Minister Karamanlis' statement that it was impossible to dispatch
them because of the distance involved.
RED STAR also intimated that it required no great military
astuteness to assess Ankara's intentions prior to the second
assault: Some three days before resumption of military actions.
the paper said, REUTER had reported Turkish deployment near
Nicosia and in' enaified military activity on the Nicosia-Kyrenia
road. And it noted that Prime Minister Ecevit had told jcurnalists
last month that the government was discussing constructio?z of
a seaport and an aircraft landing strip for the supply of Turkish
troops.
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Moscow continues to urge lmplementnticn of Reno1utfon 353 of
20 July and partieulurJy the "key point" on withdrawal of
foreign troops. In charging that troops were still being sent
to the island, Soviet commentators have pointed to British
reinforcements sent to the ,.sovereign base Areas no well as the
presence of Turkish troops, and have noted that Greece has not
withdrawn the officers who led the 15 July coup. TASS on the
18th factually reported Ccovit as saying that "it certain number
of troops might possibly stay on in Cyprue if the security of the
island requires it."
TASS' ZMIYATIN ON ?TASS Director General Zanyatin, who seems
CYPRIOT "EQUALITY" to have been assuming the mantle of
unofficial spokesman on the Cyprus situation,
seemed In a broadcast on the 16th to be offering a hint that
Moscow acknowledged the reality of the situation on the ground in
Cyprus and might be amenable to a federated Cyprus. At the
same time, however, other cowmen' has again voiced apprehension
over threats to Cyprus' independence and territorial integrity.
Zamyatin concluded hid comments on a domestic service feature
program on Cyprus by stating the Soviet ettitiide that the
internal affairs of Cyprus, "its constitutional arrangement,"
must be decided by the Cypriots themselves, both Greek and Turkish,
on the basis of "equality" and without any outside interference.
Zamyatin underscored the "equality" aspect, but not the reference
to constitutional arrangements, by repeating it in a fore1i~r.-
language commentary broadcast on th'. 19th. This comment, ry may
have been drawn from an article he wrote in SOVIET RUSSIA,
reviewed by TASS late on the 18th; the formula did not appear
in TASS' summary of the article, which is -,tot yet available in
full. Previously, Moscow has supported, as in the 28 July Soviet
government statement, the inalienable right of the Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots to decide "their problems" themselves, to
decide the future of their common motherland. Past repetitions
of this formula have also asserted that the Cypriots should decide
their fate "without outside interference."
Zamyatin first discussed the Cyprus issue in a new Moscow radio
feature "International Situation--Questions and Answers"
inaugurated by Moscow's domestic service on 10 August. Zamyatin
then teamed up with Moscow radio/TV political observer Viktor
Shra2lr., who had also participated in the earlier program, for
~he live broadcast feature on the 16th "On the Situation in Cyprus."
? It was in this broadcast--two days after Turkey had initiated its
new military drive on Cyprus--that Zamyatin came out for "equality"
in Cypriot decision-making.
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In this program, with Shragin playing the interlocutor, Zamyatin
re;jtuwed Turkey's proposals at the Geneva conference, offering
no Judgm,.nts on Ankara's suggestion that Cyprus should remain an
independent state with two federated, autonomous "cantons"
which would have "equal rights," and which would set up a federal.
government. In Turkey's opinion, Zamyatin noted, the Turkish
Cypriot canton should hold 33 parcent of the territory of Cyprus
"in fact the territory which the Turkish troops have occupied by
this date." Zamyatin observed that the Greek side found these
proposals unacceptable, "believing they would lead to a division
of the island into two parto." He went on to cite Greece as
supporting preservation of the independence and territorial
integrity of Cyprus, ana quoted the 14 August Turkish Government
statement as stressing that Turkey had no territorial claims in
Cyprus and did not pursue the aim of the island's militarization.
CRITICISM OF Whatever the authoritativeness of Zamyatin's new
PART ITIONI formula, other commentators have again voiced
qualms about possible partition. The RED STAR
article on the 18th reiterated charges of "backstage and open"
attempts by certain NATO circles to confront the world with
partition as a fait accompli. IZVESTIYA the same day complained
that under cover of the tripartite agreements "certain NATO
circles" were trying to put an end to Cyprus' sovereignty and
national independence.
On the 20t1., a domestic service commentary by Kosovan noted that
reports "appear in foreign papers" on establishing a state of
Cyprus consisting of two autonomous administrations based on the
territorial principle, and went on to,urge that the Cypriots,
Greeks and Turks, be given the opportunity and conditions to live
and work together for the good of a sovereign, independent, and
"territorially viable" Cyprus. And Shalygin in a foreign-language
commentary the samrt day declared that the island "is being divided
and the republic split up." Turkey, he said, was trying to present
demands for "an allegedly federal solution," bypassing the
legitimate government of Cyprus. IZVESTIYA correspondent Mikhaylov,
in the weekly domestic service observers' roundtable on the 18th,
also suggested disapproval in commenting that in conditions where
chauvinism can run riot" and where "foreign armed forces" are
engaged in military actions, passions are inflamed and "the
existence of the sovereign state and its territorial integrity"
are endangered.
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PRAVDA OBSERVER The most authoritative Soviet comment since
ON GUARANTEES the new Turkish military operations were
launched on the 14th came in a PRAVDA
Observer article the following day which repeated standard
charges of NATO interference in Cyprus affairs and urgcd
implementation of Resolution 353. The Observer article introduced
a new Soviet notiun of the need to provide UN guarantees of the
"legitimate rights" of the Cypriot people. Observer argued that
the development of events on Cyprus had demonstrated the "complete
groundlessness of NATO propaganda" regarding the "so-called
reliability" of the guarantees assumed by Britain, Greece and
Turkey under the Zurich-London agreements. Rather than insuring
pence, freedom and independence for Cyprus, Observer said, the
guarantees were "used for direct NATO interference" in Cyprus'
internal affairs. Observer maintained that the people of Cyprus
need "really reliable" guarantees of peace, independence, and
integrity.
PRAVDA seemed to be laying the groundwork for Malik's call later
on the 15th in the Security Council for a "more effective and
dependable system of guarantees" which would insure Cyprus'
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to
TASS' account on the 16th. Malik urged that such guarantees should
replace the "vicious system" of decisions on Cyprus being taken
within "narrow NATO circles." Subsequent comment, such as
Vladimirov's IZVESTIYA article on the 18th, has echoed the demand
for "reliable" guarantees.
U.S. ROLE Moscow has noted without comment U.S. diplomatic
contacts with Greece and Turkey, reporting that
Greece declined a U.S. proposal for Foreign Minister Mavros to go
to Washington for talks and that Karamanlis later declined
Secretary Kissinger's invitation for him to have talks in
Washington with President Ford. TASS also reported Ecevit as
saying, after meeting with the American ambassador, that the
United States "supports our demand" for establishment of a
federal system based on geographic division of the island, and
cited him later as remarking that in Turkey's opinion the United
States had acted "objectively and constructively" in the Cyprus
question. (According to an AFP report, Ecevit used the same
expression in describing the Soviet attitude.)
TASS and Moscow radio reported Secretary Kissinger's 19 August
? press conference in slightly varying accounts. Both noted that
in a statement approved by President Ford, he said the United
States would insist on compliance with the cease-fire and would
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support efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table.
The radio account added that the United Staten would help organize
these talks (Kissinger in fact said the United States would play
any role requested by the parties, and was prepared to support
Foreign 9dcretary Callaghan's efforts in this regard.) TASS
said the Secretary "stressed" that Turkey should show flexibility
at the talks, Moscow radio adding that ha said Turkey would have
to take into account Greek views both in the matter of territory
and the amount of armed forces on the island. According to TASS,
Kissinger sat'l Ecevit had assured him that Turkey would implement
the cease,-fire agreement and that it was clear from their phone
conversation that the size of Turkey's occupation area could be
reduced. The Secretary's statement in fact made no mention of
Turkish assurances about the cease-fire, but did say Turkey
considered the demarcation lint. negotiable and would carry out
the Geneva agreement provisions on phased reduction of troops on
the island.
Scattered indirect criticism of Washington's actions has come in
the form of pickups of U.S. press comment. For example, a panelist
on the weekly observers' roundtable, broadcast by the domestic
service on the 18th, said the Athens AKROPOLIS considered that
the July coup in Cyprus was carried out "with the knowledge of
American diplomats," and he went on to assert that the New York
TIMES "confirmed" this, writing that Washington bore the "rain
portion of the blame" for the tragedy in Cyprus. The panelist
added that the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR "believes that the CIA
had a hayed in events" and that American Ambassador Tasca "was
informed about what was going on."
USSR. WARSAW PACT ALLIES COMMENT 014 GREEK WI1MRAWAL FROM NATO
Moscow reacted promptly to Greece's announcement on 15 August that
it was withdrawing its armed forces from NATO. Initial comment
was cautious as to the reasons behind the withdrawal, however, with
the most candid comment coming only on the 19th when TASS director
general Leonid Zamyatin stated that the action was "a reply" to the
efforts of NATO's "leading states" to force Greece to accept
unspecified "decisions" to settle the Cyprus crisis with Turkey.
East European propaganda has been generally more forthcoming,
with commentators portraying the withdrawal as pressure on NATO to
act against Turkey.
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TASS on the 16th noted Wtntern speculation that the withdrawi1l
"may spark off the strongest crisis" in NATO since 1966, but
Moscow's comment teas been restrained in comparison to reaction
to Fr'ncu's withdrawal that year, which tied been depicted an n
"grave crisis" affecting the very future of NATO. TABS on the
16th did cite NATO fears that the lose of Greece would wenke,n
the "strategically Important" southeastern flank of the
alliance, and on the 17th the news agency reported NATO Secretary
General Luna' statement that the alliance had Indeed bean
"weakened." Also on the 17th PRAVDA c omarentutor Yuriy Yakhontov
estimated that Greece's move indicated that "faith" in the
objectives and tasks of NATO was declining among its participants
and he foresaw a growing conviction thnt "there is no future"
for NATO.
The Greek action has been explained primarily as the result of an
Inevitable conflict between the "militarism" of NATO and the
"national interests" of its individual members, a theme that was
also used in separate Radio Pence and Progress broadcasts beamed
to Asia that paralleled the status of smaller countr?.es In NATO to
those of SiATO and CENTO. The withdrawal also was attributed to
rising "anti-Americanism" in Greece and to the inability of NATO
to fulfill its role as "pence guarantor" between conflicting states.
REACTION FROM Judging from available propaganda, Bulgaria--
EAST EUROPE neighbor to both Greece and Turkey--has refrained
from comment on the Greek withdrawal from NATO,
as has another Greek neighbor, PRC-alined Albania. Romania has
reported the action without comment, although an Athens paper quoted
the Romanian ambassador to Greece as praising the withdrawal.
Nonalined Yugoslavia has used the situation to criticize all
military alliances.
Both Poland and Ccechoslovaki& portrayed the withdrawal as primarily
pressure on NATO to act against Turkey, Warsaw's PA:' on the 15th
describing it as "only blackmail" and Prague radio on the 14th
noting that Greece had "left the back door open," presumably
referring to Athens' continued political ties with the Alliance.
In a reference to the 1966 situation, Budapest's MTI on the 17th
pointed out that the Karamanlis government has not the same
"determination, sincerity and prestige" as had de Gaulle. MTI
predicted that even though U.S.-Greek relations had become "tense,"
Athens would not "want or dare to touch" American military
priv:'leges. A Budapest TV commentator on the 19th indicated
uncertainty oven the Greek political situation and over the intentions
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of the Karamanlie government in remarking that "people are
waiting for the government to make a move--to the right or to
the left; the outcome of the [internal political] struggle
cannot be predicted yet."
Yugoslavia's position was spelled out by Zagreb commentator
Milika Sundic on the 17th. Belgrade, he said, had not
considered it appropriate to issue a statement for fear of
making "a difficult situation for Greece even more difficult,"
considering that the United States "will do everything
possible . . . to make" Creece return to the military alliance.
Sundic added, however, that the government considered the
action "very, very significant and far-reaching"; he attributed
the withdrawal to Greek awareness that "membership in military
alliances cannot guarantee anybody's independence and security,
particularly not that of small countries."
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-9-
U,S,-SOVIET RELATIONS
SOVIET SCHOLAR SEES INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DETENTE IN U.S,
A Soviet observer of U.S. affairs writing in the USA Institute's
monthly journal has presented evidence suggesting that the new
trends in U.S. foreign policy associated with the Administration
of former President Nixon--particularly the pursuit of detente
with Moscow--are being institutionalized in the foreign policy
apparatus. S.B. Chetverikov, writing in the August issue of
USA signed to press before President Nixon's resignation, noted
that such steps as Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State
serve to insure the continuity of U.S. foreign policy regardless
of the results of future elections. Chetverikov's article is
only the latest in a series of articles by Soviet Americanologists
in recent months which have stressed the fundamental nature of what
they perceive as new, favorable trends in U.S, foreign policy.
While addressed primarily to the longer term evolution of U.S.
policy, these articles clearly serve the subsidiary purpose of
justifying a continuing pursuit of U.S.-Soviet detente despite
the uncertainties raised by the change in U.S administration.
The Chetverikov article described a consistent pattern of action
by the Administration "for the organizational registration and
consolidation of the [new] foreign policy course and for its
introduction into the activity of the state apparatus, that is,
for its institutionalization." In addition to Kissinger's
appointment and a move to ease bureaucratic resistance through
greater involvement of the executive apparatus in the early
stages of policy formation, the author claimed to see an intention
in the White House to improve relations with Congress, restoring
the "essential balance" of power between the two, in order to
consolidate support for the new trends in foreign policy in that
branch of government as well.
Chetverikov argued that one of the motives of the White House in
retaining Kissinger in his National Security Council role while
appointing him to head the State Department bureaucracy was to aid
in curbing the Pentagon's influence.on the formation of foreign
policy. According to the article, the carefully planned institu-
tionalization process also "attests to the fact that the desire
for detente has become deeply rooted in all the most important,
decisive spheres of American political life."
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U.S. DEt3ATE ON UL'TENTC Americnnologists such an Chotvsrikov,
in attempting to assess the impact on
U.S. foreign policy of a detente environment, hove acknowledged
that a simple pro and con division of American opinion on relations
with Moscow is no longer sufficient to describe the complexity of
the current situation among American observers and practitioners
of foreign policy. USA Institute director Arbatov, for example,
In a 13 July IZVBSTI.YA article discussing the recent summit showed
considerable concern over the fact that some earlier supporters
of detente were losing interest in the cause as the threat of
nuclear war receded. Warning of the work left to be done, Arbatov
criticized particularly U.S. liberals who like young butterflies
"flutter from one fashionable pollical crave to another."
Despite this recognition of niw complications, such Soviet observers
of the American scene have discerned a broadly favorable trend in
U.S. foreign policy thought and hence in the theoretical guidelines
governing the formation of U.S. policy. i;3A Institute deputy head
V.V. Zhurkin, for example, while noting that a preponderance of
those U.S. figures criticizing "globalists" were only arguing for
a more "selective" application of U.S. power in the would, argued
in the June issue of USA that the emergence of a signif.cant body
of opinion espousing a more complete rejection of force in favor
of diplomacy was "symptomatic" of new currents within the United
States. A monograph on U.S. foreign policy reviewed in the same
issue of USA emphasized that U.S. foreign policy had changed in
"substance" as well as form.
Other articles in USA and WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
the organ of the institute of the same name, have over the last
year detected new vitality in U.S. policy debates said to be
exerting a moderating influence on U.S. intentions in such regions
as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. For example in the
November 1973 issue of WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Yuriy Yartsev argued that "the very fact debate is developing
over this question (of U.S. policy in the MediterranpAnj is an
important and noteworthy symptom of the new trends whi:h are making
themselves felt in American public opinion."
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
MOSCON PUGS BREZH EV CALL FOR NUCLEAR-FREE MED 1 TERF ANEAN
Thei call for withdrawing U.S. and Soviet nuclear-armed vessels from
Lite Mediterranean introduced by hlrezhnev into his speech to the
Polish Sejm on 21. July has been given now currency by 'toscow in
recent days. Articles in PRAVDA and 17.VESTIYA on 14 and 1.7 August,
respectively, recalled Brezhnev's proposal in col?umentirg on current
world developments, particularly nn they born on the general status
of East-West relations. Although both articles noted the relevance
of the proposal to the current Cyprus crisis, neither expressed any
particular urgency over tha need to implement it. Rather, bath
stresa.ed the importance of the proposal no an index of the Soviet.
Union's peaceful role in world affnirn and an a potential contri-
bution to East-West detente. The I2.VESTIYA article reviewed
favorable world reaction to Bretihnev's speech.
Although Brezhnev's remarks before the Polish Sejm constituted his
most specific proposal for arms control measures In the ffeditcrranean
to date, he has alluded to the subject in more general terms on
several occasions over the past decade. His bent known previous
statement on the subject was his call at the 24th CPStt Congress for
"turning the Mediterranean into a sea of pence and friendly coopera-
tion." Although he did not specify nuclear disarmament In that
statement, he had earlier crlled for a "nuclear-free zone" In the
Mediterranean at Karlovy Vary in 1967, and (along with Koaygin and
Podgornyy) in a message to the Bulgarian leaders on the Bulgarian
national holiday in 1969. The first official Soviet proposal for
a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean was made in a 20 May 1963
note to the United States in response to the initial deployment
of U.S. nitclear missile submarines In the area.
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PORTUGAL
USSR .5J4I TORY, OPTIMISTIC ON PORIUSAL'S AFRICA,' POLICY
In cot vn Portugal's efforts In recent weeks to achieve
a political settlss~rnt for its three African colonies, Moscow
has wslcaisd with unqualiti?d approval the Portuguese provisional
goverraesatea decision, announced by President Spinols on
27 July, to move imedkately toward granting full independence
to Cuinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola. The new policy on
decolonisation signified a sharp change from Portugal's previous
position, which required that the political destiny of in
colonies be determined through referenda and which recommended
that the colonies elect to entir a confederation with Portugal.
soviet media have hailed the change In policy as a historic
decision, beneficial to all sides, and in following the
subsequent conrst, of the pa11iy's imp1Rmentatlon have expressed
confidence that Lisbon 1s sincere and that each of its African
colonies will achieve full independence.
Moscow media hr.d praised the mid-July Portuguese cabinet changes
ss presaging further democratisation and TASS had reported Prime
Minister Goncalves' initial policy statement on 18 July declaring
that Portugal recognised the colonies' right to independence and
that a government statement on the issue would be forthcoming.
But Soviet come,rent has avoided any assessment of the decolonisation
policy change in teri of the internal Portuguese political line-
up, instead typically viewing the new policy in generalised terms
as a victorious culminatian of national liberation struggles by
the colonies for over a decade against "fascist Portugal supported
by a NATO arsenal."
A Moscuw radio correspondent and specialist on African affairs,
Vladimir Dunayev, acknowledged on 4 August that Soviet media were
avoiding analysis of the factors behind Portugal's change in
policy. Speaking on the weekly observers' roundtable or. Moscoe.'s
domestic service, Dunayev remarked that observers In th? West had
recently been "guessing who it was that insisted on this in
Portugal's new provisional government, who obstructed its previous
passage, and so on. Dunayev allowed that "possibly it would be
worth while having analysts and historians examine this," but
professed to believe that at present what was important was not
to "certain the extent to which the change in policy had been
"dictated by political and military necessity," but rather to
applaud the fact of that change. Dunayev was only slightly more
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21 A0G1.1ST 1974
ft,rthcoming in t $ -tudtable program on 19 August . t)it t inl?
from all utlRpecI f It it et view given by LuIA Calit'A I , head of the
State Council of Cui, '?f41Msatt, Jt,navev noted that Cabral had
been asked "how, lie exp1niiia the changen in 1.1AhontR pt,taitloo"
on the colonle4 Cabral, :t, awerIttg vague ty that drtnocrntlc
forces had recognized l'ortugnl's .rut! intt rents ant( find realized
that democrntIzat,,.in of 0he roust ry rt,qu; rt el 11bri'nI ir,n from It"
colonial burden, ohnorvrd in panning that ''pt,f;nlbly among tremhera
of the Portuguese government, a:, )n the Arzc+?1 Foreen Movement
itself, there waA no common, t 1inr-cut position oft the colonteA."
I)unnyev characterized (.abral'n explttnnt Ion an !raving exprinard
"the very (RnrtnC' .1i' the ;,,ohlem."
OBS1ACIf:S; In preRpnting an opt lmint.ic view of Portugal's
I'FiCOSPI.CIS dreinlotl t?s Fraot. null itrdrpet"lente to Ira
African ,'ulonlrR, :soviet conimentntorn have also
warnrd that A variety of obstacles remain that may binder Its
tuplemenCAtion, principct;y to Moxnmbique and Angola. Moscow
radiu'n roundtable dincut+"ton on 19 August detailed several of
there_ clbetarlet+, giving p:lmary attrntion to n1loged plans of
ofwhite exti'*enlse trettlerH" in league with outalfic mercenary
detachmrr..R. To underacort' their warnings, Soviet romnentators
have dratir, inaloglt+rt with tither decoluniration experiences to
recent African history, raising in this regard the specter ot
violence and turmoil resulting, from mrrcenat? i en (Conn,,,, it t: rench-
titale "fieciet army" (A1)!rl'I ;), L111ty .nej,;tratiri (k) dt', 1,), and
"Katang1zntion" (Congo). In additi',n, the regime" It. South
Africa and khodenla )rave been ninklyd .,+tt stn ; rt is ulnr ,..,tike ",
prepared to undrimiut tier c+It' ( .st inn tit Mar;arbir)ur oul Angola
through threats, propaganda, and military force. An unattributed
commentary, broadcast by Moscow radio to Africa on 20 August,
for instance, annrrted that both Ieglmex had rant-rntrated troops
along their bordern with the 1'(,rttryruenc tert'ita~t'it.., rail,! t.'err
"hatching !,inlet ~)f armed intervention." flevrrthelrf;ti, while
taking note of various real and imagined obstacles that remain
on the colonies' path to, full Independence, Soviet courant over-
a11 has exhibited a clear Cc7trnenuun that the major Impedimt+r,ts
have been overcome and that Portugal in R(xm turn Itx full
attention to doment.'c probleas.
CONFIDENT
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21 AUGUST 1974
VIETNAM
PRESICENT'S S?EECH ASSAILED, CAMS FOR THIEU OUSTER REVIVED
Vietnamese commun~,t media ha4c tlncted with strIKing vigor to
President Ford's remarks on Vietnam in his 12 Atigunt apvrech,
which they have interpreted as eviden,-e nt hi i intent to pursut?
the "bankrupt" policies of the Nixon Administration. Moth the
l'RG and the DRV issued foreign ministrv ,tatementn on the
speech-on the 15th and 17tn, respectively- complaining that
the new President has given ansurances that U.S. Vietnam policy
will not be changed, a policy th.,y see as marked by continued
as+cistance to the Thieu administration.
Even more notably, Nandi press comment pegged to President Fr rd',
speech hap revived references to the southern people', struggle
"to topple" the Thieu regi:-v nd to fo-t#, a new regime which would
implement the Paris ak,rs ent, rfA *tore peace. and achieve
"national concord." Since :he signing of the Parts peace agrev-
mont in January 1973. which the communists, have int4rpreted an
tempotarilr legitimising both the Thieu and PR( administrations,
Nanot has tailed for opposition to Thieu but has stopped short of
calling for the elimination of h,*s government. The context and
t.-iing of the reappearance of twe f'armulntion on Thleu's ouster
mai mean that the communists have ber.nme even lens sanguine
rag.,-'i.ng an achievement of their goals through the implementation
of the peace agreement ard that they have taken a decision to press
their struggle in the South more vigorously and more openly.
particularly in the urban arena.
PRG, URV REACTION TO While both tl?' PRG and the URV torcrign
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ministries assailed President. Ford',
remarks in hi. ;%peach before Congress
as showing that previous policies on vietiam would be continued,
Vietnamese communist comment generally has avoiled the personal
vilifica:Ian that has been aimed at fors2r President Nixon since
his resignation.*
The PRC statement on the 15th interpreted the )-resident's remarks
on U.S. determinal:lon to see the observance ,)f the Paris agreement
as "demanding" respect for the agreement by the Vietnamese people
* For a discussion of earlier Vietnamese communist reaction to
President Ford's cuccessior,, A.e the TRENDS of 1s. August 1974,
pages 4-6.
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while making no 'iention if U.S. responsihi'.Ity. The I)RV ut.nte-
ment two days later glossed over the President's actual. remarks
on the pence agreement, claiming that "thn policy of the United
States is to make a wreck of peace and the Paris agreement. The
PKG statement saw evidence in the speech that the new Administration
will continue "all.-sided asstAt.,nce" to the Thieu administration.
And the LnV, embellishing the President's remarks on continued
assistanr.e to allies In Asia, claimed that "Gerald Ford stated
that he would pursue Nixon's policy on Vietnam and would continue
military and economic aid to the Nguyci Van Thieu administration."
The lv;igthy 15 August NHAN DAN editorial pegged to Lite President's
12 August address--mainly a chronicle 9f the Nixon Adminlatrati.in's
policies on Vietnam--reiterated the tuft-repeated Hanoi contention
tit-it the "bass' and root cause" of Nixon'R downfall stemmtd from
his "failure" In Vietnam. It quoted President Ford's 12 August
remarks on InJOchina in ful. and interpreted them to mean that
t'orJ had not fez rned the lessons of the Nixon Administration and
that he still "advocates continuing the U.S. neocolonialist war
In Sc,uth Vletnem." A QUAN not NHAN DAN Commentator article the
same day, .onslatent with ;he other propaganda, took exception
to the President's statement about observing the Paris agreement,
claiming that it was atade despite "systematic sabotage" of the
agreement by *he United States and Saigon.
Rt:MMOVAL OF THILU The revival of clap.y that, Lite people in the
South were struggling, "to topple" Thieu and
form h new government appeared first 'm t`ie 15th in Hanoi
broadcasts In Vietnamese of the N)1AN DAN editorial and QUAN imI
NiAN DAN Commentator article on President Ford's 12 August
address. In both the editorial and the Commentator article.
the reference to the effort to overthrow Thieu came shortly after
a standard evaluation of former President Nixon's resfgnntion
as a reflection of U.S. difficulties and weaknesses. The
Commentator article, for example, maintained that Thieu's "U.S.
masters are experiencing politico: difficulties, economic recession,
and critical inflation# and are in a passive position at home
and abroad."
The formulation was subsequently repeated on the 19th in a Liberation
Radio commentary and the 111anoi radio version of a NUAN DAN editorial.
both marking the 29th annl~tersary of the August Revolution.* The
* VNA It'. Its t:nglish-language transmission carrie;l excerpts of the
KHAN DAN editorials if the '5th -tnd 19th which omitted the passages
on Thieu's ouster.
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19 Attouot NHAN DAN edltorlal, while not directly ntnting that
the circumstances surrounding former President Nixon's resigna-
tion redounded tc the advantage of tl,e communists in South
Vietnam, implied that now opportunities now exist and referred
to the resignation in the context of the struggle against Thieut
In coordination with the fighting of the PLAF,
which Is vigorously attncking the enemy an
many fronts, the compatriots In the oou~hern
cities are struggling to demand the, overthrow
of Thieu--n devoted, faithful valet, of blood-
thirsty aggressor Nix,n who was ?11 imira;ed--
in order to set up a government in Saigon
approving the implementation of the Paris
agreement . . . .
The new formulation, presenting the objective of the overthrow
of the CVN as a goal for the people in the southern cities, may
indicate that the communists will be putting now stress on
gaining support in the urban areas controlled by the Saigon
government. Propaganda following the peace agreement had
previously indicated that the "urban struggle" was focusing on
demands for "pence, independence, democracy, a decent life, and
national concord."
BACKGROUND: Hanoi's current revival of the call for the overthrow
of Thieu and formation of a new govornme nt Lring to mind the
blueprint for revolution spelled out by North Vietnamese party
First Secretary Le Dunn in his programatic February 1970 article
which has been the major public document guiding Hanoi's policies
in the years following Ho Chi Minh's death In September 1969.
In that article, Le Dunn stressed the importance of "flexibility"
and prompt changes in strategy and tactics to adapt to new
factors and possibilities. While placing great weight on the
gradual strengthening of political and military forces, Le Duan
also maintainr.d that "seizing the right opportunity is an
extremely important matter" and added that: "The opportunity
.an be created by the real strength of the revolution in the
country and can also be brought about by the situation abroad."
When the revolution is strong, Le Duan postulated, then
"opportunities and advantages" will appear to develop "high
tides" in the struggle and the only problem will be the "clear-
siglredness and particular sensitivity of the leaders" to take
advantage of them. He cited Lenin in stressing that it is
important for leauere to grasp the fundamental direction of
developments and dare to "act boldly."
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The currant c111114 for overthrowing Thieu--rntliar than demanding
gJci01 goals and Saigon compliance with the pence agreement--
in affect represent n change in the communists' slogans, and
Le Duan's 1971) article indicated the % ignificance of such changes
when it pointed out the?t "Thc, art of guiding revolutionary
4ac*t.cs, stretugv, and struggle is manifested first by putting
forward sharr, appropriate slogans compatible with the concrete
situations." Ile ,ited Lenin an criticizing "those who, confronted
with the sudden turning points of history, could not respond to
the new situation but still clung to old slogans, slogans that
were still correct yesterday but devoid of significance today."
[,e Dunn also stressed the importance of the timing of new slogans,
warning that "bringing the masses Into offensives that are too
Into or too early Is dangerous to the revolution."
Basic to Le Duan's argument and to the communises' actionr and
policies since the signing of the pence ngremeent Is the assumption
that circumstances sometimes require the adoptior of limited
demands rather than the open advocacy of ultimate goals, but
that this is done with the knowledge that partial measures and
reforms will not achieve the final objective and that only
revolutionary violence" can bring about the seizure of
administrative power.
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CHINA
NEW STRESS ON ' SELF-CRITICISM", NARROWS ANT I -L I N P I AO CAMPAIGN
Peking's resolve to keep the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and
Confucius under party control. was again pointed tip in an article
in the August RED FLAG which appears aimed at curtail ing criticism
of errant cadres by the masses. Entitled "Be Promoters of
Revolutionary Unity," the article, calla-ri upon leading cadres at
all levels to lead the masses "to talk less about others' short-
comings and mistakes and let others talk about their own short-
comings and mistakts," and it stressed the need to narrow the
target of attack by "concentrating our sniriosity on the Lin I'iao
antiparty clique." Tl,,c new guidelines on self-criticism appear
designed to stop the campaign from deterioratlnp, to a mire of
debilitating recrimiuatiuns between local factions which, as in
t-:e cultural revolution, Peking would find difficult to contrail
and damaging to the economic base. Opposition to the new line
was indicated by the article's aumission that some people regard
encouraging self-criticism an "blurring the line between right
and wrong," but it declared flatly that "they are wrong."
The article singled out certain "wrong practices" an "detrimental
to revolutionary unity," noting that "deviations in orientation"
had resulted from people "ceaselenRly harping on certain ignues"
and "opposing self-criticism among comrades." indicating that
differences between factional groups ehoultl he put aside to
achieve greater unity, the article Rtreased that there is "no
reason whatsoever" for divisiveness in criticizin;; Lin and
declared that "it is necessary to be relentless in opposing the
enemy and to be friendly with our comrades." The article lashed
out at certain enemies of the nwsses who seek to "instisate
dissension and create trouble," complicating "problems which are
originally not hard to solve."
The RED FLAG article's stress on achieving rreater unity by over-
coming shortcomings through self-criticism has thus far been echoed
only in a 17 August Canton broadcast on the method used by a local
county revolutionary -ommittee to strengthen unity among feuding
mass groups. The report told how a member of the revolutionary
committee visited a poster writer regarding several sentences in
his poster mentioning "ce;?tain shortcomings and errors of mass
organizations whose views differed from those held by the writer."
The revolutionary committee member pointed out to the poster writer
that the main thrust of the campaign should be aimed at "Lin Piao's
anti-party clique" and "not at the masses." The poster writer was
instructed to "let people talk about their own shortcomings and errors."
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BACKGROUNII For the peat several months other author. itntive
articles in the contrnl media 1-1lvo deuounw:rd
factionalism and urged greater unity in conducting the campaign,
but norm has sought to substitute self-criticism for mass criticism
as a major means of atonement. An article in the June issue of
RED FLAG on strengthening unity, for example, contained no mention
of self-criticism as a moans for cadres under attack to return to
the correct path. It stressed instead the need "to mobilize the
masses to expose problems and criticise mistakes in order to
make the problems clear and distinguish between right and wrong."
By encouraging self-criticism and downplaying mass criticism, the
new guidelines in the RED FLAG article recall an earlier stage
of the long campaign against Lin. In Ja,tuary 1971 cadres were
encouraged to press on ..,...i the anti-Lin .ampaign under the
slogan that "criticism of revisionism comes first end only then
rectification of the style of work," implying that only the close
followers of Lin were under current attack. By February of this
year, however, the movement had heated up and cadres were warned
in an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial that the campaign
would be a "test for every leading comrade." The editorial had
called upon the masses to "rise in action" and c4Nrry out their
role as the main force in the campaign.
RED GUARDS Perhaps symbolizing the themes of modpr.ation and
unity now being pressed, the eighth anniversary of
Mao's 18 August 1966 Peking reception of Red Guards was marked In
an unusually subdued manner this year, drawing comment only from
Chekiang. Last year the anniversary of Mao's 18 August Red Guard
reception triggered three PEOPLE'S DAILY articles as well as several
provincial radio reports on youth settling in the countryside. The
18 August Chekiang commemoration this year did not call for a return
to cultural revolution activism, but rather replayed themes common
in recent reports from other provinces on the current status of
Red Guards. It praised local youths for their contributions in
building up the countryside, noted that many youths have been admit-
ted to the party, and called for .211 youths to deepen their study
of Mao's works and promote production. The current orderly role of
Red Guard group, was illustrated in a 10 August NCNA report on
Shanghai activitit.q for vacationing students which revealed that
Red Guard units are working with local militia units and taking part
in night patrols in order to play "an active role in maintaining
social order."
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KOREA
PYONGYANG DENIES INVOLVEMENT IN PAK ASSASSINATION ATT!!JIPT
North Korean reaction to the 15 August attempted assassination
of ROK President Pak--initially limited to brief accounts of the
incident and the death of Mrs. Pak--escalated sharply following
South Korean charges on the lith that the DPRK and the pro-DPRK
General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon)
were directly involved. DPRK denials of involvement were numerous
and vigorous, including a KCNA authorized statement and a foreign
ministry spokesman's statement on 19 August, and commentaries in
NODONG SINMUN and MINJU CNOSON on the 20th.
Countering with it:, own propaganda attack, the KCNA statement
accused Seoul of using the incident to divert world attention
from the situation in the South, denying any connection with the
assassin, whom it designated as a "criminal." The statement
further claimed that "world opinion" views the incident as the
"natural outcome" of Seoul's repressive policies "or probably a
crafty plot" to save the South's rulers. Playing on the latter
theme, the statement accused ROK and Japanese authorities of using
the incident to crack down on Chongnyon and mute anti.-Pak
sentiment among Koreans in Japan. Demonstrating the North's
concern on this point, the foreign ministry spokesman at the
19 August press conference strongly emphasized that Seoul and
Tokyo were implicating Chongnyon so they could s'ippress it.
Pyongyang's response to these events is in marked contrast to its
reaction during the January 1968 abortive attempt on Pak's lifn
by infiltrators from the North. Then, Pyongyang media ignored
Seoul's charges of Northern involvement and, extensively reporting
on the group's exploits as they attempted to elude capture,
referred to them as "armed guerrillas of the revolutionary South
Korean people."
PEKING, MOSCOW Peking's only response to the affair thus far
has been a brief 16 August NCNA account of the
shooting with the comment, attributed to Kyodo News Agency, that
the incident reflects the present tense situation in South Korea.
A 16 August Moscow broadcast in Korean cited "foreign observers"
as
-~ attributing the incident to Pak's "relentless oppression," and an
unattributed 19 August commentary on Moscow radio claimed the
"democratic press abroad" viewed the incident as a sign of
worsening political struggle in the South and alienation of the
South Korean public,
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USSR
POLYANSKIYIS AGRICULTURE MINISTRY REBUKED BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
In an implicit slap at Agriculture Minister and Politburo member
Polyanski,y, a Central 'ommittee decree published in the 10 August
PRAVDA rebuked the Ministry for poor training of agricultural
personnel. The criticism is surprising, since Polyanskiy, who
was appointed to head the ministry in February 1973 when it was
under sharp attack for bureaucratic inertia and resistance to
innovation, has already taken steps to improve the ministry's
training program and personnel policy. This suggests that he is
being criticized not just.for a general failure to c':rect in-
herited shortcomings but also for his specific policy positions
ab minister.
The Central Committee decree pointed out "serious shortcomings"
in the ministry's training of leaders and specialists of kolkhozes
and sovkhozes and "demanded a radical improvement" in this work
and a revision of the ministry's training curricula. In a 14 August
editorial on the decree, IZVESTIYA declared that, despite periodic
revisions, "year in year out" the ministry includes "second-rate
subjects" in ids training programs while neglecting study of current
problems, scientific achievements and new methods of organization
and administration of production. Ironically, a 2 January 1974
radio broadcast had already stated that the ministry had made big
changes in training of specialists, revising the curricula in
universities and technical schools to include more teaching of
planning, finance, cost accounting and new agricultural speciali-
zations.
PAST ATTACKS The decree comes against a background of criticism
ON MINISTRY and administrative changes reflecting dissatisfaction
with the entrenched agricultural. bureaucracy. The
ministry had come under sharp criticism in 1972 when V. V. Matskevic h
was still minister. In PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, RURAL LIFE and SOVIET
RUSSIA it was accuses of slowness in promoting new methods of admini-
stration and new forms of labor organization, such as unregulated
mechanized links. ~n the 19 January 1972 PRAVDA, I. N. Kuznetsov,
deputy head of the Central Committee's agriculture section, complained
that innovations were being introduced "extremely slowly" and
declared the promotion of scientific achievements "a most important
duty" of the ministry. In an April 1972 PARTY LIFE article Kuznetsov
praised the unregulated mechanized link system as having "a great
future." Shortly thereafter, he wa-, appointed deputy minister of
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agriculture, and in the 29 August 1972 RURAL LIFE, in answer
to a 25 March 1972 attack on the ministry in the same paper,
he acknowledged that the introduction of innovations in
kolkhozed and sovkhozes .us the ministry's "weakest sector"
of work and announced that the ministry had adopted new measures
to improve this work. On 2 September 1972 RURAL LIFE announced
that the ministry had organized a council on economic education
to improve training of ministry cadres and Kuznetsov was named
chairman of the council.
On 2 February 1973, after heading the ministry for almost 14 years,
Matskevich was rc;uoved and replaced by Polyanskiy, who was demoted
from the post of First Deputy Premier to take over the ministry.
Official dissatisfaction with the work of the agricultural bureau-
cracy--for which Polyanskiy bore ultimate responsibility as First
Deputy Premier---was made even clearer when the Central Committee
shor;l,y thereafter called a conference of party secretaries of
agricultural organs. With Central Committee Agriculture Secretary
Kulakov supervising, the conference, as reported in a June 1973
PARTY LIFE, stressed the need to end the ministry's bureaucratic
work style and improve its receptivity to new methods.
Since Polyanskiy's appointment, three of the nine deputy ministers
have been replaced. Deputy minister for construction A. F. Dubrovin
was fired in Hay 1973 in connection with bribetaking by his sub-
ordinates and was replaced by deputy rural construction minister
I. P. Bystryukov. Longtime deputy minister K. S. Nazarenko was
pensioned off in October 1973 and replaced by deputy RSFSR agri-
culture minister A. A. Goltsov. And a 10 April 1974 Council of
Ministers decree pensioned off G. G. Petrov, longtime deputy minister
in charge of cadres, and replaced him with A. A. Pomortsev, secretary
of the ministry's party organization. Pomortsev had become party
chief in inid 1972 after the arrest of one of Matskevich's assistants
for bribetaking had shaken the ministry. A 2 July 1972 PRAVDA article
had described the corruption in the ministry and quoted tha new party
secretary's promise to clean up the mess.
DIFFERENCES OVER POLICY In correcting the ministry's shortcomings,
Polyanskiy may be handicapped by the fact
that he probably disagrees with some of the innovations his ministry
is being urged to promote and by the fact that some of his deputies
appear to be proteges of other Politburo members and may support
innovations he opposes. One of the new methods of labor organization
urged most strongly on the ministry is the unregulated mechanized link
system. Through the years Polyanskiy has consistently ignored the
link system, and only after heavy pressure during 1972 and 1973 did
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21 AUGUST 1974
deputy minister A. P. Chubarov promise in the 15 Augurit 1971,
PRAVDA that the ministry soon would issue rccornniendutlonei of
tho links. Unlike Polyanskiy, both new deputy ministers
appointed in 1972, I. N. Kuzneteov and L. I. Khitrun, appear
to favor links and neither appears indebted to Polyanskiy for
his job. Kuzneteov rreviously was an assistant to Kulakov in
tha Central Committee agriculture section. while first deputy
minister Khitrun was a Belorussian deputy premier and protege
of Belorussian First Secretary Ptnsherov, who has been promoting
his own pet agric itural innovations.
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NOTE
MOSCOW. EAST EUROPE ON ROCKEFELLER NbMIjkTION : Moscow promptly
repovted President Ford's nomination of Nelson Rockefeller no
Vice President on 20 August, and initial comment lane echoed
that on Ford's assumption of the Presidency in expressing
optimism regarding the continuity of U.S. foreign policy.
Reporting Rockefeller's selection, a Moscow domestic radio
commentator observed that "it is pertinent to recall that in
1972 hi, highly evAluatei the steps taken by the governments
of the USSR aid the United Stdtas toward impaoviug their mutual
relations."
Scattered initial comment from Moscow's allies has favorably
noted that Mr. Rockefeller is part of the liberal wing of the
Republican Party and a proponent of realism in foreign policy,
who can thus be expected to work well with President Ford in
continuing the policy of detente. Without explicitly mentioning
the Rockefeller famil;-'s connection with Chase :-anhattan Bank,
an East Berlin domestic service commentator on the 20th pointed
to the presence of a subsidiary of the bank in Moscow as an
indication that the nominee views promotion of economic relations
with the Soviet ;anion as an important element of detente. A
talk carried by Budapest TV th;, same day viewed Governor Rockefeller's
willingness to accept the Vice Presidential nomination as evidence
of the Republican Party's concern to restore its prestige, which
had been "left In tatters by the Nixon crisis." The talk noted
additionally that it was :tr. Rockefeller who had "discovered"
Secretary Kissinger and recommended him to the Nixon Administration.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070035-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070035-0
VDIS TRENDS
21 A?'GUST 1974
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 12 - 18 AUGUST 1974
Moscow (2466 items)
Pekins (988 hems)
Cyprus Cri, is
(7X)
UX
Criticism of Lin Pico and
(7X)
7X
(PRAVDA Observer
(--)
2%)
Confucius
Article
PRC/Arnzil Diplomatic
(--)
72
Chita
(9X)
5%
Relations
U.S. Presidential
Change
(8X)
5%
USSR/Japan Northern 'Perri-
tories Dispute
(3X)
47
DPRK Liberation Anni-
versary
4X
Burmese CP 45th Anniver-
nary
(--)
4
Chile
(3X)
3X
Law of the Sea Conference
(13X)
4X
Soviet Aviation Day
(--)
2%
Cambodia
(12)
JX
Equatorial Guinea Delvga-
tion in PRC
(2014)
3X
Guinea-Bissau UN Seat
(--)
3X
U.S. Presidential Change
(--)
21
These statistics are based on the volerraat commentary output of tiie hint-ow awl
Peking domestic and International radio services The term "commentary" is ume4
to denote the lengthy It. n-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern.
ment cr party statement, or diplrunatle note Items of rxtenxive rrixortaite arr
counted as commentaries
Figures In parrnthears Indicate volume of comment during the prrrrdiug wi,rt
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume arr nut alxaye
discussed In the body of the Trrn:?. Some may have been covered in prior issues.
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070035-0