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September 5, 1974
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- ? munist ro T ends In Com a an e t ? Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00eNrean7 TMeirtial TRENDS In Communist Propaganda Confidential 5 SEPTEMBER 1974 (VOL. XXV, NO. 36) Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 (3)Ni.imr\rrint, Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 This propaganda analysis report k based exclusively on 1111,1trrial carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FIIIS withrnit coordination with oilier U.S. Government components STATSPEC Notional Security Information Unauthorised disclosure sublets to criminal sanctions CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09,42?aplAiRDP85T00871?R00900070037-8 J SEPMUIllt 1974 C ON 1ENTS CYPRUS USSR Presnen for Conference, Claimn NATO Seeking New Basen 1. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS Moncow Seen Mixed Trendn, Strennes Pronpects for Peace 3 INDIAN OCEAN BASES TASS Regrets "Inaccuracy" in President's Remark on USSR Bases 5 VIETNAM Hanoi Marks DRV National Day; Pham Van Dung Addresses Meeting 7 Dung Avoids, DRV Comment Continues Calls for Thieu'n Ouster 9 Peking Comment on DRV Anniversary Suggests Increased Support 11 PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS Peking Strongly Condemns India's "Annexation" of Sikkim 13 USSR Brezhnev Protcge Urges Stronger Party Role in Economy 15 Shift of Some Gosplan Powers to Ministries Under Consideration . . ? 18 NOTES Gierck Visit to U.S.; Slovak Uprising Anniversary; Moscow on Resumption of CSCE; Chinese Leadership; Chinese Militia; Spanish Sahara; PRC-Africa APPENDIX Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 20 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 (;(Rilikgprip5T00875R0101039190N70037-8 _ I - CYPRUS ') SEPTEMBER 19/4 USSR PRESSES FOR CONFERENCE, CLAIMS NATO SEEKING NEW BASES Moscow comment continues to locua on the proposal in the 22 August Soviet Government statement for an enlarged conference on Cyprus in the UN framework, designed to wrest the problem from the "NATO family." Moscow has In effect acknowledged the proposal's cool reception in the West, IZVESTIYA on the 27th calling for "vigilance and a resolute rebuff" to forces opposed to the Soviet Initiative. It has also hinted at the possibility the initiative will fail: PRAVDA on the 28th reported Greek plans to raise the Cyprus question at the forthcoming UN General Assembly If the Soviet proposal "In not supported by other states"; Moscow has thus far not expressed an opinion on this idea. Even-handedly sympathizing with the suffering of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Soviet media have charged that any solution to the problem is being held jealously in NATO hands while the disinterested Soviet proposal has been blocked by those countries, particularly the United States. Moscow had reported Ecevit's preference for the Geneva talks, but has played down the Turkish rejection of the Soviet initiative while emphasizing "NATO"--primarily U.S.--opposition. But Moscow has not explaied Washington's position, merely asserting, in an Arabic-language Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 29th, that it is based on "fear of seeing its shameful role in Cyprus unveiled." The statement came in the context of standard charges of a "colonialist conspiracy" in the eastern Mediterranean ultimately aimed against the Arab world. SPECULATION ON Exploiting the uncertainty about the fate of NATO FACILITIES NATO facilities in Greece following Athens' withdrawal from the military structure of the alliance, Moscow has speculated on NATO plans to fill the gap. Following initial Soviet reaction to suggestions that Israel might offer facilities to the United States,* RED STAR on i! Ceptember, as reported by TASS, claimed that- three countries had emerged as suitable replacements for Greece in NATO's "feverish search" for new bases--Italy, Turkey and Israel. Narrowing down the choices, RED STAR observed that acceptance of proposals by "military circles" * Initial Soviet comment on a possible Israeli base offer, and report- age on the possibility of a Turkish facility, are discussed in the 28 August TRENDS, page 3. Approved For Release 1999/09/2SNFOIM-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 CONFIDENTIAL VIM; TBENOS Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T008751R000000070037-8 In non-NATO Intar! would mean "the IItud unmanking of the NATO rIngleadern in the eyes of the Aral) world." An for Turvey, the paper claimed thin WilN being connidered, although "official circlen" in NATO wore keeping quiet ahout the ponnibIlity of transferring hanen to Turkey "There rem:dna only Italy," RED STAR concluded, pointing out that, "however," broad sectionn of the Italian public were opponed to granting facilitien to NATO. An earlier RED STAR it by Gavrilov and Virogradov on 25 Augunt, I mplicitly underlined a question of prime concern to Moncow In the banes isnue?freedom 01 passage through the Dardanellen. The article repeated?with a notable addition?a ntandard "proximity" formula Iii 'inserting that the nIgnificance of banes on Greek territory was determined, In the opinion of the NATO command, by their proximity to the borders of the socialint countries "and the Black Sea straits," as well as to Arab countries. Such it specific mention of the straits In this formulation is highly unusual, if not unique. RED STAR made no reference to Turkey, and the ponnibIllty of a Turkish NATO base has appeared only infrequently in other comment. A Drobkov article in PRAVDA on 29 August quoted without comment a statement attributed to the Washington POST that in order to compensate for the consequences of Greece's decision to withdraw from the NATO military structure, It would be necessary to expand NATO bases in Italy "and there also 'arises the question of the advisability of creating new bases in Turkey.'" PRAVDA also claimed that NATO was seriously considering the possibility of: "using some part of the territory of Cyprus" tor its "militarist purposes." Soviet comment in general has focused more on Italy as a primary candidate for enlarged NATO facilitl_!s. Moscow has noted reports of U.S. deliveries of military equipment to the island of Lampedusa. And an Italian-language Moscow broadcast on the 30th, claiming increased fascist activity in Italy, declared that the transfer of bases to that country would not only aggravate the general atmosphere in the Mediterranean but would also be "dangerous for the internal situation in Italy in view of the historical precedent in Greece, where a t:!actionary regime was put in power with the brutal inter- ference of NATO." PRAVDA commentator Vladimir Yermakov repeated the theme the following day, charging that NATO bases "are becoming the sources which give material support to subversive fascist forces" within member-states. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 CONFIDENTIAL ER IS TRENDS SLP1EMBER 1974 - 3 - U. S. -SOVIE1 RELATIONS MOSCOW SEES MIXED TRENDS, STRESSES PRUJPECTS FOR PFACE In a varlvty of reports and comment on U.S. developments ovor the past week, Moscow has continued to projrct the attitude of cautious optimism It evinced In Its initial assessments of the Ford Administration. PRAVDA gave n straightforward account of Pri.nfident Ford's prom; conference on 30 August, noting Its con- centration on domestic matters hut stressing the President's positive remarks on the U.S. preinfration for SALT II. Considerable C omment was devoted lo the Senate fq)proval of a record peacetime defense budget, and although much of it was negative some of it professed to see grounds for optimism in the growing opposition to military expenditures purportedly manifested by public opinion and prominent political ligures. In the meantime, there was evidence of a renewal of the hawk-dove controversy in the Soviet Unlon, will; RED STAR and PRAVDA takfilg sharply opposing positions on the appropriate goals for Soviet policy. A common feature of much of the comnent was the assertion that U.S. public opinion and prominent political figures were firmly -.omitted to the goals of detente. An article in IZVESTIYA on 28 August, for example, quoted Elmer Stoats, Comptroller General of the United States, as saying that the American people had become distrustful of the Defense Department because, aE IZVESTIYA put it, they felt that it WAS pursuing policies inconsistent with the current international situation. Tho article quoted Senator Brooke as saying that the quest for 3ecurity should be based not only on military measures but on "continuing efforts within the framework of the SALT talks." It also quoted Secretary Kissinger's statement in a 20 August speech questioning the utility of seeking security through a constant buildup of strategic forces. Such an effort, it quoted him as saying, "will lead only to a new balance at higher levels of complexity and risk." This article and others noted the impact of deteriorating economic conditions on U.S. public opinion, interpreting this as a factor which was encouraging opposition to the Pentagon's policies. On the 28th and 29th of August and on the 1st of September, RED STAR published articles which were more militant and critical of tne United States than the general run of comment in the central press and radio media. The last one, an editorial, included a statement on the goals of Soviet policy which expressed in classic terms the preference of the Soviet hawks: "The stronger our country Approved For Release 1999/09/21,04ERZU5T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/0/281?til*-RDP85TOW?ipM01:03740037-8 - 4 - nod lin armed forcen become, the nhorter will be the rondo lending mankind toward lantinv pence." The prevloun dny, PRAVDA, in on article on the Soviet proponal In the United Nal:Jowl to bon wenther warfare, had Included n nimilnrly clnnnic ntntement of the dove ponition--Brezhnev'n ntntement on 21 July at the Polinh Sjem that "if you want pence, you must purnue it policy of peace nnd ntruggle for thin policy." Thene contranting formulas have cropped up repeatedly over the past year in n ueemingly connintent pattern of internal polemicn. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 ,? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 CONFIDENTIn FB IS TRENDS 5 SEPTEMBER l9/4 - 5 - INMAN OCEAN BASES TASS REGRETS 'INACCURACY' IN PRESIDENT'S REMARK ON USSR BASES President Ford's remark--in response to n queation in his 28 August news conference about expansion of the U.F. military hose on Diego Garcia--that the Soviet [Jul on had three hutian ocean bases drew Moscow's first criticism, albeit mild, of the President in a belated TASS commentary. The initial TASS account of the news conr:erence made no mention of the Indian Ocean issue, although a fulAT PRAVDA report on 30 August did note that the President said he supported the expansion (the President said "limited" expansion) of the United States' Diego Garcia base. But where the President went on to add that he did not view this as any challenge to the Soviet Union, that the USSR already had three major naval operating bases in the Indian Ocean, and that this "particular consCruc'ion [D[ego Garcia] is, I think, a wise policy," PRAVDA said only that the President claimed that expansion of the base "would not complicate the situation in the area." PRAVDA also reported him as concluding that the base should not "lead to any spread of problems" in the Middle East. On the 31st, TASS commenLator Krasikov mildly chided the President for a "regrettable inaccuracy" in declaring that expansion of the U.S. military base on Diego Garcia did not represent any challenge to the Soviet Union "which, as he said, already has three major naval operating bases" in the Indian Ocean. Krasikov carefully absolved the President himself of the error, declaring that he had been, "unfortunately, mis- informed by his staff," as in reality "there are neither threc nor even a single Soviet naval base" in tie Indian Ocean. Moscow last winter, in a flurry of comment about the Diego Garcia issue, had denied that the Soviet Union was operating naval bases in the area and countercharged that the United States was planning to construct a chain cf bases to control the sea routes and intimidate the littoral nations.* Krasikov pointedly recallf:d "recent" testimony by CIA Director Colby before the Senate Armed services Committee--testimony in a 11 July closed-door hearing, made public on 2 August--as reported in the New York TIMES on 3 August. Krasikov noted that Colby had described the Soviet military preserv:e in the Indian Ocean "as a relatively small one"; the TIMES quotee. Colby as saying small "and inactive." Krasikov * See the 21 February 1974 TRENDS, page 19. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 19906/257a1A-RDP85T010,0403pM70037-8 - 6 - also noted that Colby had expresaed the opinion that the final level of Soviet forces In the Indian Ocean "would depend on what forces the United States alloted for that area." Summing up "Pentagon plane for making Diego Garcia n "major U.S. naval base" in the Indian Ocean, Kranikov noted that these plant) had met with "serious objections" from the U.S. Congress and had triggered a wave of protests from countries in the Indian Ocean. While the Krasikov TASS commentary was broadcast in English to the United States and Britain (Diego Garcia being a British possession), publicity for the commentary seemed afted primarily at Asian audiences, with rebroadcasts in Indian languages as well as Indonesian, Burmese, Persian and others. Soviet media apparently did not pick up a Defense Department spokes- man's statement subsequent to the President's remarks that listed the three Soviet bases an Berbera, Somalia; Umm Qasr, Iraq; and Aden, South Yemen. But a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on 4 September cited the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA) as labeling "fabri- cations" U.S. Defense Department reports on the existence of a Soviet military base in Iraq. INA, Moscow radio said, declared that the Pentagon needed such .-.eports to justify the establishment of a "big military base" in Diego Garcia and the presence of U.S. naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, and Iraq was "indignant" over the presence of military bases in the area. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25vI GIA-RDP85T00875R000000070037-8 sErrEmiliT I 974 - 7 - VIETNAH HANOI MARKS DRV NATIONAL DAY; PHAM VAN DONG ADDRESSES MEETING Hanoi marked the 2 SePtember 29th anniversary of the founding of the DRV in a traditional fashion on the Int with a wreath-laying ceremony at the cemetery of "fallen heroes," a diplomatic reception, and an evening rally which heard Premier Pham Van Deng deliver his customary address. The usual display of top leader- ship at the rally included--in addition to Phem Van Deng--Politburo members Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Clap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi. Last year in a departure from normal practice, Defense Minister Clap was absent from the anniversary ceremonies, however, his attendance this year is censister,L with his practice in recent months of appearing in public at the time of major events.* Of the Politburo members, Le Duc The has not attended a National Day rally since 1971, and Huang Van !lean since 1970. Neither Van Tien Dung not Tran Quoc Hoan has regularly attended the gathering, although Dung was present last year--presumably as a stand-in for Giap. Pham Hung's whereabouts remain unreported by the media, and his last public appearance was in September 1967. NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Hun Tho, who was in Hanoi during national day for the second consecutive year--this time on a stopover between visits to the DPRK and GDR--also participated in the major events of the day and spoke briefly at the rally. PHAM VAN DUNG As last year, Pham Van Dong in his rally speech RALLY SPEECH divided his remarks between the DRV economy and the implementation of the peace agreement. While generally reviewing the level of recovely achieved by the various sectors if the economy, the premier's discussion of the DRV's many postwar domestic problems was cursory and for the most part did not include specific measures to deal with them. * After a brief period of activities in late September and early October 1973, Giap did not appear in public for almost seven months-- then returning to public view to participate in celebrations marking May Day and the 20th anniversary of the communist victory at Dien Bieh Phu. After appearing at a banquet on 28 May, he ' again dropped from sight until 28 August when he addressed a division of troops on the occasion of the rational anniversary. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/0(9htil.tlk-RDP85T004'4000W0037-8 Anide from expounding on the need to fulfill the 1.976 and 1975 plans In an of next year'n 45th annivernary of the party, 30th annivernary of the DRV'n founding, and 85th anniversary of Ho Chi Mlnh'n birth, long-range planning wan other- wise ignored in Dong'n speech. Thin ntood in contrant to his more distant look Into the future presented in last year's speech that characterized the 1973-1975 period an a prelude to the "long-term plan of 1976-1980." Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi's 4 February speech before the DRV National Assembly formally announced that the DRV's second five-year plan would take place from 1976 to 1980 and urged the study of a "10- to 15-year developmental plan."* Since Nghi'n speech, Vietnamese communist propaganda has not elaborated on these planning goals and Pham Van Dong'n failure to make even token mention of the five-year plan suggests uncertainty in the Hanoi hierarchy as to the direction their economy is to take, a year and a half after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. Uncertainty about future goals was also suggested by Pham Van Dong's failure to reiterate previously voiced North Vietnamese resolve to slow the growth of its population. While the premier did take tangential note of the North's "rapidly increasing population" in his discussion of problems involved in commodity distribution, he did not follow through with any elaboration on the population problem as a whole. It would have been particularly appropriate for Dong to have pursued the population issue since Hanoi had just released, on 29 August, the results of the North's second general census, conducted on 1 April. A 30 August NHAN DAN editorial pegged to the census results confirmed the regime's intention, spelled out in leaders speeches earlier this year, of encouraging birth control and called for a reduction in the rate of growth from the present 2.9 percent to two percent and eventually to a "much smaller percentage." The premier, in his remarks on the situation regarding the peace agreement, reiterated standard complaints against the Saigon government and alleged U.S. intervention in the South and "massive" introduction of weapons and war materiel. Whereas last year Dong had echoed the exultant tone of Hanoi comment in the wake of the "victory" of the peace agreement, this year he offered a somber assessment, accusing the United States and Thieu of having "wrecked the peace" and "sabotaged" the agreement. He praised * Le Thanh Nghi's National Assembly speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 February 1974, pages 12-15. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25:(:)tigRWI'85T00875R000300t70037-8 5 NEIMM111.:It 1974 9 the southern fight against. "nibbling and pacification," but did repent the more optimistic cloims about mllitary achievements In the South which have appeared in the propaganda in recent days. Dung's traditional express ton of thanks to the DRV's socialist Il lies failed to include the customary mention of the support and assistance thee nations had rendered and was diluted to an assertion of "warm sentiments and heartfelt and profound gratitude to the peoples" of the Soviet Union, China, and the socialist countries. Likewise lacking in this year's address was any allusion to restoration of international tinily in the communist movement--an Issue that has been raised in his past national day talks. DONG AVOIDS, DRV COMMENT CONTINUES CALLS FOR THIEU'S OUSTER Pham Van Dong in his anniversary address did not voice the revived line, reflected In scattered communist propaganda since 15 August, on an urban struggle In the South to "topple" Thieu and set up a new government to implement the peace agreement. Instead, Dong adhered to the formulation which had been standard since the peace agreement and reflects its spirit--that is, calling for a struggle against Thieu and "for peace, freedom, democracy, a better life, and national concord," instead of Thieu's ouster. The "topple Thieu" slogan was also absent from the NI-IAN DAN anniversary editorial, but it appeared in the editorial of 29 August and other propaganda and was voiced by PRC/NFLSV leader Nguyen Huu Tho on the same platform with Dong at the anniversary rally, Dong's failure to embrace the formulation on overthrowing Thieu and its continued appearance In the media may reflect unresolved differences in the North Vietnamese leadership regarding the situation in the South and the best course of action there. Since the peace agreenent, only one of Hanoi's top leaders is known to have called attention to the ultimate objective of ousting Thieu. Second? ranking Politburo member Truong Chink took an atypically strong line on the South in a 9 February speech--as reported by Hanoi radio-- welcoming the just?concluded session of the National Assembly. While routinely endorsing the "immediate tasks" of economic reconstruction, Truong Chinh went on to stress that "we must not forget that the puppet administration has not been toppled after the U.S. withdrawal" and to recall that Ho Chi Minh had "urged our people to 'fight until all Americans are ousted and the puppets CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 16:gabiall.1/4b1A-RDP8#00t#,OR:).0070037-8 - 10 - tire toppled.'"* Truong Chinh did not go on, nn recent propagando hon, h) identity Thleu'n overthrow an a goal of the cnrront ntrnggle In the :;onth. lier Politburo member, Hanol'n top economic planner he Thnnh ? neemed to be reprenenting ('oncern?) nt vnrlance with Truong ChInh'n In an nrticle In the 14 Mnrch NHAN DAN, brondennt by Hanoi radio. Nghl wnrned thnt "we nhould not hp bent on mnintnining vigilance and mnking preparntionn for war, and thin) become nnntendy and undecided In mobilizing all forcen and latent capabIlitien to Intennively porlorm the tnnk of economic rentora- tIon nnd development with the aim of nchieving nociolint induntrinli- zntion." PRLSS, RADIO A 29 August NHAN DAN editorial went beyond previoun CtkiMLIAT recent_ Hanoi propaganda to oiler the eva I tint I on 11181 "conditions are ripe" in urban arvan "for the development of a large and broad mann ntruggle movement to oppose the United Staten and topple Thieu." The editorial maintained that the Saigon government in plagued by acute internal disputes and "serioun contradictions" of an "explonive character." The editorial's appraisal of h military outlook in the South was mark .A by nimtlar optimism. portrayed a "new nituntion" in which the ARVN "has reduced fLn large-scale operations while nbandoning many isolated positions, shrinking back in an attempt to avoid losses and reorganize its defense system." The communist forces, according to the editorial, are in a "new stance" with a "good position to continuously attack and win victories." Repeating a claim made occasionally by Hanoi media since last March, the editorial maintained that the communist.n--in the Mekong Delta and the central Truong Bo plains--have recovered "almost all the areas which the enemy has illegally occupied since 28 January 1973" and "in some areas" even improved the "position and strength of tqc revolution" in comparison with the situation when the pence agreement was signed.** An unattributed "article" broadcast by Hanoi in Vietnamese on 1 September repeated the formulation on toppling Thieu and forming a new government and was even more confident than the NHAN DAN * Truong Chinh's remarks on toppling Thieu were included in recorded excerpts of his speech broadcast by Hanoi on the following day, but briefer reports on his speech in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN omitted the passage on fhieu. ** Previous Vietnamese communist claims to have recovered territory are noted in the TRENDS of 22 May 1974, page 20. Approved For Release 1 e9fitiON25iACIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/251YelirAlt5P85T008710Vici71nl;ip7IT5)137-8 - I I -- ed II or fal In lippra In I Pp. ti., :11 y nit wit lot; In I;nut II Viet nail;The bromic:tilt nut (In iy flat ly nta I ed I nal I err I ory 111 I 1;i111t11 I nilE. iii g? I ho poilep Avr rd hnd hrvii rvga hilt a I no hid I r ta'd I ha I I he mIlit :Iry ha I once (,1 I o l'et?r1 11:111 /1111 It r11, P, IV Ng I Iii' f.'011111111111 /1I /1 "nnpretrary on I Ill' MI I It 41 ry I runt ." !Inch an titnnia 1111 VO. ('I 41 1111 01 Military litipri i or fly In innonta I ; Hann I propaganda normally follows thv less categorical line, reflected In Dong's national day speech, that thv balance of forces In moving more and wry in favor of the communists. Claims that the balance hos tipped to favor the commnnists hat. been raised In two important series of articles by the North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victory), first In August and later in November and December 1973.* Chien Thang's Angnst articles not only claimed that the "Vietnamese revolutionary forces," were ntronger than the "reactionary forces," but also praised the "extremely important role" that North Vietnam Ii istorically had payed In tills balance. In the past year a particularly positive appraisal of the balance of forces was of by Defense Minister Gimp in a 7 May television talk which echoed the Chien Thang view that the "posture and forces" of the revolution were "much stronger" than Saigon's "as far as the entire country is concerned." Thv North's relationship to the struggle in South Vietnam was addressed In exhortatory terms at the conclusion of the 1 September article broadcast by Hanoi. The radio all that "revolution means offensive" and vowed: In this autumn of revolution, the entire North, encouraged by new developments of the southern revolution and overwhelmed by enchuslasm and pride, pledges to wholeheartedly assist the South in at its ultimate goals. PEKING COMMENT ON DRV ANNIVERSARY SUGGESTS INCREASED SUPPORT Peking this year marked the DRV National Day In much the same fashion as in 1973, but elements in the behavior and content of the media may reflect somewhat greater support for the Vietnamese. Thus, while last year the Chinese leaders' message was publicized * The Chien Thang articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 29 August 1973, pages 7-9, and 12 December 1973, pages SI?S3. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 CotWIDENTIAL THENI):1 ') SEPTEMBER 19/4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 - 1) - only by Vletnamene medln, the greetingn this year -wry broadennt by Peking rndlo'n Vietnnmesp-langusge service. In nddition, the mennnge broke new ground in wishing the Vietnnmene greater Luecenn "in their ntrnggle h)r the eventual libPrntion of the entire natIon."* The ununl nnniverttnry editorial In PEOPLE'S DAILY alno used langunge which went further in nupporting evsmunlint military netioh In South Vietnam. Thus, the editorial lauded the Soutil Vietnamese "people'n" effortn to "hit bnck in strength" against Saigon attackn. Previounly, Peking hnd been more enutioun in end3rning communlnt attacks. A 21 November 1971 joint communique marking the -Jinn: of PRG/NFLSV lender Nguyen Hun Thc did affirm that the South Vietnamese were entitled to hike "all renolute meanuren".- language more rentrnined than the current editorial. Peking not avoided exprennion oi support for counterattacks in comment marking the PR(' i; 5th annlvernary thin June. (:onniotent with Peking's line In the past year, the editorial charged the (VN with violating the peace agreement "with the nupport of the United Staten." At the time of the annivernary Inst. year. Peking wan avoiding criticism of either the United Staten or Saigon. Though Peking followed last year's practice :n avoiding offern of assistance while pledging support and nolidarity with its allies, the Chinese took more care to st.resn the Ideological betas of Sino-Vietnamese relations and to underline Peking'a internationalint. duty to back the Vietnamese. Lant year the leaders' mennage and editorial made no reference to Marxism-Leninism, and only the editorial once mentioned Peking's "proletarian internationalist duty"; thin year both the message and editorial stressed that Sino-Vietnamese relations were founded on "Marxism-leninism and proletarian internationalism" and that China would resolutely perform Itn "proletarian Internationalit duties." The DRV ambassador's anniversary reception was attended by Li Hnien-nien and Hue Kuo-feng; two CCP Politburo members--Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Hniao-ping--had nimilarly attended lant year. NCNA once again reported toast o. rather than speechen, by the Chinene foreign minister and DPV ambannador at the conclave. NCNA coverage of annivernary receptiann in Peking dinclosed that DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, Vice Mininter of National Defense Tran Sam, and Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission Nguyen Van Bien are presently in Peking. Ly Ban, who in previoun years has negotiated agreements on PRC aid, had been noted present in Peking, earlier, greeting the DRV economic delegation headed by Le Thank Nghi on its arrival in China on 1 August. * Hanoi radii's Vietnamese-language version of this phrase differed slightly, and translates as "in their struggle to liberate the entire nation." Approved For Release 1999/0SIMACIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09(/25r:ICEA-IRDP85T00875,F1,9,TrirT01937-8 - I 1 PRC FORL1GN RIAA1 1 ONS PEKING STRONGLY CONDEMNS INDIA'S "ANNEXATION" OF SIKKIM A 3 September PEOPLE' DAILY Commentator orticle Iran made the nharpent Chinene critIcitim of India In recent yearn, condemning the Gandhi government's recent moven t9 tighten Indian control over Sikkim And warning of wider Indian ambitienn In South Asia. The article wan prompted by the Indian government 'n 29 Anwmt proponal for a conntiLutional amendment gtving Sikkim representation In the Indian parlinment and a ntatun 8imilar to that (d an Indian ntate. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article In July had voiced milder criticism of Indian ambitionn in regard to Sikk;m, softpedallng criticism of Min. Gandhi and avoiding explicit con- dermration of Indian actionn. Denouncing the proponed amendment as a "flagrant act of colonialist expansion" and a "grave incident,'' Commentator alleged that reducing Sikkim to an Indian colony wan merely part of Indin'n longntanding denign to become a "nub-superpower" and !.o "lord it over South Asia." Making a rare reference to pant Indian aggrandizement fostered by Nehru, the article went on to accuse the present Gandhi regime of going even further along the expansionint road, citing particularly its role In dismembering Pakintan and itn use of India' n recent succennful atomic test to engage in "nuclear black- mail." It alno made the first Chinese reference to An alleged Indian government scheme to establish a group of South A,:ian C: ountries "with itnelf an the overlord." Peking typically charged an alleged supportive Soviet role behind India's moven, asserting that Moscow's' backing for increased Indian control over Sikkim hat; hared Its position as "protector of Indian expannionints." Peking naw the current cooperation hetween the two ntatem an "the main cause" of inntabillty In South Ania and "a serious threat" to other South Asian states. The Chinese accompanied their attack with several NCNA replays of South Asian comment?Including nome from India?critical of New Delhi's stance toward Sikkim. Peking at the same time has portrayed I avorably Ito own relations with smaller South Asian states. On 28 August, NCNA responded favorably to Nepal's efforts of rice May to di !;arm anti-PRC Tibetan refugees residing in Nepal. The report noted that the rebeln had infiltrated into Nepal iollw.wing their retreat with the Dalai Lama into India In the wake of the 1959 Tibetan uprising and that they had received foreign aid CON1:DENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 CONFIDENTIAL FIIIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00815ikoblotaY70037-8 from unnpecilled "rich and powerful countrien." It pralned Ilepal'n effortn to dinnrla the TIbettnut and thereby 'future Nepnlene Internal necurtty and eliminolo n nvuultive irritant In SIno- New-deny roIntionn. And NCNA on 29 Augunt reported ihnt the Chtnene Red Cronn noclety that dny not!Ated Uri Bangladenh counter- part thnt It wnn granting 2 million yunn in relief. goodn for recent flood vIctimn. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/251: ClAi-RE)P85T008751R000300070037-8 `i1,11 I 1110,1? I 9/4 II S S MLA INLV EGL ONUS MONGER PARTY POLL I N ECON(FY 'the c I eat v!it Ind I cat ion ye 1 71 what lit t?-:hnev may have had In mind by III ri ettibt?I I 9/ I (l".;11 plenum co 1 1 1 (7 1 :I "pa; I v Fit v le" lit economic I cadet iIi Iji liar; liven pi twitted by 1)flepropet I ()yak F11 at 1I1?4?1 01 at /...I. Vat chenko iii an Aup,iint I IIKI1AINY lout na I at I I c If'. 1111' 1111'711'1 1 pt 14)11, :144'4)141111g t 4) Val Clic111?), 1 71 a 1114)11' :IC !VC 1)311 Iy 1 411 r :It a 1 I 1 ('Vi' Ill it l'4'47114)In 1 C Il ('7 ill I (111-111:11, 111r, :111(1- 11111)1 1 4 It IV, al I Valli Cal 11'11114)11(1 1 tip?, 111' 1 11111(.111(m al I by Independent mit hot It III VI?1,111?1111 ;111111111i 'It I III (17 N. A wKli I :11 177 1 III 11(11c:17;ed pat t V ;iU I Iv' !im III I hi' Vt4)114,111V 11:1VC 1)Cr11 171.141r ()1.4.. Vat clicla,4)' t ft 1 1' at I rant 11 at 11111 14111 11r1 It Ii.' 1111W:11;11 l\ :1,1!11?1 t I yr :11141 4111r -111(11?41 111 11 i. pi I' 17111 at I (it folk, examp Ii' t77 Inc 1 he fit atidni d c:ivral 1117(1 II:itI v rI t it ink !Ilion I (1 Cd1 1 III)! () t akr IIVP1 he 1 unct on!. I'! economic nth In Int 1;I! tira), a11(1 becatiNe I t alit hot I!: c Ira! I v mettibet Ili c717r1ev' 17 ent mirage . lirrii'litievs a own 1.:ortha t he "part v t v I r" econom ic admini it rat I on at t he December, p (limn 11' fI mut h t be ex pin I (It'd . 14711-11111}.: a,p,a JIM t a "narrow econom c" or even "1 eclitioc rat i " app! ()aril a cuoiyom 1l11,111111!0 I al 111' 1.;11 I ell 1 411 1 "pill 1 y appi oach in al I !There!: ot i?conom I iv! t v." lie dec ed t hat t he pat t v'r: economic po I 17y eAt I'd VII "t P i 1 1;11 improvement of et (mom c !rade/ !Ail', by p I at Inv, t a !it' tent it In and pat I y ba!ii 7: .111,1 mIll I I I I (ril (If hr 111;P: r4c!: ? III h IN 114 Wm rivrth,11 !?1)4?4?( h ;(41417'd I ha t ;1 put y !it I'" IIVI)1 ye!: 1 'gilt hip, bit raw-rat i !ail and nal ri!!...!-depar t !!?!' I ??:?;; I 7:: ; hat ; "t?!o.eili pat i? appi oat. It" i!: t CI,11111 IIir it:1111 ill? W(,1 (?(.1,11t,1:111 ('1 E,I1II; With mob i I I ;at ion ,,I 111:11o:e!: . 111 I IIr IA lune !Terch he a ko der I a red t hat "we will cont !nue 17 7 7?!:!! 1 n' t? Iv and on!: 7it en( IV .1!.!;1'1 .1 IA'll 1111 !11 ? pal y !it y n(III' %.,..17 I ill 711 ,it ()I " II! '7: imp 1 1, It u a 1 1 1 or more 1).11. t. V manayyment i7I t he onomy rt..% I In t poi icy 'lit Iy at tic 171?7 r I (7101 plenum. In t h ii I .7! I hat p I enum, party oil in iii !i were rile( raged I a t ithe a more act 1 ve role in economic mat ter!:. and 7:(7171' diiiplit:ement (7 I et- adm in 1771 rat or!: by part y t71 !fetal!. appeal rd t o have t aken place. Will le t here ha!: been no 71 ign :1!: yet t hat a ti 111111 ar deVs' I ornent ha!: emerged I ram laNt year '7: plenum. the Vat chenko art it; le se r veN not ice that pre!:!aire!: 1 or expand lug the party role Iii t ripliere remain act ivy. coNriimlyi Im. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/00i2ANPIA-RDP85TQQ875R000300070037-8 NEPTI'AIIER I9/4 VAICI II 14K0 AR; ICI I Vat It4 ntt I cli, out II IC(1 "Party y I(.--? For All Links of Administration," cited ilrezhnov's Oecember statementa about asserting n "party style" and "party ,i,iproach" In all economic activity and his June state- ment abinit assert. lug a "port y cityl e" Iii I he work of stAue organs. Ili! then procecsed to out I Inv cite ryilfled Rd(' f or the party, presenting tic Icc at; the key to progress. Ile called the party'ri experience in leading the economy "one of the most effective factors for further speeding of economic progress" and declared t hat "Introthict I on of n party style III nil CChr I (nil; vconm Ic activity creates the fundamental basis for improving the aystem of adminlstraiion." He called on party olgans to teaca economic lenders to "combine one-man leadership with collogialJy." Citing a lagging plant in his oblast, he asserted that thr.! plant had failed its plan precisely because the director "did not rely on the party organization and ceased to consider the collt,:tive's opinion." In contrast, hv held Up as a model a plant diroctor who "does not overpower hi ft subordinates with his authorit!,," In "not ashamed" to learn from others, "relies on the party organization," and "considers collective opinion." Thus, one-man liadeti-hip is combined with collegiality, and this, according to Vatchenie, "displays party style in the work of an economic leader." Other points made by Vatchenke have a N111111:11- thrust . He raised the need for increased part y ciirckIngon r mum ic f;, Who 114' not ed are smut Imes guilty ,1 1 rand , waste and other abuses . He recalled that since thr CPI-IF Congress, the number of party organizations which pons.,sscd thi? right to .-conomic IC tivities "has sIgnilicantIy increased." He praised the practice oI appointing party oificials economic leadership posts where they can Introduce "the best fratutes of party style" into economic work. Noting that the Decembel plenum had posed the task of improving the organizational structure of economic administration, Vatchenko described the extensive changes in economic organization which had taken place in iii oblast--the reorganization of trusts and enterprises into combines and associations, and the conso lfdaLion ol hundreds of workshops and other units. He proudly declared I. hat by these measures his oblast had cut administrative personnel by 9,000. While Vatcheuko by no means denied the need for introducing now methods?computers, scientific forecasts, sociological data, etc.--he made it clear that the party itself should closely control the process of modernization. addition, he declared that "no matter CON,'IDLNTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/251POIALRDP85T00875R000300070037-8 !;11.1irini,v I 9 //i - I, Dow gt cat ;ire 11.;, mil I evement it til I lir tic lent II IT-1 eclita, 1 og I cal roVii1111 I ," I I I "tiof 1110 Mar II Iii.', bitt III:111" W111(11 I r: de' I II 1 , III' pat I y t rt;ponti jI !Illy I of t I :1 I ii I lig (4'1)11(111)1c I cad(' I it 1111(1 tI Ill ftolll lig emit on 1(16(1 Ili NUM In Nome respect lir Cill I: I 11:11 lou I rfirftif)1 0 t he i I t (Annul ;niers following f Ih?c(1111)rr 1 (,()() pl . At that p 1 entitti , accord I lig to iLII)lipiIW'iit art_ IC I rn Cd 1 f oF 1 I. 1 ii, lirc;?:1111OV had noVel r1?11 Ir f 'Zed Corip1;111 find Ilc CrIlf itl Crialoili It :1(1111101st rat out; I ot t hit poor show fog of thy economy. The Name tiourceti Ind 1 cat t hat Ilre7.1inev pushed lot Inc caned party I tit erven; I on ;is a mo;i1o: of I 4?MV(IN. I I he Li It unt Ititi timi? part I 171 emit 1 'ilia t Ion oI t hese I tid !cat him; wait pi ()V 1(1(.11 by brf';'.11IWV Ii Iunu,'I I at t 24 t It Cl",;11 Congress In 19/ 1 , where he reca 1 led wit h evident approva I t hat I he December 191,9 plenum had spec I I led t hat quest loin; of tidm in lot rat Ion do not 1 nvol ve just a "narrow 0 1 it I I' of 1 1' ad e in mid nyct f a 1 I iiit;? but al I pat I y, sov let and economic organ I I onN" ond t hat " Imp! ove- 'tient til admit, int rat. Itm IN tin Import ant Inherent part " of t he part y leader/di I p of t he l'0070wmy 1:0 1 1 OW I Ilg tin' 1/v(71'1111W r I 969 plenum, an :IrIV 19/0 Cent t 1 Conan t t eV decree ordered part y omit It t ve!: of min 1 tit r I on t t ;Ike a more art( VC FOIC in rutin Ing t 11C I F In liii tit r I es and t o ac t t he Cent Fa 1 It t tigeIl to. At t ticks on m iii Int or 1.11 Ind INC I p1 Inc , bureaucrat I ton and want e accompon led by :I campa Iwo) t cut unnecessary odmin I tit rat i personne I and abol I oh tinnitcessary :idmi Of ut rat I vc 1 Ink;:, wli I ch by April 1970 had 0i imlnat rd I :11,000 admi n1 ut rat I ve pot: It I on'; In t he 161::-ilt .11 off fc I tilt; wet-e lot induced int ii Iii Ii government pot; it I ow:, such an tlIC Cant' of obkom !;cr re. f ry , I coin ing I I t';t deput y ha 1 mon ot Gosp I au. 1 Ile Inc reaNetl part Involvement Wan ttymbo I Ical I)' capped In mid-19/0, Wholl II 'Hint' 1 I add ronned Kouyg in'; Count- ! I of il Ill it tI N--t he only I. Inn' Ilrezlinev hat: ever No I ormai Iv Int i titled iii ' sphere. Dt.a.144,11 11-!(A/51, CI_ I QUI_ Ilre7.1inev 141(10-opt, t rovt:k co 1 league!: have hectn pl ayti rig a prominent role in promot iuij chit; "party ut y 1 e" t hem.. . Al t hough 1ire7.1inev J.; Dec.-ember plenum st at ement impl y I ng a y,reater part y role In economic :Rimini !it ra- t. ion Lave not caught on wide! y, t wo lead i ng organN of the Ukra in an Cent ral Comm( t re--whose 1 1 rut secretary IN I armor Dnepropet rovuk leader Shcherb ly--have recent 1 y picked up t he theme!: en thutti ord I cal 1)' in editor !al s. The 19 July issue of t he dal 1 y RADYANSKA UKRA1 NA and the August issue of the month! y theoret ica 1 journal KOK1.111N I ST CKRAINY quoted al 1 ol Brezhnev N plenum Stat. ements on assert ion of "party style," condemnation of a "technocrat ic" approach, and definition of "two pillars." coNF I DENT I Al, Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/2511ClAkRDP85T008q5RONa00070037-8 !11:1"11:1III:14 /6 - Another tomer Hneptopetrovnk G. E. Tnnkonov, lirvzhnev'a I ongtime annintant for domentic offoirm, won identified on the authorizing ogent for the publicotion of the volume containing litezhnev'n confrovernIal December 19/1 plenum remarkn--o collection ()I li z v Ngl- I rill I III 1 NpveClicti plib I I NINNI NN I if 1.41?1)111:1ty In connect Ion wIt h I IN' in Id -HA ru Ii v rg in 1 ond ann I ye rnory. Itio comparat I vi' I y yore Ind lc ti t I 4111 v (I It)),n I 1-v tq( iini hi] I I y, 1 lir I tin of I IN, VI) I 'cA VI I4'71 I IN, IIiiIt'I I ;it lou: "Renponn lb I for !spiting - -G.E. Tnnkonov." Thin voltam. IN ununnol In Hutt It includes excerptn from lirezhnev'n unpuhlinhed Decembet plennm speech. The main collection of Brezhnev nperchen--fonr volumen covering the period of 19 October 1964 thfough 24 March 19/4--doen not include ony Ilrezhaev nperchen At Centlal Committee plennms which were not pnblinhed at the time Of the plenumn. Even the fourth volume of Brezhnev npvechen, covering June 1912 to Morel( 19/4, which CAMC out on 21 Morch--after the agricultnrol collection?included nothing from the December 1973 npeech. The big four-volume collection WNN prepored under the nupervinion (d lirezhnev'n foreign offairs annintont A.M. Aleknondrov, who likewine signed each volume 3N "renponsible for Innning." The separately Issued agricultural volume included not only Brezhnev'n ntatemetAn on agriculture but neveral of his ntotemehln calling for an 1m:1-vaned party role in running the economy--statementn which appear have arouned controverny.* PRAVDA Announced on "2 Augunt that an updated, "enlarged" version of the ogriculturol collection hon bren 1!;!mcd. reinnuing of a lirezhnev collection only monthn after the original edition in NN !, 1 ,?xp 1.1 by ;;;,.yi.irg&'v. tutu.' material which could be included. Brezhnev han deliveted few npeechen thin you and only two touching on agriculture. remainn to be seen whether anything han been added to or deleted from the new ed It . SHIFT OF SOME GOSPLAN POWERS TO MINISTRIES UNDER CONSIDERATION Organizational chongen affecting the relative powern and renpective I unctions (11 Gosplan and the USSR minintries were among the innnes discunned at the December 1973 CPSU plenum, judging by two recent articles by top government oificialo. Coop 11411 Deputy Chairman * For evidence of contention over 'Alese remarks, see the Supplementary Article in the 14 August 1974 TRENDS, "Contention over Party Role in Leading Soviet Economy." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/26)DICIANK)P85T00875M00300,070037-8 19/4 A . V , Boehm- in wr t 1 ng Iii t ",)1( Anglia, I rriit t,l ECONWIIC, GAZETTE, Ind (litI ed t hat t he plenum had recommend( d t he I Fannie!' (II some Gooplan powers fIt t mini st r Mort1W11 I I (1111)1 YOH t 1 y encouraged by t at t It tides expressed at t ho p 1 01111111, l'f. IIII 111-m hided 131n I tit et- ()1 !wit rument. Malt lug, Ant omat Ion Egli I pmen t and Con t To I ;;yst ems K .N . Itudnev argued In (lit' 1 `.) August t hat mini at r I es nhou d be g 'yen more ex t eno 1 r !gilt 11 in pi ono lug. A t hough both ()I I lc lal fi 1.1hied t 17111)11,C I' I ranuf or r (fig powers to m Iii I t_ ries, linchur In argued t hat import :int d nagreement Fl tillIflt he reso 1 ved het ore t his can he done. Rudnev comp! hied 01 duo I eat hal Iii plant) I ng by mini uit r iert and p Ann !lig organs and der 1 :if-v(1 t hat t herr was an urgent need I o dee 1(10 t he quest lou oh expand lug t he r I ght s of Ill foist 1.1es , espy(' I II I I )P Iii plann Inv, and :nit!' in I st rat on . bac r lii, not I ng he dl urtinru lou tit t he December plenum, concluded that "apparent 1 y" some of I Wit: t I out; ti I Ili Fl organ t Ion can be t rant; I erred to branch mi III ut it es. llowevi,r, he added that "ra Iii lug t he role of mini nt r and expand lug the! r Independence" depend On FH() lull On of tit her quest I ow; , espec 1111 1 y t matter of t rails! err lug mini Strict; It) a product Ion II ssor fat. I on at rout tire . Ile point cd out Lhat the minist ri !MVO !Wen NI Ow 1 11 fulfill] up, the March 1973 dee rue order flip, es tab 1 I ahimcuul of product i on af4NOC int Ions , and t hat t. here wan st III widespread di sag reemen t ;111 ho whether a ministry should he regarded pr !marl I y an an administrative organ or an econom 1 C organ. Bac:burin st at ed that he pc rsona y avo red keep lug nil ii I it r I ct bmti ea I I y adm in i at rat I ve Ihudnev, a pioneer In tab I I till tug cont -account lug p roduc Ii oh a fiflOC 10111, took the oppon it o vi ewpo int In hi n art id l 0, at roqgl y ur lule t ha t nit!! r be made p1:11111in i y responr, ihle, just I Ike ent rpr Nes and product I on aNsoe I ;It I OM; RlIdtIOV t111114 f.',0e!: beyond the 1973 decision to replace mini at r main admin I at rat Ions wi th production associations. transferring the ministries' subdivisions to opt' rat fon on pr Inc I pl es of economic Inc en I lye and leaving on 1 y t he t op 1 eve 1 of the min If:try as an adminint rat lye organ . CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 4+, CoNFIDENTIAL FIIIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T008751R00030007P0037-8 - 20 - N OFES G/CRFK VISI -1 10 U.S.: More titan a month In advance of PZPR First_ Secretory Gierek's scheduled visit to the United States starting 8 October, Warsaw media have begnn pnblicizing and ntressing the importance of the event. The visit was annonnced almost simultaneously by Warsaw and Moscow on 28 August, with TAS';' report citing PAP to thv effect that the visit, at President Ford's invitation, would enable the two leaders lo review bilateral relations and "exchange viewpoints on problems of mutual interest." TRYBUNA LUDU on the 10th went to considerable I engths to stress that the visit WAli In line with detente policies Iii itiated by the Soviet Union, with which Poland has "an unbreakable alliance." The paper noted that this would be the lirst oflicial U.S. visit by a leader of the Polish People's Republic, while a Berezowski talk on Warsaw radio on thv 29th added that Glerek's trip would be "the first. meeting of the leader of Al socialist state with the new President of the United Slates, Gerald Ford." Both commentarlea cited former President Nixon's 1972 visit to Warsaw as a turning point In improving Polish-U.S. relations. Gierek will be the first top leader of one of Moscow's orthodox East European allies to visit the U.S.; of the mavericks, Tito visited Washington in October 1971 and Ceausescu in December 1973. SLOVAK UPRISING ANN1VLRSARY: Routine exiressions of Soviet- Czechoslovak solidarity marked thy observance of the 30111 anniver- sary of the Slovak National Uprising at Banska Bystrica on 29 August, Tho lovol of !;oyfol representation, Politburo member Grechko, was lower than at tile previous decennial in August 1964, when Khrushchev headed the Soviet dolegation to the 20th anniver- sary. Mazurov, al540 a CPSU Poi I thoro member , headed the Soy! et delegation at the 25111 anniversary In 1969. As in 1969, anti-Peking polemics were avoided; In 1964 Khrte;hchev had attacked the Chinese "splitters." Both Grechko and Husak ir their Banska Byst.rica speeches praised Brezhnev personally for his contribution to detente, although Husak's anniversary article in PRAVDA on the 28th did not mention Brezhnev. There was no mention of Al new world party conference by Grechko or Husak. who confined themselves to calls for communist unity. Muted references by the two principals to "difficulties" experienced by Czechoslovakia in the recent past were in contrast to a blunt reference to %he attempt of the counter- revolution in 1968" by conservative CPCZ Presidium member Bilak at Al followup meeting in Bratislava on 30 August. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00876R140,3010070P7-8 21 M0',COW Ri_!;11MI'l ION 01- CSCI-: With I he restmipt Ion on 2 Sept ember ()I the second stage of t he Con! (,rerence 4,11 :;ecur I ty and Cooper,' t Ion Iii Europe (CSCE) Soy( commen t II ors have I nd leafed some opt im I rim I hal I he con 1 erence has entered the "I In:11 st retch." TASS observer Concharov on thv 2d. h,r example, without minimfAing the complex nature of the "comparatively small number" of ontstanding Issues, suggested lhat the compromise agreements reached ()11 both humanitarian And mIlltnry observer Issues prior to the 26 .hily recess should provide nn Impetus In the cnrrent session. However, 1ZVESTIYA foreign ',flair!, editor Crigoryonts on the lot suggested some concern that CSCE might be delayed by developments In t1n. eastern MIditerranean. He argued that "no developments, not even the most dramatic, such us the Middle East war last October It? the current Cyprus crisis, should put in (Ines! ion Hie coeference," but rather the opposite - -that these events increase tIn' signilicance of a successful CSCE conclusion. Regarding the timing of the conference's proposed summit-level, third-phase finale, Moscow has demonstrated NOMe ambivalence, with routine - level commentaries generally asserting that the third phase could be held before the end of 1974. lint reserve on this if:NUV was revealed In a comprehensive assessment of the negotiations by "M. Lvov" In the 9 August weekly NEW TIMES (No. 12), which said onry that the USSR hoped IO complete the conference's work "in the shortest possible time." East European official spokesmen, on the other hand, repeatedly went on record during the recess with optimistic views that phase two could finish within a few weeks, with the finale held before the end of the year. CHINESE LEADCRSHIP: Wang Hung-wen, one of the five vice chairmen of the CCP, appears to be taking on heavier party responsibilities as old age and poor health continue to curtail the activities of the CCP's top leaders. Of the five party vice chdirmen, only Wang has appeared publftly since the annual Army Day anniversary eve reception on 11 July. Recently, for example, Wang headed the list of leaders at both the departure and return airport ceremonies for a high-level Chinese party and government delegation to Romania, a role that normally would have been plAyed by Chou En-lai, who has not made any public appearances since 31 July. Chow's failure to appear with the President of Togo during the latter'!; visit to Peking from 2-5 September marked the first time that Chou has not mot a visiting chief of state. In his 2 September banquet speech in Peking, President Edayema wished Chou "a quick recovery." Kang Sheng has not appeared since the party congress last year and apparently has serious health problems. The usually active Yeh Chien-yIng has not appeared pubIicly for nearly fivc weeks. There CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 CONFIDENTIAL ERIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T008V5R000300070037-8 - 22 - In no indication that_ Yeh, ntrong supporter of (lion' ii moderate polielen, in In any political trouble. He wan named by NCNA on 3 September an OAV of thone nending it wreath to a recently deceaned deputy to the third National. People'n Congress. LI Te-nheng hat; not appeared irince May Day and wan under heavy ponter attack during the npring. CHINESE MILITIA: Throughout the campaign to criticize Lin Plao and Confucius, urban militia unItn have been reorganized and uovd by the !tarty to maintain social order in the cities. Judging by a 3 September SInIng broadcant, a new drive in underway, at leant in TnInghai, aimed at extending militia reformo to the more remote rural areao. The broach:not revealed that selected militia unit:4 In ti rural county were recently reorganized and that plans are being made to build up the militia in pastoral areao In the coming winter-spring period. Like their urban counterparts, rural militia units apparently are being given the means to firmly deal with social disorders should they Occur. Tninghai militia authorities paid "special attention" to reorganizing and connolidating "the armed backbone militia." SPANISH SAHARA: Moscow's meager attention to Morocco's campaign to "recover Its territories" of Spanish Sahara has avoided acknowl- edging Rabat's claims and presented the issue simply as an anti- colonialist struggle variously waged by Morocco, "North African peoples" and by the "indigenous population." Soviet media, in terse reports on the 27-29 August visit of Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki to Moscow, did not montion that his talks with Mazurov and Ilichev "centered in particular" on the Spanish Sahara issue, as Rabat radio said on the 29th. A Moscow radio review of Maghreb events, broadcast in Arabic on the 21st, blandly noted Morocco's "decisive actions" to liquidate the "foreign colonial presence in the so-called Spanish Sahara" and reported King Hassan as declaring that Morocco preferred a peaceful course "to liberate" all regions still under the colonial yoke but reserved the right to "other means and methods" if Spain did not respond. The broadcast observed that the "elimination of Spanish colonialism" demanded by all sections of Moroccan public opinion was "quite reasonable." A broadcast in English to Africa on the 22d, however, did not even mention Morocco in commenting on Spain's announced decision to hold a referendum next year on self-determination In "western Sahara." The broadcast said it was too early to predict what might happen, but that a new stage in the struggle of the CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/gti,W,T,RDI P85T00875R000M070037-8 ') SEPTEMBER 1974 - 23 - "Indigenous population" was developing. And a French-language broadcast to the Maghreb on 28 August depicted "the people of Morocco and other North African countries" as waging a fight for decolonization of Spanish Sahara against colonialists and hnperinlist monopolies attempting to maintain control over the area's phosphate resources. PRC-AFRICA: Peking has lauded the 26 August agreement on Portuguese recognition of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and the withdrawal of Lisbon's armed forces as proof of its longstanding position that continuing armed struggle is the best means for the complete liberation of Portuguese Africa. A 4 September Chou En-lal congratulatory message--echoing a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and remarks by Vice Premier Teng Ilsiao-ping on the 2d--said that Guinea Bissau's success is the result of "the protracted armed struggle in which the heroic people of Guinea-Bissau have persevered." NCNA on 28 August praised the 26 August accord as "a new victory under new circumstances" but carefully admonished that only by relying on armed struggle had the Africans managed to overcome alleged military and political maneuvers by the new Lisbon government to impose a settlement short of total independence. Though not mentioning Moscow by name, NCNA criticized the Soviet stance favoring a cease-fire and a negotiated solution and Moscow's cautious optimism about Portugal's intentions, stating that Guinea Bissau's achievement "is by no means a 'gift' from the colonialists nor is it a product of "peaceful transition.'" CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8 Pll !; T111:!IW; !;EPTE'Iltf;II 1'1/4 APPrill) IX !In )1,1 , PEI( ING ;;TATI I;T I C'.; 21) Allt:IIST ? ? I !;:?:PIE'1111',II 10/4 7tonc ow (:,!..fd) I t ems" Polc Ing .(961) It ('nni)_. I ()yak lip r I s Eng Tht h -) I 17.: I;eventli All 1 :111 Cr.) I 57 Ann I vernal' y Teheran IC.rechko f;proch In (--) 171 Law of filo Sea (17) II% C',..cehoslovakla Con It'rence Cvp us Cr IsI 74 (117) 07.'. Cr it Icism of Mn Pfau (ri.;) 77 Ch Ina (97.;) and Conine los Ch e UN World Population (;:) yff7. 15 Flight (--) 1% Conference, lincharent DRV National Day ( I ) Roman inn Lib('ra t IOU ( I ')7) 10th Ann I ver sar y PRC-Laos Civil Air ( --) Agreement Vietnam* (27) 3% These statistics are based on the voicerant commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and in!ernational radio services, The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, g wern- went or party statement, or diplomnt lc note. items or extensive reportage tire counted as commentaries FigurrA in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and 'ents given major attuntion in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; In other eases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. * Additional Peking items on DRV National Day were monitored starting 2 September, and will be reflected in the next statistic:. table. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070037-8