Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 7, 1999
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 18, 1974
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6.pdf1.19 MB
~iri.~rcw 3 pra d~r Fdeleas~ 1999/09/?5 :,CIA-RDP85T00875R000300074439 w c ~, - ,? C,ommunist~ P~rop;aga~n~d~a Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Confidential TRENDS In Communist Propaganda Confidential 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 (VOL. XXV, NO. 38) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 CONFIDENTIAL This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on inaterial carried in foreign Lroadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components STATSPEC National Security Information Unauthorized disclosure suhiect to criminal sanctions CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 SEPTEMBER 1914 CONTENTS White House Request on Vietnam Aid Draws PRG, DRV Protests . . . . . 1 DRV, PRG Charge U.S. Attempts to "Control" Struggle Against GVN . . 2 DRV Generals Appear in North Vietnam Af ter Long Absences . . . . . . 3 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT Moscow Assails Anti-Arab Purposes of Rabin Visit to U. S. . . . . . . 4 CHILE Moscow Sees CIA Role in Coup as Discrediting U.S. Policy . . . . . . 6 USSR-YUGOSLAVIA Tito Acknowledges Arrest of Stalinist Group; Moscow Silent . . . . . 9 NORTH KOREA National Day Marked by Kim I1-song Presence, Calls for Unity . . . . 11 USSR-GERMANY-PRC USSR, GDR Media Attack PRC for Views on "One German Nation" . . . . 14 USSR. Military Spokesmen Air Views on Controversial Issues . . . . . . . . 16 Novorossiysk and Kerch Ceremonies Boost Brezhnev Mini-Cult . . . . . 18 NOTES Honeckcr on Warsaw Pact; DRV-Bulgarian Aid Agreement . . . . . . . . 19 APPENDIX Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics i Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25cD$5T00875RQ3MQ039-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 VIETNAM WHITE HOUSE REQUEST ON VIETNAM AID DRAWS PRG, DRV PROTESTS President Ford's 12 September appeal for Congressional restoration of funds cut from the Administration's aid request for South Vietnam was assailed in PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesman statements on the 13th and 14th, respectively. The issuance of such protests is consistent with the communist pattern in recent months of reacting promptly to public statements on the aid question by Administration officials. The President's general assurance of continuity in policy and support for allies in his 12 August speech to Congress had similarly drawn foreign ministry statements from the PRG and Hanoi, on 15 and 17 August respectively, critically interpreting his remarks as a commitment to the Nixon Administration's policy of supporting Thieu. Both the current statements routinely denounced aid to Saigon as a violation of the Paris agreement, and the PRG charged that President Ford's "allegation" about increased attacks by North Vietnam troops was part of a "premeditated plan" to utilize the current difficulties cf the ARVN as a pretext for increased aid to implement the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam. While the DRV statement acknowledged that the President was asking for restoration of funds cut by Congress from the Administration's original request, the PRG statement failed to mention this and, in contrast, gave the impression the President was asking for additional amounts. Further media reaction has been limited to commentaries broadcast by Hanoi and Liberation radios on Thieu's alleged inability to survive without U.S. aid. An LPA commentary aired on the 13th by Liberation Radio claimed that opposition to the aid in the U.S. Congress and among the American people has brought a "frenzied reaction" in the Thieu regime. Among other things, the commentary claimed that Thieu was using aid reduction to justify "failures" of many mil4.tary operations and "fabricating charges" that the communists were repairing airfields at Khe Sanh and in the central highlands and were moving their MIG's to Dong Hoi in the southern panhandle of. North Vietnam. While neither confirming nor denying that the latter activities have been taking place, the commentary alluded to the impact an interjection of communist air operations would have on the GVN war effort, by "confronting its newly-activated, ? poorly-trained and inexperienced air force with the danger of facing North Vietnam in dogfights." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 199$/MNlqi6-RDP85T0W5g$~00070039-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 DRJ, PRG CHARGE U.S. ATTEMPTS TO 'CONTROL' STRUGGLE AGAINST GVN Vietnamese communist media treatment of the antigovernment demon- strations that began in Hue on 8 September has evolved from initial factual coverage--based on Saigon and Western news sources--to authoritative comment in Hanoi's party and army dailies, NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Despite the obviously exploitable coincidence of current manifestations of opposition to Thieu and the recently revived communist calls for his ouster,* some Hanoi and PRG propaganda has struck a cautionary note, warning that the United States is attempting to infiltrate and subvert the antigovernment movement. A 14 September NH/N DAN editorial at first singled out the Hue demonstration as a "noteworthy" development in an encouraging situation in the South: but, at another point, it expressed strong suspicion that the United States was acting behind the scenes to manipulate the situation for its own benefit and even intimated that Washington might be preparing for Thieu's removal. According to the editorial, the United States--faced with the "front" to "topple Thieu"--is using Thieu as a "tool" to carry out its policies while preparing to "change horses when compelling circumstances arise." The editorial warned that "the United States is keeping a finger in the current anti-Thieu struggle movement. in the cities of South Vietnam in order to lead this movement in a direction favorable to it, while at the, same; time readying new horses." A 14 September Liberation Radio commentary voiced similar misgivings about the situation in the cities. After an optimistic appraisal of the situation in the South, the commentary warned that the United States was "seizing every opportunity to have its henchmen participate in the people's movement and raise outwardly anti-Thieu slogans to . . . control the movement and direct it to serve its political purposes." The warnings of U.S. infiltration in the urban struggle are not uniformly present in the propaganda. By contrast, a 17 September QUANT DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the situation in the southern cities did not raise any misgivings, instead conveying an air of exultation over the "seething struggle" spreading from Hue to Saigon and declaring this is a "heavy blow" to the. United States and Thieu. The commentary made the uaaal claims about popular determination to oust Thi?.u and predicted "increasingly greater successes" in this effort. * For a discussion of communist calls for Thieu s overthrow and the establishment of a new government in Saigon, see the TRENDS of 21 August 1974, pages 14-17. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/2SQZ# RDR,85T00875FNIW3MUB0039-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 DRV GENERALS APPEAR IN NORTH VIETNAM AFTER LONG ABSENCES For the first time in more than eight years Hanoi media have reported the whereabouts of Hoang Van Thai, a member of the party Central Committee and vice minister of defense who wrote several major articles on military questions in the early 1960's. Thai's last known public appearance was in Hanoi in March 1966 and his last known article was published in the January 1966 issue of the theoretical journal HOC TAP, an article which stressed the importance of North Vietnam's contribution to the war in South Vietnam. A 16 September VNA report on Thai's appearance at a Hanoi sports event on the previous day listed him as a colonel general, revealing that he had been promoted from his previous rank of lieutenant general. Thai is the third North Vietnamese officer publicly reported to hold the second highest DRV military rank. The rank of colonel general was also given this year to the head of the army's Political General Department, Song Hao;* and the rank. has been held for many years by Chu Van Tan--a representative for minority nationalities whose major responsibilities are in the government and in front organizations. Appearing along with Hoang Van Thai, according to VNA, were Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Major General Cao Van Khanh. Like Thai, Cao Van Khanh has not been mentioned by North Vietnamese media for several years; he first publicly reappeared in the North last month when Hanoi media noted that he had greeted a visiting Chinese volleyball team on 17 August. * Promotions Hanoi has made since April are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages .22-2.5. Since that time }htnoi has revealed the following additional promoLioi;: Lt. Gen. Bang Giang, Lt. Gen. Quang Dao, Lt. Gen. Tran Sam, Maj. Gen. Hoang Minh Thi, and Maj, Gen. Do Trinh. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 199?(lg? 14-RD1385T%~7W300070039-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT MOSCOW ASSIAILS ANTI ARAB PURPOSES OF RABIN VISIT TO U.S. In comment on Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's 10-14 September visit to the United States, Moscow has reiterated many of its standard denunciations of Israel's Middle East policies, while stressing that the visit presages an increase in U.S.-Israeli political, economic, and military cooperation working against Arab interests. To underscore the point, Soviet media have highlighted recent statements by Rabin that the chief purpose of his visit was to obtain guarantees of new supplies of U.S. weapons, in sufficient quantity to enable Israel co deal with neighboring Arab states "from a position of strength." Moscow has also sharply criti- cized what it termed Israel's "increasing intransigence" on key aspects of a final peace settlement--including withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab lands occupied since the 1967 war, resolution of the Palestinian question, and resumption of the Geneva peace conference. U.S. AID Soviet comment has assessed the results of Rabin's visit in general as "favorable to Israel," citing U.S. and Israeli sources to the effect that Rabin obtained the assurances of U.S. military and financial aid which he had sought. IZVESTIYA on the 16th, for example, according to TASS, reported that the United States promised to meet Israel's "imme- diate requirements in weapons" and would provide one-and-a-half billion dollars in aid. On the same day Moscow radio, in a foreign-language commentary, asserted that Rabin left Washington with "agreements that will satisfy almost all. of Israel's demands for arms supplies." TASS on the 15th was more specific, stating that the United States had agreed to deliver 50 Phantom fighter- bombers within a, as well as 200 to 250 modern M-60 tanks, lase:--?guided rockets, and other armaments. TASS also noted on the 15th and again on the 18th that the deliveries would be made under a current U.S. aid program but that Rabin had, according to U.S. officials, "achieved progress" in negotiating for U.S. arms assistance over the long term. ISRAELI Often placing the Rabin visit against a background "AGGRESSION'"' of "heightening tension" and "escalation of Israeli provocations," Moscow media have frequently pre- sented the reports of promised U.S. military aid as fresh evidence that Israel is preparing for "new aggression." This accusation of Tel Aviv's militarist intentions has often appeared in past Soviet Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 eA-1j?A5T00875RQ3Q939-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 comment, and Rabin.'s talks with the new U.S. President and other high officials were apparently viewed as an appropriate occasion to reassert charges of close U.S.-Israeli coordination in formulating Middle East policies directed against Arab interests. An 18 September PRAVDA article by V. Peresada, as reviewed by TASS, typified much of the Soviet comment when it claimed that the visit had shown that Israeli policy continued to depend on the pressure exerted by U.S. circles on Arab countries to make them "tolerant" of Israel's "annexationist aims, particularly on the Palestinian problem." Moscow radio on the 16th told its domestic audience that, beyond military and financial aid, Rabin had also sought and obtained reaffirmation of the U.S.-Israeli "special relationship," which it defined as U.S. support for Israeli aggression and provocations against neighboring Arab states. To reinforce the charge, the broadcast linked the most recent Israeli air raids on Lebanon with an "understanding" Rabin was said to have achieved with U.S. leaders. PEACE TALKS In repeating past irarnings that Israeli policies endanger peace, Moscow has continued to accuse the Rabin government of seeking to pre,rent a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. A Moscow radio "questions and answers" feature on the 14th, for example, explained the continuing delay in reconvening the Geneva peace conference as due to daily military provocations and threats by Israel against Arab countries and to Israel's refusal to agree to the partici_pat'.on of Palestinian representatives in the conference. Moscow radio's Arabic service on the 14th claimed to see a hardening of Israel's attitude in recent months on the elements of a peace settlement, citing as one cause the results of recent Israeli sou:idings of the new U.S. Administration on "the extent to which Israel can continue its expansionist policy without losing U.S.-support." At the same time, Moscow has continued to press for resumption of the Geneva peace conference as soon as possible, asse-?Ling that the conference has an essential contribution to make in achieving a final political settlement and professing a cautious optimism that new peace talks can be arranged. IZVRSTIYA on the 14th, in reviewing the reasons for Rabin's visit, noted U.S. press reports that Washington intended to pressure Israel to agree to further peace talks in return for granting Rabin's requests for more arms. Although express- ing skepticism on this point, IZVEI;TIYA emphasized the potential benefits for all sides from a reconvened Geneva conference, stressing that the conference must contribute to the final peace settlement and that the settlement itself would not only have to arrange for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and insure the Palestinians' legitimate national rights but also "guarantee genuine security for all states in the area, both the Arabs and Israel." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 199g6g?/ N'rR~-RDP85T008S 5 Or00300070039-6 18 SEPT ZR 1974 CHILE MOSCOW SEES CIA ROLE IN COUP AS DISCREDITING U.S. POLICY Moscow, giving considerable publicity to an "international week of solidarity" on the occasion of the first anniversary of the 11 September overthrow of the Allende Government, has thus far only briefly and selectively reported President Ford's remarks on Chile in his 16 September news conference. TASS noted his statement that the U.S. Government was not involved in the coup itself, but ignored his references to 40 Committee and Congressional review of covert activities. In commenting on disclosures in the U.S. press since 8 September of testimony by CIA Director Colby last April on activities tc "destabilize" the Allende government, Soviet commentators have seemed to be contriving to separate intelligence activities from the U.S. AdiJnistration.. Thus Moscow asserted that subversive activities of the CIA and the Penta;;on were "beyond even the control of the White House." Claiming that such actions have been responsible for major American political failures, Moscow observed that CIA involvement in the "fascist plot" in Chile discredits U.S. policy. FORD STATEMENT, While the first short TASS English report COLBY TESTIMONY on the President's news conference took note only of remarks on the Nixon pardon and the economy, a second TASS account later on the 17th also picked up the President's statement that the U.S. Administration had nothing to do with Allende's overthrow. "However," the account added, President Ford stated that "certain U.S. actions" in Chile were directed to help maintain the opposition' newspapers, television, radio, and political parties in opposition. The account also noted that when asked under what international law the United States had the right, as TASS put it, "to undermine the positions of the constitutionally elected government of another country," President Ford said "he would not venture any judgment on whether such acts are allowed by international law." Predictably, TASS ignored the President's statement that the United States, like other governments, takes certain actions in the intelligence field L.o help implement foreign policy and protect national security, and that communist nations spend much more money than the United States for the same purpuGes. Nor did TASS acknowledge hisreiaarks on 40 Committee and Congressional review of covert operations undertaker. by the Government. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: ? i T00875R00039QU909-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 Minimal comment thus far on the Colby testimony has focused on revelations about the CIA, long a target of Moscow attacks, while at the same time seemingly concerned to avoid linking the CIA activity in Chile with the top echelon of the U.S. Government, particularly Secretary Kissinger. Thus in cautiously discussing the activities of "the so-called 40 Committee" in the weekly observers' roundtable broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on 15 September, panelist Pyadishev avoided mentioning that the Committee is headed by Kissinger, describing it only as "a highly secret group of top Washington government officials." He noted that a State Department spokesman hac reiterated a U.S. Government statement last year that the United States had nothing to do with the military coup in Chile, and that Senator Kennedy had declared that previous government statements on this subject had been untrue and had "misled Congress." Pyadishev professed to see Peutagon and CIA activities as out of control even of the White House, asserting that CIA implication in the Chilean putsch exemplified an "old problem," one of "the wide intrusion of the American military and secret service into politics and all spheres of U.S. domestic and international" affairs. A Kuznetsov commentary on the Chile issue, broadcast in English to North America on the 13th, did charge that the CIA's "subversive activities" against democratic governments of other countries was an old practice and an integral part of the foreign policy of "previous administrations." But he also seemed concerned to portray the CIA as out of control by responsible officialdom, citing the Marchetti-Marks book on the CIA as stating that the agency had become a gigantic center of power "which does not answer to Congress and can go out of control" at any attempt to block its activities. COUP ANNIVERSARY Moscow has observed the first anniversary of the Allende overthrow with publicity for an "international week of solidarity" with Chile highlighted by a Brezhnev message to a mass meeting in Moscow on the 11th marking the solidarity campaign. The Brazhnev message deplored the "ruthless" suppression of Allende supporters and the "thousands of people killed and tortured" by the Chilean junta, and expressed the cope that "our voice of solidarity" would be heard by imprisoned Chilean Communist Party leader Corvalan. Noting President Pinochet's announcement, in his anniversary speech on the 11th, abolishing the state of internal war in Chile, TASS on the 12th called the statement "cynical" and signifying nothing, since a state of siege was being maintained. Neither Moscow nor Havana has acknowledged Pinochet's offer to release almost all political prisoners if the USSR and Cuba would follow suit. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 Soviet comment on the anniversary has continued the line of the past year in condemning the "persecution" of Chilean "democrats." TASS on the 10th publicized a statement issued the previous day in Stockholm by an "international commission" investigating the Chilean military junta's "crimes." According to TASS, "prominent lawyers" and representatives of the Chilean resistance movement took part in the work of the commission, and the statement--presumably timed to coincide with the solidarity week--demanded the immediate release of Corvalan and other political prisoners, and condemned the "mass arrests" carried out by the regime in an effort to suppress the people's resistance. Moscow has also publicized statements by Chilean communists, such as former economics minister Millas; in a 4 September PRAVDA article Mi'llas denounced the actions of the "North imerican monopolies and the Chilean military oligarchy" which led to the present tragedy, and asserted that a "'new revival of the Chilean popular masses" was occurring and their protests against fascism were increasing daily. CUBAN COMMENT Havana, which has consistently seen a U.S. hand behind the Allende overthrow, has not reacted to President Ford's remarks, but has seen the Colby testimony as providing "new" prof of Washington's "shameless intervention" in the conspiracy against Chilean democracy. And Cuba has shown no hesitation in liuking Secretary Kissinger with the decision to "son economic chaos and overthrow Allende's popular unity govern- ment." Thus a Havana international service commentary on the 11th declared that the CIA had engaged in such activities "with the consent of current Secretary of State Henry Kissinger." The commentary declared that "the U.S. Government put all its resources into the game" and must bear "direct responsibility for the wave of crime and barbarity" unleashed by Pinochet. Such Cuban accusations are not new: A Havana radio commentary on 28 August, for example, censured the United States for the "fascist bloodbath in f:hile" and maintained that "primary criminal responsibility" rests with the "imperialist government" of the United States. Cuban comment on the Chilean coup anniversary has been exemplified in an 11 September GRANMA editorial which called the coup "part of the U.S. counterrevolutionary global policy in Latin America" designed to strike against the growing movement toward sovereignty and re'overy of natural resources. GRANMA praised the "heroism, self-denial and fighting spirit" of Allende and "thousands upon thousands" of Chileans who fought with him against the c,up. The editorial called Allende's overthrow a "hard setback" to the revolutionary movement in Latin America, but concluded that "fascism has no future other than defeat." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 - 9 - USSR-YUGOSLAVIA TITO ACKNOWLEDGES ARREST OF STALINIST GROUP; MOSCOW SILENT Rumors carried in the Western press that a pro-Soviet group had been arrested in Yugoslavia after trying to form a dissident political party were confirmed by Tit-) himself in a speech at Jesenice on 12 September. His use of the terms "Cominformists" and "Stalinists"' were clearly codeword references to Moscow's involvement in the affair, at a time when Belgrade-Moscow relations have been steadily improving. Although rumors of the arrests had circulated for weeks, the exposure came less than two days after Edvard Kardelj had returned from a 10-day "vacation" to the Soviet Union that concluded with a talk with Brezhnev. The first indication that Tito might favor allowing the affair to come out in the open occurred on 8 September, when Stane Dolanc raised the dormant issue of "Cominformism" at a rally speech at Vis. Tito's sketchy remarks about the movement indicated that some 30 persons were arrested after holding their own party congress. The congress, according to an article in the 10 September Washington POST and other sources, supposedly took place in Montenegro earlier this year, Tito emphasized that the group relied on outside support. Although he described the congress as "more fantasy than reality," he pointed out that the group had an enormous amount of material "printed abroad" and that the secretary of the group was to be "someone who is outside the country." Tito expressed doubt about the identity of the backers of the group, adding that "the court will find 'chat out." However, Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic, while reporting Tito's remark that it was not known "for certain" who was behind the group, pointed out that it is already known "on whose behalf they are working." Sundic also implied that the leaders of the group were still at large and emphasized that "the countries in which they hatch their plans" "tolerate" such activity because they too are opposed to Yugoslavia's, nonalined position. Tito's remarks came in a speech covering a broad range of domestic and foreign matters delivered to political workers in Slovenia. He chose a particul-?rly sensitive time to expose the affair: Soviet Vice Premier Novikov was touring Yugoslavia, and Chief of the General Staff Kulikov was to arrive on the 17th. However, he emphasized that the arrests had to be made public. While pointing out that the group had posed no serious threat to Yugoslavia, Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 19991OS2Ar.CIA-RDP85TWPc'ASR00300070039-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 Tito--in a statement designed perhaps as much for foreign consumption as for Yugoslavia--called for "exemplary punish- ment" of the group "so that in the future it won't even occur to anybody to try something like this aga4n." In addition, he decried "our blindness and lack r); vigilance" which enabled the group to hold their congre3z.. Moscow's embarrassment over the affair is suggested by its failure to report anything at all about the speech. Indeed, of Moscow's orthodox Warsaw Pact allies, only Poland acknowledged the speech, the Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU on the 14th summarizing Tito's comments on settling the Cyprus crisis but not mentioning his remarks on the alleged plot. On the other hand, bloc maverick Romania reported the speech in both the press and on the radio. Its decision to play up Tito's remarks about the "Cominformists" likely reflected its own wariness of Moscow. Albania, like the orthodox bloc, thus far has ignored the speech. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release I 999/09/2V~ PUR1?P85T00875fWO(Y3 70039-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 NORTH KOREA NATIONAL DAY MARKED BY KIM IL-SONG, PRESENCE, CALLS IOR UNITY Pyongyang festivities greeting the 26th DPRIC National Day on 8 September were. marked by an unusual degree of participation by Kim Il-song and by new attention to the importance of ideological unity. Except for quinquennial and decennial anni- versaries, Kim's appearance at the National Day meeting in Pyongyang was his first in over a decade. Kim also attended the National Day banquet which, though occasionally attended by Kim in the past, usually has been described in North Korean media as a cabinet affair. While Kim met with a number of delegations to the anniversary, including the Chinese delegation on the 10th, monitored DPRK and Moscow media have not reported any Kim meeting with the Soviet delegation. Bodyul, CPSU Central Committee member and first secretary of the Moldavian party, headed the Soviet delegation of identical status to the Chinese, led by CCP Central Committee member and Hopeh party chief Liu Tzu-hou. KCNA on 11 September reported that the Soviet delegation had been received by Political Committee member So Chol on L:ne 10th. Kim had met with the Soviet as well as the Chinese delegations last September and in September 1972. Anniversary comment included a major speech at the Pyongyang meeting by Political Committee member Pak Song-chol, a brief banquet speech by Premier Kim I? (his first major address since returning in July from medical treatment in Romania), and a NODONG SINMUN editorial. Both Pak Song-chol's speech and the NODONG SINMUN editorial gave more attention to domestic economic and political tasks than on previous anniversaries, not only leading off with a discussion of su^h tasks as usual, but also concluding with remarks on domestic matters instead of the more customary concluding attention to international events. Pak especially stressed the need for ideological cohesion in the North, stating that the ideological revolution "must be placed ahead of other things," presumably a reference to the technical and cultural revolutions which form the other two components of Kim Il-song's revolutionary trinity. In a possible attempt to emphasize the importance of the DPRK central authorities, Pak also made a point of referring to "the leader and the party central committee" in those instances where North Korean media have normally referred simply to "the leader" or occasionally "the leader and the party." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1 g?19r MOSiAiCIA-RDPB TQ98f7t?RQ00300070039-6 18 SEPTEMBER 1974 Following the example set in several previous major DPRK speeches this year, Pak directed a harsh, personal attack against ROK President Pak Chong-hui and accused the South of blocking the North-South dialog. Pak admitted that the struggle against the regime in the South was undergoing "temporary meanderings" due to "harsh repression" by Seoul. Neither Pak nor Kim 11 voiced the usually standard anti-Japanese rhetoric, possibly a response to ROK-Japanese friction arising from the investigation of the 15 August assassination attempt on President Pak.* While Pak Song-chol called fir the United Nations to take measures to withdraw U.S. troops in South Korea "under the UN signboard," he did not repeat Kim Il's criticism last year of the "untenable argument" that U.S. troops might remain in South Korea under the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty.** PEKING Peking gave lower-level treatment to this year's DPRK anniversary than it had to the last non-quinquennial celebration in 1972, consistent with the recent PRC trend toward reduced coverage of communist countries' anniversaries. Chinese representation at the DPRK ambassador's reception in Peking this year was comparable to 1972, but the remarks this year were by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei while in 1972 they were delivered by Pulitburo member and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Chinese representation at.. the reception given by the China-Korea Friendship Association was considerably lower-ranking than in 1972. In its treatment of the founding anniversary, which included a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and Chinese leaders' greetings (monitored only in Peking radio's Korean language service), Peking maintained the line toward Korea it has followed thus far this year in calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea but generally omitting any time stipulation and avoiding a harsh portrayal of the U.S. role in South Korea. Peking's comments included standard denunciations of the Pak government and praise for the North's efforts at dialog and peaceful reunification. * For a discussion of Pyongyang's response to ROK-Japanese friction, see the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, pages 18-19. ** A 13 September ASAHI SHIMBUN report quoted Kim Il-song as telling a Japan Socialist Party delegation in North Korea on 11 September that "The stationing of U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-ROK defense treaty is another matter," distinct from the UN question. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release I 999/09/2t'~'diANikbP85T00875 tf40 dftV0039-6 I.ll SE1"TEM1S :1P 1974 MOSCOW Moscow used the DPRK founding ai.n:iversary to publicize its assistance to North Korea, Including a pointed reference in an EKONOMICI ESKAYA CAZETA article to "Joint work between USSR and DPRK ncient:lnts In the Joint Institute of Nuclear. Research in Dubna." Soviet media fully reported the normal leader greetings, but gave only brief accounts of the DPRK ambassador's reception in Moscow and a Soviet- sponsored anniversary meeting there. At both functions, Soviet: representation was at a lower level than In 1972, the last comparable DPRK founding anniversary. Moscow comment: wan generally limited to standard formulations, including its call for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from South Korea, though a 9 September commentary broadcast on the Moscow domestic radio recalled Brezhnev's support at the 24th Party Congress; for the withdrawal of "U.S. forces" from the South. A 9 September Moscow commentary in Korean pointed out with "pleasure" that "the parties, governments, and peoples of our countries hold common views on the of building socialism and common tsm and on pending international issues." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 CON EIDENTIAi, PINS TRENDS 18 SI?P I'E,1'i1SF.R 19711 - I /1 - USSR - GERMANY - PRC USSR, GDR MEDIA ATTACK PRC FOR VIEWS ON LONE GERMAN NATION' Recent_ ntittenmentn by 11RC Iead.crn challenging the FinalLt.y Of punt World War Ii. bordtrn I n Ger:;uny, an report.(-(t to the Wei; tern press, have prompted pre(1!cta6.le, ntrtn-g cr'ItIcinm I rout Soviet and i:ant German media. According to Western hewn reports, Went German opposition CDU Chal rma:( Kohl, during ;t 3-17. Septemher Ch i nee;e visit, wan told by PRC Deputy Foreign MInin1('r Uhf no Kean-hua and Vice Preml_or Teng Ilnlao-pLng, on 6 September that the Chinese nt.-1.1_1 recognize "a single German nn t. ton" and that one clay condition; would be nultabi for rcunii1:Li oil of the two German states Into it single German nation. Chlao wn!; ainn reported to have offered a Loan t. to the national tinily of' Germany at a reception on the 6th at the FRG emhanay. This Chinese view of the postwar German nItuntion has been stated before both official.l.y and pub l.icly, drawing, vehement denunclatlon:-; by Soviet and East German observers, Iiut the timing, of the recent Chinese :;tatementn must be particularly Irritating for tile East. Germans and the Soviets. On 4 September the United St.~t' ;nd the GDR signed the documents establishing diplomatic rclaticm:;, which Soviet and Eant. German comment has, hailed as the culmit:at ion OI the postwar Soviet goal of t.iaal tnternationai rcCoy;nitlot1 of the two German :;t?tes.* EUROPEAN AND Reacting a3 Moscow 11:1s on previous occasions when ASIAN BORDERS the Chinese h_tve iseucd c;LateTi nt:+ on (.he German issue, two 'L'ASS commentaries on the reported Chinese ,tatements reflected Soviet sensitivities; regarding not only the German border issue but also the S i no-Soviet border I n Asir, , On the 7th A. Kranikov charged that in presenting to Kohl Peking's views on "territorial claims to the Soviet Union, China would Iike to create a problem of frontiers In Europe an well." And on the 18th, V. V1nogradov, reporting from Bonn on the cluscress of viewpoint:; of the Wc;t German "revanchists" and the Chinese leaders, noted the "'similarity' of interests of Peking, which makes claims to Far Eastern territories of the Soviet Union, and the interests of West German revanchists, who refuse to recognize state frontiers that formed in Europe as a result of the destruction of the Hitler Reich." * See the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, pages 6-7. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 CONFI1)l;N'I'IAI, IBIS 'T'RENDS I H SI;I"I'I:M31;R 19Y4 The Kr.anikov coumlcnLfry concluded that the (;hi.uese wcr(, to "clone down" the GDR when they allegedly asserted that W ' ;t Germany was "the only Gerrnn nation." Ile drew ;1 pnrnl lcl between this "cloning clown" of the (;I)R and a r;taternent by Prem,ler (;hot] Fn-lal to n group of West German businessmen In PekIng In P1; y 1973; Chou reportedly then said that, having studied In Berlin for :t year, he had never heard of a city vaned Ka1.Iningral, but was I;ni l.t;lr with Koenigsberg. East: Berlin % reaction was n.lno quick and n trong. NI?II1;S I)E(l'1'S(;III,ANI) In a s geed commentary on the 9th denounced the Chinese for agrecing with Kohl that "there are not two German state:;" and supporting Bonn's "Illegal claim to Went Berl In," charging that Peking again ha!; demonstrated that the "M;olnts have completely broken with Marxism- Lenin Lsm." Moncow'n PRAVDA on the J I th put) I I nhed a deta I Ied !;Urn;ary of the East Berlin party organ';: article. PEKING'S TREATMENT While NCNA reported the various activitlc; of the Kohl delegation, It did so without detailing the substance of the talks between Kohl Auld the Chinese leaders. Peking's most recent exposition of C1le Chinese view regarding the "German question" came In mid-1973, after the Security Council vote on the two Germanys' admission to the UN. PRC representative Huang llua on 22 June 1973 had told the Council that despite the 28 year:; since the end of World War It, there still. was no "peace treaty with Germany" and the two German ;;tat _ s were "sti.11 living under abnormal conditions." Continuing his statement, obviously provocat?ve to Moscow and East Berlin, llu;;nl; declared: We maintain that a just and reasonable settlement of the German question should be achieved at an early date on condition of respecting the interests and wishes of the people of the two German states, and that the affairs of the German people should be settled by the G(:j.ran pcop.le themselves through consultations." [emphasis added] Additionally, to further demonstrate that the two German states have a unique relationship, NCNA a day earlier had reported on the 21 June 1913 exchange of ratification documents for the GDR-FRG Basic Relations Treaty, taking pains to point out that Bonn and East Berlin had exchanged "permanent representatives" and not ambassadors. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 CONF1JENTIAL FIL.i.S T121;N1)S 18 SI:PTI:NBER 1,974 11 S S R MILITARY SPOKESMEN AIR VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES Such potentially controver.siz:i. 1utiuen as one-man command, Conk warfare, and detente were among the ftb,lects addr.en;sed by prominent. Sovic:, military spokesmen over the past week. Although none of the w:atcments broke new ground on the Insucn they addressed, each reflected a topical interest or individual. viewpoint which deserves notice. Whether they rcf.lect brorder patterns of concerns; and currents of opinion within the military remains to be determined by subsequent events. ONE-MAN CO(+AND A mayor article on one-man command was authored by Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force Colonel. General A.N. Yefimov In the 7 September issue of RED STAR. Although there have been few signs of ferment over the Issue for many years, one-man command remains a sensitive subject in the Soviet Union, since it registers party recognition of the commander';; autonomy ',r his own professional sphere. Ycfimov's treatment of the subject emphasized this aspect: Its central thesis way. that modern military conditions have enhanced and complicated the ml.i.itary commander's responsit ies and hence reinforced the traditional reasons for giving him broad authority. Yefimov Included among hiL arguments for the commander's, autonomy the somewhat surprising asserrion that it is he "who take.; the decision to fight"--a tactical decision, one: assumes, alt;iough Yefimov does not specify. Why the article was published n` Lhis time and what if any particular concerns prompted it is not made clear. It may be relevant to note, however, that it comes at a time of increased stress on ideology in the Soviet Union, centering around the CPSU decree on the Belorussian party organization summarized in the 30 August PRAVDA. A subsequent PRAVDA editorial described this decree as a document of "general party significance," and it is already apparent that a major campaign stressing "ideological struggle" and "communist morality" is getting under way on the basis of the party's initiative, RED STAR took a particularly prominent role in sparking the campaign by publishing a long and detailed commentary on the decree in its 31 August issue. Although neither the RED STAR commentary nor other documents have stressed the relevance of the decree to army party organizations, it is apparent that the latter will regard the decree as a warrant for increased activity. It may be this prospective development which prompted the Yefimov article. From Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 ~;6ii !*60615T00875R0 d-JO'O b39-6 L 1 SIs1.''1I;MBER 1974 From the standpoint of the military profenn.ionaln, the time may have seemed appropriate to remind al'. military personnel that the line between the claims of military professional Joni and party enthus- lasm has been clearly defined In party documents. TANt', WARFARE The second item of note was an art.lcle by Chief Marshal of Tank Troops P.A. Rotin.istrov In the 7 September IZVEST1YA. Ai though largely :inspir.ationaI in tone in accordance with the requirements of the occasion, Tank Troops Day, it contained a remarkably defensive passage on the role of tanks; in modern combat. This would be newsworthy In the case of any Soviet spokesmen, but doubly ao for Rotmistrov, wh was a hero commander of tanks in World War 11, and who has been an ardent public advocate of their potentiol role in modern combat since. In an apparent acknowledgment of lessonr drawn from last year's Middle East war, Rotmistrov observed that every weapon must eventually "meet Its antipode--the counterweapon." lie went on to argue that offensive weapons always gained the upper hand in the technological duel between offense and defense, and that NATO countries were continuing to operate on the assumption that tanks would continue to play a significant role in modern combat. Never- theless, the fact that he felt constrained to make the argument strongly suggests the issue has come under debate within the Soviet military establishment. DETENTE AND DEFENSE The third notable item was Crechko's speech at the award ceremony in Kcrch honoring the city for its World War II role as the jumping-off point for the liberation of the Crimea. In his remarks on the international. situation, Grechko made no more than a perfunctory bow to the successes of the Soviet Union's peace program, stressing instead the dangers that remained on the international horizon. In this respect his remarks stand in marked contrast to those by Brezhnev on the same subject at Novorossiysk a week earlier. Whereas Brezhnev :lad noted in passing that it wou' 4 be "premature" to conclude that the foundations for peace had been firmly established, Brezhnev's main emphasis was on the continued commitment of the Soviet Union to peace and on the good prospects for achieving it. Grechko reversed the emphasis, stressing instead the need for continued caution. According to the 14 September live broadcast of his speech, Grechko said: The party teaches us to assess realistically the international situation and consider not only the positive changes but also the factors opposing peace. . . . We must preserve a high degree of vigilance, maintain the defense capacity of our state at a proper level, and intensify its defenses. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release I 99PtQ lg ~ l1A-RDP85TQ q,?; RQAg300070039-6 113 SJ?1''1'I:MIIN,R .1974 NOVOROSS I YS K AND KERCH CEREMONIES BOOST BREZHNEV MINI-CULT One of the by-products--presumably not unanticipated--of the award of "Hero-city" honors to Novo r.ossIysk and K, has been the generation of a gr.i ?it deal of favorable pui)liclLy about Brez%nev's World War II role. Judging by hrecedenis the Soviet leadership Is extremely grad[; i nI; about any of its members to acquire a publi.C reputation as a wartime hero. Despite earnest efforts, Br.ezlinev has had only modest success along this, certainly nothing to compare with the reputation that Khrushchev managed to acquire on the ban In of. his comparatively broader wartime responsf.billt.f.e.-, and 111"; association with more dramatic events and personal.atie:,. The recent ceremonies at Novoros slysk and should narrow the gap in this regard. lirezhni v dr.amat[ identified hfmsel.I WI L11 the memory of these wartime campaigns by his physical presence at the Novorossiysk ceremonies. Moreover, the speeches at both ceremonies repeatedly drew attention to his wartime role. lie was lionized for his "personal courage and stamina," for being an "example of party spirit and military gallantry tor the soldiers," for having been seen "in the most difficult moments ant[ in the most difficult positions," and for being "loved by all comrades and troops." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 GTIAIRbP86T00875ROOO-300070039-6 18 SEP I'F.MIii:1P :1974 NOTES HOI CKCR ON WARSAW PACT: The windup of. Soviet troop maneuvers Iii Last Germany together with the conclusion of the Pact exercisen in the Baltic Sea was used by SLU First Secretary Ilonecker on the 1.3th as an occasion for asserting dedication to the Pact and gratitude to the Soviet Union f:or protecting the socialist community and insuring the success of detente. The exercises in the Magdeburg region of the (;I)R were billed as Involving only Soviet troops, while the 4-13 September naval maneuvers in the Baltic, under Pact commander Yakubovslcly'n direction, were said to involve the USSR, the GDR, and Poland. The latter exercise preceded by only three days the start of NATO's Northern Merger maneuvers in the Baltic area. Speaking to the Soviet garrison in Magdeburg on the 1.3th, Ilonecker praised the "internationalist help and comradely support of the Soviet Union" and asserted that "the invincible military power of socialism, with the Soviet Army as its core" was a major factor in the success of detente. Reiterating a statement issued by the April 1974 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, he said that as long as NATO exists and "na effective disarmament measures have been carried out," the Warsaw Pact states "deem it necessary to strengthen their defense capabilities." DRV-BULr,ARJAN AID AGREEMENT: An economic aid agreement for 1975 betweer. the DRV and Bulgaria was signed in Sofia on 14 September by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ivan Iliev and by DRV Vice Premier Phan Trong Tue, who was in Sofia to participate in celebrations marking Bulgaria's 30th national day. This is the first agreement on aid for 1975 that Hanoi had concluded with an ally, although a DRV economic delegation led by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi discussed long-range economic cooperation during a tour of communist states earlier this year, stopping in Sofia from 9. to 13 July. Available Hanoi and Sofia reports on the agreement make no reference to military assistance and do not specify whether the aid must be repaid. Military assistance was mentioned in reports on the 1974 package, signed during a visit to Bulgaria by DRV Premier Pham `Jan Dong, from 1 to 8 August 1973. Present at this year's signing ceremony was DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Nguyen Van Dao, who recently led a trade delegation to Yugoslavia for the signing of a three-year trade and payments agreement in Belgrade on 16 August, and who represented the DRV in discussions with the Yugoslavs aimed at "implementing" aid set aside for the DRV last year. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R0003000TO03-9a6 1.8 SEPTEMBER 1974 APPENDIX MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9 - 15 SEPTEMBER 1974 Moscow (2621 item Peking (1047 items Chilea1i Solidarity (5%) 10% Seventh Asian Games, (25%) 24% Week China (7%) 7% Teheran Indian "Annexation" of (6%) 14% Indian Foreign (--) 5% Sikkim Minister Singh in [PRC Foreign (--) 4%] USSR Ministry Statement [Brezhnev-Singh (--) 3%1 Nigerian President Gowon (3%) 11% Meeting Novorossiysk Award (6%) 5% in PRC [Mao-Gowon Meeting (--) 3%] Ceremony Criticism of Lin Piao (7%) 8% [Brezhnev (4%) 3%] and Confucius Speech DPRK National Da (1% Bulgarian Revolu- (5%) 3% y Mozambique Inde endenc ) (- 6% tion 30th p e Chou Congratulations to -) (--) 5% 3% Anniversary DPRK National Day (1%) 3% New Zealand Prime Minister Rowling These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not, always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in ether cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6