TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 18, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
18 SEPTEMBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 38)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on inaterial
carried in foreign Lroadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components
STATSPEC
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure suhiect to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 SEPTEMBER 1914
CONTENTS
White House Request on Vietnam Aid Draws PRG, DRV Protests . . . . .
1
DRV, PRG Charge U.S. Attempts to "Control" Struggle Against GVN . .
2
DRV Generals Appear in North Vietnam Af ter Long Absences . . . . . .
3
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Moscow Assails Anti-Arab Purposes of Rabin Visit to U. S. . . . . . .
4
CHILE
Moscow Sees CIA Role in Coup as Discrediting U.S. Policy . . . . . .
6
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
Tito Acknowledges Arrest of Stalinist Group; Moscow Silent . . . . .
9
NORTH KOREA
National Day Marked by Kim I1-song Presence, Calls for Unity . . . .
11
USSR-GERMANY-PRC
USSR, GDR Media Attack PRC for Views on "One German Nation" . . . .
14
USSR.
Military Spokesmen Air Views on Controversial Issues . . . . . . . .
16
Novorossiysk and Kerch Ceremonies Boost Brezhnev Mini-Cult . . . . .
18
NOTES
Honeckcr on Warsaw Pact; DRV-Bulgarian Aid Agreement . . . . . . . .
19
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
i
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VIETNAM
WHITE HOUSE REQUEST ON VIETNAM AID DRAWS PRG, DRV PROTESTS
President Ford's 12 September appeal for Congressional restoration
of funds cut from the Administration's aid request for South
Vietnam was assailed in PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesman
statements on the 13th and 14th, respectively. The issuance of
such protests is consistent with the communist pattern in recent
months of reacting promptly to public statements on the aid question
by Administration officials. The President's general assurance
of continuity in policy and support for allies in his 12 August
speech to Congress had similarly drawn foreign ministry statements
from the PRG and Hanoi, on 15 and 17 August respectively, critically
interpreting his remarks as a commitment to the Nixon Administration's
policy of supporting Thieu.
Both the current statements routinely denounced aid to Saigon as
a violation of the Paris agreement, and the PRG charged that
President Ford's "allegation" about increased attacks by North
Vietnam troops was part of a "premeditated plan" to utilize the
current difficulties cf the ARVN as a pretext for increased aid to
implement the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam. While the DRV statement
acknowledged that the President was asking for restoration of funds
cut by Congress from the Administration's original request, the
PRG statement failed to mention this and, in contrast, gave the
impression the President was asking for additional amounts.
Further media reaction has been limited to commentaries broadcast
by Hanoi and Liberation radios on Thieu's alleged inability to
survive without U.S. aid. An LPA commentary aired on the 13th
by Liberation Radio claimed that opposition to the aid in the U.S.
Congress and among the American people has brought a "frenzied
reaction" in the Thieu regime. Among other things, the commentary
claimed that Thieu was using aid reduction to justify "failures" of
many mil4.tary operations and "fabricating charges" that the
communists were repairing airfields at Khe Sanh and in the central
highlands and were moving their MIG's to Dong Hoi in the southern
panhandle of. North Vietnam. While neither confirming nor denying
that the latter activities have been taking place, the commentary
alluded to the impact an interjection of communist air operations
would have on the GVN war effort, by "confronting its newly-activated,
? poorly-trained and inexperienced air force with the danger of facing
North Vietnam in dogfights."
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DRJ, PRG CHARGE U.S. ATTEMPTS TO 'CONTROL' STRUGGLE AGAINST GVN
Vietnamese communist media treatment of the antigovernment demon-
strations that began in Hue on 8 September has evolved from initial
factual coverage--based on Saigon and Western news sources--to
authoritative comment in Hanoi's party and army dailies, NHAN DAN
and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Despite the obviously exploitable coincidence
of current manifestations of opposition to Thieu and the recently
revived communist calls for his ouster,* some Hanoi and PRG
propaganda has struck a cautionary note, warning that the United
States is attempting to infiltrate and subvert the antigovernment
movement.
A 14 September NH/N DAN editorial at first singled out the Hue
demonstration as a "noteworthy" development in an encouraging
situation in the South: but, at another point, it expressed strong
suspicion that the United States was acting behind the scenes to
manipulate the situation for its own benefit and even intimated
that Washington might be preparing for Thieu's removal. According
to the editorial, the United States--faced with the "front" to
"topple Thieu"--is using Thieu as a "tool" to carry out its policies
while preparing to "change horses when compelling circumstances
arise." The editorial warned that "the United States is keeping
a finger in the current anti-Thieu struggle movement. in the cities
of South Vietnam in order to lead this movement in a direction
favorable to it, while at the, same; time readying new horses."
A 14 September Liberation Radio commentary voiced similar misgivings
about the situation in the cities. After an optimistic appraisal
of the situation in the South, the commentary warned that the United
States was "seizing every opportunity to have its henchmen participate
in the people's movement and raise outwardly anti-Thieu slogans
to . . . control the movement and direct it to serve its political
purposes."
The warnings of U.S. infiltration in the urban struggle are not
uniformly present in the propaganda. By contrast, a 17 September
QUANT DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the situation in the southern cities
did not raise any misgivings, instead conveying an air of exultation
over the "seething struggle" spreading from Hue to Saigon and declaring
this is a "heavy blow" to the. United States and Thieu. The commentary
made the uaaal claims about popular determination to oust Thi?.u and
predicted "increasingly greater successes" in this effort.
* For a discussion of communist calls for Thieu s overthrow and the
establishment of a new government in Saigon, see the TRENDS of 21 August
1974, pages 14-17.
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DRV GENERALS APPEAR IN NORTH VIETNAM AFTER LONG ABSENCES
For the first time in more than eight years Hanoi media have reported
the whereabouts of Hoang Van Thai, a member of the party Central
Committee and vice minister of defense who wrote several major
articles on military questions in the early 1960's. Thai's last
known public appearance was in Hanoi in March 1966 and his last
known article was published in the January 1966 issue of the
theoretical journal HOC TAP, an article which stressed the
importance of North Vietnam's contribution to the war in South
Vietnam.
A 16 September VNA report on Thai's appearance at a Hanoi sports
event on the previous day listed him as a colonel general, revealing
that he had been promoted from his previous rank of lieutenant
general. Thai is the third North Vietnamese officer publicly
reported to hold the second highest DRV military rank. The rank
of colonel general was also given this year to the head of the
army's Political General Department, Song Hao;* and the rank. has
been held for many years by Chu Van Tan--a representative for
minority nationalities whose major responsibilities are in the
government and in front organizations.
Appearing along with Hoang Van Thai, according to VNA, were
Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Major General Cao Van Khanh.
Like Thai, Cao Van Khanh has not been mentioned by North Vietnamese
media for several years; he first publicly reappeared in the
North last month when Hanoi media noted that he had greeted a
visiting Chinese volleyball team on 17 August.
* Promotions Hanoi has made since April are discussed in the TRENDS
of 7 August 1974, pages .22-2.5. Since that time }htnoi has revealed
the following additional promoLioi;: Lt. Gen. Bang Giang, Lt. Gen.
Quang Dao, Lt. Gen. Tran Sam, Maj. Gen. Hoang Minh Thi, and Maj, Gen.
Do Trinh.
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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
MOSCOW ASSIAILS ANTI ARAB PURPOSES OF RABIN VISIT TO U.S.
In comment on Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's 10-14 September visit
to the United States, Moscow has reiterated many of its standard
denunciations of Israel's Middle East policies, while stressing
that the visit presages an increase in U.S.-Israeli political,
economic, and military cooperation working against Arab interests.
To underscore the point, Soviet media have highlighted recent
statements by Rabin that the chief purpose of his visit was to
obtain guarantees of new supplies of U.S. weapons, in sufficient
quantity to enable Israel co deal with neighboring Arab states
"from a position of strength." Moscow has also sharply criti-
cized what it termed Israel's "increasing intransigence" on key
aspects of a final peace settlement--including withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Arab lands occupied since the 1967 war,
resolution of the Palestinian question, and resumption of the
Geneva peace conference.
U.S. AID Soviet comment has assessed the results of Rabin's
visit in general as "favorable to Israel," citing
U.S. and Israeli sources to the effect that Rabin obtained the
assurances of U.S. military and financial aid which he had
sought. IZVESTIYA on the 16th, for example, according to TASS,
reported that the United States promised to meet Israel's "imme-
diate requirements in weapons" and would provide one-and-a-half
billion dollars in aid. On the same day Moscow radio, in a
foreign-language commentary, asserted that Rabin left Washington
with "agreements that will satisfy almost all. of Israel's demands
for arms supplies." TASS on the 15th was more specific, stating
that the United States had agreed to deliver 50 Phantom fighter-
bombers within a y.ar, as well as 200 to 250 modern M-60 tanks,
lase:--?guided rockets, and other armaments. TASS also noted on
the 15th and again on the 18th that the deliveries would be made
under a current U.S. aid program but that Rabin had, according to
U.S. officials, "achieved progress" in negotiating for U.S. arms
assistance over the long term.
ISRAELI Often placing the Rabin visit against a background
"AGGRESSION'"' of "heightening tension" and "escalation of Israeli
provocations," Moscow media have frequently pre-
sented the reports of promised U.S. military aid as fresh evidence
that Israel is preparing for "new aggression." This accusation of
Tel Aviv's militarist intentions has often appeared in past Soviet
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comment, and Rabin.'s talks with the new U.S. President and other
high officials were apparently viewed as an appropriate occasion
to reassert charges of close U.S.-Israeli coordination in formulating
Middle East policies directed against Arab interests. An 18 September
PRAVDA article by V. Peresada, as reviewed by TASS, typified much
of the Soviet comment when it claimed that the visit had shown that
Israeli policy continued to depend on the pressure exerted by U.S.
circles on Arab countries to make them "tolerant" of Israel's
"annexationist aims, particularly on the Palestinian problem."
Moscow radio on the 16th told its domestic audience that, beyond
military and financial aid, Rabin had also sought and obtained
reaffirmation of the U.S.-Israeli "special relationship," which it
defined as U.S. support for Israeli aggression and provocations
against neighboring Arab states. To reinforce the charge, the
broadcast linked the most recent Israeli air raids on Lebanon with
an "understanding" Rabin was said to have achieved with U.S. leaders.
PEACE TALKS In repeating past irarnings that Israeli policies
endanger peace, Moscow has continued to accuse
the Rabin government of seeking to pre,rent a comprehensive Middle
East peace settlement. A Moscow radio "questions and answers"
feature on the 14th, for example, explained the continuing delay
in reconvening the Geneva peace conference as due to daily military
provocations and threats by Israel against Arab countries and to
Israel's refusal to agree to the partici_pat'.on of Palestinian
representatives in the conference. Moscow radio's Arabic service
on the 14th claimed to see a hardening of Israel's attitude in
recent months on the elements of a peace settlement, citing as
one cause the results of recent Israeli sou:idings of the new U.S.
Administration on "the extent to which Israel can continue its
expansionist policy without losing U.S.-support."
At the same time, Moscow has continued to press for resumption of
the Geneva peace conference as soon as possible, asse-?Ling that the
conference has an essential contribution to make in achieving a
final political settlement and professing a cautious optimism that
new peace talks can be arranged. IZVRSTIYA on the 14th, in reviewing
the reasons for Rabin's visit, noted U.S. press reports that Washington
intended to pressure Israel to agree to further peace talks in
return for granting Rabin's requests for more arms. Although express-
ing skepticism on this point, IZVEI;TIYA emphasized the potential
benefits for all sides from a reconvened Geneva conference, stressing
that the conference must contribute to the final peace settlement and
that the settlement itself would not only have to arrange for Israeli
withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and insure the Palestinians'
legitimate national rights but also "guarantee genuine security for all
states in the area, both the Arabs and Israel."
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CHILE
MOSCOW SEES CIA ROLE IN COUP AS DISCREDITING U.S. POLICY
Moscow, giving considerable publicity to an "international week
of solidarity" on the occasion of the first anniversary of the
11 September overthrow of the Allende Government, has thus far
only briefly and selectively reported President Ford's remarks
on Chile in his 16 September news conference. TASS noted his
statement that the U.S. Government was not involved in the coup
itself, but ignored his references to 40 Committee and Congressional
review of covert activities. In commenting on disclosures in the
U.S. press since 8 September of testimony by CIA Director Colby
last April on activities tc "destabilize" the Allende government,
Soviet commentators have seemed to be contriving to separate
intelligence activities from the U.S. AdiJnistration.. Thus
Moscow asserted that subversive activities of the CIA and the
Penta;;on were "beyond even the control of the White House."
Claiming that such actions have been responsible for major American
political failures, Moscow observed that CIA involvement in the
"fascist plot" in Chile discredits U.S. policy.
FORD STATEMENT, While the first short TASS English report
COLBY TESTIMONY on the President's news conference took note
only of remarks on the Nixon pardon and the
economy, a second TASS account later on the 17th also picked up
the President's statement that the U.S. Administration had nothing
to do with Allende's overthrow. "However," the account added,
President Ford stated that "certain U.S. actions" in Chile were
directed to help maintain the opposition' newspapers, television,
radio, and political parties in opposition. The account also
noted that when asked under what international law the United
States had the right, as TASS put it, "to undermine the positions
of the constitutionally elected government of another country,"
President Ford said "he would not venture any judgment on whether
such acts are allowed by international law."
Predictably, TASS ignored the President's statement that the United
States, like other governments, takes certain actions in the
intelligence field L.o help implement foreign policy and protect
national security, and that communist nations spend much more money
than the United States for the same purpuGes. Nor did TASS
acknowledge hisreiaarks on 40 Committee and Congressional review
of covert operations undertaker. by the Government.
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Minimal comment thus far on the Colby testimony has focused on
revelations about the CIA, long a target of Moscow attacks, while
at the same time seemingly concerned to avoid linking the CIA
activity in Chile with the top echelon of the U.S. Government,
particularly Secretary Kissinger. Thus in cautiously discussing
the activities of "the so-called 40 Committee" in the weekly
observers' roundtable broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on
15 September, panelist Pyadishev avoided mentioning that the
Committee is headed by Kissinger, describing it only as "a highly
secret group of top Washington government officials." He noted
that a State Department spokesman hac reiterated a U.S. Government
statement last year that the United States had nothing to do with
the military coup in Chile, and that Senator Kennedy had declared
that previous government statements on this subject had been untrue
and had "misled Congress." Pyadishev professed to see Peutagon
and CIA activities as out of control even of the White House,
asserting that CIA implication in the Chilean putsch exemplified
an "old problem," one of "the wide intrusion of the American military
and secret service into politics and all spheres of U.S. domestic
and international" affairs.
A Kuznetsov commentary on the Chile issue, broadcast in English
to North America on the 13th, did charge that the CIA's "subversive
activities" against democratic governments of other countries
was an old practice and an integral part of the foreign policy of
"previous administrations." But he also seemed concerned to portray
the CIA as out of control by responsible officialdom, citing the
Marchetti-Marks book on the CIA as stating that the agency had
become a gigantic center of power "which does not answer to Congress
and can go out of control" at any attempt to block its activities.
COUP ANNIVERSARY Moscow has observed the first anniversary of
the Allende overthrow with publicity for an
"international week of solidarity" with Chile highlighted by a
Brezhnev message to a mass meeting in Moscow on the 11th marking
the solidarity campaign. The Brazhnev message deplored the
"ruthless" suppression of Allende supporters and the "thousands
of people killed and tortured" by the Chilean junta, and expressed
the cope that "our voice of solidarity" would be heard by imprisoned
Chilean Communist Party leader Corvalan.
Noting President Pinochet's announcement, in his anniversary speech
on the 11th, abolishing the state of internal war in Chile, TASS
on the 12th called the statement "cynical" and signifying nothing, since
a state of siege was being maintained. Neither Moscow nor Havana
has acknowledged Pinochet's offer to release almost all political
prisoners if the USSR and Cuba would follow suit.
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Soviet comment on the anniversary has continued the line of the
past year in condemning the "persecution" of Chilean "democrats."
TASS on the 10th publicized a statement issued the previous day
in Stockholm by an "international commission" investigating the
Chilean military junta's "crimes." According to TASS, "prominent
lawyers" and representatives of the Chilean resistance movement
took part in the work of the commission, and the statement--presumably
timed to coincide with the solidarity week--demanded the immediate
release of Corvalan and other political prisoners, and condemned
the "mass arrests" carried out by the regime in an effort to suppress
the people's resistance. Moscow has also publicized statements
by Chilean communists, such as former economics minister Millas;
in a 4 September PRAVDA article Mi'llas denounced the actions of
the "North imerican monopolies and the Chilean military oligarchy"
which led to the present tragedy, and asserted that a "'new revival
of the Chilean popular masses" was occurring and their protests
against fascism were increasing daily.
CUBAN COMMENT Havana, which has consistently seen a U.S. hand
behind the Allende overthrow, has not reacted
to President Ford's remarks, but has seen the Colby testimony as
providing "new" prof of Washington's "shameless intervention" in
the conspiracy against Chilean democracy. And Cuba has shown no
hesitation in liuking Secretary Kissinger with the decision to
"son economic chaos and overthrow Allende's popular unity govern-
ment." Thus a Havana international service commentary on the 11th
declared that the CIA had engaged in such activities "with the
consent of current Secretary of State Henry Kissinger." The
commentary declared that "the U.S. Government put all its resources
into the game" and must bear "direct responsibility for the wave
of crime and barbarity" unleashed by Pinochet. Such Cuban accusations
are not new: A Havana radio commentary on 28 August, for example,
censured the United States for the "fascist bloodbath in f:hile" and
maintained that "primary criminal responsibility" rests with the
"imperialist government" of the United States.
Cuban comment on the Chilean coup anniversary has been exemplified
in an 11 September GRANMA editorial which called the coup "part of
the U.S. counterrevolutionary global policy in Latin America"
designed to strike against the growing movement toward sovereignty
and re'overy of natural resources. GRANMA praised the "heroism,
self-denial and fighting spirit" of Allende and "thousands upon
thousands" of Chileans who fought with him against the c,up. The
editorial called Allende's overthrow a "hard setback" to the
revolutionary movement in Latin America, but concluded that "fascism
has no future other than defeat."
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- 9 -
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
TITO ACKNOWLEDGES ARREST OF STALINIST GROUP; MOSCOW SILENT
Rumors carried in the Western press that a pro-Soviet group had
been arrested in Yugoslavia after trying to form a dissident
political party were confirmed by Tit-) himself in a speech at
Jesenice on 12 September. His use of the terms "Cominformists"
and "Stalinists"' were clearly codeword references to Moscow's
involvement in the affair, at a time when Belgrade-Moscow
relations have been steadily improving. Although rumors of the
arrests had circulated for weeks, the exposure came less than
two days after Edvard Kardelj had returned from a 10-day
"vacation" to the Soviet Union that concluded with a talk with
Brezhnev. The first indication that Tito might favor allowing
the affair to come out in the open occurred on 8 September,
when Stane Dolanc raised the dormant issue of "Cominformism" at
a rally speech at Vis.
Tito's sketchy remarks about the movement indicated that some
30 persons were arrested after holding their own party congress.
The congress, according to an article in the 10 September
Washington POST and other sources, supposedly took place in
Montenegro earlier this year, Tito emphasized that the group
relied on outside support. Although he described the congress
as "more fantasy than reality," he pointed out that the group had
an enormous amount of material "printed abroad" and that the
secretary of the group was to be "someone who is outside the
country." Tito expressed doubt about the identity of the backers
of the group, adding that "the court will find 'chat out." However,
Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic, while reporting Tito's remark
that it was not known "for certain" who was behind the group,
pointed out that it is already known "on whose behalf they are
working." Sundic also implied that the leaders of the group were
still at large and emphasized that "the countries in which they
hatch their plans" "tolerate" such activity because they too are
opposed to Yugoslavia's, nonalined position.
Tito's remarks came in a speech covering a broad range of domestic
and foreign matters delivered to political workers in Slovenia.
He chose a particul-?rly sensitive time to expose the affair: Soviet
Vice Premier Novikov was touring Yugoslavia, and Chief of the
General Staff Kulikov was to arrive on the 17th. However, he
emphasized that the arrests had to be made public. While pointing
out that the group had posed no serious threat to Yugoslavia,
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Tito--in a statement designed perhaps as much for foreign
consumption as for Yugoslavia--called for "exemplary punish-
ment" of the group "so that in the future it won't even
occur to anybody to try something like this aga4n." In
addition, he decried "our blindness and lack r); vigilance"
which enabled the group to hold their congre3z..
Moscow's embarrassment over the affair is suggested by its
failure to report anything at all about the speech. Indeed,
of Moscow's orthodox Warsaw Pact allies, only Poland acknowledged
the speech, the Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU on the 14th summarizing
Tito's comments on settling the Cyprus crisis but not mentioning
his remarks on the alleged plot. On the other hand, bloc
maverick Romania reported the speech in both the press and on
the radio. Its decision to play up Tito's remarks about the
"Cominformists" likely reflected its own wariness of Moscow.
Albania, like the orthodox bloc, thus far has ignored the
speech.
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NORTH KOREA
NATIONAL DAY MARKED BY KIM IL-SONG, PRESENCE, CALLS IOR UNITY
Pyongyang festivities greeting the 26th DPRIC National Day on
8 September were. marked by an unusual degree of participation
by Kim Il-song and by new attention to the importance of
ideological unity. Except for quinquennial and decennial anni-
versaries, Kim's appearance at the National Day meeting in
Pyongyang was his first in over a decade. Kim also attended
the National Day banquet which, though occasionally attended by
Kim in the past, usually has been described in North Korean
media as a cabinet affair. While Kim met with a number of
delegations to the anniversary, including the Chinese delegation
on the 10th, monitored DPRK and Moscow media have not reported
any Kim meeting with the Soviet delegation. Bodyul, CPSU
Central Committee member and first secretary of the Moldavian
party, headed the Soviet delegation of identical status to the
Chinese, led by CCP Central Committee member and Hopeh party
chief Liu Tzu-hou. KCNA on 11 September reported that the Soviet
delegation had been received by Political Committee member So Chol
on L:ne 10th. Kim had met with the Soviet as well as the Chinese
delegations last September and in September 1972.
Anniversary comment included a major speech at the Pyongyang
meeting by Political Committee member Pak Song-chol, a brief
banquet speech by Premier Kim I? (his first major address since
returning in July from medical treatment in Romania), and a
NODONG SINMUN editorial. Both Pak Song-chol's speech and the
NODONG SINMUN editorial gave more attention to domestic economic
and political tasks than on previous anniversaries, not only
leading off with a discussion of su^h tasks as usual, but also
concluding with remarks on domestic matters instead of the more
customary concluding attention to international events. Pak
especially stressed the need for ideological cohesion in the North,
stating that the ideological revolution "must be placed ahead of
other things," presumably a reference to the technical and
cultural revolutions which form the other two components of
Kim Il-song's revolutionary trinity. In a possible attempt to
emphasize the importance of the DPRK central authorities, Pak
also made a point of referring to "the leader and the party
central committee" in those instances where North Korean media
have normally referred simply to "the leader" or occasionally
"the leader and the party."
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18 SEPTEMBER 1974
Following the example set in several previous major DPRK speeches
this year, Pak directed a harsh, personal attack against ROK
President Pak Chong-hui and accused the South of blocking the
North-South dialog. Pak admitted that the struggle against the
regime in the South was undergoing "temporary meanderings" due
to "harsh repression" by Seoul. Neither Pak nor Kim 11 voiced
the usually standard anti-Japanese rhetoric, possibly a response
to ROK-Japanese friction arising from the investigation of the
15 August assassination attempt on President Pak.* While Pak
Song-chol called fir the United Nations to take measures to
withdraw U.S. troops in South Korea "under the UN signboard,"
he did not repeat Kim Il's criticism last year of the "untenable
argument" that U.S. troops might remain in South Korea under the
U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty.**
PEKING Peking gave lower-level treatment to this year's DPRK
anniversary than it had to the last non-quinquennial
celebration in 1972, consistent with the recent PRC trend toward
reduced coverage of communist countries' anniversaries. Chinese
representation at the DPRK ambassador's reception in Peking this
year was comparable to 1972, but the remarks this year were by
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei while in 1972 they were delivered by
Pulitburo member and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Chinese
representation at.. the reception given by the China-Korea Friendship
Association was considerably lower-ranking than in 1972. In its
treatment of the founding anniversary, which included a PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial and Chinese leaders' greetings (monitored only in
Peking radio's Korean language service), Peking maintained the line
toward Korea it has followed thus far this year in calling for the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea but generally omitting
any time stipulation and avoiding a harsh portrayal of the U.S. role
in South Korea. Peking's comments included standard denunciations
of the Pak government and praise for the North's efforts at dialog
and peaceful reunification.
* For a discussion of Pyongyang's response to ROK-Japanese
friction, see the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, pages 18-19.
** A 13 September ASAHI SHIMBUN report quoted Kim Il-song as
telling a Japan Socialist Party delegation in North Korea on
11 September that "The stationing of U.S. forces in accordance with
the U.S.-ROK defense treaty is another matter," distinct from the
UN question.
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I.ll SE1"TEM1S :1P 1974
MOSCOW Moscow used the DPRK founding ai.n:iversary prl.marl.ly
to publicize its assistance to North Korea, Including
a pointed reference in an EKONOMICI ESKAYA CAZETA article to
"Joint work between USSR and DPRK ncient:lnts In the Joint
Institute of Nuclear. Research in Dubna." Soviet media fully
reported the normal leader greetings, but gave only brief accounts
of the DPRK ambassador's reception in Moscow and a Soviet-
sponsored anniversary meeting there. At both functions, Soviet:
representation was at a lower level than In 1972, the last
comparable DPRK founding anniversary. Moscow comment: wan generally
limited to standard formulations, including its call for the
withdrawal of "foreign troops" from South Korea, though a
9 September commentary broadcast on the Moscow domestic radio
recalled Brezhnev's support at the 24th Party Congress; for the
withdrawal of "U.S. forces" from the South. A 9 September
Moscow commentary in Korean pointed out with "pleasure" that "the
parties, governments, and peoples of our countries hold common
views on the problc.as of building socialism and common tsm and on
pending international issues."
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CON EIDENTIAi, PINS TRENDS
18 SI?P I'E,1'i1SF.R 19711
- I /1 -
USSR - GERMANY - PRC
USSR, GDR MEDIA ATTACK PRC FOR VIEWS ON LONE GERMAN NATION'
Recent_ ntittenmentn by 11RC Iead.crn challenging the FinalLt.y Of punt
World War Ii. bordtrn I n Ger:;uny, an report.(-(t to the Wei; tern press,
have prompted pre(1!cta6.le, ntrtn-g cr'ItIcinm I rout Soviet and i:ant
German media. According to Western hewn reports, Went German
opposition CDU Chal rma:( Kohl, during ;t 3-17. Septemher Ch i nee;e
visit, wan told by PRC Deputy Foreign MInin1('r Uhf no
Kean-hua
and Vice Preml_or Teng Ilnlao-pLng, on 6 September that the
Chinese nt.-1.1_1 recognize "a single German nn t. ton" and that one clay
condition; would be nultabi for rcunii1:Li oil of the two German
states Into it single German nation. Chlao wn!; ainn reported to
have offered a Loan t. to the national tinily of' Germany at a
reception on the 6th at the FRG emhanay.
This Chinese view of the postwar German nItuntion has been stated
before both official.l.y and pub l.icly, drawing, vehement denunclatlon:-;
by Soviet and East German observers, Iiut the timing, of the recent
Chinese :;tatementn must be particularly Irritating for tile East.
Germans and the Soviets. On 4 September the United St.~t' ;nd the
GDR signed the documents establishing diplomatic rclaticm:;, which
Soviet and Eant. German comment has, hailed as the culmit:at ion OI the
postwar Soviet goal of t.iaal tnternationai rcCoy;nitlot1 of the two
German :;t?tes.*
EUROPEAN AND Reacting a3 Moscow 11:1s on previous occasions when
ASIAN BORDERS the Chinese h_tve iseucd c;LateTi nt:+ on (.he German
issue, two 'L'ASS commentaries on the reported
Chinese ,tatements reflected Soviet sensitivities; regarding not only
the German border issue but also the S i no-Soviet border I n Asir, ,
On the 7th A. Kranikov charged that in presenting to Kohl Peking's
views on "territorial claims to the Soviet Union, China would Iike
to create a problem of frontiers In Europe an well." And on the
18th, V. V1nogradov, reporting from Bonn on the cluscress of viewpoint:;
of the Wc;t German "revanchists" and the Chinese leaders, noted the
"'similarity' of interests of Peking, which makes claims to Far
Eastern territories of the Soviet Union, and the interests of West
German revanchists, who refuse to recognize state frontiers that
formed in Europe as a result of the destruction of the Hitler Reich."
* See the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, pages 6-7.
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CONFI1)l;N'I'IAI, IBIS 'T'RENDS
I H SI;I"I'I:M31;R 19Y4
The Kr.anikov coumlcnLfry concluded that the (;hi.uese wcr(, nttcmpt.ing
to "clone down" the GDR when they allegedly asserted that W ' ;t
Germany was "the only Gerrnn nation." Ile drew ;1 pnrnl lcl between
this "cloning clown" of the (;I)R and a r;taternent by Prem,ler (;hot]
Fn-lal to n group of West German businessmen In PekIng In P1; y 1973;
Chou reportedly then said that, having studied In Berlin for :t year,
he had never heard of a city vaned Ka1.Iningral, but was I;ni l.t;lr
with Koenigsberg.
East: Berlin % reaction was n.lno quick and n trong. NI?II1;S I)E(l'1'S(;III,ANI)
In a s geed commentary on the 9th denounced the Chinese for agrecing
with Kohl that "there are not two German state:;" and supporting
Bonn's "Illegal claim to Went Berl In," charging that Peking again ha!;
demonstrated that the "M;olnts have completely broken with Marxism-
Lenin Lsm." Moncow'n PRAVDA on the J I th put) I I nhed a deta I Ied !;Urn;ary
of the East Berlin party organ';: article.
PEKING'S TREATMENT While NCNA reported the various activitlc;
of the Kohl delegation, It did so without
detailing the substance of the talks between Kohl Auld the Chinese
leaders. Peking's most recent exposition of C1le Chinese view
regarding the "German question" came In mid-1973, after the
Security Council vote on the two Germanys' admission to the UN.
PRC representative Huang llua on 22 June 1973 had told the Council
that despite the 28 year:; since the end of World War It, there
still. was no "peace treaty with Germany" and the two German ;;tat _ s
were "sti.11 living under abnormal conditions." Continuing his
statement, obviously provocat?ve to Moscow and East Berlin, llu;;nl;
declared:
We maintain that a just and reasonable settlement
of the German question should be achieved at an
early date on condition of respecting the interests
and wishes of the people of the two German states,
and that the affairs of the German people should
be settled by the G(:j.ran pcop.le themselves through
consultations." [emphasis added]
Additionally, to further demonstrate that the two German states have
a unique relationship, NCNA a day earlier had reported on the
21 June 1913 exchange of ratification documents for the GDR-FRG
Basic Relations Treaty, taking pains to point out that Bonn and East
Berlin had exchanged "permanent representatives" and not ambassadors.
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CONF1JENTIAL FIL.i.S T121;N1)S
18 SI:PTI:NBER 1,974
11 S S R
MILITARY SPOKESMEN AIR VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
Such potentially controver.siz:i. 1utiuen as one-man command, Conk
warfare, and detente were among the ftb,lects addr.en;sed by prominent.
Sovic:, military spokesmen over the past week. Although none of
the w:atcments broke new ground on the Insucn they addressed, each
reflected a topical interest or individual. viewpoint which deserves
notice. Whether they rcf.lect brorder patterns of concerns; and
currents of opinion within the military remains to be determined
by subsequent events.
ONE-MAN CO(+AND A mayor article on one-man command was authored
by Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force
Colonel. General A.N. Yefimov In the 7 September issue of RED STAR.
Although there have been few signs of ferment over the Issue for
many years, one-man command remains a sensitive subject in the
Soviet Union, since it registers party recognition of the commander';;
autonomy ',r his own professional sphere. Ycfimov's treatment of
the subject emphasized this aspect: Its central thesis way. that
modern military conditions have enhanced and complicated the ml.i.itary
commander's responsit ies and hence reinforced the traditional
reasons for giving him broad authority. Yefimov Included among
hiL arguments for the commander's, autonomy the somewhat surprising
asserrion that it is he "who take.; the decision to fight"--a
tactical decision, one: assumes, alt;iough Yefimov does not specify.
Why the article was published n` Lhis time and what if any particular
concerns prompted it is not made clear. It may be relevant to note,
however, that it comes at a time of increased stress on ideology
in the Soviet Union, centering around the CPSU decree on the
Belorussian party organization summarized in the 30 August PRAVDA.
A subsequent PRAVDA editorial described this decree as a document
of "general party significance," and it is already apparent that
a major campaign stressing "ideological struggle" and "communist
morality" is getting under way on the basis of the party's initiative,
RED STAR took a particularly prominent role in sparking the campaign
by publishing a long and detailed commentary on the decree in its
31 August issue. Although neither the RED STAR commentary nor
other documents have stressed the relevance of the decree to army
party organizations, it is apparent that the latter will regard
the decree as a warrant for increased activity. It may be this
prospective development which prompted the Yefimov article. From
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L 1 SIs1.''1I;MBER 1974
From the standpoint of the military profenn.ionaln, the time may
have seemed appropriate to remind al'. military personnel that the
line between the claims of military professional Joni and party enthus-
lasm has been clearly defined In party documents.
TANt', WARFARE The second item of note was an art.lcle by Chief
Marshal of Tank Troops P.A. Rotin.istrov In the
7 September IZVEST1YA. Ai though largely :inspir.ationaI in tone in
accordance with the requirements of the occasion, Tank Troops Day,
it contained a remarkably defensive passage on the role of tanks;
in modern combat. This would be newsworthy In the case of any
Soviet spokesmen, but doubly ao for Rotmistrov, wh was a hero
commander of tanks in World War 11, and who has been an ardent
public advocate of their potentiol role in modern combat since.
In an apparent acknowledgment of lessonr drawn from last year's
Middle East war, Rotmistrov observed that every weapon must
eventually "meet Its antipode--the counterweapon." lie went on to
argue that offensive weapons always gained the upper hand in the
technological duel between offense and defense, and that NATO
countries were continuing to operate on the assumption that tanks
would continue to play a significant role in modern combat. Never-
theless, the fact that he felt constrained to make the argument
strongly suggests the issue has come under debate within the Soviet
military establishment.
DETENTE AND DEFENSE The third notable item was Crechko's speech
at the award ceremony in Kcrch honoring the
city for its World War II role as the jumping-off point for the
liberation of the Crimea. In his remarks on the international.
situation, Grechko made no more than a perfunctory bow to the
successes of the Soviet Union's peace program, stressing instead
the dangers that remained on the international horizon. In this
respect his remarks stand in marked contrast to those by Brezhnev
on the same subject at Novorossiysk a week earlier. Whereas
Brezhnev :lad noted in passing that it wou' 4 be "premature" to conclude
that the foundations for peace had been firmly established,
Brezhnev's main emphasis was on the continued commitment of the
Soviet Union to peace and on the good prospects for achieving it.
Grechko reversed the emphasis, stressing instead the need for
continued caution. According to the 14 September live broadcast
of his speech, Grechko said:
The party teaches us to assess realistically the
international situation and consider not only the
positive changes but also the factors opposing
peace. . . . We must preserve a high degree of vigilance,
maintain the defense capacity of our state at a proper
level, and intensify its defenses.
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113 SJ?1''1'I:MIIN,R .1974
NOVOROSS I YS K AND KERCH CEREMONIES BOOST BREZHNEV MINI-CULT
One of the by-products--presumably not unanticipated--of the
award of "Hero-city" honors to Novo r.ossIysk and K,er.ch has
been the generation of a gr.i ?it deal of favorable pui)liclLy
about Brez%nev's World War II role. Judging by hrecedenis
the Soviet leadership Is extremely grad[; i nI; about al.lowi.ng any
of its members to acquire a publi.C reputation as a wartime
hero. Despite earnest efforts, Br.ezlinev has had only modest
success along this .l.i.ne, certainly nothing to compare with the
reputation that Khrushchev managed to acquire on the ban In of.
his comparatively broader wartime responsf.billt.f.e.-, and 111";
association with more dramatic events and personal.atie:,.
The recent ceremonies at Novoros slysk and Ker.ch should narrow the
gap in this regard. lirezhni v dr.amat[cal.ly identified hfmsel.I WI L11
the memory of these wartime campaigns by his physical presence at
the Novorossiysk ceremonies. Moreover, the speeches at both
ceremonies repeatedly drew attention to his wartime role. lie was
lionized for his "personal courage and stamina," for being an
"example of party spirit and military gallantry tor the soldiers,"
for having been seen "in the most difficult moments ant[ in the
most difficult positions," and for being "loved by all comrades
and troops."
CONFIDENTIAL
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18 SEP I'F.MIii:1P :1974
NOTES
HOI CKCR ON WARSAW PACT: The windup of. Soviet troop maneuvers Iii
Last Germany together with the conclusion of the Wart.aw Pact
exercisen in the Baltic Sea was used by SLU First Secretary
Ilonecker on the 1.3th as an occasion for asserting dedication to
strengtheni.ng the Pact and gratitude to the Soviet Union f:or
protecting the socialist community and insuring the success of
detente. The exercises in the Magdeburg region of the (;I)R were
billed as Involving only Soviet troops, while the 4-13 September
naval maneuvers in the Baltic, under Pact commander Yakubovslcly'n
direction, were said to involve the USSR, the GDR, and Poland.
The latter exercise preceded by only three days the start of
NATO's Northern Merger maneuvers in the Baltic area. Speaking to
the Soviet garrison in Magdeburg on the 1.3th, Ilonecker praised
the "internationalist help and comradely support of the Soviet
Union" and asserted that "the invincible military power of
socialism, with the Soviet Army as its core" was a major factor
in the success of detente. Reiterating a statement issued by the
April 1974 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative
Committee, he said that as long as NATO exists and "na effective
disarmament measures have been carried out," the Warsaw Pact
states "deem it necessary to strengthen their defense capabilities."
DRV-BULr,ARJAN AID AGREEMENT: An economic aid agreement for 1975
betweer. the DRV and Bulgaria was signed in Sofia on 14 September
by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ivan Iliev and by
DRV Vice Premier Phan Trong Tue, who was in Sofia to participate
in celebrations marking Bulgaria's 30th national day. This is
the first agreement on aid for 1975 that Hanoi had concluded with
an ally, although a DRV economic delegation led by Vice Premier
Le Thanh Nghi discussed long-range economic cooperation during a
tour of communist states earlier this year, stopping in Sofia from
9. to 13 July. Available Hanoi and Sofia reports on the agreement
make no reference to military assistance and do not specify whether
the aid must be repaid. Military assistance was mentioned in
reports on the 1974 package, signed during a visit to Bulgaria by
DRV Premier Pham `Jan Dong, from 1 to 8 August 1973. Present at
this year's signing ceremony was DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
Nguyen Van Dao, who recently led a trade delegation to Yugoslavia
for the signing of a three-year trade and payments agreement in
Belgrade on 16 August, and who represented the DRV in discussions
with the Yugoslavs aimed at "implementing" aid set aside for the
DRV last year.
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1.8 SEPTEMBER 1974
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9 - 15 SEPTEMBER 1974
Moscow (2621 item
Peking (1047 items
Chilea1i Solidarity
(5%)
10%
Seventh Asian Games,
(25%)
24%
Week
China
(7%)
7%
Teheran
Indian "Annexation" of
(6%)
14%
Indian Foreign
(--)
5%
Sikkim
Minister Singh in
[PRC Foreign
(--)
4%]
USSR
Ministry Statement
[Brezhnev-Singh
(--)
3%1
Nigerian President Gowon (3%)
11%
Meeting
Novorossiysk Award
(6%)
5%
in PRC
[Mao-Gowon Meeting
(--)
3%]
Ceremony
Criticism of Lin Piao
(7%)
8%
[Brezhnev
(4%)
3%]
and Confucius
Speech
DPRK National Da
(1%
Bulgarian Revolu-
(5%)
3%
y
Mozambique Inde
endenc
)
(-
6%
tion 30th
p
e
Chou Congratulations to
-)
(--)
5%
3%
Anniversary
DPRK National Day
(1%)
3%
New Zealand Prime
Minister Rowling
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not, always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in ether cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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