Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 7, 1999
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 25, 1974
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4.pdf1.15 MB
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R00,Q000~-0440-4'.a8 on a en ID'S 'RENDS In Communist Propaganda Confidential 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 (VOL. XXV, NO. 39) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 199@9fW1&~,ktTDP85T00875R000300070040-4 This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. STATSPEC National Security Information Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions Approved For Release I 9f9QAYIYY ' -kDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 199M9i2TA-RDP85T70O300070040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 CONTENTS U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS Ford, Kissinger Statements, SALT Get Moscow Attention. . . . . . . . . 1 FORCE REDUCTION TALKS Moscow, Allies Remain Adamant in Rejecting NATO's Proposals. . . . . . 3 COMMUNIST RELATIONS PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA Cite Bloc Support for Ideological Drive. . . . . . . 5 Yugoslavia Sentences Stalinists, Criticizes Outside Support. . . . . . 7 USSR-IRAQ Moscow Hails Ties With Iraq, Reaffirms Aid to Palestinians . . . . . . 9 INDOCHINA Recent Ford Statements Draw Routine Response From DRV, PRG . . . . . . 10 Lao Delegation Visits Hanoi at Start of Maur Seeking Aid . . . . . . . 11 DRV Chief of Staff Dung Calls for Army Modernization . . . . . . . . . 12 Chou, Chiang Ching Greet Visiting Philippine First Lady. . . . . . . . 15 Peking Sees Shift in Economic Balance Toward Third World . . . . . . . 16 NOTES JCP-CPSTJ Relations; PRC-Greece; U.S. Role in Chile . . . . . . . . . . 18 APPENDIX Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 U. S. -SOVIET RE L A T I ONS FORD, KISSINGER STATEMENTS, SALT GET MOSCOW ATTENTION The issues of detente and U.S.-Soviet relations have reemerged as focal points of Soviet reportage and comment as Moscow media took note of recent statements by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and provided customary editorial send-offs for the opening of the UN General Absembly session and the resumption of the SALT talks. While with one exception--an article by G.A. Trofimenko on SALE in the USA journal, discussed below--Moscow refrained from extensive comment on any of these events, it treated them in a way seemingly carefully calculated to avoid jolts to the delicate process of developing good relations with the new U.S. Administration. FORD, KISSINGER Moscow's treatment of the recent series of STATEMENTS statements by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger--the President's press conference on the 16th, his UN address on the 18th, his speech in Michigan on the 23d, and the Secretary's UN address on the 23d--suggests it is still observing a "honeymoon" relationship with the new Administration. Despite several openings which these statements offered for Moscow propaganda exploitation, it has confined itself largely to straight reporting or paraphrasing of the original statements. Even the President's remarks regarding the question of the CIA's involvement in Chile elicited little more than passing notice by Moscow commentators. The same can be said for the President's and Secretary's warnings to the oil-producing nations in their speeches on the 23d. Although Moscow has begun to replay adverse Arab reaction to the statements, particularly in broadcasts beamed to the Arab world, it has refrained from originating any critical comment of its own on the subject. This cautious treatment of the new Administration comes against a background of renewed emphasis in Soviet comment on the optimistic themes which Moscow habitually associates with the United Nations and SALT. IZVESTIYA on the 19th carried a self-congratulatory editorial hailing the socialist countries' contribution to bringing about the favorable trends in international relations which, it said, were "continuing and deepening." The Moscow observers round- table program on the 22d discussed the opening of the SALT talks in a similar vein. Hailing the achievements thus far, one commentator predicted that progress in the talks should promote "in an even more fundamental way" an improvement of the international climate. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 19991G9J25 r -RDP5T00875R000300070040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 SALT The major Soviet comment on SALT was a major article by G.A. Trofimenko in the September issue of the USA journal which has Just become available in translation. It is apparent the article is intended to be a persuasive and reasonable presentation of the Soviet viewpoint regarding the conceptual framework which should govern the search for solutions. Although the article argues in moderate terms and is shot through with an optimistic outlook, it presents a frank critique of American viewpoints which are said to pose obstacles to agreement. Among the views criticized is what is described as an American penchant for defining national interests in terms of a zero-sum game--a Soviet loss is an American gain. Another is Secretary Schlesinger's "retargeting doctrine," which the article disparages as a bluff intended to exert psychological pressure, on the grounds that such subjects are not discussed in public by responsible officials. Finally, in an apparent reference to Secretary Kissinger's reported effort in March to persuade the Soviets to accept the concept of "throw-weight" as a principle for negotiating limitations on offensive missiles, it deplores the practice of "American theoretician." to propose a "purely American model of a solution . . which is at radical variance with the traditions and principles of the military-technological policy of the other side." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 FORCE REDUCTION TALKS MOSCOW, ALLIES REMAIN ADAMANT IN REJECTING NATO'S PROPOSALS The spate of comment prompted by the convening of the fourth round of the Vienna force reduction negotiations on 24 September maintained the public standpat attitude of Moscow and its allies that rejects both NATO's draft proposals as a basis for negotiations as well as the pessimistic Western press views about an alleged state of "paralysis" in the talks. Soviet comment following the 17 June recess of the third round had stressed that-the East's position was "the same" as outlined in the original November 1973 proposal. This assessment was-given by the Eastern bloc's main spokesman, Warsaw's T. Strulak, in an interview with PRAVDA's Vienna correspondent I. Melnikov published on 5 August. During the recess Soviet comment routinely. rejected one aspect after another of NATO's draft proposals, with Vladimir Komlev in the weekly NEW TIMES (No. 30) for the first time in Soviet media publicly rejecting various NATO proposals made in the "informal talks" outside the formal plenary sessions. Repeating Moscow's strong criticism of the West European states and Canada for not making a firm commitment along with the United States and the socialist states to reduce their forces, Komlev declared that it is "essential for the talks to result in a clear definition of the extent of the force and arms reduction for each party to the agreement" on the basis of "agreed d-~adlines." Tnen alluding to the informal talk;,, Komlev said: "Nor is the situation changed by certain clarifications which, according to Western press reports, the NATO countries have made to their position, since the essence of this position remains as before." Updating the Pact's public adamant position, Prague's CTK on 24 September reported Czechoslovak delegate Klein as telling that day's plenary meeting that "the Western concept ignores the principle of equality of the participants and therefore cannot serve as a basis for a future solution." Despite this view, Moscow commentators have made a concerted effort to refute, as stated by TASS observer Goncharov on the 24th, the "exaggerated pessimism" expressed in the West over the progress of the Vienna talks. They have noted that although there has been no meeting of minds on the two sides' basic proposals, the talks have made possible detailed discussions of these proposals in a businesslike atmosphere. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 CSCE LINK TO MBFR Evidence that Moscow is marking time in Vienna until it clearly sees prospects for a successful conclu^ion to the Geneva C SCE negotiations was again readily apparent in Fc?reign Minister Gromyko's speech to the UN General Assembly on the 24th. Gromyko made a lengthy, moderate assessment of the CSCE negotiations; said the USSP, "attaches primary importance" to their successful completion, the "number one question in European political life today"; and then added a brief passage on the force reduction talks.. The TASS account quotes Gromyko as saying the USSR "also" believes it important to achieve results in Vienna, and that any agreements must be based on "strict observance by all of the rule of undiminished security for each side," the standard Moscow formulation. Gromyko carefully avoided an explicit linkage of the Vienna talks to a successful CSCE conclusion, unlike CPSU Politburo candidate member and secretary Ponomarev, who did so in a rare Soviet leadership statement on 10 June.* Gromyko instead followed the more general position of calling for a conclusion of the CSCE and declaring that it then would be easier to solve other outstanding questions. At the unofficial level, however, IZVESTIYA political observer Matveyev, in the Moscow radio international observers roundtable program on the 22d, was more direct than Gromyko, point- ing out that the successful conclusion of the CSCE "without a doubt will help bring about favorable progress" at the Vienna talks. U.S. AIRLIFT CAPABILITY A unique aspect of the comment during the summer recess has been the unusual stress on the significance of NATO's strategic airlift capability. This was discussed in detail in August in a three-part series of articles in RED STAR by Professor Colonel Relov, a commentator who in recent years has repeatedly discussed in the Soviet military paper U.S. air warfare doctrines and capabilities. Although he did not explicitly mention the force reduction talks, Belov made clear, in discussing the U.S. "dual-basing" system and the series of recent Reforger exercises, that the U.S. aim was to demonstrate to its NATO allies "the possibility of rapidly building up the bloc's armed forces" in the event of "'emergency circumstances."' Belov stopped short of stating the obvious conclusion his readers would reach: i.e., the Soviet military leadership must take into consideration the U.S. potential for rapidly sending troops and armaments to the European theater when comparing Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. * See the TRENDS of 19 June 1974, page 19. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 0 IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 - 5 - COMMUNIST RE LATI0NS PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA CITE BLOC SUPPORT FOR IDEOLOGICAL DRIVE Moscow's current revivalist drive for enhanced ideological vigilance and communist morality, launched by the CPSU's decree on the Belorussian party organization summarized in PRAVDA on 30 August, has assumed bloc-wide dimensions, judging by recent articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. The PRAVDj arti-le, on 14 September, provided a roundup of articles from the leading party journals of Moscow's orthodox East European allies and Mongolia, all calling for an intensification of the ideological struggle. IZVESTIYA on 12 September carried an article by the deputy director of Czechoslovak television warning against complacency on the ideological front in the era of detente. Earlier evidence that the bloc parties undertook some coordination on the current ideological campaign was afforded by the prompt and extensive reporting of the CPSU decree in the main party dailies of the orthodox East European countries. In this respect, the current campaign is reminiscent of the bloc-wide reemphasis on ideological struggle and policy coordination which followed the Crimea meeting of bloc leaders in July 1973. PRAVDA ROUNDUP The PRAVDA roundup, entitled "The Force of the Ideas of Socialism" and written by a former PRAVDA Peking correspondent, M. Domogatskikh, was unusual both for its focus on a single theme and for its blunt inference that the substance of the 30 August CPSU resolution had applicability for foreign communist parties as well. Thus, after quoting the CPSU resolution to the effect that building a new society "and the ferocity of the ideological struggle in the international arena are making increasingly high demands on ideological activity," the review declared that "the enhance- ment of the role of ideological work is considered necessary in all fraternal parties." Without giving any indication of the dates of the articles selected, the PRAVDA roundup went- out of its way to highlight hardlining state- ments from the party journals of Poland and Hungary--countries which are usually less strident in the ideological sphere than the other orthodox Warsaw Pact members. The PZPR's NOWE, DROGI was cited as declaring that the Polish party "resolutely opposes the chauvinist and antisocialist ideology of China's Maoist leaders" and that "Maoism directs its anti-Soviet spearhead against all socialist countries and against People's Poland's basic national and social interests." The Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 Budapest theoretical monthly TARSADALMI SZEMLE was quoted as under- scoring such themes as defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism, V:Lntensification of Marxist propaganda," and "not least--close cooperation with other socialist countries and communist and workers parties." The review also quoted the Hungarian journal as warning that "it would be shortsighted and naive to suppose that the enemies of our system have abandoned their designs" and as stressing the need to "expose anti-Marxist political concepts." Citations from Bulgaria's NOVO UREME, Czechoslovakia's ZIVOT STEANY, East Germany's EINHEIT, and the MPR's NAMYN AM'DRAL included standard tributes to the successes of the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence combined with warnings against slackening the international class struggle. With Peking the obvious target, ZIVOT STRANY was quoted additionally as asserting that communists throughout the world are "exposing the hostile propaganda of imperialist ideologists and apostates of Marxism-Leninism who throw in their lot with them whatever disguise they might wear." The Prague party journal was also rennr.ted as observing that "the new conditions" of the ideological struggle between the two world systems demanded greater internationalization and "new forms" of ideological activity by the fraternal parties. There was, however, no mention in the review of the proposed all- European and world conferences of communist parties. IZVESTIYA The article in the 12 September morning edition of ARTICLE IZVESTIYA by Czechoslovak television deputy director Milos Marko dealt more in specifics than the PRAVDA review, which adhered largely to generalities on the ideological struggle. Thus the article, entitled "On the Fronts of the Ideo- logical Struggle: The Only Correct Path," recalled that the December 1973 Moscow conference of party secretaries had underscored the urgency of "a resolute rebuff to ideological sabotage and to attempts by aggressive imperialist circles to wreck the process of relaxation of tension." Marko also cited Brezhnev's statement, in his 21 July speech in Warsaw on the occasion of Poland's 30th liberation anniversary, that "the communists' general line on questions of ideology is essentially a unified line." Brezhnev had gone out of his way in his Warsaw speech to stress that the socialist community was based on "common ideology" and that the socialist countries' cooperation in ideology had been markedly intensified "in recent years." Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/Z?RP85T0087?RO9970040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 YUGOSLAVIA SENTENCES STALINISTS, CRITICIZES OUTSIDE SUPPORT Belgrade's handling of the publicity surrounding the exposure and sentencing of the group of pro-Soviet dissidents arrested last April reflects an effort to maximize the admonitory implications of the affair vis-a-vis Moscow without pushing the admonition to the point of endangering relations between the two countries. A statement issued by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office on 20 September announced that 32 persons had been given sentences ranging from one to 14 years. Like Tito's remarks on 12 September, the statement provided few details on the affair, particularly on the sensitive question of where the group received its outside support.* Limited media comment provided little additional detail but harshly criticized the countries, unidentified, that "tolerated" the activities of the group. The public prosecutor's statement claimed that the aims of the "illegal group" were to organize itself "for hostile activity against the constitutional order" and to establish a rival political party. Only two of the members--identified as the leaders--were named, one a pensioner, the other a professor. That the group was subordinate to outside control was clearly implied in the statement's contention that they were "in contact with Cominformist emigrees working abroad against our country from whom they received orders and propaganda material." Media comment has been very limited, suggesting an effort by the regime to prevent the airing of critical remarks that might go beyond the party leadership's own criticism. TANJUG provided the first response, a commentary issued immediately after the public prosecutor's statement; and an official League of Communists commentary was carried by KO,,MUNIST on the 23d. Both provided few additional details on the case but emphasized the need for continued vigilance against "all" opponents of the regime and discussed the implications of outside support for the group. in a slap at bloc countries that harbor Cominformist emigrees, TANJUG called the toleration of these groups by other countries "unacceptable," pointing out that "it is directed not only against our country but also against the basic principles on which international relations, cooperation and friendly relations among countries are based." KOMUNIST was more * For a discussion of Tito's speech, see the TRENDS of 18 September 1974, pages 9-10. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/OSP I-DO A DP85TOO&MR 070040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 critical, seeing the group's activity as not only "confirmation of the importance and desperation of the anti-Yugoslav Cominformists" but even more importantly also of the "bureaucratic-dogmatic people in the country who share its views." KOMUNIST also emphasized that such toleration endangered relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and "the country from which such activity is pursu.ed." The party paper added that Yugoslavia would never tolerate such activity on its own soil, realizing that this "would lead to spoiled relations with these countries and to a spoiled international atmosphere in genera].." Belgrade's reproofs about too much publicity and speculation have clearly been the West as well. Reports about Soviet and Hungarian troops massing near the Yugoslav border as well as about the impending recall of Soviet, Czechoslavak and Hungarian diplo- matic envoys in Belgrade have been carried in the Western media. Tito himself warned against overdramatizing the case, and KOIi1TNIST cautioned Western media against "wishful thinking" a;,out deteriorating relations between Belgrade and Moscow. The decision to go ahead with the long-scheduled "friendly official" visit of Soviet Army ChirL of Staff Kulikov from 17-23 September may have been intended it part to dispel such rumors. Moscow and orthodox bloc media have continued to ignore the affair, while maverick Romania, which also had reported Tito's 12 September speech, reported the sentencing of the group. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25rr1CtP&RDP85T0087f9QQ 070040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 USSR-IRAQ MOSCOW HAILS TIES WITH IRAQ, REAFFIRMS AID TO PALESTINIANS Moscow, commenting on the 18-22 September visit to the Soviet Union by Iraqi Foreign Minister S. Taqah, has used the occasion to praise the current state of "stable and successfully developing" Soviet- Iraqi relations while expressing its intent to strengthen coopera- tion in "political, economic, cultural, and other fields." TASS on 21 September, reporting a meeting between Taqah and Podgornyy, stated that both countries also pledged to continue their aid and support to the Palestinian resi.stance movement. Moscow and Baghdad n. dia have not disclosed except in highly general terms what specific topics were discussed during Taqah's talks with Soviet officials who, in addition to Podgornyy, reportedly included V. Kuznetsov, first deputy foreign minister. According to Iraqi sources, Taqah was also scheduled to meet with Brezhnev on 19 September but for unexplained reasons apparently did not. One probable topic was the continued fighting since last spring between Kurdish and Iraqi forces in northern Iraq and the implications of the conflict for Iraqi-Iranian-Soviet relations., Moscow radio's Arabic service on 20 September suggested that the Kurdish problem was indeed discussed by noting Taqah's visit and, reviewing the political context in which it was taking place, observing that in the past the USSR had praised Iraq's efforts to solve the Kurdish issue, Asserting that "this has worried Iraq's enemies," the broadcast stated that Iraq could count on Soviet support in solving its problems. Another topic mentioned by the 20 September Moscow radio commentary, and described as "naturally" a subject of discussion, was "the Middle East situation" and the need for coordination o. Arab and Soviet policies, especially in regard to Israel. In an Arabic language commentary on 23 September Mosco'a radio suggested that Moscow and Baghdad may not have been in complete agreement recently on the Palestinian question. Noting that certain Arab newspapers had been spreading "poisonous propaganda," the commentary singled out a specific issue--the Beirut AN-NAHAR on 20 September--for publishing "lies hostile to the Arab cause concerning Soviet-Iraqi differences on the Palestinian cause." Both this commentary and the Moscow domestic radio on 21 September, in reporting the Taqah-Podgornyy meeting, stated that both "the Soviet Union and Iraq intend to continue furnishing aid and support to the Palestine resistance movement, which they consider an integral part of the Arab national liberation movement." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TQQIQR3QQQ70040-4 INDOCHINA RECENT FORD STATEMENTS DRAW ROUTINE RESPONSE FROM DRV: PRG DRV and PRG media routinely criticized the Administration's Foreign policy in low-level press and radio comment on President lord's speeches to the United Nations on 18 September and to the World Energy'Conference on the 23d. The 18 September White House statement on American personnel unaccounted for in Southeast Asia drew official protests from the DRV Foreign hinistry spokesman. and a PRG delegation spokesman at the La Celle Saint Cloud consultative conference. Comment on the President's UN speech took his incidental reference to Indochina and his remarks on Secretary Kissinger as points of departure for castigating U.S. policy on Vietnam and denigrating Kissinger. According to a 20 September NHAN DAN commentary, President Ford's speech constituted a "dull repetition" of Nixon's foreign policy and revealed a "vary wrong attitude" by the U.S. Government toward Vietnam and Indochina. The commentary charged that the United States had "deliberately kept open the wounds of war" in Indochina by its aid to Saigon and Phnom Penh. Simi'arly, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the following 2 labeled lord's remarks on Indochina a "deceitful statement" aimed at concealing the "aggressive" policies of the United States. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN dwelt at length on Ford's statements in support of the Secretary of State, terming them a "lavish eulogy" of the "architect of the Nixon Doctrine" and characterizing Kissinger as a "cunning, crafty lackey" who has served "the most reactionary U.S. forces." Hanoi's continued sensitivity to charges that it is not cooperating .Ln accounting for missing U.S. servicemen was evident in the effort made in the 20 September foreign ministry spokesman's statement to discredit President Ford's appeal that U.S. teams be allowed to conduct the necessary searches. In reacting to what it described as an accusation by the President that the DRV and PRG had itot responded to such appeals, the statement claimed this was a "brazen U.S. distortion" designed to "mislead" public opinion, to "conceal continued U.S. involvement and intervention" in South Vietnam, and to "conceal very grave systematic violations" of the Paris agreement. While not directly denying DRV unwillingness to agree to the search for the missing personnel, the statement attempted to give an impression that Hanoi was cooperating by maintaining that it had Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R0003000710040-4 complied with the scheduled return of U.S. prisoners and the repatriation from the DRV of the remains of U.S. pilots who died in captivity. Lack of progress in the search, the state- ment declared, was a result of U.S. and Saigon "sabotage" of the Paris agreement in other areas, namely the supplying of U.S. military aid to the GVN and Saigon's detention of "hundreds of thousands" of civilian PRG personnel. DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements issued in August protesting U.S. aid to South Vietnam and the U.S. stand on its personnel missing in action similarly had charged the United States with a "campaign of slander" to shift the blame to The DRV for not implementing the Paris agreement in this regard.* LAO DELEGATION VISITS HANOI AT START OF TOUR SEEKING AID A delegation of the Lao Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) visited North Vietnam from 15 to 18 September on its first stop in an aid-seeking mission which Vientiane media say will take a month and visit Peking, Pyongyang, and Algiers, as well as Hanoi. The delegation was led by Minister of Economy and Planning Sot Phetrasi, a representative from the Pathet Lao side of the PGNU, and included Vice Minister of Transport and Public Works Houmphan Saignasit, an experienced Vientiane government official. DRV Minister Dang Thi met and saw off the delegation, hosted a reception in its honor, and led the North Vietnamese side in discussions on economic and cultural cooperation. Dang Thi was not identified in his position as chairman of the Nation Reunification Commission, but it is possible that his responsibilities in that post for handling aid to South Vietnam qualified him to deal with the Lao negotiations. (Prior to his appointment to head the Reunification Commission in April this year, Dang Thi was a minister in the Premier's Office and had held posts in planning and in scientific and technical fields.) The delegation was also received by Premier Pham Van Dong on 17 September. According to Hanoi and Lao reports, four agreements were signed in Hanoi on 18 September, including an accord on DRV assistance to Laos in goods and materials. Vientiane and Pathet Lao media, but not VNA, specified that the aid would be gratuitous and include fnod, medicines, and clothing. Lao media also reported * The foreign ministry statements and other commentary on missing personnel are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 21-22. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999Mffv8''8A-RDP851 0 ft Op3A970040-4 that one of the agreements provided for cooperation in building a road and a railway from Laos to the sea through DRV territory; VNA's report only mentioned the building of a road. The other two accords dealt with the shipment of goods through DRV territory and with the repair of Route 7 in Laos. Vientiane noted that the latter protocol also covered transport of DRV goods to Laos during the 1974-1975 dry season. Hanoi "warmly acclaimed" the agreements in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 19th which suggested that DRV assistance was necessarily limited. The editorial pointed out that North Vietnam still faced "many difficulties in the postwar reconstruction" and noted that the DRV people would "contribute to the extent of their limited potential." The Lao delegation left Hanoi on 18 September, arriving in Algiers on the 20th after passing through Vientiane and Moscow. DRV CHIEF OF STAFF DUNG CALLS FOR ARMY MODERNIZATION Hanoi's abiding concern about modernizing and improving its armed forces since the cease-fire was reflected in a talk by DRV Chief of Staff Senior General Van Tien Dung at a "recent" all-army school conference of cadres. Dung, long a strong exponent of using main- force units employing the tactics of conventional warfare, presented a well-reasoned argument for building a professional army grounded in modern tr.chnology and trained in the technique of combat coordi- nation. The first part of Dung's address was summarized in the August issue of the army journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, but no other portion has been made public. No date for the cadre conference was given in the journal, but a 27 June Hanoi broadcast had reported that Dung, along with Colonel General Song Hao, had addressed a "recent" conference of military schools. Dung's remarks suggest continued Hanoi concern over the possibility of future direct U.S. military involvement in Indochina. He warned not only of alleged U.S.-Saigon efforts to "sabotage" the Paris peace agreement but also that a "sizable U.S. force has been maintained outside Vietnam as a 7realistic deterrent force'." It is this set of circumstances, he asserted, that require constant "revolutionary vigilance" for all eventualities. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release I 999/09/25uNOI Rf '85T00875RQ0 gg0040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 According to Dung, the tasks posed by this situation constitute "major, burning" problems of the armed forces whose solution must be consistent not only with DRV economic and industrial "realities" but with world scientific and technological development as well. Flatly stating that the VPA has not yet been "regularized and modernized," he called for creative application, throughout the country and the army, of the latest in scientific and technical knowledge so as to "quickly" increase national defense potential. While professing his allegiance to the importance of the political and moral underpinnings of a revolutionary army as "the most fundamental factor" in its combat strength, Dung made no bones about "other factors" that must be taken into account--namely, organization, weapons and equipment, and tactics. He gave short shrift to organizational needs and dwelt at length on the "the very important" factor of weapons and equipment. Quo:-ing Engels to the effect that the military application of advanced technology can necessitate a total reorganization of the armed forces, Dung called for a recognition of this "objective law" in carrying out ''appropriate formulas" of leadership and command. In discussing the tactics a regular, modern army must employ, Dung's main concern was what he termed "coordinated combat tactics''--a theme he had developed in some detail in a talk at an all-army cadre class that was published in the December 1973 TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. In the earlier talk Dung had defined coordinated combat as taking place among all armed branches on different scales and claimed that this was exemplified during the campaigns of the 1972 "strategic offensive." An army that is unable to coordinate in this manner, Dung argued in his current talk, is not yet a truly regular and modern force despite structure, organization, numerical strength and modern equipment. Noting that a regular and modern army should be able to engage. in combat at various levels, Dung marie it clear that it is especially large-scale coordinated combat that he had in mind, sn.d he declared that such an army would be able to: Direct strategically significant, annihilating blows at the enemy; rapidly and noticeably change the balance of forces on the battlefield in our favor; and, together with all our armed forces and people, contribute to victoriously concluding the war. At another point, perhaps reflecting Hanoi's intention to follow a previously untried strategy in any future military escalation, Dung cautioned that campaigns should not be based on previously Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/6?YitDLtk-IRDP85TOd75h 00070040-4 Oe 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 established patterns or "inflexible formula." He added that large-scale coordinated attacks do not necessarily mean either the massive use of weapons to replace men or numerical strength to overpower the enemy. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/ ~F01FYP85T00875ROO03M70040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 CHINA CHOU, CHIANG CHING GREET VISITING PHILIPPINE FIRST LADY Peking's keen interest in improved relations with the Philippines has been demonstrated by the unusually high-level welcome accorded Philippine first lady Imelda Marcos thus far during her China tour, dramatized by her reception by Chou Fn-lai at a hospital in Peking on 20 September, the day of her arrival. While her visit is at Chou's invitation, the premier's last public appearance had been the Chinese Army Day reception on 31 July. Apart from Chou's "friendly" conversation, during which he wished her a warns welcome and extended his regards to President Marcos, she has received unprecedented attention from Chiang Ching who, as Mrs. Marcos' nearest protocol equivalent, has apparently assumed the role of co-hostess.* Chiang met with Mrs. Marcos on the 20th for a "friendly" talk,,. escorted her to a concert in Peking on the 23d, and was present on the 24th to guide her on a tour of Tientsin, the first time Chiang is known to have escorted a foreign visitor outside the Pelting area. Chiang's important role was underlined in a 23 September banquet speech by Vice Premier Li lisien-nien, who noted that Mrs. Marcos had been received by Chou "and Comrade Chiang Ching." In addition, a 22 September NCNA account indicated Chiang's hostess role by stating that she had "entrusted" the State Council Cultural Group with presenting an opera soiree for Mrs. Marcos on the 22d. Chiang's active role may be further explained by cultural talks apparently conducted by the two sides. During her speech at the reciprocal banquet on the 23d, Mrs. Marcos emph,-isized that "growing contacts in the cultural and economic fields" are forerunners of stable and lasting relationships. As Mrs. Marcos' main host while in Peking, Li llsien-nien led Chinese officials at the airport welcome ceremonies, was present at her meetings with Chou and with Chiang Ching on the 20th, hosted a banquet in her honor that even-ng, and attended the Philippines' reciprocal banquet on the 23d. Li also led Chinese officials at the z23 September signing of letters for "further development of trade between China and the Philippines." In his * According to a Manila-datelined AFP report on 25 September, Mrs. Marcos is extending her departure from China from 27 September to 2 October at the personal' invitation of Chiang Ching, in order to attend PRC National Day on the 1st. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release I 999i0O la'i .4-RDP85TQQ@7q 9300070040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 banquet remarks on the 20th,L i lauded recently increased delegation exchanges and expanded trade between China and the Philippines and on t'he 23d characterized the current visit as having achieved "positive results" and added a "new page" to friendly bilateral relations. Li expressed confidence that relations would undergo "a new and greater development." When she left Peking for Tientsin on the 24th, Mrs. Marcos was accompanied only by deputy foreign ministers Han Nien-lung and Wang Hai-Jung, according to Peking radio. After her arrival in Tientsin, she was joined by Chiang Ching, who accompanied her to a cultural performance, to a production brigade, and to a bicycle factory. Mrs. Marcos also attended an evening banquet hosted by provincial chief Hsieh Hsueh-kung, but NCNA's 24 September report on the day's activities did not report that Chiang was present. PEKING SEES SHIFT IN ECONOMIC BALANCE TOWARD THIRD WORLD A 20 September PEOPLE'S DAILY article bluntly asserted that a change in the world balance of economic power has already taken place, citing as evidence recent efforts by the United States, the Soviet Union and developed Western countries to seek surplus capital from oil-producing, developing nations. Last April, at the time of the UN conference on raw materials, Peking had described the oil producers' boycott and pricing moves as a "pioneering action" and had predicted that by such actions in the future the developing states could shift the balance of economic power more in favor of the third world. The current article, signed by PEOPLE'S DATL'i commentator Jen Ku-ping, represents a measured advance from previous Chinese r,sessments. Peking thus far has maintained a discreet silence on recent U.S. efforts to redress the economic balance. While Peking media have devoted unusual attention to the economic problems facing the Ford Administration,* they have thus far failed to report the President's recent addresses at the United Nations and at the Detroit World Energy Conference, or the 20 September U.S.-West European agreement on oil sharing. A 23 September NCNA report on UN proceedings noted that Secretary Kissinger made a statement that day but avoided discussing its substance. * For background see the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, page 9. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/NIGtV4&85T008761k#bb~670040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 Characterizing the United States as a "swashbuckling dollar empire" that is begging for dollar9 from oil-producing countries, Jen's article was the first Peking acknowledgement of reported recent efforts by the U.S. Treasury Department as well as by private business to lure Arab oil capital. to the United States. The Soviet Union came in for predictably harsher treatment as "even more jealous and covetous of the Middle East's oil dollars," and as being especially "insidious" in selling arms dearly in return for cheap oil during the October 1973 Middle East war. Jen also called attention to investments of Middle East oil money in West Europe and Japan. Citing the new capital flow from oil producers to developed nations as proof of the "splitting" and "great disorder" in the international economic realm, the article went on to stress an unusally bleak assessment of the industrialized nations' economic woes. It said the United States and other developed Western states are now struggling desperately amid "the most unprecedented economic confusion of the postwar period." It cited particularly problems of inflation, production declines, capital shortages, mounting debts and "enormous balance of payments deficits." The article added that Moscow faces similar problems. The Chinese have, however, given no indication they view changes in the economic balance as having an effect on the world strategic balance. Recent PEOPLE'S DAILY articles timed to coincide with the reconvening of the SALT talks and East-West talks over European disarmament in Geneva and Vienna--including a lengthy 14 September commentary by Jen Ku-ping--have stressed the longstanding Chinese view that the United States and the USSR, despite economic and other problems, are determined to continue the arms expansion and strategic rivalry to sustain their dominant positions abroad. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/8bl~v'~lk'=RDP85T0(lt0 NOTES MA OP977RO40-4 JCP-CPSU RELATIONS: The Japanese Communist Party has finallly responded to an attack on it by Argentine CP leader A. Fava--reprint- ed in the May issue of the Soviet journal PARTY LIFE--with an unsigned article in the 15 September AKAHATA. While the delay and the relatively low level of response suggest the JCP has no desire to broaden the polemics, the AKAHATA article did directly counter- attack against the CPSU, hinting at Soviet authorship of the Fava article and accusing the Soviet Union of grossly overestimating both its own role as a revolutionary force and the beneficial consequences of its detente with the United States. Condemning the CPSU and the CCP equally for interfering in JCP internal affairs, AKAHATA maintained that both parties had destroyed the unity of the international communist movement. Finally, reaffirming the JCP stand that the Southern Kuriles were rightly Japanese territory that had been unjustly seized after World War II, AKAHATA made public the text of a 1959 JCP-CPSU agreement which indicated the Soviet Union would be willing to consider returning the territory once specified developments had taken place in Japan's domestic structure and foreign policy. The Fava article had bitingly criticized the JCP demand for return of the northern territories as without foundation and "unprecedented in the history of the international communist movement." PRC-GREECE: Reflecting the continuing Chinese interest in encourag- ing Western unity against Moscow, Peking's sparse comment on the new Greek government has played up Athen's pro-West initiatives while softpedaling coverage of last month's anti-U.S. riots and decision to withdraw from NATO's military structure. Peking coverage of the riots and decision to withdraw has been limited to passing notice in a 5 September domestic radio "currei.t events talk" which reviewed events surrounding the Cyprus crisis and carefully pointed. out Athens' continuing political membership in NATO. NCNA subsequently highlighted cne revived EEC-Greek ties in a 17 September report that the Common Market had agreed to Athen's request to revive Greece's associate status with the EEC. NCNA noted that the decision will release EEC aid funds for Greece frozen following the 1967 military coup, and it played up the French prime minister's recent pledge to use French influence to help Greece join the Common Market as a full member. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/41PFI(PFXiRDP85T00875ROW3UN70040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 U.S. ROLE IN CHILE: Soviet and Cuban follow-up reportage and comment on President Ford's 16 September press conference remarks on CIA activities relater to Chile reflect divergent treatment, the Soviet central press still avoiding direct attribution of the coup to official U.S. policy in its own comment while Cuban media directly accuse and condemn the President. At the same time, Soviet media have replayed strongly critical U.S. and Chilean remarks, including a 23 September TASS English report that Allende's widow, Hortensia Bussi de Allende, holds "Henry Kissinger, assistant to the U.S. President for national security, responsible" for approving CIA expenditures in Chile. By contrast, there was no mention of Kissinger or President Ford in a V. Matveyev IZVESTIYA article on the 20th that condemned the "sinister operations" of "U.S. intelligence and other departments" aimed at overthrowing Allende. Matveyev was implicitly critical of the President's remarks justifying the CIA role in Chile, observing that the CIA role could not be dismissed by,,,"sophistry" or "any reference to the United States' alleged 'state interests."' Havana radio's initial reaction on the 18th claimed that "U.S. complicity" in Allende's over- throw "has been confessed by the current Yankee President, Gerald Ford." And Havana on the 20th informed Cubans that "Mr. Gerald Ford has had the supreme shamelessness" to admit CIA actions against Allende, and it deplored what it termed the President's "Mussolinian assertion" that Allende had threatened Chilean opposition parties and the press. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00876ROA070040-4 25 SEPTEMBER 1974 APPENDIX MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16 - 22 SEPTEMBER 1974 Moscow (2393 items) UNGA Session [Gromyko Arrival Statement China (7%) Chile (12%) Cyprus Crisis (2%) Iraqi Foreign Minister (--) Taqah in USSR 30th Anniversary, of Finnish Withdrawal From World War II Gromyko in FRG Peking (923 items) 8% Seventh Asian Games, (24%) 16% 3%] Teheran Mauritanian President (--) 13%* 7% Daddah in PRC, DPRK 4% UNGA Session (--) 6% 3% Criticism of Lin Piao (8%) 5% 3% and Confucius Philippines First Lady (--) 4% 3% Imelda Marcos in PRC (1%) (--) (--) (--) 3% Mozambique Independence (5%) 3% Nigerian President Gowon (--) 3% Visit Communique These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commenta; ies. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. * This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's mFsting with Daddah. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4