TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070044-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: October 23, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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FDIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Moscow Hardliners Defiant Over Art Show - page 19
Confidential
23 OCTOBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 43)
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This propaganda analysis r art is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security Information
Unauthorixed disclosure tubjrr to
criminal sanctions
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23 OCTOBER 1974
CONTENTS
USSR-EGYPT
Fahmi Visit Lauded for Accord on Brezhnev Trip, Palestinians . . 1
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Warsaw Meeting Opens Drive for 1975 European CP Conference . . . 8
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow: Peking Seeks Conflict in Europe, Halt in Detente . . . 12
INDOCHINA
DRV Endorses Contacts With Thai "People," Rebuffs Government . . 13
DRV Author Hong Chuong Assesses U.S. Power, Detente Policies . . 14
CHINA
Campaign Seeks Big Boost in Last Quarter Industrial Output . . . i7
USSR
Moscow Hardliners Appear to Defy Leadership Over Art Show . . . 19
Fedorenko Proposes Reorganization of Gosplan and Ministries . . 22
NOTES
JCP on Ford Visit; PRC.-USSR-Balkans; Castro Speech . . . . . . . 25
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics i
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USSR-EGYPT
FAHMI VISIT LAUDED FOR ACCORD ON BREZHNEV TRIP, PALESTINIANS
The agreement on a Brezhnev -visit to Egypt in January has predictably
been heralded by Moscow as the major accomplishment of the talks
during the 14-18 October visit of an Egyptian Government delegation
headed by Foreign Minister Fahmi. To give the news maximum impact,
TASS issued an "announcement" on 15 October reporting on the
Brezhnev-Fahmi meeting that day and the forthcoming Cairo summit.
The announcement in effect constituted a mini-communique on
Soviet-Egyptian relations. Thu fi_rsi document on the delegation's
talks, another TASS "announcement" issued on the 18th, dealt only
with the "full accord" between the two sides on the need to
reconvene the Geneva conference and to resolve the Palestinian
question, in the latter case repeating Brezhnev's support, a week
earlier, for a Palestinian "national home." The absence of any
reference to bilateral relations in the final document appears to
reflect a decision to set aside continuing difficult problems
pending the work of "joint specialized committees" which will meet
in Cairo and Moscow to prepare for the January summit.
Although Soviet media have not mentioned precise dates for
Brezhnev's trip,* Cairo radio and MENA both reported cn 15 October
that a meeting between Brezhnev and Sadat would take place on
15 January--a date of commemorative significance, in that Podgornyy
on 15 January 1971 attended ceremonies commissioning the Aswan
hydropower complex.
STATEMENTS ON VISIT The release of two separate statements on
the :,isit is a departure from the customary
practice; usually whL-n Brezhnevv receives an Arab official but does
not participate in the official F.alks, such a meeting is reported
in the final communique at the end of the visit. In the present
case, Moscow presumably desired to give maximum publicity to the
agreement on Brezhnev's Cairo visit. Normally invitations for
visits and acceptances appear at the end of a final statement on a
delegation's talks.
* Cairo's AKHBAR AL-YAWN noted on the 19th that Brezhnev's visit
was tentatively scheduled to last four days. Arab media have also
indicated that the Cairo visit may be part of a larger tour of the
Arab world, with Syria specifically mentioned.
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The report of the BrezhneNv-Fahmi meeting, described by TASS as an
"announcement" and by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as an
"official statement," was in essence a short communique on
bilateral relations. It expressed the sides' determination to
continue strengthening and developing relations of friendship
and cooperation on the basis of the May 1971 treaty. Brezhnev
emphasized the USSR's "principled course" of "every kind of
support" for the Arabs' anti-:imperialist struggle, the elimination
of the "aftermaths of thk.. Israeli aggression" and the establishment
of peace in the Middle East. And Fahmi, on behalf of Egypt and
President as-Sadat personally, expressed gratitude for the USSR's
"all round assistance and support" for Egypt's economy and
"defense potential."
Restriction of the concluding document on the Egyptian delegation's
talks to the Palestinian issue and the Geneva conference was
apparently not at first anticipated by Cairo media. Thus on the
16th MENA reported that the "joint communique" would deal with the
forthcoming summit, the Geneva conference, the Middle East problem,
and bilateral relations. By the evening of the 17th the format
had apparently been set: MENA provided a fairly accurate summary
while Cairo radio said the "joint communique" would define the Soviet
and Egyptian attitudes toward the Palestinian issue and the Geneva
conference. Seemingly acknowledging that the final statement was
much narrower in focus than might have been anticipated, TASS on
the 21st reported a Fahmi interview in which he "explained the
reasons why a separate statement was adopted on the Palestine issue."
Fahmi reportedly said that the statement indicated "a complete
identity of Soviet and Egyptian views on the PLO" and reaffirmed the
PLO's right to represent the Palestinians at the Geneva conference
as an independent participant.
MOSCOW TREATMENT OF Soviet media have given selective,
FAHMI, BREZHNEV VISITS generally upbeat coverage of the Fahmi
visit, publicizing the two statements
and Gromyko luncheon remarks but confining comment largely to
generalities. Assessing the Brezhnev trip as opening up favorable
prospects for improving Soviet-Egyptian relations, Moscow has
failed to suggest, much less specify, what agreements might
result from the summit talks. Moscow media, frequently replaying
Arab press comment, have stressed the general themes that Soviet-
Egyptian relations are based on long-term strategic and principled
considerations, as reflected in the May 1971 friendship and
cooperation treaty, that Soviet aid has been generous and reliable,
and that Brezhnev's visit will further develop and strengthen the
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countries' mutual relations. Moscow has stressed the importance
it attaches to a "successful" visit. TASS in a dispatch from
Cairo on the 21st, for example, citing statements by Fahmi to
AKHBAR AL-YAWM, singled out his remarks that Brezhnev's decision
to meet with as-Sadat represents "a turning point" and "a reply
to all doubts and insinuations" T,ith regard to Soviet-Egyptian
relations, and added that the forthcoming summit is to produce
results.
That difficult problems remain to be resolved was suggested in
the announcement on the Brezhnev-Fahmi talks which said that
"a range of matters which could underlie future accords" at a
Soviet-Egyptian 'ummit meeting was "defined." Putting it another
way, Gromyko, is a luncheon speech on the 16th reported in a
Moscow Arabic-language broadcast, said that "issues on the
subject of negotiations and the agreements connected with them
were defined," and Fahm: at the same luncheon was reported by TASS
as declaring that there were no problems "which it would be
difficult to solve."
In other remarks, Gromyko appeared bent to impress on the Egyptians
Soviet expectations that Cairo should demonstrate its good
intentions. Speaking at a luncheon on the 17th--as reported by
MENA, but not TASS--Gromyko declared that "all competent departments"
in the USSR would begin to prepare for the Brezhnev visit, which
must be crowned with success." He added somewhat cryptically
11 that "as long as there is a firm and stable policy, success must
result." And at the airport departure ceremony, according to
Cairo radio on the 18th, Gromyko again seemed to suggest concern
over Cairo's attitude in remarking that "we will do everything
possible to prepare for the meeting. We hope the Egyptian side
will do likewise." The Soviet Union and Egypt, he said, must not
allow "any person" to interfere in their friendship or to create
obstacles in their way.
ARAB MEDIA ON In the most detailed account available of the
BILATERAL PROBLEMS course of the Fahmi talks, a Moscow dispatch
by Musa Sabri published in the 19 October
AKHBAR AL-YAWM said the Brezhnev-Fahmi meeting gave the "green
light" and subsequent talks dealt with "the bread lines of bilateral
relations in a bid to avoid any future differences." He made clear
that past "charges and countercharges" revolved around Egyptian
accusations of inadequate arms deliveries and Soviet complaints
of Egyptian press recriminations against the USSR and Cairo's
failure to observe the treaty provision on "coordination." Musa
Sabri insisted that neither side assumed that the aim of the visit
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was to conclude new agreements, but rather that they agreed
"on a specific program of action in various fi'lds" and focused
on present and future cooperation "in a new climate of mutual
confidence and understanding."
Indicating various topics under consideration, Musa Sabri
observed chat at his meeting with Fahmi, Bcezhnev had three
files on military aid, economic aid, and "the Egyptian information
campaign," as well as a copy of the treaty. The talks, he
revealed, covered debt rescheduling, Soviet-Egyptian coordination
of stands and consultations ("otherwise," the Soviet Union
would merely be an "arms merchant" for Egypt), and Soviet
recognition of Egypt's "political influence." The question of
Egyptian-U.S. relations was not a point of contention, Musa Sabri
maintained, noting that Brezhnev said the USSR had nothing against
such relations and "itself now deals with the United States."
More specific on aid projects, a MENA report on the 16th, citing
sources in the Fahmi delegation, referred to Egypt's request for
a new steel and iron complex, a nuclear reactor, and a nuclear
plant for generating electric power. It added that the sources
were optimistic that problems in the areas of trade and technology
could be resolved. And the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA) on the 19th,
citing "observers in Moscow," mentioned Moscow's "agreement in
principle to provide Egypt with nuclear reactors to utilize nuclear
energy for peaceful. purposes."
MILITARY AID Soviet media have not indicated whether during
the Fahmi visit any agreements or understandings
were reached on the question of further Soviet military aid
for Egypt, although references to favorable prospects for such
aid had occurred before and early in the visit. Moscow radio's
Arabic service on the 14th, for instance, citing the Egyptian
newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH, told its listeners that talks during
the Fahmi delegation's visit would help develop Soviet-Egyptian
military and economic relations. Such references were not
followed up or repeated in later Soviet comment.
The question of mil tary aid was almost certainly discussed,
however, in view of the fact that the chief of staff of the
Egyptian armed forces, Lieutenant General al-Jamasi, was a member
of the Fahml delegation to Moscow and, according to Moscow radio,
met at least once on 16 October with the chief of the Soviet
General Staff, Army General V. Kulikov. Only Moscow's "unofficial"
Radio Peace and Progress has commented on these talks, stating
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uninformatively that they were friendly and covered "issues of
mutual interest." RP:' implied in this context, however, that
additional Soviet military aid was being or would be granted to
Egypt, noting that "Soviet military aid is important to the Arabs
in their conflict with Israel" and quoting the Egyptian War
Minister as having said recently that "the Soviet Union is
generously giving us all kinds of modern arms."
Arab media have speculated on the results on the Fahmi delegation's
talks on military-related matters. INA on the 20th, for example,
citing Egyptian sources, asserted that al-Jamasi's negotiations with
Soviet military officials had been "very successful," but added
that "the reports did not publish any details." A commentary
broadcast by Cairo's Voice of the Arabs on the 18th mentioned,
almost in passing, that the Soviet-Egyptian joint statement on the
Palestinian question had been issued "in addition to what has
been agreed upon between the two countries in the fields of trade,
industry, mutual cooperation, and military support."
PALESTINIAN ISSUE, The statement on the 18th issued at the
GENEVA CONFERENCE conclusion of the Fahmi visit made the
Palestinians' right to the creation of a
"national home" a condition of a Middle East political settlement.
Just a week previously, in his 11 October Kishinev speech, Brezhnev
had put the Soviet Union on record for the first time as supporting
the Palestinians' right to "their own national home" (ochag).
Earlier, Podgornyy, in an 8 September speech in Sofia, had endorsed
the Palestinians' "sovereign right to establish their own statehood
in one form or another."
Moscow also came out firmly with Cairo for "independent participation"
of representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization "on equal
terms" with cther participants in the Geneva peace conference.
Moscow had waffled on this issue earlier: The communique on Fahmi's
visit to Moscow last January had supported Palestinian representation
but not explicitly a PLO delegation. Then Brezhnev in his 14 June
Supreme Soviet election speech spoke of the joint efforts of "states"
taking part in the Geneva talks, with no mention of a Palestinian
presence. The 3 July communique on the Nixon-Brezhnev summit skirted
the problem in asserting that the two countries, as co-chairmen of
the Geneva conference, considered that it should resume as soon as
possible with "the question of other participants from the Middle East
area to be discussed at the conference." But the communique on the
visit of a PLO delegation to Moscow in early August expressed Soviet
support for PLO participation "on an equal footing" with other
delegations.
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In the 18 October document, the sides also expressed satisfaction
with the 14 October General Assembly resolution inviting the PLO
to participate in deliberations on the question of Palestine.
While the statement quoted the language of the UNGA resolution
inviting the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people,"
MENA's 16 October advance report on the final Soviet-Egyptian
statement said it would welcome the UNGA invitation to the PLO
"as the sole representative" of the Palestinians.
The statement also recorded the two sides' view that a full
political settlement must be achieved within the framework of
the Geneva conference, and that Egypt and the USSR would work
for resumption of the conference "at the earliest date." Cairo
media indicated that the Egyptians explained their problem of
first coordinating the Arab front before proceeding to Geneva:
MENA on the 16th cited Fahmi as saying that the Soviet Union
appreciated Egypt's stand that it could not go to Geneva until
the Arab ranks were unified in a single front. And Musa Sabri,
in his 19 October AKHBAR AL-YAWN article, also referred to "full
appreciation" of Egypt's "essential" role in coordinating the Arab
stand. Musa Sabri also noted that while the sides believed there
could be no final solution outside the Geneva conference, both
would welcome any progress in bringing about a new withdrawal
within the framework of continuing Israeli-Arab disengagement
"under the military phase" of the situation.
BACKGROUND ON RELATIONS Since the October 1973 war, high-level
Soviet-Egyptian visits have been
confined to Fahmi's 21-24 January talks in Moscow to acquaint the
Soviet leaders, according to Cairo radio, with the Israeli-
Egyptian disengagement agreement, and to Gromyko's 1-5 March
talks in Cairo.* Fahmi also met with Gromyko while in New York in
April and with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington in
mid-August, and Hijazi, then first deputy prime minister, met with
Podgornyy when both were in Sofia in early September for Bulgarian
anniversary ceremonies.
Following an exchange of recriminations between Moscow and Cairo last
spring,** Soviet-Egyptian relations seemingly had taken a turn for
the better by mid-May, when as-Sadat described a communication from
* The visits are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January
1974,
pages
3-4, 30 January 1974, pages 1-3, and 6 March 1974, pages
1-6.
** Soviet-Egyptian charge;:, and countercharges are reviewed in the
TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 7-8, and 24 April 1974, pages 1-4.
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Brezhnev as "cordial" and expressing "the beginning of a more positive
phase" in relations. President as-Sadat reportedly handed his reply
to Soviet Ambassador Polyakov on 6 June; characterizing this letter
as welcoming the opening of a "new page" in relations, AKHBAR AL-YAWM
had said that as-Sadat would soon send Fahmi to Moscow to meet with
Soviet leaders. And Fahmi confirmed this at an Egyptian cabinet
meeting on 11 June at which he said, according to Cairo radio, that
he would prepare a Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting. Fahmi's visit
was scheduled to begin 15 July, but less than a week before his
departure Cairo announced that the Soviet leadership had requested
a postponement i!ftil October so that "sufficient preparations"
could be made for the meeting.
That the Fahmi visit postponement still rankled waF vident in a
Musa Sabri article in AL-AKHBAR on 13 October, on ti, eve of the
delegation's visit. In a barbed welcome to Brezhnev-s remark in his
Kishinev speech thaw the Middle East might erupt any time if
procrastination continued, Musa Sabri observed that "for the very
reasons" Brezhnev gave in his statement, Egypt had been anxious not
to waste time and was therefore "astonished" when Moscow postponed
the Fahmi visit last summer.
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COMMUNIST RELATIONS
WARSAW MEETING OPENS DRIVE FOR 1975 EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE
The call for convening an all-European communist party conference
in 1975 issued by the 16-18 October Warsaw "consultative" meeting
of 28 European communist parties represents the first formal
organizational move in the drive to convene a new world communist
party conference. Some evidence that Moscow is willing to pay
the price of such gatherings by tolerating more diversity in
the communist movement was indicated by the attendance at Warsaw
of three independently oriented parties--the Romanian, Yugoslav,
and Norwegian--whi,.< had boycotted the last European communist
party conference at Karlovy Vary in April 1967. Other evidence
symbolizing the current effort to make public gestures of
accommodation was the announcement by Warsaw on the 10th, by
Moscow the next day, and in the final communique on the Warsaw
conclave that it had been called on the initiative of the Italian
as well as the Polish communist parties. At the same time,
adherence to past positions in speeches by Soviet delegate
Ponomarev on the one hand, and by the Romanian, Yugoslav, and
Italian CP delegates on the other suggests that more difficulties
are likely to impede the convening of a European and an eventual
world communist party conference. As in 1967, the Albanian,
Netherlands, and Icelandic CP's boycotted the Warsaw proceedings.
The 18 October final communique registered the participating
parties' "desire" that a conference of all European communist
parties be held in East Germany "no later than mid-1975,"
preceded by a preparatory meeting this December or January.
It recorded agreement on the central subject of the planned
conference: "The Struggle for Peace, Security, Cooperation, and
Social Progress in Europe." Speakers at the meeting en?-isioned
that the European communist conference would take place after the
windup of the European Security Conference.
Whereas the communique on the 1967 Karlovy Vary conference had
referred only briefly to free and broad discussion at that gathering,
the Warsaw meeting communique went out of its way to stress that the
proceedings had been based on "equal rights, respect for the views
of all parties, and a desire to achieve a common standpoint,"
principles which the participants specified should prevail in the
further preparations and the final conference. The mutual under-
standing and proletarian internationalism displayed at the meeting,
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it added, were "in complete accordance with normal relations
between fraternal parties." While communist media gave no hint
of controversy in the Warsaw proceedings, Rome's ANSA on the 18th
carried a denial by the Italian CP delegation head, Pajetta, that
there had been any discussion of a possible anti-Peking resolution
at the forthcoming European CP conference.
Low-keyed Soviet followup comment stressed that the Warsaw meeting
and the planned European CP conference would strengthen detente.
A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 19th recalled that
Brezhnev--in his first public statement of support for a European
CP conference--had declared at Katowice on 20 July that such a
conference would promote "joint action" toward further relaxing
tensions on the continent. The weekly Moscow domestic service
roundtable discussion on the 20th wound up with remarks stressing
that the European communist parties can, through their delibera-
tions, make the process of detente irreversible.
PONOMAREV SPEECH Although Soviet delegation head Ponomarev
included a reference to open discussion at
the forthcoming conference in his 16 October speech, he took a
tougher line than the final communique in stressing the need for
unity and concerted action by the European CP's to overcome the
obstacles to detente. Thus, he declared that convening a
European communist conference was prompted not only by the
interests of the European peoples but by "the immediate interests
of the European communist movement," adding that the conference
would promote "further cohesion of the world communist movement
on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."
Presumably alluding to the Chinese, among others, the CPSU
Politburo member and secretary went on to note that the European
CP conference would aid the struggle against "all kinds of
anticommunism" and for "the Marxist-Leninist outlook." Ponomarev
proposed that the planned conference adopt two documents--a
"politi_cal" one detailing a program of joint actions, and another
addressing an appeal to the European peoples. Both documents,
he declared, "must express the joint and agreed view of all"
conference participants. This consensus, he added, would not
preclude each party's voicing its own individual views in
conference speeches and formulating the documents, in accordance
with "democratic norms" and equality.
Ponomarev's speech was carried only in summary form, by TASS on
the 17th and in PRAVDA the next day.
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ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA Bucharest and Belgrade waited until just
before the Warsaw meeting opened to reveal
their decisions to participate in the gathering, and both warned
that they would participate in t', 'ontinued preparations and
the conference itself only if t}1 :1'r views on international party
conferences were not violated. Ttius, the Romanian Communist
Party Executive Committee was reported by Bucharest radio on the
15th as deciding, on a motion by Ceausescu, to participate in
the Warsaw meeting. The decision, reported only as one of several
actions on various subjects at the Executive Committee session,
reiterated Bucharest's stand that "all" parties--including those
who do not want to join in "compulsory" decisions or in criticism
of other parties--should be invited to and participate in inter-
national communist party conferences.
While the other participating East European countries, including
Yugoslavi,, publicized the contents of their delegates' speeches
during the course of the Warsaw meeting, the Romanians waited
until four days after it ended. An article by the delegation head,
RCP secretary Andrei, in the 22 October SCINTEIA reported on the
stand he had taken at the gathering, in accordance with the
"mandate" which he said had been spelled out by Ceausescu. Andrei
reported among other things that he had served notice at the
meeting that the RCP was "committed by statutory documents and
decisions not to subscribe in any way to actions attacking and
blaming other parties." At the Moscow international party conference
in June 1969 Ceausescu had signed "with reservations" the main
conference document, which had registered only muted criticism of
dissident views without mentioning the Chinese. Andrei's current
article declares in effect that the RCP's participation in the
preparations for and convening of even a European CP conference
would depend on respect for "each party's independence and autonomy."
Yugoslav participation in the Warsaw meeting was revealed officially
in a TANJUG report on the 15th that an LCY delegation, headed by
Executive Committee secretary Grlickov, had left that day for the
Polish capital. The report was amplified only by a statement that
at the meeting "views will be exchanged on convening a conference of
communist parties of our continent." Also on the 15th, a talk by
Zagreb radio's outspoken commentator Sundic dismissed alleged
Western speculation that Belgrade's participation in the meeting
meant that Yugoslavia was turning toward the socialist community,
that it had been subjected to "an immediate threat" by the
socialist camp, or that there was any connection between its
participation and the recent trial of Cominformist groups in
Yugoslavia.
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Grlickov's speech in Warsaw on the 17th, carried in full by
TANJUG the same day, did little to improve relations between
the LCY and the CPSU. Stressing that the situation confronting
the communist movement today was completely different from
that in "past decades," the Yugoslav delegate ruled out any
direction of the movement from "one center" or institutionalizing
international consultations as a means of working out common
strategy. With obvious particular reference to the 1960 Moscow
conference, which had roundly denounced "Yugoslav revisionism,"
Grlickov declared that a European communist party conference
must not be treated as "a continuation" of previous conferences.
He added that neither should a European gathering deal with the
holding of a new world party conference, since the conditions
for such a conference "are absent." A Warsaw-datelined dispatch
published in the French CP's L'HUMANITE on the 18th noted that
the Yugoslav speech was the only one to refer directly to a
"world" party conference. Stressing that the problems of Europe
today were "very complex," Grlickov said in conclusion that his
party would decide later whether to participate in furc',ier
preparations for a European CP conference.
ITALIAN CP On behalf of one of the two parties which had
organized the Warsaw meeting, the Italian CP's
Pajetta declared at the opening session that he anticipated
"a free, frank, and profound confrontation of views between our
parties, on the basis of equality." The speech, as reported by
L'UNITA on the 17th, also ruled out criticism of absent parties.
Reasserting the principle of unity in diversity, Pajetta told
the meeting that "unity is a result of the combination of the
experiences of the workers movement of every country," each
nation's peculiarities, and each party's autonomy.
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SINO - SOVIET R ELATIONS
MOSCOW: PEKING SEEKS CONFLICT IN EUROPE, HALT IN DETENTE
Recent remarks by Chinese leaders regarding a "unified" Germany
and detente during their talks with West German legislators
visiting Peking have produced an outpouring of Moscow radio
and press comment accusing Peking of seeking to wreck detente
and encourage East-West conflict in Europe.* The Soviet
reaction included a 19 October commentary by PRAVDA's
authoritative Yuriy Zhukov warning against the "dangerous noise"
of the "Peking firebrands."
Zhukov, focusing on Western reports of PRC Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping's statements to the FRG Bundestag delegation that
peace cannot last for a whole generation and that the threat to
peace in Europe comes from the USSR, accused the Chinese of
resurrecting the "NATO myth" that "the only thing to be seen
on the European plains are Soviet divisions ready to pounce on
the West." Zhukov went on to denounce alleged Peking support
for a more powerful NATO, an expanded arms race, and "a new
military grouping of West European states which would serve as
a NATO subsidiary." He accused the Chinese of ulterior motives,
saying they wished to "warm their hands over a thermonuclear fire
after causing a clash between socialist and capitalist countries."
Underlining the importance Moscow attaches to the Teng pronounce-
ments, Zhukov made a rare Soviet acknowledgment of the vice
premier's rising stature in the Chinese hierarchy, stating that
recent reports show that "since the illness of Premier Chou En-lai
he has been substituting for him."
Other Soviet comment has sought to link Teng's reported remarks on
war with Peking's endorsement of a unified Germany and its reported
invitation to the FRG opposition leader Strauss to visit China
early in 1975, describing this as Chinese fostering of a "repetition
of Hitler's crusade against communism." Much of the Soviet comment
has replayed Zhukov's view that Peking seeks to destroy detente and
stir up an East-West conflict in Europe, but a 21 October commentary
on Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress went further,
raising the specter of a common China-West European front against
Moscow. The commentator noted that neo-fascists in the West hope
that Peking's support for NATO would lead to a "common West European-
Chinese strategy against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."
* For background on Chinese remarks to FRG legislators showing
Peking's heightened support for a unified Germany, see the TRENDS of
17 October 1974, page 17.
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''.3 OCTOBER 1974
INDOCHINA
DRV ENDORSES CONTACTS WITH THAI "PEOPLE," REBUFFS GOVERNMENT
Reflecting a new, more positive dimension in DRV policy toward
Thailand, a DRV Foreign Ministry information department spokesman
declared in an interview with VNA that Hanoi is interested in
developing contacts with the Thai "people," even though official
DRV-Thai exchanges must await a change in Bangkok's "hostile"
policy toward Vietnam. The VNA interview was released on
18 October, in response to comment in Thai media two days earlier
that Bangkok government officials had welcomed reports from a
Thai visitor to Hanoi that alleged the director of North Vietnam's
commission on foreign cultural relations had expressed approval
"in principle" for cultural exchanges.
Stressing that contacts at this time must be limited, the spokes-
man took issue with "distorted reports" circulated by Thai
officials concerning developing bilateral contacts, asserting
they are designed to "soothe public opinion" and to "sidetrack"
the Thai people's struggle against Bangkok's pro-U.S. policies.
Because of Thaii.'rd's "hostile policy toward Vietnam and Indochina,"
he advised, "it is unrealistic for the Thai administration to
talk about improving relations between the two countries." He
charged specifically that "Thai -uthorities have sold out Thailand's
independence and sovereignty" to the United States and have not
drawn the "appropriate lessons" from the U.S. withdrawal from
Indochina in the wake of the Paris and Vientiane agreements, and
he attacked Bangkok's continued tolerance of U.S. bases in Thailand
and its aid for Thieu in South Vietnam. Concluding on a positive
note, the spokesman advised that Bangkok's policy "can by no means"
prevent the development of friendly relations between the "peoples"
of Thailand and Vietnam, who "in their cwn interests" should have
"contacts and join efforts" to preserve their "longstanding relations
of friendship."
Though the full imp- cations of Hanoi's de?,arche ::_e not yet
clear, the spokesman's comment comes against a background of recently
active Hanoi efforts pressing for a change in the Sanya government's
policy of supporting the United States in Indochina and allowing
U.S. military forces to remain in Thailand. After an authoritative
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23 OCTOBER 1974
NHAN DAN "Observer" article in May 1974 specified that such a
shift represented a basic precondition for improved DRV-Thai
relations, Hanoi issued a steady stream of authoritative
comment focused against Bangkok's pro-U.S. stance.* The
present spokesman's interview, by adding the specific entice-
ment of bilateral cultural contacts to encourage Thailand
to change its ways, suggests that Hanoi intends to use both
the carrot of bilateral exchange and the stick of propaganda
attacks on Bangkok policies in pushing for a change in the
Sanya government's ties with the United States.
DRV AUTHOR HONG CHUONG ASSESSES U.S. P( ER, DETENTE POLICIES
U.S. policies of decent, with Moscow and rapprochement with Peking
have been assailed in recant three-part Hanoi radio talk attri-
buted to Hong Cliuong--an assistant editor of the DRV party journal
HOC TAP who authored remarkably frank articles in the 1960's
criticizing the Soviets and Chinese. Hong Chuong's talk was
broadcast in Vietnamese in thrps daily installments beginning on
8 October and was summarized in Hanoi's Mandarin-language broad-
casts beginning on the 14th. The timing of his attack on U.S.
policies of detente, like the timing of the most recent government
statements issued by the PRG and DRV on 8 and 11 October respec-
tively, may be related to Secretary Kissinger's scheduled
23-27 October Moscow visit.** There are precedents in Vietnamese
communist propaganda that suggest a pattern of deliberate activity
timed to coincide with U.S. diplomatic initiatives involving
Hanoi's allies. Thus, for example, the last previous PRG state-
ment was issued on 22 March, two days before Secretary Kissinger's
arrival for talks in Moscow, and a major Hanoi propaganda assault
was launched against U.S. overtures to socialist states last
fall before the Secretary's scheduled visit to Peking.
Hong Chuong restates the long-standing Vietnamese communist
contention that Washington is attempting to divide the socialist
countries with its detente policy and that it is improving relations
* For background on Hanoi's recent view of Thailand see the TRENDS
of 2 October 1974, pages Sl-S3.
** The PRG and DRV government statements are discussed respectively,
in the TRENDS of 8 October 1974, pages 11-12, and 17 October 1974,
pages 8-9.
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23 OCTOBER 1974
with the big socialist states in order to promote cultural and
ideological inroads and concentrate on opposing the small
socialist countries. At the same time, Hong Chuong suggests
a more sanguine Hanoi appraisal of U.S. efforts than was
reflected in its propaganda a year ago. In a series of articles
last November and December the military commentator "Chien
Binh" (Combatant) had used strident terms in warning that
the United States was attempting to "surround, divide, and
intimidate" the socialist camp, "sabotage" the communist
movement, "repress" the national liberation movement, and
"frantically counterattack" the revolutionary movement.* By
contrast, Hong Chuong emphasizes U.S. weaknesses, claiming that
U.S. failure to "encircle and isolate" the socialist system
has forced Washington to implement a new policy of developing
normal diplomatic relations with a number of socialist countries.
Chien Binh's article a year ago appeared to be criticizing
Hanoi's allies when it admonished that de,:ente can only be used
to create conditions to launch stronger o-fensives. Taking a
different focus, Hong Chuong seems to r_f lect less concern that
Moscow or Peking has been taken in by the alleged U.S. ploy. He
maintains that the "present detente between the U.S. imperialists
and a number of socialist countries is only temporary and limited,"
expresses confidence in the role of the "world socialist system"
as a "revolutionary base for our country," and says that the
socialist system is "providing firm and stably: support to the
small and weak countries struggling to protect their fundamental
national rights."
Hong Chuong underlines his evaluation of the weakened U.S. position
in concluding passages, among other things claiming that recent
world developments--including the settlements in Vietnam and Laos,
the change of governments in Thailand and Portugal, and events in
the Hidale East and Cyprus--have demonstrated that the United
States no longer holds the same position of strength and that the
world balance of forces "has completely changed." Maintaining that
the weakened U.S. posture had forced it to rescrt to "perfidious
mr.neuvers," Hong Chuong derisively notes that Secretary Kissinger
has "traveled from one country to another to publicize the so-called
interdependence theory designed to undermine the coordinated actions
of the small and weak countries" that are opposing "U.S. infiltration."
He goes on to suggest that such tactics will fail, since the United
States is in a declining position.
* Chien Binh's articles are discussed in the 12 December 1973 TRENDS,
pages Sl-S5.
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BACKGROUND Hong Chuong had previously been a prolific contributor
to HOC TAP, publishing at least. 34 articles in the
Journal since it first appeared in 1956; but ha has been less
prominent in recent years. His last article in HOC TAP was published
in May 1971, and since then his only known article was a discourse
on literary theory and criticism published in the November-December.
1973 issue of the bimonthly literary journal TAP CHI VAN HOC. He
appeared in public in 1971 and again in 1973, but is not known to
have appeared in 1972.
Many of Hong Chuong's HOC TAP articles dealt with cultural subje^ts,
but particularly beginning in 1963, he wrote significant comme :ies
on the situation in South Vietnam and world developments. Among other
thLags, he was the author of radical attacks on r.?:)viet and Chinese
policies: The controversial nature of a November 1964 Hong Chuong
article, hailing Khrushchev's ouster two months earlier, was demon-
strated when Hanoi authorities deleted the article from issues of
HOC TAP after initial copies had already been released. A May 1967
HOC TAP article by Hong Chuong launched a thinly veiled attack on
the Chinese cultural revolution, among other things, warning against
the deification of a leader.
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23 OCTOBER 1974
CHINA
CAMPAIGN SEEKS BIG BOOST IN LAST QUARTER INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
Peking seems determined to increase PRC industrial output
significantly in the fourth quarter of 1974, placing special
attention on light industry, following a disappointing indus-
trial performance during the first three quarters. Peking
and provincial media comment stresses that the increases will
result from carrying out the anti-Lin Piao nd Confucius
campaign, although the shift to light industry probably is
prompted by good crops this year, which furnish a material
base for better performance.
Complementing the production drive, Peking continues to press
the themes of party control and revoluiontary unity as part
of the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign. These themes--which
have dominated the movement since this summer when provincial
radios reported economic dislocations resulting from the
previous radical stage of the movement--were again sounded in an
October RED FLAG article on unity, indicating that problems
are continuing. The article, broadcast by Peking radio on
20 October, argued that if revolutionary unity was weakened
it would lead to "losses to our revolution and production."
The article criticized cadres who "feel unhappy about the
masses' criticism and instigate conflicting sentiments among
the masses" and it cautioned cadres holding differing views
to "seek common ground on major points while reserving
differences on minor points."
The need to continue the campaign under tight party control
also continues to bL emphasi=c!d in provincial broadcasts.
Sining radio on 17 October, for example, urged party members
to pay more attention to "self-criticism" and to "refrain
from picking on the shortcomings or mistakes of others."
The broadcast also called on cadres to lead the masses toward
unity and to struggle against "words and deeds that weaken
or break away from the leadership of _he party" or "violate
party discipline."
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION The turn towards promoting light
industry has thus far been displayed
most strongly in Kwangtung, where a 14 October industrial rally
and an 18 October NANFANG DAILY euitorial devoted renewed
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23 OCTOBER 1974
attention to the nead for promoting light industrial produc-
tion. The theme may be national in scope, at least for
provinces with bimtlar conditions; according to the Canton
rally report, broadcast by Canton radio on the 18th, the rally
proposals were adopted after "the essence of the party Central
Committee's directive on present industrial production" was
explained. The light industry theme was picked up by Anhwei
province on 22 October, with a progress report and an ANHWEI
DAILY editorial.
The Canton rally and editorial both called for using the ideo-
logical movement to increase production, stressing the control
aspects of L1.3 campaign. The editorial in particular stated
that cadres must "dare to control the class struggle" and
singled out "veteran workers" as the group to be most relied on.
Othcr provinces have also called for a production surge in the
fourth quarter, but without singling out light industry for
attention. A 20 October Hopei report on a provincial meeting
cited as a unit's criterion of success in the campaign whether
"it can fulfill and overfulf ill the state plan in an all-around
way." Similarly, a HUNAN DAILY editorial broadcast by Changsha
radio on 17 October put local units on notice that production
levels would be used to determine how well criticism of Lin and
Confucius has been carried out. The editorial argued that
greater party leadership over workers was essential to meet
fourth-quarter production goals and it called upon all party
committees to "assign persons specifically responsible for
control over production."
BACKGROUND ON LIGHT The last time China made a major push
INDUSTRY CAMPAIGN in light industry was in the summer
and fall of 1972. That shift also took
advantage of a good agricultural crop, but it also seemed to be
related to changes in line following the Lin Piao affair and the
decline in influence of PLA leaders. An article in RED FLAG
No. b for 1972, announcing the new stress on light industry,
criticized "imperialist and social imperialist countries" where
"industry, especially military industry, has developed abnormally."
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23 OCTOBER 1974
MOSCOW HARDLINERS APPEAR TO DEFY LEADERSHIP OVER ART SHOW
The leadership of Moscow's Cheremushki district party committee,
whose suppression of an art exhibit in Moscow a month ago
caused an international scandal, was singled out in the Moscow
organization's newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 17 October
as a model for other district committees to follow in handling
ideological work. Coming a month after the top party leadership
had reversed the district committee's action and allowed the
art show to be pr3sented, and two weeks after the first secretary
of the offending district committee was dismissed allegedly for
mishandling the affair, the editorial amounts, in effect, to a
defiance of the leadership for its handling of the affair.
ART SHOW FIASCO The art show fiasco began on 15 September,
when a group of artists attempted to hold an
abstract art exhibit in a field in Cheremushki district, after
Moscow city executive committee officials had refused to
issue a permit. The violent breaking up of the exhibit and
roughing up of foreign newsmen by a gang of plainclothes militia-
men brought a wave of extremely bad publicity in the Western
press.
?.nitially the suppression was defended in broadcasts beamed abroad
and in a letter published in the 20 September SOVIET CULTURE. Then
Moscow executive committee official N.Ya. Sychev, formerly head
of the city party committee's ideology section, held a 28 September
press conference specifically to counter the "incorrect, distorted"
reporting of the event in the foreign press and to deny that there
had been any "crushing of the exhibit."
However, this line was apparently judged insufficient by some
higher level officials. On 29 September, the same day Sychev's
statements appeared in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, a second modern art
show was permitted without interference and, according to Western
reports, drew thousands of visitors. This was followed by an even
more unusual slap at the Moscow organization and its policies. On
9 October it was announced that the first secretary of the
offending district committee, B.N. Chaplin, had been removed at
an 8 October district party committee plenum. No hint of the
reasons was given in the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA account, but foreign
newsmen were immediately tipped off by unidentified "Soviet
sources" that Chaplin's removal was punishment for mishandling the
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23 OCTOBER 1974
art shorn and that Moscow city party committee ideology secretary
V.N. Yagodkin was also apparently implicated in the affair. This
was reported in the New York TIMES on 10 October. Despite the
implicit rebuke to Yagodkin, he has as yet suffered no evident
loss of authority and continu2s to function as Moscow's ideology
boss.
MOSCOW'S HARDLINERS The Moscow City leadership has earned a
well-deserved reputation in recent years
for advocating and applying repressive policies against th'
liberal intelligentsia. Both the dismissed first secretary of
the Cheremushki district party committee, V.N. Chaplin, and the
Moscow City party committee's ideology secretary, V.N. Yagodkin,
have contributed to this reputation.
Chaplin's views were set forth in an article in the May 1974
KOMMUNIST which reviewed the work of his district committee with
the scientific-technical intelligentsia. He noi.ed that his
district is Moscow's "science district," where half of all party
members work in scientific institutes. He stressed the importance
of ideological war, attacked "technocrat ism" (read "apoliti=ism"),
and assailed scholars who "nibble at the bait" of "humanization"
and "liberalization." He particularly complained about scientists
who thought scholars could stick to "pure science" and who argued
for a "division of labor" whereby party organizations would handle
ideological work and not "overburden" specialists with public
activities.
Chaplin's views appear close to those of Yagodkin, who seems to
have built his career largely by devising ways of forcing scholars
t,) do more ideological study during his tenure as party secretary
aZ Moscow State Uni-'ersity. Chaplin first appeared in August
1965 as second secretary of the Okty.ibr district, adjacent to the
university where Yagodkin was leading party work, and in the
December 1968 reorganization of Moscow districts he was chosen to
head the newly created Cheremushki district south of the university.
Meanwhile, Yagodkin's ideological innovations at the university
won him promotion to Moscow City party committee ideology secretary
in March 1971, and he has since used this position to attack liberal.
trends in the leading history, philosophy and economic institutes.
He has become perhaps the leading spokesman for the theory that
detente necessitates ideological tightening up at home and has
played one of the leading roles in the 1973-74 crackdown on social
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23 OCTOBER 1974
sciences. He lectured the General History Institute on the
ideological dangers arising from detente in June 1973, for
example.* He demanded that philosophy become a weapon in the
ideological war at a November 1973 Central Committee conference
of philosophers, reported in the May 1974 HERALD OF THE USSR
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. And he attacked innovative economists
such as G.S. Lisichkin and, by implication, N.P. Fedorenko at
a November 1973 Central Committee conference of economists,
according to the February 1974 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS.
In addition to these public attacks, he indicated in the February
QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article that his city party committee had
issued decrees directly intervening in cadre matters at
Fedorenko's institute as well as at the Institute of Economics.
In a February 1974 KOMMUNIST article he assailed any "technocratic"
approach to the economy and .gain called for an ideological
crackdown in the face of detente. Spurred by a Centrai Committee
decree on raising the ideological level of social science t:!aching
at Saratov University and Moscow's Bauman technical school
published in the 24 June PRAVDA, Grishin and Yagodkin began a
new series of meeting;: in July to tighten up.
* See the Supplementary Article "New Ally for Leader of Soviet
Revisionist Historians" in the TRENDS of 1 May 1974.
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'3 OCTOBER 1974
FEDORENKO PROPOSES REORGANIZATION OF GOSPLAN AND MINISTRIES
In a September QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article, top Soviet economist
N. P. Fedorenko, academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences'
economic division, proposes stripping the State Planning Commission,
Gosplan, of some if its planning functions and transforming
ministries into independent self-financing units. Such an action
would represent a major reform and a marked reduction of rigid
central planning. Innovator Fedorenko's proposal follows closely
on the heels of a similar idea floated in mid-August in TRUD by
reform-minded minister K. N. Rudnev. The simultaneous presentation
of this idea by two such prominent figures suggests it ranks as
one of the major viewpoints being pressed in the current high-level
debate over changes in the economic system. Such discussions do
not, however, suggest early adoption given the regime's traditional
caution about major economic policy shifts.
REFORM PROPOSALS Addressing his article to the December plenum's
call for changes in the economic system,
Fedorenko proposed that Gosplan be relieved of current planning to
concentrate on long-range planning and that it be reorganized along
"functional" lines instead of the present "branch" lines. This would
mean transferring to the ministries responsibility for planning for
their own branches. Further, Fedorenko indicated that the ministries
should finance their operations and investments from their own
profits or from bank loans, rather than from budget allocations. He
carefully stressed that this would preserve the principle of central-
ized planning, while forcing economic units at all levels--ministries,
associations and enterprises--to adopt the most efficient planning
and investment decisions. One of the key obstacles to the success
of the 1965 economic reform was that while enterprises were to
operate on the principle of economic accountability, their superior
organs--ministries and main administrations--were not. The March 1973
decree on productions associations extended the principle of economic
accountability upward to production associations, which are replacing
main administrations, and Fedorenko's proposal would extend it all
the way to the ministerial level.
Fedorenko's proposal dovetails with arguments advanced by Rudnev in
a 15 August TRUD article on improving the administrative mechanism.
Like Fedorenko, Rudnev, minister of irMCrument making, automation
equipment and control systems, is a leading innovator. At a key
May 1968 all-union conference on the economic reform, Rudnev had
proposed that his whole ministry be made self-financing. He said
this would require that all current planning for his branch be
transferred from Gosplan to the ministry. This was finally done in
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April 1970, but Rudnev's ministry has remained the only such
self-financed ministry. In his August TRUD article he declared
that full self-financing had proved successful in his ministry
and should be applied to other ministries, changing them from
purely administrative bodies to economically responsible entities.
He called for strong, independent ministries which would do
their own current planning, rather than depending on Gosplan
for this function.
GOSPLAN RESISTANCE Gosplan has been the target of proposals
for reorganization for
some time,
but has
been put on the defensive since the December
1973
plenum,
which
apparently heard sharp attacks on its work.
For
example,
in the
wake of the discussion o economic problems at the December 1972
plenum, Gosplan's departments--most of which are organized on
branch lines--came under criticism for poor coordination of
interbranch problems. These criticisms were noted in a 17 February
1973 TRUD article by Gosplan Deputy Chairman A. V. Bachurin, who
rejected suggestions to basically reorganize Gosplan. He also
appeared to spike any idea of transferring branch planning to
ministries, stressing instead that branch ministries were even
less efficient than Gosplan in overseeing interbranch coordination.
However, as Bachurin acknowledged in a 26 August 1974 ECONOMIC
GAZETTE article, new demands to transfer some Gosplan functions
to ministries were made at the December 1973 plenum. After the
plenum Gosplan Chairman Baybakov publicly defended his organization's
prerogatives in this regard. In articles on improving planning
in the March PLANNED ECONOMY and the 23 May TRUD, he stressed that
Lenin himself had oriented Gosplan to handle branch as well as
territorial planning and current as well as long term planning
and insisted that this coordinated approach to planning was now
more important "than ever before." He also took a calculated
swing at Gosplan foe Fedorenko, who has been a promoter of
mathematical economic methods and the system of optimal functioning
of the economy (SOFE). Declaring that no matter how important
mathematical economic methodology was, it still remained just one
of many methods, he ridiculed "some economists" for overrating
it and the "so-called" SOFE.
Bachurin conceded in '.iis August a, ticle, however, that perhaps
some Gosplan functions could go to ministries. But he attacked
the concept of self-financing ministries, declaring that ministries
should remain administrative bodies rather than become economically
responsible entities.
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BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN While the precise attitude of Brezhnev
POSITIONS UNCLEAR and Kosygin toward the proposals is not
clear, Gosplan may not be able to count
on their full support. Kosygin's views have appeared to coincide
with those of the Gosplan leaders in some respects, but he has
also fostered the idea of transferring the subdivisions of
ministries (enterprises and production associations) to economic
accountability and has helped promote some of Fedorenko's ideas
in the past. Brezhnev's repeated assertions that political
considerations must take precedence over economic considerations
suggest that he would be less than sympathetic to Fedorenko's
goal of allowing economic organs to make decisions on purely
economic grounds. At the same time Brezhnev has been a frequent
critic of Gosplan. At the 24th CPSU Congress, for example, he
urged a strengthening of ministries and reduction of Gosplan's
current planning functions, and at the December 1973 plenum he
called for a comprehensive reorganization of planning.
In any case, the chances for early adoption of the Fedorenko-
Rudnev proposals appear slim in view of the regime's tendency to
move slowly and cautiously on economic changes. Even the transfer
of ministerial subdivisions to economic accountability ordered
by the March 1973 decree on production associations is proceeding
extremely slowly Although ministries had been ordered to prepare
schemes for reorganizing their main administrations into cost
accounting production associations and industrial associations
for submission to the Council of Ministers by September 1973,
there have been repeated complaints of delay and evasion and
the council's approval of the first such schemes was only announced
in the 6 September 1974 IZVESTIYA--one year later.
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NOTES
JCP ON FORD VISIT: A 21 October statemenc by the Presidium of
the Japan CommuntsL Party has called for a "great national
movement" against President Ford's November visit to Tokyo.
Evoking the memory of the large demonstrations in 1960 against
the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the statement called
for formation of "joint struggle" organizations on a scale
surpassing those in the 1960 demonstrations which led to can-
cellation of a planned visit by President Eisenhower. The
statement takes advantage of the controversy over the presence
of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan that has flared up recently
following Congressional testimony by a retired U.S. Navy
admiral to link t1Rz visit to an alleged attempt by the United
States aLLd Japan to "promote transformation of their military
alliance into a nuclear military alliance."
PRC-USSR-BALKANS: An 18 October article by PEOPLE'S DAILY
international affairs commentator Jen Ku-ping has offered an
unusually comprehensive indictment of Soviet policy in the
Balkans, charging that Moscow has stepped up its "expansionism"
there in the wake of the 1973 Middle East war and this year's
Cyprus crisis. Tre article portrays Moscow as backing the
Cominformist group in Yugoslavia and notes Soviet military
pressures on Romania, pointing up Soviet military exercises
in the Balkans and demand^ ''3r army transit rights. In an
obvious reference to Brezhnev's 11 October speech at Kishinev,
Jen denounces' unnamed Sov:-et leaders who "appeared at points
on the Soviet borders adjo.'.ning the Balkans to boast in person
of Russia's history of gobb=.'ng up neighboring territories."
He also indirectly assailed Moscow's support for Bulgarian
claims to parts of Macedonia that are now thin Yugoslavia,
accusing the Soviets of having "secretly s. ed territorial
disputes." Lauding the example of Yugoslav-Romanian coopera-
tion shown in the joint communique on Tito's visit to Bucharest
in July, Peking called on Balk,..i nations to strengthen mutual
relations and take "powerful measures" to rebuff the "menace of
expansionism" posed by the USSR.
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 Approved For Release I 999/09 4?1,ilq14pP85T00877F 0ggLA"70044-0
23 OCTOBER 1974
CASTRO SPEECH: For the second time in three weeks Cuban
Prime Minister Fidel Castro has criticized U.S. policies
toward the Third World, in an 18 October address to a World
Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Havana. Dealing
primarily with world economic problems, Castro asserted that
"Yankee imperialism" aimed at division of the oil-producing
and other Third World countries and that these countries
must unite to end the "rapacious exploitation" of the past.
As in his 28 September speech, Castro urged OPEC members to
invest in underdeveloped rather than industrial nations
where the investments would become a "hostage for imperialism".
Possibly concerned to assume a firm pose in view of the forth-
comin,, OAS conference--which will consider lifting sanctions
imposed against Cuba--Castro declared that the Cuban revolu-
tion was becoming "more revolutionary, more internationalist"
and more loyal to "the immortal ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin."
In reporting Castro's speech on the 19th, TASS described his
praise for Latin American efforts against "the interference of
monopolies and agreed with his assessment that the blockade of
Cuba had failed, but refrained from mentioning his direct
criticism of the United States. Soviet media have recently
repeated their encouragement for a thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations
by approvingly reporting U.S. press articles supporting this
view.
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 FBIS 'T'RENDS
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- i -
A P P E N D I X
MOSCUw, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 14 - 20 OCTOBER 1974
Moscow (2839 items)
Peking (952 items)
Egyptian Foreign Minister
(--)
12%
Criticism of Lin Piao
(5%)
10
Fahmi in USSR
[TABS "Announcements"
(--)
7%]
and Confucius
Indochina
(7%)
8%
on Fahmi Talks with
(Vietnam
(3%)
5%]
Brezhnev, Gromyko
[Laos
(R)
2%]
USSR/Finl
and Armistice,
(--)
10%
Danish Prime Minister
(--)
8
30th An
[Podg
niversary
ornyy Speeches
(--)
3%]
Hartling in PRC
UNGA Session
(12%)
7%
in F
inland
USSR Balkans Policy
(--)
3%
China
(4%)
5%
PRAVI)A Ed
itorial Article
(1%)
4%
on 10th
October
Brezhnev
Anniversary CPSU
Plenum
Speech to USSR-
(--)
3%
U.S. Tr
Council
European
ade, Economic
Communist and
(--)
3%
Workers
Warsaw
Parties Meeting,
October Anniversary Slogans (1%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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