SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL', NO 1, 1964

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 4, 1965
• Content Type: TRANS

A TRANS NO. 939
01JRNAt VOYENNAIA."MY?-8
4 AIJGUST 1965
LITA EORET
0300090007-9
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLAT I ON
11,-mber 9?,9 II- August 196ri
c: T I. 1 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
,deree efinr4. iPtCPFP e?Dt
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SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MYSLI, No 1, 1964
Table of Contents
. . _ _ _ . _
Further Strengthen Troop Discipline, by Col P. Bodenkov
(Not translated)
Problems of Military-Technical Superiority, by Capt 1st
Rank V. Kulakov
The Augmentation of Strategic Efforts in Modern Armed
Conflict, by Maj Gen Kh. Dzhelaukhov
Civil Defense in Nuclear-Rocket War, by Col Gen Avn 0.
Tolstikov
Modern Fortifications, by Engr-Col B. Mikhaylov
The Question of Economic Costs in Modern War, by Lt Col
Yu. Vlas'yevich (Based on materials from the foreign
press -- Not translated)
Basic Stages in the D velopment of Soviet Military-
Historical Science, by Lt Col I. Rostunov (Excrpts
only)
Some Details on the Automation of Troop
by Col V. Sinyak (Not translated)
The Atomic Round for the 155 mm Howitzer
Selected Works of a Distinguished Soviet
Col (Ret) V. Uskov (Not translated)
TechAical Prcogress and Militarism, by L.
revie; -- not translated)
Control in the US,
(Not translated)
Scholar, by
Gruzdev (Book
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, by Col O.
Sosyura, Engr-Capt S. Yoremin, and Engr-Capt M.
Goryainov
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PROBLMS OF MILITARY-TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY
Captain 1st Rank V. Kulukov
CPYRGHT
The revolution in military affairs, of which we are witnesses and
in which we are participants, is connected with the appearance of
essentially new c4rmamunt, and the sharp increase in the effectiveness
of combat equipment in armed conflict. The main, and in fact decisive,
element of the material basis of the revolutionary changes in military
affairs was the development of nuclear-rocket weapons as a result of
the combination of the nuclear warhead with the intercontinental ballistic
rocket. The development of strategic rockets of the megaton class was es-
pecially important. The tremendous destructive power of u nuclear warhead
with TNT equivalent of millions of tons in combination with u super-long-
range ballistic rocket, and especially a global rocket, represnets a vir-
tually irresistible ,eapon. It gives its possessor unprecedented possibili-
ties for the execution of military missions assuring the swift achievement
of a decisive strategic effect.
Modern weapons can be created only when there is a very high level
of development of science and technology and of all the productive
forces of society.. Here, naturally, has been demonstrated the indisputable
superiority of the socialist method of production over that of capitalism.
The Soviet Union in u minimum period of time not only put an end to the
monopoly of the US over the atomic weapon, and developed the atomic and
hydrogen bomb, but it also in a few years moved ahead of all countries in
the development of rocket technology. The achievement by the Soviet Union
of military-technical superiority over the US was a historically necessary
victory of our economics, science, and technology over the economically
and militarily strongest country of capitalism.
A monoply of the nuclear weapon in the hands of the US militarists,
if it had beLn maintained long enough, in combination with superiority
in means of delivery, represented u great threat to peace and social
progress. The existenc of the powerful modern weapon in the hands of a
socialist state confronted the aggressive militaristic forces with the
entirely real prospect of being wiped off the face of the earth if they
attempted to start a new world war.
But depriving the enemy of superiority in military technology does
not mean depriving him of the capability of starting a new world war.
Imperialism possesses a strong military machine, many times more powerful
than that which it had during World War II, and it is continuing to srengthen
it and develop it. The governments of the imperialist states are talking
all measures to overtake and surpass the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries in the development of military technology and in the combat capa-
baity of the armed forces. As Lieut. Gun Trudeau, Commanding Officer,
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Research arid Development Command, US Army, remarked, scientists, engineers,
military strategists and government leaders "arc working intensively on
programs of research and development to create superior weapons and equip-
ment" and thereby assure "qualitative superiority over the Russians and
their satellites." (Army Information Digest, January, 1962.) The author
of the book, "A Forward Strategy for America," reflecting the views of the
most militant American militarists, seeking ways to "bring Russia to her
knees", ca= to the conclusion that for the attainment of this goal the
US must possess "fundamental military components". Chief among them is
the establishment and maintenance by the US and her allies of "military-
technical superiority over the Communist bloc." (R. Strausz-Hupe, W.
Kintner, S. Possony. A 'Forward Strategy for America. New York, 1961,
p. 161.) To attain this goal they are insisting on a sharp step-up of
the arms race, assuming that thus they can "break the back of the Soviet
economy." (Ibid., p. 35Y0
The constant increases in military appropriations and in efforts
for the development of the latest combat equipment in the major capitalist
countries, along with overt and covert opposition to Soviet proposals for
general anq complete disarmament, is evidence of the fact that the strug-
gle for military-tecbnical superiority not only has not slackened, but hae
entered a new, still more intensive stage.
The nilitary potential of a state, its ability to wage war and win
victory now is primarily determined by its capability of using the power
within the nucleus as the basic source of fire power in combination with
highly effective rocket means of delivery. Neither the most intensive
economic efforts nor the mobilization of any number of troops can provide
the fire power necessary for modern armed forces unless their armament
includes nuclear-ro&ct weapons.
In turn, for the creation of nuclear-rocket weapons, a great econo-
mIc and scientific potential is necessary. A high level of development
of science and technology in combination with a highly developed economy
is an absolute necessity for the achievement of military-technical super-
iority over the enemy, especially in the field of nuclear-rocket weapons.
Thus superiority in nuclear-rocket weapons is the decisive factor
of military-technical superiority. At the same time, conventional weapons,
which likewise are being constantly improved, will also continue to play
their part along with the latest combat equipment?rocket and nuclear.
In itself, military equipment is only one of the elements which
make up military-technical superiority, which completely depends on
the people who are operating the equipment. The achievement of military-
technical superiority presupposes, along with the production of the
necessary quantity of the most modern instruments of war, the most through
and intensive training of a mass of men who are capable of proving their
superiority over the enemy in the mastery of combat equipment and its use
ctory.
in al:140130a FORiaseg2tkolibsitif:r6WAbibgirocklARibbf360696ifor-i
CPYRGHT
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Lenin, from the e.;tperLence of Worl War I, concluded that in war "he
will come out on top who has the gr .test technology, organization, and
di.seilaine, and the best machines." (Collected.Works, Vol. L!y, p 167).
From this thesis of Lenin it follows that superiority over the enemy
based on higher technology can only bring victory to those armed forces
which are distinguished by the greatest discipline and are best organized.
Superior combat equipment, and qualitatively superior personnel who have
completely mastered its use constitute an organically single basis of
military-technical superiority over the enemy. And in order that this
theoretically generall accepted unity may be assured in the every-day prac-
tice of military development, military science must in a timely manner put
forth the most expedient principles or utilization and forms of organiza-
tion of the armed forces, corresponding to the latest instruments of war
which have become part of their armament. These principles and forms
inevitably change with changes in the nature and capabilities of the instru-
ments of combat, with the emergence of new methods of accomplishing military
missions and with the raising of demands on personnel. Thus, with the ap-
pearance of nuclear-rocket weapons, in Soviet military doctrine as estab-
lished the principle of the decisive role of strategic rocket troops, now
a main branch of the armed forces.
Along with the possession of superior technical equipment and qualita-
tively superior personnel, the correct and timely carrying out of the
organization of the armed forces plays an extremely important part in
assuring constant military-technical superiority over the enemy. This
in turn requires scientifically accurate solution of the problems of develop-
ing existing and creating new, branches and arms of the armed forces
and of determining their place and role in the military organization of
the country and the relations and cooperation among them. In the process
of solving these important problems, there is determined the total fire
power and quantity and nature of the means of delivery for the armed forces
as a whole; there takes place a distribution of the means of combat among
the branches and arms; and there is worked out a thought out single sys-
tem of armament that satisfies the needs of the troops for personnel,
technical equipment and transport, and fry all kinds Of supply.
To elucidate the most general principles of this highly complex
process it is necessary to abstract from the multitude of details and
pick out those things most essential, involving general principles,
and characteristic for the process as a. whole.
The vaxiety of combat missions and of the ways and means of accomplish-
ing them calls for the existence of vaeious branches and arms of the armed
forces, distinguished one from another by the environment in which they
operate, by their fire power, who or what carries the fire power, and the
degree of operational mobility and maneuverability; and by their mission
and the methods and consequences of their combat operations. But there
is a more common basis on which is determined the specifics of the or-
ganization of branches and arms of the armed forces. This is the completely
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defined form, peculiar to each of them, of the combination of men and
equipment. Therefore the process of organization of the armed forces is
essentially the search for and the establishment of the most rational form
'yr: combination of men and equipment.
W:thLn the Cramel,orft of any component of the armed forces?whether
It be an inCantry company or a rocket unity a soyedineniye of ships or'
planes, a smalA. padrazdelenlye or a large obgyedineniye--the technical
instment and the men operating them are combined in some organized
form fcir the execution of certain combat missions, Here, naturally;
there has devei,)ped between the two a certain qualitative and quantitative
relationship. It is perfectly obvious that this relationship changes with
developments in military affairs) and mainly as a result of the emer-
gence of new, imprwed military-technical means.
Military-technical progress invariably leads to a growth in the amount
of power and the supply of technical equipment available to the armed
foes, increasing thereby their fighting power, As a result of industrial
and technical development, there is an increase in the combat qualities
of the armed forces, and less expenditure of human energy is required to
achieve an immediate combat effect thanks to the expanding use of techni-
cal equipment. Thus, the most important natural tendency of development
in military affairs is the constant change in the qualitative and quanti-
tative relationship between the mass of men and technical equipment, with
the latter assuming ever greater importance in this relationship. We
emphasize that we are talking about the increase in the relative impor-
tance of the immediate combat effect achieved by the weapon as contrasted
with the effort of the individual. As an example we may point to the
importance in the past of the rifleman-sniper and of aimed fire in general
in comparison with automatic fire, and then artillery fire y the means of
attack ,af the airforces, and finally, the nuclear weapon?
In the revolutim in militPry affairs this tendency has been demon-
strated very graphically and thoroughly. As a result of the abrupt
qualitative leap in the development of sources of fire power and means
of delivering it, and also the appearance of other latest technical equip-
ment, there has been created the possibility of decreasing the number of
personnel of the armed forces directly engaged in combat operations for
the direct destruction of the enemy, without decreasing, and in fact
increasing, their fire power. In the period from 1955 to 1960 the number
of the SoViet armed forces was decreased by one third, but their fire
powe, as N. S. KHRUSHCHEV has noted, increased many times during the
same period, thanks to the introduction of the latest forms of modern
military technical equipment. (N. S. EHRUSHCBEV. Disarmament is the
Way tu Strengthen Peace and Secure Friendship Between Nations.
.3.ospolitizdat: :1960. p.35.)
CPYRGHT
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However, this tendency, which should operate according to objective
law is not always carried out when it should be. We cite the following
examples.
In his speech at the conference of officials of industry and con-
sruction of the RSFSR on 24 April 1963, KHRUSHCHBV said that our economic
leaders concern themselves very little with problems of the organization
of labor, and told about the case of the purchase from the US of several
plants for the manufacture of cinder blocks. In one of them, built in
Kiev, over 100 men were working, while the US had a total of 16 men in
such a plant. (Pravda, 26 April 1963) Thus the incorrect determination
of the relationship between men and machines resulted in a lowering of
the calculated productivity of labor of each man by about six times.
In the US journal, n1L.Lag Review, there appeared the following
typical example. "To support one NATO division of 18:887 men at the
front, about 35:000 men are required in the rear." The journal explains
this situation by the overloading of the troops with technical equip-
ment, which results in "disturbing the balance between the auxiliary
services and the line units." (Military Review, January 1961)
From these data it is difficult to give any accurate estimate of
the degree of lowering of the combat effectivemess of NATO troops noted
by this journal, but it is perfectly obvious that in this case, too
(though for a different reason - overloading the troops with technical
equipment), there has not beeo maintained the most advantageous ratio
between men and machines.
The analogy between industry and the military has its limits, for
understandable reasons. In industry, as a rule, it is always advantageous
to replace the labor of a large number of men with that of a smaller
number operating more productive machinery. In the organization of armed
conflict such an exchange is not always possible, and is not always useful
in view of the specific nature of combat missions. For example, with a
heavy machine gn with a crew of three men and a rate of fire of 300
rounds a minute: the fire rate of one soldier amounts to 100 rounds a
minute, about ten times that of a soldier with a non-automatic rifle.
The extensive use of the heavy machine gun has not displaced the
individual soldier, since a variety of combat tasks of the latter cannot
be carried out by the machine gun crew. For similar reasons the appear-
ance of the submachine gun with a rate of fire of 100 rounds a minute,
in the armament of the individual soldier has not resulted in the elimina-
tion of the heavy machine gun.
But just as in industry: in military affairs any new technical means
represents progress only if, while having an effectiveness greater than
(or equal to) the obsolete means which it is replacing, it requires a
smaller number of personnel to operate it. Therefore in peacetime there
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GHT
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is also the possibility: without lowering, or even with raising the
fire power: combat capability and combat readiness of the armed forces,
to free human resources needed for the national economy: and when neces-
sary: to create a greater number of well-trained troops.
From the above there arises the conclusion that the results of mili-
tary-technical progress: which constitute the material basis for develop-
ment in the military field.) are completely utilized only if in the armed
forces the ratio between men and technical equipment changes in a timely
manner and cor'responds to the sharply increasing capabilities of new
types of weapons and all the technical equipment coming into use in the
armed forces. For practical military development, this means the creation
in all branches and arms of the armed forces of such forms of organization
as will represent the most advantageous relationship between men and tech-
nical equipment: providing the highest combat effectiveness of the armed
forces with the maximum possible release of human resources, taking into
account probable losses.
Since the development of combat equipment goes on continuously, there
should be continuous changes in the ratio between men and equipment in
the troops. But important changes in the organization of the armed forces,
like in military art, are connected with the appearance of essentially
new, qualitatively and quantitatively: types of armament. In military
development there are always certain periods of time when certain combat
equipment is the basis of the armament of the army, even though it is
constantly being improved. For such a period there exists objectively a
completely determined optimum relationship between manpower and technical
equipment which is most advantageous from the point of view of effective
utilization and economy of manpower and equipment. And if this relation-
ship :Is not maintained within the framework of the existing forms of
organization of the armed forces: then it follows that these forms aro
not in accordance with the level of military-technical development. Here
there are possible imbalances of two hinds?either there is a surplus or
a shortage of combat and other technical equipment among the troops. The
reasons for these imbalances: as Is noted in the foreign military press,
may be:
--A shortage of manpower, but with adequate industrial and technical
eanabilities for supplying the troops with equipment.
--Adequate manpower: but a lack of industrial and technical capa-
bilities.
--Inefficient forms of organization of the armed forces, and also
incorrectly established. correlation among the branches and arms.
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Each of these causes some lElck of compatibility in the correlation
between men and equipment and consequently constitutes an obstacle to
the complete realization of the latest military-technical achievements
in the military field.
Only with the optimum correlation between the number of appropriately
trained personnel, and the quantity of the latest combat equipment in all
the branches and arms is there opportunity for the full utilization of
the results of military-technical progress; only then can the potential
power of the armed forces, founded on the organic unity of men and. equip-
ment, be manifested with maximum combat effectiveness in the waging of
modern war. Strict observance of this correlation, with the increasing
supply of the troops with constantly improved technical equipment, pro-
vides the basis for the creation of maximum combat capability of the
armed forces and at the same time for the observance of necessary
economy of manpower and industrial-technical resources.
Thus the creation of military organizatipnal forms which assure the
most advantageous relationship between men and equipment is absolutely
obligatory in the process of military development. In other words, the
establishment of the optimum relationship between the number of personnel
and the quantity of technical equipment in the armed forces, corresponding
to the level of military-technical progress attained, is a requirement
conforming to dbjective laws of development in the military field. This
provides a basis for the conclusion that in military development Of mili-
tary affairs there operates the objective law of obligatory qualitative
and quantitative correspondence between personnel and technical equip-
ment, organizationally combined in the system of the armed forces.
Failure to observe this law in the practice of military development
hinders the creation of such armed forces as will correspond in their
power to the economic and military capabilities of the state.
Inasmuch as for each given level of military-technical development
(fixed for a given period by the types of weapons and equipment existing
in the armed forces) there exists objectively a certain optimum correla-
tion between the quantity of personnel and equipment in the aimed forcesi
only within the framework of which is attainable the maximum power of
the armed forces; this same correlation is one of the most important
factors of the military might of the state together with its human and
industrial-technical resources. From this it follows that of two states
on approximately an equal level of military-technical development, the
stronger in a military sense will be that which is able to create quanti-
tatively superior armed forces, organized on the basis of an optimum
correlation between personnel and equipmenb, taking into account the
high combat characteristics of the nuclear weapon. Any deviation from
this correlation affects the growth of the military might of the state,
since a shortage of personnel cannot be made up for by supplying the
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troops with a great quantity of technical equipment, just as an insuffi-
ciene3r of the latter cannot be compensated for by an increase in the
number of people brought into the armed. forces. In both cases there is
a violation of the objectively obligatory relationship between personnel
and equipment
In. planning any weapons or equipment unit--a tank; plane; ship, artil-
lery or rdcket complex, radio-location station, etc.--there is established
an efficient correlation between personnel and equipment, determined by
the requirements of the most effective servicing and operation of that
unit. This establishes a natural limit to the number of personnel
assigned to the equipment. Therefore, the supply of technical equipment
to the troops at a given level of military-technical development also has
its natural limit for each branch and arm, for each method of armed con-
flict. And since exceeding this limit does not result in increasing the
combat power of the armed forces, increasing it furth(r for mobilized
deployment is possible only by increasing the number of troops adequately
supplied with the combat equipment. The stronger in war will always be
that state, not with the greatest supply of such equipment to its armed
forces which Its industry can provide, but that which has the greatest
number of troops, armed and supplied with the most modern combat and
other technical equipment in the necessary and adequate amount; i.e.,
on the basis of the optimum correlation between personnel and equipment.
The imperialist states; having in view the relationship of forces
between the two camps unfavorable to them, especially in manpower; are
striving to compensate for shortages in the latter by an ever greater
quantity of arms and equipment introduced into the armed forces. The
emphasis here Is on increasing the mobility and fire power of the military
units
Such a way of achieving mialtary superiority might lead to success
under two conditions first; if the level of military-technical develop-
ment in the socialist countries were much lower than in the capitalist
countries, and second; if the technical supply of the troops could be
increased limitlessly without thereby lowering their combat capability.
But; as we know: these conditions do not exist. The socialist camp
certainly does not lag behind the imperialists in level of military-
technical development, and in many Important types of weapons the Soviet
Union is certainly surpassing them. Its growing inductrial and scien-
tific and technical capabilities are assuring a constant supply to our
armed forces of weapons and equipment meeting modern reqairements. This
fact has often been noted in the bourgeois press. The well-known
American military historian; Walter Millis; wrote in his book, War and
Men,, that the US has received repeated evidence of the power of Soviet
military equipment. It is in many respects equal to exer own, and in
some, possibly, superior. If the West has been able to replace men
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with new veapono, IL would be reasonable to suppose that Russia can do
the same, and that whatever military advantage we might gain by this
means, it would at best be only temporary." (Walter Millis. Arms and Men,
New York, 1956, p 303)
The idea of "replaing men with weapons" very inaccurately reflects
reality. New weapcms increase the combat capability of men, but do not
replace them. In modern war equipment plays an extremely great, ever
increasing, role, But. along with this the role of men, too, in waging
armed conflict is constantly increasing. The more effective the means
of combat and the more advanced the technical equipment supplied the
troops, the more complicated, responsible and effective become the role
of men in combat operations, and the greater becomes their capability of
affecting the course and outcome of the conflict. In other words, a
growth in the role of the individual man in armed conflict is an inevit-
able consequence, conforming to objective law, of military-technical pro-
Therefore with the increase of the role of the military-technical
facto in. war, the requirements for physical and spiritual qualities of
men in the armed forces, for their combat and political training, and for
their general cultural and intellectual development: not only are not
decreased but, on the contrary; are increased.
The highly destructive and maneuverable characteristics of nuclear-
rocket weapons and the great degree of mechanization, automation, and
plentifa supply of the technical means of command and communications
makes it possible to accomplish the necessary maneuver of forces, their
rapid deployment, an adequate concentration of fire power and a reliable
delivery of the means of destruction to the target with much less effort
but with better-qualified people. But in a war against a strong enemy,
with extensive territory enabling him to use space and time for the
organization of active and passive defense, the maneuver of forces and
the mobilization of reserves--a single attack with strategic rocket-
nuclear weapons is not enough for a complete victOry over such an
enemy. Therefore large contingents of men will be needed in all the
brances and arms of the armed forces to carry out a great variety of
missions on an operational-strategic and tactical level.
In a world nuclear-rocket war, deciding the fate of the two
opposing social-economic systems, each of the combatants would face the
necessity of mobilizing all his available human and material resources
in order to attain superiority not only in quality, but also in quantity
of all modern Instruments of war.
A nuclear-rocket war would require unheard-of straining of efforts,
energy and initiative: the greatest courage, steadfastness and discipline,
and the highest possible morale and military spirit on the part of every
person in any position. With the transformation of the whole territory
of the country, essentially: into a theater of military operations, the
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demands on the erganizational capabilitice of the leading party, political
and economic cadres of the country would be exceptionally great juot as
in the past, the khwiedge and organizing ability of the command and
pelitical personnel of the armed forces and their ability to inspire and
lead people into bottle in the most unbelievably difficult conditions
will play a ...remen(Lus part in the attainment of victOry.
A very essential characteristic of modern weapons and equipment is
the fact that their development as well as their use requires the efforts
of many highly qualified scientists; engineers, technicians and workers.
The economic; scientific, and engineering-technical aspects of armed
conflict are now so great that a high level of training and creative
ability of the scientific-technical cadres and the workers of industry
has become a most important condition for success in such a conflict.
With the growth of the supply to the army of technical equipment,
the vile of the masses of the people in the achievement of military-techni-
cal supexie,rity over the enemy before the war and during its progress
S teadily increases. The more complex and improved the weapons and techni-
cal equipment of the troops; the higher and the more varied are the demands
on the personnel in the armed forces. The quality of personnel -- their
general cultural level, their combat and military-technical training, and
their morale and military spirit -- must meet the high requirements brought
about by the nature of modern war and the tremendous combat capabilities
of modern technical equipment.
The revolution in military affairs is being carried out by people,
and ts them remains the decisive role in the utilization of all the possi-
bilities being idpened up by this revolution. Along with the sudden growth
of the military-technical factor, the decisive role in war will; as in
the past, belong t- the economic and secialepe:Utical facterrs. No matter
the level of military-technical pregress, the basic, objective
law of mar, f()mr.aated by Lenin, will not cease to operate: ,"He will
gain the victory in war who has the greatest reserves, the greatest
sources of strength, and the greatest support among the masses of the
(Gollected. Works, Vol. 30, p 55). It is perfectly obvious
that the expression, "sources of strength and reserves," includes, along
with human resources, an types of the latest combat equipment; including
nuclear-rocket weapons and that without malitary-technical superiority
sver the enemy, achieved be-Pere the beginning of the war and maintained
thrugh7yut its progress, victory in modern war canns)t be assured.
Weapsns sf tremendouse destructive pswer have not justified the
hepes of the imperialist militarists who counted on tt to relieve them
cmpletely r)f any dependence on the will and public opinion of the masses
of the people in carrying out aggressive military adventures.
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CPYRGHT
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Oince the latent typen of armament and combat equipment and the maso
of conscientious people, full ef initiative, who have completely mastered
them constitute an organically united material basis for the waging of
war, the problem of military-technical superiority does not exist, and
cannot be considered, outside this unit. Consequently, it also cannot
be considered outside those very closely connected economic and social-
political conditions in which take place the industrial and military
activities of people.
The moral-political and military qualities of the workers of the
socialist countries, called into the armed forces, are incomparably
higher than those of the soldiers and sailors of the ipperialist countries.
This indisputable fact wa3 repeatedly proven by the victorious military
experience of the Soviet armed forces. In attaining military-technical
superiority, in solving the most important problems of modern war, which
"also necessarily demand highly qualified human material, just as does
modern technology" (Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 8, p 35), the socialist
countries have a decisive, immeasurable, and indisputable advantage over
the imperialist states,
In modern war, as never in the past, the ability of a state to assure
the military-technical superiority of its armed forces is determined
basically not only by a high level of industrial-technical development
and an absolute volume of production, but to a decisive degree it depends
also on the nature of the social-economic and political structure of the
state. It is perfectly obvious that an economic system, developing on
the basis of social ownership of the means of production, constantly
increasing the tempo of its development, planning not only within the
limits of one country but also on the scale of a number of countries
united by a single socialist goal and a fundamental community of interests,
not experiencing crises and anarchy of production--that such an economic
system naturally has a tremendous advantage over capitalism. This advan-
tage is a decisive factor also in the attainment of military-technical
superiority.
Facing the aggressive imperialist powers, who are striving to unite
their efforts to attain military superiority over the world socialist
system, a comprehensive expansion of the economic relations among the
countries of socialism and a strengthening of the close friendship
among them is an objective necessity. Therefore the Central Committee
CPSU justifiably condemned the so-called theory of "reliance on one's
own powers" as having nothing in common with the principles of socialist
Internationalism.. The policy of "reliance on one's own powers", which
proposes the creation of self-sufficient national economies, for which
economic relations with the other countries of socialism are limited to
trade, represent an attempt to undermine the unity of the socialist
community and its economic and military strength.
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Military-technical superiority originates in economics, in the ecops
nomic system, which develops according to its awn specific laws. The
capitalist economic system has as its goal the increasing of profits for
the enrichment of the exploiting upper classes of society. The basic
goal of socialism is the maximum satisfaction of the needs of all the
people. Scientific and technical progress and the progress of industry
under capitalism leads to a sharpening of the class conflict; under
socialism?to Lhe strengthening of the psychological-political unity of
society.
The world socialist system, beyond any doubt, has greater sources
of strength, greater reserves, and greater endurance in the mass of the
people as compared with the capitalist system. The military-technical
superiority over the US achieved by the Soviet Union is an impressive
factor in containing imperialist aggression and an important condition
for the achievement of victory in war, if the imperialists should start
one. However, this circumstance should not become grounds for self-
satisfaction or complacency. In a military respec, the camp of
imperialism represents a strong and crafty opponent, forcing on us an
arms race and a bitter struggle for military-technical superiority.
The favorable prerequisites being created by the socialist system do
not in themselves automatically so: a the problems of maintaining mili-
tary-technical superiority; this is accomplished by constant strained
efforts of people, both in producing the necessary quantity of modern
combat equipment and in mastering the use of such equipment and using it
in armed conflict. The achievement of military-technical superiority is
a problem not only for economics, industry, science and technology, but
also for military art. The best armament and technical equipment of the
army will not bring victory if they are not used in complete conformance
with the laws of armed conflict, if the methods and forms of the use of
weapons do not correspond to their combat characteristics and capabilities;
i.e., if they do not meet the demands of modern military science and mili-
tary art.
After science and industry have produced combat equipment excelling
in quantity and quality that of the enemy, and this has become part of
the armament of our forces, the decisive role in establishing and main-
taining military technical superiority throughout the war and making it
a real factor in the achievement of victory belongs to the military
organization cia. the state, to military science, to combat training, and
to the readiness, morale, and military spirit of the armed forces.
For the Soviet Union, just as for the other socialist states which
are under the military thzeat of imperialism, it is extremely important
to keep up s'ifficiently effective armed forces and constantly maintain
military-technical superiority with a minimum expenditure of the financial-
economic means and the manpower necessary for use in a rapidly developing
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national economy. In connection with thio, the task of optimum solutions
of all the problems of military development, military planning and the
organization of troops becomes especially urgent.
In its modern form and scope, this task may be accomplished on the
basis of wide use of mathematical methods of research of military phe-
nomena. The use of electronic computing equipment in military develop-
ment and planning makes it possible to produce multi-variant calculations
which radically facilitate the selection of the most advantageous, optimum
variant of military organizational structure of the armed forces as a
whole, and also the solution of problems of the most advantageous
qualitative and quantitative relationship between the branches and arms,
as to what should be their relative weight in the general system of
military organization in accordance with their defined military missions
and the combat equipment which they have in their armament.
The law of obligatory qualitative and quantitative relationship
between personnel and equipment in the troops provides a direct theo-
retical basis for the mathematization of the process of military develop-
ment. The objective necessity of establishing an optimum organizational
structure of the armed forces arises directly from this law, since only
in it can there be realized a complete correspondence of personnel and
equipment, based, as noted above, on an optimum correlation between
them.
The determination of the appropriate military-technical and military-
economic criteria necessary for programming the work of computers) being
a subject for special research, does not enter into the scope of this
article. We will point out only one of the possible approaches to this
problem. As Academician V. Nemchinov says, for the use of computer pTo-
blem-solving techniques in the field of the national economy, definition
of economic indices and categories must be carried to such a degree of
accuracy that they would be expressed in strict mathematical form and
quantitative definition and thus be suitable for transmission into the
input unit of a computer, (Pravda, 20 July 1962) It would be completely
possible to form such kind of quantitative definition from the absolute
and relative indices expressing the quantitative and qualitative charac-
teristics of the branches and arms, such as their fire power and striking
force, mobility and maneuverability, combat capability and combat readiness,
controlability and ability to survive, and also the conditions of training
and indoctrination and the living arrangements of the troops.
In evaluating the combat capabilities of the armed forces, of great
importance, for example, is the relative index of the mobility of the
troops, their capability of rapid maneuver, and the ratio of the quantity
of motor and air transport, taking into account seating capacity and
speed, to the number of personnel. However, for any branch or arm the
main index of its combat effectiveness and technical supply is the
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absolute and relative magnitude of its fire power. This all the more
txue for nuclear-rocket weapons which are a single complex of fire power
and means of delivery, and in view of their tremendous destructive power,
have a limit of accumulation attainable in our time.
Relative fire power -is essentially the fire power in a gun crew per
each man and therefore has a perfectly exact mathematical expression, suit-
able for transgdzsion to the input unit of a computer. In combination with
other important indices (both absolute and relative) which charadterize
all the other combat characteristics of branches and arms and also with
the use of the established table-of-organization units of the combat com-
position of troops; there is a complete basis for the selection of the
necessary mathematically determined indices for working out corresponding
models and programming the operations of dbmputers.
Of course the computer by itself cannot give a complete and compre-
hensive solution to the problem of creating an optimum military organi-
zatten and of optimum military planning. But it can give in the shortest
time a sufficient number of variants of the solutions of these problems,
faeilitating the selection of the most advantageous optioum variants
which provide for maximum strength of the armed forces with minimum ex-
penditures of means and resources.
For the maintenance of constant and undiminishing military-technical
superiority over the enemy it is abSolutely necessary to cons!,.der care-
fully the general trends of development of science and technology, and
especially to study carefully foreign military technology and the
dtrectins of its development. Here it is especially important always
to keep in mind, the possibilities of using the factor of technological
surprise, which with the modern _level and. tempos of the development of
scienee and technology are very rapidly increasing.
It is known that the US is striving to provide al: branches and arms
of the armed frees with an ample supply of nuclear weapons by a very mb-
stantial expansion cf the range of TNT equivalents of nuclear bombs and
warheads. In 1962/63 fiscal year, according to a statement by Secretary
of Defense MacNamara; the US planned to spend $1500000000 for nuclear
armament. The plans and already-begun projects of the American militarists
encompass all possible areas and means of combat activities, from armed
confltct for "supremacy in space" to equipping primary troop podrazdeleniya
with nuclear weapens. Our probable enemies have very substantial industrial
and scientific and teehnical capabilities which they are using for the
creation of new means of combat.
It is important to keep in mind constantly that the Western states,
trying te compensate for lagging behind the Soviet Union in the develop-
ment f row.ket technology, are paying great attention to the development
of chemical, biological, radioactive, and other means of mass destruction.
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ApprovedF,BrERMORMOORMOIT EMPARMED CONFLICT
CPYRGHT
by Maj Gen Kh. DZHELAUKHOV
The problems of augmenting efforts in a Uttle and in an operation
have always been in the center of attention of practical workers and
theoreticians in military affairs: they have been given a prominent place
in field and combat manuals and in various theoretical studies.
The necessity for augmentaticn of efforts arises from the various and
complex missions carried out by troops in a battle, an operation, and in
armed conflict as a whole. The nature of these missions and their scale
require from the troops simultaneous efforts, or efforts in sequence.
Usually it is not possible to carry out missions in an operation using
only the original operational formation. As a rule there arises the need
to change the operational formation by strengthening already formed
groups, by carrying out a suitable maneuver, by regrouping forces and mate-
riel, by bringing them up from the depth of the country or the theater
of operations, i.e., by augmenting efforts at the place where it is needed
and at a definite time.
This situation is observed not only on the tactical or operational
level, but on the strategic as well.
The augmentation of strategic efforts was called for by the need to
achieve superiority over the enemy in forces and materiel, or, at least,
by the desire to maintain the capabilities of the operating groups and
the existing relationship of forces, in order to effectively carry out
the missions of armed conflict in a given theater of military operations.
In the very fact of the origi \al strategic concentration and deployment
of forces usually lay the essunce of the augmentation of strategic
efforts, which could be effected, for example, by bringing up newly
mobilized soyedineniya and chasti from the interior of the country0
In a general sense, the concept of "augmentation of strategic efforts"
means the capability of a given state or coalition of states to increase
the strength of its resistance and at any given moment of the war to be
stronger than the opposing side, skillfully using all its resource." all
its economic, psychological-political, and military potential.
What are theourees, directions, constitutent elements and degree of
augmentation of strategic efforts? What indices determine this pehnomenon
of armed conflfct in modem conditions?
The experience of the world wars provides rich material for the illus-
tration and theoretical analysis of these indices. Thus the following in-
dices were and, ve are convinced, will be in the future, the effective sources
or premises for augmentation of strategic efforts of states during a war:
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AeercEdificOfiee9112AR.CYPagyPARWMLWR?Rg?9).
A__ole on the
basis of utilizing the economy of the country and technical progress; an
increase in the output of armament and creation of new models of armament;
-- a growth in the total numerical strength of armed forces and of the
number in them of basic soyedineniya, weapons, and combat equipment;
-- the existence and the establishment of strategic reserves of
armed forces and of materiel and technical means for uninterrupted supply
of the operating troops in the theaters of war.
-- the capability of all types of transport to handle an ever-
increasing volume of transportation of troops and freight to the theaters
of military operations in the period of immediate preparation for war and
during the war.
-- a growth in the number of military-trained cadres and a well-
ordered system for accelerating the1..7 training.
-- an efficiently organiLzed higher military leadership, capable of
eaectively utilizing the material possibilities and the political-
psychological state of the personnel of the sawed forces in decisive
periods of the war for the attainment of victory.
As is obvious from the above list of indices, the sources of augmenta-
tion of strategic efforts do not fit within the framework of military art;
economic, psychological-political, scientific-technical, and other factors
are present here, The sources listed, it seems to us, might be the con-
stituent parts of three basic interrelated (and only conventionally separated
one from another) directions (or fields) of the augmentation of strategic
efforts.
These fields are the following military-economic, including a wide
range of problems, from the military-economic potential of the country as
a whole to the supplying to theaters of operations of weapons, technical
equipment, food, fuel and other supplies; scientific and technical, creat-
ing the theoretical and the industrial bases for the appearance of new kinds
and types of-Neapons (tanks, jet planes, radar, rocket and nuclear instru-
ments of destruction, atomic submarines, etc.); and finally, the military-
organizational field, which in the general plan provides, In particular,
for the augmentation of strategic efforts by the strategic maneuver of
forces and materiel, utilization of reserves, creation of new strategic
groups, opening up of new fighting fronts, increasing the number and the
combat personnel of the armed forces, etc.
In the system of fields listed above, the economic capabilities of
the country and its achievements in science and technology -- its military
economic potential -- are decisive. Without them no kind of augmentation
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CPYRGHT
A
pprovea ror Keiease ZUUWIM/UU : LAA-KUVUOI UUd/OKUUUJUUUUUUUt-U
of efforts in a war is possible. However, this is most concretely revealed
in the sphere of armed conflict; this is where are manifested the results
of the efforts of the political leadership of the country in the utiliza-
tion of economics and scientific and technical thought for the all-round
supply of the growing needs of the armed forces in war. So, without going
into a detailed study of the first two fields, let us examine more in detail
the third.
An obvious concrete indicator of one of the sources of the augmentation
of strategic efforts is the successive increases in the number of armed
forces in comparison with their original peacetime composition, or with
that of the first months of the war. The change in the number of armed
forces of certain states during the preparation for and In the course of
World War II is shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Countries
Numerical
dtren th of armed forces
in thousands
1939
1940
1941
1945
Germany
4600
5600
7200
10,938
Great Britain
2223
3291
3291
4,683
USA
341
411
901
12,245
The possibilities for the augmentation of strategic efforts is
graphically shown by the quantitative increase in various arms aoi
combat technical equipment -- for example, In the air forces (Table 2) and
in the navies of these same countries.
Table 2
Countries Increase in the al. forces
1940 1941 1945
Personnel Planes Personnel Planes Personnel Planes
(in 1000's) (in 1000's) (in 1000's)
Germany
757
6,000
113q0
6,500
1,726
7,000
Great Britain
118
2,300
665
6,900
963
12;000
USA
84
2,300
___
2,340
34,000
In the British navy in 1939-40 there were 373 combat ships, and in 1945,
1172. For the corresponding years in the US navy there were, respectively,
387 and 1442 ships.
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ti ANatur addglign to materials L equipment and weapons, military-
ailigr OARFTYP HTNW94118-APU5SRPMR4K390P190934iFees for the
PYRGHTaugmentation of strategic efforts.
By the beginning of World War I Russia had 5,650,000 trained reserv-
ists. This was considered completely adequate for successfully carrying
on a war. However, by the end of 1914 it was already neeesnaly to
call up for mobilization 5,115,000 men; i.e., the supply of trained
reserves was practically exhausted. In 1915 an additional 5,010,000
men were mobilized. Altogether during the war Russia mobilized
14,000,000 men, not counting the regular army at the beginning of the
war. (P. V. Sokolov. War and Human Resources. Voyenizdat, 1961, p. 53)
A similar situation existed in the other belligerent countries.
Table 3 (ibid.) gives a graphic representation of the augmentation of
efforts and the replacement of losses by reserves.
The experiences of the wars shows that the number mobilized is usually
two to three times the number of trained reservists at the beginning of
the war.
Along with the quantitative aspect of the augmentation of strategic
efforts, the qualitative aspect has assumed great (and in some cases
primary) importance. In the army, fighting a just war, high morale and
political awareness superior to that of the enemy, well-knit combat
organization of ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya, and efficient and flexible
operation of the organs of command exerted very substantial influence on
the augmentation of efforts and the attainment of victory. It should be
emphasized that also the improvement of the combat characteristics of
vq,ric,us kinds of weapons and the appearance of qualitatively new armament
(tanks and planes of new systems, rocket artillery, etc.) to a great
degree led to the achievement of superiority over the enemy. It is
generally known that Soviet tanks and artillery were superior to the
similar weapons of Fascist Germany.
It is true that the qualitative changes in weapons and combat equip-
ment did not lead to the achievement Of victory on the strategic level,
but they may have contrlbuted indirectly by gains on the tactical and
operational levels, and thus later 'affected the strategic results of the
armed cr,liflicto
Let us stipulate in advance that now the very concept of "augmentation
strategic efforts" has acquired asomewhat different meaning. Actually,
as a result of massed use 'ofnuclear-rocket weapons and other means of
destruction, which obviously will inflict serious losses on the belliger-
ents, it is hard t,.) imagine that subsequent efforts by either side will
prove to be more powerful. than the preceding ones, especially the initial
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CPYRGA*
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Re lenishment of Armed Forces b Reserves in millions
Countries
1..1.140.1?MINII???????,,
World War I
World War II
Popul- No. mobi-
ation lized
% of mo-
bilized to'
' Popula- No. mob!-
tion lized
% of mobi-
lized to
population
Germany
67
__-_-__222114.
13.3
19.7
I
69.3
_
17.0-,*
,
24.5
USA
100
3.8
3.8
'
131.7
14.0
10.6
Britain (with-
out dominions
& colonies)
46
5.0
10.8
'
,
I
47.8
6.0
12.6
France (with-
out colonies)
39
.6.8
17.2
,
I
42.0
5.0
12.0
*Including some contingents of Austrians, Frenchmen, Poles, Czechs
and other peoples of countries occupied by Germany.
Nevertheless there is required certain efforts on the part of the
political and strategic leadership of the country or coalition of countries
directed toward maintaining, by consecutive commitment to action of vari-
ous forces and instruments of war, the superiority over the enemy existing
from the beginning of the war, or achieving subsequent strengthening of
their groups of armed forces for the most rapid execution of the stra-
tegic missions of the beginning period of the war.
In explaining the idea of "augmentation of strategic efforts in
modern conditions:" we proceed from the following principles of Soviet
military doctrine: first, recognition that even in modern war massive
armies are required; second, the position that victory over a strong
enemy can be achieved by the joint efforts of all the basic types of
armed forces with close cooperation among them, and with the decisive
role of strategic rocket troops.
Obviously, in elucidating the essence of the idea we are examining, it
is necessary to take into account the differences and the specific charac-
teristics of the different types of armed forces. In particular, the
idea of "augmentation of strategic efforts" As applied to strategic nuclear
weapons means their constant readiness to inflict repeated blows on vari-
ous enemy targets, especially his means of nuclear attack. The strength
of subsequent blows may turn out to be much less than that.of the first
ones; however, the capability of inflicting them contributes as a whole
to an augmentation of the totality of nuclear effectiveness against the
enemy.
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Therefore, if we are talking about the use of strategic nuclear
weapons, the position expressed, it seems to us, should be understood
not in the sense of an increase in the force of each successive attack
in comparison with the preceding one, but as an augmentation of the
total power of all the nuclear attacks as a result of their being
launched one after the other. Such an augmentation of the power of
rocket and nuclear attacks makes it possible to constantly maintain the
strategic initiative, which we will speak about in somewhat more detail
below.
With regard to the "augmentation of strategic efforts" as applied
to Ground Troops, PVO strany troops, the Air Forces and the Navy, it
seems to us that, despite the existence of nuclear weapons in their
organization, the augmentation of strategic efforts for these forces will
be achieved mainly by a quantitative increase and a qualitative improve-
ment of their forces and equipment. A similar position is noted in the
military doctrine of all the major powers of the world and in theories
of military strategy. In them is foreseen the necessity of creating
massive armed forces and subsequently increasing their numerical strength
by mobilizing and deploying in theaters of military operations large
strategic groups by the beginning of the war and during its beginning
period.
The term: "augmentation of strategic efforts," we must assume, will
keep its former meaning (when subsequent attacks exceed previous one in
their force) in a case where the warring sides are drawn into a nuclear
war gradually--let us say, after some military conflict, local war, etc.
In such a case the augmentation of strategic efforts is possible by a
continuously increasing inclusion of troops and materiel in military
operations.
Finally, we note that we oonsider a third peculiarity of the use of
this term in modern theory of strategy. While it is difficult to imagine
the most "classic" form of the augmentation of efforts in the war as a
whole, specifically this form may occur in the study of the military oper-
ation:. in one of the theaters where the operations develop in the course
of the war.
The problem of the augmentation of strategic efforts in modern con-
ditions, just as formerly, has two sides--the qualitative and the quanti-
tative. Both are closely inter-related, but for convenience and depth
of understanding, let us consider them separately.
The qualitative side is connected with the preparation of armed forces
still in peace time and is the most economical, and consequently the most
essential. It includes the qualitative improvement of the weapons and
combat equipment, the attainment of military-technical superiority over
the enemy on the basis of very rapid development of modern science and
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technology. Among factors involved in the qualitative side of augmenta-
tion of efforts arc combat readiness, higher than that of the enemy, and
organizati,;,A of ob'yedineniya, soyedineniya, and organs of
command) and their great mobility, and capability of executing a rapid
maneuver.
The problem of qualitative augmentation of efforts primarily depends
on a conscientious attitude of personnel toward carrying out combat mis-
sions?in the final analysis, on their moral-political attitudes, their
readiness to sacrifice themselves in the name of the great ideals of
Marxism-Leninism. Brought up on Leninist ideas, the soldiers of the
Soviet Army and the armies of the other socialist countries are capable
of assuring the high combat readiness of the armed forces. There are
many instances from the history of the wars when) thanks to high moral;
steadfastness and combat organization; soyedineniya and ob'yedineniya
achieved superiority in a battle or operation over a numerically superior
enemy. In modern conditions nuclear-rocket weapons enable even individual
smaller units to actively carry on the fight with the enemy.
There remains the other side of the augmentation of strategic efforts
--the quantitative increase in the number of soyedineniya, of operational
rocket !nstallations, of planes) of ships of various classes, of the
supplementary forces and materiel of the PVO troops and PVO strany troops,
and the increase of the material and technical means which provide for
the carrying on of armed conflict.
Both aspects of the augmentation of scrategic efforts are closely
connected with the whole system of building up and preparing the armed
forces for war. During the prepRration there takes place in good time
an accumulation of various reserves: material and technical means, various
weapons, amomition, and, in addition: trained military cadres. The com-
position and quality of these reserves must provide for the complete
mobilization of new formations in short periods of time) and also there-
after, the timely replenishment of ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya which
have suffered losses at the beginning of the war.
In the matter of the degree of augmentation of strategic efforts,
this depends), in our opinion, on such factors as the situation and
immediate prospects for development of the military-economic potential
of the country, the table-of-organization structure of the basic components
of the armed forces, the smooth and efficient organization of the system
of control of forces and equipment in the 'armed forces and in the govern-
ment as a whole, and, finally, on the moral-political attitude of the
personnel and the combat readiness of units of the armed forces.
The modern conception of augmentation of strategic efforts does not
have to be bound up with just a, simple quantitative increase of forces
and materiel, by which to attain quantitative superiority over the enemy,
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though this is an important aspect of the problem. It is connected with
such successive commitment of new forces and materiel to armed conflict
as would maintain the strength of existing groups and a favorable corre-
lation of forces, or would provide for the launching of attacks by these
groups, with the neutralization of various strategic targets in the
different theaters of operations, and of superior forces and materiel of
the enemy in a given sector. Implied here is the expedient use of the
combat characteristic of the various arms and their close coordination
on a strategic level.
Thus there enters into the concept of "augmentation of strategic
efforts" a complex of strategic measures leading to a quantitative and
qualitative strengthenin6 of strategic groups and making possible the
lauching against the enemy in short periods of time of simultaneous or
successive attacks with nuclear and conventional weapons, the seizure and
maintenance of the strategic initiative, and the achievement of a sub-
stantial superiority over the enemy in the interests of effectively carry-
ing out the strategic missions of the beginning period of the war.
The augmentation of strategic efforts in a modern world war, obviously,
is a coalition problem, aince it is impossible to solve this problem on a
scale of just the armed forces of single nations, especially if the states
involved are limited in size and capabilities. A constant and dependable
augmentation of efforts is within the power of a state or a coalition
possessing great economic and military capabilities and having a variety
of state and strategic reserves for the constant replenishment of the
armed forces with everything needed.
From th,:: nature of modern war it follows that the use of nuclear-
rocket weapoos as a aecisive means of armed conflict makes it possible
to achieve immediate strategic goals in a short time in the beginning
period of the war.
The most probable way of unleashing a world war, as they write about
it in foreign countries, may be by a sudden attack with strategic nuclear
weapons against targets in the border zones and in the interior of the
country. At the same time one must expect that there will be drawn into
military operations all other kinds of armed forces in the land and sea
theaters, on a global scale.
Under such conditions only a high state of combAt readiness of the
peacetime armed forces and their ability to repulse and frustrate the
first nuclear strike of the enemy will make it possible to begin the
first operations of the branches of the armed forces, seize the strategic
Initiative, and create favorable prerequisites for further waging of the
war.
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CPYRGHT
Ap
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ng tale missions of the beginning period of the war may be
accomplished by strikes with strategic nuclear weapons, and the conduct
of strategic operations In continental and ocean theaters of operations
with the participation of all the basic branches of armed forces and with
the decisive role of strategic rockets. The nuclear strikes and the active
military operations, obviously, will encompass the territories of all the
countries making up the enemy coalition, as well as ocean areas.
Naturally, each of the warring sides in the very beginning period of
the war will successively have to commit its forces to action, both those
existing in peacetime as well as those mobilized before the war or at its
beginning; i.e., there will be required a systematic augmentation of
efforts of strategic groups of the armed forces. In the light of this,
obviously, there will arise the necessity first of all to strengthen from
the beginning of the war the troops of the first strategic echelon by
transferring forces and equipment to the zone of military operations
from the neighboring regions, and subsequently from the depth of the
theater or even from other continents (as, for example, the US military
command is planning).
From an analysis of the nature of modern war it is evident that a
constant and rapid augmentation of strategic efforts will be one of the
essential factors in the execution of such missions of the beginning
period as, for example, the seizure and maintenance of the strategic
initiative.
The seizure of the strategic initiative in the initial period of
the war is usually connected with the surprise use by the aggressor of
forces and equipment and the opening up of military operations on a
wide scale. The experience of wars graphically emphasize this principle.
For example, as a result of a surprise attack of the German-Fascist
troops on Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway and other countries at the
beginning and during World War 11, Germany's military command seized the
strategic initiative and achieved a quick victory over the armed forces
of these countries.
The sudden and treacherous attack of the German armed forces on the
Soviel-? Union in June 1941 likewise enabled the German command to seize
the strategic initiative and achieve a major initial strategic success.
The enemy maintained the initiative in strategic operations for a long
time. The Soviet Supreme Command and the Armed Forces had to wrest this
initl.ative from the hands of the aggressor under difficult conditions and
in a stubborn struggle. It required almost a year and a half for a break
in the strategic situation in our favor. As a result of the great battle
on the Volga in the period from August 191.1.2 to January 191.1.3 when large
forces of German-Fascist troops were defeated and taken prisoner, there
was provided a beginning of a transfer of the strategic initiative into
the hands of the Soviet command.
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But the seizure and maintenance of the strategic initiative in the
initial period of a modern war will, obviously, be incomparably more diffi-
cult. A sudden and massed use Of nuclear weapons by the enemy even under
conditions of an effective repulse of this strike and the inflication.of
an immediate strike upon the enemy, cannot completely guarantee, we must
assume, against major destruction of economic and military targets and.
losses in the armed forces and among the population. Therefore, with a
sudden beginning of a war by the enemy, seizure and maintenance of the
strategic initiative will proceed in the very complec circumstances of a
war begun with mutual losses on both sides.
The great destruction and losses from nuclear-rocket weapons in the
very first hours of the war will result in the necessity of replacing the
groups of armed forces in the theaters of operations. Accordingly, the
problems connected with the accomplishment of augmentation of strategic
effort b and the attainment of superiority over the enemy in the initial
period of the war will retain, it seems to us, real importance even under
conditions of nuclear war.
In our opinion, after the timely frustration of the first attack of
the enemy end the infliction on him of a crushing rocket and nuclear
attack in return, there will be required very aggressive activity by the
existing forces and equipment deployed in the theaters of operations at .
the beginning of the war, and likewise of those arriving from the border
regions and from the interior of the country, which will first of all pro-
mote the maintenance of the strategic initiative. This increase of efforts
will make it possible to successfully carry out the operations of the
initial period of the war in the main theaters of. operations--continental
and oceanic.
Thus the initial augmentation of strategic efforts is intended for
retaining the strategic initiative of operations from the beginning of
the war and at the same time is directed toward the achievement of sub-
sequent or simultaneous execution of strategic missions in the initial
period of the war.
Let us examine what, in our opinion, are the basic elements of the
augmentation of strategic efforts. They are as follows:
The maneuver of strategic rocket weapons for the augmentation of
strategic efforts is a completely new form of maneuver. No arny in the
world has yet any experience with the mass use of nuclear-rocket weapons.
Nevertheless, a decisive part in the augmentation of strategic efforts
has been attributed to them. The augmentation of efforts by strategic
rocket weapons may be accomplished by a maneuver of trajectories or by
redeploying part of the rocket weapons to the necessary sectors (theaters
of military operations). The great speed of rockets, the possibility of
extensive changes in their trajectories and of repeated launchings, ,
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independent of weather conditions, makes it possible to attain most
rapidly the greatest effect in the augmentation of strategic efforts,
especially) it seems to us, in the initial period of the war.
The maneuver of strategic air forces and of rocket-launching naval
forces is likewise a very effective means of augmentation of strategic
efforts. This maneuver is accomplished by re-directing planes in the air,
or by re-deploying them from one air-fields network to another. At the
same time one must take into account the great vulnerability of modern
aircraft to weapons of active anti-aircraft warfare. However, under
certain conditions of war the strategic air force may be a most dependable
and effective means of augmentation of strategic efforts. This may be
especially true when the enemy has started the war without resorting to
nuclear weapons. In such a case the augmentation of efforts will mainly
take the same form as in past wars, by the use of conventional weapons.
Rocket-launching forces of the navy, like the air forces of a front)
under certain conditions are able) in our opinion, to make a substantial
contribution to the augmentation of efforts.
The maneuver of forces and materiel of branches of the Armed Forces
from one theater of operations or strategic sector to others, especially
by maneuver of land forces, air forces, and naval forces (especially
rocket-launching submarines), and also the maneuver of strategic reserves,
is an old form of maneuver, extensively used in the past, and at the
same time one complicated and very difficult with regard to scope and
scale under modern conditions. Such augmentation of efforts is carried
out for the creation of new strategic groups and a new strategic front of
armed conflict or for the purpose of strengthening existing strategic
groups.
The experience of wars, particularly of World War II, has shown that
skillful use of the partisan movement in occupied territory is an important
element in the augmentation of strategic efforts. The goal of organized
attacks of partisans is to inflict damage to the military-economic poten-
tial of the enemy) to disrupt his commeroial and operational transportation,
and to draw sizeable forces away from the main battle front by combined
attacks against rear targets of the enemy and against his strategic groups.
Naturally, all these operations are carried out on the basis of a general
plan of armed conflict in a given theater of operations.
The active operations of Soviet partisans in the rear of the enemy
during World War II are generally known. Hitler's command was forced to
divert several tens of divisions to fighting the partisans and to weaken
his groups on the Soviet-German front. As Gen. Eisenhower recognized,
after the Invasion of France in 1944 by the British and Americans, the
French partisans with their operations took the place of up to 12
divisions.
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Partisan warfare may assume especially large portions in areas
contiguous to the main theaters of military operations.
The use of the armed forces of states which have entered the war
after its beginning on the side of a certain coalition may play a sub-
stantial role in the whole system of augmentation of strategic efforts.
For example: during World War II, when Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were
put out of the war, their armed forces were drawn into the fight against
the German-Fascist troops. However, this situation, in our opinion, may
occur only under very favorable conditions.
Mst probably the joining of the coalition by such states would have
a purely symbolic character, since the augmentation of strategic efforts
by the armed forces and materiel of these new allies will prove to be
very minor. The moral effect of such joining might be exceptionally
great, and it would serve as a positive example to other states who were
in a vacillating position.
One should take into account the potential resources and the advantages
of strategic position of the territory of countries which have joined the
coalition--the existence of various kinds of strategic raw materials, the
possibility of bases for the air or naval forces of the coalition--and
at the same time try to prevent the enemy from using tbnse possibilities
in his interests. In all cases there is required a realistic consideration
of the existing international situation, so as to avoid a situation where
the joining of the coalition by the new allies would entail a deterioration
of the strategic situation of the whole coalition.
Measures for weakening the active strategic groups of the enemy by
partial or complete isolation of them from the rear, destruction of strategic
reserves, and an aggressive fight to destroy his ocean, sea, air and land
communications occupy a prominent place in the general system of augmentation
of strategic efforts.
This method of attaining superiority over the enemy leads to an augmenta-
tion of strategic efforts, as it were, indirectly, since this takes place
not as a result of a qualitative and absolute quantitative increase of
one's own forces and materiel, but as a result of weakening the enemy,
achieved by a sharp curtailment of his bringing up of reinforcements and
of reserves in general.
Finally, a very important source for the augmentation of strategic
efforts is the skillful manipulation of the existing material-technical
means by redistributing them among the groups of armed forces ia the
theaters of operations and bringing them up from the rear of the country.
This is necessary not only for the supply of soyedineniya and ob'yedineniya
arriving in the theaters of operations, by way of augmentation of strategic
efforts, but also for the replenishment of materiel, especially of nuclear
ammunition, to the operating groups of the armed forces.
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CPYRGHT
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Thus, an analysis of the nature of nuclear war and of its initial
period, and also of the possible strategic missions which can be accom-
plished in this period, logically leads to the necessity of augmentation
of strategic efforts. The basic elements of such augmentation are the
maneuver of nuclear-rocket weapons and of forces and materiel of the
branches df the armed forces.
Each of the elements of augmentation of strategic efforts listed in
this article is a subject of special study and is of very great importance
for the further deep study of the nature of the initial period of modern
war. The problems connected with the augmentation of strategic efforts
are assuming great theoretical and practical importance.
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Approved For ReleaseC2DUTOONEESIR-FTETP85M825R000330040007-9
CPYRGHT By Col Gen Avn 0. TOISTIKOV
The appearance and rapid development of nuclear weapons and their
means of delivery against targets radically changed the role and importance
of civil defense in strengthening the defense capability of the country.
This was the result in the first place of changes in the strategic objec-
tives of armed attack. In the past, it was necessary to destroy the
enemy's armed forces in order to force an enemy to capitulate. This was
the primary objective of strategic plans. Under conditions attending a
nuclear-rocket war, foreign military leaders add to this strategic ob-
jecLive the factor of armed force against the most important economic,
and administrative and political centers and the task of completely dis-
organizing the administration of the national economy and demoralizing
the population in the principal economic areas if not in the entire
country.
The glorius Armed Forces guard our country against the attack of
imperialist aggressors; they are always ready to give a crushing strike
against any enemy which dares to attack the Sovftet Union and the coun-
tries of the socialist camp. The might of our Armed Forces which have
available the most perfect rocket and nuclear and other modern weapons
is known to the entire world. Their power is directly dependent on the
complete readiness and efficient operation of the rear of the country.
Therefore, the creation of conditions for its vital activities during a
nuclear-rocket war is at present a very important state mission. That
is precisely why our party and government pay great attention to civil
defense, to strengthening the Armed Forces and enhancing their combat
readiness, and to conducting country-wide defense measures intended to
protect the population and increase the stability of the national economy,
including agricultural production, primarily against the effects of
nuclear weapons. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these
measures and consequently the role of civil defense in questions of
preparing the country for that situation which would occur were a war
to be unleashed against the USSR.
During a nuclear-rocket war, not a single measure related to the
defense of the urban and rural population or to the operation of
industry, communications, or transport, could be executed without con-
sidering civil defense requirements. It has been called upon to create
conditions required for the normal operation of organs of state control
under that complex situation which could arise in the country at the
very onset of war. The solution of many military problems depends to a
degree on the thoroughness of the manner in which civil defense measures
are carried out. These problems include mobilization, preparing re-
serves, ensuring the successful conduct of operations by armed forces,
damage control measures following nuclear attack, and certain others.
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CPYRGHT
Approved F6t ReliVEtseV000/081/OttltIAIRDFP45tlii0a7510010130000007,-9the population and
ensuring the stability of the economy is not new. These measures were
executed by Civil Defense when it was called Local Air Defense during
World War II, Civil Defense has always directed its efforts to increasing
the defense capability of our country. The defense and rescue measures
which it conducted facilitated the defense of the stable operation of
rear installation against German-fascist occupation troops during the
years of the Great Patriotic War. Civil defense personnel under the
supervision of party and Soviet organs persistently and selflessly
struggled against the effects of enemy aerial attack, restored indus-
trial enterprises and communication lines destroyed by bombardment,
extinguished fires, and rendered medical aid to the population.
Many local air defense formations at the front lines during the war,
hand ii . hand with the soldiers of the Soviet army, retained the honor
and independence of our Motherland. For their heroism, thousands of
milifaant personnel and civil defense commanders were awarded orders and
medals of the Soviet Union. The civil defense organization of the heroic
city of Leningrad was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. However, during
the last war, civil defense measures as compared with modern requirements
for the defense of the population had a restricted nature. They were
conducted only in large cities and at certain, very important installations
located within the range of operation of enemy aircraft. These cities
and installations, as is known, were comparatively few and the planning
of civil defense measures had an exceptionally local nature. The plans
of civil defense for cities and installations were not related since it
was thought that tbey were able with their own forces and means to con-
duct damage control following an aerial attack. Therefore, the super-
vision of the civil defense operations or local air defense operations,
as they were previously called, was decentralized.
All this can be explained only by the fact that the level of develop-
ment of attack weapons of the Hitlerite air force did not at that time
urgently require a change in the nature or the volume of civil defense
measures or the system of controlling civil defense or local air defense.
Strikes against rear installations were delivered by the enemy only by
means of aircraft whose range was not great as compared to modern attack
means. Therefore, it was absolutely not required to divert state funds,
for example, for the construction of numerous protective structures or
for the conduct of other civil defense measures in the depth of the
country. It was completely understandable that during this period,
civil defense or local air defense was not called for in the strategic
plan,
29
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PYR
A3VoNc1*67 l*SieNgliMoNATOrt iAIRIDP8ST0Ogri5R00013=191006g-tf its conduct
(31-11re assigning new and ever more serious missions to the country's civil
defense. The basic principles of its conduct which were completely
spelled out in the CPSU Program, the decisions of the 22d Party Congress,
and the basic tenets of Soviet military doctrine are radically changing.
The Party Program said that the CPSU considers the defense of the so-
cialist fatherland, the strengthening of the defense of the USSR and the
might of the Soviet Armed Forces as the devoted duty of the party and
the entire Soviet people and as the most important function of the
socialist state.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government not only have assigned
civil defense ever new and responsible missions but they have given it a
harmonious organizational structure. Modern USSR civil defense is a
system of country-wide defense measures to be implemented in advance for
the purpose of safeguarding the population, enhancing the stability of
the economy against the effects of weapons of mass destruction, and also
for the purpose of implementing rescue and priority emergency restoration
work in damage centers.
The country-wide nature of civil defense lies in the fact that its
measures presently are executed not in certain cities as was the situa-
tion during World War II, but throughout the entire country. The interests
of the cause of defending the country require that each city, each workers
settlement, and rural populated point be readied for civil defense and
that each Soviet citizen have firm skills and knowledge required for de-
fense against the devastating effects of modern weapons. This is one
side of the matter. The other lies in the fact that in order to imple-
ment civil defense missions both in peacetime and in wartime, not only
civil defense staffci and services but all organs of state power must be
concerned 2 Councils of ministers, departments, sovnarkhozes, organiza-
tions, and establishments. Based on the instructions of the party and
government and easo on the recommendations of civil defense organs they
are obliged to be concerned in a practical manner with the problems of
guaranteeing the defense of the population and also the materiel to carry
out this responsibility. This distribution of responsibility for the
supervision of civil defense makes it possible to take into account in the
best manner the peculiarities of each republic, oblast, city, rayon, or
installation.
Moreover, modern warfare requires that all organs of state and
national economic control be basically readied for operation under the
complex conditions of wartime. That is why it is necessary that the
appropriate organs, namely; ministries) departments, etc., create condi-
tions even in peacetime for the stable control of organizations and
establishments within their jurisdiction and ready their apparatus for
implementing missions under a complex combat situation.
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PYRGHT A
pproved FiSraRehaased2000103/091PAIIAIRC/0876M6135660?6.061Mritry-wide measures,
It is necessary to keep in mind that at the same time it is a national
matter and its practical activity depends on the personnel and the ma-
terial resources of the entire country. The national character of USSR
civil defense is a sharp expression of the socialist nature of the Soviet
society in the defense of which all our people should be interested.
It is necessary to stress the role of public organizations in civil
defense matters. Now, Dosaaf, Red Cross, and Red Crescent organizations
are conducting enormous and useful work in this field. However, it is
necessary to stress that trade-unions and Komsomol organizations have
for a long time refrained from aiding civil defense organizations. And
this is absolutely not the correct thing This situation does not cor-
respond to the general course of our Lenin party which is to enlist the
publia cn a wide scale in controlling the state and raise the role of
trade unions and the Komsomol in the period of advanced development of
Communism in our country. All these public organizations under the super-
vision of the party can give exceptionally enormous aid to civil defense
organs in readying the population and civil defense formations, in
creating and stockpiling means of defense, in organizing rescue work,
and in executing other missions.
The primary mission of civil defense is the protection of the popula-
tion, In implementing this in peacetime, it is necessary above all to
train the population of the country in defense measures against weapons
of mass destruction. And this is completely logical. Under conditions
attending a nuclear-rocket war, the entire population must know of the
devastating factors of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons,
study the means and methods of defense against them, and learn how to
skillfully perform in a complex situation and quickly render self-aid
and mutual aid, and assist in damage-control measures.
This is an enormous country-wide measure, It is being implemented
by civil defense staffs, and Dosaaf, Red Cross, and Red Crescent organiza-
tions. Under a coordinated plan with them, cultural and other organs
explain to the population the measures of defense against means of mass
destruction. No small role in implementing this mission belongs to
military units of the Soviet Army and Navy which have great capabilities
for organizing and conducting classes with the population. If the ef-
forts of all organizations connected with the training of the population
are coordinated and united and if, in addition, all reserve officers were
engaged in this matter, it could be said with confidence that the train-
ing of the population would be significantly improved.
It is interesting to note that civil defense measures now have ac-
quired a somewhat practical importance in that literally all countries
In the world are now paying very great attention to it. In the US, for
example, the Civil Defense Regulations have been issued in which the
nature of the coordination between the army and civil defense has been
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outlined. The Regulations present the official views of the US govern-
ment regarding this problem. It states that in Addition to the spiritual
and humanitarian values which form the model of American life there are
certain basic factors in the national power: a healthy economy, powerful
armed forces, and a strong civil defense. Great importance is being as-
signed civil defense in West Germany. General Erich Hampe, the
chief of civil defense in West Germany writes in his book, "In the Power
Plants of the Great Air Powers," that even if all other factors were equal,
a future war would be lost if civil defense were lacking.
In order to better understand the role of civil defense in a nuclear-
rocket war, it is necessary to look at certain missions which it is im-
plementing under the new conditions.
A very important aspect of the activities of the civil defense organs
and of scientific research establishments is the development of theoretical
tenets upon which are based practical recommendat' ,ns for the immediate
protection of the population against nuclear weapons. Now, two points
of view are being expressed abroad on the way to solve this problem.
Advocates of the first points of view are recommending the dispersal or
evacuation of the population from large cities into rural areas; and
advocates of the second point of view recommend the creation of shelter
and cover to protect the population directly within the cities and
populated areas and providing the population with individual protective
equipment.
It is thought possible to provide the most effective defense of the
population during a nuclear attack in large cities by means of promptly
evacuating the population. If under conditions attending a threat of
enemy attack, the evacuation of the population from large cities is im-
plemented rapidly and in an organized manner, this will be the best
method of safeguarding the population. As is known, the evacuation of
the population was executed during World War II primarily in remote
rural areas without thorough preliminary preparation. Now, in order to
execute this mission, it is recommended that one proceed from a prin-
cipally different position which takes into consideration the conditions
urler which a nuclear war may arise. Above all, evacuation must be con-
d. ed according to plans worked out in advance, and the most efficient
way to conduct it within the shortest possible time must be employed.
With this objective, it is necessary to plan for the utilization during
evacuation of all transport not in use -- vehicular, railroad, city,
maritime, river fleet transport, etc. This requires all civil defense
organizations, national economic organs, and the military command to
coordinate operations. Certain problems connected with the evacuation
of the population have at the same time enormous importance to the
national economy. This applies to the development of highways and subur-
ban rail transport. In solving this problem, the interests of civil
defense and the economy undoubtedly coincide.
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CPYRGHT
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Given the availatiltty of mobile transport with good loading capacity,
the dispetsal of the population of large cities then becomes a practical
matter even in peaceful conditions. If industrial installations of large
cities would locate certain branches in suburban areas with good approaches,
the transport of workers to and from work could be implemented within a
relatively short time. This could create not only healthier conditions
for tens and nundreds of thousands of people, but could considerably fa-
cilitate the miasion of protecting them in the event of a nuclear-rocket
attack. It sheuld be noted that under developing conditions, a specific
portion of the workers of a numter of industrial targets of large cities
would permanently live in suburban areas,
The problem of evacuation of the population has presently great
signifioance in almost all the countries of the world. For example,
this is how rroblems of evacuation are solved in Sweden. In May 1961,
ReguLations for Swedish Citiaens were issued which said that evacuation
is planned for all cities whose population exceeds 10,000 and also for
certain less populated points which can be likely targets of attack, It
is intended to execute evacuation gradually if the situation permits, or
hastily if miliary danger erupts. Recommendations are given on how to
conduct cneself if evacuation is announced.
However, there are many in the West who think that it is complicated
to execute evacuation under conditions attending a surprise unleashing
of war. It is noted that this measure will be, in fact, difficult to
implement given the extremely limited tiroe. Therefore, in most of the
countries of the imperialist camp, together' with the planning of evacua-
tion measures, the construction of shelters for safeguarding the popula-
tion in cities is being eonducted.
In such countries as the US, West Germany, and England, the problem
of the construction of shelte:rs has now been posed more intensively than
ever before. hot only militao-y specialists and civil defense organs are
involved with them, tut also the ruling circles of the country. For
example in 1958, the US adopted the "National Program For the Construc-
tion of Shelters," Enormcus funds were assigned for its implementation.
When President Kennedy assumed power, this program was considerably
expanded. According to the press, the new program provides for cover
by mid-1968 for approximately 240 million people against radioactive
fallout.
The organization of the protection of the population is closely
related to the problem of the :nest efficient deployment of productive
forces in the country. It is completely obvious that the correct deploy-
ment of industrial targets on the territory of the country and also the
arrangement of cities with a vie.; to the requirements of civil defense,
has not only political and economla but also highly important strategic:
significance,
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An important method of limiting the growth of large cities is to
remove enterprises and establishments not related to the vital operation
of the city. The execution of these missions makes it possible under
conditions of nuclear-rocket war to best ensure the protection of the
population and increase the stability of the military-economic potential
of the country. It should be noted that these civil defense requirements
coincide with the national economic requirements of the country. Comrade
KHRUSHCHEV, in a 19 Sep:amber 1963 meeting with agricultural supervisors
and specialists of Astrakhanrikaya Oblast said "The construction of new
enterprises is required in Siberia, and in the Eastern areas of the
country, that is, where power is cheap. And it would even be economi-
cally feasible to move to the Eastern areas even certain old-established
suppliers of power for production."
Together with limiting the growth of large cities, the problem of
dispersing material resources and reserves requires immediate solution.
Considering the enormous destructive force of nuclear weapons, it is not
now feasible to concentrate the state's material reserves in large centrs.
They must be dispersed to suburban areas.
Modern warfare poses a different problem regarding the protection of
agricultural production. As is known, it supplies the population and
army with food and industry with raw materials. In the past, the defense
of agricultural production has been paid little attention since it was
in the rear of the country and did not directly sustain the means of
destruction employed by the enemy. Now the situation has changed sharply.
Rocket and nuclear weapons can inflict varied types of damage against
agricultural production over enormous areas. In relation to this, civil
defense has been assigned the mission of carefully preparing agriculture
for operation under conditions of wartime. Here, it is above all neces-
sary to designate such measures as the defense of livestock, plants,
water resources, and food reserves, and the notification of the popula-
tion of radioactive danger, among others.
In addition, civil defense is developing scientifically-based
methodological recommendations on regimens of behavior of the population
in contaminated areas, and the operation of industrial and agricultural
installations in the areas which have sustained nuclear strikes. It will
establish the length of time in which personnel may remain in contaminated
areas, depending on the level of radiation. The recommendations of civil
defense will make it possible to more correctly organize production
activity; regulate production shifts, the procedure for public catering,
the withdrawal of the population from cover, their movement, etc.
The problem of the coordination of civil defense with the Armed Forces
requires particular examination. The complexity of the measures which
civil defense will execute in nuclear-rocket war requires not simple co-
ordination with Armed Forces but joint operations in executing missions to
strengthen the defense capability of the country.
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Thererore , in modern conditions lse tne co cooraination of Armed
Forces and civil defense in required. First of all, both the Armed
Forces and civil defense will execute missions related to strengthening
the defense capability of our socialist country. They have a single
goal and Joint interests which are directed to the defense of the Soviet
people and their spiritual and material values against an aggressor
attack.
In connection with this, the primary forces of civil defense and the
Armed Forces in a future war must be closely coordinated and directed to
the execution of one mission' namely, the destruction of the aggressor
were he to attempt to attack us and the protection of the stability of
the rear areas, This in required by the nature and peculiarities of the
conduct of mcdcrn warfare, It .s necessary to stress that in the past,
the prc;r.lem of coordinating. MPV0 (Local Air Defense) operations with the
Armed Fortes was paid extremely little attention. Organs for supervising
civil defense and their commanders and staffs were poorly coordinated.
The military chiefs often were not at all concerned with civil defense.
Life has shown that this condition is not permissible. Not a single com-
mander must stand apart from civil defense problems. This conclusion
arises from the nature of modern warfare in which the borders between
front and rear are eliminated, Under the new conditions were the im-
perialists to unleash war, the Army, the Navy, and civil defense would
simultaneously enter armed warfare, This extraordinarily important situa-
tion must he considered by the military command and civil defense leader-
ship at all levels. Victory in a nuclear-rocket war will depend on the
readiness of the Army and Navy for the decisive destruction of the enemy,
on the stability of the rear, and on the moral and physical qualities of
the entire population, its organization, discipline, and ability to
promptly employ all the measures required to protect the population and
installations of the national economy.
Since the efforts of civil defense are closely related to the efforts
of the Armed Forces, the best effect may be attained by the coordinated
and planned solution of all problems in strengthening the defense of the
country. This will permit the coordination of operations in the best
way and the concentration of forces in the primary, decisive areas. The
planning of measures of civil defense on a country-wide scale is one of
the urgent requirements which make it possible, given the modern level
of development of economic and defense capabilities of the country, to
ready civil defense on a foundation of coordinated prdnciples.
Which are the measures which can be conducted by the coordinated
forces of civil defense and armed forces and which are not connected with
the conduct of combat operations in wartime? From our point of view the
measures include warning the pcpulation of the threat of attack, ensuring
the evacuation of the population, organizing radiological and other types
of reconnaissance, conducting rescue and priority emergency-restoration
work, combatting air drops and diversionary groups of the enemy, et*
pp(eved 10i =6ase 2000/00/03
-3
35
CPYR
PP
d For Roloaco1000 /09 ? CIA RDP 5T00875R000300090007 9
GHT In the initial period of the war, prompt warning acquires extremely
important significance both for the armed forces and for civil defense.
To ensure the transmission of the required signals within the shortest
possible time means that more time can be allowed for conducting various
measures intended to safeguard the population and thus create those
conditions which reduce the effectiveness of the weapons of mass destruc-
tion employed by the enemy. In order to successfully implement this mis-
sion, the military command and civil defense organs must maintain con-
stant coordination and centralized, automatic control for warning the
population must be widely employed. It is also important to stipulate
the use of all country-wide and departmental means of communication for
the constant control of troops and civil defense forces.
There are many points of contact between the military command and
civil defense in conducting evacuation measures; for example, the utiliza-
tion of suburban areas to deploy the evacuated population and personnel
of civil defense formations, the utilization of transport means, highways,
etc., could be included in this.
In a future war, transport will have enormous importance. Civil
defense can render enormous aid to the military command, in this area.
Damaged bridges, railroad centers, and other communication installations
can be quickly restored by civil defense forces. All this will faci-
litate the successful movement of troops into designated areas and will
make it possible for troops to implement the required maneuver. This
does not exclude a circle of problems which can and must be implemented
by the close, continuous coordination of civil defense with the armed
forces.
We shall dwell on another problem, namely, rescue operations. Now,
it is well known that were an enemy to succeed in employing nuclear
weapons, great destruction would occur in cities and even entire indus-
trial areas. The volume of rescue and priority emergency-restoration
work in damaged cities and installations will be enormous and very complex
in nature. To eliminate the centers of nuclear destruction requires an
enormous number of special civil defense formations; and the assistance
of the population as well as that of army and navy units is required.
Therefore, it is no accident that at the present time, the problem of
creating voluntary civil defense formations composed of public and their
combat training is creating a stir. It is possible to say without exag-
geration that in order to rescue the injured, formations composed of
multimillions of personnel are required. This situation makes it obli-
gatory to expand the foundation for their recruitment. If in the past
war these formations were created only in cities and industrial installa-
tions, they are now required in rural areas. Given this situation, the
mission is to prepare personnel to conduct complex rescue and priority
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? CPYRG
HT
emergency-restoration work which must be conducted at a high rate of
speed and within a relatively short time period, Assistance to the in-
jured population must be given immediately following a nuclear blast.
A delay in rendering assistance can lead to additional fatalities among
the population. Considering this situation, it is expedient to create
formations at each enterprise, and at each kolkhoz and sovkhoz,
Rescue work in nuclear damage centers will be enormous in scope. In
fact, they will have the nature of rescue operations. Their scale can
be most varied. In a number of cases, it will be required to mobilize
not only all civil defense forces but also to engage military units.
The rate of work in rescuing persons and materiel will be relatively
intensive. Under these conditions, civil defense staffs will execute
the wide-scale maneuver of forces and means in order to ensure the
execution of primary missions in the basic areas of civil defense operation.
The complexity of this maneuver consists in the fact that it can occur
under complex conditions of radioactive contamination of the terrain and
in the winter season. These conditions must be carefully studied and
considered in appropriate plans and reviewed during exercises conducted
in peacetime.
The civil defense rescue operations at the oblast and republic level
are unthinkable without close coordination with the military command.
The detailed coordination of plans with the Armed Forces is a primary
condition for the correct supervision of civil defense under the complex
conditions of a combat situation- This is why it is extremely important
that civil defense staffs, even, in peacetime, strengthen relations and
develop problems required the execution of missions jointly with units
of the Armed Forces and coordinate the required plans for conducting
rescue and priority emergency restoration work in centers of nuclear
destruction.
Civil defense undoubtedly will be required to assist the Armed Forces
in conducting certain measures. Thus, in the period of conducting rescue
work, Military Transport Aviation, together with Civil Air Fleet, can
render civil defense unestimable aid, particularly in evacuating the in-
jured, supplying food and required necessities to the population in de-
stroyed areas, etc. At the same time, civil defense is readying its
formations so that they may be ready in the event of necessity to fulfill
rescue and priority emergency-restoration work in a number of installa-
tions ae the Ministry of Defense,
The CPSU Program stipulates concrete and scientifically-based mis-
sions to strengthen the Armed Forces and the defense capability of the
Soviet Union, The party proceeds on the basis that as long as imperialism
exists the danger of aggressive wars also exists.
Under these conditions it is necessary to constantly strengthen and
getect USSR Civil Defense which has become under modern conditions one
pro rl-ttg 1WM.1?4?H,R694 fitAAPP?gTg9R5INNIVPIROPO3f9 the country.
":57
CPYRGHT
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emergency-restoration work which must be conducted at a high rate of
speed and within a relatively short time period. Assistance to the in-
jured population must be given immediately following a nuclear blast.
A delay in rendering assistance can lead to, additional fatalities among
the population. Considering this situation, it is expedient to create
formations at each enterprise, and at each kolkhoz and sovkhoz.
Rescue work in nuclear damage centers will be enormous in scope. In
fact, they will have the nature of rescue operations. Their scale can
be most varied. In a number of cases, it will be rewired to mobilize
not only all civil defense forces but also to engage military units.
The rate of work in rescuing persons and materiel will be relatively
Intensive . Under these conditions, civil defense staffs will execute
the wide-scale maneuver of forces and means in order to ensure the
execution of primary missions in the basic areas of civil defense operation.
The complexity of' this maneuver consists in the fact that it can occur
under complex conditions of radioactive contamination of the terrain and
In the winter season. These conditions must be carefully studied and
considered in appropriate plans and reviewed during exercises conducted
In peacetime,
The civil defense rescue operations at the oblast and republic level
are unthinkable without close coordination with the military command.
The detailed coordination of plans with the Armed Forces is a primary
condition for the correct supervision of civil defense under the complex
conditions of a combat situation. This is why it is extremely important
that civil defense staffs even in peacetime, strengthen relations and
develop problems required the execution of missions jointly with units
of the Armed Forces and coordinate the required plans for conducting
rescue and priority emergency restoration work in centers of nuclear
destruction.
Civil defense undoubtedly will be required to assist the Armed Forces
In conducting certain measures. Thus, in the period of conducting rescue
work, Military Transport Aviation, together with Civil Air Fleet, can
render civil defense unestimable aid, particularly in evacuating the in-
jured, supplying food and required necessities to the population in de-
stroyed areas, etc. At the same time, civil defense is readying its
formations so that they may be ready in the event of necessity to fulfill
rescue and priority emergency-restoration work in a number of installa-
tions of the Ministry of Defense.
The CPSU Program stipulates concrete and scientifically-based mis-
sions to strengthen the Armed Forces and the defense capability of the
Soviet Union. The party proceeds on the basis that as long as imperialism
exists the danger of aggressive wars also exists.
Under these conditions it is necessary to constantly strengthen and
perfect USSR Civil DefeAse which has become under modern conditions one
ApprovsfilW5q919?4919s: W4W4P90:17599PROQUIEW09 the country.
31
Approved For Release 200%8K9 owisvgigRoo0300090007-9
by Engr-Col B. MIKHAYLOV
CPYRGHT
When armed conflict first orginated certain means of supporting
and protecting troops appeared and became the property of combatant
sides,, depending on the state of development of military technology.
This is confirmed by numerous historical facts of the building and
use in war of castles, fortified villages; camps, forts, and various
fortified bases and regions. Due to the improvement of means of conflict
and the increased numbers and improved, quality of these types of instal.
lations, the theory of erecting and using them in war was created --
fortification was born. In the past It Was defined by prominent mili-
tary scientists ad the science and practice of building military strong-
holds.
As is known; fortification was divided into field work and permanent
structures depending on the mission and the time required to erect the
strongholds. In various forms each of them was for a specific purpose
-- to ensure high combat effectiveness for weapons and subsequently the
troops as a whole or for protection of personnel and combat equipment
from the enemy's means of destruction. The permanent fortification,
as M. V. Frunze wrote; was primarily for strategic purposes; especially
when the states had sufficient time to prepare their territories for
war, and the field fortification was used by the troops to support
tactical and operational missions dil'ectly in the course of combat
operations. A basic feature of the development of both types of.
fortifications is their continuous improvement depending on changes in
the means and methods of armed. conflict, the organization of troops,
and other factors.
Until not too long ago the fortification was primarily used to
support the combat operations of ground troops directly in the course
of a battle or in border areas of theaters of military operations; and
.to a lesser degree it was used to support the activities and protect the
rear of the country, including the population.
This situation changed radically in our t a result of the
rapid development of weapons of mass destruct f- . their means of
delivery, changes in the methods of conducting war, and the appearance
of new branches of the armed. forces.
The ability of combatant sides to inflict surprise massive nuclear
strikes and to accomplish large-scale assault landings in the rear in
a short time; the higher mobility of troops, and the large scope and
swiftness of modern operations unavoidably necessitated a new look at
the place and significance of fortifications in modern warfare.
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Ap
Today it is generally agreed that if war is unleashed because of the
aggressive actions of imperialist countries it will bear a universal
nature and involve vast territories and their armed forces, economics,
and populations. Necessary measures to ensure the combat readiness of
and provide protection for these elements will positively be required.
The changed nature of potential military operations makes it possi-
ble to consider that modern fortification will serve its purpose not for
the sake of a certain unit; but in the interests of all branches of the
armed forces, the preservation of military and government control, and
protection for the country's economic targets and the population.
Modern fortification can be defined as the science of planning and
building military engineering installationsand their complexes to ensure
the effectiveness of actions, to ensure combat readiness, to protect
weapons, equIpment and personnel of all branches and arms of the armed
forces; and to protect economic targets and the population in a war.
This definition does not pretend to be a final warding. However, it
seems to us that it reflects the significance and the role of fortifica-
tion in modern conditions.
Inclusion of protection. for the country's economic targets and the
population as a. purpose of fortification is necessitated by the transfer
of the sphere of modern strategic combat into the depth of the states
where it is necessary to ensure not only the effectiveness and stability
of strategic rocket positions, surface-to-air,missile sites, and regions
of ground troop mobilization; but also the preservation of strategic
industrial targets which supply them, and the population. Fortification
is the most important element of strategic preparation of a country for
war o NATO countries are conducting this type of preparation under the
widely known name of infrastructure using construction and engineering
troops, civil defense formations; and special construction organizations.
'Another feature of the development of fortification is the dependence
of its changes on qualitative leaps in the economy and in technology,
especially construction technology.
The high level of mechanization of ordinary construction work, its
industrial nature, and the numerous, varied, and powerful modern con-
struction techniques open broad possibilities for mechanizing forti-
fication work and, consequently, for cutting down their completion time.
The quickness and mechanization of this work make it necessary to
unify fortified installations; to Increase their technical qualities, and
to industrialize their production and erection. Moreover, the widespread
use of new, modern; superstrong and light materials in civilian and
industrial construction and the rapid development of their production
creates favorable conditions for using these materials in the field of
fortification.
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ArhblktagilFSPR414tfteclanthellftv:41701010851100675140C300900d73-9the
dependence of its changes on the nature of the struggle between weapons
of destruction and methods of defense, which F. Engels graphically
described as "the struggle of the wall and the shell." The appearance
of nuclear weapons that possess new, multiple destruction and affect
tremendous areas required radical changes in the protective character-
istics of fortified structures and their complexes. The NATO countries,
for example, are widely developing large, strong, completely airtight,
shockproof installations, etc. The use of fortified installations becomes
efficient only when combined with a whole complex of defense measures --
organizational (dispersion, alternates, selection of appropriate building
sites, conducting defense regimens, etc); technological (increasing the
protective characteristics of armament and equipment); and engineering
and technical (camouflage, use of individual protection means, etc.).
Without these it is impossible to obtain the necessary survivability of
the installations.
All these objective circumstances of present-day realities pose
problems on the theory and practice of fortification concerning the
development and creation of installations that are effective in combat
and defense aspects, expedient from a technological point of view, and
that are quick to erect; concerning the development of rational forms
and methods for the broad use of means of mechanization, and concerning
the the determination of trends in their development.
The modern theory of fortification is called upon to develop
scientifically based positions enabling all arms and branehes of the
armed forces to. use fortifications in the course of combat operations
and for the purpose of protecting targets of military economic potential,
organs of state control', the population, and.to develop reasonable ways
of planning and building installations..
'Modern means of conducting armed.conflict sharply increase' the role
of permanent fortifications that will chiefly be used on a strategio
scale.
The military press of many highly developed countries has often
noted that the characteristics of potential armed conflict, particularly
in the initial period of the war, requires that rockets be kept in con-
stant combat readiness so they can be launched quickly and surely. The
foreign press writes that in view of the complexity, large dimensions,
and vulnerability of modern strategic rockets it is possible to create
the best conditions for maintaining them in continuous combat readiness
for launch only in specially equipped, hardened silos. It is known that
attempts in the US to provide the necessary conditions for rockets openly
erected in positions did not yield positive results, and the Department
of Defense had to undertake the broad construction of hardened missile
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Ap
CPYRGHT
proved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP8o1 008 thR000300090007-9
silos" It is believed that these silos will make it possible to create
the necessary conditions for constant and prolonged launch readiness,
high combat effectiveness, and survivability of large strategic rockets.
According to US information, rockets in these silos can be preserved
for many months and can be launched in several seconds at any time The
degree of protection. for the whole complex rises sharply in accordance
with this since the target is only slightly vulnerable to an inter-
continental. nuclear rocket strike" (Civli En ineeriBE, April 1962;
Journal of the Construction Divisio/2) No 4Ol, January 1962)
To repulse rocket strikes directed at positional regions and hardened
missile silos and to counteract assault landings it is also considered
necessary to have hardened antimissile and antiaircraft positions and a
minimal fortified land protective belt of obstacles and pill boxes as
components of the positional region.
Thus the theory of fortification in modern conditions can be said
to include the fortified fire installation complex in the form of rein-
forced positional regions or bases of large strategic rockets with a
permanent garrison, special armament and equipment, a control system,
fortified installationa,,Ala network of roads. A system of such rein-
forced positional regions of large strategic rockets certainly does not
exhaust all possibilities for modern fortified installations in rocket
troops. Hardened bases for atomic missile submarines, launch aircraft,
railroad trains used for launching Minuteman missiles, and field bases
for mobile units of medium range strategic rockets will no doubt be widely
discussed as varieties of them.
Protection of strategic targets by antimissile and antiaircraft
resources that must also be maintained in constant combat readiness is a
very important problem in a nuclear war. As numerous accounts in the
foreign press testify the positions for such modern antimissile and
antiaircraft missiles as the Nike-Zeus and the Nike-X must ensure pro-
longed preservation, continuous readiness for instantaneous launch,
fastest possible second launches, guidance accuracy, and finally posi-
tive rocket effects despite numerous enemy countermeasures. To furnish
all these conditions needed for combat effectiveness and protection for
large-scale air defense rockets in open positions is recognized as
difficult, Obviously, such conditions can only be created in specially
equipped hardened surface-to-air rocket fire installations,
According to US information, a certain increase in cost for the
engineering equipment of hardened installations in cOmparison with
expenses for open-position equipment is compensated for by the sharp
decrease of numbers of service personnel, transports and lower
operational costs associated with this It is recognized that groups
of these reinforced surface-to-air rocket fire installations might
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PYR
GHor .%) P
fringtRakY8Fler-d3rifiVeaM21096/0A - ien
figd Cii41Welfsgt.liena. Ctrlardened PRO
and PVO regions to protect important targets. It is thought that these
types of fortifications will include positions for combatting assault
landings, a system of hardened control centers and shelters for radar
stations, and all types of engineering equipment. Thus we have another
type of fortification -- a system of hardenud PRO and PVO areas and
zones.
Obviously, in addition to these fortified static positions, more
durable types of fortified positions for mobile antiaircraft and anti-
missile defense weapons will be found.
Foreign military specialists, especially of the NATO countries, are
expressing views on using certain types of permanent fortifications to
secure conditions for ground troops conducting combat operations in
border zones. As is known, in past wars the task of stopping surprise
invasions of enemy forces was placed on the troops situated in border
areas having permanent fortifications on the primary strategic axes.
However, during World Wax II this type of fortification often did not
justify the hopes placed on it. Fortified areas, as is known, were
skirted by the enemy. Frequently being without support of troop
soyedieneniya? they did not play the role of a sustained strategic
barrier for the highly mobile troops of the attacking side.
At the present time, as apparent from the foreign press, in a
number of places, on the Maginot Line and in Belgium fortifications, for
example, they are attempting to modernize some fortified areas and use
them for control posts, depots, bases, etc. Apparently, this type of
fortification will have a local significance only.
It is not thought possible to create systems of deeply echeloned.
permanent fortified strong points which are to a certain extent
attached to such key positions as road junctions, defiles, bridges,
tunnels, 'mountain passes, crossings, etc. in the main lines of border
zones. A system of such permanent combat ready reinforced strong points
in the main lines in a border zone could be supplemented by prepared
poSitions for deploying tank groupings, by Sudden erection of large
obstacles and by destruction. The subsequent rout of the enemy will
be accomplished by prepared nuclear rocket strikes and strikes of
ground troops from reinforced Initial positions or areas.
It is known, for example, that in a nuclear-rocket war previously
prepared reinforced build up areas in mountainous or forrested areas are
a new type of fortification providing stability of basing and mobilization
d deployment of ground troops. These build up areas include dispersed
towns, arsenals, depots, road systems, camouflage, etc. The Pfaltz,
Rhine and other build up areas mentioned numerous times in the US and
West German press relate to these.
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CPYRGHT
prove or e ease ZUUU/Uo/UU : UIA-KUVUOI UUd/OKUUUJUUUUUUUt-U
The g rowing of su (prise attach and the enormous destructive
prmer and great rani,,e of nucaear-rocket weapons whose targets, as the
Cs:reign press often writes; conAd be large administrative, industrial,
power, material and transportation centers, and the most Important
military targets threughsut the cssantry are deflnitely reflected la the
content sf the theory and practice of fortification. In thes( conditions
it is ressgmzed az especially impertant to preserve the constant
effectiveness, and survivability not only of the troops, but also control
systems and communIcations organs nf the country and the armed forces,
inasnmch ac they ar:e rniefly located An large populated 'enters that are
known to the enemy and that are relatively vulnerable?
Destruction of control of the country and the armed forces in a modern
war, especially in its Initial perlod,is fraught with serious consequences.
The most: Important csntrol centers and communications nets in certain
csuntries have already been dupcated and concealed in reliable fortified
installari(ns. The la'ste ereate favorable conditions for operating the
msdeils apparatus .f c.Nmunications control organs and provide them with
a, high aelie:S ,"Yr. survjyabti.ty. Being connected by hichly stable lines of
rommunicatisn, alternate centers of o,sntrol will prove to be extremely
effective in a nuclear war,, (Western Construction. December 1961.0 Detrcsit
Free Press, June 30 1963)
A system of these frtified installations for command posts and
communications centers; dispensed and well protected, represent a new
form of perranent fortificatisn, From foreign press materials it is
evident that the wide use :1' industrial mining excavation,tunnels
subway statins and lines, etc.) for this purpose make it poss:ale to
substants,ally reduce the cost of cmstIng a highly stable alternate
system of rysntrol and communcatS;.,enE
The types ef'fortlficatisns mentioned above may be supplemented by
a system :sf fortified stations equipped both in peacetime and during war
as mbile csnIxssi pssts sn railroad ea'ss cr trucks. (Western Construction,
October, 1961).
Also censSdered, extremely impnrtant in. modern conditions is the use
of comp:exes of fortified structures in a country's overall system of
measures for protesting the pspulatisns of large cities, and reducing the
damage which might be inflicted on industry and strategic reserves by
enemy strikes. Judging from infoTmation in the foreign press, forti-
fications are being built into many new industrial enterprises and homes
and are being installed in many existing structures. For example, to
provide temporary shelter and evacuatisn s:f the population of a number
of large cities, the USA intends to use systems of connected basements;
tsnnels for city utility :lines:: subways, etc...
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Annrrn,c.rI Ft-tr Palaaca 9nnninRinci ? rha_pnpAcTnnR7gprinn-Annnannn7_ci
GHT
Naturally, Soviet military science, faced with the threat of a
world war unleashed by imperialists, must also develop the theory and
practice of modern fortification in the interest of strengthening the
defense capability of the country. In this light and especially in
conpection with the danger of a surprise attack by the enemy, the role
of pelmanent fortifications has increased greatly. They make it possible
to provide in advance, during peacetime, the necessary conditions for
maintaining constant combat readiness and the effectiveness and reliability
of the operations of the country's armed forces.
Protection against the powerful and combined nature of a nuclear
attack requires widening the sphere of using systems and complexes of
fortified installations, their intelligent and economical combination
with other methods and means of protection (dispersion, camouflag,
duplication, maneuvers, and increasing the stability of armament and
equipment), and also coordination with civilian construction.
The development of armament and military equipment and progress in
the conistruction industry make it possible to create fundamentally new
types of fortified structures and complexes which are economical and
quickly constructed, and also to develop structures which provide pro-
tection against the effects of nuclear weapons.
Changes in the armament and organization of troops and the character
of modern military operations and. war inevitably lead to actual changes
in the area of field fortifications.
It is well bnown that modern ground troops are vastly differeiat from
those of the past: they are well equipped with combat vehicles -- tanks,
armored transports, xocket transporters, etc., and also technical and
transport vehicles. Their opurations are characterized, by great striking
power., high maneuverability, and swiftness. They are well suited for
independent operations along different axes and can conduct an attack
largely from vehicles.
This feature of ground troops requires that modern field fortifi-
cations take into account first of all, the swiftness of combat operations
and, secondly, the presence of a large number of well protected combat
vehicles among the troops. In view of this, it is necessary to create
simple and quickly constructed fortified field installation, using the
mechanical durability and tightness of the bodies of covered combat and
transport vehicles.
Moreover, tank, armored carriers, and other types of combat machines .
can, with a minimum of additional work, become the base of .a position,
providing the high effectiveness of their weapons and protection. The
total of these positions, located according to the battle decision and
with regard to protective terrain features: ;represent a; nag form-7?f
tellAVOZWear4M4itilaite2630/08/airelia,-RDROMM8Y61200inefift0011Taasive
7iDeratians and during a quick switch to the defensive.
1414.
PYRGHT
p rovea i-or Ju
JO.'''0ti!nuuuuuuugt-R ATRY616r2 .fttnbeieited from deeply
echeloned positions in the form of a system of dispersed weapons emplace-
ments, covered positions, and "fire pockets" calculated to draw in the
enemy so that it may 1Y! destroyed by nuclear strikes readied in advance
or by other means. Wido maneuvering of fire and mobile reserves within
the combat formations is possible in such a belt.
The basis of the fortification of positions will apparently consist
of trenches for combat machines (tanks, self-propelled guns, armored
carriers with anttank guided missiles, armored rocket transporters, etc.)
and covered positions consisting of entrenched technical and transport
v-hicles with hermetically sealed bodes or covered positions made from
rneumatic or other portable structures carried with the troops (2rdnance,
November - December 1958).
Under conditions of fast-moving battles and operations, a system
of such weapons emplacements and covered positions can be supplemented
by only a limited number of trenches. Since each podrazdeleniya will
have its own entrenching equipment, creating these positions will require
very little time. The creation of these fortifications consisting of a
system of entrenched transport and combat vehicles differs greatly from
the construction of former systems of trenches, dugouts, earth-and-timber
pillboxes, and communications trenches which required much time, a large
amount of materials, transport vehicles and manpower.
This makes it possible for combat detachments and other podrazdeleniya
to create their own fortified installations without the assistance of
engineer troops, or at least with only limited help from them.
In our opinion, all-around protection against the devastating effects
of nuclear weapons can be reliably provided only by the hermetically
sealed bodies of combat and technical vehicles or prefabricated structures.
The character of modern defensive zones and positions created during
offensive operations results from the existing means and methods of
battle and the organization of ground troops. The presence of armored
combat vehicles (tanks, armored carriers, armored rocket transporters,
etc.) in combat formations enables the latter to establish a sufficiently
powerful system of fire.
In our opinion, the type of fortification indicated above might be
one of the variations, since it creates conditions for the most effective
use of modern weapons and provides a high level of troop survivability in
the complex with camouflage and dispersion. The creation of such forti-
fied positions and defensive zones can be accomplished without expendi-
tures for materials and transportation and with a minimum amount of
manpower and machinery.
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. The fortification of terrain while troops are located in concentra-
tion areas, during a day's halt) and in other cases of temporary halts
HT (for example, during a march) before a zone with a high level of radio-
active contamination, before a wide water barrier) can be accomplished
in a similar fashion. The basis of protective measures during such halts
will be the erection of earth fortifications, using equipment and
explosives, in places corresponding to the troop formation and promoting
.their readiness for immediate movement without unnecessary expenditures
of time for reforming into columns.
A highly original form of nodern field fortifications is the
,forLation of fortified field positions of mobile rocket and antiaircraft
rocket units of ground troops consisting of qUickly established strong
points. With very short preparation periods and requirements for high
mobility, armored rocket transporters, technical vehicles with
hermetically sealed bodies, and portable pneumatic shelters can be
entrenched with the use of special earth-moving equipment.
Promoting the survivability of mobile control posts and communications
centers is considered an important form of field fortification. In view
of the short-term nature of the stations of these organs) the use of under-
ground reinforced concrete or metal field installations for their protection
during modern operations Involving extensive maneuvering Wil41.,An all
probability, be limited. Judging from information in the foreign press,
stations of control organs will more often be protected by entrenching
control vehicles with armored bodies ("tortoise-type" vehicles, "control
tanks," and others) and carefully camouflaging and dispersing them.
Thus, drastic changes in the means and methods of combat operations
of ground troops result in the appearance of new forms and types of field
fortifications and new methods of erecting them during fast-moving combat
operations,
The types of manufactured items and work methods in modern construction
industry will, in our opinion, have a real influence both on the methods
of erecting fortifications and on the types of fortified installations.
The construction time of fortifications will be greatly reduced, and the
amounts of materials; manpower) machinery and transportation required
will decrease. Practically no construction will be involved) except for
digging pits and cushioning layers of earth for solid, hermetically-
sealed vehicles and portable shells. The search for methods of rapidly
setting up field fortifications is considered very important in view
of the swiftness of modern operations.
Scientifically based operational, technical, mathematical, and
economical methods of analysis for finding new forms and types of
fortifications are being developed on the basis of the latest views on
strategy and military art, the rapidly developing mathematical methods
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of researching an evaluating the effectiveness and survivability of pro-
tective complexes, the successes oi applied physics, the theories of
designing economical structures to withstand dynamic loads, and modern
science.
Study of the devastating properties of modern weapons will make it
possible to find theoretical and practical bases for developing new pro-
tective structures and the principles of using fortified installations in
the complexes of all modes of protection.
Progressive methods of complex organization and mechanization are
making it possible to develop the theory and scientifically based methods
of rapidly and economically constructing fortified complexes. This is
being done in the interests of all branches of the Armed Forces and to
conserve the military-economic potential of the country.
The successes of chemical sciences and solid-state physics make it
possible to develop the theory of creating new fortified materials --
special kinds of concrete, polymer-concrete, etc.
Successes in the fields of electronics, automation, and other
technical sciences are making it possible to find new solutions to
problems of the theory of equipping the interior of fortified installations
to ensure the constant combat readiness of weapons and equipment.
Mar Su R. Ya. MALINOVSKap in his speech at the 22nd Congress of the
CPSU, stated: "Despite the fact that in a future war nuclear rocket
weapons will play the decisive role, we nevertheless come to the con-
clusion that final victory over an aggressor can be achieved only as the
result of the combined operations of all branches of the Armed Forces."
To ensure the success of the operations of all branches of the
Armed Forces, the efforts of modern fortification must be included in a
complex of many measures
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BASIC STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY-HISTOFtICAL SCIENCE
by Lt Col I. ROSTUNOV
CPYRGHT
"The necissity for a thorough study of the history of wars and
military art has repeatedly been stressed in the orders of Mar SU R. Ya.
MALINOVSKIY, Minister of Defense USSR, and in a number of speeches by
other Soviet military leaders -- Mar SU A. A. GRECHKO, Mar SU S. S.
BIBYUZ0V, and Army Gen A. A. YEPISHEV (Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal,
No 2, 1961; No 1, 1963; Voyennaya Mysl', No 9, 1963). It is universally
recognized that the experience of the past has not lost its significance
in an age of nuclear-rocket weapons. Military history helps solve the
theoretical and practical problems of building and training armed forces.
Its further development meets the requirements of the Soviet Army and
Navy and the interests of the ideological struggle with reactionary
bourgeois historiography....
"Soviet military-historical science, like Soviet historical science
in general, has to do with the field of superstructure?.the development
of which is determined by the development of the basis. Consequently,
its periodization must be done with regard to the periodization of the
history of Soviet society.
"The discussions which appeared on the pages of the journal Istoriya
SSSR in 1961 and 1962 presented well-founded modern views on the principles
of the periodization of the history of Soviet historical science, its
division into large periods and more fractional internal stages, and also
analyzed the factors which determined the development of the science at
each stage (M. V. NECHKINA. "Summarizing the Discussion of the Period-
ization of Soviet Historical Science," Istoriya SSSR No 2, 1962). There-
fore, these problems are not discussed in detail in this article. The
history of Soviet historical science is divided into three periods approxi-
mating the main periods in the development of Soviet society .- the period
of transition from capitalism to socialism and the establishment of the
basis of a socialist society, the period of completing the building of
socialism and the beginning of the gradual transition from socialism to
communism, and the period of the extensive building of communism. The
first of these cover the 14me from the victory"in the Great October Sotialist
Revolution to the middle or the thirties; the second, .12.L'om the midule of
the thirties to the 22nd Party Congress; and the third, from the 22nd
Party Congress to the present....
"The Commission for the Analysis and Utilization of the Experience
of the War of 1914-1916 (Military History Commission) was established in
August 1918. It consisted primarily of former generals of the Russian
Arny who voluntarily went over to the side of the Soviet Government and
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expressed a desire to devote th,:ir knowledge to the strengthening or the
Red Army They included A. A. SVECHIN, D. P. PARSKIY, V. N. KLEMBOVSKIY,
A M. ZAYONCHKOVSKIY, A, A. NEZNAMOV, and others. The outstanding Russian
military leader A. A. DRUSILOV was a member of the commission for some
time,
"The work of the commission was carried out under difficult conditions.
The membership changed frequently as a number of members were called to
the fronts of the Civil War, Archive documents were not examined and put
in order. Nevertheless, the commission achieved well-known results during
their five years of work....
"With the development of the history of World War I, there arose an
urgent need for the study of the history of the Red Army and the history
of the Civil. War. The analysis of the armed struggle of the first
socialist state, which represented a qualitatively new stage in the
development of military affairs, was of great importance and was assigned
to the commission. The commission was unable to make a serious analysis
of this subject, however, since the necessary documents were still located
In the headquarters of chasti, soyedineniya, and Wyedineniya. Also,
the members of the commission, most of whom had served in the former
Russian Army, did not understand the essence of the Civil War and did not
consider its experience valuable for military science. Only with the
liquidation of fronts and the conversion of the army to a peaeeti.me status
were certain improvements noted in the work of the commission. The
collection of documents and memoirs of participants in the events was
begun, resulting in the publication of the first volume of .G28.,
yErna (The Civil War), Two more volumes of this work were published in
1923 and 1924....
"Generalized military-historical experience, especially the experi-
ence of World War I and. the Civil War which was examined with regard to
new tendencies in the development of armament and military equipment, was
the basis of works on military art. Mar SU A. A. GEECHED rightfully
points out: 'The broad and, on the whole, expedient use of the experi-
ence of World War I for the development of military theory in the new
conditions would have been impossible, of course, if military history had
been underrated in the Red Army in the 20's and 30's- Military-historical
work in those years was at its iroper level, It was not just a narrow
circle of specialists who were engaged directly in military history, but
also many officers and generals, including prominent military leaders,
from whose pens came a number of solid theoretical works. CyamE27
istoricheskiLl_hu_n_arl., No 2, 1961, page 7)
"The work of Soviet military historians at the given stage would
have been more useful if it had not been for the pernicious effect of the
Stalin personality cult which began to manifest itself at the end of the
20s. In 1929 an article by K. Ye. VOROSHILOV, "Stalin andleLE21_11,11m,"
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was published to please the cult in which events of the civil war were
incorrectly discussed, and the role of the party and the people as the
real defender of the victorious October Revolution was minimized. This
article had an adverse effect on subsequent military-historical works.
Under the influence of the personality cult Leninist estimations and
analytical methods in the study of military history began to be violated
and citation-illustrative methods became widespread in literature. Con-
crete historical research of events and facts was frequently replaced by
simple description of them without profound generalizations or conclusions,
which seriously lowered the quality of military-historical works.
"In spite of this, Soviet military-historical science achieved great
successes in the first period of its development. Research of the experi-
ence of the World War I and the Civil War, which was widely used in training
and educating the troops, yielded the greatest results. Other wars were
studied to a lesser degree, including the historic struggle of the Russian
people against foreign invaders. The views of M. N. POKROVSKIY, who was
then head of a number of Soviet historical institutions, undoubtedly had
an effect here. This outstanding Bolshevik scientist played an important
role in the creation of Marxist historical science. However, he made many
mistakes in his scientific activities, including negation of the patriot-
ism of the national masses in the wars of pre-revolutionary Russia. More-
over, the possibilities of military history for the patriotic education
of soldiers of the armed forces and the whole Soviet nation were not used
to the fullest extent. In addition: the creation of generalized works on
the history of military art became difficult. Books which attempted to
resolve this problem were a rare phenomenon. (A. SVECHIN, Evolyutsiya
aasEr,2022-usstva The Evolution of Military Art, Vols 1-2, Nor cow -
Leningrad, State Publishing House, 1927-1928; V. SUKHOV, Krat1d3 therk
isto:711en_mojii21_-tusstva? A Brief Essay on the History of Military
Art, Moscow-Leningrad: State Publishing House., 1929)
"Soviet military-historical science was born and developed in the
sharpest struggle against anti-scientific concepts. It had to endure
serious attacks from Trotskiy and like-minded persons who denied the
possibility of using Marxist-Leninist dialectical methods for analysis
of military-historical events and facts, rejected the existence of
military science, and tried to prove that in the field of military affairs
only the practical profession, the military leader: has the decisive
significance. They regarded the experience of the Soviet Armed Forces in
the Civil War with scorn and ignored the very fact of the birth and
development of Soviet military art, though at the same time they bowed
to bourgeois military art in every way possible. The exposure and
ideological rout of Trotsivism favorably affected the development of
military science, including military history.
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"Simultaneously; a. struggle was conducted against the erroneous views
in the works of several historians; predominately the old military special-
ists. Thus, the works of A. A. SVECHIN were distinctly influenced by the
German bourgeois historian Hans Eelbruck. A thorough criticism of the
military-strategic and military-bistorical view of SVECHIN was given at
an open meeting of the plenum of the section on the study of problems of
war of the Leningrad Department of the Communist Academy attached to the
Central Executive Committee USSR on 25 April 1931. (Protiv F_JEeaL;171.2.m(Al
teoriv..n v.e.z__Ynno-rniauchnpm fronte.. Krtika Le_01._che'sstra?kitikmo-
istorishesloikhac.IL......gzechina.,? Against Reactionary Theories on
the Military-Scientific Front. A Criticism of the Strategic and .Military-
Historical Views of Professor Svechin; Mbscow; Voyenizdat, 1931. A. I.
VERKHOVSKIY's attempt to question the scientific significance of F. Engels'
works in the field of military theory and history received a decisive
rebuff. (7,a2iski Notes; Communist Academy; Section on the Study of the
Problems of War; Vol 1; Moscow, Publishing House of the Communist Academy;
1930; pp 55-61.) At a discussion held in the Military Academy imeni
Frunze in April 191; serious deviations from Marxist-Leninist metkodology
were noted in the works on military theory and history of B. I. GOREV;
an instructor at this academy. (Protiv men'shevisImishaisjidealizma
v vayosakhymy_i vovenr.5.1.2.1a:.; Against Menshevist Idealism in
Questions of War and Military Affairs, Moscow, Voyenizdat; 1931) By the
middle of the 1930's anti-Marxist concepts on the military theoretical
front had been overcome. Marxist-Leninist methodology completely triumphed
in the field of military science....
"During these years military historians acquired their first press
organ; Vovenno-istoricheskly zhurnal (Military History Journal). It was
published regularly beginning with August 1939. The last double issue
appeared in June-July 1941. After the outbreak of the Great Patriotic
War, it was combined with the journal Vaule01.1101 (Military Thought).
A total cf 23 issues was published. The predominant subjects were on
the history of the Soviet Armed Forces and on the Civil War and World War
I. The journal was popular among wide circles of Soviet military cadres
and played an important role in working out a number of scientific pro-
blems and in the propaganda of military-historical knowledge.
"Consequently, in the years preceding the Great Patriotic War; our
science had been raised to a new level. The range of
scientific research subjects had increased. Great attention was given to
studying the practical experience of modern wars and making the facts
available to the troops, even thcagh this kind of work was not conducted
in a sufficient volume or with sufficient effectiveness. The role of
military history in the patriotic education of Soviet people and of Army
and Navy personnel had gxewn more important..
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The study of military history, Which developeo on a large scvle
during postwar years, required an increased number of scientific cadres.
The training of these cadres was successfully solved by establishing
military history faculties at the Military Academy imeni Frunze and the
Academy of the General Staff. During a relatively short period, these
military educational institutions graduated a sufficient number of
qualified military historians to satisfy the requirements of our Armed
Forces.
"The development of Soviet military-historical science during the
second period was characterized by undeniable achievements. Our litera-
ture was enriched by valuable research and popular scientific works. A
new direction in science was conceived, i.e. historiography of the Great
Patriotic War and of World War 11. However, during this period the nega-
ttve influence of the Stalin personality cult on military-historical
science became fully evident. B. N. PONOMABEV, secretary of the Central
Committee CPSU, stated in a report at the All-Union Conference of Histori-
ans in December 1962: .If we are to sum up the negative consequences of
the personality cult for historical science, they can be reduced to three
principal factors: 1. depreciation of Lenin's role and the role of the
masses and the party in the history of our country, and the exaltation
4.,f Stalin's role, thereby distorting historical truths; 2. publicizing
a non-Marxist approach to the study of historical processes, as well as
subjectivity and arbitrariness in evaluating historical events and
figures; and 3. bureaucratic administration and unconscientious
criticism in scientific Torking groups, and the iiadiscriminate use of
various labels'.
"The above statements may be fully applied to military-historical
science. The Stalin personality cult hindered the work on problems of
miltary history, particularly the history of the Civil War and the
Great Patriotic War. However, this cult could not turn the development
of military-historical science from its correct course. Soviet military
historians, founding their research on Marxist-Leninist methodology, were
able even during the period of the personality cult to overcome its nega-
tive influence and to make new progress in studying the history of wars
and of military art....
"The period following the 20th CPSU Congress is noted for an unpre-
cEdented upsurge in the development of military-histooical science. This
liecame evident specifically in the growth of scientific research. Military
historians engaged in large-scale research on a number of subjects which
previously, during the personality cult, could not be studied deeply and
extensively. One of the most important topics of research was the study
of the guiding and organizing activities of the Communist Party in building
the Soviet Armed Forces and the defense of our country. The publication
of the comprehensive work, Istorl ai_y_mm_unistictheskati,Soy_e_t_Lolasi
ZazIL,(Histor.7 of the GPS1177Zg a great achievement. This work gave a
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truthful account of the heroic history oi the cPbu. many questions of
party history were formulated and discussed in a new way, in accordance
with decisions of the 20th Congress; and errors, which had been made in
historical literature during the personality cult period, were corrected.
A number of monographs and collections of documents were devoted to the
glorious Leninist party as organizer and. inspirer of victories of the
Soviet people during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War....
"Further progress was made in the field of studying the history of
World War II. One should note the work by a group of generals and offi-
cers of the military-historical section, Military-Scientific Administra-
tion of the General Staff, who published the book Vtorayt_mirovaya voyna
't.939-19,L5 (WorM Wa:xHL.L. 1939-1945) A great contribution to the
study or this subject was made by V. M. KULISH, V. A. SEKISTOVI G. A.
DEBORIN, and D. M. PROEKTOR....
"Studying the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II
as a whole Soviet military histo7.1ans waged a relentless struggle against
reactionary bourgeois historiography. Flagrant falsification of history;
contained in the works of military writers in the US; England, West
Germany, and other capitalist countries., is aimed at belittling the
decisive role of the Soviet Union and its armed forces in the defeat of
Hitierism and the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist en-
slavement. It was necessary to disprove the false contrivances of the
bourgeois historians; to contradict them with an objective portrayal of
events.. With this objective a collection of articles Protiv
fal'sifikatorov is tori! vtoramirovov vouly, (Against the Falsifiers of
the History of World War IT) was published in 1959. It must be recog-
nized that military historians did not always speak against the falsi-
fiers of history in a timely manner and with sufficient decisiveness
and did not always give a deserved rebuff to the slanderers of the
imperialist camp....
"Military-historical literature published after the 20th Party Congress
was characterized by significant broadening of its cource material. base.
This was made possible by the statement of the Soviet government of 13
August 1958 'Regulation on the State Archive Fund of the USSR. Military
historians were permitted freer entry to archive material which allowed
much new documented information to be made accessible to scholars....
"The revival of milltary-historical work, which followed the 20th
Party Congress, was characterized by Increased interest in the study of
military history by servicemen of our Armed Forces. This to a great
degree resulted from decrees of the Minister of Defense USSR No 168 (1958)
and 171 (1962), They clearly enphasized the importance of a thorough
study of the history of wars and of military art in modern conditions
which is tc c ntal.n concrete :,nstyiJctins fir' the relativel.y wider use
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of the experience of it in the practice of teaching and training troops.
Instructions for military-historical work in the USSR Armed Forces were
elaborated and stated.
"The revolution i military affairs, which is connected with the
Introduction of nuclea''-rocket weapons, exerted great influence in the
development of Soviet ,ailitary-historical science during the third period.
Radical changes in the structure of the armed forces and the forms and
methods of conducting military operations required military historians
and theoreticians to turn their attention mainly to researching such
experiences of the past which had not lost their significance for new,
changing situations In particular, a more detailed study of the oper-
ations of the beginning period of the war was begun.
"In addition to successes, basic shortcomings existed in the work of
our military historians. As it stated in the decree of the Minister of
Defense USSR No 171 (1962), several works on the history of the Great
Patriotic War and World War II are not yet on the desired ideological-
theoretical and scientific level, are primarily of a descriptive nature,
and lack sufficiently thorough general conclusions, particularly on
questions having actual significance for solving contemporary tasks of
building and training the armed forces. Questions of the development
of military art in the postwar period are little studied."
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
by Col O. SOSYURA0 Candidate of Technical Sciences,
Docent; Engr-Capt S. YEREMIN, Candidate of Technical
Sciences; and Engr-CaptM. GORYAINOV
CPYRGHT
The publication of a translation of the book by T. L. Saati,
Matemayierneto issledovanIELEEEELILL (Mathematical Methods of
Operations Research, translated from English by Yu. M. PEVNITSKIY,
V. S. TOMMIEVSKIY, and N. F. TRUBITSYN;" under the editorship of A. P.
GRISHIN, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Prof; Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1963,
420 pages), was received with interest, principally by persons who
encounter operations research in their practical activities.
The author states in the preface that, unlike other works in this
subject, he has attempted to show the many different mathematical methods
being used in operations research. 5) a certain degree the author has
been successful in this undertaking.
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A FDD TRANS 'NO 939
URNAL vOyENNAyAAPHY?elea''
AUGUST 1965
, SOVIET
,
THEORETICAL
9PYRGHT
Approvea -KUlat50 UUOIOKUUUSUUUVUUU (-U
hc AR is the only book in translation, which describes
and illustrates the principal mathematical methods used in operations re-
search. It discusses various methods of optimization (gradient, vari-
ational, as well as linear, quadratic, and dynamic programiftg), principles
of the theory of games, the queueing theory, the theory of probabilities,
and mathematical statistics. The book is commendable for its descrip-
tion of the great variety of mathematical methods used in operations
research.
One must agree with the editor of the translation who pointed out
that there is a considerable lack of Lalance in the discussion of pro-
blems brought up in this book,
'Ile first part :)f the boos*. gives a general idea about operations
research.
The author briefly introduce the readers to the subject, including
the history ond long-range development of operations research (Chapter 1).
Scientific literature does not yet have a definitely established
definition of the concept "operations research." The book under review
offers three definitions. In our opinion, the most appropriate is the
last one which defines operations research as "rendering asSistance to
administrators in the adoption of decisions by providing them with the
necessary quantitative infomation obtained by scientific methods"
(page 11). Referring to one odd definition, the author states that the
"incomplete idea" is the most valuable part of that particular defini-
tion. In our opinion, an incomplete idea cannot be accepted as a merit
of a definition,
In discussing scientific methods of operations research, the author
refers to the principal stages of research and their content (Chapter 2).
He also gives practical advice, which is useful not only to researchers,
but also to persons who direct the research activities and who make use
of the results of completed research..
In the following chapter the author tells his readers about a very
important concept in operations research, i.e., the existence of a
solution to problems, and the methods of proof. T. Saati quotes
Interesting examples for this concept. However, in our opinion, he gives
too much attention to mathematical logic and the use of truth tables
(pages 53-67), even though their practical application is very limited.
Usually such questions are solved without the use of speedal symbolism.
The fourth chapter is eimitled "Elementary, Classical Methods Used
in the Structure of Mathematical Models." The word "elementary" is not
quite accurate, since the problems under discussion are by no means
elementary; for example differential equations, linear difference
equations, integral equations, operat,asr analysis of dimensions method
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t squares. MIS cnapter contains
useful reference material. The examples given by the author are not
HTeqxmlly valid. Some of them are clear and interesting to read (pages
69-70)? while others are too sketchy.
The principal mathematical content of the book is included in its
second and third parts. The second part of the book (chapters 5, 6, and
7) is devoted to methods of solving problems of optimization. It is
knol,Tn that problems of the determination of ortima.occupy a central posi-
tion In operations research. Therefore, these pages are the most valua-
ble part of the book. They contain a discussion of the following sub-
jects: methods of solving different equations (methods of Newton, Gauss-
Jordan, method of steepest descent), methods of solving inequalities
(method of elimination of variables, relaxation method, exponential
method), optimization methods with or without restrictions (Lagrange 's
method, gradient method, variational method), dynamic programing, linear
programing, quadratic programing, and theory of games.
It may be noted that many of these questions have been discussed in
previous works, and some of them in more detail than in the book under
review. For example, we may list the following: Bellman, on dynamic
programing; Gass (or Hass?), on linear programing; McKinsey, on the
theory of games; a brochure by E. S. Wentzel, and others.
The book by T. Saati gives an idea of the great variety of mathe-
matical methcis of operations research and shows how much mathematical
training and eruaition specialists in operations research must have. At
the same time, the book cannot be considered as a textbook, since the
greater part of it is too condensed. It would be more caTrect to regard
it as a reference book on mathematical methods of operations research
and on some exauiples of their application.
Part 3 of the book discusses rdie following subjects ? elements of
the theory of probabilities (Chapter 8): principles of statistics
(Chapter 10), and a review of the oueueing theory (Chapter 11). Readers
who have some experience in the solution of problems will be most inter-
ested in Chapter 90 Some Supplements." in this chapter the author cites
20 exaRples of various problems to illustrate the use of methods described
In preceding chapters. These examp:.es are interesting in their foruula-
tion and in the applied criteria, which may be useful in the solutio
other problems. The review of methods of the queuein6 theory is brief,
but c invir.cing The author gives many formulations of problems and
solatIons? which are also valuable mainly as reference material.
The .chapters on the theory of probabilities and on mathematical
statistics may also be used mainly for reference purposes. The material
presented by the author will not suffice if a reader wants to become
completely familiar with the methods under discussion-
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It should be noted tha,. the book would gain considerably in value if
IL would contain a more detailed discussion with examples of optimization
methods; as the latter occupy an important place in the solution of pro-
blems in operations research. The important question of selection of
criteria has also been given insufficient attention, although it is known
that a correct formulation of a problem and correct selection of criteria
amounts to a halfway solution of the problem.
The author should be commended for his great attention to bibliog-
raphy, which is appended to each chapter and lists the titles of 526
foreign books. Unfortunately, the author mentions only three Soviet
authors, i.e., A. N. KOLMOGOROV; An Yan KHINCHIN, and B. V. GNEDENKO,
and the translators and editor of ?the translation failed to supplement
the bo'..k: with a Soviet bibliography and a list of works translated into
Russian.
It may be noted that a shortcoming of the translation is the large
number of printing errors which make it difficult to absorb the material;
and sometimes even distort the meaning. For example, page 275 cites the
following formula (8-42):
2
-2 -2 -2 , 2 2 2
M ((Xi - R1) (X2 - 5Z2)21 = xl xl + x 2 xl 4- a' xl ? a x 2,
where X1 and X.2 are independent, random variables. Here, in addition to
Lisprints in the symbols (the first product includes 0% instead of
, and the third product gives A2 instead of Aa ), a serious
mistake was made, since the right side equals the dispersion D (Xi X2)0
and the left side equals simply da A2
In addition, there are inaccuracies and omissions on page 162 in
the formula (5-149), and on pages 92, 169; 193, 231; 273, 2789 3020 335,
and 343, These and other misprints should have been listed under errata.
As a whole, the book by T. L. Saati is undoubtedly useful, both for
beginners and for more experienced workers in operations research of a
military and non-military character. It is mainly interesting as a refer-
ence book on mathematical methods of operations research and contains a
large number of examples. The readers may check their knowledge by
solving the problems and analyzing the sclutions of these examples,
We would like to make two suggestions which, we believe, will be
supported by many other people. First, one should. begin with the publi-
cation of overt, fundamental, Soviet works of a specialized; educational,
and popular-scientific character, which could be used both by specialists
in operations research and by workers using the results.
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Secondly, it is time to think about the publication of an overt journal
for operations research. During the initial period, one could start with
the publication of a supplement to the journal yammat_avz.
CPYRGHT
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