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March 25, 1966
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Approved For Releas 00090011-4 FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION TRANSLATI ON L." CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ?t2ICA-k1508t11108W5R000300090011-4 Washington, D. C. 9PRAWMAitlYSL?, Approved For Release 2StateR8:fraiRIMIRN8R8 Issue No 10, October 1965 Voyennaya Mysl? (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR Ministr7r?Orrei' er?=6;" printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House, Moscow. The articles translated herein are from Issue No 10, October 1965 which waS. signed for the press 22 September 1965. TABLE OF CONTENTS Some Urgent Problems in Military Engineering Psychology, by B. Lomov? Col V. Ofitserov, and Lt Col V. Rubaklyin Strategy and Transport, by Mai Gen Tech Trps Ya. Shepennikov and Col Ye, Nensberg On Means and Methods of Programmed Teaching, Book Review by Engr Col N. Bazanov and Engr Lt Col V. Koshutin Some Problems in the Methodology of Soviet Military Science, by Co3. V Solov? yev An Answer to Opponents, by Maj Gen I. Zav?yalov It Depends on What One Should Give Up, by Rear Adm (Ret) K. Zotov Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Book Review by Lt Col Ye. Rybkin Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 PAGE 1 13 26 57 63 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 SOME URGENT PROBLEMS IN MILITARY ENGINEERING PSYC11OLOGy 1 by B. LOMOV, corresponding member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences cpyRGilifFSR, Col V. OFITSEROV, and Lt Col V. RUBAKHIN The provision of our armed forces with new equipment leads to a change in the nature of the relationship between man and machine. Automated sys- temathat net only supply power and perform technological functions, but systems which perform administrative functions as well, are being imple- mented on an increasing scale. An intermediary link, as it were, forms between the soldier and the weapon -- a complex control system. In a cer- tain sense this separates the person from the weapon, makes the control process a remote control operatiov, decreases the number of moving compo- nents, decreases, the physical load, but at the same time increases the mental lead, and ccmplicates the structure of movements. The perception and processing of information, programming of action, adoption of decisions and control are gaining an increasing role in the work of the soldier. At the same time modern military equipment is char- acterized by high speeds, the complexity of many pi.ocesses and unexpected situations. A pilot, for instance, in a modern fighter has to operate his aircraft under the influence of considerable G-force factors, and at speeds exceeding the speed of sound. Under such conditions a person does not have the time to fully perceive the rapidly changing situation, and react in time and correctly to the readings on tens of instruments. The preparation of missiles for launching is measured in very short periods of time and must be carried out in strict correspondence with the assigned program. The activities of the air defense and antimissile defense crews are also highly limited in time and take place in a complex and constantly chang- ing situation. All this sharply increases the demands made on the sensory organs of the person, as well as on the intellectual and emotional-will power elements of military activities, In this it is also necessary to remember that in a future war it will be necessary to function under conditions created by the use of weapons of mass destruction. Powerful nuclear blasts with their blinding flashes and high temperatures, areas of extensive fires and destruction, large areas of radioactive.and.chemical.contamination, instantaneous mac,s losses of personnel and materiel -- this is far from a complete picture of modern. combat. In such combat the nervous system of the soldier will be subjected to superstimuli. If ordinary disturbances (noise, bright lights, low or high temperatures) exert an inhibiting effect on human activity, super-stimuli may completely disorganize a person's entire behavior, dis- rupt the performance of firmly learned and habitual functions. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 1 RGHTPit9VeidEgrq0e??%P9,94*.Q9kiPIHNP18T9?,81TFP:513?991r9:11T41?of i:ronucing an appropriate effect capabilities into account, peculiaies of human se-nsory eruns, human intelletua:t and motor activity, or, speaking in geneLak, tne peculiax of human psyche in the past, when the .a2:.1Lament, materiej and oon-Ltons of thelr Use WYCO not as ,7omplicatcd, an accurate nfhumaa capabilities was, perhaps, not aways ff.00s-sary. At the pfl,nnT., however, it :MpOSSA):ie to gec by. without such a .c..ondie:rati.on. As commonly known at the bogi):,ning of World War IA some typ,,; of m7,1tary equipment did not produce the result expectd of it when it was designed. Because of the numerous 'n Lakes made by the per5onnel uslng such equipment there occurred frequent hreakdowns and accidents, which decreased its combat efficiency, it is also neesary to point ou,: the fact that the training of specialists took a very long period of tame. The training of an American fighter pilot at that time took about one- fourth of the pilot's total time in the servioa and c-ost0,000 dollars. Special analysis indicated that al tUs, for the mc,,z.t part, occurred because of a failure to take into aczeunt iiic.tors as the physaolo- gicai and psychological pecullares of the person%el in the (123igning and creation of military. equipment, Snbequently, as a result of engi- neering-psychological research, it was possible i.ncreac the effi- ciency with which the military eq:Apmewt was used, at the same time accel- erating the training of the persoyine. The resolution of technical ques- tions, with a consideration of the psiohophysiological pec.,.;Iiarities of the 2ersonnel, promotes an incrcal,t! in the combat ability of the troops, and, in the end, increases the economy fcatures and the efficiency of the equipment being designed, As reported in the foreign px.css the US Aix FA..4.-c. annuany loses between 300 and 400 pilots and about FAO .aircraf.4 Statstics have :indi- cated that hiiman eiTor is thc main cause of accdents,..:: incorrect identifi- c:.,tion of instruments, impcxfezt depth percept.ion or an IDCOITOCt determnation of the aixtraft posit?on, opeiatj.on of ':.:Col'itr0;.5, Between .953 and 196S the ,t)t of arc aft 7.o;,t some 7/21 million dollars in the US. American psycholog'its worked out the ANIP (Army Navy Instrumeltation Program), which changed the representation of certain flight parame):exs, pacticularly during landings, from instrument readings to television :mages This 7,y1:7em el:iminated man/ of the errors foTmorly made by pilots. It is interestf,ng to note that the cost of s.eien- tific research and design wori performed in a:.cordance with the AN-A) pro- gram came to a total of only 26 million dollars over a ten-year period. During the postwar years a certain mount o?. experience was acquired ln collaboration between the designers and pVi:ioloOsts, psychoLogists and doctors during the design of some type5 of military equipment. This first of all applies to air force and air defense equipment. Not too much, however, has been accomplished thus far. The combat training of military Arrrnoad FrIr Palaaca 9nnninRinci ? rna_PnPAcTnng7gpnnnlnnnanni CPYRGHT AppetNe Fe 2OOOIOOIO3 . CA-R rosT o 711 00 0 0 0011-4 pilots evidences the fact that not everything is taken into account in the design of aircraft cockpits. Officer-aviators V, Ochakov, An Paterkin and P. Sablin, for instance, write that at first glance the cockpit of a modern missile-armed aircraft appears to be ultimate perfection. The designers made sure to equip it with all that is necessary to control the operation of the numerous units of this most complex machine. At the same time, how- ever, they note, it is important to remember that, in the last analysis, the machine is controlled by people, and these people have a certain limit to their.physiological_capacities. There is such a large number of switches, levers and.dials_that in some situations it is practically impossible for the pilot_to_find_the ones. he .needs, particularly if time is of critical essence. The letter writers categorically protest against an increase in the number of instruments, which no longer ease, but, on the contrary, com- plicate.the pilots work. Similar examples may be also cited with regard to other types of wea- pons and equipment. They all indicate that under the present-day conditions there is an immeasurable increase in the role of military psychology in gen- eral, and in military engineering psychology in particular. Military engineering psychology is usually understood to be a branch of military psychology studying the role and functions of man in the control of complex military equipment for the purpose of achieving its most effi- cient utilization On the one hand military engineering psychology rests on the theory of the art of war, on general psychology and the psychology of labor, while on the other hand it rests on the technical and mathemati- cal sciences: theory of automatic control, theory of information, theory of mass.operation? etc. The role.of military engineering psychology increases in the course of the technical rearmament of the forces. It was born in the 1940's as in independent. science in connection with the tasks that had to be resolved in the design of military equipment. At the present time the military psycho- logists are engaged in a detailed study of human functions in the operation of aircraft, radar equipment, missile complexes and. other types of complex military equipment. In the US, for instance, psychological research was primarily concentrated in the air force. Now special attention is being devoted to an investigation. of. the role of. humans on board a space ship, in the interests of the military utilization of space. What problems does military engineering, psychology resolve? The most important program is the determination of the optimal distribu- tion of functions between man and military equipment. This is particularly important with regard to automated systems which functions should be dele- gated?to the machine, and which ones should be left up to humans? This, to a great extent, pr::determines not only the reliability and accuracy of the gntire sarstem Approvea Por Kelbalilit2OiCkii0k411.(elikAbP(etrOWS11060301T01910011-4 Approvgd For Release 2000108/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 Tile distribution of functions between man and machine is, first ef all, a psychological question. Engineering psychology permits the most comprehensive analysis of the possibilities available to man and machines, and helps to determine the functions and efficiency of each of them. The continuous development of technology and the perfection of personnel makes it necessary for engineering psychology to periodically re-eValuatc the functions of homans and machines. The practical resolution of the given problem insistently demands a detailed determination of the psychological structure of the human opera- tor's activities, as the most important link in the control system. Spe- cial research carried out by psychologists indicate that the structure of this activity is highly peculiar and complex, since it is associated with the utilization of clearly expressed "game" control systems and with the resolution of operating tasks. The specific features of this activity is, first of all, the remote control method of operating weapons, equipment and processes. The thing is that tne actual missiles and targets, as a rule, are inaccessible for direct perception. The operators of a radar station, for example, do not see the actual targets they are tracking, while the operators of the control systems of some missile installations see neither the target, nor the missiles themselves. This peculiarity gives rise to a number of individual operations decoding of information being perceived, restoration of information either lost or distorted by noise, analysis of the information for' sense, and other operations? It is also necessary to say that the activity of the operator, parti- cularly a military operator, has not yet been fully studied. This to a great degree explains the difficulties eneountered in the creation of theoretical informational models describing the behavior of the operator in various systems. In all cases when determining the place and role of the operator in technical systems profound knowledge and an all around accounting is required of the possibilities of the person's analysers (sensory organs), the maximum speed with which he can act, his accuracy, reliability and resistance to interference when working. It is necessary to know these characteristics for each of the stages involved in the work of the operator both in the perception of information and the resolution of problems, and in the performance of various operations in response. The limits of sensitivity of human analysers are ccmmonly called thres- holds. Stimuli are not perceived beyond the upper and lower thresholds. The resolving power of the eye3 for instance, under favorable comAtions of visibility on the average is equal to one angular minute, Objects with smaller angular characteristics are not perceived by the eye. The thres- hold of discrimination is reversely proportional to the contrast threshold. The latter is equal to l?5-200 percent (in the sphere of medium brightness). Under normal conditions the eye reacts to colors having wave lengths of from 380 to 760 mm. The human audio analyser distinguishes sounds within l62O cycles er second Lb ex thousand cycleAltiVicwfAtilEIROMr2CM9M. : CIA-RDP85 00870 CPYRGHT App i uved . 4JI F Relccic 2000/00/09 . CIA-RDP0ST00075R000300090011-4 The. humanAotteeption time for elementary information and for its pro- an average of 0.25-0.30 of a second. The minimum reaction time to signalsiraming. in rapid succession is around 0.25 of a second, with intervals of from 2.57 to 2.91 seconds between the signals, while the mini- mum interval between the signals must be no less than 0.5 of a second. If tho interval is less the reaction to the next signal is delayed. It should. be mentioned that the limits of human sensitivity are not permaneetIy unchangeable. They depend on the influence of external factors and, in addition to that,. as it will be pointed out later, they change in the process of. training and with the acquiSition of practical experience. Modern psychology has hundreds of characteristics similar to those cited above. Their correct accounting will substantially incru,3e the accuracy. and efficiency with which the equipment is used. -Ihe importance of thislecomes evident if it is taken into account that the probability of error free work by a system ar; a whole is equal to the product of the probability of error free work or each element. The least accurate ele- ment in.the control systems turns out to be man. A decrease in his errors, in a number of. cases, may be more effective for the entire system, than a decrease., in the errors of the machine links. There is, for instance, no point in making a super accurate instrument, if the scale is calibrated so that the. operator can make gross errors in taking the readings from it. That is_why an incomplete, iind all the more, an inaccurate accounting of the psychic possibilities of man lead to a sharp decrease in the effective- ness of the various systems, and sometimes completely nullifies the techni- cal possibilities of such systems. The problem concerning the reliability of human work has been studied much less than the problem concerning speed and accuracy of human actions. At the same time, in the opinion of many scientists, this is important not only for technology, but also for modern psychology. This refers to a determination of the length of time during which the operator can perform various operations with an assigned degree of accuracy, a determination of the which. his soetilled reliability changes in the course of the day, the causes of these changes, etc. The reliability of the operator is associated with his working ability, and with the degree of fatigue. It was not by accident that so much time was devoted to questions concerning fatigability of humans,. particularly in the process of receiving and pro- cessing information, at the XV Inter-national Congress on Applied Psychol- ogy. The reliability of the work performed by operators depends also on their capacity for observation, in other words, their mental and sensory viii/ance. The thing is that constant observation of homogeneous signals quickly brings about the state of fatigue and drowsiness, which decreases vigilance. Under conditions involving monotonous observations the opera- tor can miss an important signal. The struggle against such phenomena is also a task of military engineering psychology. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 5 Approved ForReJease 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 ine reliability of the operator also depends on his resistance to interference, i.e., on his ability to work in a concentrated manner under conditions involving distracting stimuli (noise, vibrations, high or low temperature). The problems of the operator's resistance to interference has not yet been adequately studied. The available research material, devoted, in part, to the influence of noise and vibration on humans in aircraft, submarines and tanks, indicate that external interference cause perceptible shifts in an entire series of physiological and psychic func- tions, at the same time deaccelerating sensory-motor processes. The influence of such interference is intensified particularly in dangerous situations, causing affective psychic states in humans. These states are expressed mostly in tenseness, which seems to bind the operator, and when it changes into fear it disorganizes all of his activities. In view of the fact that the combat work of a soldier-operator will take place in most cases in dangerous situations, the problem of tenseness is not only a specific problem, but one of the most important problems of military psychology in general and of 'military engineering psychology in particular. Unfortunately this problem has also been investigated only to a limited degree. The initial results that are available indicate that military engineering psychology can contribute something useful in this respect as well. In order to achieve an optimum distribution of functions between the operator and the military equipment it is necessary to know the mechanisms of the informational activity of humans, their capability of receiving, processing, storing and transmitting information. It is known that the human brain consists of 12-16 billion neurons and has a colossal capacity for storing information: from 1.5-106 to 1021 binary units4. Humans, however, utilize less than half of these potential possi- bilities. The thing is that information flows to the brain several times slower than it is processes in the brain. The "input" of information is carried out through the human analysers and therefore depends on their transmissivity. The transmissivity of the visual analyser, at first glance, may appear to be most significant. It is, for instance, equal to 58 binary units per second in the identification of digits, and 91 binary units in the identification of letters. This, however, pertains only to the sim- plest information, to the resolution of elementary identification problems. As the task is made more complicated, the transmissivity of the visual analyser drops sharply. It also depends on the signal time, their content, the degree of fatigue and the training background of the operator. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 6 CPYRGHT Approvcd Forlicicaoc 2000/08/09 : CIA RDP85T0087512000300090011 4 Such a substantial diversion between the information storage capacity of the brain and the possibilities of feed information to it poses an exceptionally important problem before science the problem of the optimum information coding. The latter presupposes the resolution of such problems as the selection of the optimum character of the signals, the saturation of each signal with information, the determination of the permissible rate at which the signals may be ii,:esented in different forms, and under different working conditions. Military engineering psychology resolves these questions primarily as they apply to the work of military operators. The resolution of the ques- tion concerning the analyser that could be used to the best advantage for the 'transmission of various signals (visual, audio, etc.). The reading of aircraft instruments, for instance, is primarily a visual. function. As a result of this the visua1 analyser is overloaded, and the pilot tires easily which leads to errors in aircraft cortrol and often results in accidents. Engineering psychology research indicated the realistic possibility of eas- ing the load on the pilot's vision by shifting part of the visual signals to audio signals. The results that were obtained confirmed that a more optimum distribution of signals among the different analysers facilitates control. of the aircraft and makes it more accurate and reliable. Humans are not as fast as machines, they are not as good as the machine in their resistance to interference, in transmissivity and in other parameters. A modern electronic computer, for instance, is capable of performing 10,000 operations per second, while a neuron of the visual analyser is capable of only several dozen operations per second. There occurs the question whether man should be completely exclude from the control system? It turns out that this is impossible to accomplish. Man is not chained, by a program, and he possesses great sensory (perceptional) flexibility, i.e., he has the capacity of properly evaluating signals within much greater limits than a machine, he can react to the most unex- pected signals, and also select the most economical methods of action in a situation that.may develop, etc. Man, therefore, is the most universal and plastic link in the control system. An important problem of military engineering psychology is the pro- vision e the designers with necessary data for the design of new types of military equipment (particularly units involving the reflection of information being received,, and controls). The participation of military psychologists is necessary in all stages of the work -- from the design of the system to its implementation into serial production. They will help from the very start to correctly distribute functions between man and machines and bring the design into correspondence with human capa- bilities, thus avoiding numerous unfortunate blunders. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 7 85T00875n00300090011-4 . AtirnicttedsFclraggArefflo3PRigri9e:sqM.P.Phas now peen carried out in the field of engineering psychology, devoted to the design of the eperatort' work places, the determination. of the most effective forms and dimensions of instrument dials, and to the study of aircraft controls. The principles involved in the distribution of fittings on the control panels have now been more or less determined. The 'Rain principles is the principle, of significance, in accordance with which everything associated with the performance of the main operation must be located in the most con- venient spots, in a scientifically important one. It demands the grouping of indicator instruments and controls according to their purpose. The fre- quency of use principle should also be mentioned, in accordance with which the instruments used most frequently must always be "under hand." Quite a few special investigations were devoted to the problem of the readability of the indicator instruments, with the aid of which information is transmitted from the machine to man in the present day control systems. Just recently the prevalent opinion was that the larger the instrument the greater the speed and accuracy with which it is read. Research determined that dials with a diameter of around 75 mm are read best if they are located no more than 75 cm from the operator's eyes. The efficiency with which the dials are read is, in general, determined by their angular dimensions. According to the results producedlby the experiments the optimal angular dimensions of the scales are within 2.50 - 5.00. As far as the calibration of the dials is concerned, the minimum width of the lines on the dials must be 1.5-2 times greater than the threshold width. In the case of small air- craft instruments, for instance, the lines must be 0.8-1.0 mm wide, while the lines on the larger instruments must be 1.2-1.5 mm. When using symbol indicators the first place position in identification accuracy is possessed by digits formed by straight lines. In many control systems a. considerable effect is produced by the use of combination indi- cators, for instance, those combining radar images with symbol indication. Color coding, i.e., the utilization of color as a signal, particularly violet, blue, green, yellow and red colors (depending on the demands made on the dials and their purposes), is very effective? Until recently, in designing controls, economy of working motions of the operator was the main consideration. In accordance with that principle it was consireered that of all the possible motions executed by the operator those requiring the least effort should be selected, covering the least distance. Such an approach proved to be somewhat incorrect. Present day research in the field of engineering psychology indicates that the economy of motions prineiple is not the main factor in the design of controls. Principal errors made by the operator are caused not by the extra efforts and motions, but by the improper design of control panels, which do not provide optimal conditions for action in accordance with the task. m ApiPSvedFaikeVAV20663/118/0Y: tiN-R0018gri0016Y6REMIM092011st64t of the fact 8 CPYRGHT Appruved Fur Release 2000/08/09 . CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 that he confuses. the controls, forgets to execute necessary actions, and ,performs the reverse moticns. All this, in tiw last analysis, is associated iiith the f'iifficullies of dist: guiahing controls and relating them to the readings on the indicator instruments. Military engineering psychology is mak- ing concrete recommendations for the best distribution r-f con- trols in the aircraft cockpits. Interest: is presented by data concerning the highest effi- ciency whic) is attained in manipulating cont::.ols, thc5MTciai. and time ch,?::.:!cteristics of whose movements -rn coordinated with signal. It has been proven that the (Y'Ficiency of work done by a pe on increases '.'en specil inicator instrumens are used sng the results of klis Tct4on.1, i.e., wher there is feedback.. in the control pron.s. 'i ,.s permits an immediate rectification of any error and increases the safety in the operation of various systems. Still, despite the positive results that have been attained this field can be considered as having been fully elaborated at the level of present day military practice. The psychomotor sphere of .the operator's activities should be studied. The concept that the "button" activity of the op2rator is elemen- tary from the viewpoint of its dynamic qualities, is far from the truth. An investigation of this question indicates that even the simplest motions have a complex structure. For instance when dressing a button the fingers perform over 60, and when a toggle switch is tripped, .over 80 micro-motions. The motor activity of the operator as a whole Must be just as complex in the light of such data We know very little about that however. At the same time a detailed knowledge of these questions would permit a new approach to the design of controls, and could open up new ways of rationaling the operator's work. On the whole the task of military engineering psychology consists not only of adapting the equipment to man as well as possible, but also, on the contrary, of "adapting" man to the equipment as. well. This gives rise to as important a problem as the elaboration of scientifically substantiated recommenda- tions concerning the development of sensitivity, m-mf)ry, rapid thinking and psychomotor qualities in the military personnel. Practice and special research convincingly indicate that .there are great reserves available for increasing the sensory, motor and intellectual possibilities of humans. It is known, for instance, that the rosolving power of the eyes of trained aerial photo interpreters, (binocular vision) is equal to sev- ert14 AWEPAPRel@MRPARANMEMMISMODOMMTOMOZROOMMAWOVIEkperienced CPYRGHT Approved Fur Reledbe 2000/08/09 C1A-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 rilots can detect: a 1A-27. change in the number of engine revolu- tions, wl?ereas ordinary people can detect a fM-107, change in engine revolutions. in order to utilize these psycho-physiological reserves 'Jpecially (7cganized training of the soldiers is required. Con- sequently pliitary engineering psychology is capable of making a substantial contribution to the training of Soviet soldiers, partibularly of the engineering troops,. Let us not, by the way, think that the method of training military operators is just now making its first steps and does not yet have a sufficient theo- retical-pedagogical basis. The participation of military engi- neering psychology in the design of trainers, training display stands, and other training aids. Military engineering psychology must have its say in the programming of training as well: it must determine the trans- missivity of various analysers, the necessary time for presenta- tion of information, the adaptation of so-called "training machines" to man, etc. The errors that have occurred in this sphere are associated with the inadequate elaboration of theo- retical fundamentals of programmed training, in part, with the underevaluation of the data in general, pedagogical and engi- neering psychology. Here military engineering psychology links up with the psychology of labor, pedagogical psychology and militaly psychology. An investigation of the possibilities of simulating psycho- logical processes, primarily those of perception and reasoning with 17(:! aid of electronic computers, is of considerable signi- ficance among the other problems of military engineering psycho- logy. The role of this problem increases with the further impleme'ltation of automation into military practice. The simulation of psychological processes also has con- siderable practical significance in the creation of automatic identification machines that could interpret aerial photographs, read topographical maps and various graphic combat documents, and could also preceive oral commands. This is an exceptionally complex problem, for the perceiving mechanisms must simulate not only complex analytical-synthetic processes of semantic perception and identification. The per- ception devices created in the US, of the "perceptron" type, have thus far been able to identify only simple objects on aerial photographs with precise outlines. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 10 Appruved Fur Reledbe 2000/08/09 . CIA-RDP83T00873R000300090011-4 One of the premises for the further automation of the identification process, the creation of more perfect auto- matic machines, is the study and simulation of various psychic operations, of which the act of perception is formed. Some of the important problems faced by military engi- neering psychology are also the study of group activity of military specialists in the controlling process, study of certain linked psychic and functional. relationships, an increase in their independence, as well as study of the problem of psycho- physiological compatability. The latter is a boundary problem between social and engineering psychology. It is also necessary to mention the problem concerning the selection of operators for various branches and arms of the armed forces on the basis of psychology testing. In the past few years there has been certain animation in the sphere of military psychology and pedrogy, and a number of textbooks and collections were published. Unfortunately almost all of them .fail to illuminate questions pertaining to military engineering psychology, inasmuch as there is still a lack of experimental and statistical materials. The urgent nature of the problems that have arisen requires a broader development of special research in military educational estab- lishments and the scientific research institutions. Notes: 1. Engineering psychology, a comparatively new science, investigates the relationship between man and machine in "man-machine" systems. This article examines the military aspects of engineering psychology in the light of the revo- lution, in military :=7cie-Ince. 2. Electronic Information Display Systems, Washington-London, 1963 3. The resolving power of the eye is its ability to distinguish two objects at a certain ditance. 4. The binary unit oi information , is the amount of information received as a result of the one time selection out of two equally probable possibilities. This involves two arbitrary opposite signs (+, -; 1.0 and others. Binary,units serve to designate any letter or digit with the aid of different com- binations of only two signals in the preparation of textual or digital information for processing 4y computers. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00030U090011-4 11 Approvea ror Keiease ZUUU/Uo/UU : UIA-KUVUO I UUd/OKUUUJUUUUUU11-4 Notes: 5. Inzhenernaya psikhologiya sbornik statey (Engineering Psychology. A Collection of Articles (Translated from English) , "Progress" Publishing House, 1964; Problem inzhenerno sikholo?ii (material- 1-y lenin- gradskoy on erentsii po inz enernoy psik, (Pro- blems of Engineering Psychology Material: . the First Leningrad Conference on Engineering Psychology) , Publish- ing House of the Academy of Sciences ESFSR, Issue No 1, 1964; Iv3ues 2 and 3, 1965. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 12 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 STRATEGY AND TRANSPORT CPYRGHT by Maj nen Tech Trps Ya. SHEPENNIKOV and Col Ye. NENSBERn It is genekuly known that military strategy depends, to a decisive degree, on the state of countrY-; economy, part of which is transport. Prom' its Si,oe stracerv? .xerts a most direct influence on-i:he developmpnt of the entire _ransportation system. To he sure, in various historical periods and in different States this interdependenbo was manifested Lo an unequal degee and in vaz-ious forms. Howcver, to the extent of improvement of the armed force3 and military art and the raising of production and means of communication to a higher level, the recrprocal influ7 Jence of strategy and transport steadily increased, which has been particularly demonstrated in recent years with the. radical change in the methods and means of armed combat and the notice- able increase in the capabilities of all types of transport. In contemporary conditions the overwhelming majority of technical, technological, economic and organizational problems concerning the improvemerit and utilization of the transportation network to one degree or nOther affect the interests of mili- tary strategy. This is completely natural inasmuch as the con- ditions and operation of the transportation network in peacetime to a great extent determirgthe capability of its use both for the timely strengthening of the defense capability of a country or military coalition, and for supporting the combat operations of armed forCes in case of the outbreak of war.. For e)cample, the construction of new and the reconstruction 'Of existing com- municationfnetworks, the development of junttions and other connecting points of the various types of transport, the modern- ization of rolling stock, the improvement of methods and equip- ment for the control of traffic, etc. are of very important significance for strategy. All of these factors to one degree or another influence the organization of the movement of troops and their supply of all the necessities for waging combat opera- tions. 1 That is why one of the important missions the systematic study of the ..routing, condition the communication network which can be used to wage war. An evaluation is made both on one's territory of a probable enemy of the condition and the transportation objectives of strategic of strategy is and capacity of prepare for and own and on the of communications' importance, the possibilities of their use, and also the means, methods, prior- ities and time periods of influence upon them in case of need. Arrroved For Roience 2nnn1n81nci ? ria_prpgrajawsgaanaanuti1..4 13 ApproxteelfrAtift9te@sliivROP/a?/0..PAPROPPPPIT-cfleg5FPYRNN989.1/11.mpor t ant to GHIorrectly determined requirdd time periods, volume of military transport and required carrying capacity of the routes of com- munication. Strategy determines the requirement of armed forces and, within fLs own resources, of transport maintenance and ser- vice (rehabilitation, exploitation, and other factors), directs their preparation and implements the general management of the activity of military transport services. Agencies of strategic leadership should plan measures directed at a shielding (defense, protection) strategically important transportation objectives from enemy attack, and in case of destruction of important equipment and installations on the routes of commuhication provide for the possibility of mov- ing troops on foot and shifting freight traffic from one type of transport to another. In the solution of its problems military strategy is guided by the principle of the greatest combined use of all types of transport as, in cortemporary conditions, nut one of them individually is in a condition to insure the accomplish- ment of all wartime transportation. The strategic leadership has at its disposal a special military-tran6port apparatus. Its structure depends on the composition and organization of the armed forces and also on the system of governmental control of transportation, and therefore in various countries it is different. However, these agencies have basically similar pur- poses and responsibilities. As a rule in both peacetime and wartime each of them: prepares and presents to the strategic leadership materials (calculations, projectq, plans, etc.), whiCh are necessary for solution by the government of national overall transport prob- lems, in particular the preparation of networks for operation during wartime; insures, controls and considers on the basis of instruc- tions of the leadership, in coordination with governmental economic, transport and ()the). agencies, the implementation of decisions applicable to these problems and individual ques- tions; takes necessary measures for the timely fulfillment of the requirements of the armed forces for movements and trans- portation using all forms of transport; directs the organization, training and operation of the military transport services. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 14 PYRGHT Approyed For Relea5e 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 Pile work in the military transport agencies of subordinate management echelons is conductel in accordance with these basic 'functions of the higher military transport agency. One of the most important missions of military strategy consists of the determination of the special purpose orientation and methods of develppment of the transportation network to meet the conditions and character of the conduct of the war. In socialist countries the complex development and use of types of transport as component parts of a single network and the coordinated implementation of transportation is accomplished in accordance with the national economic plans. In caFitalist countries transport companies also fully understand the economic advantages of mutually coordinated devel- opment of railroad networks and highways, oil and gas lines, water routes and airlines. This also explains the urge toward amalgamation of various types of transport into single transport monopolies. Such a tendency is especially strikingly apparent in the US where railroad companies are joining with motor trans- port and river transport enterprises. There is an expanding sphere of mixed transport of commercial freight using not only containers but also piggy-back service (truck trailers trans- ported on rail flat-cars, ferries, boats), containers on wheels (rolling stock with chassis, trailer and brake devices adaptable for both rail and highway movement), and river?and sea-going craft. The movement of freight using containers, piggy-back service and container cars is most-widely used in the US and West Germany. Thus, in 1963 in the US alone,about 800,000 flat- cars were used only for piggy-back- service; in West Germany container cars replaced abotA 400,000 two-axle'frei-ght cars. In Canada almost 200,000 flatcars were loaded with containers and truck trailers - 35 percent more than in 1961; and the extent of mixed rail-motor vehicle transport also increased in France and England. On this basis there is also an ever expanding introduction of combined movement of troops and equipment using various types of transport under the centralized direction of the.military transport agencies. Depending on the scale of the movement (intercontinental, within the limits of adjoining-theaters, insidea single theater of military operations, etc.) their man- agement is concentrated in the hands of the. military transport agency of the corresponding command (supreme, high command in the_theatar s_fi Approyea Kelease-zvui.nueff 7CIA?Ftt085TOAIMR000t000iteel 1 cond half of 15 Amoroved.For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 RGHT963 Derense Department organized on a trial basis the mixed container transportation of military freight from central warehouses located in the interior of the country to bases of troop units located in West Germany. The 'movement was accom- plished according to a single plan in the sequence rail, sea, again rail, and followed by motor vehicle transport with direct trans-shipping of the containers (freight car-ship -- freight car;-motor vehicle). Delivery of the freight shipment took 10 days. Analysis of historical experience and the research of foreign military specialists reveals that development of means of communication, taking into account the requirements of the national economy and the considerations of strategy, promotes an increase in the economic and military pitential of the coun- try and creates the most favorable conditions for transportation support of operations of armed forces in the course of a war. There exist two different methods for development of the network. If one proceeds primarily from considerations of the development of the economy th7en it is most rational to estab- lish on the main axis of transport high capacity rail lines, motor vehicle highways and other main lines with large traffic capacities. This makes it possible to concentrate high capacity. freight and passenger traffic on a comparatively small number of such main routes, to put them into operation in short periods of time, and to make the most economical and effective use of transportation facilities. However, in wartime such a network will limit the possibility of dispersing hauling,.loading and unloading of troops and cargo. In addition to this, it is very vulnerable and the rebuilding of destroyed major objectives (for example, rail centers) requires large expenditures of time, personnel and resources. Taking this into considerations all developed countries of the world are increasing the density of the networks of routes of communication in order to create the most favorable conditions for transportation support of possible operations of armed forces. In this manner vitality is increased and the capabilities for dispersing transportation and increasing the maneuverability of transport and the like are being expanded. In the years of the first 5-year plans, preceding the Great Patriotic War, in the interior regions of our country, especially in the eastern part possessing enormous natural resources, in the interest of building the socialist economy there was developed the construction of new and the reconstruc- tion d'Fei vehicle 16 ? A p gnotaettF 0 dielelasp 211MCi81119S CtIA-F4PP Wn.(14 8 NV OROPMU 1fr tworks were established. And during these years there was in essence created an entire network of qualitatively new routes of communication with considerably greater capacity than form- erly. It is important to note that the increase in trans- portation operations proceeded considerably faster than the increase in the extent of routes of communication; ,:hat is, the'nes-EWork was used more ihtensively on a continuing basis (table 1). Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T01875R000300090011-4 CPYRGHT Approve:41 Fnr RPIPaSP 700010R109 ? cIA-RnpR5TnnR75Rnnnfinnn9nni 1-Lt Table 1 Increase in 1940 in Relation to 1928 (1928 e Teals 1) Type Transport Freight Traffic Passenger Traffic Distance Remarks Rail 4.4 4.0 1.38 Ministry of Trans- port railroads River 2.3 1.8 1.5 Routes for general use* Motor Vehicle Oil Pipeliner! 44.o 5.8 4.9 am on 4.5 2.5 Hard surface roads Mainline pipelines *Sea transport service in not included in view of its connectionwetth foreign trade. communications. The progress of the transportation system in our country played a definitely positive role bpth in the Initial period of the war and in the future course of military operations. In wars of the not too distant past, depending on the dimensions of the territory of a country, the enemy's means and methods of influence and the protection from them, strategy made an entirely different demand on the transportation network in the rear of the country,and on that in the theaters of military operations. of miiitn,ry orciltttnm, In probable theaters of military operations great attention was devoted not only to increasing the density of the transportation network, but also to increas- ing its vitality to the depth of the range of weapons of destruction which the enemy had at his disposal. In contemporary conditions the directed purpose and methods of develop- ment of ti-t transportation network and timely :_)reparation for operation at the beginning period of a possible war would have to be changed. Currently military operation can be spread over the entire territory of a country. All branches of the economy of a country, including the transportation system must be prepared for this in advance, and that factor, of course, must be taken into consideration during peacetime development. The solution of problems raised in the area of transportation for the years 1961-1980 by the CPSUXXIInd Party Congress plays and will continue to play a role of no small importance in the preparation of the USSR for the jjiuveJ Fvi Relecte 2000/0 . -R/T05T00075R0003000 CRYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 prevention of possible aggression and for the repulsion and immediate rout of the enemy. Among the important problems to be solved in the interest of the national economy are: the expansion of transportation and road construc- tion; further technical renewal of railrold and other types of transport; significant increase in the speeds on railroads; ocean and river wateeways; coordination of the development of all types of transport as component parts of a single transportation system. In accordance with this at the present time the construction of new and the reconstruction of operational routes of communication, primarily on those axes where the growth of transportation requirements is most intense, are being expanded and accelerated. For coping with large volume freight shipments in short periods of time and for the economic use of transportation facilities on these ages there are being developed main lines equipped with powerful equipment possessing high trans- portation and traffic capabilities. Going into operation are railroad lines with electric and diesel-electric .re'action, deep-water river routes, developed seaports and canals, motor vehicle roads with improved surfaces, mainline rail- and gaslines, and important airlines of Union-wide significance. In conformity with the development of the mainline systme, inner-region trans- portation construction is also being accomplished. Characteristic in transportation machinery building is the inerease in tractive power and in the freight and carrying cpapcity of rolling stock. Of course, to meet the demands of economy other types are also produced; for example, boats for small rivers, small capacity cargo vehicles, etc. At the same time the traveling speed of transportation equipment is also increasing (design, road, cruising). In the course of the next few years the development of the indices on individual lines might be brought to the following magnitudes (table 2). Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 19 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-ftea817,90875R000300090011-4 Freight Lift Speed Transport Units or Capacity (km/hr) Remarks Freight Train 8,000-10,000 tons 100 Gross weight Express train 1,000 persons 140-160 On some lines up to 200 i/hr Tanker 80,000 tons 35 In the future., up to 11-5 km/kr Cargo Ship 12,000-15,000 tons 120-130 On hydrofoils - Truck-trailer large capacity 70-80 tone 80-100 On roads of categories I - II Passenger plane, jet 200 persons 1,000 In the fixture 12D to 2,000-3,000 km/hr The increase in carrying caparv-ity and speed of transport units is being combined with improved routes, control, sitgla.1 and communications equipment, and with the ever-increasing introduction of automation, remote controls and other types of the latest te.chnology. Servicing of the rolling stock classi- fying and. loading-unloading operations are being concentrated in Darcy! trans- portation centers equipped with large-scale means for the complex mechaniza- tion of labor consuming work. Of important significance is the accomplishment of a complex of large- scale technical, technological and organizational measures for the purpose of coordinating the development of all types of transport as component parts of a single transportation Ftystem. The distribution of transportation between types of transnort is beinc; im-nroved?. In the design, conBtx..ut.l.ion and reConstrup- tl?n nutes of oommunicatIOrs uwd jointly for Pomplcx tranb porttan thircii.S.behig d e- 'velopect a closer correlation of the traffic and carryin6 capacities ruid the operational capacity of components of terminals and transshipment )orts etc., and coordination of basic parameters of rolling stock especially applicable to the conditions of the productivity of transshipment (reload- ing) work. Important also is the increase in the production of containers and piggy back trailers, rolling stock for theit transportation and also for the mixed transportation of various types of freight for direct shipment, as well as the coordination of traffic schedules and technological processes at junction points of various routes of communication. Special agencies Annrovcdr llclea3c 2000/08/09 ? CIA RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 20 CPYRGHT Amotelifigr SietiOWR29ffiOM9 glIMNPok5DP?T5IN9P.Pc9R9R1,1, he omb IncA1 (q)emL t I Y1 Of various types of transport, and the planning and. Implementation of trano- portation. The direct cooperation of transport and other agencies participa- tina in the organization and implementation of transportation is also beinn improved. Scientific and technical collaboration and reciprocal assistance in pro- duction between socialist countries in the building of transport equiament and meachinery and the technical use of all types of transport is constantly expanding. International freight and passenger movemento, the greater part of which are transported by railroads, are being accomplished accordina to coordinated plans. In conformity with the trend of development of transport, military strtt- egy defines general principles and concrete methods for its timely preparation for steady operation in wartime, taking into consideration. the probable character of a future war. It can be anticipated that in a contemporary war transport will suffer large- scale losses: it is possible that there will be complete or partial destruction of many important transportation centers, large briclges, ports, canals, lo?ks, and main civilian airports, as well as power failures on the main electric rail- roads. From the very first hours of the war it is possible that the trans- portation system dill be cut into a namber of mutually isolated regions and sectors with a considerable portion Of the latter iocatcd in zones of strong radio-active contamination. The transportinn apacitT of all types of transport will decrease shortly. Together with this along the netwcrIc of the communication routes there must be carried out was movements cf troop the transportation of materiel and other movements which must be accomplished in very compressed time periods. In peacetime the greater portion of transportation is accomplished by railroads. In the Soviet Union; for example, in 1965, of the total freight hauled according to plan the proportim of rail traasport was approximately 70 percent, maritime (inclusing foreign trade) - over 14 perceat, mainline oil-pipelines - almost 6 percent, motor vehicle over 5 percent, river less than 5 percent, and air - 0.1 percent. According to current calculation in 1980 the rail transport portion of the over-all freight turnover will be re- duced to 58-55 percent, and the others will have a corresponding increase to 42-45 percent. As for the absolute volume of freight. turnover of the railroads during the period 1966-1980, it should increase approximately 2.4-2.5 times. A corresponding change in the proportion of freight turnover of individual types of' transport will take place also in many other socialist countries. In case of an outbreak of war the role of various types of transport in the implementation of transportation will be substantally changed. Rail- roads and internal waterways with large hydrotecbnical facilities might be dIstroved inema will be possible QATFOTRelSe14619068Rilt 61A-Kr6FteriAnMb030110g011at-4 Omyru. er complaetion of a l'arge volume of work. Less vulnerable are pipe- CPYR(HT rtwari Pnr Raloacci 9nnninRinci ? ri A_pnpRgTnnR7gpnnnlnnnanni -A I. Li( (t.A.) n.j.,? :OA.] Icf..!:1) /LTA! 11101,1.1.1.' ron(0;? eip.1.1.1)mer1i., is required for tliteir 1est,i)rati(,r.1.; p..!.t.:1,)ary.1.1. and Proeeeding from the l'ore;,,,oinr., weuld. be 1.(n.Leal. at the benintann: niLld. 0 a ?,/,'L 1 t!) aseLjo. 1,hi: Walla ti.,11.1;1pOrtatiOn. t.?.( ;f101:0.1. VC 11 .I.C.Lu Line rring port,. However, in app.Lientl.c,n thlic net prael,.iieel. th.k:y canin-ik un- Ond..1 1. 1 unally pitiCe ra Lread trans port; in. al I. )I :1.( ? . i trnot, )tulL on the fact that in theatern 0 In! .)1Y IL) bo possible 1.,e mein! ma:nimum use of motor vehicle and ti. r tranepor (in additien, to pump 1v L inroegh pipelines), or to use rn..Lirolids for almost al.. t]yansportation .in or Of the. C pun' i;r .!7,11(2 f.r.31:, pinCe it In I;1197/1.1 tha t the enemy steive to deliver pe-,,rerf:n1 nue-Lear rt on obje(A.:tes located. in the rear areae, of the comtry. in the second. place, the deneit,y uS tie,: rail- road system in many of the in regions Is lo on than that, for cen.mple? t ht! IP.: stern theater of :ailltary operation. Thus, L:ivinc, the average nallread density of the USSR a value of 100 percent, and comparing it with the (1.(inr_;-_;.-!...y of several of the Union Repn-nlics, then, for exnmple, in Kazakhstan the reiative magnitude nould be abeut 70 percent, whereasin Belorussia it .Lecreancs approximately l .5 times) in the Ukraine almost 6 titne s, and in 12,a1tie almost 7 -tines The density of .the railroad network is even higher tel other soe.Lal.Lot countries of F;urov.-.. For example, in Rumania it Is approx- imately )i..6 km per 100 sq. 1:in of territory, in Poland - 8. 5, in Hungary - 11.1, in Czechoslovakia - 12.1t rind in East Germany - 15 km per 100 sq.. km (Socin,list and Cajzitalist Countries in Fic;unes. Gospolitizdat, 1963. Data compiled for 1961- In)(72 and rounded off to 0.1 km per 100 sq. 1;w.) Without the help of motor vehicle, pipeline, and, whore possible, also air transport, rear area railroad lines will not be able to operate. Consequenty, for the movement of troops, hauling of freight and other transportation all available routes of eommuniteation and transportation equipment jhould be used in the mont e::pedient combinations. The principle of their combined and mutually coordinated use fully preserves its importance both in theaters of military operations and in the interior regions of the country. In this connection it is necessary to establish Which specific combinations and forms of coordination of various types of transport will be most rational and in accordance with this develop basic means for the primary support of the operational capability of systems in strategically important sectors. Military strategy and the theory of military communications are involved in the solution to these problems. The greatest difficulty in the organization of transport work arises in connection with the destruction of objectives on railroads and inland water routes. There are varied means for overcoming such bariers. The selection of the mast rational of them depends on many conditions of the actual situation. However, in any case the factor of time, which usually is determining, will 'lay the main role. Aooroved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 22 CPYRGHT AppluvedFyi Relecte 2000/00/09 . CIA-RDP05T00075R000300090011-4 Thus, st'or example? to restore de:.3t1'oyed. locks and reestablish through traffic of ships along a canal. in the beginning period. of' war will not be pf.vsible primarily because cri? lack of time. For this very reason it will not lie possible in a timely manner to restore a blocked. tunnel on a railroad line and open it again for the through traffie of' trains. .En tubr3 period 'railroads can be re c s t ructed for the thrcu gh traffic of' t rains til rough sonic d stroyed j tine t ions; temporary railroad bridges could be built (varteties of short t(..!rf?:..onntruction, .I'loating? etc). Productive work at time will be made difficult by obstacles, fires and the high. level of radiution. It, should olro be taiien account that the traffic capa- city of' temporary installations and structures is usually not so great. For example, in re-rout, train traffic because of' a destroyed. bridge from a double-track span ro a single-track temporary detour provided by a short,- term construction, bridge, the traffic capacity will reduced several times in comparison with that over the direct route prior to the destruction. If, on the detour, ills required to use another ,ro.d, less powerful type of locomotive or to decrease the weight of the trains the.n the traffic capacity will be reduced even more. Depending on the conditicaL,4 of !7;itu.atior. -in, the interior regions of the country and. in the theaters of militanr operations, over various sec- tors of the transportation system and for different distances there can also be made direct rail, motor vehicle; river and air movements, and also troops can be moved on foot. In theaters of military operations and in regions of combined operations of ground troops, movements of large and individual units will be completed on foot and, the transportation r.q' mir,ere1. by means of through services, with parallel use. of' motor vehicle and air trnasport and field.s pipelines. As is known, armament, composition, organization, military art and also stratesy depend primarly at', a given (noment (-i.e.' the degree of production attained and on the means of communication. With tie development of railroads, the in- crease in their traffic capacity and in the fre:ight carry:inFr cpapcity of roll- ing stock, tempos and volume of military transport increased and the concen- tration of troops and their supply was facilitated. The specific influence of the condition of the railroad ystem on the time periods of strategic deployment of' troops can be seen in the example of Germany and Russia during the first world war. Germany was able to complete strategic deployment of 'the 13th. day after the notice of mobilization, whereas Russia, becuase of the lack of a developed railroad system and front line roads along the western border, only on the 214-th day. It is natural that already at that time both the Russian and -the German general staffs were very interested in. planning the development of the communications network on the most important strategic axes. This is natural. because the construction of railroads on the 6.4..ons during that time, 413Povce-fl PSPOWseaMMtrOlib Pdbetliktlit&OOMMOCr1000.91704-44 as, on the other hand, now also, was one of the main phases of preparation for 23 Appr uved Fur Reledbe 2000/08/09 . CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 CPYRGfire war. Tbasy if it can be so expressed, is the transport support of sper fic strategic plans and intentions, whe.reas the efforst directed at increas- ing traffic capacity of all roads in the country, the improvement of roll ii stock, etc, to a definite degree is the result of the general requirements w: strategy. And what now is the influence of strategy on the character of development of the transportation system and trarsport in general? Thorough research of this problem is considerable practical interest. In this regard it is necessary to cOnsider the constant grown in the volume of transport work and under DOW conditions. It is sailleient to recall the characteristics of transportation support for the forward movement of large troop formation, so changed in their composition. For the accomplishment of this important task all types of transport are now involved, and, of course, this situation indicates an entire complex of porblems, the solution to whicl is possible only bylong-term and timely preparation. During conditions when the continental armed forces consisted only of ground troops and the routes of communication were very poor-4 developed, military operations were conducted primarily along roads. The role of the old Smolensk road in the Patriotic War of 1812 is generally known as well as the memorable strategy of the "echeloned" war of 1918-1920. At the present time in their sectors of oeprations troops will strive not only to use the entire network of existing routes of communication, but also lay new routes idetereverr they are required. For now, as never before, the strategic mobility of troops and their capability to accomplish swift regroupings and maneuvers are conditioned by the operation of rail, otor vehicle and other types of transport. The success of the development of contemporary operations in any active military theater depends directly on the condition of routes of communication and transport equipment. And what about r-viewing the changed military requirement for materiel? It is not simply the fact that it has sharply increased. Completely new types of sup9J.y loads have appeared requiring the development of special rolling stock. The change in the compostion of supply loads has also had a marked influence on the development of transport. During the Great Patriotic War., as is known, by volume the shipment of fuels and lubricants was less than that of other freight. Now, in connection with the completion of the process of mechanization and motorization of troops, the volume of fuel transport has increased so much that previous means of transporting it are no longer satis- factory. Experience itself gave rise to the problem of the development of stationary and field pipelines, soft containers and other equipment facilita- ting the delivery of the tremendous quantity of fuel from supply bases to the troops. In such manmer, the revolution in the military_fieldying rise to a change AppaiweidtEmyReietita.t2M60/99 :ISMRPFIWIKWP.IMPonPIPIPV/1parati onn n 24 CIMMR:4-4d For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 development of transport which required a sharp increase in its vitality and readiness to support military operations characterized by the broad scope, great depth and high tempos of their conduct. In the article have been reviewed several points characterizing the re- ciprocal influence of strategy and transport. Now it is generally recognized that strategic plans will be practical only when they take into cinsideration important economic factors including the condition and capability of the trans- portation system and transportation agencies. Together with this, on the basis of newly equipped transport and the appearance of new lines and technical equipment, there can be and should be introduct.1 appropriate corrections in strategic plans. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 25 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 ON MEANS and METHODS OF PROGRAMMED TEACHING Book Review by Engr Col N. BAZANOV and Engr Lt Col V. KOSHUTIN Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 26 CPYRGHT APPron&VG4tri% ALnlag to Q0108/09 ? CIA7RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 programmea training nave recently been given in- creasing attention of both scientific workers and teachers. Interest in this subject is explained not only by the need to seek new means and methods of teaching, caused by the tumaLtuous development of science and technology, and by the ever increasing voluno of knowledge, but also by the fact that very hopeful results have already been attained in this fieldn A number of specialized works were published on the theroy and practice of programmed teaching. They include the book by A. V. Prokof'yev. The author, a military pedadogue, presents the reader with materials pertaining to the practice of programmed teaching in military educational establishments and in the units. The book reviewed here is devoted not so much to theoretical questions, as to the means and methods of programmed teaching, i.e., to the practical as- pct of thiS field and, naturally will evoke the interest primarily of those who are directly engaged in teaching, and are vitally interested in increas- ing the effectiveness of teaching. Proceeding from the fact that teaching is a controlled process, the author briefly cites the shortcomings of the ordinary teaching system, which is pri- marily of a group and mass nature, where the weak reverse link between the student and the teacher does not sufficient control over the assimi- lation of material by the students. The book provides a very competent des- cription of the essence of programmed teaching as a process in which the present day group and mass teaching processes are given individualized fea- tures and incorporate elements of constant control over the assi,vilation of various material. From the definition of the essence of programmed teaching it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that the widespread application of such teaching will allow a sharp increase in the effectiveness of group and mass methods of teaching. Principal attention in the book under review is concentrated on the means and methods of programmed teaching. After defining certain propenuisite 7'_71.- itial concepts, the author describes the methods used in propvring teaching materials for the programming of textbooks and teaching machines, and explains two main ways of arranging materials for the textbook or machine (linear and ramified program). Some chapters are devoted to a descripition of various models of machines designed in various educational establishments of the Soviet Union and abroad, and to a classification of programmed textbooks and teaching machines. A special chapter describes an automated class and teaching equipment. In conclusion the author attempts to sutriva2i.: the experience acquired in the utilization of programmed textbooks and teaching machines both at home and abroad. By way of an illustration of programmed teaching he cites some statistical data concerning the progress of the students enrolled in conven- t407eWitbriMiNgelnktibM13709qUA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : GIA-RDP85 I 00875R000.300090011-4 r;HT There is no doubt that this book will be of considerable help in the de- velopment and pe-fection of the means and methods of programmed teaching and will therefore evoke a certain amount of interest in-the reader. We would like to direct the readers' attention to certain elements of a general character that are important in order to understand the principles and the role of programmed teaching. UnLil recently there existed different viewpoint; regarding the role of the methods of programmed teh-ching, regarding the poosibilities of programed textbooks 1,4pd particularly, of the teaching machines. Some tended to consider that the cibation of sufficiently complex teaching machines, with a high level of automation, would permit the automation of all aspects of the teaching process, including final examinations and the planning of the teaching pr. cess itself. Here, it appears to us, it is necessary to caution the teachers against an over evaluation of the role of automated teaching, which reduces the instructor to the position of an operator of an "automatic teaching ma- chine." With regard to this question we hold the view that machines and prOgrammed textbooks serve to supplement and improve the pedagogical process. The assertion that "the automatic machine teaches man" as a paraphrase of "the automatic machine controls the blast furnace process the programs for the teaching machines are compiled by the teacher. Furthermore these pro- grams required considerably more creativity than that required in the conven- tional teaching system. With respect to this question the author of the book under review adheres to an opinion with which it is impossible to disagree: "Teaching machines, programmed textbooks and the entire method- of programmed teaching merely ,supplement and improve the peduogical prOcess (italics ours, reviewer) of which the teacher is an integral part. The role of the teacher remains a leading one. His functions are made somewhat more complicated., and require a different approach to the teaching porcess, particularly in the preparation and conduct of classes involving the use of teaching machines or programmed textbooks" (page 26). Moreover, methods of programmed teaching can hardly be considered univer- sal and applicable to all the disciplines. The sphere of their effective application, apparently, will be limited to the so-called "exact sciences." The utilization of machines, let us say, in the study of such scientilic disciplines as philosophy, and minor strategy will inevitably lead to the "cramming" of the students with simplified, schematized answers, and, con- sequently, will result in the impoverishment of knowledge. This is men- tioned by the author in passing at the end of the book. It would, however, be useful if the spheres of application of programmed teaching would have been defined not only with regard to different disciplines, but also (even if hypothetically) with regard to the different segments of those disciplines where the new methods are generally effective. The foregoing should also have been 41.ersmitkattiq vmhzatimmdsm-Rop85Too875Rnoomoo9oolt4 C.PYRG Approved FerRelease 2000/00/03 . CIA-RDr1351-001375R000 000300114 A. V. Prokof'yev also does not shut his eyes to the shortcomings of the new teaching method: the certain probability of an accidental "guessing" of the correct answer when the correct answer must be selected from a few al- ternative answers; the difficulties involved in the preparation and pro- gramming of the material for teaching; the unnecessary expenditure of the students' energy on parasitic operations, and other shortcomings. It must be assumed, however, that with a wise approach to the matter these shortcomings will be eventually eliminated as experience is accumulated. Indices such as progress of the students, "speed" with which the material is assimilated by them, the time spent by the teacher on the programming of the material, the skill level of the teacher, as well as the cost involved in the teaching of one student) should be the criteria for determining the ef- fectiveness of programmed teaching. All this, naturally) is based on a com- parison with the conventional teaching system HT The author, utilizing the accumulated statistical data, shows the doubt- less advantages of programmed teaching over conventional teaching methods. The criteria he choses, for evaluation, however, consist only of the pro- gress of the students and the time spent on the course or part of a course. Let us quote from the book: "... In one of the institutims of higher educa- tion the average grades earned in experimental courses on pulse engineering and porpagation of radio waves, which were based on the programmed method of teaching, were 0:2 and 0.5 points higher than the grades earned by the con- trol group, while the time spent on the experimental course decreased by 15%-18%. The experiment was conducted during one semester using 52 hours of study material" (page 146). Unfortunately A. V. Prokof'yev does not show the degree to which the teacher's work was further complicated or the increase in the amount of time required for his work with the new teaching method. On the whole it may be said that the book presents doubtless interest to the military teachers in the military educational establishments, and parti- cularly in the units. This book is, first of all, useful to those who are making the first steps in the field of programmed teaching. The examples of programmed textbooks and teaching machines given in the book are not the only ones in existence noreare they mandatory. The creative thought peda- gogue can create more perfect devices, which may be distinguished both by the complexity of the programs, and by their design features. In our opinion, however, it is necessary to beware of haste in this matter, to avoid groundless implementation of programmed teaching devices into any teaching process. It is also important to avoid thP vulgarization of the very idea by creating "automatic machines" with a selective system of answers. Each step must be checked out in practice, so that a true perfection of the military teaching system would yield a real increase in the effectiveness with which highly skilled military specialists are trained. Approved For RPIPaSP 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 No-LAIProved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 1. A. V. PROKOF'YEVI Programmirovanoive obucheniye, mashi d a 21224911palm (Programmed Teaching. Machines for Teaching), Military Publishing House, 1965, 164 pages. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 30 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 SOME PROBLEMS IN THE METHODOLOGY OF SOVIET MILITARY-HISTROICAL SCIENCE CPYRGHT by Col V. SOLOV'YEV A The Communist Party, true to the precepts of Lenin, pays great attention to the development of science. It develops it policies on a strictly scientific basis, guided by objective laws of social development, collective reasoning, and the experience of the masses. The Party Program points out that social sciences constitute the scientific foundation of the development of society. The application of science is becoming a decisive factor in the tremendous growth of productive forces. The role of science in the whole life of society, including the military field, has grown to a tremendous degree. Without its comprehensive development, any field of human activity is condemned to stagnation. The necessity of a scientific approach to the solution of the problems of life, and the difficulty of these problems, places on workers on the theoretical front great and responsible tasks. The party demands of scholars that they permit no manifestations of sub- jectivism in their activity, that it he based strictly on objective data, and that they carefully check their conclusions in practice. Under present conditions, when the development of science in- sistently demands the extension of knowledge, broad generalizations, and ever improved methods of analysis, Marxist-Leninist methodology has assumed especially great importance. As is known, the achieve- ments of science are directly related to the methods of acquiring knowledge, the development of which assures the success of subsequent concrete research. And it is perfectly natural that in recent years problems of methodology have attracted great attention and have be- come the subject of discussion at a number of authoritative scien- tific conferences. There is no doubt of the positive significance of the conference of military historians held in March, 1965, devoted to the methodology of military-historical research, and of the revised report of Col A. N. GRYLEV on the subject discussed, published in Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military-Historical Journal), No 7, 1965. But this is only the beginning of a great and extremely necessary work which it is necessary to carry on a wide front. For several decades the decisions of the party on military matters have been guided by Lenin's thesis that "without science it is im- possible to build a modern army" (Complete Works, Vol 4o, p 183). This statement is especially true now, when the world has witnessed 3praefiarRatftg68/A :14VR91589jrrbolisitnillee4sgoongli14 en a revolution is tt ing place in military affairs. CPYRG Approved For Release 2000108/09 :CIA-RDP85-100875R00030009001 1-4 Problems of the defense capability of the country and of the HT organization and conduct of armed conflict have become immeasurably more difficult in our era. Only a strictly scientific approach to military problems, and a decisive overcoming of voluntarism and subjectivism assures the making of correct, well-founded decisions. In this connection, there is an increase in the importance of creative mastery of dialectical materialism as the methodological basis of Soviet science, and of the role of research on problems of the dialectics of knowledge and the dialectical forms and methods of thinking. The tremendous experience of more than a century irrefutably confirms that the Marxist dialectical method correctly reflects the objective laws of the material world, and therefore serves all sciences, including the military one, as a perfect instrument for the cognition of reality. The indisputable truth is that the study of the very complex phenomena of war and military affairs must be conducted in accordance with the laws of materialistic dialectics and be based on them. Marxism-Leninism is for Soviet military science and its constituent part, military history, a world-outlook and methodological foundation. The strength of Soviet military science is rooted in its resting on the most advanced philosophy of our time. However, Marxist dialectical methodology does not replace the methods of other sciences, but is their common philosophical basis and serves an an instrument of cogni- tion in all fields. The methods of military science, including those of military history, have a more particular, applied character: they are concerned with concrete ways, measures and means of obtaining and processing factual materials. Methodology and method are closely linked with each other. The methods of acquiring knowledge, used by the different sciences, are extremely varied. Among them are some that are common to many sciences, but there are also specific methods for each separate science. War, as an extremely complex social phenomenon, is studied by many sciences. Military science studies the laws specifically of armed conflict, which develop both on the basis of its dependence on political, material and psychological conditions, and as a result of the interaction of causes and circumstances peculiar to armed conflict itself. iSoviet military science includes a system of sciences: the general theory of military science, the theory of military art, military- historical science, the theory of training and indoctrination of troops, military administration, military geography, and military-technical sciences. Each of these has itwArtiwt7g03/430:16egbitic24be studied a AP Inv et54E0 liAiP IC-MAP Wad' sc I searcM. CPYRGHT Appr uved Fur Reledbe 2000/08/09 . CIA-RDP851-00875R000300090011-4 Scientific research in militaxar science is progressing on a wide scale. A great many different probbims, faa ramoved from one another, are being studied. Even in a single field of knowledge many problems are being studied which are not closely connected with one another and rewire different approaches, different ways and methods of research, and various combinations of them. Moreover, the methods of research are determined not only by the subject studied, but by the goal and expected result of the research. Thus there cannot exist a single, universal method of research for all the branches of knowledge making up military science. The choice of methods, ways and means of acquiring knowledge is a dif- ferent and important process on which the results of the work depend to a great degree. Some methods of research can be successfully applied in a number of the fields making up military science, and they may supplement one another. Others can be used only in a certain field. In the theory of military art, exercises and maneuvers, command- and-staff exercises, war games, etc., are used as such specific methods of research (they simultaneously serve as operational training). They cannot always be applied in military-technical sciences. At the same time there are inherent in military science such methods, common to many sciences, as the method of observation, the comparative method, the mathematical method, and logical methods. The radical changes taking place in military affairs require not only an acceleration of the tempo of scientific research, and in many fields a change in its direction, but alse the improvement of old, and development of new, methods of research. The need for this arises from the internal logic of the development of sciences and from the new practical requirements. The development of science is Inevitably accompanied by the improvement of old and the appearance of new ways of research. This process has been reflected iv many divisions of military science in recent years, but unfortunaaely, not very extensively yet In military history. It must be said that the methods in this field have changed very little. This is espeaially intolerable since the subject of its study has undergone great changes. A study of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and of World War II as a whole, In many ways different from wars af previous eras, and the radical changes caused by the post-war revolution in military affairs, which have already become a subject of study for military history, have placed before military history tasks which demand an improvement of it methods. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 33 PYRG APPEiVi*Filf.ROPIGE4R9.91,0/01141:ciA-P,Ii1??TC5187MP01:9,91.r?911-4hitAory -IT of military art, and the development of the armed forces and military eqpipment. Its aim is to determine the general principles inherent in wars and military affairs in a certain historical epoch. It studies all these problems in close connection with the political, economic and other factors affecting military developments. Naturally, military history interacts with general history, using its conclusions for evaluating the political essence of wars, the economic potential of the belligerent countries, etc. The most important component of military history is the history of military art which engages in the study of the principles of the development of military art, and the means and methods of solving strategic, operational and tactical problems. The task of military history is to generalize, on a strictly scientific basis, the experience of military organization and of armed conflict. Combat experience, gained at the cost of severe trials on the battlefields where the Soviet people have defended their freedom and national independence, serves as one of the most important founda- tions of Soviet military science and is an effective source of develep- ment of military science and of the armed forces. Of great importance is the theoretical interpretation of problems concerning the place of military history in military science, its relation to the practice of military development, and the discovery of the directions in which the creative efforts of military historians should be mainly concent- rated. Speaking about the dependence of the metY-A of military-historical science on the subject of its research, it is aecessary to start with the fact that it is a border science--it is a part of civilian history, on the one hand, and of military science on the other. Military history's subject for research is a certain group of facts and laws which are studied by general history, and a group of facts and laws which are the subject of military science. Needless to say, Soviet military history should use both the methods of general history and those of military science. The interrelationship of these methods is determined in each case by the specific content of the subject being studied. One of the most urgent methodological problems which Soviet military history faces is the correct solution of the problem of the relationship between the historical and the logical in its research. This question is closely conneced with the problem of overcoming subjectivism in military-historical science. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 3)4. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 A deeply historical world-outlook is inherent in Marxism-Leninism. Marx and Engels wrote in German Ideo42gy: "We know only one, single science, i.e., the science of history. History can be looked at from two sides; it can be divided into the history of nature and the history of man. But both aspects are inseparably connected; as long as man exists, the history of nature and the history of ma a will have a mutually determining effect." (Works, Vol 3, 1955, p 16). This formula expresses the idea of the historical viewpoint as the chief methodological require- ment and general principle of all sciences. Lenin firmly emphasized the necessity of an "absolutely historical analysis of the problem of forms of conflict" (Complete Works, Vol 14, p 2), and pointed out that it was most important "to look at each problem from the point of view of how a certain phenomenon in history arose, what were the main stages through which this phenomenon passed in its development, and from the point of view of this development, to see what this thing has become now" (Complete Collected Works, Vol 39, p 67). This Lenin thesis shows better than anything else the place and role of military history in the system of knowledge of military science. A most important task of military history is the study of those processed and principles which have determined military developments in the past and, in a changed form, continue to affect them under present conditions. The disclosure of cause-and-effect relationships and basic principles makes it possible correctly to understand the process of military development and to foresee the nature of armed conflict. Marxist-Leninist methodology demands that phenomena be studied in their development and change. It starts from the premise that the most profound theoretical conclusions are attainable if they are based on the generalization of concrete historical material. Logic should rest on history,but at the same time history cannot help resting on logic. A most important principle of the dialectical method is the inseparable relationship of the logical and the historical. The unity of the historical and the logical is of decisive importance for under- standing the relationship between the history of some Phenomenon and the result of its development. Marxist dialectics perceives the logical as the concentrated theoretical expression of a historical process. The logical method of cognition enables one to see what new thing has come into being, to discover the principles of development, and to develop general concepts and formulas. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 35 Aoorovcd RcIcac 2QQOIQ8IO IA I1pP85TOO8ThI100030009Ou At tri same time um nisu.ori(Fai method cannot be presented as just a description of facts. It should disclose the same lawn of develop- ment of phenomena as the logical method; however, not in abstract, theoretical form-- but, as Engels said, by tracing the "actual develop- ment" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol 132 1959, p the concrete events, and the activities of classes, parties, and Individuals, and by investigating all these phenomena in the conditions In which they arose and developed. The logical and historical methods of acquiring knowledge inter- penetrate each other. They cannot be opposed to eae_ other. The logical method presumes having recourse, when necessary, to the elucidation of concrete events and facts, while the historical method should disclose the principles of historical development. It is an intolerable situation when a historian substitutes a repetition of previously approved conclusions and sociological formulas for concrete research work. This results in substituting for analysis of typical facts a one-sided selection of "examples", which gives rise to dogmatism am', scholasticism, deprives science of its connection with real life, and leads to the disappearance from historical works of scientific generalizations and conclusions. The materialistic methodology of history provides guidance for research, but is not a means of constructing certain abstract outlines to which historical facts may be adjusted. The role of theoretical generalization in military-historical research should not consist, as it often has in the past, in illustrating certain theses stated by somebody, or in selecting examples confirming laws and principles in military matters which have long been well known. Such "historical research", naturally, does not meet the demands of scientific search for knowledge. As has been repeatedly pointed out in our military press, a real shortcoming of much of our military-historical literature is its descriptive character; the lack of analysis of events and phenomena, of generalization of facts; a withdrawal from the important problems of military-historical science and the history of military art; and dogmatism. This trend reveals itself most fully in the "insignificant themes" of a number of articles on military-historical matters in the periodical press, and in the insignificance of the subjects of some dissertations being defended, and even of certain monographs. A deci- sive strpggle against the gap between history and theory, and against an indifferent attitude toward theoretical interpretation of military-historical experience continues to be an essential task of the day. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 36 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/06/09 : GIA-RDP65 I 006(5R000.300090011-4 ScienWic research presupposes the posing of an urgent problem, the answer to which was not previously, known. Herein lies the meaning of reuenrcn work. Only a correct, scientific solution of a problem can provide the recommendations needed by the practice of military development. It is true that during the postwar years Soviet military historians have gathered, systematized and described an immense amount of factual material on the history of the Great Patriotic War. There have also been compiled basic works like the multi-volumed history of that war, monographs on the most important operations of the past war, research on the history of the military art, and many others. However, there still has not been overcome the lag in analysis and generalization of the many-sided experience of the past war; which is very important for our country and its armed forces. A correct combination of the historical and the logical has become especfally urgent under modern conditions. The rapidly developing revolution in military affairs requires interpretation of its complex processes apd their origins. The use of the historical method in military-historical science presumes the discovery of facts and, on the basis of their description, the re-crehtion cf the most accurate possible picture of the events being studied. Inasmuch as the military historian has the task of tracing the process of development of events, he cannot limit himself to a photographic fixation of any one of them. In other words, in the description of a war, a campaignlan operation; or a battle, he must arrange the facts in their interrelationship with one another and trace their development. The success of military-historical research is determined at the very beginning by the ability of historians to establish correctly the range of facts which is to become the subject of their study. This is the basis for further theoretical work. Mistakes or negligence allowed here lead to failures in conclusions and generalizations, and cast doubt on the scientific values of the research. Of course; no research in any one field can cover the inexhaustible number of separate facts making up its content. The selection of certain facts and the ignoring of others is permissible and necessary in any research, including that of military science and military history. . Military researchers should be unswervingly guided in their work by the extremely important instruction of Lenin about the necessity for setious, scientific approach to the selection of facts. In the field Of hbcial'phenomena there is no procedure more wide-spread and more ill-founded than the picking out of individual facts and playing with Approved Fur Reledse 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00030009011- 3T CPYRC HT Aoproved.ForRelease 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85-1008tbR00030009q0-1-1-4 examples mercileooly castigatlilg such procedures, Letho taught that "it is necessary to endeavor to establish a foundation of accurate and indisputable facto on which one could rest securely and with which one could confront any of those 'general' or 'approximate' arguments w)lich are so misused in some countries in our time" (Complete Collected Worll.s, Vol 30, pp 350-351) It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this Leninist principle of military science. It, undoubtedly, is one of the basic criteria in determining the scientific quality of a work and the correctness of the conclusions drawn. The slightest departure from it leads to the most undesirable consequences. Prosposals based on a one-sided selection of facts do not rest on a scientific basis. They may have the most unfavorable effect on the development of military science, and on practices which are based on such recommendations. It is necessary to see to it strictly that the factual basis of military-historical research is many-sided and does not miss important facts. However, it also should not be overloaded with a greai; quantity of insignificant facts. A materialistic and dialectical approach to the facts being studied and the establishment of causal relations and interrelationships make it possible to establish correctly that necessary "foundation of facts" 'withdut which there can be no military-scientific research. In our opinion, military historians must strive to interpret critically and master completely all the specific methods and means of classification and processing of facts which have been developed by the best of their predecessors. First of all it should be said that study of the experience of the past cannot be based only on favorable examples. A one-sided approach to the study of wartime experience creates a distorted picture and leads to one-sided conclusions and to the embellishing of reality. In this case the sphere of research fails to include the real activities of command cadres, aimed at the overcoming of difficulties and mistakes, at carrying out assigned missions in spite of all obstacles, -- i.e., everything which constitutes the essential part of the organizational capabilities of command personnel. Military historians, in creating a "foundation of facts" for their research, should be concerned about the reliability of sources used in their work (most often these are written documents), should determine their political trend and establish how complete is the information provided by them and the degree of accuracy and reliability of this information. Historical documents may be a weapon of political struggle. For theresearcher it is important to understand in what circumstances the source came into being:, and what influence aoc66930666/fficis, ideology, and bieffrellegeFfir-qtleMADRIASigt.: ea-INfepuis7oKu 38 CPYRGHT Appruved Fur Reledbe 2000/08/09 . CIA-RDP85T00873R000300090011-4 In evaluating the reliability of a source it should be determined whether there are any contradictory data in it, or disagreements with other sources. Military documentation presents favorable opportunities in this respect, since the same events are reflected in documents Issued by various echelons. Only by strictly considering all these circumstances can the truth of events be established. The selection of facts depends greatly on the subject of research, its aims, and the level on which it is conducted -- tactical, operational, strategic, or one encompassing the phenomena of war as a whole. In research on problems of the history of military art, in most cases it is necessary to work with documents which describe the conditions in which the battle or operation being studied took place, the composition of our own forces and those of the enemy, their morale and combat lpalities, the decisions of the command (our own and the enemy's), and the organization of contro34 to deal with data on the preparation for a battle or operation, the organization of coordina- tion, and the carrying out of command decisions by the operating units; to work with documents describing changes in the situation in the course of combat operationsand the new decisions made by the command on the basis of these changes, the role of arms of troops and branches of the armed forces in the achievement of victory--i.e., the whole complex of data which reveal the results of combat operations both of our troops and those of the enemy. Just this cursory listing of some groups of facts typical of military historical research shows what a wide range of material it Is based on. Obviously this material should not be used in military- historical research in the form of a mass of uncollated facts, but in an orderly, systematic form. Facts in such research are most often set forth in chronological and logical order. And when some problem of military science is being studied, a certain part of the work (the introductory chapter) is devoted to a review of the consecutive development of the problem, i.e., of those stages which preceded its present status. In re-creating a picture of military events or describing the processes which have taken place in military affairs, the historian places them in a certain order and a certain relationship to one another, and determines the role, place and importance of certain facts. This task becomes more difficult as the scale of the events being described expands. It is easier in describing a battle; it presents more difficulty in describing an operation and its dif- ficulty greatly increases in setting forth events on a strategic scale, or that of the war as a whole. In this case the researcher deals with a great number of Interacting phenomena in the armed conflict and with more complex processes, and has to consider all Appffikt*Or gle611% latratin9?. infk-eDiatttoet75R000mimaincli -.tither factors on the course of the armed conflict, 39 Approy,ecKpriftlajwipq9i0k09 CIA-RDP85700875RD003000908114 . - 171:1.47., e a ullo, tne ul!iicuitly of the tasks performed by the historian in recreating a picture of the past. He said:: "In the study of hie pry, what troubles and torments the student most is historical perspective, the interrelationship of phenomena, and their relative importance. Being guided by one's personal evaluation, it is easy to exaggerate or underestimate some- thing which one has not experienced personally, and thus the facts may be so presented that what results is not a picture of what hap- pened, but a hullucinatory reflection of ones awn imagination, a specter sulstantiated by documents" (Voprosy istorii, No 7, 1965, p 210. In military-historical works, the description of events, situations, and command measures is of great, importance and occupies much space. The historical method here does not appear in pure form, inasmuch as the selection, classification and grouping of facts also includes the logical method. Incidentally, Engels pointed out this fact in his definition of historical and logical methods. Description is the stage of scientific research which prepares for the transition to theoretical interpretation of the material. Without description of facts, it is impossible to explain them, but, on the other hand, description alone does not make a science. Description and explanation in military-historical research are closely interrelated; dia/ectically, one shifts to the other. It is not permissible for military-historical research to remain In the stage of description of individual episodes of military history, without going on to generalizations and theoretical conclusions; it must not fail to present a profound revelation of the cause-and- effect relations of phenomena and to trace, on the basis of concrete materials, the effect of the laws of armed conflict, and the laws of the development of tactics, operational skill, and strategy. No matter how conscientiously an author tries to collect and describe his material, unless his work contains some theoretical generalizations, some posing of problems, it will not be of much importance and will -ibute relatively little to today's military science and practice. ,ng with certain successes in systematizing and describing the i'an.s of the past war, there have been substantial deficiencies. Many documents continue to remain outside the field of vision of military historical research. Statistical data on many quantitative characteristics of the past war are in an unsatisfactory state; among them are those describing the scope of the armed conflict. Statistical data provided in the published works are often contra- dictory. The "mathematization" of military-historical science deserves serious attention. Mathematical methods make it possible to disclose quantitative principles in the phenomena being studied. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 ApperuiPri-F-Pc-6, litnninPula %-r 421.12 r12ft ralVIRT52(111113111M As we know, the importance of computer techniques is rapidly increasing. Ih mahtr fields of knowledge computers are being used more and more frequently. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of military history, although it presents a wide field of activity for the use of mathematical methods. CPYRGHT Inasmuch as armed conflict is a process involving two sides, the researcher should strive to gain possession of the facts which adequately describe the actions of both sides. However, a major shortcoming of many works of military history is the one-sided exposition of the armed conflict and of the war as a whole. In these works the facts describing the condition of the forces; actions; and decisions of the enemy are analyzed very inadequately. No substantial improvement in this respect has been noted in recent years. The publication and dissemination among scholars of documents and facts casting light on the planning of the armed con- flict by the Nazi German command; the status of the military economy and the psychological potential of the fascist bloc, and the opera- tions of the Wehrmacht and troops of Germany's satellites on the Soviet-German front (which should constitute an important part of the "foundation of facts" in military-historical resirch)--these, in our opinion, have been accomplished far from effectively. There is a similar situation with regard to the publishing of materials on the politics, economics and combat operations of the armies of the US and Great Britain during World War II. Uatil these shortcomings are eliminated, military science in many fields will rest on inadeq4ate data of practical experience, and military-historical thought will not have that broad basis of -facts which the development of the military aff irs requires. The Creation of a system of scientifically well-founded information in relation to problems being studied by military history is an important and urgent task. In our opinion, the study of facts of military history should be carried on from three viewpoints. First of all, for recreating a picture of the past, the historian examines groups of facts as phenomena. This work is accomplished in the descriptive part of the work on military history, and it is insufficient for a scientific exposition of the subject. Further; using the historical approach, the researcher should give a retrospective evalution of the facts being considered, i.e., show them as the results of a preceding development. In military-historical works, this is accomplished most often in the introductory part; which contains, along with a description of the circumstances in which the everts take place; information on how these circumstances developed (for example; the Appraki-Ptilft4VAV-AtiatbaklePltasktirsti5-feftPX4661669egi f4campai. gn or 141 PYRGH Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 atrdt&gic operation, the operatf.onal situation, eto.). And finally, the group of facts being studied must be considered from the point of view of the effect they have had op the further development of events. The logical method finds widest application in the study of specific problems of military history and the history of military art. In studying problems of the tactical and operational level, the military historian, on the basis of a study of concrete facts, should give an analysis of the situation of the battle or operation?, make a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the forces of the two sides; and determine how correctly the command evaluated the enemy and the capabilities of its own forces, how weLLthe decisions it made met the situation, whether preparations for the operation were carried out correctly, whether all possibilities for the achieve- ment of victory were utilized, what factors promoted or hindered the achievement of victory, and at what costs victory was achieved. The attention of the resaarcher is concentrated on such problems as the choice of direction of the main attack, the depth, tempo and duration of an operation, the disposition of combat formations and the organiza- tion of coordination, the forms of operational maneuver, the organiza- tion of troop control, and the logistical support of troops. In studying one or even several battles and operations, the historian deals with a comparatively limited number of facts, and this, naturally, gives no basis for broad conclusions and generaliza- tions. However, even in such cases his principal task consists of revealing how, in the specific conditions of a particular battle or operation, there were manifested certain laws of armed conflict, and what effect subjective factors had on the outcome of the battle or operation. In evaluating such works, we should proceed on the basis that it is not enough to know the laws in general; it is necessary to fol3'ow consistently the nature of their effect and manifestation in the concrete conditions of a battle or operation. The logical element assures a more profound and diverse character in the study of a number of operations or battles. Here the nature of the generalizations and conclusiono has quite different qualities. The wide rangevorobservations makes it possible with more assurance to discover the factors, laws, and those aspects of phenomena which contribute to victory or lead to defeat. A persistent struggleris needed to make military-historical works go beyond the bounds of superficial illustration of already well-known laws and principles. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 112 CPYRGHT Arirrtwari Ft-tr Palaacch 9nnninRinci ? rha_pnpAcTnnR7gpnnnlnnnanni 1-4 In the study of a number of operations or battles the nature of description in works of military history also changes substantially. Their descriptive part rests on a much broader basis of facts and observations, the elements of classification and groupings of facts occupy a much larger place in them, and the comparative method is more extensively used. In other words, in the descriptive part of generalizing military-historical works the elements of logical analysis are considerably more extensive than in works devoted to description of individual battles or operations. Here the relation of the logical and the historical appears in a fuller, more developed, interpenetrating form. The logical method of research has extensive application in the exposition of problems of the history of military art, when, on the basis of factual data, a study is made of the principles in the development of the armed forces and combat equip- ment and the methods of using them in battles operations, and in a war as a whole. Above we have considered some of the typical groups of facts with which a military historian deals in trying to analyze the laws of military actions on an operational and tactical scale. A different range of problems arises in the study of war as a whole or of its separate periods and campaigns, the economic and psychological capabilities of one's own country and of the enemy, problems of the organization and training of armed forces for war, etc. This type of research requires the study and comparison of even more complex and diverse groups of facts. Thus, in studying problems of strategy it is necessary to examine the facts which characterize the inter- relationship of strategy and politics, the economic, ideological, and diplomatic preparation of the country for war, mobilization and operation plans, the training and disposition of reserves, border security, organization of bases and routes of communications, the nature and purpose of war, methods of warfare, forms and methods of command of operational ob'yedineniya, the course of the war on the strategic level, the material base of the warp etc. In atudying the phenomena of armed conflict, the researcher must proceed from the basis that, despite its decisive influence on the course of the war, armed conflict cannot be studied in isolation from other forms of conflict, but that its development and laws are closely related to the politics, economics, and psychological-political life of society, the status of science and technology, etc. The study of the effect of these factors on armed conflict is a most important task of military science, and especially of military history. The laws of armed conflict reflect multilateral relations and processes, and interact with each other. It must be taken into account that the effect of these factors in military operations on various levels is not identical and is exercised throuAll various intermediate links. proved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 A1,1-guyed Fui Relecte 2000/00/09 . CIA-RDP05T0007uR0003000900114 In studying the course of armed conflict and problems of the history of military art, it is very important to reveal the cause- and-effect relation of important phenomena in a battle, an operation, a campaign, a period of war or in the course of the war as a whole. This; as a rule; requires examination of events in chronological sequence (and the overwhelming majority of works on military history are written in this way), careful consideration of the importance of material and morale factors in the armed conflict; the factors of' time and space, the influence of subjective factors on the develop- ment of battles and orations, etc. In bringing to light the causes and effect of some event of the war, the military historian must not lose sight of his main goal--the objective investigation of the causes of victory or defeat of troops, both our own and those of the enemy. ? Since any of the events :studied in relation to a war, an operation or a battle has 1.-ts own sequence of development and causal inter- relationships; the logic of military-historical research demands that these processes be revealed in the concrete events being studied. The next step in the work should include a generalization of the sum- total of observations, the exclusion from them of what is incidental and not characteristic; the discovery of a certain repetitiveness of phenomena and interdependent relations, and finally, the formulation of a hypothesis. Military science and its component part, military history (like; for that; matter, any other science) cannot do without scientifically based hypotheses. The very process of the discovery of laws of armed conflict and of the relations of interacting phenomena pre- supposes the presentation by the researcher of certain hypotheses, of well-founded suppositions, based on the study of facts. In further work and in the consideration of a wider range of facts, they provide a certain direction to the research and will be either confirmed or refuted. In the process of discovery of the laws of armed conflict, in searching for the correct solution of the relations between the whole; the particular and the individual, the develop- ment of hypothesis is an important and necessary stage in scientific investigation. Unfortunately it must be admitted that in works of military history the scientifically well-founded hypothesis is rarely en- countered. This applies equally to dissertations on subjects of military history, including those for a doctor's degree. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 44 ? CPYRGHT ? ApprovediPArdUleate 2606108109 stiliaRDP85170087.5f2Q41311.0939011I+ advancing it, the author admits the possibility of its being mistaken. The real enemy of science is dogmatiz certainty of the abaolute truth of hypotheses, refussl to test them in practice and against new facts. And this is a direat route for the entry of subjectivism into science, capable of doing serious harm to military history. The scholar must be a strict Judge of his own hypotheses and genelalizations. Dogmatic conviction of the absolute truth of a stated proposition leads to curtailment of acientific search, to stagnation of thought. Dogmatism is the enemy of science. it goes hand in hand with subjectivism, being, essentially; its opposite side. A specific feature of military-historical works on a tactical., operational or strategic level is the fact that problems of military art have a prominent place in them, and that they analyze the sub- jective activity of commanders. In the solution of this complex problem, the logic of military-historical research requires both consideration of the important objective factors affecting the course and results of the armed conflict and the war as a NNhole (of which we have spoken above), and careful analysis of the actiity of a military leader. It is very important to trace in historical facts the role of the subjective factor of the conscious, purposeful activity of the people's masses in the'course of a war. Turning possibilities for victory into reality in a battle, an operation, or a war depends much on the actions of the commander. The subjective factor can in large measure affect the objective conditions for waging the armed conflict. In this connection it should be stressed that with the growth of the power of weapons the influence of chance on the course of the armed conflict has likewise increased. Correct consideration of this factor is of special importance for the initial period of the war. Under modern conditions a miscalculation in evaluating the military-political situation on the eve of' war; or delay in taking steps to repel aggreasion2 can lead to extremely serious conse- quences and fatelly affect the course and even the outcome of the war. This situation is directly related to the work of the military historians. It is no secret that in many military-historical works very little attention is paid to the creative activity of the military leader, to his decision-making process. And this is of very great importance for the development of tactical; operational and strategic thinking. In this respect, nothing can take the place of past experience, especially that of the Great Patriotic War. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP88-100875R000300090011-4 45 CPYRG Ab44614t/ IF& R6Iskite 204101106/09 1.:OCIAIRDPS5T1008175 R08030110900A1 -4,f armed -IT conflict, and also of the principles of military art on which the military leader depends in his practical operatiens enables the military historian to bring out how, in a concrete situation, these. principles were applied, to what extent they correspond to objectlye laws, what new constructive ideas the military leader introduced ir accomplishing bis tasks, what wac the result of his actions, and what determined it. The success of this work depends on scientific honesty, ad- herence to principle, objectivity and lack of bias, and communist party spirit in approach to the study. The science of military history can be of assistance to practice IA the solving of very complex problems presented by the revolution in military affairs only if it provides a scientific analysis of the past, presenting neither an embellished nor a dark picture of it. Historical truth, objective reality, the interests of our people and the building of communism completely coincide. Mar SU M. V. ZAKHAROV is profoundly right in pointing out the special danger of subjectivism in the military fiebd. He remarks that those historians are justly nriticized who, in evaluating certain operations of the Great Patriotic War are guided not by what military-political and strategic significance these operations really had, but by what positions are now held by the people then charged with commanding them. The higher the positions they hold, the more it is said, the importance of the operations has to be built up and emphasized. And so they build them up and magnify them, as though they do not suspect that herein they are departing from the party positions of principled scientific workers and slipping down into the positions of scientific toadies. And it is well known that where toadyism begins, science ends, objectivity ends, and subjectivity takes over" (Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 February 1965). Marxist-Leninist philosophy proceeds fror the premise that prac- tical activity must be based on correct ideas about the external world, and about what is true. It most definitely comes out against subjectivism, against depicting the present or the past from a pre- judiced point of view, whether better or worse than actual. The struggle to eradicate once and for all this anti-scientific, harmful and abnormal practice, resting like a heavy burden on military - historical science, is an important task of Soviet military historians. It is necessary to follow consistently the teaching of Lenin: "It is not a matter of who is looking at it, nor who is interested in it, but what it is, independent of human consciousness" (Leninskiy sbornik, Vol XI, p 385). We must remember the angry condemnation by Lenin of the subjective concoction, "the game of examples." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 46 CPYRGHT Approved re nfddb1/68/bg :stetk-RDTP8161418b7BRO6Or30069t161 114 the consistent application of the principles of dialectical materialism in. theoretical and practical work, and the study of phenomena from the point of view of the interests of workers, which comp3etely coincides with the scientific reflection of reality. The tremendous and diverse military experience of the Soviet state is of great value for strengthening the defense capability of our country. Treating it in a slighting way is intolerable. Combat experience has been paid for in blood, and can be acquired in no other way. Especially necessary is a comprehensive analysis of the complex processes which took place in military affairs during the Great Patriotic War and World War II, and also in the postwar period. However, another aspect of the problem should also be soberly analyzed. In periods of rapid development in the military field, it is dangerous to neglect changed conditions of conducting combat operations, and to adapt to them former experienac, gained in a dif- ferent historical situation and on the basis of obsolete combat equipment. While seeing a certain continuity in the development of phenomena and intently analyzing the origins of new methods of armed conflict, a researcher should not allow the routine pattern of old practices to conceal what has developed in the military field as a result of the use of new powerful means of armed conflict and of a change in the situation. The historical principle does not consist merely in seeing the historical roots of new phenomena. It is no less important to interpret correctly the changes that have occurred and the full extent of the difference between the new and the old, to reveal the special features of the new situations, and to utilize to the limit the possibilities of the new weapons, new equipment, new social relations, and changes in the human material. The old experience-in the new circumstances has to be revised critically; it should help to understand more deeply the new tenden- cies, and bhould not conceal them. The task of military science is not only to reveal those aspects of past experience which can be useful in JcArn conditions, but also to promote timely elimination of obsolete principles, methods and means of. conflict which were effective in the past but have now become old, fixed routines which. hinder the development of military thought and the solution of practical military problems. The solution of this difficult problem requires a correct under- standing of the'specific manifestation in military matters of one of tne basic laws of dialectics--i.e., the law of the negation of the negation. Marxist philosophy teaches that the new, in replacing the old, retains from the latter everything that is valuable and positive. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP8V00875R000300090011-4 ,T V ? AD131"18VtilF6MeleaSO2600WaYbgle. 860415P89-PISOMR300030009961914Y not skeptica negation..., but negation as an aspect of relationship, of development, with a positive content." (Philosophical Notebooks, 1934, p 216). The dialectical approach to military developments warns against the under estimation of some phenomena and the over- estimation of others, and against one-sided solutions. Approaching the development of mTlitary affairs historically, we should disclose the processes which have brought the present into being and see the processes which are determining the future. The require- ment of Marxist dialectics for a combination of the logical and the historical in military science is demonstrated most fully in just such an approach. The October, November and March plenums of the Central Committee CPSU, held under the sign of Leninist demands for theoretical and practical work, have occupied an important place in the life of our country. They brought into the life of the Party much that is new and restored a genuinely scientific Leninist style. The Party is consistently eliminating elements of subjectivism and improvisation in the solution of problems of the state, the economy, and party organization. This is giving new, powerful stimuli to the further flourishing of science in our country. Purposeful, creative work, based on the principles of Marxist dialectical methodology and on a careful study of past experience, and directed toward the solution of urgent scientific problems which are closely tied to modern military requirements, -- this is what is required of military-scientific cadres. The comprehensive study of problems of methodology of Soviet military science whould have an Important place in the accomplishnent of these tasks. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 AN ANSWER 10 OPPONEJITS CPYRGHT by Mhj. Gen I. ZAVIYALOV An article "The Types and Forms of Military Operations," published in the January 1965 issue of Voyennaya Mysig, has provoked a fairly wide exchange of opini ens on the problems mentioned in it. (Voyennuallyslt, Nos 6,7, and b, 1965). The most serious objections were to the thesis that military operations are divided into only two kinds, offense and de- fense, and that nuclear attacks cannot be considered as an independent kind of operation. Some comments cast doubt on the statement that in a nuclear war a strategic defense is possible, and that, the combat, actions of rocket troops and PVO Strany troops will take on the form or the corresponding operations 5hieh they sunporl;/. There was also expressed the opinion that attacks of naval and UiT forces cannot be regarded as either offense or defense. Hence, obviously, itis necessary to explain a number of the theses advanced by us. First, our assertion that military operations by their nature --i.e., by their basic; most essential characteristics--are divided into two kinds, offense and defense, and that no other kinds of operations exist in armed rionflict. We start off from the proposition that an attack and its repulse; or offense and defense, are two dialectically interrelated activities, one flowing from the other, two aspects of a single process--armed conflict. They cannot exist separately, one without the other. Moreover, in the operations of both sides there always exist elements both of offense and of defense. There is never offense or defense in "pure" form. Thus, during an armed aonflict, in its. various stages or in particular regions, water;areas, or air spaces, each of the belligerents, while basically carrying on one of the two kinds of operations, at the same time is forced to carry on also the Other, even though on a smaller scale. The front as a whole may be attacking, but certain of its armies and smaller units may be on the defensive. On the other hand, during a defensive battle, armies and certain of their units may shift to a counter-attack, i.e., conduct offensive operations. In a battle and in an operation, effensive and defensive activities are carred on simultaneously. In other words, during armed conflict each side has to attack ani defend simultaneously, repulse attacks and launch counter-attacks. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 /1.9 PYK-GH I Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 iiPTYPALF.Rjr tly? re are tne moot varieL IQiid.0 oLc.:o1iib5,1: operatA one: attack and. counter-attack? meeting engagements? assto.ulL and counter- assault, retreat and pursuit., reconnaissance and. security measures. But in all this diversity of activities there are certain common characteristics by which they necessarily belong either to the offense or the defense. What are the basic and most characteristic attributes of the offense They are two the launcLing of attael;13 with weapons, and. movement of the troops forward. Here the main characteristic, the essenLial basis of offense is the strike for only by the use of all kinds of weapons is it possible to inflict heavy losses on the enemy and deprive him of the capability of offering resistance. Some of .my opponents associate the offense primarily with forward movement of troops, with occupation of the territory of the enemy. In their opinion, without such movement there is no offensive. But everyone 'mows that the advance i.. primarily for troops to occupy the most favorable position for the launching of attacks, for taking possession of territory in case of retreat of the enemy or his loss of combat capability as a result of attacks:, in order to deprive him of the possibility of using his weapons. In other words? advance of the troops is to a certain degree subordinate to the attack. In the early stare of development of the military art, the weapons of the armed forces were only cold steel, and. in order to attack the enemy, the belligerents had to come together, or one of them occupied a fortified position, and the other had. tc move up to :it. With the develop- ment of firee.rms? the need for such proximity gradually disappeared.. The more the range and. destructive power of the weapons increased, the less became the need for movement. While even now the infant3.7? with its weapons of close combat, when rIm. the offensive, is almost al-erays on the move, the artillery makes such shift of position only to change firing positions, when its range is inadequate for effective fire on the enemy. The air force, for launching attacks, changes its airfields even less often. As to strategic rocket troops, their effer.tive range is so great that they need not shift posi-L:on at all. Thus one: of the characteris,1;ics of the offensive, movement forward, has disappeared completely for strategic rocket troops. Defense also has two basic characteristic.. the first is repulsing the offensive of the enemy by launching counterattacks on him With weapons, and. the second is holding the most favorable positions for combat opera- tions. Here again the attack plays the principal role, for only it is capable .of inflicting losses on the enemy and breaking up his offensive. Holding of positions is of subordinate importance. It is required for creating the most favorable conditions for the use of weaponds to inflict maximum losses on the enemy as he approaches the defensive positions, and also to protect the defending forces and their combat equipment form the blows of the enemy, using terrain, engineering installations, and various means ofprcromsfiEcisieR4ipasp 7nnninFung ? ciA_RnpRsTnng7sRnnwinntvanni -a 5 PYRGHT Approved For !Release 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 `..cliub the main aharacteristic of bs th offense and defense has been and still iL; the attack. The difference between these two kinds of operations' censists in the ways in which the attacks are launched and the means of destruction are used, determined by the aims of the armed conflict. Disputing this thesis, i.e., that armed conflict is a two-sided process characterized by a combination of offensive and defensive onera,dons, Gen V. PETEENED asserts that what is typical of modern co,.ai..)11:: is not offense and defense; nob attack and protection against I t, lduL at'alck on the attacker) using primarily nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that in a future war attack on the attacker may prove to be the basic, decisive method of operations, especially at the beginning of the war, since strategic nuclear weapons art already in their launching positions and ready for immediate use. But even in this case, when both sides simultaneously begin extensive offensive operation's, using nuclear weapons, defense as a form of armed conflict does not lose its importance. It is quite obvious that attack on the attacker cannot continue very long. There can be one of tiJo outcomes of such a conflict: either one of the sides will be completely overwhelmed) and the war will end with that, or it will suffer such losses that it will be much weaker than its enemy and will be forced to acRipt on a large scale defensive methods of operations. Moreover, the very process of attacking the attacker is not completely devoid of defensive activities. For example, rocket troops, in order to maintain the capability of launching attacks on the enemy, must themselves be dependably protected and secure from his blows from the air. And this requires a well-organized, strong air defense, and the building of well-protected launching positions. In a nuclear war between sides relatively equal in strength, that. side will have the advantage which uses its nuclear power with the greatest effect, best organizes its protection against the nuclear attack of the enemy, and is able to repulse his attacks 'with greater skill- Therefore it would be incorrect to think that in a nuclear war there is possible only such a combination of Mnds of operations as an attack on the attacker, or an offensive against the side on the offensive, and to deny the possibility of other combinations?for example, an offensive against the defender or an offensive against (pursuit of) a retreating enemy. There' are no bases for thinking thus. Even in nu.clear-war:, offense and defense will be used in the most varieC. combinations. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 51 Apiaroved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 atruLdenLaLLy, cue auuacy, on 1,110 RG1AIC1SJ1 is not somethin new, OV characteristic only of nuclear war. It Ls nothing other than the sfunui- tancous shift of the belligerents to decisive offensive operations with RGHThe aim of most quickly using their weapons for inflicting attacks on the enemy. As a result of such operations, there take place meeting engagements, which are well know to us from past wars. Continuing to develop their objections on this uurtter, GEN PETIMIKO an some other Lhink that the concepts "offense" and "defense" are applicable only to the operations of ground forces .? But to say this is to deny the obvious situation that in the air and on the sea the opposing sides are also attacking each other and resisting attack. Just as on land, the armed ccsfflict in the air and on the sea is nothing other than the launching of attacks and the repelling of them by tse two sides, i.e., offense and defense. And although N. V'YUNENKO says that the attack is not necessa/lly a constituent element of offense and defense, we cannot imagine either an offensive or a defense without attacks, any more than We can imagine assaults (udary) cutside of an attack (napadeniye), or defense without repulse of attacx. This situation is equally true for all kinds of armed forces and for all levels of military operations, tactical, operational, and strategic. Of course, offense or defense for each branch of armed forces has its own characteristic features. But the main, basic features for these kinds of operations are common to all of them. Showing the "inconsistencies" of our positions on kinds of military operations, some of my opponents state that under modern conditions strategic defense is not applicable. Thus, in the opinion of PELRIINKO? an attempt to apply in a rocket and nuclear war( "defense on a strategic level would inevitably lead the armed forces, and consequently the country, to defeat." (Voyenna2-2. 1/Porsl', No 6, 1965, pp 26-27). Approximately the same point of view is held by Mar Su V. SOKOLOVSKIY, Gen M. CHEREDNICHENKO, and Col. V. LARIONOV (id, pp 27-34) However, these views, as can be concluded from the comments received, are probably the result of their authors considering the concepts "strategic defense" and "defensive stratea as identical; with this, of . course, it is impossible to agree. These are completely different categories. Defensive strategy means refraining from active offensive operations. It Is erroneous in its basis and unacceptable to us. Strategic defense de- termines only the scale on which this form of operation may be undertaken iu a nuclear war, without it being necessary at all that the armed forces as a whole carry out strategic defense. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 52 PYRGHT Appr uved Fur ROvobe 2090/08/09 . CIA-RDP85TOQ875R000300090011-4 The military doctrine of the Soviet Union; in its political aims, never has had and cannot have an aggressive character. Our country has never attacked anybody, and does not intend to attack anybody. A war of conquest is alien to it, as it is to all the socialist countries. But this does not mean at all that in a war the Soviet Union would conduct only defensive operations. If the imperialists commit an act of aggression against us, we will unleash the most decisive, active'offensive, using all the military might of our armed forces. The 'enemy's attack will be answered by us with an attack of still greater force, using to the litit the offensive potential of our armed forces, which has immeasurably Increased with the development of nuclear weapons, for a decisivc and quick defeat of the aggressors. This constitutes the basis of our strategic concepts. At the same time we cannot underestimate strategic defense, either. Its role in modern war arises from the necessity of accomplishing that very important, primary mIssion of the armed forces of frustrating the nuclear attack of the enemy. Of course, strategic nuclear weapons have a special place in accomplish- ing this mission. They primarily and mainly are called upon to destroy the nuclear weapons of the enemy. But nuclear strikes at the enemy's msans of iraclear attack can scarcely achieve their complete destruction. :these means are dispersed over great lard and water greas, are well protected under ground and under water, and a part of them under any circumstances will go into action. So the destruotion of them in flight will be a basic element in modern strategic defense. In other words, strategic defense in a nuclear war is primarily air defense (antimissile, anti aircraft, and anti space), to be carried out over the territory of a whole country. In speaking thus about strategic defense2 we at the same time emphasize its exceptionally great importance for the defense of the state, we shcw that a tremendous role it will play in a future war, what an important place it will have among all the other methods of operations, and we call attention to its very great spatial dimensions and to the participation in it of a great quantity of men and equipment. And this does not at all distort the concept of "strategic defense", about which V. PETRENKO is worried: At the same Lime, it by no means follows from these propositions that defense can be the predominant form of operations. But apparently SOKOLOVSKI( and CHEREDNICHENKO consider my statements to mean just this when they write that they are deeply convinced that "if eather of the sides were to carry out strategic defense even if this is meant to apply to the activities of PTO Strany troops), it will inevitably suffer defeat." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 53 YR Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 It is ai.iiculu uo concede that they reject strategic defense altoghether. Irhis is confirmed by the following position stated by them: "Now both GHisides will attack simultaneously, and firaL of all with the principal instruments of warfare--rockets and nuclear weapons, anl likewise they will simultaneously defend themselves primarily by the means of anti- air and anti-missile defence. They will also car:y on other military operations," (Voyennaya Mys11, No 6, 1965, p 20. Consequently there will be both offense and defense, with defense no-; on a tactical or operational level, but on a scale of the whole country, with the par- ticipation of all the PVO troops or a great part of them, with the aim of repelling a nuclear attack of the enemy. And you cannot call such a defense anything but "strategic." Certain doubts expressed by A. YEE1MOVSKIY can hardly shake the correctness of this position. He thinks that from the point of view cf its mission the composition of the participating forces and weapons, and the size of the area involved, anti-air defense is on a strategic level. But since the operations of PVO troops ar divided territorially, they may take place at various times and in various regions, and theit principal efforts cannot be directed against the main grouping of the enemy; consequently) anti-air defense cannot be included in strategic operations. However, as is known, primarily strategic operations are defined by rtheij strategic purposes, by their role in the total system of armed conflict, by the participation of a large number of ob"yedineniya and soyedineniya, and by great dimensions as to area. From this point of view there can be no doubt as to the strategic nature of the operations of PITO troops. As to their being separated in time and space they do not lose their strategic significance from this, especially since it is incorrect to assume that the principal efforts of the PVO troops cannot be directed against the main forces of the enemy. This thesis is refuted by all combat experience. For destruction of the main grouping of the enemy in the air, there are always concentrated such PITO forces and weapons as are necessary for such a purpose. We should like to note again that there can be strategic defense not only against missiles, space satellites and aircraft, but also in the land theaters of military operations and the sea and ocean areas contiguous to them. And this is entirely natural- If one side conducts a strategic offensive, the other side is forced to shift to a defense on a correspond- ing scale. This position would be true even if the war should begin with an attack on the attacker. In this defense large formations of all branches of armed forces would participate, Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 5ui. AgOvgilliTor Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 -A In objecting to our theses about the kinds of military operations, some of the opponents rank the nuclear attack along uith offense and defense., culling it too? a kind of military operation. But these are magnitudes of a completely different order. As may easily be gathered. ilrom everything said above, they cannot be combined. in one concept. While offense and. defense are different aspects of one and. the same process--armed conflict., the nuclear attack is a qualitative characteristic of this 'process, indnit.cating by what means and methods the armed conflict, offence and defense, will be carried on. Attacks strategic nuclear weapons will be launched. first and c foremost in the interests of the main kind of operations of the armed C orce?-;, by which stratezr counts on achieving the aims o.g the war. This Irina of operation, undoubtedly., will be offensive And consequently its d.e.cisive force must be strategic nuclear weapons. !reliever:, this does not e.Kclude the possibility of launching nuclear attacks also in the interests of C.efense. To regard. the strategic nuclear attack as an independent form of military operations on a place with offense and. defense would be to contradict the dialectics of armed conflict as a single process--attack and its repulse, offense and. defense. In the light of what has been said, It must be admitted that our attempt to regard the war in the ether Lradio warfarig as an indepezident kind of military operations is unsound, and. should be rejected as mis- ? taken. The war in -the ether basically has the same two kinds of operations ? off ensive and. defensive; it Is not carried on in isolation from the com- bat operations of the aimed forces, but is an inseperable part of them,. and serves the intere.ste of the defense or the offense. We should. like to say a few words about the forms of military operat- ions. A.. IllaMOVSICE:..objects to the statement that the actions of PVO Strany troops will be carried out in the form of different operations (ope.ratsii). He gives as his reasons the fact that "the actions of PVO Strany troops take place usually as independent ones:, carried out by separate soyedineniya and, less frequently,' by obnyedineniya? and. are of' local importance. :ilerefore the PVO Strany troops carry out not operations, but coffeat actions, which take on the form of an operation only when an operational ob"yedineniye has a compact distribution i-c7f its force], covering a nearby group of major rear-area targets or of troops 7 " (Voyennaya Mysl , No Y., 1965, pp 19-2Q). But this reasoning cannot be accepted as well-founded.. What indicates an operation is primarily the operational or strategic nature of the aims of the operation, its importance in performing the missions in a gt.ven stage oproved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 55 of the I7Z.%:1 the participation in it of operational obuyedineniya of one or more branches of armed forces, and. the large area involved, and in no case is it the compactness at' disposition of operational obuyedineniya. Moreover., we cannot agree that the actions of PVO troops are carried out by separate soyedineniya? less often by obuyedineniya? and are of' local importance. Many operational obuye(linm- iya, not only of the PVO Strany troops, but all the PVO resources of the ground forces, navy, and fighter aviation, may simultaneously participate in repelling enemy attacks from the air. The combat operations will be conducted over immense areas and. be of exceptionally great national., and not just local significance. The combat capability of the armed forces and the ability of the state to perform its vital functions will greatly depend on the successful repulse of a nuclear attack of the enemy. From the point of view of basic characteristics, the actions of PVC Strany troops, must be considered. as taking the form of an operation.. And, despite all Objections, they are usually so planned. As to the term; "combat actions", it does not and. cannot express any kind of form. It is too indefinite and is used for a t'r,eneral designation of the activities aC arrred forces, without regard to their scale or kind.. PETRIIIKO writes: "In missile and nuclear war there are such loical forms of strategic operations as strategic nuclear attacks, the strategic offensive in a theater of military operations, combat actions of NO Strany Troops, and also the use of special farces and. equipment in space" (Voyennaya No 6, 1965, p 26). It appears to me that the author simply does. not want to distinguish between the kinds., levels, methods, and forms of actions. In conclusion, we should like to express our deep gratitude to all the readers who have participated in the discussion of this vital subject, those 'who have supported and refined the theses set forth by us, and particularly those who, from their own points of view, have criticized them. There is no doubt that the criticism has helped both the author and many readers to analyze and correctly understand the problems raised in the article under discussion. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 56 T)' TRANS 1..),NO ?9`, r 0 OYENNAY AIZCH 1.9 6 6. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 IT DliTENDS ON WHAT ONE MOULD GIVE UP CPYRGHT by Rear Ala (let) IC. ZOTOV ALaost every time that new weapons are developed, there appear opinions that we must immediately give up existing tactical, operational, strategic or even general military views and work out essentially new r..oneepts. And, on the ether hand, frequently attempts are made to reject, or at least to belittle, the importance of the new weapons. BLit century-old experience has shown convincingly that these extreme points of a view are, as a rule, wrong. It is not only a fact that the new for a certain period of time exists along with the old, but mainly that the old.? as well as the new, always represents a diversity of elements, connections, and relations of different degrees of importance and stability. If some of them have no special roots in practical life, others., on the contrary, rest on 'very firm ground.. Finally, there are certain laws of long-term or even permanent effect. Incautious attempts to reject them Off -hand can do nothing but harm. Therefore, major reorganizations in the armed forces are usually carried out very circurn;:pectly. From these standpoints, the article of Maj Gen I, ZAB 'Y.ALOV seems timely and. useful. Welcoming its appearance, and. the many replies to it, we also should like to make certain observations on the problems con- sidered. First of all, we cannot, agree in principle with ZAWYALOV's idea of ranking as a military operation (along with. offense and defense) the war in the ether," i.e., phenomena on an entirely different plane. It is interesting to follow the arg-ument of the author. "Of course," he says, "in this kind of operations we shall encounter the same offensive and, defensive, for it is impossible to imagine the war in the ether apart from the interests of the offense or defense, But? "follows the antithesis, "the fact is that this war is carried on siJiultaneously both in the Interests of the offense and. the defense." And? concludes the author by way of synthesis., "it may attain such development that in certain tases it will dictate the nature of the operations of the armed forces of the belligerents, and. from this point of view will take on a certain inde- pendence" (p22). (Reply to the Article of Maj Gen I ZAVIYALOV? "The TIoes and Forms of Military Operations", Voyennaya Mysl', No 1, 1965) LFootnote presumbaly belonging to this paragraph, but not keyed to anything above] Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 57 PYRG IciPPItdCied --raiii.Lkell6gb ob biciwo 91(;) lAkROP8STOP 8 ZSR000 3.Q.K19 11t4 excerj wneLher lie is LaThing about the defensive or offensive nature of radio -11-warfare itself, or about, the military operations (tactical, operational, or strategic) which it is supporting at a given moment. The fact is IiiaL this warfare alMost always includes simultaneously both "offensive" operations (interfering with the radio communications of the enemy and finding out about his operations and intentions) and "defensive" operations (protection of one's own radio communications from enemy interference and intercept). On the other hand, the whole complex of radio warfare, as the author correctly states, is carried on both on the offensive and the defensive. We only want to emphasize that whether it be one or the other, i.e., more offensive or more defensive, is by no means directly related to the operations it is supporting. Depending on circumstances, radio warfare may tend to be 'offensive on the defense, and be predominantly defensive on the offense. Finally, it is true that radio warfare "in some situations will dictate the character of the operations of the armed forces" in war- fare at one level on another. But this applies to other forms of support operattons as well--for 'example, to intelligence and supply But from the fact that the results say, of intelligence may permit us to move over to the offensive from the defensive, or, on the contrary, make us take a defensive position, does it follow tImat intelligence has "a certain indepandence" and should be considered one of thr? kinds of military operations--in other-words, be placed on the aame level with the offensive and the defensive? Of course noto It is another matter that radio warfare represents a new phenomenon of very great importance which, in comparison with the time of its appear- ance in World War I; can now play a tremendous role, all the way up to the strategic level. If one side or the other should invent a means of ineucapablel absolute effect on all the radioelectronics of the enemy, this would amount to deciding the outcome of the war as a whole, a decision of a more or less offensive mature, but possibly, in some cir- cumstances, even more or less defensive. But, In the first place, such a thing is practically impossible, and in the second place, even in this hypothetical situation, everything remains as it is; radio warfare Is still radio warfare; offense and defense--still offense and defense. We have dwelt in such detail ox. radio warfare because the solution of the problem of nuclear attack is based on the same principles, despite the fact that radio warfare is' a support operation; and nuclear attack a foundation of military operations. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 52.5 PYRGHT APProvg.OF.91(Fte)e299PMe869AbR-RIPPgiqq.R5R9.9PPR9intid4ve" really be strategic? And is there a basis for (ilLsLill1d1s11ifle the nuclear attack as a certain speciad kind of operation, to be ranked along with offense and 'defense? "In whet does the concept of 'the offensive" consist?" asks Oen ZAV'YALOV (p 16), and he correctly answers: "In the launching of attacks with tin use of various kinds of weapons. Jai the early stages of the military arl,, these were the lance, the sword, thd spear, the bow and arrow theil the firearm of the foot soldier, artillery; tanks, planes, chemical weapons, and, finally, rocketE and nuclear weapons. The offensive necessarily presupposes active operations, movement forward toward the enemy, Vith the aim of attacking and defeating him. And when we speak here of moving forward, we have in mind not only ground troo,)s? hut also planes, ships, shells, rockets, etc." The author conreeGly concludes "The attack is 1 one-time act of striking (porazheniya) the enemy. It is intended to accomplish some pert'.cular mission, for the attainment of a particular goal, and may be launched by units of any size of all the branches of armed forces." Thus the attach is one of the basic elements of armed conflicn, with this element being very varied in scope. We may talk about fire strikes, or attacks on tactical operational, or, finally, strategic level, such as, for .example, the "ten decisive attacks" of the 1944 campaign on the Soviet-German front, One can also speak of psychological (morallnyye) attacks Finally, one may regard a war as a whole as a single tremendous political attack. To be sure, since the development of the firearm, we have often used the word "fire" instead of the word "attack" (as in the combination "fire and maneuver") but this substitution, for obvious reasons, is permissible only in such combina- tions. In all Other cases "attack" is used and accepted as the broader and more flexible concept. Thus a E.,gantic nuclear attack, planned for the beginning of a great war, is a strategic offensive act, regardless of whether it is "Initial", "preventive," or "retaliatory." In other words, we arrive at the Conclusion that the eencepts, "offense" and "defense", on the one hand, and "attack", on the other, are on different planes and must not be confused. Wow it is asked, can the concepts "offense" and "defense" be applied to the operation of all branches of the armed. forces? Opinions in the discussion of this question differ. Some think that it is possible to speak about these kinds of operations only with reference to ground troops, since only they move (on the "offensive") over certain. territory, or defend certain lines,. Others, on the other hand, deny the significance of such a division of operations even for ground troops. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 59 CPY VIAMtirciVIERVFOr Releasei2000/138/119): CIA4RDE85TOD878R9.000110911.-41rilriv.; that, in the first place, the telm "offehalve" is not applicable to RGHITeir operations; naval forces conduct neither. au on:ens:lye nor a defensive, but inflict attacks on the enemy; in the second place, "the nature of combat operations of the navy. remains the same 'both in a period of strategic defense and (taring a strategic offensive. For example, the navy may land amphibious landing forces or provide artillery support to the coastal flank of ground troops both in defensive and offensive operations." (Voyenanya Nysi' No (, lc 5, PP-34-35) The second statemerru is more leas true, but only for the simple, and already partly referred to, reason that the nature of operations on various levels by no means coincide one with another. For cecample, a strategic defense may be combined with an operational offensive; the latter may require somewhere a tactical defense; etc. A bullet, says Gen ZAV'YALOV, "is always on the offensive". But this statement is more or less true just because, after all, the offensive or defensive direction of the operations Of a higher echelon in most cases are reflected in one way or another in the nature of the operations of subordinate echelons. Thus, landing operations are more often required of a fleet in offensive operations of a front to which it is subordinate; on the other hands, the evacuation of troops from the shore, which occurs on the defense, will almost never occur on. the offensive. MAMAYEV's first statement is not true at all: because every operation of the navy and of each of its sub-units (like we will add, that of any other branch of service and its sub-units) always has been, is, and will be either Offensive or defensive in nature. Thus, escorting a convoy is for the fleet a defensive operation, but an anti-submarine ship, attacking in this operation a submarine which ? it has discovered, is carrying out a tactical offensive. The forces of a fleet, putting ashore operational tr tactical landing forces, is thereby operational or tactically attacking, but at the same time a ship, fighting back at enemy airplanes, is tactically on the defensive. On this question Capt 1st Bank N. support of his statements he refers to of Japan in 1941. But this reference; founded. V'YUNENKO supports MAYAYEV. In : the operations of the armed forces in our opinion, is not well- Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CI&RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 CPYRGH AjaprovId FE:6141:ter616 21detwo8/64(licibear4DP861;00075R0003op90011 -411c US .1: :tt Pearl harbor "was nothing else but an attack (War)", an VVUNENM writes, is true. But his statement that "in these operations ... there was nothing that, could be called on offensIve--neither seienre of any area against the resistance of the enemy, nor other marks of an offensive operation." (Voyennaya Nysl , No (, 1965, p 22) is, to say the least, accepting the des-Tred fact as the actual fact. In the Japanese general strae,le offensive in the Pacific in the first half year of the war, tile 1.11 t,he US 1:1(!c?1, at Pearl Harbor wee nothing other than a major offensive operation We Hill sum up our strtements. Rockets and nuclear weapons have completely changed the,:e of war, of an operation, or of a battle. But can we conclude from this that we must reject the concepts of "offensive" and "defensive"? Note that we are not rejecting the concepts of "tactics" and "operational art" because of the appearance of these new weapons And not just because armed conflict with such weapons will not exclude the operations of other branches of forces, for which these eoncpts will continue to keep their meaning, but also because the use of nuclear ? weapons will be subordinated to certain strategic, operational and tactical laws(zahonomernosti). Almost the same tbing could be said about the categories of "offensive" and "defensive". First, in many cases they will be manifested in, so to speak, "pure form." Second, the inevitable counter-action (vstrechnyy) nature of many of the operations still will not exclude the possible display in each of them of offensive initiative, placing the enemy in one way or another in a defensive position with all the ensuing, including political and psychological, consequences. And while the politically new social and economic structure always defends itself against the reactionary forces of an out-moded system wich seek to destroy it, it always has striven, is striving; and will. strive, as the experience of history shows, toward cffensive operations, directly in a malitary sense, i.e., strategic; operational and tactical. And this constitates one of the important guarante3s of its success.. Essentially, Mur Su V. SOKOLOVSYIY and Maj Gen M. ClIEREDNICIIMO do not dispute this; they believe that "rocket-nuclear and air-nuclear attacks on economic and political targets, nuclear installations, and armed forces of the agrossor are the mcst offensive kind of strategic operations of all the kinds that have ever been used in wars. It will have the decisive role in the defeat of the aggressor." (Voyennaya Mys11, No 6, 1265, p 29) Precisely "the most offensive kind," contrasted with the defensive-- quod ernt itomonstrachun Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090011-4 61 Approved For Release 2000108/09 : CIA-ROF85T00875R00030009.0011-4 kanaily, tile nature '0.1 both the olfensive and the d.efenpe 1)r.ul now greatly changed in most cases, but who would dispute that' ? However, that is another question to which, incidentally, a great many articles and studies have already been devoted. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-13IDP85T00875R000300090011-4 62 Approved ForRelialWRIMONOMAIRNIMUMOSCUOMMOWNAIRS CPYRGHT Book Review by Lt Col Ye. RYBKIN Thin collection of articles published by Voyenizdal in 1965 is made up of materials previously published in our military press on this subject. The articles examine the material-technological and social-political basis of the revolution in military affairs and the principal forms of their being influenced by scientific-technological progress. Much attention is paid to the use of new weapons and to a revision, in connection with this, of a num- ber of principles in the theory of military art; the content of Soviet mili- tary doctrine is set forth and its interconnection with military science is shown. In a number of. articles light is thrown on the tasks in training and educating troops in connection with the new stage in the development of the armed forces and special emphasis is given to the question of strengthening one-man authority and troop discipline. The goal of a selection of such articles is to delineate the character- istics of the revolution in military affairs, and to give a more or less general picture of it. It seems to us that the book must be evaluated from this point of view. it must be said that the articles are auecessfully cho- sen. At the same time it seems necessary to comment on the substance of cer- tain principles expressed by the authors. First of all there is the question concerning the essence and substance of the revolution in military affairs. The answer to this question is given in one degree or another in several articles. Thus, in our opinion it is most clearly formulated in the article by Col P. M. DEREVYANKO:I'Bv the modern revolution in military affairs is implied the entire sum of fundamental changes in the means of armed couibat, in the mothods of conducting combat operations, in the organization of troops, their education and training the sum total of changes which have been realized during the last 15 years in the most industrially and scientifically developed countries, and which are connected mainly with the creation of rocket-nuclear weapons." (p. 101). From this definition it follows that the revolution in military affairs took place not only in socialist but in capitalist countries, too. Unfortu- nately, this thesis has not been further developed "hut it would be highly interesting to show the common characteristics and the principal differences of such a revolution under the conditions of capitalism and of socialism.. The scientific-technical side of the revolution in military affairs is shown fully enough in the book. In this regard the most interesting articles are by Col Gen S. M. SHTEMENKO, Col Gen N. A. LOMOV and Col P. M. DEREVYANKO. It is no ..,td that uninterrupted and ever-accelerating progress in the field of natural and technical sciences promises further discoveries and makes possible the creation of fundamentally new weapons. (p. 95) Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85-10,1875R000300090011-4 Ar644t1 PiOiRe1iiad4?; 20004/CiftiaCUVRIVWSQ8781Ra0.03000909,1 lia4d.rient ed. that the era of the development of firearms ? in its 6.:46entia1. features, bad ended (p. 99). This .was in the last quarter of the 19th oentury. Actually the invention of automatic firearms weapOOS exended this era to some eat ents but nevertheless it is already a thing of the past. The development of weap- ons has found new paths. "It may be stated," it is further observed hat.,"t speaking in the words of Engels, a new era in the. development of weapone? based on the use of the atomic explosion:, ha a come" (p.99). 'ft eeem s to us that one ought; to continue this thought, the era ef development of roeket- nuclear weapons s in their essential featureas has already been delineated. TbAlr further development probably will not lead to anything basically new in that direction. However, the working out of methods s forms and means of combat la continuing on an ever-increasing scaler Neat IA turn is the search for a weapon that would be able to reliably and instanta:neously destroy rockets with nuclear charges in flight and to hurl. them back into cosmde space or neutralize the nuclear warheads of flying roekets (cef. po 75). Apparently, it is Seat this kind of research that cou:Id bring something fuadamentally new into the charaetel" of modern armed combat. Very interesting is the article "military Doctrine and Militar, Doctrine," We would like to turn the readers' attention to the thought *hat military science and military doctrine are developing perhaps in a parallel manner but not quite uniformly or similarly. Each one has a dialectie of develop- ment peculiar to it, as does every s Un eet, Mtlitary science is continually introducing changes in its views. Bbypeirer, military doctrine does not react to individual changes for some time but turns to them only when their (pan- titive assumulation is definitely felt and requires an aldrupt change in basic principles. At the same time military doctrine continues its development even up to the change in its fundamental principles. But, of course, the forms of its improvement must be different from the usual discussions on questions of military science, for doctrine, expressed particularly in such documents as regulations, bears the character of law. On its basis, direc- tives and orders from the leadership of the armed forces are composed and military development in a particular historical period takes place. Reviewing almost all the questions touched upon in the book we note that they concern only a rocket-nuclear world war. Eren the question *f the necessity for preserving and developing the old, "classical!' branches of the armed forces and types of troops and ordinary firearms is diaeussed only in the light of such a war. However., one must not forget about the "small wars," which the imperialists are continually waging. It is believed that theoretical thinking ought to take this situation into account and give more attention to the problems of conducting local wars. The leading role of the CPSU tn conducting the revolutionary transfor- mation in military affairs is noted in a number of articles (p. 9s 88-89, 104 and others). "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union," it says in the book, "has opportunely aimed. soviet science and technology at mastering the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RIM85T00875R000300090011-4 PYRGHT Appagn14-0SitTEratre. IMUU : CAA-KliFtS0 I UU25 tOKUUUJUUUUUU1 1-4 nucleus, has correctly evaluated perspectives in the development of rocket-nuclear weapons and their deciding role in the defense of the country, and has quickly organized their manufacture and introonation into the Armed Forces. The party mobilized our military cadres for Toaster- ing the corresponding means and methods of conducting combat operations and for educating and training personnel according to the conditions of modern war" (p. 104). The alathors of the articles in which this question is touched upon under- line that the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government have shown foresightedness and wisdom in their evaluation of the trend of develop- ment in military affairs, and have correctly determined the character of a poeoible war; and have done everything necessary to put the USSR Armed. Forces and the defense capability of the country on the level required today.. In the book the readers attention it turned. to the fact that now "as never before, the preAminary working out of all the basic questions of future combat operations, while still in peace-time, takes on the greatest significance" (p. 5). This thesis received Its proper development in the article by Col Gen M. Eli, KALASHNIKOV and Col S. K. IL'IN "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Training of Soviet Soldiers," where special attention is given to the conditions of personnel training. uTormerly, for the purpose of accomplishing victory in armed combat," write the authors, "It was possible to build up efforts for handling equipment and weapons and for training cadres and the entire personnel gradually; during the warn (p. 177). Now the situation is different. It presupposes transferring the center of gravity of all per Ci. training efforts to peacetime. This is undoubtedly related also to ideological training. "During peacetime the moral strength of the troops must be raised to unprecedented heights by the entire system of party-political work" (p. 177). With the beginning of rapidly developing military operations there will be little time for system- atic and thorough propaganda writ For this reason each soldier must be morally ready for battle at any moment. And; what is especially tmportant; he must fully understand the savage aspect of imperialism and know about its plans and activities; and about Its criminal antipopular crimes. The growth in the propertion of a country's military efforts in peace- time bears the. character of a specific law of nuclear war. The effect of this law-applies to all the branches in the military organization. It is a pity that certain elements of the' effect of this Taw have not been fully explained in this collectioa. in particular; on pages 46-47, where charac- teristics of economic; moral-political and military potentials are given, the specific character of their appearance in nuclear war; connected with the effect of the above-mentioned law., is not revealed. In the book much attention is given to problems of high combat readiness of the Armed F6rces for an immediate strike against an aggressor who has started a nuclear war. In a rituatian where the surprise factor and the Approved For Ralea?e 2000/08/09,: 91A-RDP85Tp)875R000300090011-4 PYRG ini.fk6ista% Nittb/069?pRbizigtiro-w5r66630603064481. ;t;ed In th antic:le by Army Gen A. A0 YE:PIM-M., troops must Matinually be in high battle readiness. "Not days andmerthay as in the past. but hours and min- Friutez.? or even seconds -- that is the period ef 'ff,;ime by whieh the degree of battle readiness of troops is measured. To be always on the alert is not easy, but it is extremely nece.ssary. And our soldiers undertstand this very well -- from the private up to a h:!gh military commander.(p. In this connection the book throws 11..Erliis on questions of the role of the individual in war and. the organization oT troop control. The question of sharply increasing the ind.ivid.ual responsibility of each soldier for the work ass*aed, to him Ls raise?n various aspects and In several articles. In an era of new weaponry the least lack of diec:F.pliee or disorganization of even one man can lead to fatal results for tens and hundreds of thousands of his comrades :in arms? No matter how complex and powerful equipment macy be, the fate of a 'battle and, a ei4ar is decided by "people who are masters of this equipment? strong in split and body., im- measurably dedicated to the ideas of communism; and ready for any conibat task, in spite of mortal. danger" (p. The revolution in military affairs corresponds to deep changes even in the development of our society, which is now rising to a qualitatively new stage in the building of communism. One o.0 the most important featnrea of these changes is the further widening of the front in the struggle for the utmost;, comprehensive development of the human personality. The party re- quires from us a more decisive struggle in order that not only "the masses" but each individual be in the center of our attention. The Soviet government is giving the individual more and more bleasings. The process of training, education and guidance of each indtvidual for the time 'being still lags be- hind the requirements set by the party and our entire society. So it is even in the army. "Not the masses, not the personnel as a whole? but the individual with his first name and surname," it says in, the book., "with all his attending merits and deficiencies, with the peculiarities in the con- stitution of his mind and his character -- that is the main thing in educa- tion, the deciding link in the chain of work for any eaucator, be he comman- der of a chast? or commander of a section., a party leacier or a Komsomol. activist" (p. 17). The requirements stress the urgent necessity for wide adoption in the army of specific social research that involves the study of general social, specific and concrete factors influencing the molding and education of an individual up to his entry into the army and while in the army. It is about time to create an institute or a scientific center -- laboratories for milltary-social research at least on public principles, on the basis of the existing academies, sehools:, staffs and political organs. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RE5685T00875R000300090011-4 CPYRGHT ? ? ApprovelliferaRafg 21939?M9-9dRAPIPP5ANNErgiggrli/' eotbat and One-Man authority" is very interesting. The dynamism keenness and fast-moving quality introduced into military operations on any scale by rocket-nuclear and any other type of the newest equipment immeauurably increases the re- sponsibility of a one-man commander and increases the difficulty cf the tasks entrusted to him. The author is right when he indicates the necessity of allowing a one-man commander more independence and, initiative and of im- planting in him a aense of daring responaibilitym and readiness to take p risk- In addition, one should net eampletely discard the opinion that in eertain spheres of military Command there should be instancea of joint forms of leadership" In realitym under. modern conditions the amount of time at the commander's disposal has been ahortened and the flow of infor- mation has grown. For this reason it becomes difficult for a one-man commander to show the necessary apeedm efficiencym initiative and daring without an all-around analysis of information" It turns out that the commander's dependence on the staff gecqp working on the eollection and analysis of essential date has grown. This reeults in, the necessity of deciding questions in seeruhing for new, more flexible forms for a com- mander's support by the staff group. Unfortunately, thers ere some unclear formulations in the book. For example, on page 49 there is some overlapping in the concepts of "types" (tipov),vTorms"(vidov) and "ca' res" kkategoriy) of wars" It is known that war may be considered as a twe-sided struggle and may be designated as follow: "War between a socialist and a eapitali6t government," "imperial- ist war on both sidea0" "civil war" and. so on. In this instance we are dealing with the concept of "type" of 'war, which reflects its social-politi- cal characteristics" War may also be evaluated as aetion of one of the warring sides. In that case we would have to use the term "form" of the war. This; according to the character of the struggle waged by one side, the following forms are distinguished; 'war In defense of the socialist . fatherland," "national liberation war," 'colonial war" and so on. The word "category" applied. to war defines the ware according to their scale, in which the social-political eontent should be apecifieally stipula- ted. Thus, a local war can have to moat varied charaeterm 'beeiag imperialis- tic only on one side (but on the other, of course, it is liberational!). The most varied governments, including sceallet governments (for example the Korean People's Democratic; Republic: 1950-1)53), can partietpate in a local war. It seems to us that in using the words "type's "form", and "category" applied to war it is essential to give more preelse definition, One can scarcely agree with the statement wLich ignores the political factor, 1. e.? that "the new means of armed combat define the decisive Ob- jectives of a war" (p. 80). The degree of decisiveness of Objectives in a p kivacnitikbiasliainftszatiAtcalRo MIT GOIMR012600 ONO (*Won ? 6 fity-OiRe(16Vtgrabh-idIDATOtki,IgittRYOM1/450bb01114trelopment of mIlita PA-i.ue" hat q s?ea n? g warring country has ever profited by a prolonged war" (p. 131) in alno incorrect. It all depend.? on the specific condition/3. K1YTUZ0V in 1812, for example, depended mainly on a prolonged war. On the whole, the publication of the collection of articles" Frobleni revolyinii v voyennom dele (Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs) is useful for the masa reader: it will help him to become acquainted with the easence of the revolution in military affairs and with the range of problems resulting from it. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-WP85T00875R000300090011-4